The dynamics of alliances. A game theoretical approach
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S.l. : s.n.
Number of pages
X, 223 p.
RU Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen, 28 november 2007
Promotores : Godfroij, A.J.A., Deemen, A.M.A. van
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Strategie - t/m 2007
In this dissertation, Annelies de Ridder presents a game theoretical approach to strategic alliances. More specifically, the dynamics of and within alliances have been studied. To do so, four new models have been developed in the game theoretical tradition. Both coalition theory and strategic game theory have been used. Two main conclusions can be drawn. First, based on the models, several results can be presented. Model one defines conditions under which firms can reach stable (groups of) alliances; e.g. take preferences of all firms into account and agree on which combination of firms is best. Model two shows the importance of procedure in reaching an alliance agreement in multi-partner alliances. From model three, it can be concluded that pre-alliance interactions between alliance members can play a role in the behavior of partner during an alliance. Model four analyzes how dominance by one alliance member can distort the commitment-opportunism balance in an alliance. Second, since a game theoretical approach to alliances has been lacking in the literature so far, the other main results of this study is to illustrate that and how game theory can be used to explain alliance dynamics. On the one hand, it has been studied which parts and elements of alliance practice and alliance literature match with game theory. This defines in which cases we can use the theory. On the other hand, several incompatible elements between theory and field of application have been repaired.
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