Points of Reference: A new argument for the logical possibility of identity theory
Source
Romanian Journal of Analytic Philosophy, VI, 2, (2012), pp. 49-76ISSN
Publication type
Article / Letter to editor
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Organization
Werkplaats buitenpromovendi FFTR
Journal title
Romanian Journal of Analytic Philosophy
Volume
vol. VI
Issue
iss. 2
Languages used
English (eng)
Page start
p. 49
Page end
p. 76
Subject
Center for Cognition, Culture and Language (CCCL)Abstract
Abstract : In the 1950’s and 1960’s, Feigl, Place and smart offered an answer to the mind‐body problem called identity theory. according to identity theory, there are physical descriptions describing the same event as first‐person de‐ scriptions of experience. In this article, we address the criticism that mind‐body identity can be refuted on logical grounds, taken in the widest sense. kripke’s criticism to this effect, as developed in Naming and Necessity, will be our central concern. another notorious argument we will consider is Chalmers’s, as de‐ veloped in The Conscious Mind. the identity theorists originally held that iden‐ tity statements could be contingently true. kripke argues that all true identi‐ ty statements are true necessarily. if the mind‐body identity is contingent, as kripke thinks it must be, it cannot be true. unlike identity theorists, i accept that body‐mind identity must be necessary, but unlike kripke, i argue that it can be. Central to my refutation of kripke and Chalmers is a more elaborate ap‐ proach to thinking about reference.
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