Abstract
In recent Kantian discussions about suicide, it is not uncommon to find rela- tively ‘mild’ approaches towards suicide. Even though as a rule suicide is still impermissible, some argue that there may be circumstances that can make suicide morally permissible. If a person suffers such that she cannot be consi- dered to have a rational life any more, suicide is no longer immoral because the object of the moral duty is no longer present. In this paper, I investigate this argumentative strategy by exploring what it might mean to have a ‘ratio- nal life’. I argue that on a minimal conception, people who suffer unbearably still lead rational lives and suicide is thus not morally justified. On substantial conceptions, however, not only does having a rational life become a contin- gent affair, it also leads to a more liberal approach towards suicide than ‘mild Kantians’ may be prepared to accept.
