Fulltext present in this item

Thumbnail
Fulltext: 113000.pdf
Format: PDF
Description: publisher's version
Title: Shaping beliefs in experimental markets for expert services: Guilt aversion and the impact of promises and money-burning options
Author(s): Beck, A.; Kerschbamer, R.; Qiu, J. ; Sutter, M.
Publication year: 2013
Source: Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 81, (2013), pp. 145-164
Number of Pages: 20 p.
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.05.002
Publication type: Article / Letter to editor

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item : https://hdl.handle.net/2066/113000   https://hdl.handle.net/2066/113000

Display more details
Subject: Distributional Conflicts in a Globalizing World: Consequences for State-Market-Civil Society Arrangements
Organization: Financiële economie en ondernemingsfinanciering
Journal title:
Games and Economic Behavior
Volume: vol. 81
Page start: p. 145
Page end: p. 164
Abstract:
In a credence goods game with an expert and a consumer, we study experimentally the impact of two devices that are predicted to induce consumer-friendly behavior if the expert has a propensity to feel guilty when he believes that he violates the consumer's payoff expectations: (i) an opportunity for the expert to make a non-binding promise; and (ii) an opportunity for the consumer to burn money. In belief-based guilt aversion theory the first opportunity shapes an expert's behavior if an appropriate promise is made and if it is expected to be believed by the consumer; by contrast, the second opportunity might change behavior even though this option is never used along the predicted path. Experimental results confirm the behavioral relevance of (i) but fail to confirm (ii).
Languages used: English (eng)

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Browse

Statistics