Gender Beliefs and Cooperation in a Public Goods Game
Number of pages
SourceEconomics Bulletin, 35, 2, (2015), pp. A117-1153
Article / Letter to editor
Display more detailsDisplay less details
Economische theorie en economisch beleid
SubjectGender and Power in Politics and Management
This paper identifies gender beliefs in a public goods game and studies their impact on cooperation. On average, the beliefs of men, but not those of women, depend significantly on the group gender composition, with men expecting groups to be more cooperative when more females are present in the group. Gender beliefs of women are not absent, however, but show more variance than those of men. The contributions to the public good are driven by gender beliefs, and after controlling for them, contributions do not depend on the gender group composition directly.
This item appears in the following Collection(s)
- Academic publications 
- Electronic publications 
- Nijmegen School of Management 
- Open Access publications 
Upload full text
Use your RU credentials (u/z-number and password) to log in with SURFconext to upload a file for processing by the repository team.