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      Expectations in the Ultimatum Game

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      Creators
      Vavra, P.
      Chang, L.J.
      Sanfey, A.G.
      Date of Archiving
      2018
      Archive
      Radboud Data Repository
      Data archive handle
      https://hdl.handle.net/11633/di.dccn.DSC_3014030.01_615
      Related publications
      Expectations in the Ultimatum Game: Distinct effects of mean and variance of expected offers  
      Publication type
      Dataset
      Access level
      Restricted access
      Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/2066/203794   https://hdl.handle.net/2066/203794
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      Organization
      PI Group Decision Neuroscience
      SW OZ BSI SCP
      Audience(s)
      Life sciences
      Languages used
      English
      Key words
      Ultimatum Game; expectations; social; fairness; decision making
      Abstract
      Being treated fairly by others is an important need in everyday life. Experimentally, fairness can be studied using the Ultimatum Game, where the decision to reject a low, but non-zero offer is seen as a way to punish the other player for an unacceptable offer. The canonical explanation of such behavior is inequity aversion: people prefer equal outcomes over personal gains. However, there is abundant evidence that people’s decision to reject a low offer can be changed by contextual factors and their emotional state, which cannot be explained by the inequity aversion model. Here, we expand a recent alternative explanation: rejections are driven by deviations from expectations: the larger the difference between the actual offer and the expected offer, the more likely one is to reject the offer. Specifically, we provided participants with explicit information on what kind of offers to expect using histograms depicting distribution of offers given in a previous experiment by the same proposers. Crucially, we showed four different distributions, manipulating both the mean and the variance of these expected sets of offers. We found that 50% of our participants clearly and systematically changed their behavior as a function of their expectations (11% followed the standard-economic model of pure self-interest and 39% where not distinguishable from the inequity-aversion model). Using a logistic mixed-model analysis, we found that the mean and variance differently affect the decision to reject an offer. Specifically, the mean expected offer affected the threshold of what offers are acceptable, while the expected variance of offers changed how strict participants were about this threshold. Together, these results suggest that social expectations have a more complex nature as current theories propose.
      This item appears in the following Collection(s)
      • Datasets [1282]
      • Donders Centre for Cognitive Neuroimaging [3439]
      • Faculty of Social Sciences [27382]
       
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