When experts and public officeholders break the rules
Publication year
2024Publisher
Oxford : Oxford University Press
ISBN
9780198896388
In
Flinders, M.; Dimova, G.; Hinterleitner, M. (ed.), The politics & governance of blame, pp. 379-398Related links
Publication type
Part of book or chapter of book
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Editor(s)
Flinders, M.
Dimova, G.
Hinterleitner, M.
Rhodes, R.A.W.
Weaver, R..K.
Organization
Bestuurskunde (leerstoel)
Languages used
English (eng)
Book title
Flinders, M.; Dimova, G.; Hinterleitner, M. (ed.), The politics & governance of blame
Page start
p. 379
Page end
p. 398
Subject
Institute for Management ResearchAbstract
During the outbreak of COVID-19, stringent measures were enforced to limit the spread of the virus. However, it was not only citizens who sometimes failed to abide by the rules; sometimes, experts and public office holders failed to either follow or enforce them which often resulted in a public outcry, ensuing blame games, and the occasional resignation. In this Chapter, we study four cases where experts and public office holders faced criticism and blame by failing to follow or enforce COVID-19 rules. The situational circumstances of these four cases (same crisis, similar type of COVID-19 rules that were not always well-received, with incidents happening during (the end of) the first wave), allows case comparison to a larger extent than is usually the case in blame game research. Comparing the cases reveals four factors that further help to explain how blame games evolve: type of function/position, arena accessibility, support, and administrative rules and regulations.
This item appears in the following Collection(s)
- Academic publications [243859]
- Nijmegen School of Management [18521]
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