If only There Were a Blueprint!
Factors for Success and Failure of UN Peace-Building Operations

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Abstract

In spite of the fact that UN peacekeeping operations are a relative new field for scholarly research, the literature on the subject has grown into a substantial body. This article distils from this body of scholarly literature eleven clusters of factors for success and failure for UN peacekeeping operations in general and tests these on four case studies – Cambodia, Mozambique, Rwanda and El Salvador – of one particular type of UN peacekeeping operation: the UN peace-building operations. It concludes that although the results of the four cases of UN peace-building operations largely confirm the factors for success and failure as found in literature for UN peacekeeping operations in general, theory on UN peace-building operations still needs adjustment and fine tuning. Amongst others, it appears from the cases that two factors that receive a lot of attention in literature – the non-use of force by the operation and the need for a clear and detailed mandate – are less important.

Keywords

assessment issues; factors for success and failure; peace operations; peace building; security dilemma; causes of conflict; ownership

Although in the media UN peacekeeping operations currently receive less attention than during their heyday in the first half of the 1990s, they are again deployed in similar numbers and at comparable scales. Typically, in spite of the fact that the first UN peacekeeping operation was deployed shortly after the Second World War, only the last ten to fifteen years have they become a more frequent subject of scholarly and policy oriented literature. Nonetheless, academics and policy makers have developed a number of factors for success and failure; these are requirements that operations must meet to increase the chances that they successfully contribute to durable peace. Durable peace is the achievement of negative peace and the sufficient addressing of the causes of conflict. Additionally, negative peace is the absence of direct physical violence, opposed to positive peace which entails more than only the absence of physical violence. The concept of positive peace also directs attention to the causes of conflict, such as the presence of social justice, a fair distribution of power and resources, equal protection and impartial enforcement of law.¹

In order to qualify as a success in this article, the contribution of the operation must have helped to establish ten years of negative peace and a positive development in remedying the causes of the conflict. The article distils clusters of factors for success and failure from the existing body of scholarly literature on UN peacekeeping operations in general and tests these clusters on one particular kind of UN peacekeeping operation: UN peace-building operations. For this purpose, UN peacekeeping operations are defined as those operations deployed by the United Nations which the organization itself regards as UN peacekeeping operations. To date, the UN has deployed 60 such operations under Chapter VI or Chapter VII mandate.² A UN peace-building operation is regarded as a UN peacekeeping operation that is supposed to do more than maintain the status quo. It is also aimed at building an agreement-based peace following an intrastate conflict. For that purpose it remains impartial towards the signatories, but may not always have their consent.³

¹ Johan Galtung, 'Violence, Peace, and Peace Research', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol.6, no.3, 1969, pp.167-191.

² *United Nations Peacekeeping Homepage*, <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/index.asp>, 13 November 2008.

³ The concepts of impartial and consent are used in the same way as in Alex J. Bellamy, Paul Williams and Stuart Griffin, *Understanding Peacekeeping* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004). They use a distinction of peace operations which originates from the British Army, in which a peace keeping operation is both with the consent

To begin this article, the most important general factors for success and failure of UN peacekeeping operations, according to literature on the topic, is reviewed. Next, case studies of UN peace-building operations are selected, which are also briefly assessed. Subsequently, the factors for success and failure of UN peacekeeping operations are tested on four cases of UN peace-building operations. The research for this part of the study was done both by literature and document study as well as through field research and interviews in all four countries under review, in addition to New York. Finally, a review is made regarding the extent the factors for success and failure of UN peacekeeping operations need adjustment in order to apply to UN peace-building operations.

Factors for Success and Failure in UN Peacekeeping Operations: The Literature

From scholarly and lessons learned literature on UN peacekeeping operations the following eleven clusters of factors for success and failure can be distilled.⁴ Although in the practise of UN peacekeeping operations some additional lessons may have been learned these have not yet fully penetrated the body of scholarly literature.

Consent, Willingness and Sincerity

The United Nations Secretariat calls the genuine desire on the part of combatants to resolve their differences peacefully a prerequisite for the success of a peacekeeping operation.⁵ Doyle and Sambanis find that an operation has the best chance for success if the parties have underlined their genuine desire for peace with a formal peace agreement.⁶ Consent is important because if lost, the operation can only implement its mandate by military force. If an opera-

of the parties and impartial. Peace enforcement is still impartial but not necessarily with the consent of the parties. A partial operation without the consent of the parties is war.

⁴ Although research points out that factors such as the duration and intensity of the conflict, the number of factions, the type of conflict (ethnic, identity, language, etc.) and the level of democracy and economic development in the country are of great relevance to the chances for success, this research does not look at these endogenous factors as they cannot be addressed by a UN peacekeeping operation. For good statistical research on these factors, see: V. Page Fortna, 'Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace after Civil War', *International Studies Quarterly*, vol.48, no.2, 2004, pp.269-292; Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, *Building Peace: Challenges and Strategies after Civil War* (n.p.: World Bank, 1999); Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, 'International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis', *American Political Science Review*, vol.94, no.4, 2000, pp.779-801; and Birger Heldt, *Conditions for Successful Intra-state Peacekeeping Missions* (n.p.: Uppsala University, 2001).

⁵ United Nations, *Basic Facts about the United Nations* (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 2000).

tion is then not longer regarded as impartial, this would mean that it would lose its peace-keeping character and that it would cross the line into war fighting.⁷

According to many scholars the presence of a peacekeeping operation in a conflict alters the situation on the ground. It forces the belligerents to recalculate the dangers and opportunities as a result of the introduction of the new factor. They argue that each party will question whether the 'road of peace' still serves its best interests. The answer to this question depends largely upon the belligerent's momentum and military position. Each party will also question whether it views the United Nations as the best vehicle to travel the road it chose. Thus, the parties may view a peace process accompanied by a peacekeeping operation as a desirable alternative for war, but they can also see the mission as a threat to their security and interests. Nonetheless, even if an uncooperative party, or spoiler, chooses war, it can view the operation as an opportunity to manipulate or recuperate. In such a case parties may be insincere and break their promises later on. The choices parties make are thought to depend, in large part, on the design, the type and the configuration of the mission. If the operation offers a realistic peace they would be likely to react differently than if it is merely a token force.⁸

Moreover, sincerity at the time of signing a peace agreement is not regarded to be sufficient by many scholars. They point out that peace agreements also often bring tensions to the surface within parties; the unity that was maintained for the sake of war can easily be lost once peace breaks out. Peace can then frustrate the aims of certain parts of a coalition, giving reasons for splinter groups to break away. In addition, even if a party sincerely intended to reach peace, it most often did not do so unconditionally and can become disappointed. Subsequently, it is often hard to distinguish disappointment from insincerity. Furthermore, such a condition does not necessarily have to be publicly and explicitly stated in a peace agreement. For example, *União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola* (UNITA), in Angola,

⁶ Doyle and Sambanis, *Building Peace*.

⁷ Gareth J. Evans, *Cooperating for Peace: The Global Agenda for the 1990s and Beyond* (St. Leonards: Allen and Unwin, 1993); Darya Pushkina, 'Towards Successful Peace-Keeping: Remembering Croatia', *Cooperation and Conflict*, vol.39, no.4, 2004, pp.393-415; Duane Bratt, 'Explaining Peacekeeping Performance: The UN in Internal Conflicts', *International Peacekeeping*, vol.4, no.3, 1997, pp.45-70; Steven R. Ratner, *The UN Peacekeeping: Building Peace in Lands of Conflicts after the Cold War* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995); Michael W. Doyle, Ian Johnstone and Robert C. Orr, 'Strategies for Peace: Conclusions and Lessons', in Michael W. Doyle, Ian Johnstone and Robert C. Orr (eds.), *Keeping the Peace: Multidimensional UN Operations in Cambodia and El Salvador* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp.369-391.

⁸ Michael Wesley, *Casualties of the New World Order: The Causes of Failure of UN Missions to Civil Wars* (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1997); Pushkina, 'Towards Successful Peace-Keeping'; Doyle and Sambanis, *Building Peace*; David Carment and Dane Rowlands, 'Three's Company: Evaluating Third-Party Intervention in Intrastate Conflict', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol.42, no.5, 1998, pp.572-599; Dan Smith, 'Trends and Causes of Armed Conflicts', in Norbert Ropers, et al. (eds.), *Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation* (n.p.: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, 2000); and Stephen J. Stedman, 'Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes', *International Security*, vol.22, no.2, 1997, pp.5-53.

expected to win the elections and for that reason only it agreed to sign the peace accords. When this condition was not met, it was disappointed and renewed the conflict.⁹

Impartiality and the Non-Use of Force

It is generally thought that a peacekeeping operation needs to remain impartial and has to be regarded as such, because otherwise it runs the risk of losing the consent of the parties and becoming a party itself in the conflict.¹⁰ The principle of non-use of force is closely related to impartiality as it is thought to be more likely that an operation is regarded to be impartial if no force is used. Generally it is said that if a peacekeeping operation has lost the consent of the parties and is regarded to be, or is, partial, its continuation requires adapting the mandate towards war fighting.¹¹ During the 1990s, operations like the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Yugoslavia and the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) in Somalia faced huge problems amongst others because their mandates were not changed, when they became seen as partial and they subsequently became caught in the middle ground between peacekeeping and war fighting.¹²

The Brahimi report concludes that the consent of the local parties, impartiality and the use of force only in self-defence 'should remain the bedrock principles of peacekeeping'.¹³ However, the awareness that parties may be insincere, may withdraw consent or that their leadership may lose control over the fighting forces as discussed under the factor 'consent, willingness and sincerity' leads the Brahimi panel to weaken its own statement on the importance of impartiality and non-use of force. It acknowledges that if parties withdraw their consent once an operation is deployed, the operation should also be able to defend its mandate. Impartiality, in that case, is defined as 'adherence to the principles of the Charter and to the objectives of a mandate that is rooted in those Charter principles.' In addition, the non-use of force should, according to the Brahimi panel, in some cases also be abandoned because it is not only 'operationally justified', but also 'morally compelled'. Peacekeeping operations should, according to the report, be willing to use force in order to defend, among others, the

⁹ Ibidem.

¹⁰ Evans, *Cooperating for Peace*.

¹¹ Evans, *Cooperating for Peace*; Pushkina, 'Towards Successful Peace-Keeping'; Bratt, 'Explaining Peacekeeping Performance'; Ratner, *The UN Peacekeeping*; and Doyle, Johnstone and Orr, 'Strategies for Peace'.

¹² Evans, *Cooperating for Peace*.

¹³ Lakhdar Brahimi, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, UN doc. A/55/305- S/2000/809, 21 August 2000.

mandate and civilians.¹⁴ In the last few years this has also been put into practise in some of the UN peacekeeping operations.

Co-Operation from Important Outside Actors

The United Nations Secretariat names strong political support by the international community and the provision of the resources necessary to achieve the operation's objectives as prerequisites for the success of an operation.¹⁵ Also, several scholars found that the chances for success of a peacekeeping operation are larger if the 'international community' embodied by the permanent members of the Security Council and the troop contributing countries fully support the operation and back it with funds and resources.¹⁶ Bratt points especially at the importance of support from the United States.¹⁷ The reports of the Independent Inquiry on Rwanda and the Secretary-General on Srebrenica also argue that an important reason why the United Nations failed in those cases was the lack of political will by the international community.¹⁸ In addition, in his Supplement to an Agenda for Peace, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali warned that a lack of political will, and following from this the lack of finances at the United Nations to implement the tasks assigned to it, is 'dangerous'.¹⁹

Furthermore, according to Evans and Pushkina, it is necessary that outside backers and suppliers of the belligerents end their support for violent means and stimulate the non-violent resolution of the conflict.²⁰ Wesley and Bratt even argue that this link is one of the potentially most important mechanisms of influence on the success of a peacekeeping operation. Often, member states have or have had such a sponsoring link with a conflicting party. If these member states feel they have an interest in using their links to restrain their clients this provides the peacekeeping operation with enormous leverage over the protagonists. It is

¹⁴ Ibidem.

¹⁵ United Nations, *Basic Facts about the United Nations*.

¹⁶ Evans, *Cooperating for Peace*; Bratt, 'Explaining Peacekeeping Performance'; and Doyle and Sambanis, *Building Peace*.

¹⁷ Bratt, 'Explaining Peacekeeping Performance'.

¹⁸ Independent Inquiry, Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, UN doc. S/1999/1257, 16 December 1999; and Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 53/35: The Fall of Srebrenica, UN doc. A/54/549, 15 November 1999.

¹⁹ Secretary-General, Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the United Nations, UN doc. A/50/60 - S/1995/1, 3 January 1995.

²⁰ Evans, *Cooperating for Peace*; and Pushkina, 'Towards Successful Peace-Keeping'.

argued that the more dependent the protagonists are upon these links, the larger the chance for co-operation.²¹

Sense of Security of the Parties

Although less prominent, several scholars argue that in order to increase the chance of a successful disarmament and demobilisation process, an operation requires sufficient strength to guarantee the security of the parties.²² The conflict and its history have often created a perception amongst parties that the other is not to be trusted and that one has to provide for one's own security against the threat of the other. The parties often face a security dilemma, in which they have armed themselves for the purpose of self-defense. In order to stop this spiral, to break this security dilemma and to enable disarmament and demobilization, an operation needs to provide alternative sources for a sense of security. For this reason, parties must perceive the intervention as sustained, committed and credible. Carment and Rowlands point out that the chances for success increase strongly if the parties view that the third party is willing to enforce the settlement.²³ Strong, third-party involvement is also key in what Hampson calls fostering ripeness. He describes ripeness as a 'fostered, not inherited condition.'²⁴ (see below) According to the Brahimi report, military components of peacekeeping operations 'must be capable of defending themselves, other mission components and the mission's mandate.'²⁵ This is a broad concept of self-defence, as it includes the possibility that peacekeeping operations have to use force and should be prepared to do so against those who target civilians or deny humanitarian access to civilian populations. What follows from this is that peacekeeping operations should not be prepared for best-case scenarios, but for worst-case scenarios. Until 2000 the Secretariat has, however, in the view of the Brahimi-report often applied 'best-case planning assumptions to situations where the local actors have historically exhibited worst-case behaviour.'²⁶ Since the report this lesson has generally been implemented.

²¹ Wesley, *Casualties of the New World Order*; and Bratt, 'Explaining Peacekeeping Performance'.

²² Evans, *Cooperating for Peace*; Pushkina, 'Towards Successful Peace-Keeping'; Roland Paris, 'Broadening the Study of Peace Operations', *International Studies Review*, vol.2, no.3, 2000, pp.27-44; Barbara F. Walter, 'Designing Transitions from Civil War: Demobilization, Democratization, and Commitments to Peace', *International Security*, vol.24, no.1, 1999, pp.127-155; Fen O. Hampson, *Nurturing Peace: Why Peace Settlements Succeed or Fail* (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996); and Carment and Rowlands, 'Three's Company'.

²³ Carment and Rowlands, 'Three's Company'.

²⁴ Hampson, *Nurturing Peace*.

²⁵ Brahimi, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations.

Clear, Appropriate and Achievable Mandate

The United Nations Secretariat gives a clear mandate as a further prerequisite for the success of an operation.²⁷ The objectives stated in a mission's mandate are generally regarded to be of enormous importance to the success of a peacekeeping operation. Also the Brahimi report views a clear, credible and achievable mandate as very important.²⁸ The extent to which mandates are achievable and appropriate to the situation on the ground depends on the diagnosis of the conflict on which the objectives are based. Therefore good planning is a necessity. Further problems arise as a result of the vagueness of some peace agreements, which most of the time are diplomatically phrased compromises at the end of a negotiation process. Moreover, disagreement within the Security Council may also lead to ambiguous mandates.²⁹ The report of the Secretary-General on the fall of Srebrenica noticed that

With the benefit of hindsight, one can see that many of the errors the United Nations made flowed from a single and no doubt well-intentioned effort; we tried to keep the peace and apply the rules of peacekeeping when there was no peace to keep. [...] we tried to create – or imagine – an environment in which the tenets of peacekeeping – agreement between the parties, deployment by consent, and impartiality – could be upheld.³⁰

Since the failures of the mid-1990s, it is now generally acknowledged that if one intervenes in a conflict, one must realise that every phase and every level of a conflict requires different 'policy tools' to influence the course of the conflict, and that one cannot unthinkingly and indiscriminately apply every sort of intervention in each phase or at each level of conflict. Although, it is not necessarily so that specific interventions are fixed to specific phases or levels of conflicts, the international political, as well as scholarly, community has come to the awareness that a too free interpretation may lead to disaster. Peacekeeping, for example, is regarded to be a rather dangerous business if a conflict has reached the level of war. In addition, in such a situation it is also a rather useless tool as there is no peace to keep.³¹ Finally,

²⁶ Ibidem.

²⁷ United Nations, *Basic Facts about the United Nations*.

²⁸ Brahimi, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations.

²⁹ Wesley, *Casualties of the New World Order*; and Evans, *Cooperating for Peace*.

³⁰ Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 53/35: The Fall of Srebrenica.

³¹ Conflict Prevention Network, *Peace Building & Conflict Prevention in Developing Countries: A Practical Guide (draft document)* (Brussels and Ebenhausen: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik and Conflict Prevention Network, 1999); United Nations, *General Guidelines for Peacekeeping Operations* (Turin: United Nations Department of Peace-keeping Operations, 1995); Brahimi, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations; Advisory Council on Peace and Security (Adviesraad Vrede en Veiligheid), *Lost Innocence* (Verloren

Doyle and Sambanis found that more extensive mandates for multidimensional peacekeeping operation are ‘highly significant determinants’ and ‘positively and significantly correlated’ to successful peace-building.³²

Timely Deployment and at the Right Time

Although a tendency exists to pay attention to conflicts only once they have reached the level of crisis or war, intervening at such a late stage significantly decreases the possibilities for outside actors. This reduction in potential is, according to the Conflict Prevention Network, brought about in two respects. First, at a stage of high intensity the ‘policy tools’ to positively influence the course of a conflict are limited. Second, since at such a late stage only little time exists to analyse the causes of conflict, there is a tendency to react to events, rather than to follow a proactive policy. It has, consequently, generally been acknowledged that the best prospects for successful outside intervention in a conflict is at the level of both stable and unstable peace, either during the pre- or the post-conflict phase. Additionally, many consider the pre-conflict phase to be the most suitable phase for intervention, as a wide variety of measures are still available to address the root causes of the conflict and the conflict has not yet acquire its own dynamics.³³ As the saying goes: ‘an ounce of prevention is better than a pound of cure.’ Likewise, it is thought that if conflict can be prevented many costs can be avoided, not only in terms of human lives, but even, according to Brown and Rosecrance, financially.³⁴ Indeed Heldt finds that, statistically, the longer the period from the start of the conflict to the deployment of the operation, the larger the chance of continued warfare.³⁵

Doyle and Sambanis have contradictory statistical findings. According to their research the longer a conflict has raged before the United Nations enters, the larger the chance is for success. They explained their findings by arguing that it is likely that war-weariness strengthens the parties’ desire for peace.³⁶ Indeed, many scholars argue, that in order for negotiations to make a chance of being successful a conflict needs to be, what Zartman calls, ‘ripe’. According to them the dynamics of a conflict must have produced a ‘mutually hurting

onschuld: Nederland en vredesoperaties) (The Hague: Adviesraad Vrede en Veiligheid, 1996); Doyle and Sambanis, *Building Peace*.

³² Doyle and Sambanis, ‘International Peacebuilding’.

³³ Conflict Prevention Network, *Peace Building & Conflict Prevention in Developing Countries*.

³⁴ Michael E. Brown and Ricard N. Rosecrance, *The Costs of Conflict: Prevention and Cure in the Global Arena* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999).

³⁵ Heldt, *Conditions for Successful Intrastate Peacekeeping Missions*.

³⁶ Doyle and Sambanis, *Building Peace*.

stalemate' on the battlefield and the parties must be sufficiently exhausted in order to consider a political solution to the conflict – a new equilibrium must exist. If such a deadlock is too painful and a victory is not in sight, parties perceive negotiations as a way out. Such a 'mutual hurting stalemate' should, according to Zartman, be seen in the light of a simple cost-benefit analysis. The costs of negotiations perceived by the parties should be less than the costs of continuing the fight. As a result, the moment of 'ripeness' can appear and reappear throughout the whole period of a conflict and it can be seized, as well as passed. The concept does, however, imply that the success of peacekeeping operations, like conflict resolution in general, largely depends upon factors intrinsic to the conflict process and third-party involvement plays a less important, more accommodating role.³⁷

Once the parties agree to the deployment of a peacekeeping operation, rapid deployment is often essential. The Brahimi report argues that the first twelve weeks following a peace agreement or cease-fire are of enormous importance because the belligerents assess the ability and credibility of an operation to implement its mandate most often at the start of the mission. Therefore, it is thought that if an operation does not show these capacities during this period, the consent or co-operation of the parties may be affected. At the same time, slow deployment of a peacekeeping operation may mean the momentum for peace can be lost.³⁸

Competent Leadership and Personnel, and Clear Command Structures

Diehl points at the importance of effective command structures to enhance the chances for success.³⁹ The Brahimi report went so far as to say that 'the tenor of an entire mission can be heavily influenced by the character and ability of those who lead it.' However, the leadership is not the only characteristic of an operation that is important, it is also other military and civilian personnel whose aptitude is contributive to operational success. Additionally, the provision of adequate equipment necessary for the operation is just as critical as the ability of participating personnel. The explanation why leadership, personnel and command structures are essential to the success of an operation is simple: they are the basis for the implementation of a mandate and each 'policy tool' of which the peacekeeping operation is comprised.⁴⁰

³⁷ I. William Zartman, 'Ripeness: The Hurting Stalemate and Beyond', in Paul C. Stern and Daniel Druckman (eds.), *International Conflict Resolution after the Cold War* (Washington DC: National Academy Press, 2000), pp.225-250.

³⁸ Brahimi, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations.

³⁹ Paul F. Diehl, *International Peacekeeping: With a New Epilogue on Somalia, Bosnia, and Cambodia* (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994).

⁴⁰ Brahimi, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations.

Sufficiently Long Duration

Heldt finds that missions with longer duration have a larger chance of success than shorter operations.⁴¹ Chesterman argues that although ‘a lengthy international presence’ does not ensure success ‘an early departure guarantees failure’.⁴² Nonetheless, in order to maintain the credibility and effectiveness of peacekeeping in general Evans holds that the United Nations has to establish a clear termination point or clear termination criteria. To ensure that the renewal of mandates does not become routine, milestones measuring progress and explicit sunset clauses should, according to him, be included in mandates. It is according to him, however, not always best to take a single event as a signal for departure. For example, the successful organisation of elections may not be sufficient for peace to take root.⁴³

Internal and External Co-Ordination

Co-ordination and co-operation, both internally and externally, is regarded to be very important for peacekeeping operations to succeed. Externally, according to the Brahimi report, operations must be embedded in a broader and more comprehensive strategy to resolve the conflict and to build durable peace. For this purpose the operation is expected to coordinate with organisations such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to solve the underlying causes of the conflict. In this respect a single country approach is viewed to be insufficient as most often the stabilisation of a whole region is necessary to end the conflict.⁴⁴ Internally, co-ordination and coherence also enhance the chances for success. It is, for example, according to Evans, necessary for the peace makers and the political leadership of the operation to make peace in order for the Military Component to keep it. Without such co-ordination, if the peacemakers fail, the peacekeepers may become trapped between the parties.⁴⁵

‘Ownership’

⁴¹ Heldt, *Conditions for Successful Intrastate Peacekeeping Missions*.

⁴² Simon Chesterman, *You, the People: The United Nations, Transitional Administration and State-Building* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).

⁴³ Evans, *Cooperating for Peace*.

⁴⁴ Brahimi, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations.

‘Ownership’ is presently one of the major buzzwords in the peacekeeping business. Its meaning is not fully clear, but includes the consent of and accountability to the local population. In essence the local population should feel that the result of the operation is what it wanted and that the country has not become a trusteeship occupied by a foreign military force. Nonetheless, Chesterman notes that ownership can only be the end and not the means of the operation. After all, if the countries where operations are stationed were capable of ownership, they would not need the international presence. He argues that it is the exact absence of consensus over strategies and the conflict caused by this that calls for a peacekeeping operation to intervene. However, during the process of political normalisation opportunities for more accountability develop and the failure to establish mechanisms to do so may also create frustration amongst the local parties and population.⁴⁶

Causes of the Conflict

Although less prominently, some scholars regard addressing the underlying causes of the conflict to be important to prevent the resumption and recurrence of conflict.⁴⁷ They argue that efforts of reconstruction may be doomed if the causes of conflict remain because then conflict will eventually flair up again. For example, several observers of the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina expect a resumption of the conflict once the international peacekeeping force leaves, because the causes of the conflict will not be sufficiently addressed.⁴⁸ In addition, according to Fetherston, peacekeeping operations should not be directed at negative peace – and be relatively static – but at positive peace – and be proactive. She argues that conflict is caused by the frustration of human needs and is at least partly a subjective phenomenon. Nonetheless, these social and cultural conditions that cause violent conflict can and should, according to her, be changed by peacekeeping operations.⁴⁹

Cases of UN Peace-Building Operations

⁴⁵ Evans, *Cooperating for Peace*.

⁴⁶ Chesterman, *You, the People*.

⁴⁷ Joao Honwana, ‘Mozambique: What Nexus among Peacemaking, Peacekeeping, and Development?’, in Ricardo R. Laremont (ed.), *The Causes of War and the Consequences of Peacekeeping in Africa* (Portsmouth: Heinemann, 2002), pp.195-221.

⁴⁸ Smith, ‘Trends and Causes of Armed Conflicts’.

The Case Selection

For the purpose of this article a potential case is a UN peacekeeping operation or string of successive UN peacekeeping operations. In order to qualify for review as a case in this article, the UN peace-building operation must meet the following criteria:

1. As the end of the Cold War has dramatically changed the international environment, the (first) operation is deployed in or after 1989.
2. In order to distinguish the ordinary UN peacekeeping operation from the UN peace-building operation, the operation finds its origins in a peace agreement.
3. Since it is nowadays the most dominant sort of conflict, especially with regard to UN peace-building operations, the operation is deployed in an intrastate conflict. For this reason the peace agreement has to be signed by at least one sub/non-state actor.
4. In order to leave enough time to be able to measure the durability of the contribution by the operation(s), the presence of the United Nations ends before 1997.
5. In order to minimize the influence of other actors, the United Nations is the lead organisation. This is determined by whether that organisation deployed the military component of the operation.

Only four cases qualify to the above criteria – Cambodia, Mozambique, Rwanda and El Salvador – which are portrayed shortly.

Before turning to the cases it must be stressed that although, for the purpose of measuring durability, pre-1997 operations are chosen, this does not make the results of the research less relevant for contemporary operations. The policy instruments implemented in the cases studied are generally very similar to, if not the same as, those in present day operations. Furthermore, the underlying processes that explain the cases are still the same as they follow from the same sort of conflict processes and operational dynamics and the policy tools operations implement. The United Nations has, however, learned several lessons and is nowadays, among other things, privy to more robust (chapter VII) mandates and a more integrated approach better able to coop with some of the problems faced in the past.

Cambodia

⁴⁹ A. Beth Fetherston, 'Putting the Peace back in to Peacekeeping: Theory Must Inform Practice', *International Peacekeeping*, vol.1, no.1, 1994, pp.3-29.

Between 1991 and 1993 the United Nations was present in Cambodia with two operations, the United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC) followed by the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). Both operations aimed to implement the Paris Agreements between the Khmer Rouge, the Phnom Penh regime, the royalist *Front Uni National pour un Cambodge Indépendant, Neutre, Pacifique, et Coopératif* (FUNCINPEC) and the republican Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF). The cold war had drawn to an end and the major powers supported a solution for the Cambodian conflict in order to distance themselves without the loss of face. The conflicting parties gave in to the pressure from their patrons partly because the conflict had reached a stalemate. Nonetheless, they lacked trust in each other and felt insecure. The agreement allowed differing interpretations, what caused disagreement and further mistrust. Unfortunately the deployment of the UNTAC was sluggish, and its implementation was too weak according to the Khmer Rouge. This party did not feel that UNTAC would safeguard its security if it would demobilise and withdrew from the peace process. The Khmer Rouge felt it could survive with the support of Thailand and China. The remaining parties decided to continue without the Khmer Rouge under the skilful guidance of Special Representative of the Secretary General Akashi. The Security Council supported his non-violent approach and although the Khmer Rouge threatened to disturb the peace process it never did. About 360,000 refugees were repatriated and when UNTAC left the republicans and royalists were more or less fully demobilised and disarmed. Furthermore, elections were successfully organised and a number of civil society organisations were established. Other issues like reintegration of refugees were less successful due to a lack of coordination within the operation. Although the royalists won the elections, the Phnom Penh regime managed to maintain its position in government through the threat of violence. After the 'coalition government' was formed UNTAC quickly left, leaving behind an unstable country in which the government continued to struggle for some years against the Khmer Rouge. Nonetheless, after UNTAC left and without the continuing support of China, Thailand and the population the Khmer Rouge was eventually doomed to waste away, as it did in 1998. Nowadays, Cambodia is a peaceful, albeit very weak democracy.⁵⁰

⁵⁰ For good literature on the case study of Cambodia which has been frequently used in this research, see: Nassrine Azimi, *The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC): Debriefing and Lessons. Report and Recommendations of the International Conference Singapore, August 1994* (London, The Hague and Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1995); David P. Chandler, *A History of Cambodia* (Boulder and Oxford: Westview Press; 2nd edition, 1996); Michael W. Doyle, *UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia, UNTAC's Civil Mandate* (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, 1995); Trevor Findlay, *Cambodia: The Legacy and Lessons of UNTAC, SIPRI Research Report*, no.9 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); Steve Heder and Judy Ledgerwood (eds.), *Propaganda, Politics, and Violence in Cambodia: Democratic Transition under United Nations Peacekeeping* (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1996); Janet E. Heininger, *Peacekeeping in Transition: The United Nations in*

Mozambique

The United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) was deployed from 1992 to 1994. The aim of the operation was to assist in the implementation of the General Peace Agreement, which was signed in Rome by the *Frente de Libertação de Moçambique* (FRELIMO) government and *Resistência Nacional Moçambicana* (RENAMO). Although the conflict in Mozambique had only partly been related to the cold war, the peace process was able to ride the wave of its termination. More important, however, was the fact that in the meantime the apartheid regime in South Africa had ended and Pretoria started to cooperate with Frontline States, like Mozambique. As a consequence RENAMO lost an important cornerstone of its strength. Nonetheless, confidence between the parties was still very weak and ONUMOZ's slow deployment contributed to instability. Until after their start, the participation of RENAMO in the elections remained uncertain. Only after the first day of the elections did the RENAMO leadership decide to participate in them, which it eventually lost. Nonetheless, RENAMO continued to cooperate with ONUMOZ. This is in large part due to the diplomatic skills of the ONUMOZ leadership. Like in Cambodia the elections received priority over most other issues and consequently suffered because of a lack of attention. Mozambique would certainly not become a text book example of a well-functioning democracy because the operation did not have sufficient time to address human rights and democracy issues. Also the sustainability of many rehabilitation projects was limited as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) did not follow-up on many of these. Moreover, in some cases the Mozambican parties felt solutions were externally imposed. Nonetheless, the demilitarization of the country was eventually nearly complete and the struggle between RENAMO and FRELIMO was, in the end, continued within the political arena.⁵¹

Cambodia (New York: Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1994); Sorpong Peou, *Conflict Neutralization in the Cambodia War: From Battlefield to Ballot-Box* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1997); David W. Roberts, *Political Transition in Cambodia 1991-1999: Power, Elitism and Democracy* (Cornwall: Curzon, 2001); and United Nations, *The United Nations and Cambodia: 1991-1995, Blue Books Series*, No.2 (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1995).

⁵¹ For good literature on the case study of Mozambique which has been frequently used in this research, see: Chris Alden, 'The UN and the Resolution of Conflict in Mozambique', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol.33, no.1, 1995, pp.103-128; Jeremy Armon, Dylan Hendrickson and Alex Vines, 'The Mozambican Peace Process in Perspective', *Accord*, no. 3, (London: Conciliation Resources, 1998); Cameron Hume, *Ending Mozambique's War: The Role of Mediation and Good Offices* (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1994); Dennis C. Jett, 'Lessons Unlearned: Or Why Mozambique's Successful Peacekeeping Operation Might Not Be Replicated Elsewhere', *Journal of Humanitarian Assistance* (<http://www.jha.ac/Ref/aar008.htm>) (document posted 2002); Malyn Newitt, *A History of Mozambique* (London: Hurst, 1995); Richard Synge, *Mozambique: UN Peacekeeping in Action 1992-94* (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997); United Nations, *The United Nations and Mozambique: 1992-1995, Blue Books Series*, no.5 (New York: United

Rwanda

In 1993 the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) was deployed on the basis of the Arusha Peace Agreement. This agreement between the Government of Rwanda and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) was very detailed in many aspects, but did not provide the United Nations with a role on many essential issues that caused the conflict to begin, such as human rights and elections. Next to France no other major power was interested in the developments in Rwanda. This was expressed in the size and mandate of the operation. Moreover, although President Habyarimana had signed the agreement under heavy pressure from the international community, a large share of his supporters fiercely opposed it. UNAMIR was deployed relatively rapidly, but still later than the parties had hoped it would. As a consequence a number of deadlines were not reached and distrust between the parties became even stronger. After the civil war between Hutu and Tutsi flared up again in neighbouring Burundi, inter-ethnic relations within Rwanda polarized sharply. Implementation of a number of issues lagged further behind and the Security Council hoped to pressure the parties by threatening to withdraw UNAMIR if deadlines were not met. When, subsequently, President Habyarimana was killed when his plane was shot down, the Hutu elite, out of fear for losing their position and overwhelmingly supported by the Hutu population, started a genocide on the Tutsi. Next, UNAMIR and the rest of the international community stood by and watched from the sideline when about 800,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu were slaughtered. Special Representative of the Secretary-General Booh Booh hoped to mediate a truth between the parties, in the face of genocide, which the RPF rejected. Worse, the capacity of UNAMIR was decreased out of fear for the lives of the peacekeepers. The only major power willing to intervene, France, had supported the Hutu elites for many years. Eventually the genocide was only ended by the RPF when it took over power. Millions of Hutu, however, fled to Zaire and Tanzania out of fear of this RPF advance. The French did establish the *zone Turquoise* to alleviate the humanitarian situation, but this region was also where the genocide continued longest. In spite of the fact that UNAMIR remained in Rwanda until 1996, with the genocide it lost its aim to implement the Arusha Agreement. Under the authoritarian regime of the RPF the tensions between the Tutsi and the Hutu were not removed,

Nations Department of Public Information, 1995); Alex Vines, *RENAMO: From Terrorism to Democracy in Mozambique?* (London: James Currey, revised and updated edition, 1996).

but merely suppressed. Nonetheless, for the time being Rwanda knows relative negative peace, albeit at the cost of stability in the Democratic Republic of Congo.⁵²

El Salvador

The United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) commenced in 1991 to implement the Agreement on Human Rights agreement between the Government of El Salvador and the *Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional* (FMLN). In 1992, after the signing of the Chapultepec Agreement, in addition to the human rights component, the rest of the operation was quickly deployed. Confidence between the parties remained absent for a long time and the implementation of the accord had to be renegotiated continuously. The leadership of ONUSAL was essential in the success of these renegotiations. During this process the role of ONUSAL only increased further, enabling it to gain more and more control of the peace process. The peace process was close to collapse when secret arms caches of the FMLN were discovered, while at the same time right wing death squads continued to operate. Nonetheless, the conflicting parties chose to continue on the road to peace. They were supported to stay on this road by not only ONUSAL but also a broader group of amongst other partners civil society, the neighbouring countries, Washington DC and Moscow. Cooperation between ONUSAL and especially the World Bank was, however, sometimes difficult. The World Bank's Structural Adjustment Programmes barely allowed sufficient funds for the government to pay for the demilitarisation of the country. Although the FMLN lost the elections, it successfully made the transition from rebel organisation to political party, and participated fully in a peaceful and democratic country. In 1995 ONUSAL ended, when El Salvador was demilitarised, effectively ending one of the last cold war proxy wars.⁵³

⁵² For good literature on the case study of Rwanda which has been frequently used in this research, see: Howard Adelman and Astrid Suhrke, *The Path of a Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire* (New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 1999); Michael Barnett, *Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2002); Romeo Dallaire [with Brent Beardsley], *Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda* (Toronto: Random House Canada, 2003). Alison Des Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999); Bruce D. Jones, *Peacemaking in Rwanda: The Dynamics of Failure* (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, 2001); Gerard Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997); Filip Reyntjens, *Rwanda. Trois jours qui ont fait basculer l'histoire*, *Cahiers Africains*, no.16 (Brussels and Paris: Institut Africain-CEDAF, 1995); United Nations, *The United Nations and Rwanda: 1993-1996, Blue Books Series*, no.10 (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996); Peter Uvin, *Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda* (West Harford: Kumarian Press, 1998); and Peter Uvin, 'Reading the Rwandan Genocide', *International Studies Review*, vol.3, no.3, 2001, pp.75-99.

⁵³ For good literature on the case study of El Salvador which has been frequently used in this research, see: Ian Johnstone, *Rights and Reconciliation: UN Strategies in El Salvador* (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, 1995); Terry L. Karl, 'El Salvador's Negotiated Revolution', *Foreign Affairs*, vol.71, no.2, 1992, pp.147-164; Tommie S. Montgomery, 'Getting to Peace in El Salvador: The Roles of the United Nations Secretariat and ONUSAL', *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, vol.37, no.4, 1995, pp.139-172; Margaret Pop-

Factors for Success and Failure UN Peace-Building Operations: The Cases

Consent, Willingness and Sincerity

The cases show that only if parties have the sincere intention to come to peace, a UN peace-building operation can contribute to durable peace. In Mozambique and El Salvador this sincere intention was present amongst all parties because, among other reasons, the opposition parties did not have alternative ways to finance the struggle. In both Cambodia and Rwanda the ‘spoilers’ saw an alternative road of conflict, which was preferred to the peace process. In Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge was either not sincere or lost faith in the process at the beginning of the operation, when it started to regard UNTAC as too weak of a security guarantee and saw no alternatives to conflict. Moreover, it was able to continue the struggle for a few more years as it controlled a gem and logging industry. The lack of sincerity of the Phnom Penh regime became obvious when, after losing the elections, it resorted to the threat of violence to remain in power. In the case of Rwanda the implementation of the Arusha Agreement was not in the interest of the Hutu extremists, as it was likely that after the elections they would no longer be able to reap the privileges and incomes of their government positions. Among other reasons, to defend these positions they subsequently started the genocide in which they killed the competitors for their jobs. However, the RPF was also eager to pick up arms again, because it felt that due to international intervention it had not been able to fully pursue the military option. The reason why willingness and sincerity is needed is that, not even taking into account the discussion whether one can enforce peace upon unwilling parties, peace-building operations, even when mandated under chapter VII of the Charter, are generally neither prepared, nor equipped and sized to fight wars. Both UNTAC and UNAMIR proved to be unable to deal with the ‘spoilers’.

Impartiality and the Non-Use of Force

kin, *Peace without Justice: Obstacles to Building the Rule of Law in El Salvador* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000); Salvador Samayoa, *El Salvador: La reforma pactada* (San Salvador: UCA Editores, 2003); United Nations, *The United Nations and El Salvador: 1990-1995, Blue Books Series*, no.4 (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1995).

The principle of non-use of force is, according to this research, not relevant to the success or failure of an operation. Rather the opposite, the use of force or at least the threat of it may be important to ensure success. In Rwanda this is the case as, according to force commander Dallaire, the use of force might have prevented the genocide.⁵⁴ Also in Cambodia one may wonder whether a tougher stance would not have improved the result.⁵⁵ In Mozambique and El Salvador there was never the need to use force. Nonetheless, all parties reasoned they would receive support from the ‘international community’ if others would break the peace agreement. As such, it appears from the cases that credibility of the threat of the use of force is of great importance to the factor ‘sense of security of the parties’ (see below). Parties feel more secure if they know that if the others in the peace process do not keep up their part of the bargain, they will be defended against them. This may include the use of force. Impartiality, on the other hand, is a border that may be dangerous to cross, as it follows from all cases that fighting a war was neither in the mandate of the UN peace-building operations, nor were the operations prepared, equipped and sized for it.

Co-Operation from Important Outside Actors

The cases show that, as found in the literature on UN peacekeeping operations, without the co-operation of neighbouring countries and the permanent members of the Security Council the chances for a positive contribution by a UN peace-building operation to durable peace decreases strongly. Support of the permanent members of the Security Council is important because unity in the Council is not only needed to provide the mandate and resources, but can also be used to pressure proxies into compliance. The co-operation from neighbouring countries is essential because often these countries support one of the parties and many policy instruments, like the monitoring of borders and the verification of the withdrawal of foreign forces, require their assistance. In Mozambique and El Salvador due to the end of the cold war the international conflict ended, but also the regional conflict was terminated. Consequently the Security Council and the neighbouring countries fully supported the UN peace-building operations present. In Cambodia, although the Security Council and Thailand had formally agreed with the Paris Agreement, in practise the co-operation of Thailand and China with UNTAC was not optimal. Both continued to support the Khmer Rouge and Thailand

⁵⁴ Scot R. Feil, *Preventing Genocide: How the Early Use of Force Might Have Succeeded in Rwanda* (New York: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, 1998).

⁵⁵ Findlay, *Cambodia: The Legacy and Lessons of UNTAC*.

frustrated the establishment of border control posts at its territory. Rwanda lacked a major characteristic of the other three conflicts; it was not a cold war proxy conflict. As a result, the United States, Russia and China lacked interests and remained less involved, while countries such as France, Uganda and Zaire continued their support to the parties.

Sense of Security of the Parties

Also from the cases it appears that a short term danger is lurking at the start of the operation, because although the parties may view the projected durable peace as the best alternative, the road towards that future will be perceived as and often is bumpy. The parties perceive their security to increase through cease-fire monitoring, especially if a credible, large, well trained and equipped, and robustly mandated force is thought to come to their rescue when needed during the demilitarisation process. Also the monitoring of human rights, the civilian police and the civil administration can contribute to this sense of security. In Rwanda, UNAMIR was unable to provide in such a sense of security. Both sides feared being massacred by the other and as they knew UNAMIR would not act in such a case, they rearmed. In Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge felt insecure as it deemed UNTAC too weak and inactive. It decided to leave the peace process, which in turn held back the Phnom Penh regime from demilitarising. In El Salvador and, to a lesser extent, Mozambique the operations were much more able to provide the needed sense of security. Nonetheless, even in those two cases the parties held back secret arms caches to be used when they felt the military option would be more fruitful than negotiation.

Clear, Appropriate and Achievable Mandate

Although in the literature a clear, appropriate and achievable mandate is regarded to be of great importance for the implementation and success of an operation, the cases do not necessarily confirm this for UN peace-building operations. The Arusha peace agreement, the basis for the mandate of UNAMIR, is one of the most detailed accords, but was not able to prevent the genocide in Rwanda. Yet, in the case of El Salvador the vagueness of the Chapultepec agreement allowed ONUSAL to slowly grow and direct the peace process. As a result of the need to continue the negotiations during the presence of the operation, ONUSAL was able to

create a ‘carefully-chosen, constructive “mission creep”’.⁵⁶ It has to be said though that in the case of Cambodia, the Paris Peace Agreements were sufficiently vague to allow mistrust to trickle in. Consequently, the role of clarity of and detail in mandates is still not clear. It appears, however, that half-hearted or compromise mandates are inherently dangerous. This is especially relevant regarding the mandate that is finally negotiated in the Security Council. If the permanent five disagree or only reluctantly agree this may provide operations with an inadequate mandate or with inadequate means to implement mandates. This was the case in Rwanda and partially in Cambodia, but much less so in the other two cases. Such half-hearted compromise Security Council mandates and inadequate means are much more the crux of the problem. Nonetheless, this has already been treated under the factor ‘Co-operation from important outside actors’.

Timely Deployment and at the Right Time

It follows from the cases that, indeed, the interval between the signing of the peace agreement and the deployment of the UN peace-building operation should be kept to a minimum. The fact that in Rwanda the deployment of UNAMIR was later than the parties planned contributed to the parties’ loss of trust in the deadlines of their agreements and in each other. In Cambodia and Mozambique, the slow and late deployment of the operations also contributed to instability, especially during the start of the operation. In the case of Cambodia this is also likely to have contributed to the decision of the Khmer Rouge to leave the peace process. In El Salvador the human rights division was already present before the signing of the peace agreement and the military component was transferred immediately from the United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA). As a result, the situation remained more stable.

The case studies demonstrate that right timing is very important to the contribution of an operation as well. In El Salvador and Mozambique the conflicts were ripe for resolution and both parties saw future possibilities to continue the conflict diminish. In Cambodia a mutually hurting stalemate had appeared on the battlefield, but the Khmer Rouge remained belligerent for a few more years. In Rwanda the conflict was not ripe at all, as both parties argued there was more to win in the continuation of the conflict. They were, however, pushed

⁵⁶ William Stanley and David Holiday, ‘Peace Mission Strategy and Domestic Actors: UN Mediation, Verification and Institution-Building in El Salvador’, *International Peacekeeping*, vol.4, no.2, 1997, pp.22-49.

to the negotiations table by the international community. Thus, if a conflict is not yet ripe, a UN peace-building operation cannot play its accommodating role.

Competent Leadership and Personnel, and Clear Command Structures

From the case studies as well it appears that leadership is important, especially with regard to the continuing mediation role during the presence of an operation. In Mozambique Ajello managed to shepherd the peace process and ONUMOZ through critical moments, especially at the time of the elections. In El Salvador the leadership of Riza, Ocampo and Ter Horst, aided by Goulding, was essential in continuous renegotiations. This leadership was absent in Rwanda where Booh-Booh was not respected and not taken serious by the parties. Although Akashi, in Cambodia, skilfully managed to continue the peace process in spite of all the problems, he has been criticised for not taking a stronger approach. His critics argue that a tougher stance might have prevented the problems all together. Furthermore, in all four cases the operations suffered from incompetent military and civilian police officers, who often became a public relations problem. Clear command structures proved to be important especially in extreme situations. In the case of Rwanda the lack of clarity and friction between Kigali and UN headquarters in New York caused UNAMIR and New York to make the wrong decisions at a time of genocide.⁵⁷

Sufficiently Long Duration

The cases show that, indeed, in order to contribute sufficiently to negative peace and especially to address the causes of the conflict, time is needed. Based upon considerations of cost the Security Council, however, tries to keep the duration of the operation to a minimum and consequently drawdown is frequently started before the situation on the ground allows it, thereby preventing the creation of negative peace. In Mozambique and Cambodia this led to a deteriorated security situation and in the case of Mozambique, especially, to the premature end of the disarmament process. In Rwanda the United Nations even threatened to withdraw its forces and partially did so later when those who committed the genocide could only applaud the drawdown. El Salvador was the only case where the military component stayed sufficiently long to implement all of its tasks. In all four cases the causes of conflict were

⁵⁷ Independent Inquiry, Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda.

only partly addressed, because to deal with them is a long process which cannot be finished within a time frame limited by Security Council demands for financial parsimony. Consequently, many of these processes were started by the UN peace-building operation, but critical follow-up work was the aegis of other organizations in the field, like UNDP, the World Bank, and the UNHCR. This was not always sufficient. Nonetheless, the cases show that a long duration of a UN peace-building operation is not necessarily needed if the operation is embedded into the long-term approach of the organizations on the ground.

Internal and External Co-Ordination

Also from the case studies, it follows that internal and external co-ordination is very important. As the implementation of policy tools is not a singular process, but instead relies on the successful implementation of other policy tools, internal co-ordination is paramount. There were two problems in the cases in this respect. First, important policy tools were sometimes rushed in order to be completed in time for another. In the name of expediency, quality was sacrificed. In Cambodia and Mozambique, for example, the operations had to rush, *inter alia*, demobilisation and repatriation to facilitate elections. Second, two complementary policy tools sometimes failed to link up with each other and then a too large window of time could arise between these two processes. In such a case, it was the quality of the second policy tool that suffered. This problem was present in all cases where reintegration followed repatriation of refugees and reintegration followed demobilisation of ex-combatants. External co-ordination also faced two problems. First, during the operation, other organisations, like non-governmental organisations and international financial institutions, did not retreat and continued to be active. Thus, their actions sometimes thwarted each other because they were not always sufficiently co-ordinated. In the case of El Salvador, De Soto described the co-operative context between the World Bank and ONUSAL as two doctors working on a patient without knowing what the other one is doing.⁵⁸ Second, since after the departure of an operation the results of some policy tools must be maintained – e.g. newly built bridges or improved human rights situations – the lack of co-ordination with the organisation responsible for the follow-up sometimes affected the sustainability of the contribution. In all four cases, the co-ordination with UNDP, was especially important, because the organisation had to continue good governance, disarmament and reintegration programmes.

⁵⁸ Alvaro De Soto and Graciana del Castillo, 'Obstacles to Peacebuilding', *Foreign Policy*, no.94, 1994, pp.69-83.

'Ownership'

The cases show that something like 'ownership' is needed to ensure that the contribution made by the operation is sustainable. During the presence of an operation, placing the parties at the same table to confront concrete problems functioned not only to provide them with 'ownership' of the process, but also to reconcile their problems. In Mozambique the talks on humanitarian aid and in Cambodia on day-to-day military affairs contributed to this. Nonetheless, in all cases parties complained that they were not sufficiently involved in decisions on what should be done and what was important. Especially in Mozambique this left them with the impression that some solutions were imposed, which undermined their intentions to cultivate positive outcomes. This brings us to the problem of 'ownership' after the departure of the operation. In all cases the new governments tended to view the improvements in human rights and good governance not to be their own. The parties tended to fall back into their habits of lacking of good governance, ruling autocratically and violating human rights. Cambodia and El Salvador show, however, that involving civil society enhances 'ownership' for the future. In those cases human rights organisations were incorporated and aided to counter-balance the pernicious habits of the governments.

Causes of the Conflict

The factor 'causes of the conflict' proves to be very important in the cases. The more causes were addressed – the breadth – and the more attention was given to each cause – the depth, the more successful the operation. In El Salvador, Cambodia and Mozambique more attention was given to the causes of conflict than in Rwanda. It is very likely that this explains the different outcome for Rwanda. Moreover, in El Salvador this attention was more thorough than in Cambodia and Mozambique, which contributed to the more stable situation in the first case. In the short term, the lack of good governance and the lack of legitimacy of the government were important causes of conflict to be addressed. Particularly in El Salvador the causes of conflict were addressed in depth. In Mozambique and Cambodia this was done as well, although to a lesser extent. In Rwanda, while these two causes lay at the exact heart of the conflict, UNAMIR barely touched upon good governance issues and the legitimacy of the government was not even intended to be addressed. In the long run, however, the other causes of conflict need to be addressed as well. Nonetheless, although economic issues are important

causes of conflict, they received very little or no attention at all. The same is the case with the improvement of the relations between the conflicting groups, although national reconciliation is often especially regarded as the basis for durable peace. Also the strength of the state and its institutions, vital for stability in the long-term, received too often too little attention.

Conclusions

Testing the clusters of factors for success and failure for UN peacekeeping operations, as gathered from literature, against the four case studies of UN peace-building operations shows that this research confirms eight of the eleven factors found in literature without conditions. ‘Consent, willingness and sincerity’, ‘Co-operation from important outside actors’, ‘Sense of security of the parties’, ‘Timely deployment and at the right time’, ‘Competent leadership and personnel, and clear command structures’, ‘Internal and external co-ordination’, ‘Ownership’ and ‘Causes of the conflict’ prove to be also very important factors for success and failure of UN peace-building operations. Nonetheless, in the case studies of UN peace-building operations the factors ‘Sense of security of the parties’ and ‘Causes of the conflict’ appear to be more important than in the literature on UN peacekeeping operations. Furthermore, in principle, the factor ‘Sufficiently long duration’ is also confirmed, but might be better rephrased to include the fact that embedding the UN peace-building operation into a long-term approach might make long duration unnecessary. Finally, the factors ‘Impartiality and the non-use of force’ and ‘Clear, appropriate and achievable mandate’ are, however, rejected. The use of force or at least the threat of it may sometimes be necessary to help the parties to feel secure. A vague mandate may sometimes be very useful to expand the influence of the operation, while a detailed mandate sometimes provides too many hurdles not to stumble.

In short, although the established theory of factors for success and failure for UN peacekeeping operations largely prove to be valid for the four cases of UN peace-building operations, the above proves that theory of UN peace-building operations still needs adjustment and fine tuning. Some of these adjustments are lessons which also have been learned in the practice of the UN peacekeeping operations deployed since the time of the four case studies. Present-day UN peace-building operations are, for example, generally robustly mandated. Albeit the research of the last ten to fifteen years has produced a lot of theory and knowledge, it has so far not fully produced a blueprint for successful UN peace-building operations. Ad-

vanced research, but also the new experiences of future operations, will hopefully provide more pieces to further solve this puzzle.