
Fulltext:
95216.pdf
Embargo:
until further notice
Size:
203.6Kb
Format:
PDF
Description:
publisher's version
Source
European Journal of Political Economy, 27, 2, (2011), pp. 385-398ISSN
Publication type
Article / Letter to editor

Display more detailsDisplay less details
Organization
Internationale economie
Journal title
European Journal of Political Economy
Volume
vol. 27
Issue
iss. 2
Page start
p. 385
Page end
p. 398
Subject
Distributional Conflicts in a Globalizing World: Consequences for State-Market-Civil Society ArrangementsAbstract
We use measures of trade-related corruption to investigate the effects of corruption on international trade and compare the results with those of corruption in general. We distinguish corruption in an exporting economy from that in an importing economy. Both distinctions appear to be important. Corruption in general hampers international trade, whereas bribe paying to customs enhances imports. This effect is most robust in importing countries with inefficient customs. High waiting times at the border significantly reduce international trade. The effects of unpredictability of corruption and policies are inconclusive.
This item appears in the following Collection(s)
- Academic publications [204996]
- Electronic publications [103280]
- Nijmegen School of Management [12944]
Upload full text
Use your RU credentials (u/z-number and password) to log in with SURFconext to upload a file for processing by the repository team.