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Title: Behavioral spillovers from freeriding in multilevel interactions
Author(s): Thommes, K. ; Vyrastekova, J. ; Akkerman, A.
Publication year: 2015
Source: Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, vol. 56, (2015), pp. 78-87
Number of Pages: 10 p.
ISSN: 2214-8043
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2015.03.006
Publication type: Article / Letter to editor

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item : https://hdl.handle.net/2066/141017   https://hdl.handle.net/2066/141017

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Subject: Integrated Decision Making (ID)
Organization: Politicologie
Economische theorie en economisch beleid
Journal title:
Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
Volume: vol. 56
Page start: p. 78
Page end: p. 87
Abstract:
We study multilevel interactions using experimental methods. Does the efficiency of a production team suffer from the freeriding behavior of some team members at the firm level? Can we identify behavioral spillovers affecting teams? We isolate common tasks that teams must complete – coordination and cooperation – and model each of them using a simple experimental game that is designed to avoid identification problems. By observing a team's efficiency before and after the firm-level event, we identify the behavioral spillovers of freeriding to team-level cooperation and coordination. We demonstrate that team composition with respect to freeriding behavior of individual members during the firm-level conflict conditions behavioral spillovers. In particular, the efficiency of heterogeneous teams decreases after a firm-level conflict, whereas homogeneous teams can improve their performance.
Languages used: English (eng)

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