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The European Universities, Citizenship and Its Limits: what won’t solve the problems of our time

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ABSTRACT This article attempts to weave together in an original manner a number of themes regarding citizenship and higher education in Europe. Thus, the authors look critically at the notion of citizenship itself; its role in Aristotle and in Hegel’s state-versus-civil-society contrast; its relation to the world of work or labour; its connection with the concept of Bildung (‘general edification’); the originally divergent strands of the twentieth-century American assault on Bildung in higher education, an assault now extended to Europe, especially in European Union policy and (in a more complex and contradictory manner) in the Bologna process; the marketized university as a psychotic organization; and – a twist in the story – the reaction to some of these developments in the ideology of citizenism, which the authors problematize.

Introduction

In this article, we address some issues concerning citizenship and higher education, and their relation to the domain of work in the framework of Europe and, specifically, of the European Union, of the latter’s recent policies and of the so-called Bologna process. The order of the topics addressed is: the notion of citizenship itself, from Aristotle through Hegel to the present day; European citizenship and the European Union (EU), the latter understood as a kind of Hegelian ‘civil society’; Hegel, the Master–Slave dialectic and the citizen as ‘worker’, i.e. not merely as active, but as productively active; the citizen as a product of Bildung, especially in the writings of the Hegelian, Alexandre Kojève; Bildung under assault as a dominant policy approach to higher education and the universities; the origins of that assault in American thinking and policy, from the early twentieth century onwards (from Thorstein Veblen to our own time); the ‘Economic Theory of the University’ as one example of the spread of the ‘Economic Theory of Everything’; the borrowing by Europe of the American conception of the university as a marketized institution, both by the EU and in the non-EU and rather more complex Bologna process; the marketized university as a ‘psychotic organization’, with appropriate effects on its members; some consequences of developments in European higher education for the topic of European citizenship; and, finally, (returning critically to the Hegelian starting point) the critique of citizenism as a compensatory ideology in a world in which no institution, including the university, seems able to escape from the clutches of capitalism: the ‘there is no alternative’ dogma. Our circle thus runs from citizenship to citizenism.

Whereas education and citizenship have for a long time been intimately linked in philosophical and educational thinking – from Aristotle onwards, through to Rousseau, to John Dewey and later – this task seems much more problematic in the conditions of the one-
dimensional capitalism of the post-1989 period, in which, it seems, all values are reduced to a single quantitative denominator, measured directly or indirectly in terms of anticipated and realized profit – a world of consumers, stakeholders and ‘good governance’, of politics treated on the lines of business management. It would be easy in this connection to quote, for example, the Schmittian critique of such liberal anti-politics (Schmitt, 1996), and we shall refer to this critique below. But let us for the moment cite a quite different source: in fact, an eminent British Liberal politician, Lord Ashdown. For so patent is the crisis of citizenship in our time that even an Establishment figure like Ashdown remarks: ‘We are in a serious crisis of governance. This is the end of the politics of belief, being replaced by managerialism’ (Gerard, 2009).

Our aim is to focus on some possibly unsuspected links between the above-mentioned notions and themes as well as to draw the reader’s attention to lesser-known but important work done on certain of the various sub-themes. For the latter reason we quote, sometimes at length, from the authors of such work. We do not necessarily subscribe to every line of their argument or conclusions, but aim with their help to cut through the undergrowth of detail – there are already immense quantities of academic texts on many of the matters raised here – in order to draw new lines of conceptual connection. Our further goal is thus to contribute, together with the other articles in this number, to stimulating the research agenda on citizenship and higher education.

The Concept of Citizenship

The notion of citizenship is, of course, an old one. The term itself has Latin roots; but a Greek version – politeia, the citizen being a polites – already existed. Aristotle, for example, wrote in his Politics (1972, 1275a) that ‘a citizen pure and simple is defined by nothing else so much as by the right to participate in judicial functions and in office’ (see also Collins, 2006). What is relevant for our purposes is that, for Aristotle, the citizen is thus engaged in political debate and decision making, and to that extent or in that function not engaged in productive labour, either on his own behalf or as a wage labourer – or (‘naturally’, we might say) as a slave.

It is for just this reason – namely because of the specifically moral character of citizen virtue – that the domain and function of citizenship must be carefully differentiated from the domain and function of labour. Ralph Harrington (2005) notes that, as in Aristotle’s politics generally, the essence of citizenship lies in active participation. In this connection, he adds, the citizen must have the leisure to devote himself to the educative or cultural pursuits which aid his understanding of virtue. Thus, Aristotle (1972, VII, 1329a) argues that ‘the citizens must not live in mechanical or commercial life. Such a life is not noble, and it militates against virtue’. In brief, the citizen is (necessarily) a free man; whereas the ‘mechanic or businessman’ is (necessarily) not. So not only is citizenship always an active virtue (a point discussed by Gert Biesta in his contribution to this number), but it is a domain clearly discriminated from that of ‘mechanical or commercial life’: the capacity for its proper exercise is even considered incompatible with a life dominated by such activities.

Hegel, in his Philosophy of History, posthumously published in 1837, notes:

The consciousness of Freedom first arose among the Greeks, and therefore they were free; but they, and the Romans likewise, knew only that some are free – not man as such. Even Plato and Aristotle did not know this. The Greeks, therefore, had slaves; and their whole life and the maintenance of their splendid liberty, was implicated with the institution of slavery. (Hegel, 2004, p. 18)

Hegel adds that a state is well constituted and internally powerful when the private interest of its citizens is at one with the common interest of the state; that is to say, when each finds its gratification and realization in the other. But this relation of being ‘at one’ is not a relation of identity between the private and common interest: on the contrary, conceptually these two spheres are carefully distinguished.

The basis for the distinction is to be found in Hegel’s division, drawn in his Philosophy of Right of 1821, between civil society and the state. Citizenship, in the modern Hegelian sense, requires the emergence of the modern state and therefore of a conscious idea of that state, which is an artefact with a long prehistory. In his Philosophy of Right (Hegel, 1952), the structure of Hegel’s argument is roughly the following: civil society is a system of needs (each of us needs food, clothing, a roof over
our head, and so on), together with those productive organizations – businesses – capable of providing these goods. Since such a developed commercial system would be impossible without 'law and order' – for otherwise, the goods that a business supplies might never be paid for or even arrive at their destination – civil society also includes a corresponding justice system and a police force for its imposition, as well as the necessary physical and technical infrastructure. Note, therefore, that for Hegel, this work of the judiciary, police, and so on belongs to civil society and not to the state.

In itself – that is to say, in isolation from the state – civil society would, however, be a 'soulless community': an aggregate of atomic individuals, related to one another as no more than abstract, juridically defined persons. Every 'substantial link' – every true ethical link – between these individuals would be missing. This, let us note in anticipation of what comes later in the article, is more or less the view defended by the more consequent neo-liberals of our own time (as if it were a clever and novel idea), a particularly revealing and indeed crude example being offered by the Nobel Prize-winning economist James Buchanan, who holds that civil society, together with its, in his view, entirely egoistic actors, is all there is.[1] Outside of it there is, or ought to be, no separate 'state', except as a technical apparatus of coordination. This is the very opposite of Hegel's view. Hegel argues, on the contrary, that every substantial – moral, therefore essentially human – link between human beings (compare Hegel on Aristotle) lies in national ethical life (in Sittlichkeit); that is, not in personal morality (Moralität), but in the ethical structures transmitted and reproduced by the institution of the state, in its 'proper' form (see below).

Hegel has his philosophical grounds for this claim: for instance, that it is the state which unites Universal and Particular – and thus becomes the nation. For the state must be more than mere (formal) universality; it must rest on specific national customs (national Sitten); only in this way does it come to possess individuality, without which any concrete, historically determinate linking of Universal and Particular would be absent. The state, he adds, to make matters even clearer (our present-day jurists might profitably read him again on this point), is the sphere not of private but of public law. There is no such thing as Great Britain Limited or Nederland BV (besloten vennootschap or 'limited company'). These are metaphysically and politically perverse conceptions of the state. Finally, Hegel distinguishes between the 'strictly political state' and the 'state proper'. The strictly political state is legislature, the executive and the Crown; the state proper also and concretely comprises the (subjective) political sentiments of its subjects. These latter he calls expressions of 'everyday patriotism', a revealing expression.

The European Union as a Management System for Civil Society

We have introduced Hegel here for the following reason: that there is a good Hegelian case to be made for the argument that the European Union, as it has now taken form after a half century of complex and even contradictory development, is not competent to engender any kind of true citizenship. To begin with, Hegel insists that the state cannot be a contractually based institution. 'It is ... far from the truth', he notes, 'to ground the nature of the State on the contractual relation'. Indeed, 'the intrusion of this contractual relation ... into the relation between the individual and the State has been productive of the greatest confusion in both constitutional law and public life' (Hegel, 1952, Part I, ii, para. 75). That is to say, the greatest mistake one could make would be to regard political authority as just a conventionally based management system for civil society, based on contractual agreements between its individual (and in this function self-seeking) members, or between similarly self-seeking governments.

In this regard, we may cite a piece by the French political scientist Gérard Duprat (1991), in which he argues that, from a Hegelian point of view, the European Community is not a state-like construction, even if it plays, in part, a government role. Its 'powers' ought not even, Duprat suggests, to be called 'political'. It functions for the most part outside of any system of representation – and to that extent, its so-called 'democratic deficit' is not a fault but lies in the logic of its principles of operation. It was never intended to reproduce or replace the parliamentary-democratic nation state, even if it sometimes for its own purposes mimics the latter on certain points, for example, in its administrative terminology (like calling the European Parliament a 'parliament', as if this latter somehow represented the sovereignty of an in reality non-existent
people). It does, however, provide a system of justice and it polices that system; it is oriented to the satisfaction of needs. In short, it is a civil society, in Hegel’s sense. More accurately, it is a ‘management system for civil society’ (Lock, 2003, p. 10).

The EU, in fact, lacks the essential properties of a state ‘proper’; and to the extent that it might attempt to transform itself into such a state or ‘superstate’, it would in so doing precisely destroy those properties, to the extent that they have been maintained at the level of the various nation states of Europe. In so doing, it would also, on this view, destroy citizenship: that which now goes under the name of ‘European citizenship’, being, again on this account, no citizenship of any such ‘proper’ kind.

Ètienne Balibar (2006) speaks about the meaning of the name ‘Europe’ and of that of the category of ‘citizenship’ – and, therefore, already, about the paradox of a citizenship ‘without citizens – or conversely: citizens without citizenship’, as he puts it. He recalls

that in different European languages, sometimes within the ‘same’ language as it is used by different groups or within different boundaries, the words citizen and citizenship do not have the same range or hierarchy of meanings. I am considering here the various derivatives and accepted equivalents of the Latin word *civis*, which our political tradition took as a translation of the Greek *polites*. Since the generalization of the national form of the State, a basic equivalence has been established between the idea of nationality, or belonging to a nation, and citizenship, or enjoying the rights and performing the obligations of a citizen, participating in a polity. This is supposed to encapsulate the realization of democratic sovereignty, at least ideally. (Balibar, 2006)

That is how it comes about, he suggests, that we have citizens without citizenship and, at the same time, citizenship without citizens. He adds:

And here I am thinking of the fact that, since the Maastricht Treaty, the EU has legally created a notion of citizenship that encapsulates the various national citizenships, where ‘citizenship’ refers to a common membership, the belonging to the same supranational ensemble. A new ‘European passport’ has been created, which the Draft Constitution wanted to associate with forms of solidarity or mutual protection when abroad. But the corresponding citizens do not exist in the strong institutional sense ... The Eurocitizens never meet as such, they never discuss, not even indirectly though their political parties or ‘organic intellectuals’. Nor is it possible to claim rights as an individual in Europe, as it is in the USA. This has especially tragic consequences in the case of migrants and alien residents in Europe who remain second-class citizens (i.e. no citizens at all), subjected to the arbitrary decisions of national governments. Eurocitizenship without Eurocitizens, then.

Clearly [the two above-mentioned defects regarding citizens and citizenship] do not compensate each other; they are but two sides of the same medal. You will say: of course, this comes from the fact that the EU is not a State; and nobody wants it to become a State, because Europe is not a ‘nation’. It is not even a Federation. (Balibar, 2006)

Earlier, Balibar also linked the two themes touched on above, but they are treated by him in a very different manner from Aristotle. In his *We, the People of Europe?* (Balibar, 2004), he proposes that the idea and institution of European citizenship be defined in a new manner: he constructs a new concept of citizenship, that is, transnational citizenship. Balibar characterizes it as citizenship of residency, which includes everyone who actually lives in a given territory, i.e. all residents in Europe, rather than the ‘nationals’ belonging to some land that is a member state of the EU. He takes the citizenry to be a *demos* or constituent political power rather than an *ethnos* or communal identity. A European citizen, in short, is someone who works in Europe (or is the family of such a person, and includes the unemployed, etc.). Biesta (2009, p. 154) interestingly notes that ‘the idea of European citizenship ... first of all emerged in the context of the question of free movement of economically active persons’. Balibar’s proposal is to extend such a status beyond the existing ‘European citizens’, thus including non-EU immigrants, who nowadays make up a large part of the productive labour force.

The sense of the gap between the very different cases which we have selected, namely Aristotle and Balibar, with a reference to Hegel, may be further illuminated by a glance at Alexandre Kojève’s (1980) commentary on Hegel. Thus, as Patrick Riley (1981, pp. 7-8) points out, in Hegel’s story, the Slave’s ‘overcoming’ of his fear of the Master and of death, his final
transcendence of slavery itself, ‘is not historically complete until men choose their own work and become citizens of a “universal and homogeneous” Hegelian state’. So history ‘is, inter alia, a history of “slave ideologies” by which Slaves conceal their slavery from themselves’. But the transformation of the Slave, the surmounting of his terror, is ‘long and dolorous’. At first, Kojève (reading Hegel) asserts, as Riley also notes, the Slave ‘raises himself’ through his work to the ‘abstract idea’ of liberty – an abstract idea which he, however, cannot ‘realize’ because ‘he does not yet dare to act in view of this realization, that is, to struggle against the Master and risk his life in a struggle for liberty’. Before ‘realizing’ his liberty, the Slave ‘imagines a series of ideologies, by which he seeks to justify himself, to justify his servitude, to reconcile the ideal of liberty with the fact of slavery’.

Two points in particular should be borne in mind here. First, that citizenship is here linked to work: it is the Slaves, the class of labourers, who finally become the citizens of the Hegelian state – and not the Masters, who reveal themselves as no more than a parasitic class. Second, however, it is not all or any kind of work that fits a man or woman for citizenship: it is work ‘which men choose’, not, therefore, work performed as Slaves of a Master, but the work of an emancipated class – as Kojève sees it, of the emancipated proletariat, which up to the moment of its emancipation is the Slave class of modernity.

Citizenship, in its truest sense (if one is a Hegelian, in a fully developed historical sense) is, therefore, only possible after the ‘suppression’ of the opposition between Master and Slave (Kojève, 1980, p. 43). Kojève argues:

The complete, absolutely free man will be the Slave who has ‘overcome’ his slavery. If idle Mastery is an impasse, laborious Slavery, in contrast, is the source of all human, social, historical progress. History is the history of the working Slave. (Kojève, 1980, p. 20)

So, in the raw, natural, given world, the Slave is the slave of the Master. In the technical world transformed by his work, he rules – or, at least, will one day rule – as absolute Master. And this Mastery that arises from work will be an entirely different thing from the ‘immediate’ mastery of the Master. The future and History hence belong not to the warlike Master but to the working Slave. (Kojève, 1980, p. 20, quoted in Riley, 1981, p. 9)

The working Slave is the future citizen because he or she has, as Kojève puts it, suppressed Mastery, by suppressing the class of Masters.

So far, we have outlined a number of lines of philosophical thought. We now proceed to the realm of application – which is, of course, always less clear-cut, ‘dirtier’ and more difficult to follow in its essential logic than are the arguments of abstract thought. Nevertheless, it seems to us that some references to present-day events may help illustrate the relevance of our provisional philosophical hypotheses. If we want to know more about citizenship and its possible futures, we must, if we follow the line of argument sketched out above, look first at the question of work or labour. Indeed, the same is true when we come to consider, later in this article, the relation between citizenship, work and education: for work, according to Kojève, again reading Hegel, is Bildung or education ‘in a double sense of the word: on the one hand it forms and transforms the world, humanizes it, by making it more adapted to man; on the other hand, it transforms, forms, educates man, humanizes him’.

(Kojève, 1980, p. 23, quoted in Riley, 1981, p. 9)

This is a significant insight.

**The American Historical Background**

Let us already link these themes, beginning with a short survey of recent treatments of the question of the relation between work and education, especially higher education and the universities. The story begins, it is important to note, not in Europe but in America. In the following paragraphs we aim to track the (sometimes confusing) emergence in the United States of a number of key concepts which were later integrated into European, including EU, thinking about the context and role of higher education and of scientific research.
A classic analysis of the American research university in the 1960s, set out in the book by the sociologists Talcott Parsons & Gerald Platt (1973), *The American University* – the theoretical apparatus being due to Parsons – is in part something of a celebration, in many ways a justified celebration, of the American university at its best, at a time when it already had a major world impact not only in terms of the production of excellent students, but also of high-quality researchers. Yet it is a book that portrayed a good deal of the reality which more recent advocates of the ‘research university’ in Europe sweep under the rug, or at least do not care to dwell upon. Whatever our misgivings about the theoretical framework deployed – which is today regarded as outmoded (though not superseded as a general orientation) – the general thrust of the argument was by no means controversial at the time, and has been signally influential.

More accessible and more widely consequential, though not embedded in a systematic analysis of the American university, and with a more skeletal theoretical apparatus, was the promotion by another Harvard sociologist, Daniel Bell (1973), of the concept of the *post-industrial society*, in his particular version called the *knowledge economy* – a state of affairs in which the university, understood as a site of production of basic *theoretical* knowledge vital to the progress of high technology, as well as of applied knowledge and technologies, comes to occupy an unprecedentedly central place as a key institution of economy, defence, culture and society in the West. This vision was supported by the independent contemporary development of a number of associated concepts, such as the works published in the 1960s on the ‘knowledge industry’ (by the economist Fritz Machlup) and on the ‘knowledgeable society’ (by the sociologist Robert Lane), or on the ‘information economy’ (by the cyberscientist M. Porat) in the 1970s, this last reflecting the rise, spread, acceleration and interlinking (or cyberlinking) via digital interfaces of the new technologies of information, computation, communication, control and automation.

All this has led to the spread of, or rather the saturation of the social world with ever more numerous (even superabundant), versatile, powerful, ever faster (on nanoscales and beyond), ever more interconnected, intertranslatable and ‘intelligent’ machines, networks and systems, spanning the globe – with microchips embedded in all new artefacts, large and small, industrial or domestic (microchips with everything), so that ‘unintelligent’ tools or machines will become increasingly an endangered species; as well as in natural, organic beings (genes, organs, brains, organisms, even their implantation under the skin of human beings), all according to the imperative of universal cyborgification.

Such machines permeate knowledge work and the mode of scientific and technological knowledge production itself (and the emergence of the ‘robot scientist’, as baptized recently by the octet of non-robotic scientists who designed the first effective members of this new taxon, as reported in *Nature* [‘Don’t Fear the Robot Scientist’, 2004]), as well as the ever more knowledge-dependent, knowledge-intensive, technology-intensive advance (the three are largely co-implicated in contemporary terms, and increasingly mediated and permeated by information technology) in every field of production, transport, communications, media, weapons systems, ‘intelligence’, security, biomedicine, commerce, finance, the professions, etc. This material advance is often charmingly characterized as ‘dematerialization’, or as a move towards a ‘light’, or even ‘weightless’ as well as ‘frictionless economy’: positive feedback loops unlimited. It should be added – a point which is sometimes overlooked – that Bell (1973) confidently envisaged, indeed took for granted, an enduring and considerable role for an enlightened state (a benign, social-reforming state) in the promotion of the knowledge university, not only the knowledge economy but a more equitable society, far beyond what the marketeers would countenance today: in regard to this area, his vision appears wholly at variance with the current state-promoted market redesign of universities and the overall ideology informing it. A citizen university, we might almost say, as against the entrepreneurial university. In other words, the conceptual configuration is different from what we are familiar with today in Europe.

These two works, to be sure, were written at a time of an unprecedented economic bonanza, an epoch which is still being called a golden age for the universities – and, of course, above all for the research universities as well as for scientific research in general, the fostering of the latter being due above all to federal government largesse, in what we can now see as the *epoch of the governmentalization* (though especially ‘federalization’) of science funding, which lasted from the 1940s roughly until the 1980s, and saw the surge of ‘Big Science’. This term was popularized, though not invented, by the first great scientometrician in the early 1960s; the invention is credited,
unsurprisingly perhaps, to a nuclear physicist, and its diffusion to another (Derek J. de Solla Price, E.O. Lawrence and Alvin Weinberg respectively).

The 1980s can be seen as a turning point in this process, inaugurating what may be called a new epoch, the epoch of marketization of the sciences and especially of the universities, and the increasing privatization of academic research and scientific research (a decade before the end of the cold war, and in the United States partly through a link to the Star Wars venture, it should be remembered). However – and this is a critical point – substantial federal funding for scientific research has been maintained in America, if on a much reduced scale, especially in the area of health or health-related sciences, as well as, of course, in fields of perceived military relevance or national security. And a great deal of private research and development, not least in the pharmaceutical field, is in effect parasitic on public science, and does not nearly match the public-funded effort in financial terms or in the importance and scale of innovation. In addition to the turn in general orientation regarding the funding of science, an important measure in bringing the marketization of science into full effect was the Bayh–Dole Act, enacted in 1980, which afforded key incentives to the marketization of academic research and more generally of the universities, coinciding as it did with the surge in molecular genetic research, with its ambitious pharmaceutical, therapeutic and generally biomedical promises. This Act gave universities intellectual property rights in their inventions, so that they could begin to operate on a semi-business basis.

What we see here is the gradual emergence of a number of concepts which would later be exploited – yet essentially modified – by educational policy makers in the United States and in Europe. But let us take a brief step back. For a study of such fairly recent developments should be complemented by the reading of a work first published long ago, in 1918: Thorstein Veblen’s The Higher Learning in America: a memorandum on the conduct of universities by business men, a book which might well have been regarded until recently as a dated, eminently forgettable tract for the times, or rather, against the times (President Coolidge’s notorious utterance, ‘America’s business is business’, came a few years later), much as the 1923 novel by the radical activist Upton Sinclair, The Goosestep, which in a manner fictionalized Veblen’s vision, attacking the control of universities by ‘captains of industry’ (or of finance) via the boards of trustees – though both reserved special venom for the megalomaniac university presidents of the time. Sinclair attacked the universities as having knuckled under to the rule of the plutocracy, transforming these institutions from instruments of the public weal into instruments of capitalist interests. We might almost say that there is nothing new about the criticisms today directed by academics against their extra-academic masters; or rather, these criticisms were anticipated, if in a rather different context, nearly a century ago.

In any case, all this was before the great surge of American universities after the Second World War, boosted by factors such as the historic G.I Bill, and later the ‘Sputnik effect’, which triggered the National Defense Education Act of 1950, and was further enhanced by the example of California’s Master Plan for Higher Education, issued in 1960. This led to unprecedented increases in student numbers, prestige, real achievement and worldwide influence – unprecedented in America, but the same phenomenon was seen in the rest of the (Western) world.

Perhaps we may consider the current expansion-cum-marketization of Western universities as marking another historic wave, converging towards a similar threshold in participation rates in higher education of about 40-50% of the relevant age cohorts. Britain now appears as probably the world’s leading marketizer of universities – that is to say, the most successful mass peddler of academic wares, next to the United States, and certainly leading in Europe. However, it should be noted that other European countries have started moving in the same direction; and one can hear the marketizing, managerializing, business drums, loud and clear, day in and day out, almost everywhere in and around universities in every European country, from academics as well as ministers, often with what appears to be the zeal and lamentable one-sidedness of recent converts and the tunnel vision of fanatics. A third wave of massification of higher education (or post-secondary education) and a new threshold of market intensification and technological concentration of academic endeavour will occur if for-profit e-universities (or ‘digital diploma mills’) take off and enlist the many millions to be targeted in a new academic Gold Rush: a frontier, and maybe the Final Frontier, of Darwinian academic capitalism.

Some advocates of the proposed reforms in university financing, which are now being energetically promoted in Europe, have been perfectly candid about the underlying drive: the
universities, they say, are the last great ‘nationalized industry’ in Europe (everything these days is an ‘industry’) still to be ‘tackled’, by which is presumably meant privatized or something similar (that is, steered into state-defined marketization, ‘forced to be free’), even if it is not (yet) intended that universities should be put up for auction like the railways (see Hutchins, 1968, ch. 8)

‘Entrepreneur’ has indeed become, in the last decade or two, perhaps the supreme honorific term of the age, and all too widely applied as a ‘hurrah word’, not only in general parlance, but even within social science discourse. Schumpeter’s (1912) famous eulogy of the entrepreneur was partly inspired by a Carlyle-type vision of ‘heroes’ as shapers of history, and something of this Carlyle-type heroization persists in current-day valuations, though the ‘heroes of consumption’ (commercial music ‘stars’, the opulent range of entertainers of all kinds, celebrities, those famous for being famous) also enjoy high status and wealth, and indeed may also be regarded as entrepreneurs of their own kind. Leo Lowenthal’s well-known succession model of cultural change, involving a major shift from the predominance of ‘heroes of production’ to the predominance of ‘heroes of consumption’, has thus been partially invalidated by the recent course of social transformation (see, for example, Lowenthal, 1944). To be sure, the phrase ‘heroes of production’ should be taken in a wide sense, for many of them could perhaps be better seen as ‘heroes of business’, ‘heroes of management’, ‘heroes of finance’, ‘heroes of asset-stripping’, ‘heroes of organization re-engineering’, ‘heroes of creative accounting’, ‘heroes of paper entrepreneurialism’ (to borrow the American economist Robert Reich’s expression), ‘heroes of crony capitalism’, or ‘heroes of predatory capitalism’ than ‘heroes of production’ in any strict sense – though, of course, in the e-economy there are a number of outstanding inventor-entrepreneurs, and the three-in-one scientist-engineer-entrepreneur compositum is a salient feature of the New Economy and bio-economy landscape of our time. One should bear in mind that the Schumpeterian entrepreneur was not exclusively or even primarily associated with the deployment of new technology: both in his original formulation of the concept of entrepreneur and in his late work, entrepreneurship could also involve other domains, such as the discovery of new resources, entrepreneurship could also involve other domains, such as the discovery of new resources, the exploitation of new markets or the advantages of new organizational forms.

In any case, the ongoing ‘knowledge explosion’ is, of course, accompanied by an ‘ignorance explosion’, the obsolescence of university-educated professionals in fields of rapid technological or technoscience or technomarket-generated advance, such as practically all branches of engineering (and more and more fields – professional, as well as semi- or para-professional – are or will be affected by such changes and rates of change, biomedicine being perhaps just as striking a case as engineering and maybe even more directly subject than engineering to marketing pressures), as documented by the Polish-Canadian academic engineer J. Lukasiewicz (1976).

The ‘socially unattached, free-floating intelligentsia’ of Alfred Weber and Karl Mannheim today floats, or will float, in the market, and indeed in a variety of markets: in the Stock Exchange rather than in general civil society. In essence, the thrust of ‘research university’ propaganda (but this organizational type would be more accurately characterized in the light of present trends and plans as the ‘research-business university’, the ‘market-driven research university’, the ‘research marketplace academe’, or ‘campus-sited knowledge industry firms’) is that we do not need traditional institutions, or any institutions other than those based on the property principle, including, of course, ‘intellectual property’, without which, more than ever, technoscience, and indeed ever more frequently science of any kind, cannot proceed; based on markets, business organizations and, residually, on the state (though perhaps only on some degree of ‘state-like’ institutions, as, for example, the EU), in a self-proclaimed world of ‘sovereign’ (that is, narcissistic) individuals, all of whom are only out to ‘make another euro’.

As usual, the ‘we’ who do not need such traditional institutions means, of course, the ‘right people’, the self-appointed elites, not those foredoomed to inhabit the academic McJob land. For who, it is asked, needs social and cultural institutions when we have got markets? Who needs universities functioning as social and cultural institutions, with a sense of civilization, when we have got winner-takes-all academic labour markets, the university as firm, the university as public limited company, the corporate, or increasingly corporatized, university as a hectic marketplace buzzing, indeed awash with grants, research contracts, patents, copyrights, commercialized research output of all sorts, consultancies, etc., and self-consciously active as a quasi-market?

In this ‘new knowledge world’, the persons once known as ‘students’, ‘undergraduates’ or ‘pupils’, educands of all sorts, are increasingly redefined, in keeping with the zeitgeist and with the
prevailing role models – in the same way as ‘passengers’, ‘travellers’, ‘patients’, ‘clients’, ‘theatregoers’, ‘music lovers’, ‘library users’, and so on are now all uniformly labelled as ‘consumers’ of the relevant ‘products’. Indeed, academics themselves, educators of all sorts, are driven to redefine themselves as ‘knowledge entrepreneurs’. So, in response to the question ‘What do you do?’, the appropriate answer is, ‘I am in the knowledge business’ (or the knowledge industry), as others might say, ‘I am in insurance’. They are to be seen as producers, recyclers, distributors, advertisers, repackagers, assemblers and disassemblers, merchants, sellers, touts and disc jockeys of ‘knowledge products’.

One of the more interesting works published in the wake of the student rebellions of 1968-69 was a tract by James Buchanan & Nicos Devletoglou (1970), a work which already amounted to an economic or market theory of the university, presenting an analytical micro-economic model of higher education as, in essence, a set of market arrangements. The text contains related prescriptions for eliminating the deep structural causes of student discontent, mass rebellion and radical politicization, namely the non-market pretences (bureaucratic or non-bureaucratic) which, the authors claimed, prevailed especially in the public or state universities, under the guise of free or accessible education.

Something like the Economic Theory of the University outlined in that work of 40 years ago – ‘economic theories’ of anything start out roughly from the presupposition that society is nothing but the product of, and can be explained by the study of, the actions of self-interested individuals, homines economici – seems tacitly presupposed as gospel truth in current academic policy, not to be challenged by the plebs infima of the universities, though, curiously, it has never received the formal development and extensive journal commentaries that the Economic Theory of Democracy has enjoyed since Anthony Downs, in the last three decades or so, in political science journals and elsewhere. The Economic Theory of Democracy (put forward in 1970), the Economic Theory of Democracy, the Economic Theory of Politics, the Economic Theory of Nationalism, the Economic Theory of Ideology, the Economic Theory of Public Administration (the public choice movement), the Economic Theory of Crime and Punishment, the Economic Theory of Fertility, the Economic Theory of the Family or Households, the Economic Theory of Marriage and Babies (there are markets for both, analytically speaking, and not just the real, sometimes unlawful ones), the Economic Theory of Social Institutions, the various Rational Choice Theory applications, like the Rational Choice Theory of Religion (whereby the essential relation between humans and deities at all times everywhere becomes one of do ut des), among other such economorphic, market-centred theories or programmes – all these have been mightily more influential in policy making than any of their rivals, especially their sociological rivals. Similarly, the more recently formulated Economic Theory of Science, Micro-Economics of Knowledge, or Rational Choice Theory of Scientific Knowledge Production all promise equally to supersede ‘sociological accounts of the sociology of science’, of whatever variety (functionalist, constructivist, neo-Marxist, or whatever), to be replaced by economorphic, specifically micro-economic, market-centred accounts – most systematically summarized in the philosopher of science Philip Kitcher’s (2001) Science, Truth, and Democracy, though elements of it have been around for a long time (for more detail on all the above, see Martins, 2004).

We do not have space here to enter into details of other regions of the world, nor of the important phenomenon of educational migration. Thus, for instance, Johanna Waters (2008) has made an investigation of the movement of higher education students from Hong Kong to Canada. Such phenomena can be interpreted in various ways. One way is to understand them as a further step in the creation of a transnational higher education industry, in which ‘services’ which used to be offered largely – though never exclusively – on a national or regional level are now ever more energetically marketed on a global scale, with ever greater ‘consumer take-up’ from, among others, non-Western students from sufficiently prosperous backgrounds. Ted Tapper & David Palfreyman note:

At the international level there is the steady expansion of competition ... for ‘the best deals’ ...
The question is how national systems adjust in order to cope with the increasing globalization of the core functions of higher education, that is teaching and research. (Tapper & Palfreyman, 2004, p. 2)
The further question is, thus, how the international market responds. Kemal Guruz (2008), former President of the Turkish Council of Higher Education, has recently devoted a whole study to this phenomenon of international student mobility, its history and consequences, using the concept of the global knowledge economy.

From America to Europe: marketized higher education and research

This effective marketization of science – in both the narrower Anglo-American sense and the broader continental sense – is now hegemonic, and the pressures for further privatization and commercialization of research are stronger than ever before. It is with regret that we are obliged, at this point, to draw the attention of the reader to the fact that it is precisely this picture of science, of research, of higher education and of university education that has become or is becoming the dominant tendency in the EU too, though there are, of course, contradictory currents at various decision-making levels in that multilayer body, as well as in the different member states.

Although it was not an EU initiative, we must also refer to the Bologna Declaration of 1999. As Pavel Zgaga and Gert Biesta have pointed out (in personal communication), the Bologna process has been quite divergently applied in the various signatory states, depending on local circumstances and interests. It has a more variegated and contradictory reality than EU education policy, and we sympathize with colleagues who are attempting to make use of these contradictions in order to defend sound academic practices from within it. But, in any case, even if there had been no ‘Bologna’, in our view the national states would have reformed their higher education systems in a roughly similar direction (or were, as in the Netherlands, already doing so), for this pan-European project expresses in its dominant (but by no means uncontested) line the logic of advanced – or decadent – capitalism as such.

We do not have space in this piece to enter into the details of the Bologna process. Let us, however, note that it has two aspects, concerning procedure and content. The procedure is one of the strangest imaginable: the original meeting held in Bologna in 1999 was informal and its planning activities lacked any legal competence, let alone democratic legitimacy – yet the results were treated as if they were binding on European governments. In summary, the legality of the whole Bologna process is ‘soft’ and its legitimacy dubious (on the procedural question, see, for example, Brunkhorst, 2006; Lemke, 2007). Thus,

the 1999 meeting of ministers imposed no obligations on governments. Nothing in the Declaration with which it closed laid a requirement on states to implement any of the items contained in it. This point is well made by Brunkhorst, [who] argues that the national governments – and more especially the education ministries – made use of Bologna to play a familiar political game. In order to promote their own reform plans, they initiated the joint Bologna Process which, it was then suggested, required them to implement reforms of just this type ... Thus, any criticism of the content of these invasive plans would have to be addressed not to them but to ‘Europe’ – for at the national level, it was suggested, little room for manoeuvre any longer existed. (Lock & Lorenz, 2007, pp. 410-411)

In respect of content, let us refer to an analysis by the Belgian publicist Ruben Ramboer (2002), who places the Bologna Declaration (in spite of it being formally and to some extent actually independent of the EU) in the context of the Lisbon agenda set in 2000, the well-known objective of which was ‘to make the EU the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-driven economy by 2010’ (Lisbon European Council, 2000). This was to be achieved by various policy measures, including the radical transformation of the higher education system in a neo-Taylorist direction: that is to say, its transformation into a standardized, homogenized, ‘efficient’ producer of whatever the European labour market happens to require. In this connection, it was important to wrest control of the education institutions from the teachers, academics and researchers, who tended to have the ‘wrong’ – ‘outdated’ – idea of what education is about. Thus, as in the Taylorized factory of a century ago, now academic ‘labour’ was to be similarly subjected to ever greater fragmentation (called ‘specialization’), while overall regulation passed into the hands of the new public managers, themselves in the service of external political and economic forces. These managers now armed themselves with ever more extensive instruments of surveillance and control, vaguely perceived by the older generations of academics as ‘interference’ in the domain of
their own professional competence, yet de facto unstoppable, even in their most absurd versions, by any complaint or protest.

In short, academia and science were to be ‘commercialized’. One of the consumerist policies which was now to be marketed by Bologna and the European Commission as a key to the new European approach was ‘lifelong learning’. This – superficially attractive – formula in reality turned out to mean little more (as the European Commission has itself made clear) than the transformation of education generally and the universities in particular into commercial undertakings. For instance, an ‘open university’, the Commission has explained, is an ‘industrial enterprise’, whose task is to sell its products on the permanent education market (Commission of the European Communities, 1991). The Commission, to ensure that its view prevails, has even put the member states under pressure to scrap from their constitutions any ‘obsolete’ definitions of education and replace them with an article on ‘the possibility of Lifelong Learning’ – that is, of a lifelong, legally imposed subordination to a single, fundamentalist, ultimately anti-academic conception of educational life (see Ramboer, 2002).

This is not a ‘mere’ matter of a regressive higher education policy being imposed at pan-European level: it has incalculably more serious consequences. For instance, Sievers (2008, pp. 238-239) has argued that the Bologna Declaration not only subverts traditional academic values, but ‘appears to be concomitant with a significant flight into psychotic thinking on the part of the respective European ministers’. For it is apparently ‘driven by the megalomaniac and manic impetus of reinventing European universities for the sake of global dominance’ (p. 240). He adds that the politics of this and similar reform processes in higher education can be regarded as ‘concomitant with a high degree of totalitarian thinking’; they constitute a dynamic leading ‘to a totalitarian consciousness in the organizational culture of universities’ (p. 242). The imposition of so-called business-type imperatives on the universities has led to the introduction of management structures, which, ‘it is believed, will allow planning, certainty and control’ (Sievers, 2008, p. 243).

Sievers comments – and we quote him at length – that:

underlying these efforts is the fantasy that [ever more such audit-type] control will result in better management ... and thus reduce the uncertainties resulting from primitive anxieties. Though these anxieties cannot be eliminated, the attempt to bring them under control provides the illusion that they can be held in check. At the same time, the psychotic anxieties related to the survival of the institution and the future of academic and administrative positions result in the role of rescuer being projected into management, which it compliantly introjects. The more the pressure, the more likely the psychotic dynamic will increase and that managers – like other organizational role holders – will become caught in their own individual psychotic parts. To the extent that the thinking in and about the university takes on a psychotic quality, management is mobilized to take on a more authoritarian stance, where decisions cannot be questioned and doubts cannot be raised. This leads ultimately to a totalitarian state of mind. (Sievers, 2008, pp. 242-243)

Thus, if Sievers is right, we have or shall soon have psychotic institutions of higher education engaged in the mass production of, among other things, ‘psychotic citizens’. So much for the Bologna process.[2]

Now most critics of the kinds of reforms presently being implemented both by national governments and by Bologna point in their diagnosis to the imposition on universities – as well as on other educational establishments – of outside control in the form of the infamous ‘new public management’. This term, Rosemary Deem notes, is used to refer to the adoption in the public sector of organizational forms, management practices, technologies and norms derived from private business. What, in consequence, disappears is ‘the collegiality of academics of equal status working together with minimal hierarchy and maximum trust’. What replaces such collegiality, trust and professional discretion is regulation from on high by non-professionals, according to their own, non-academic agenda – that is to say, by non-academic interests and for ultimately non-academic purposes (Deem, 1998, pp. 48, 52). These imposed reforms have, according to the observers, dealt a fatal blow to academe. Magdalini Kolokitha (2007) concludes her study ‘It’s the end of the “University” as we know it’ with the remark that the institutions now in the process of reform on the lines of the Bologna process – that is to say, nearly all such institutions in Europe –
will soon no longer deserve to bear the name of ‘university’. This honourable title will have expired.

Discussion

We now arrive at a provisional summary of the above. This is that the very structure of the EU prevents it from developing an active practice of European citizenship: for, as we (and others) have argued, it is rather a ‘management system for civil society’ than a ‘state proper’ which could command the loyalty of its people, based on a legitimate claim to sovereignty.

Our hypothesis regarding the background to this state of affairs is that the EU has adopted a hyper-liberal definition of its own status, function and responsibilities. For whatever reasons, it never fully accepted the status of state or superstate. Kojève (see above) wrote very relevantly in this context:

The essentially political – that is, in the final analysis bellicose – entity, which the State in the strict sense is, should [according to the consequent liberals] be replaced by a simple economic and social as well as police administration, at the disposal and at the service of ‘society’, itself conceived of as an aggregate of individuals. The individual was supposed to embody and reveal, in his own isolation, the supreme human value. Thus conceived, the ‘statist’ liberal administration had to be fundamentally peaceful and pacifist. Put differently, it did not have, strictly speaking, any ‘will to power’, and consequently had no effective need, nor adequate desire, for the ‘independence’ or political autonomy which characterizes the very essence of the true State. (Quoted in Lock, 2005-06, p. 10)

One need only read the White Paper on European Governance, inspired by former President of the European Commission Romano Prodi, to understand that this is, en gros, the direction which the EU has chosen – though with some dissenting voices – to take (Commission of the European Communities, 2001).

As already suggested, the situation can be summed up in a few words: the EU provides the European population with a system of justice and it polices that system; it is oriented to the satisfaction of economic needs. In short, it is not a superstate, nor an empire, but rather – quite prosaically, to repeat the point – a management system for civil society. It is just this prosaic character of the EU that is problematic. For it has ceased to be any kind of effective ideal. Thus, it is incapable of promoting a ‘European citizenship’ in anything like the Hegelian meaning. In that sense, its higher education policy fits perfectly with its political strategy: the tendential destruction of Bildung, in anything like its original sense, and the fundamental reorientation of the universities to the role of higher education factories for the satisfaction of the needs of a labour market defined in terms similar to those typical of the United States in the last decades (see above). It has also helped to sever the link between university education and citizenship. Biesta (2009) asks what kind of citizenship might be promoted in and through EU higher education. Our argument provides one answer.

Another illuminating way to make the point – or to gloss it – is, as Gert Biesta argues, to note that the ‘active citizen’ is a paradoxical notion in the European context: as he puts it, ‘there is a tendency within the idea of “active citizenship” to depoliticise the very idea of citizenship’ (Biesta, 2009, p. 146). Biesta prefers the idea of a ‘critical’ and ‘political’ form of citizenship to that of the so-called ‘active citizen’: ‘political’ here means, among other things, ‘non-consensual’. His account links in with ours to the extent that we argue, especially in respect of the reference to Hegel, that a civil-society-type governance system – as exemplified by the EU – actively promotes, for obvious reasons, such depolitization: civil society is, by definition, non-politics; a world of commerce in which there are, as Carl Schmitt (1996, pp. 28, 48) suggests in his 1932 Concept of the Political, no ‘enemies’ but only ‘competitors’ – exemplified in the never-ending competition between individual ‘citizens’, ‘active’ especially in the sense that each is involved in a permanent struggle to elbow out others in the struggle for survival and the optimization of personal welfare.
Finale: citizenism

But this point having been made, one last theme remains: a ‘twist to the story’. For we are by no means obliged to accept a Hegelian conception of citizenship. On the contrary, it seems that this conception, though a revealing one, may be regarded from a certain political point of view as a ‘compensatory category’: in essence, a straw to cling to in a period – the post-1980s epoch of the apparent victory and absolute hegemony of capitalism – when no ‘alternative system’ seems possible, only at best a mitigation of the worst excesses of that system, on the basis of a resistance backed up by an appeal to such citizen values. In this connection, we shall make a final brief reference to the ideology of citizen values – what the French call *citoyennisme* – and to the critique of this ideology.

A collective publication on the topic (‘The Citizenist Impasse’, 2001) summarizes a number of elements of the problem. The authors note:

By ‘citizenism’ we mean an ideology of which the principal traits are 1) the belief in democracy as something capable of opposing capitalism, 2) the project of reinforcing the State ... so as to put this politics in place, [and] 3) the citizen as the active basis for this politics.

The goal of citizenism is to humanize capitalism, to render it more just, in a certain way to give it a supplemental soul. Here the class struggle is replaced by the political participation of the citizenry.

The roots of citizenism, the authors add, are to be found in the break-up of the old labour movement and in globalization in its recent form, dating from the 1970s and 1980s, and characterized by increasing automation, resulting mass unemployment and delocalization of labour to the Third World. The nation states contribute to the mechanisms of this globalization process by getting rid of the public sector inherited from the war economy (de-nationalizations), by becoming ‘flexible’ and by reducing the cost of work as much as possible [etc.] ... Deprived of perspectives, the class struggle can only shut itself into defensive struggles, sometimes very violent ... But this energy is especially the energy of despair.

Now the relation between citizenship and the state, the authors argue, is one of both opposition and support:

Citizenism is opposed to the State but cannot do without the legitimation that it offers. Citizenist movements must set themselves up as interlocutors, and to do this they must sometimes undertake ‘radical actions’, that is to say, illegal or spectacular actions. It is a question here of setting oneself up as a victim, of blaming the State (that is to say, to oppose the ideal State to the real State), so as to arrive more quickly at the negotiating table.

The ideal state is here, arguably, something like the Hegelian state. So we have a kind of twenty-first-century version of ‘left’ Hegelianism.

But the point is that the Hegelian state – one enjoying more or less undisputed legitimacy and able to call on its citizen’s ‘everyday loyalty’ – is no longer a serious political option. In Europe, the very existence and operation of the EU – that behemoth of a civil society – renders any such perspective entirely unrealistic. So, as Raymond Debord (2005) remarks, every reference by citizenism to an ideal of ‘public service’, including in the domain of the universities and of their teaching and research functions, must be regarded as not much less utopian than the old labour movement’s struggle for a swift transition to an undiluted socialism.[3] Citizenism, Debord insists, is a humanism, rooted in a moral revolt against the injustices of war, oppression and injustice: its goal is to palliate the hardships, suffering and dangers caused by capitalism, for which, however, it is assumed (as we have seen) there is no systematic substitute. Citizenism is a teleology of Right. It finds its roots in the ideology of the French Revolution, but in an age in which that ideology is an obvious anachronism, long ago surpassed and superseded by Marxism and other social theories. Thus, a Marxist would characterize citizenism as a case of false consciousness – which, Debord comments, is, in fact, too kind an appellation. Rather, citizenism can be seen as an attempt by, especially, those social strata traditionally living on and politically supportive of statism to recreate an ideology capable of regaining some leverage, even if fragile and marginal, on economic, social and political life.
To all of the problems which we have signalized, there seems to be no possible answer in present EU education, social or economic policy. Indeed, we might hypothesize – without being able to provide all the arguments here for our claim and allowing for the immense complications and contradictions involved in any real-life process, which we cannot explore here (though some of the other articles in this number do so) – that the principal obstacle to their solution in a European framework is the aggregate structure of the present policies of the EU itself. Or, to put the matter another way, the promotion of a properly critical citizenship would require two things: first, the promotion of a properly critical system of higher education, entirely reversing current EU policies, and, second, a struggle against the ‘consensus’ model of citizenship, a struggle which, however, cannot be carried on in *abstracto* but can emerge only from an intensification of the social struggles consequent on – if we may quote him here – what Cardinal Cormac Murphy-O’Connor has called the ‘death of capitalism’ (Pierce, 2009), or let us say, the epoch of its slow death agony.

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Notes
[1] See, for example, Buchanan (1969). The problem about Buchanan is not his economic mathematics but his naïve philosophy of man. Thus, David B. Wilson (1987), in a review of Buchanan’s work, notes that, in sum, he ‘won the Nobel for demonstrating that politicians and bureaucrats act in their own self-interest just the way everybody else does’.

[2] For a more detailed analysis of the sense of this process, see Lorenz (2006). Wolfgang Essbach (2005, 2007) of the University of Freiburg has denounced Bologna. In Dutch there exists a radical critique by Karin Verelst (2000), and there is much more in the same vein, in various European languages.

[3] Though, as we know, Marxists have always defended, with strong arguments – and present-day Marxists still defend – an anti-utopian conception of politics.

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173


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