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Title: Does corruption discourage international trade?
Author(s): Jong, E. de ; Bogmans, C.W.J.
Publication year: 2011
Source: European Journal of Political Economy, vol. 27, iss. 2, (2011), pp. 385-398
Number of Pages: 14 p.
ISSN: 0176-2680
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2010.11.005
Publication type: Article / Letter to editor

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item : https://hdl.handle.net/2066/95216   https://hdl.handle.net/2066/95216

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Subject: Distributional Conflicts in a Globalizing World: Consequences for State-Market-Civil Society Arrangements
Organization: Internationale economie
Journal title:
European Journal of Political Economy
Volume: vol. 27
Issue: iss. 2
Page start: p. 385
Page end: p. 398
Abstract:
We use measures of trade-related corruption to investigate the effects of corruption on international trade and compare the results with those of corruption in general. We distinguish corruption in an exporting economy from that in an importing economy. Both distinctions appear to be important. Corruption in general hampers international trade, whereas bribe paying to customs enhances imports. This effect is most robust in importing countries with inefficient customs. High waiting times at the border significantly reduce international trade. The effects of unpredictability of corruption and policies are inconclusive.

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