Dankbaar. Denken over danken na de dood van God.

Abstract

The question of my book can be introduced by quoting some examples of the way it presents itself in everyday situations: we sometimes feel grateful without knowing whom we could be grateful to. In such situations in which we cannot thank someone for what (s)he gave us, this feeling of gratefulness makes us (or at least those who can’t or don’t want to address this feeling to a God) feel embarrassed: we feel a gratefulness which we cannot assent to; we relativize a feeling that nevertheless imposes itself upon us. I want to suggest a diagnosis for that embarrassment (2), find out what concept of gratefulness has contributed to it (3), and ask the question whether we can think of gratefulness in a way that allows us to feel grateful in such cases as indicated, even after what Nietzsche called ‘the death of God’ (3-6).

For a diagnosis of the problem I rely on what Nietzsche writes on the history (and the future) of nihilism. The God that died is the one who is so strongly interwoven with all domains of our culture and our way of thinking, and doing that his death will torn us apart between the ideas and the ideals without which we cannot live anymore, and the criticism of these very same ideals to which our truthfulness compels us. The embarrassment I pointed at in the first section could very well be one appearance of this ‘nihilistic condition’, which Nietzsche calls our ‘terrifying Either/Or’ (GS 346).

An overview of the history of philosophical thinking about gratitude from Aristotle to Nietzsche may show how gratitude came to be conceived of as a special form of reciprocity that recompenses for a gift received.

Our feelings and experiences (e.g. our feeling of gratefulness) are codetermined by the way we conceptualize them. It is the task of philosophy to ‘save the phenomena’, which implies breaking through prevalent interpretations and conceptualizations. In a second itinerary through the history of philosophical thinking about gratitude, we may discover thus far undisclosed and unsuspected possibilities for an alternative conceptualization of gratitude.

Some results of this second itinerary can be summarized by referring to the iconography of the three Graces. There being three (and not just two) graces reminds us of the importance of ‘receiving’ as the condition of possibility for both ‘giving’ and ‘thanking’. The unity and the movement of the three graces (their round dance) suggest that the different roles are not separated or distributed in a fixed way. Gratefulness is the expression of being part of a community and a tradition. The ‘identity’ of the three ladies (Aglaia, Euphrosyne and Thalia) suggests the concurrence of giving, receiving and thanking.

By conclusion I indicate how this conception of gratefulness could be interpreted as an Aristotelian virtue (the best realization of our capacity to receive, a mean between an attitude of appropriation and one of neglect) and I refer once again to Nietzsche who does also make a distinction between two concepts of gratitude, one being a kind of revenge, the other being a creative affirmation of reality as it is. Nothing prevents the religious believer to address this alternative gratitude to God, but it will be a God who does not compel one to be grateful, but who can be discovered by gratitude.