Traces of Change

Dynamics in cultural heritage preservation arrangements in Norway, Arizona and the Netherlands

Sara de Boer
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Een wetenschappelijke proeve op het gebied van de Managementwetenschappen

Proefschrift
ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan de Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen
op gezag van de rector magnificus, prof. mr. S.C.J.J. Kortmann volgens besluit van het college van decanen in het openbaar te verdedigen op dinsdag 12 januari 2010 om 15.30 uur precies

door

Sara de Boer
geboren op 29 maart 1976
te Nieuwkoop
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Wie bepaalt welke gebouwen, structuren en landschappen tot ons cultureel erfgoed behoren en als zodanig beschermd moeten worden? En op welke gronden gebeurt dat?

In het publieke domein hanteren experts en beleidsmakers criteria als historische betekenis, artistieke en esthetische waarde, belang voor nationale, regionale of lokale identiteit en bijdrage aan ruimtelijke kwaliteit. In de privé-omgeving spelen echter heel andere motieven een rol bij de vraag waarom we gebouwen of andere elementen in onze fysieke leefomgeving waardevol en behoudenswaardig vinden. Daarbij zijn herinneringen, associaties en emoties een belangrijke factor.

Zo is het oude, kleine, witte huisje dat op de omslag van dit boek staat afgebeeld voor mij en mijn familie van onschatbare waarde, terwijl het geen enkele monumentale status heeft. Het huisje staat aan de rand van het dorpje Oostkapelle op het Zeeuwse schiereiland Walcheren. Het is daar in 1901 als arbeiderswoning gebouwd van sloopafval. In de oude houten balken van het plafond kun je nog zien waar vroeger de bedsteden zaten. En tot op de dag van vandaag vertonen de muren de sporen (vochtplekken) van de inundatie van Walcheren (strategische onderwaterzetting door de Geallieerden, 1944-1946).


Een gebouw, ongeacht zijn historische, artistieke of esthetische waarde, krijgt pas echt betekenis door de mensen die er om wat voor reden dan ook binding mee hebben of waarde aan toekennen. Hetzelfde geldt in zekere zin voor dit proefschrift. Het schrijven ervan heb ik grotendeels alleen en in eenzaamheid gedaan en dit vormde de afgelopen jaren een belangrijk deel van mijn leven. Het krijgt nu betekenis door de mensen die het lezen en zich er een mening over vormen. Eerder kreeg het voor mij persoonlijk al betekenis door de voldoening die elke behaalde mijlpaal (hoe klein ook) bracht en zeker ook door de vele gesprekken met familie, vrienden en collega’s over de ‘ups’ en ‘downs’ die met het schrijven gepaard gingen. Zonder hun oprechte interesse, onvoorwaardelijke steun en constructieve feedback zou ik er niet in geslaagd zijn me hier negen jaar lang in vast te bijten. Ik ben hen daar ontzettend dankbaar voor.

Met plezier kijk ik terug op mijn tijd aan de faculteit Managementwetenschappen in Nijmegen. Veel goede herinneringen heb ik aan de samenwerking met collega’s van de leerstoelgroepen Bestuurskunde en Politicologie, het onderzoeksprogramma Governance and Places en niet te vergeten de AI0-kamer. Onmisbaar waren de lunches, borrels en etentjes met collega-AIO’s. Femke, Mirjam, ik hoop jullie de komende tijd weer wat vaker te zien.

De jaren erna bij Alterra in Wageningen waren onvergetelijk. Ine, Froukje, Wiebren, Mariëlle, Jan, wat hebben we leuke, interessante en leerzame onderzoeksprojecten gedaan samen. Bedankt voor heel veel werkplezier en jullie morele steun al die jaren dat mijn proefschrift ‘bijna’ af was. Rosalie, ik denk nog vaak terug aan onze gezellige carpoolavonturen als ik in mijn eentje in de trein naar Den Bosch rijd. Ik hoor het graag als je nog eens een lift nodig hebt.

Inmiddels werk ik alweer bijna een jaar bij de afdeling Integraal Beleid van Waterschap Aa en Maas in Den Bosch. Na acht jaar onderzoek te hebben gedaan naar dynamiek en diversiteit in beleidsprocessen rond cultureel erfgoed, landschap, natuur, milieu en water, krijg ik hier de kans mijn kennis en ervaring op dit vlak in de praktijk te brengen. Behalve leuke en inspirerende collega’s heeft me blij dat het afgelopen jaar veel nieuwe inzichten en een hoop voldoening opgeleverd. IB-ers en andere collega’s binnen en buiten Aa en Maas, ik kijk er naar uit ook de komende jaren met jullie nieuwe uitdagingen aan te gaan.

Mijn volleybalteam bij VoCASA in Nijmegen mag zeker niet onvermeld blijven. In wisselende samenstellingen hebben we al heel veel seizoenen het volleybalveld in menige sporthal onveilig gemaakt. Dat was voor mij een onmisbare uitlaatklep. Nicolet, jij bent niet alleen ontzettend leuk als teamgenoot, maar ook nog eens geweldig goed in je werk als grafisch vormgever. Bedankt voor je hulp, adviezen en engelengeduld de afgelopen maanden. Het resultaat mag er zijn.

Walstraters, als ik aan jullie denk, verschijnt er een grote glimlach op mijn gezicht. Mijn leven veranderde sinds je bestaan en ik kan niet wachten tot jullie er zijn.

Mira, wat hebben we veel meegemaakt samen de afgelopen jaren: gevolleybald, gefitnest, gefeest en toen bijna tegelijkertijd verliefd geworden, gesetteld, kinderen gekregen. Dankjewel voor je vriendschap en steun al meer dan vijftien jaar.

Remke, je bent al heel mijn leven een bijzondere vriendin. Onze weekenden samen, waarin ik even niet aan mijn proefschrift hoefde te denken, waren voor mij heel waardevol. Ik hoop dat 2010 niet alleen voor (Eric en) mij, maar zeker ook voor jou en Joost een gedenkwaardig jaar wordt.

Renze, Marianne, wat toepasselijk dat jullie me als paramiften bijstaan in de allerlaatste fase van mijn promotietraject. Als grote broer en nicht hebben jullie, ieder op je eigen manier en vaak zonder het je te realiseren, een belangrijke rol gespeeld bij ‘grote’ keuzes in mijn leven.

Tiny, Thijs, ik ben ongelooflijk trots, gelukkig en dankbaar dat jullie mijn ouders zijn. Jullie onvoorwaardelijke liefde en steun, maar ook jullie wijze raad en kritische blik draag ik voor altijd mee.

Lieve Eric, wat is mijn leven veranderd sinds de tijd dat we samen aan de Walstraat woonden. Van goede vriend en sportmaatje ben je uitgegroeid tot grote liefde. Jij haalt het mooiste in mensen naar boven. Wat een geluksvogel ben ik.

Lieve Tessa, tegen de tijd dat jij dit kunt lezen weet je al niks meer van mijn ‘werk op zolder’. Zonder je daar bewust van te zijn heb je een heel nieuwe wereld voor me geopend: een wereld van verwondering, vertederen, herkenning, moederliefde. Dat maakt al het andere betrekkelijk.

En jij, lief, klein wondertje in mijn buik, ik kan niet wachten tot je er bent. Samen nieuwe avonturen tegemoet!

Sara de Boer, november 2009
DYNAMICS IN CULTURAL HERITAGE PRESERVATION
1.1 Introduction

Cultural heritage is receiving a lot of attention these days. In our globalizing world, it has become an important factor in providing people with a sense of place and identity. Archeological sites, architectural masterpieces, historic urban and rural landscapes: all have become symbols of cultural identity and collective memory and their preservation is given more and more political priority, both nationally and internationally (Arizpe 1999, Goverde 2000, Knox and Marston 1998, Nelissen et al. 2000). Moreover, as our stock of cultural heritage grows bigger, with new categories of buildings and sites being recognized for their cultural-historic value every day, preservationists are confronted with a growing amount of work. At the same time, they are facing a great deal of hostility and resistance. Preservation efforts are criticized for being expensive, elitist and interfering with private property rights. Despite evidence that cultural heritage preservation contributes to the viability and prosperity of cities and regions, it is often seen as a brake on spatial and economic development (Clark 2000). All things considered, cultural heritage preservationists are facing some difficult challenges nowadays. As Lowenthal (2000:18) puts it: “Cultural heritage is much in vogue. It is also in serious trouble.”

This book is about the policy practices through which individuals and organizations attempt to deal with current challenges in the field of cultural heritage preservation. Furthermore, it analyzes the dynamics that are occurring in these policy practices. From the very beginning of my study, I have been fascinated by a number of developments that seem to be taking place in Western society. I would like to emphasize here that whenever I speak of Western society or Western states in this thesis, I refer to the economically and technologically well-developed states in Western Europe and Northern America with a relatively long tradition of constitutional democracy. The developments that fascinate me involve the emergence of new definitions of cultural heritage, the introduction of new policy problems and policy solutions, and the involvement of new policy actors in cultural heritage preservation. Three examples that I have come across during my study illustrate the kinds of dynamics that I am interested in. They are described in the following sections. First, the example of Utstein Kloster involves the preservation of a medieval monastery and its surrounding landscape near the village of Rennesøy in Norway. The second example deals with the redevelopment of the historic Hayden Flour Mill complex in Tempe, Arizona. Finally, the Hessenberg example involves the redevelopment of a historic site in the city center of Nijmegen, my hometown.

1.1.1 The Utstein Monastery in Rennesøy, Norway

Rennesøy, a rural community located on Norway’s west coast near the city of Stavanger, is one of the municipalities with the highest density of protected heritage sites in Norway. Rennesøy’s cultural landscape has been formed by human occupation and agricultural activity during thousands of years. It shows traces from the Stone Age to the present day. The most prominent heritage site in Rennesøy is Utstein Kloster, the best-preserved medieval monastery in Norway, and its surrounding landscape. Throughout history, the Utstein area has successively accommodated the seat of a Viking chief, a monastery, a king’s manor and a private residence. Today, Utstein Kloster is a popular tourist attraction and the monastery complex serves as a conference center. The extensive rural area surrounding the monastery is still owned by farmers (Miljøverndepartementet 1999, Rennesøy Kommune 2004a, 2004b, 2004c, Riksantikvaren 2004).

In 1999, the Norwegian government decided to protect the Utstein area as one of the first cultural environments under the renewed Norwegian Cultural Heritage Act of 1992. The protection order applies to both the monastery and the cultural landscape, covering parts of the islands Klosterøy and Fjøløy and the surrounding fjord. The main goal is to preserve Utstein’s characteristic agricultural landscape. However, since the protection order also affects the farms at Utstein, it is emphasized that the agricultural activities and developments in the area must not be hindered. The protection order implies that the property owners need government approval for any alternative or development affecting the cultural landscape. In return, the farmers can request financial compensation from the government for any extra costs related to the preservation of Utstein’s cultural landscape (Miljøverndepartementet 1999, Riksantikvaren 2004).

Whereas Norway’s Ministry of the Environment took the initiative to protect the Utstein cultural environment, the Rogaland county government was responsible for creating a broadly supported management plan to regulate the day-to-day maintenance, use and development of the area. For that purpose, a regional cooperative body was set up, comprising representatives of the property owners at Utstein, the municipality of Rennesøy and the Rogaland county government (Miljøverndepartementet 1999). At an early stage in the cooperative process, the county government wrote a first draft for the management plan. It included a comprehensive overview of all the practical implications the protection order would have for the farmers at Utstein. Although initially, the farmers had been very content with the protected status of Utstein because it would protect them against any unwanted development, they were very critical about the proposed management plan. Basically, they felt they would suddenly lose control over their property whereas for centuries, their families had been responsible for maintaining and developing the area. Moreover, the property owners were unsatisfied with the limited possibilities for financial support.

The Rogaland county government tried to solve the conflict by writing a second, less comprehensive and more owner-oriented management plan. Nevertheless, the farmers had lost their faith in the authorities and decided to participate no longer in the cooperative body. As a consequence, no management plan was established for the Utstein cultural environment. Instead, the Rogaland county government attempted to control the activities and developments affecting Utstein’s cultural landscape by means of its agricultural policy. One of the responsibilities of county governments in Norway involves the distribution of state subsidies for the agricultural sector. In order to be eligible for such subsidies, farmers need to write applications in which they account for their activities, including the way they deal with the cultural-historic values of their property. For the Utstein Kloster cultural environment, the subsidy scheme was considered a suitable instrument to control the daily maintenance and use of the historic landscape.
In summary, this example demonstrates that in Norway, the definition of cultural heritage has been broadened to include entire cultural landscapes or environments. Furthermore, the example shows that the Rogaland county government started a decentralized, interactive policy process involving all interested parties with the intention of creating support for the preservation of a significant cultural landscape. Finally, this example involves an attempt to arrive at a pragmatic solution that is attuned to all interests involved, including cultural heritage and agricultural interests.

1.1.2 The Hayden Flour Mill in Tempe, Arizona

Although the city of Tempe has a relatively short history, it is one of the oldest communities in the metropolitan area of Phoenix, the capital city of Arizona. Tempe dates back to the year 1871 when a man called Charles T. Hayden established his residence and businesses in the area. Since the late nineteenth century, Tempe has developed into a major center of employment, recreation and education for the Phoenix region. Today, the city’s history is visible through its historic buildings and neighborhoods. Less visible but equally important are the archeological resources of Tempe’s past, including the remains of several villages of the prehistoric Hohokam people who lived in south-central Arizona between 200 B.C. and 1450 A.D. (City of Tempe 2003a, Royo 2004).

When arriving in Tempe from the north, one cannot miss the impressive white industrial complex referred to as the Hayden Flour Mill against the background of the red-colored Hayden Butte mountain. The flour mill complex is a significant heritage site for the city of Tempe as it represents the most important industry of Tempe’s early history and at the same time, symbolizes Tempe’s agricultural past. Moreover, the complex is associated with Charles T. Hayden, the founder of Tempe, who built the first flour mill in 1874. This original mill burned down in 1890 and was replaced by a similar structure, which suffered the same fate. The existing mill was constructed in 1918 and has only been slightly modified since. On the neighboring Hayden Butte, numerous archeological sites have been documented during the past decades. Hence, the area is considered to be the most important site associated with the prehistoric Hohokam people who lived in southern Arizona.

Ever since the Hayden Flour Mill was closed down in 1997, redevelopment of the area has been under discussion. Being located right between Tempe’s historic downtown and the ‘Tempe Town Lake’ business and recreation area, the flour mill complex has become a critical redevelopment site. Moreover, the complex has started to fall into decay. An initial plan for the Hayden Flour Mill site included an office, retail and residential redevelopment and incorporated the slopes of the Hayden Butte. At a meeting of Tempe’s Historic Preservation Commission in 2000, a public discussion was held on the proposed redevelopment. Many people expressed their concern about the adverse effects the plan would have for the historic area. In the end, the city government decided against allowing any construction on the Hayden Butte and thus, the redevelopment plan failed (City of Tempe 2000, Padgett 2004, The Arizona Republic 2004).

Following additional discussion, the Historic Preservation Commission expressed that the design of any redevelopment of the Hayden Flour Mill complex should reflect the historical and industrial character of the mill and should acknowledge the Hohokam cultures associated with the surrounding area. In addition, the design should establish a link to the existing downtown and the Tempe Town Lake area. Finally, Tempe’s Historic Preservation Commission determined that public input should be considered in the evaluation of any proposed development in the area (City of Tempe 2000). In 2003, the City of Tempe decided to acquire the Hayden Flour Mill property in order to secure a sensible re-use. Similar to the initial redevelopment plan, the new proposal consists of a mixed-use development, including retail and restaurants, offices, residential units and parking space. This time however, the preservation of the area’s cultural-historical qualities is guaranteed (City of Tempe 2003b, The Arizona Republic 2004).

In conclusion, this example shows that the people of Tempe recognize their industrial heritage as an important resource for the creation of spatial quality in their city. In addition, the example demonstrates that in response to many protests, the Tempe city government has halted an important redevelopment plan in order to preserve a highly valued heritage site, despite a high development pressure and a strong desire for economic growth in Tempe. Finally, this example illustrates the establishment of a redevelopment plan that is based on public input and that incorporates both preservation and economic development goals.

1.1.3 The Hessenberg in Nijmegen, the Netherlands

The city of Nijmegen, my hometown, is the oldest city in the Netherlands. Until recently, it was generally accepted that Nijmegen was founded as ‘Ulpia Noviomagus Batavorum’ by the Roman emperor Trajan in A.D. 104 or 105. Today, several archeologists and historians argue that the city of Nijmegen dates back even further, to the very beginning of the Christian era (Brabers 2002). As a result of its long history and despite severe bombing during the Second World War, Nijmegen has an attractive historic city center and a considerable number of historic buildings, structures and sites. One of Nijmegen’s historic sites, the Hessenberg, has received a lot of attention in recent years. The Hessenberg is a waste area in the middle of the city center, which accommodates an archeological site, an old Roman Catholic orphanage dating from the seventeenth century, and the locally significant Titus Brandsma chapel. This chapel was built in 1960 as memorial for a Catholic priest who died in a Nazi concentration camp and was beatified by the Pope in 1985 because of his bravery during the war (Neelen 1998, Numaga 1999, Plangroep Hessenberg 2002c).

In 1998, Nijmegen’s city government decided to rigorously redevelop the Hessenberg area and create room for six apartment buildings and a parking garage, in spite of
negative advice from both the National Department for Conservation and the city's Aesthetic Control Committee. The city's rather ambitious redevelopment plan, referred to as 'Flash Gordon', encountered a lot of resistance from neighboring residents and shopkeepers, historical societies and environmental groups. They especially rejected the demolition of the old Roman Catholic orphanage and the Titus Brandsma chapel.

In addition, they felt that the project would have a harmful effect on the integrity of Nijmegen's historic city center (Neelen 1998, Numaga 1999, 2000, 2001).

After two years of dispute, the city government finally decided to withdraw the 'Flash Gordon' plan. Instead, a participative planning project was initiated for the redevelopment of the Hessenberg area, with the aim of respecting the cultural-historical qualities of the area and using them as a source of inspiration for future redevelopment. In 2001, a representative planning team of local residents and businesses, advocacy groups, city officials and the proposed developer formulated the following starting points for the design: (a) preservation of the historic and archeological resources; (b) creation of a connection with other important elements of Nijmegen's city center, such as the historic city center and the Kronenburgerpark; and (c) accommodation for mixed uses, such as housing, office spaces, parking lots and green areas (De Gelderlander 2001, 2002, 2004, Gemeente Nijmegen 2001, 2002, 2003, Numaga 2002, Plangroep Hessenberg 2002a, 2002b, 2002c, Projectbureau Belvedere 2001).

Subsequently, a special design team produced three draft designs for the Hessenberg area, which were judged on financial-economic feasibility and cultural-historical aspects. After consultation with neighboring residents, businesses and other interested parties, a definitive design for the Hessenberg was presented in the autumn of 2004.

Nijmegen's City Council approved the plan in December of that same year. Although at present, the Hessenberg is still under construction, a sustainable re-use that is based on the design: (a) preservation of the historic and archeological resources; (b) creation of a connection with other important elements of Nijmegen's city center, such as the historic city center and the Kronenburgerpark; and (c) accommodation for mixed uses, such as housing, office spaces, parking lots and green areas (De Gelderlander 2003, Gemeente Nijmegen 2003, Plangroep Hessenberg 2003a, 2003b, 2003c, Scheenen 2004).

To sum up, this example shows that the people of Nijmegen, who clearly value their cultural heritage as a source of identity, were able to block an ambitious redevelopment plan for a much appreciated historic site in the middle of the city center. In addition, the example demonstrates that eventually, Nijmegen's city government initiated a participative process to create an alternative redevelopment plan that is supported by all interested parties. Finally, the example involves an attempt to arrive at a solution that combines cultural heritage goals with other interests, including housing and commerce.

1.1.4 Recent Developments in Cultural Heritage Preservation

The three examples that I described in the preceding sections illustrate a variety of developments in the field of cultural heritage preservation. Moreover, they show that rather similar developments are occurring in three different Western countries. First, the examples demonstrate a general trend in Western society that cultural heritage is increasingly valued as a source of identity and an important factor for the creation of spatial quality. In addition, the examples show that the definition of cultural heritage has broadened to include, for example, cultural landscapes and industrial heritage. Furthermore, the examples reveal the major challenge that many preservationists must deal with today: the challenge of coping with a high development pressure and a strong desire for economic growth. Accordingly, the examples show attempts to arrive at pragmatic solutions in which the preservation of cultural heritage sites is combined with other interests or policy goals related to, for example, agriculture, housing or commerce. Finally, the three examples illustrate shifts in the way policy practices in the field of cultural heritage preservation are organized. They mark a transformation from a relatively closed and hierarchical form of government to a more transparent and participative government style.

If these developments are indeed occurring throughout Western society, the question arises why and how day-to-day preservation practices are changing. The focus in my analysis is on change (and/or stability) in both the content and the organization of preservation practices. When I speak of content, I refer to the prevailing definition of cultural heritage, the arguments that are used for the preservation of cultural heritage, and the way in which cultural heritage is considered to be preserved, for example, through strict conservation, detailed reconstruction, careful restoration or sensitive redevelopment. The organization of preservation practices involves the policy actors that are involved, the division of power between these actors, and the rules and procedures that determine how these actors act and interact and how decisions are made in the field of cultural heritage preservation.

Hence, my analysis involves a comparison of discursive and organizational dynamics in preservation practices in different Western states. As the three examples that I described in this section already indicated, the states that are selected as cases in this study are Norway, Arizona (U.S.) and the Netherlands. The comparison between preservation practices in these three states is based on the hypothesis that preservation practices in different Western states are changing along the lines of recent trends in the field of cultural heritage preservation. In chapter 3, the selection of cases for this study is accounted for (section 3.5).

1.2 The Cultural Heritage Concept

What does the cultural heritage concept refer to in this study? According to my dictionary, the noun ‘heritage’ stands for “the history, traditions and qualities that a country or society has had for many years and that are considered an important part of its character” (Hornby et al. 2000: 608). In addition, the adjective ‘cultural’ implies a connection with “(…) the culture of a particular society group”, whereas the noun ‘culture’ refers to “the customs and beliefs, art, way of life and social organization of a particular country or group” (Hornby et al. 2000: 306). From a preservationist’s perspective, Howard (2003: 6) defines heritage as
A more detailed definition
reasons, I only focus on policy practices related to the preservation of built heritage.
processes. Moreover, this study would become too comprehensive if it were to focus on
involves different policy actors, different laws and institutions and different policy
archeological findings and sites lies beyond the scope of this study. The main reason for
Vocht (1978) distinguish between: (a) archeological elements, that is, visible and hidden
When discussing the cultural elements in our physical environment, Nelissen and De
Monuments: architectural works, works of monumental sculpture and painting,
elements or structures of an archeological nature, inscriptions, cave dwellings and
“… all spatial elements and structures that were constructed in the past and that can be regarded as very valuable.” A more detailed definition can be found in UNESCO’s World Heritage Convention, which says that the following shall be considered cultural heritage:
archeological sites which are of outstanding universal value from the point of view of history, art or science;”
Sites: works of man or the combined works of nature and man, and areas including
archeological sites which are of outstanding universal value from the historical,
aesthetic, etnological or anthropological point of view” (UNESCO 1972, Article 1).

When discussing the cultural elements in our physical environment, Nelissen and De Vocht (1978) distinguish between: (a) archeological elements, that is, visible and hidden findings from prehistoric, Roman or medieval times; (b) historic-geographical elements, such as settlements, tracks, roads, dykes, canals and subdivisions of land; (c) architectural elements, such as churches, monasteries, courthouses, buildings of government, farms, houses, castles and fortresses; and (d) industrial and technological elements, such as bridges, railways and railway stations, factories, lighthouses and water towers (cf. Nelissen and De Vocht 1978: 56-57). It is important to note that the preservation of archeological findings and sites lies beyond the scope of this study. The main reason for this delineation is that in many Western countries, the policy domain of archeology has developed separately from that of built heritage preservation. As a consequence, it often involves different policy actors, different laws and institutions and different policy processes. Moreover, this study would become too comprehensive if it were to focus on shifts in the preservation of both archeological elements and built heritage. For these reasons, I only focus on policy practices related to the preservation of built heritage.

A final remark has to be made with regard to the discursive character of the cultural heritage concept. Any definition of cultural heritage depends on the perspective or discourse from which it is constructed. Therefore, I agree with Howard (2003) when he emphasizes that historic buildings, city structures or landscapes do not become ‘heritage’ until people recognize them as such. Identification is a crucial process in cultural heritage preservation. Accordingly, important questions in this study are: who has the competences and/or capacities to decide what buildings and/or landscapes are valuable and preservation-worthy; what rules and procedures prevail in decision making processes; and on the basis of what ideas, definitions, values and criteria are decisions made in the field of cultural heritage preservation? For that reason, I focus on (shifts in) both the organization (diversity of policy actors, division of power, prevailing rules and procedures) and the content (diversity of policy discourses: ideas, definitions, values and criteria) of cultural heritage preservation.

1.3 The Values of Cultural Heritage

There are many different perspectives on the value of cultural heritage and accordingly, many different arguments are used for the preservation of cultural heritage values. First, many preservationists argue that “… a monument, with all its values, can make a contribution to the everyday life environment that surrounds it (…)” (Cantacuzino and King 1999: 12). Cultural heritage is often considered to contribute to the quality of life through its role in creating pleasant places and in strengthening cultural identity and collective memory (Clark 2000). Second, it is claimed that cultural heritage has the potential to contribute to social inclusion, social cohesion and democratic citizenship. Clark stresses that “… everyone should have the opportunity to: (a) use, discover, and delight in and draw meaning from (…) cultural heritage; (b) enjoy access to information, activities and resources; (c) participate in the identification, understanding, use and conservation of (…) cultural heritage” (2000: 107-108). Nelissen and Bogie (2000) mention yet other reasons why the preservation of our cultural heritage is important, such as: (a) it is basic material for research and education; (b) it is a source of inspiration for designers of new buildings, cities and landscapes; and (c) it generates income through recreational and tourist activities (Nelissen and Bogie 2000). Finally, it is sometimes argued that cultural heritage preservation contributes to a sustainable development because it promotes the re-use of existing buildings and structures.

Mason (2002) distinguishes between social-cultural and economic values of cultural heritage. In his view, social-cultural values are at the traditional core of cultural heritage preservation. They are the values that are “… attached to an object, building or place because it holds meaning for people or social groups due to its age, beauty, artistry or association with a significant person or event (…)” (Mason 2002: 11). They can be divided into historical, aesthetic, symbolic, spiritual and social values. The economic values of cultural heritage overlap a great deal with the social-cultural values, but they are conceptualized in a different way. For instance, the ‘use values’ of cultural heritage refer to the goods and services that flow from it. Admission fees for a historic site are such values. The ‘nonuse values’ of a cultural heritage site refer to the amount of money that individuals are willing to pay in order to acquire or protect it (Mason 2002).

As a final point, many preservationists emphasize that certain values of cultural heritage are absolute. They assume that some kind of value is intrinsic to the whole
notion of something being identified as truly old or ‘authentic’. Their argument is similar to the idea of intrinsic value that is often referred to in the field of nature conservation, implying that nature and wildlife are intrinsically valuable (Mason 2002). In contrast, I agree with Mason (2002) when he states that cultural heritage values are fundamentally conditional: they are socially as well as spatially constructed. In this respect, it is important to recognize the political value of cultural heritage. Howard (2003) argues that political actors or governments often use concepts such as cultural heritage and national identity to legitimize their authority and to gain prestige. The challenge for preservationists, then, is ‘(…) to extend the range of conserved things to include those that are important to people other than the dominant group (…)’ (Howard 2003: 47), with an open agenda and a transparent policy. The challenge for me as a researcher is to explore which policy actors and which policy discourses dominate the debate on cultural heritage preservation and which organizational and discursive chances have occurred in the field recently. Hence, the focus in my analysis of preservation practices is on recent dynamics in and between the variety of policy actors that are involved, the division of power between these actors, the rules that determine how these actors (inter)act and how decisions are made, and the prevailing ideas about cultural heritage and cultural heritage preservation.

1.4 Cultural Heritage Preservation in Retrospect

In the previous sections, I delineated the object of my study to the organizational and discursive aspects of policy practices related to the preservation of built heritage, and I described the broad variety of arguments that are used for the preservation of cultural heritage. In this section, I provide a brief overview of the history of cultural heritage preservation in Western society so far. Attention is paid to the most important developments in the field of cultural heritage preservation both in the past and in the present day.

The first official form of cultural heritage preservation in Western history can be dated back to the end of the eighteenth century, when the revolutionary government of France decided not to destroy the palaces and monuments of the previous regime, but to take them over and convert them to uses more appropriate to the new revolutionary nation (Howard 2003). For the first time, the past was deliberately conserved for the purposes of the present by governmental efforts. Although at present, a vast amount of cultural heritage is recognized, designated and conserved by governmental actors, it is important to note that in most Western countries, the very first initiatives to preserve cultural heritage typically came from the social-cultural elite in civil society. For example, wealthy civilians would buy threatened historic properties in order to conserve them or they would encourage governmental actors to take responsibility for the preservation of valuable historic buildings and sites. In response to these civil initiatives, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, governmental bodies were established in most Western societies with the explicit task of preserving the national heritage. Their work mainly consisted of listing significant historic buildings and protecting them through newly created preservation laws (Howard 2003, Tyler 2000).

In the nineteenth century, the French architect Eugène Emmanuel Viollet-le-Duc was one of the first architects concerned with the restoration of historic buildings. He argued that ‘(…) important monuments should be rebuilt not necessarily as they originally were, but as they should have been’ (Tyler 2000: 19), following the ‘right principles’ of functionalism (Denslagen 2004: 122). In contrast to Viollet-le-Duc, the nineteenth-century English art historian John Ruskin felt that historic buildings should remain untouched. He argued that a society has no right to improve, or even restore, the craftsmanship of another era (Denslagen 2004, Tyler 2000). As he explained: ‘It is impossible, as impossible as to raise the dead, to restore anything that has ever been great or beautiful in architecture’ (Denslagen 2004: 98). Over time, the extreme viewpoints of Viollet-le-Duc and Ruskin were refined and some claim that a general consensus has formed as to the appropriate strategy for preservation of cultural heritage (Tyler 2000). Others argue there is still a fierce debate going on in Western cultural heritage preservation between proponents of strict conservation and advocates of restoration or even reconstruction of historic properties (Denslagen 2004).

Basically, most preservation policies in Western society are based on more or less similar ideas and principles such as: (a) the obligation to perform research and documentation in order to generate and safeguard knowledge of cultural heritage; (b) the obligation to respect cultural heritage as a cumulative physical record of human activity; (c) the obligation to safeguard the authenticity of cultural heritage; and (d) the obligation to do no harm to cultural heritage (Maturo 2000). In everyday practice however, preservation practices may still vary greatly, ranging from ‘(…) minimal intervention and conservative repair to artistic restoration, modernization, and ruthless adaptations according to the fashion of re-use and modern life’ (Jokilehto 1999a: 22). Moreover, preservation policies and practices are continually changing. For example, within many Western countries today, we are witnessing a growing degree of integration between cultural heritage preservation, land use planning and associated policy fields. As the processes of globalization and internationalization have created a desire to retain essential elements of local and regional identity, an important question in today’s land use planning has become ‘(…) how to produce landscapes that allow expressions of globalization and internationalization in a way that regional and local identity is recognized and exploited as a lifestyle quality factor’ (Goverde 2000: 207). In other words, land use planners increasingly aim at integrating cultural heritage values in modern redevelopments in order to establish places that are both pleasant and functional.

In addition, as I mentioned earlier, the definitions of cultural heritage are becoming wider and wider. In current policies, the approach to cultural heritage is widening from individual objects to entire areas or landscapes. ‘Historic environment’ and ‘cultural landscape’ have become common terms (Cantacuzino and King 1999, Clark 2000, Howard 2003). The role of cultural heritage in society is expanding as well. Until recently, cultural heritage has been regarded mainly as a source of national unity arising from the recognition of great architecture, monuments or achievements. Heritage has been valued for being historic, beautiful or created by a major artist. In the present day, cultural heritage is seen more and more as a much broader phenomenon that can contribute to regional and local identity, economic prosperity and social cohesion. For example, it is recognized that heritage may reflect regional diversity rather than national unity. Although cultural heritage legislation often emphasizes national values, regional and local values are becoming important as well. As a consequence, local communities are increasingly taking responsibility for heritage issues. Furthermore, arguments regarding
the economic values of cultural heritage are becoming increasingly important in policy making. Even private businesses are beginning to see cultural heritage as an opportunity rather than a barrier to progress (Clark 2000).

Because cultural heritage definitions and values are becoming more complex, cultural heritage preservation becomes a political issue as well as a technical one (Clark 2000, Howard 2003, Mason 2002). Questions arise such as: whose heritage are we preserving; for whom are we preserving it; who decides what heritage should be protected; and on the basis of what criteria? The professional expertise involved in cultural heritage preservation is changing as well. Today, cultural heritage preservation may be part of landscape and spatial planning, social-economic development or environmental management (Clark 2000). Finally, cultural heritage preservation is becoming a terrain for experimentation with citizenship, voluntary work and public-private partnerships (Weber 2000). Governments increasingly recognize the importance of participation by individuals and communities in defining and managing their cultural heritage. In the 1960s, 70s and 80s, cultural heritage preservation typically involved formal, authoritarian and ‘top down’ policy making, with decisions made by experts and regulated by formal rules and regulations. At present, open, transparent, ‘bottom up’ decision making is becoming increasingly important. For example, preservationists are more and more interested in how the public perceives cultural heritage sites (Clark 2000).

To sum up, there appears to be a trend in Western cultural heritage preservation that (a) preservationists are moving away from the idea of designating small sites to the idea that the whole of the landscape may have significance; (b) although national heritage remains an important idea, many preservationists are beginning to think that it should be complemented by ideas such as regional and local distinctiveness; (c) cultural heritage preservation is becoming increasingly integrated with land use planning and related policy fields; and (d) the role of local and private actors in policy and decision making is strengthening. In line with these general trends, I expect day-to-day preservation practices in different Western states to change. Accordingly, the main research question that I formulate for this thesis is: to what extent do day-to-day preservation practices in Western society reveal change and how can we understand the ongoing changes in Western preservation practices?

In order to provide answers, this study analyzes day-to-day preservation practices and relates them to broader social-political developments that are taking place in Western society. The aim of my study is to analyze, compare and understand recent dynamics in and between the content and organization of preservation arrangements in Norway, Arizona and the Netherlands against the background of social-political transformations in Western society. In the following section, I go further into these ongoing social-political transformations. The much discussed transition from government to governance is addressed in section 1.6.

1.5 Social-Political Transformations

The developments in the field of cultural heritage preservation that were described in the previous section do (or did) not take place in a vacuum. Instead, they are situated in specific social-political contexts, which change in the course of time as a result of the ongoing interactions between state, market and civil society. In other words, policy practices in the field of cultural heritage preservation develop against the background of social-political transformations in Western society. In this section, I provide an overview of social-political transformations that have influenced developments in the field of cultural heritage preservation.

In the history of Western society, several periods can be distinguished that reflect different social-political interrelations. The modern Western state first came into existence in the Renaissance of the sixteenth century, during which major changes occurred. The feudal system of the Middle Ages withered away and several scientific discoveries fundamentally altered the prevailing worldview. They laid the foundation for a belief in the progressive advancement of society. In the young European states of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the central administration became the main instrument for controlling the empire and executing policies. In brief, the social-political context of those days was characterized by a centralized authority in the hands of an absolute monarch and a central administration (Kickert and Stillman II 1999, Raadschelders and Rutgers 1999).

Two fundamental changes in the eighteenth and nineteenth century have been crucial for the further development of the modern Western state. First, the Industrial Revolution radically altered production processes. Small-scale production gave way to large-scale production thanks to inventions such as the steam engine and electricity. Second, the Enlightenment had strengthened ideas about what proper governance was. Ideas about the separation of powers had been introduced by Locke and Montesquieu, and ideas about the sovereignty of the people’s will had been put forward by Rousseau. They not only inspired the Founding Fathers in their American Revolution (1775-1783), but also provided the ideological basis for the French Revolution (1789-1799), which heralded the end of the absolutist monarchy throughout continental Europe (in Britain, the absolutist monarchy had been abolished already in the late seventeenth century). State power shifted to democratically elected parliaments operating under modern constitutions. The government’s primary role changed from managing the king’s estates to making and enforcing laws and protecting rights and liberties (Raadschelders and Rutgers 1999, Stillman II 1999). Against this background, the very first ideas and initiatives concerning the preservation of cultural heritage emerged, for example in France, where the revolutionary government decided to preserve the palaces of the previous regime and adapt them to the needs of the ‘new’ nation.

At the end of the eighteenth century, ideas emerged about human rights and the welfare state. Initially, the core of state activity was legislating activities of others, but from the end of the nineteenth century onward, central government also became involved in the execution of policies in areas such as social security, housing, education, welfare, nature conservation and cultural heritage preservation. During the nineteenth century, pioneers such as the French architect Viollet-le-Duc and the English art historian Ruskin had advocated the preservation of valuable historic buildings and sites. In many Western countries, including the United States, advocacy organizations were set up by the social-cultural elite, with the aim to protect historic properties from deterioration or demolition. As I also mentioned in the previous section, these advocacy organizations urged national governments to take responsibility for the preservation of valuable historic buildings and sites. In the late nineteenth and early...
The interactions of and interrelations within those networks have specific policy issues or policy fields, ‘governance networks’ of public and private actors with other actors at different territorial levels in order to achieve their goals, as they just one of many actors involved in policy making. They must bargain and cooperate in public and/or private policy networks. The power of the nation state has been challenged both from the outside, by the growing role of inter- and supranational institutions; and from economic and social activities have become worldwide in scope and that there has been a growing interconnectedness within and between states and societies, ‘individualization’ is often described as an all-pervasive process, made possible by modern technologies and opening new perspectives for emancipation, but also leaving the individual unprotected against personal and economic insecurity due to the erosion of solidarity and the withdrawal of the state (Van Tatenhove et al. 2000). Both processes have had and still have an enormous impact on the roles of and relations between state, market and civil society. Many attempts have been made to redefine those roles and relations between governmental and non-governmental actors, which have resulted in various new forms of government (Nelissen 2002a, Van Tatenhove et al. 2000). As the three examples in section 1.1 illustrate, this is also visible in the field of cultural heritage preservation, where a shift is taking place from a relatively closed and hierarchical form of government to a more proactive, transparent, participative and bottom-up government style. In public administration literature from the 1990s onwards, the appearance of new forms of government is mostly referred to as ‘the transition from government to governance’. This phenomenon is further elaborated upon in the following section.

1.6 The Transition from Government to Governance
Many newly emerging forms of policy making in Western society imply a retreating government: they involve processes of decentralization, deregulation, privatization, an integral approach to policy problems, and an interactive style of policy making (Nelissen 2002a). These developments not only indicate a transformation in society, they also represent a paradigm shift in public administration literature. Terms such as ‘government’, ‘networks’, ‘complexity’, ‘interdependence’, ‘deliberation’, ‘co-production’, ‘horizontal steering’, ‘bottom-up approach’ and ‘multi-actor steering’ now dominate the debate, while terms such as ‘the state’, ‘government’, ‘power’, ‘authority’, ‘command and control’ and ‘hierarchical-bureaucratic steering’ have become less prominent (Hajer and Wagenaar 2002, Needham 2000, Nelissen 2002a). Moreover, it has become fashionable in public administration literature to talk about ‘the transition from government to governance’, meaning that policy making is no longer restricted to the formal structures of government. Instead, there is a growing involvement of non-governmental actors in policy making and policy making processes are increasingly informal, ad hoc and temporary in nature (Sørensen and Torfing 2004, Van der Zouwen 2006). In this context, ‘government’ refers to situations in which the state steers developments in society through classical, hierarchical forms of policy making. In contrast, ‘governance’ refers to forms of policy making in which representatives of state, market and civil society cooperate in public and/or private policy networks.

During the past decades, the power of the nation state has been challenged both from the outside, by the growing role of inter- and supranational institutions; and from twentieth centuries, governmental bodies were established in most Western societies with the explicit task of listing and protecting cultural heritage on the basis of newly created preservation laws.

After the Second World War, the real expansion of the welfare state took place, especially in Europe, following the rebuilding of destroyed countries and their economies. Whereas until then, state government only played a marginal role in societal developments, in the post-war period, it actually tried to build a new society (Kickert and Stillman II 1999, Raadschelders and Rutgers 1999). The government was seen as the appropriate, legitimate and unchallenged authority to steer social and economic developments. This implied increased public spending on public services and a growing political intervention in the market (Pierre and Peters 2000). In line with this trend and in response to the massive destruction of historic buildings and sites during the war, the period from the post-war years until the 1970s witnessed a strong growth in preservation efforts. In many Western countries, comprehensive preservation laws and programs were established.

In the 1980s, the Western state arrived at yet another period. High expectations about government planning turned into disillusionment with the state’s steering capacities. The economic recession led to the necessity of drastic budget cuts in many policy areas. As a consequence, the 1980s and 1990s became a period of deconstruction and retrenchment in the public sector, accompanied by a call for more businesslike approaches, more productive and efficient organizations, higher quality services and more customer-orientatedness (Kickert and Stillman II 1999). A distinctly market-based philosophy became dominant, referred to as New Public Management. Through decentralization, privatization, deregulation, cut-backs in public spending, tax cuts and radical institutional and administrative reform, attempts were made to reverse the growth in government in order to allow the market to play a stronger role in society (Pierre and Peters 2000). This social-political transformation also had its impact in the field of cultural heritage preservation. In the Netherlands, for example, a number of tasks and responsibilities were decentralized from the national to the local government level. Furthermore, a new funding system was introduced, the administration of which was delegated to a private foundation.

From the 1990s onward, again new ideas have emerged about what is and what should be the role of government in society. The key question has become how democratic government, which is expected to exert influence, control and coordination, should perform these roles in the changing social-political climate of the 1990s (Pierre and Peters 2000). During the past decades, the interrelations between state, market and civil actors have become more complex. Once, governments were considered to be the central steering actor in society, but today, the ideas about governmental steering and policy making have changed. As a result of macro-sociological processes such as globalization, regionalization and individualization, governments are increasingly considered to be just one of many actors involved in policy making. They must bargain and cooperate with other actors at different territorial levels in order to achieve their goals, as they can no longer rely on hierarchical authority to govern society. Consequently, around specific policy issues or policy fields, ‘governance networks’ of public and private actors have developed. The interactions of and interrelations within those networks have come to determine the content, organization and outcome of policy practices as much as direct government interventions (Bovens et al. 2001, Godfroij and Nelissen 1993, Nelissen et al. 1996).

In other words, in the last decades of the twentieth century, the ‘manageable’ society gave way to an ‘elusive’ society that, due to macro-sociological processes of globalization and individualization, is far less transparent (Hajer and Wagenaar 2003, Nelissen 2002a, Van Tatenhove et al. 2000). Whereas ‘globalization’ implies that many political, economic and social activities have become worldwide in scope and that there has been a growing interconnectedness within and between states and societies, ‘individualization’ is often described as an all-pervasive process, made possible by modern technologies and opening new perspectives for emancipation, but also leaving the individual unprotected against personal and economic insecurity due to the erosion of solidarity and the withdrawal of the state (Van Tatenhove et al. 2000). Both processes have had and still have an enormous impact on the roles of and relations between state, market and civil society. Many attempts have been made to redefine those roles and relations between governmental and non-governmental actors, which have resulted in various new forms of government (Nelissen 2002a, Van Tatenhove et al. 2000). As the three examples in section 1.1 illustrate, this is also visible in the field of cultural heritage preservation, where a shift is taking place from a relatively closed and hierarchical form of government to a more proactive, transparent, participative and bottom-up government style. In public administration literature from the 1990s onwards, the appearance of new forms of government is mostly referred to as ‘the transition from government to governance’. This phenomenon is further elaborated upon in the following section.

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During the past decades, the power of the nation state has been challenged both from the outside, by the growing role of inter- and supranational institutions; and from
the inside, by the increasing interdependencies and interrelations between state, market and civil society. Because of these transformations, there is on the one hand a shift in the focus of policy making: from hierarchical and well-institutionalized forms of government towards less formalized practices of governance. On the other hand, there is a shift in the focus of policy making: governance at sub- and supranational levels is gaining importance in comparison with the national level (Liefferink et al. 2002, Pierre 2000, Pierre and Peters 2000). In this changed social-political context, governmental actors search for new ways to achieve their goals. They increasingly play a role as negotiator in or facilitator of policy making processes in which a variety of public and private actors participate. As a result, public policy no longer involves a hierarchically designed and enforced plan, but rather an open, complex and interactive process. In this process, the state grants certain powers and authorities to civil society and market actors. At the same time, businesses, citizens and advocacy groups increasingly claim these responsibilities out of dissatisfaction with the government’s performance. However, the transition from government to governance implies not only another form of steering by the government. It also means that state, market and civil society are increasingly intertwined, both organizationally and discursively (Boonstra 2004, Pestman and Van Tatenhove 1998).

The shift from government to governance does not mean that the traditional hierarchical institutions of government are simply fading away. Instead, they must now increasingly compete with “…open-ended, ad hoc arrangements that demonstrate remarkable problem-solving capacity and open up opportunities for learning and change in exactly those circumstances where classical, modernist institutions have failed to deliver” (Hajer and Wagenaar 2003: 3). As a result, policy making has become a mix of all kinds of governing efforts by all kinds of social-political actors, at different levels, in different governance styles. The different forms of policy making are conditional responses to specific policy problems and specific policy practices. They cannot be understood without an awareness of the nature of policy problems and the setting in which they occur, as well as a recognition of the parties who have long been active in these areas (Kooiman 2003, Nelissen 2002a).

In summary, the debate on the transition from government to governance suggests a growing skepticism about the traditional synoptic or rational view of steering that perceives society as a passive object that can be governed by the state. Instead, it makes more sense to recognize the variety of actors that participate and negotiate in policy making processes, and to take the various forms of formal and informal interactions between actors from government, market and civil society as starting point of analysis (Liefferink et al. 2002, Pierre 2000). For this reason, the conceptual framework that is used in this study is based on the policy arrangement approach that has been developed by Van Tatenhove et al. (2000), Arts and Leroy (2003 and 2006). This approach has the increasing interweaving of and interference between state, civil society and market as its starting point (Liefferink et al. 2002, Van Tatenhove et al. 2000). The policy arrangement approach is a method of policy analysis that perceives policy practices as a temporary equilibrium in the organization and the content of a policy field. In order to understand the specific character of existing policy practices, the policy arrangement approach creates a dialectical link between day-to-day policy making processes and long-term processes of social-political change. This characteristic in particular makes the policy arrangement approach a suitable approach for my study, which aims to analyze recent developments in different preservation arrangements against the background of social-political transformations in Western society.

1.7 Research Goal and Preliminary Research Questions

In conclusion, the aim of my study is to analyze, compare and understand recent dynamics in and between the organization and content of the preservation arrangements in Norway, Arizona and the Netherlands against the background of general social-political transformations in Western society since the early 1990s. My main research questions are:

1. What organizational and discursive developments have emerged in the three preservation arrangements in Norway, Arizona and the Netherlands since the early 1990s?
2. What are the main similarities and differences between the emerging developments in the three preservation arrangements?
3. To what extent can the emerging developments in the three preservation arrangements be understood in relation to general social-political transformations in Western society?

These three research questions will be answered in the course of this book. First, chapter 2 addresses the conceptual framework for analyzing, comparing and understanding recent dynamics in the field of cultural heritage preservation. The conceptual framework is based on the policy arrangement approach. At the end of chapter 2, I reframe the research questions in terms of this conceptual framework. Next, chapter 3 discusses the methodological framework of this study. It deals with methodological issues such as the research strategy that is applied and the research methods that are used to collect data.

The chapters 4, 5 and 6 provide the analyses of recent dynamics in the field of cultural heritage preservation in Norway, Arizona and the Netherlands. The main issues that are discussed in these three empirical chapters are: (a) the initial characteristics of the three preservation arrangements in the early 1990s and (b) the (interplay between organizational and discursive developments that have taken place from the early 1990s onwards. Subsequently, chapter 7 discusses the similarities and differences between the dynamics in the three preservation arrangements and places them against the background of social-political transformations in Western society. In the final chapter, I summarize my main findings, reflect on the conceptual framework of this study, and discuss the relevance of my results for policymakers and practitioners.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
2.1 Introduction

The research goal and research questions that were formulated in the previous chapter imply certain requirements for the conceptual framework that is used in this study. First, they ask for a conceptual framework that enables me to analyze the dynamics in and between the content and the organization of policy practices in the field of cultural heritage preservation. This means that the framework has to address the interplay between the existing ideas about cultural heritage and cultural heritage preservation, the variety of policy actors that are involved, the division of power between these actors and the rules that determine how these actors (inter)act and how decisions are made. Second, the conceptual framework must allow me to incorporate not only the (inter)actions of individual policy actors in the analysis of preservation practices but also the social-political transformations that are taking place in Western society. It must address the relationship between day-to-day (inter)actions of policy actors on the one hand and structural transformations in society on the other. To be more specific, the conceptual framework should enable me to analyze current dynamics in Western preservation practices in the light of general trends in the field of cultural heritage preservation.

The conceptual framework that I use in this study is based on the policy arrangement approach as developed by Van Tatenhove et al. (2000) and Arts and Leroy (2003 and 2006). The main arguments for applying the policy arrangement approach are put forward in the next section (2.2). In the sections 2.3 to 2.5, I define and operationalize the three key concepts of the policy arrangement approach. They are: political modernization, institutionalization and policy arrangement. Finally, at the end of this chapter, I reformulate the research questions that are central to this study.

2.2 Policy Arrangements versus Policy Networks

A theoretical approach that is frequently applied when studying policy practices is the policy network approach. In the 1980s and 1990s, many public administration scientists and policy makers considered this approach as the answer to the growing complexity of policy problems and the increasing interdependence of policy actors (Boonstra 2004, Nelissen et al. 2004). Gradually, policy networks have become the leading metaphor in research on new, interactive forms of policy making that result from ‘the transition from government to governance’ (see section 1.6). Defining policy networks as “…more or less stable patterns of social relations between interdependent actors, which develop around policy problems and/or clusters of instruments and which are formed, maintained and changed through series of games” (Klijn 1996: 51, my translation), the policy network approach suggests that a public policy is (re)produced through the interactions of a broad variety of autonomous but interdependent actors who exchange resources in order to achieve their goals.

A key characteristic of many policy network analyses is their interest in improving policy making processes and reforming public management (Rhodes 2006). They demonstrate the (inter)relational characteristics of policy networks (description) and promote their widespread use by emphasizing their qualities in comparison with traditional forms of government (prescription). Here, the central focus of attention is on how policy networks can be regulated through processes of ‘meta-steering’ (Nelissen et al. 2004, Sørensen and Torfing 2004). Other, more analytical policy network approaches not only concentrate on the (inter)relational aspects of policy networks but also incorporate more structural (discursive or organizational) elements in the analysis, in attempts to understand current developments in public policy making (explanation). For example, in his analysis of networks as ‘social action systems’, Godfroij (1981) addresses the dialectical relationship between individual actors and social systems by emphasizing that actors are conditioned by given social structures, but they ‘work up’ those structures in their strategic interaction. Similarly, Sørensen and Torfing (2004) emphasize that the negotiations and interactions in a policy network take place within a relatively institutionalized framework of rules, procedures, values, concepts and ideologies, which is adjusted through these same negotiations and interactions between the participants in the network. Moreover, under the influence of general theorists such as Giddens (1984, 1990), Beck (1992) and Castells (1996), policy network approaches have increasingly focused on structural transitions in society, including shifts in (power) relations between state, market and civil society, whereby policy networks are seen as the result of societal change (Goverde and Nelissen 2000, Goverde and Van Tatenhove 2000, Rhodes 2006). In this way, policy networks are a useful concept for analyzing policy making processes and understanding ongoing developments therein against the background of structural transformations in society.

Nevertheless, I do not apply the policy network approach in this study. Instead, I make use of the policy arrangement approach as developed by Van Tatenhove et al. (2000) and Arts and Leroy (2003 and 2006). The main reason for applying the policy arrangement approach is that it provides me with a comprehensive solution for analyzing the two types of dialectics that are relevant for this study: (a) the interplay between the content and the organization of policy practices and (b) the interplay between the (inter)actions of individual actors and the ongoing structural transformation processes in society. In this way, the policy arrangement concept meets the two requirements that I formulated in 2.1. The focus of the policy arrangement approach is on change and stability in policy making processes in either discursive or organizational matters, and induced by either the (inter)actions of policy actors or more structural developments. In this way, the approach explicitly bridges two dichotomies in social science: (a) the dichotomy between a discursive and an organizational perspective on social reality (content versus organization) and (b) the dichotomy between an anascope and a catascope perspective on social reality (actor versus structure) (see figure 2.1). This needs further explanation.

As regards the dichotomy between content and organization, the policy arrangement approach not only combines a discursive and organizational analysis of policy practices but explicitly focuses our attention on the interplay between the content (dominant discourses) and the organization (actors involved, prevailing rules of the game, division of power) of policymaking processes. The focus is on the discursive activity within a policy arrangement, through which a variety of policy actors, representing state, market and civil society, act and interact in attempts to influence policymaking processes and establish policy outcomes that are consistent with their values, ideas and interests (their ‘logic of action’, cf. Crozier and Friedberg 1977). As a result of this discursive activity, shifts may occur in the policy actors that are involved, the division of power between these policy actors, the prevailing rules of the game and/or the dominant policy discourse (see 2.5).
The duality of agency and structure (Giddens 1984) refers to the dilemma between a catastrophic and an anarchistic perspective on social phenomena. Whereas a catastrophic perspective focuses on institutions, institutional behavior and structural trends in society, an anarchistic perspective is focused on the behavior of individual actors, for whom institutions and structural trends merely form the context. The dichotomy between the two perspectives can be bridged through a dialectical approach that focuses on the mutual determination of individual and social phenomena (Crozier and Friedberg 1977, Godfröij 1981, Touraine 1974, Zijderveld 1966, 2000). The policy arrangement approach is such a dialectical approach in the sense that it takes the interplay between the discursive activity in day-to-day policy practices on the one hand and more structural developments in Western society (political modernization) on the other as its starting point (see 2.3).

A second important reason for using the policy arrangement approach is that it has proved to be suitable for analyzing dynamics in a broad variety of policy fields related to the environment and public space. Although originally, the approach was developed to study change and stability in environmental policy (Van Tatenhove et al. 2000), in recent years, it has been fruitfully applied to analyze dynamics in rural policy (Boonstra 2004), nature policy (Bogaert 2004, Van der Zouwen 2006), water management (Wiering and Crabbé 2006) and cultural heritage preservation (De Boer 2006).

Like any approach, however, the policy arrangement approach has some disadvantages as well. A first pitfall is that, when applied inappropriately, it could result in a relatively static analysis of the separate characteristics or 'dimensions' of policy practices. In this study, I avoid this by explicitly focusing on the dynamics of and the interrelations between the organizational and discursive dimensions of preservation arrangements.

Second, the concept of political modernization has been criticized for being abstract and difficult to operationalize (Arts and Leroy 2003, Boonstra 2004). Although recent definitions and operationalizations of political modernization (see Arts and Van Tatenhove 2006) are more concrete, I operationalize the concept yet further by explicitly relating it to the four dimensions of policy arrangements in the field of cultural heritage preservation. This is done in section 2.5.5. The political modernization concept has also been criticized for being normative and suggesting a straight, linear development of societal progress (Glasbergen 2003). In general, there is much academic resistance regarding the concepts of modernization and modernity for this same reason. Nevertheless, there is no valid objection to continue the use of these concepts as long as "[…] one defines them clearly in advance, thereby demarcating their specific meaning" (Zijderveld 2000: 89). Accordingly, it is important to note that in the policy arrangement approach, political modernization is a neutral concept that refers to a variety of continuing social-political transformations in Western society. This means that (a) the process of political modernization is a perpetual process; (b) the two phases that are currently distinguished (see section 2.3) are not seen as two separate, consecutive worlds but as coexistent modes of policy making; and (c) new, additional phases of political modernization may occur in the future (cf. Arts and Leroy 2003, Arts and Van Tatenhove 2006). A basic assumption in this thesis is that in today’s field of cultural heritage preservation, organizational and discursive elements from the two different phases of political modernization stand side by side. This means that elements from the first and the second phase of political modernization may be reflected simultaneously in one single preservation arrangement. In section 2.5.5, I further operationalize the two phases of political modernization by explicitly relating them to the four dimensions of policy arrangements in the field of cultural heritage preservation.

A third disadvantage of the policy arrangement approach is its relatively limited definition of the concept of power. In the policy arrangement approach, power is mainly seen as "[…] the mobilization and deployment of available resources" (Liefferink 2006: 47); or as "[…] the ability of actors to mobilize resources in order to achieve certain outcomes in social relations, and […] as the asymmetrical distribution of resources in society, implying various positions of autonomy and dependency between actors" (Arts 2006: 20). In section 2.5.2, I refine the definition of power by differentiating between three different forms or layers of power. Fourth, some have argued that the policy arrangement approach tends to overemphasize those policy discourses that dominate the policymaking process and to focus primarily on those policy arrangements that are already stabilized, whereas it tends to overlook the ‘minor’ policy discourses that may never institutionalize, the ‘immature’ policy arrangements that have not fully stabilized yet, and the phenomenon of ‘institutional void’ (Boonstra 2004, Hajer 2003). I do not share this critique. In my view, the policy arrangement approach, by offering the opportunity to start from a discursive angle, allows researchers to analyze all sorts of policy discourses even if they may never dominate the debate, to point at power struggles between competing policy discourses, and to envision all sorts of possible policy arrangements that may be emerging and stabilizing in the future. Moreover, by stressing the temporary character of and the dynamics within a policy arrangement, we avoid the risk of overemphasizing stability or stabilization in policy arrangements (Van der Zouwen 2006).

\[\text{Figure 2.1 Policy arrangements: bridging two dichotomies in social science (cf. Arts and Leroy 2006: 8)}\]
2.3 Political Modernization

Whether regarded as late, post- or super-modernity and whether perceived as caused by globalization, regionalization, individualization or other processes, there appears to be a broad consensus on the emergence of certain macro-sociological developments in Western society. One of these developments involves the vanishing of traditional divides between state, market and civil society (Arts and Leroy 2003, Van Tatenhove et al. 2000). In response to changing circumstances in society, our traditional institutions are rapidly and radically transforming. They are changing from being state-oriented, authoritarian, top-down and closed to being more democratic, flexible, bottom-up and open. At the same time, our perspective on institutions has dramatically changed as well. Institutions are no longer believed to be god-given or natural. Instead, it is generally accepted that institutions are socially constructed by actors according to their needs and interests (Zijderveld 2000). Accordingly, the scientific debate about new institutions, new forms of governance or new policy arrangements is focused on the question of how we can understand their emergence against the background of broader macro-sociological developments (Nelissen 2002a).

As I mentioned earlier, Van Tatenhove et al. (2000) use the concept ‘political modernization’ to analyze the interrelation between structural social-political developments in Western society and day-to-day policy practices. Political modernization can be defined as the shifting relationships between state, market and civil society in the political domain of society, which imply new ideas about and new forms of governance. The ‘political domain’ is the setting in which different groups in society (from state, market and civil society) produce and reproduce discourses, coalitions, rules and power in attempts to influence policy processes. The relationships between state, market and civil society are shifting in the sense that (a) the distinctions between the three subsystems are becoming increasingly blurred; and (b) a relocation of politics is taking place from the nation state to other (local or regional and international) levels (Arts and Van Tatenhove 2006). Decisions are not only made within traditional, formal settings such as political parties and parliament. In contrast, policy making also takes place outside these institutions in informal settings, a phenomenon Beck (1992) refers to as ‘sub-politics’. In public administration literature, these shifts in the relationships between state, market and civil society are often referred to as the transition from government to governance (see section 1.6).

A central notion in the policy arrangement approach is that the process of political modernization influences and conditions day-to-day policy practices. However, interactions in policy arrangements do not, in turn, (directly) change the process of political modernization (Arts and Leroy 2003, Arts and Van Tatenhove 2006). This needs to be explained. On the one hand, structural processes, such as globalization, regionalization, individualization and the rise of information technology (at macro level), but also the structural properties of a policy arrangement (at meso level: rules of the game, distribution of power, discourses, see 2.5) are the context in which the (inter)actions of individual policy actors (at micro level) take place. In this sense, the structural context (at macro and meso level) both constrains and enables policy actors in their attempts to influence policy processes. In return, as a result of the policy actors’ (inter)actions (micro level), the structural properties of policy arrangements (meso level) may change. However, this change does not automatically affect the ongoing process of political modernization in Western society (macro level). Instead, political modernization is the unforeseen consequence of an infinite variety of (inter)actions in a diversity of policy arrangements (Arts and Van Tatenhove 2006). For this reason, the effect that (changes in) day-to-day policy practices in the field of cultural heritage preservation have on the process of political modernization in Western society is not studied in this book.

In the policy arrangement approach, two phases of political modernization are distinguished, each of which can be characterized by specific interrelations between state, market and civil society and by specific discourses on steering. In general, the first phase of political modernization is ‘nation-state centered’ and closely linked to the project of (early) modernity. The notion of a ‘manageable society’ is central, which is reflected in closed, rational, hierarchical, top-down forms of policy making. The nation state is regarded as the main steering actor, whereas society is believed to be highly manageable by state regulation. Furthermore, the first phase of political modernization is characterized by a relative isolation of state, market and civil society. Specific interrelations between the three subsystems (such as statism, corporatism and liberalism) depend on the political preferences and traditions of a society (Arts and Van Tatenhove 2006).

In contrast, the second phase of political modernization has developed beyond the ‘nation-state model’ and is strongly related to what is referred to as late, reflexive or post-modernity. The manageable society is being redefined, the nation state loses its exclusiveness, and the relations between state, market and civil society become pluriform. State actors can no longer rely on hierarchical authority to govern society and must cooperate with market actors and civil society in order to achieve their goals. Market actors are increasingly challenged to take public responsibility and civil society is re-politicized. Accordingly, a central feature of the second phase of political modernization is the emergence of various new, open, interactive, bottom-up forms of governance next to more traditional forms of government and hence, a plurality of policy practices (Arts and Van Tatenhove 2006).

2.4 Institutionalization

Another concept that is central to the policy arrangement approach is institutionalization. Institutionalization refers to the ongoing process of transformation through which policy arrangements are produced and reproduced (Arts and Leroy 2003, Van Tatenhove et al. 2000). It involves “(…) the historical process in which initially individual and subjective behavior (…) is imitated and then repeated in time to such an extent that it develops into a collective and objective pattern of behavior, which in turn exerts a stimulating and controlling influence on subsequent individual and subjective actions, thoughts and feelings (…)” (Zijderveld 2000: 31-32). In other words, institutions are shaped by individual, subjective behavior but at the same time, they condition behavior as well (Kooiman 2003, Steunenberg 2001).

From a similar dialectical perspective, the policy arrangement approach analyzes the process of institutionalization as “(…) the interplay between structuration and stabilization, in which the contents and the organization of policy arrangements are (re)produced in interaction, within the context of long-term processes of societal and political change” (Van Tatenhove et al. 2000: 19). ‘Structuration’ involves the gradual formation of the content...
According to the policy arrangement approach, ‘the organization and content’ of a policy domain are inextricably linked in processes of policy making. Furthermore, any ‘stabilization’ of the organization and content of a policy domain is only temporary, because arrangements are constantly influenced by the interactions of policy actors in specific policymaking processes and/or by long-term processes of political modernization (Van Tatenhove et al. 2000). This implies that a policy arrangement is dynamic in nature: it changes continuously.

A ‘policy domain’ includes all policy practices with regard to an issue. In this study, the policy domain of cultural heritage preservation is at the center of attention. Accordingly, the term policy domain is operationalized as the whole of policy practices concerning cultural heritage preservation in a specific state or context. The delineation of the preservation domain is an empirical matter, as its boundaries may be different for each state or context. For example, governmental and non-governmental actors, rules, regulations, traditions, plans and ideas stemming from (inter)national, regional and local levels may (or may not) play a role. Accordingly, my analysis is not restricted to actors, rules and ideas from the national level alone.

In conclusion, in this study, preservation arrangements are analyzed as the temporary stabilizations of the organization and content of cultural heritage preservation in three different states or contexts. In the policy arrangement approach, four dimensions of a policy arrangement are distinguished. They are: (a) the policy actors involved and the coalitions they build; (b) the prevailing rules of the game; (c) the established division of power (these are three organizational dimensions); and (d) the existing diversity of policy discourses (the discursive dimension of a policy arrangement). These four dimensions do not simply add up to define a policy arrangement. They are strongly interrelated. The tetrahedron in figure 2.2 visualizes that change in one of the four dimensions could lead to change in the other dimensions, like in a chain reaction (Arts and Leroy 2003, Liefferink 2006). For example, the appearance of new policy actors may add new ideas to the dominant policy discourse and/or alter the prevailing rules of the game and division of power. Therefore, the analysis of a policy arrangement only makes sense if it is comprehensive, which means that it covers all four dimensions of a policy arrangement as well as their interrelations (Liefferink 2006). The analysis of a policy arrangement can take each of the four corners of the tetrahedron as starting point. Starting from the actors dimension and looking at discourses, for example, one focuses on the presence of discourse coalitions (see section 2.5.4). Starting from the rules dimension and focusing on the division of power, ones attention is drawn to forms of power that are embedded in rules (see section 2.5.2). In this way, figure 2.2 also shows the analytical possibilities of the policy arrangements approach (Liefferink 2006: 59). In the following sections, I present some theoretical notions on the four dimensions of a policy arrangement: actors and coalitions (2.5.1), power (2.5.2), rules of the game (2.5.3) and policy discourses (2.5.4).

2.5 Policy Arrangements

In this section, the policy arrangement concept itself is defined and operationalized. A policy arrangement can be seen as the set of regulations, agreements, practices, traditions and values that has evolved over time and that reflects both the dominant beliefs of and the power relations between the actors in a certain policy domain (cf. Chandler 2000, Nelissen et al. 2000). Van Tatenhove et al. (2000: 54) define a policy arrangement as ‘(...) the temporary stabilization of the organization and content of a policy domain at a specific level of policy making.’ According to the policy arrangement approach, ‘the organization and content of a policy arrangement (accepted discourses, coalitions, rules and division of power) through the actions and interactions of policy actors. ‘Stabilization’ refers to the process in which a policy arrangement becomes increasingly stable and starts constraining the policy actors involved to adopting certain concepts, values, ideas, rules and routines (Arts and Leroy 2006, Van Tatenhove et al. 2000).

In policy arrangements, new ideas, actors, rules or power resources are introduced continuously, either in the course of ongoing (inter)actions or in relation to more structural social-political transformations in society. Some of the newly emerging ideas, actors, rules or power resources may be more influential than others and eventually change or ‘destabilize’ existing discourses, coalitions, rules and/or distribution of power. In some cases, such changes may even result in the gradual structuration and stabilization of new organizational and discursive patterns. For example, new problem definitions become accepted or new interaction patterns become routines. This process of destabilization, structuration and stabilization of the content and organization of a policy arrangement is, in this study, referred to as institutionalization.

2.5.1 Actors and Coalitions

Actors and coalitions represent the first dimension of a policy arrangement. In this study, actors are the (governmental and non-governmental) organizations and individuals that are involved in cultural heritage preservation. In general, these actors have a certain amount of power and represent certain views, perspectives or discourses. Accordingly,
these actors identify certain policy goals and they engage in policy processes to achieve those goals. While doing so, some actors may support the prevailing rules, division of power and policy discourse(s) in the policy arrangement, whereas others might challenge these (Arts and Leroy 2003, Van Tatenhove et al. 2000).

A coalition is a group of two or more actors that cooperate as they share certain power resources, rules and/or discourses. The cooperation may also be based on the interdependency between the actors involved. Moreover, coalitions may either support or challenge dominant rules or discourses. The extent to which I focus on coalitions between actors depends on the extent to which they occur. I assume that the occurrence of coalitions differs from case to case. For example, actors may agree on what cultural heritage sites should be selected for preservation and jointly lobby for their registration and protection. Yet these same actors may disagree on the way in which and by whom these cultural heritage sites should be preserved and may fight over responsibilities and funds.

### 2.5.2 Power

The second dimension of policy arrangements involves the division of power between the actors involved. Power is a complex and multilayered concept. Three interconnected layers of power can be distinguished: (1) relational power (actor-oriented), (2) dispositional power and (3) structural power (both structure-oriented) (Arts and Van Tatenhove 2005, Goverde and Van Tatenhove 2000).

The first layer, ‘relational power’, involves the most obvious or visible type of power. It refers to the capacity of policy actors to influence other actors and/or to achieve policy outcomes that are consistent with their interests and ideas, by determining decisions but also by dominating public debates, defining policy issues and/or setting agendas (Arts and Van Tatenhove 2005, Goverde and Van Tatenhove 2000). Relational power may be transitive or intransitive in nature. Transitive power refers to situations where actors achieve outcomes against the will of others. It always involves a zero-sum game: whatever power actor A has, actor B lacks and vice versa. Intransitive power is not a zero-sum game. It indicates ‘joint practices’ through which actors achieve common goals and refers to the ‘self-empowerment’ of a group or community (Arts and Van Tatenhove 2005, Goehler 2000).

Whereas in an actor-oriented approach, power is mainly seen as something between actors, in a structure-oriented approach, power is defined as a feature of institutions that influence the behavior of actors (Peters 1999). In line with the latter, the second layer of ‘dispositional power’ places power in an institutional context. Power is seen as the relative autonomous or dependent positions of actors within a specific context. The relative autonomy or dependency of actors determines what they may (or may not) achieve. The relative positions of actors are defined by the prevailing rules of the game (see section 5.2.3) and the existing division of resources in a policy arrangement (Arts and Van Tatenhove 2005, Goverde and Van Tatenhove 2000). Resources may involve the control of legal rights and responsibilities, information, money or property. In other words, actors in the field of cultural heritage preservation have a relative autonomous position if they have important tasks and responsibilities, such as the authority to select preservation-worthy cultural heritage sites, if they possess the necessary information or funds for the maintenance or restoration of cultural heritage sites and/or if they own the land on which cultural heritage sites are located.

Finally, the third layer of ‘structural power’ refers to the way macro-societal structures shape the nature and conduct of individuals and organizations (Arts and Van Tatenhove 2005, Goverde and Van Tatenhove 2000). Power is seen as the outcome of the structural characteristics of society. These structural characteristics include “(...) orders of signification, legitimization and domination, which are ‘materialized’ in discourses as well as in political, legal and economic institutions of societies (...)” (Arts and Van Tatenhove 2005: 351). In other words, the division of power between the actors in a policy arrangement is the outcome of the relevant social-political context of that policy arrangement (i.e. the power relations between state, market and civil society), which is also reflected in the prevailing rules of the game (see 2.5.3) and in the dominant policy discourse (see 2.5.4). This implies that, in relation to ongoing social-political transformations, such as shifting relationships between state, market and civil society (which I refer to as ‘political modernization’, see sections 2.3 and 2.5.5), the division of power in a policy arrangement, the prevailing rules and the dominant policy discourses, may gradually change.

In conclusion, in this study, actors are considered to have a certain amount of power if the prevailing rules of the game, the dominant policy discourse, the existing division of resources and/or the relevant social-political context (power relations between state, market and civil society) of the preservation arrangement provide them with a relatively autonomous position and hence, the capacity to influence policy outcomes.

### 2.5.3 Rules of the Game

The prevailing rules of the game form the third dimension of a policy arrangement. They define possibilities and constraints for actors to act within a certain policy domain. They prescribe how the political game is played, what norms and values are legitimate, how policies are developed and decisions are made. Furthermore, the rules of the game determine the actors that have access to the policy making process (and those who do not) and they define the interrelations between those actors (Arts and Leroy 2003, Van Tatenhove et al. 2000).

In the analysis of a policy arrangement, different types and categories of rules can be distinguished. First, we can distinguish between formal and informal rules. Formal rules are those norms or standards that are prescribed in policy documents such as laws, decrees, agreements, schemes and plans. These official documents may for example lay down the formal division of tasks and responsibilities in a policy domain and/or provide the framework for policymaking processes. Informal rules are those norms or standards that are connected with the existing customs or traditions in a policy domain. Examples of informal rules are a tendency towards consensus building or a preference for minimum state intervention. Whether formal or informal in nature, the prevailing rules of the game in a policy arrangement determine how policymaking processes are arranged or structured. They prescribe the allocation of tasks and responsibilities between the actors involved in a policy domain, for example the responsibility to develop and implement policies. Furthermore, they determine what actors can and what actors cannot participate in policymaking processes. Based on such rules, access to policymaking processes can be relatively easy or relatively restricted.
2.5.4 Policy Discourses

The three dimensions that have been discussed so far represent the organization of a policy arrangement. This section deals with the content of a policy arrangement: the existing variety of policy discourses. Policy discourses are the "(... dominant interpretative schemes, ranging from formal policy concepts to popular story lines, by which meaning is given to a policy domain" (Van Tatenhove et al. 2000: 63). A basic notion in the policy arrangement approach is that within a policy domain, a number of competing policy discourses can coexist. These different policy discourses are advocated by actors or a coalition of actors within a policy arrangement. Policy discourses that have become powerful or dominant within the context of a specific policy domain tend to stabilize or institutionalize over time, thereby resulting in new policy arrangements. However, the dominant policy discourse may also be challenged by (coalitions of) actors that advocate competing discourses (Van der Zouwen 2006, Van Tatenhove et al. 2000). Hence, a policy arrangement could be seen as the outcome of a struggle for hegemony between a variety of competing policy discourses, which are advocated by (coalitions of) actors within the arrangement.

Within the social sciences, a large variety of discourse definitions and theories exist. Whereas some state that discourse refers to any form of written or spoken text, others refer to a much broader, institutionalized social system of traditions, rules and power relations when they speak of discourse (Zwanikken 2001). Positioned somewhere between these two extremes, the policy arrangement approach builds on the definition that Hajer has provided to analyze policy discourses. Hajer defines a discourse as: "(... a specific ensemble of ideas, concepts and categorizations that are produced, reproduced and transformed in a particular set of practices and through which meaning is given to physical and social realities (...)" (Hajer 1995: 44). In other words, policy discourses are socially constructed in the day-to-day interactions between policy actors and they give meaning to specific policy problems and policy solutions. In addition, policy discourses always feature a normative element: they connect a given problem situation with a desired policy outcome and present arguments why a problem situation should be dealt with in a certain way (Dicke 2001, Van Eeten 1999).

In this study, policy discourses are defined as specific ensembles of ideas, concepts and categorizations that are produced, reproduced and transformed and through which actors give meaning to policy situations in the field of cultural heritage preservation. Important elements of a policy discourse are: (a) the policy problems that are identified; (b) the policy solutions that are defined; (c) the themes, concepts, categorizations and metaphors that are frequently used; and (d) the ideas, theories and perspectives that implicitly control the thinking in cultural heritage preservation (Boonstra 2002, 2004, Dicke 2001). In my view, policy discourses in the field of cultural heritage preservation first include ideas about what cultural heritage is and why it is protection worthy. In addition, preservation discourses contain perspectives on the way in which cultural heritage should be preserved.

Finally, I would like to make some remarks regarding the analysis of discourses. Although discourses have a powerful influence on what we see and how we interpret what we see, they are difficult to assess. We are often unaware of their role in organizing our perceptions, thoughts and actions. An extremely relativist interpretation of discourses leads to the position that all discourses are equally valid. However, intuitively we understand that not all discourses are of equal value (Rein and Schön 1993). Even though discourses are interpretative constructs, they can, like any story, "(...) be put to the test and interrogated on their fit with reality (...)" (Dicke 2001: 13). Therefore, the use of the concept of discourse in this study does not imply the relativization of science. Yet the question remains whether a totally objective or neutral assessment of discourses is ever possible. In my view, we can identify and describe policy discourses in a scientifically acceptable manner as long as we, at the same time, explicitly clarify and question our own theories, assumptions, ideologies and discourses (cf. Alvesson and Sköldberg 2000, Flyvbjerg 2001). For that reason, this chapter has the explicit aim to discuss my assumptions regarding organizational and discursive developments in current preservation arrangements.

2.5.5 Four Dimensions and the Two Phases of Political Modernization

In this section, I relate the four dimensions of a policy arrangement with the two phases of political modernization that were discussed in section 2.3 (see table 2.1).

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<th>Table 2.1 Dimensions and the two phases of political modernization</th>
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<td><strong>Dimension</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Actors and coalitions</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Division of power</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Rules of the game</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Dominant policy discourse(s)</strong></td>
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The first phase of political modernization is featured by a relative isolation of state, market and civil society. The division of power between actors and the prevailing rules of the game depend on the predominant form of steering in society: statism, corporatism, liberalism. In a statist society, hierarchy is the prevailing rule of the game, which means that state actors possess crucial resources in the field: the responsibility to select cultural heritage sites and develop preservation strategies. In a corporatist society, cooperation prevails as rule of the game and crucial resources are shared by the state and a selection of non-governmental preservation organizations. In a liberalist society, the prevailing rule of the game is competition and private actors possess crucial resources (for example private property rights). The policy discourses that dominate the first phase of political modernization in the field of cultural heritage preservation are primarily determined by cultural heritage experts from the social and cultural elite. Cultural heritage typically refers to historic buildings and sites that are authentic, beautiful and/or created by a great artist. Cultural heritage sites are considered protection-worthy as sources of national pride and unity. Furthermore, cultural heritage preservation is primarily about the protection of national heritage against any unwanted developments.

In the second phase of political modernization, a broad variety of actors from state, market and civil society have access to policymaking processes in the field of cultural heritage preservation. These actors recognize that they depend on each other for the achievement of their goals and accordingly, deliberation and cooperation are important rules of the game. State actors acknowledge the importance of participation by civil society and market actors in order to define and manage a representative sample of local and regional cultural heritage values. At the same time, more and more actors from civil society (NGOs) claim a role by independently implementing preservation projects and/or cooperating with state or market actors in joint restoration and redevelopment projects. Market actors are eager to invest in the redevelopment of cultural heritage sites because of the opportunities they offer as tourist attractions and settlement factors. As a result, the second phase is characterized by a great plurality of preservation practices, at different levels of policymaking, with or without the involvement of state actors. Finally, the policy discourses that dominate the second phase of political modernization typically reflect notions as cultural diversity, architectural eclecticism, the constructive nature and contextuality of cultural heritage, and the idea that no single culture or perspective can be favored over others. Accordingly, the aim is to preserve a representative sample of heritage values by providing them with viable (new) functions. Preservation arrangements in different Western states to reveal a growing internal diversity, with or without the involvement of state actors.

As I mentioned before, I am fascinated by the idea that current preservation arrangements may be changing along the lines of the ongoing political modernization process in Western society. In relation to the political modernization process, I expect current preservation arrangements in different Western states to reveal a growing internal diversity in the sense that they embrace a growing plurality of preservation practices, at different levels of policymaking, with or without the involvement of state actors. Accordingly, I reformulate the main hypothesis of this thesis as follows: the process of political modernization in Western society is related to a growing internal diversity in current preservation arrangements.

2.6 Reformulated Research Questions
This thesis deals with the comparative analysis of current developments in the organization and the content of preservation arrangements in different Western countries. The preservation arrangements are the units of research. The goal of my study is to analyze and understand current dynamics in the preservation arrangements in Norway, Arizona and the Netherlands by (a) exploring the developments that have emerged in the three preservation arrangements since the early 1990s in terms of (i) actors and coalitions, (ii) division of power, (iii) rules of the game and (iv) policy discourses; and (b) placing these developments against the background of the political modernization process in Western society.

In chapter 1, I formulated three preliminary research questions. These questions are now reformulated in terms of the concepts, ideas and hypothesis that were introduced in this chapter. The following research questions are central to this study:

1. What developments have emerged in the preservation arrangements in Norway, Arizona and the Netherlands since the early 1990s in terms of actors and coalitions, rules of the game, division of power and policy discourses?
2. What are the main similarities and differences between the organizational and discursive dynamics in the three preservation arrangements?
3. To what extent can the organizational and discursive dynamics in the three preservation arrangements be understood in relation to the political modernization process in Western society?

The first research question requires an answer that is descriptive in nature. It is dealt with in the chapters 4 (Norway), 5 (Arizona) and 6 (the Netherlands). These three empirical chapters provide reconstructions of the organizational and discursive developments emerging in the preservation arrangements under study. The second research question is comparative in nature: it calls for a comparison between the results that are presented in the empirical chapters. This comparison is provided in chapter 7 (section 7.3). The third research question focuses on understanding the emerging developments in Norway, Arizona and Netherlands. Accordingly, section 7.4 places the reconstructed developments against the background of the ongoing process of political modernization in Western society. Finally, in chapter 8, I present the main conclusions of my study. First however, the next chapter deals with the research strategy and methodology that are used to arrive at answers to my research questions.
3

METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK
3.1 Introduction

This methodological chapter connects the previous conceptual chapter with the empirical chapters that follow by addressing how I arrive at answers to my research questions. It delineates the tradition in which and the strategy and methods through which I conducted my research. Moreover, it explicates the reasons why I chose this particular research design. In doing so, this chapter provides insight in both the design and the process of my research.

In the following sections, I describe and provide arguments for all relevant methodological considerations and choices in this study. First, section 3.2 highlights the reflexive character of my study. Next, section 3.3 presents the selected research strategy: the multiple case study. In section 3.4, the internationally comparative character of my study is addressed and section 3.5 presents the way in which the three cases Norway, Arizona and the Netherlands are selected. Finally, section 3.6 deals with the research methods that I use to provide answers to the research questions that are formulated in chapter 2.

3.2 Reflexive Policy Analysis

From the very beginning of this study, I have been inspired by the tradition of reflexive policy analysis. Whether referred to as a ‘reflexive’ (Alvesson and Sköldberg 2000), ‘interpretative’ (Hajer and Wagenaar 2003), ‘narrative’ (Czarniawska 1998, Dicke 2001, Omega and Landa 1996, Roe 1994), ‘phronetic’ (Flyvbjerg 2001), ‘social-constructivist’ (De Jong 1999, Farmer 1995, Termeer 1993, Zwanikken 2001), ‘post-positivist’ (Vanoy 2003), ‘post-structuralist’ (Gottweis 2003) or ‘post-empiricist’ (Fischer 2003) approach, the main idea is that there are different constructions of ‘the truth’, all of which have been created in social interaction between people. However, this does not imply that the truth could be anything at all. Not reality itself, but rather the vocabularies and concepts that are used to represent it are socially constructed.

Because of its underlying assumption that there are different constructions of reality, a reflexive approach requires a research methodology that enables us to observe a diversity of reality-constructions. For policy analysis, a reflexive approach means that policy phenomena are analyzed as ‘articulations’ rather than facts. This means that reflexive policy analysis focuses the attention on the different perspectives or discourses from which different policy actors act, while keeping an open mind about the topics under discussion. In addition, a reflexive approach pays great attention to the (written and unwritten) rules that define who counts as an actor in a particular policy arrangement and who does not (De Jong 1999, Gottweis 2003, Miles and Huberman 1994).

Another idea that is central to a reflexive approach is that all people, including researchers, unavoidably see reality through a certain frame or perspective. Because it is very difficult (if not impossible) for researchers to identify their taken-for-granted assumptions and blind spots, purely neutral or objective research does not exist (Alvesson and Sköldberg 2000, Farmer 1995, Fischer 2003, Flyvbjerg 2001, Gottweis 2003, Zwanikken 2001). In an attempt to deal with these circumstances, a reflexive approach examines the set of assumptions and social constructions that constitute the frame or perspective through which we see (Farmer 1995, Fischer 2003, Flyvbjerg 2001). This has important implications for the research methodology to be applied. Basically, reflexive research has two main characteristics: careful interpretation and reflection. The first refers to the idea that all references to empirical data are the results of interpretation. This implies a hermeneutic methodology, meaning that the researcher interprets what she observes or re-interprets what others have observed and interpreted. The second characteristic, reflection, refers to ‘the interpretation of interpretation’ or the critical self-exploration of one’s own interpretations of the empirical material. This implies a dialectic or double hermeneutic research methodology, which is based on the process of confrontation. The researcher confronts his or her own interpretation of the empirical data with an alternative set of interpretations (Alvesson and Sköldberg 2000, Gu 1990, Zwanikken 2001).

In conclusion, a major methodological challenge in this study is to identify, (re-)interpret and reflect on my interpretations of empirical data in order to arrive at valid and reliable reconstructions of and a plausible understanding of the developments emerging in the three preservation arrangements under study. This chapter aims to address all relevant methodological choices I have made during the research process in attempts to produce such reconstructions and interpretations.

3.3 Case Study Strategy

My choice for a reflexive approach, involving a prudent and thorough interpretation of research material, implies that I use a qualitative research design. In qualitative research, one or a small number of objects is studied rather intensively by focusing on a large number of variables. In addition, multiple methods of data-collection are used, such as content analysis, participative observation and face-to-face interviews (Miles and Huberman 1994, Swanborn 1996). A design or strategy that is used very often within qualitative research is the case study. In case studies, the researcher tries to get a deep insight into one or a small number of objects or processes. Important features of a case-study strategy are: (a) a relatively small number of research objects; (b) a selective or strategic sample of research objects; (c) a labor-intensive form of data-collection and method-triangulation; and (d) an open, holistic way of data-collection (Verschuren and Doorward 1998). Furthermore, in case study research, the objects under study are examined within their specific context, whereby special attention is paid to the interrelatedness of relevant factors (Hutjes and Van Buuren 1992, Yin 1994). For this reason, I consider the case study as an appropriate strategy for this study, in which three preservation processes are analyzed within their specific national contexts and against the background of a general process of political modernization.

In the social sciences, special attention goes out to the reliability of research methods and the internal and external validity of research results. Reliability is a matter of whether a particular research methodology, applied repeatedly to the same object, leads to the same result each time (Babbie 2001, Maso and Smaling 1998, Miles and Huberman 1994). Basically, reliability is a concern every time a single observer is the source of data, because there is no safeguard against the effects of that observer’s subjectivity (Babbie 2001). However, the reliability or ‘trackability’ of a research project can be increased by explicitly describing all choices made during the project regarding the research material, theoretical concepts and propositions, research methods and strategies (Maso and Smaling 1998). Accordingly, the goal of this chapter is to identify and justify all methodological choices that I have made during my study.
Internal validity refers to the extent to which a research project is free of biases (Babbie 2001). A possible measure to increase the internal validity of a research project is the triangulation of research methods and material, which means that several research methods are used and different sources are addressed to test the same finding (Babbie 2001, Maso and Smaling 1998, Verhage 2002). In addition, reflexive research promotes the confrontation of one’s findings with other interpretations. If a better interpretation demonstrates the previous interpretation to be less appropriate, this new interpretation remains valid until another, even better interpretation is produced. In other words, one interpretation is not just as good as another, which would be the case for relativism (Flyvbjerg 2001). In order to optimize the internal validity of my study, I have used different research methods (face-to-face interviews, content analysis and participative observation) and several kinds of research material (the texts of interviews, policy documents, laws and regulations, meetings, hearings, conferences, workshops, websites, etc.) in order to increase the internal validity of my results. Furthermore, I have sent my research results to informants in order to verify whether my findings are merely my interpretations or shared interpretations and thereby more valid descriptions of the studied cases.

External validity is the extent to which research results can be generalized to other situations than the studied situation. The external validity of case studies is a much discussed matter. Like Flyvbjerg (2001), I believe it is a major misunderstanding that general, context-independent knowledge is more valuable than concrete, context-dependent knowledge and that case studies cannot contribute to scientific development because one cannot generalize on the basis of an individual case. In Flyvbjerg’s view, which I share, social science has nothing else to offer than context-dependent knowledge and that the case study is especially well suited to produce this knowledge. Therefore, the strength of the case study strategy lies in the ‘power of example’, in revealing patterns in policymaking processes and in the development of practical knowledge. Accordingly, the aim of this study is to determine how and why developments occur in three different preservation arrangements, rather than to generalize from the three cases to preservation arrangements in general or to other policy fields.

To some extent however, it is possible to generalize the results that are generated through case study research. According to Maso and Smaling (1998), the concept of ‘transferability’ provides a solution here. This concept is based on arguments of analogy. It implies that it is not the researcher herself but the reader of the thesis who decides whether analogy exists between the studied situation and other situations. In order to increase the transferability of a case study, the researcher should provide as much information as possible about the specific context in which the studied cases are situated. Moreover, the transferability of case studies can be increased by a strategic selection of cases. For example, a wide variation of cases enables us to obtain information about the significance of various contextual circumstances for specific cases (Flyvbjerg 2001). Accordingly, in order to enhance the transferability of this study, my selection of cases involves a wide variety of preservation arrangements (see section 3.5). Furthermore, I pay special attention to the specific geographical, historical and social-political contexts of my three cases. This enables the reader to decide whether the results of my three case studies are transferable to other cases as well.

3.4 International Comparison

This thesis compares current developments in a wide variety of preservation arrangements. My hypothesis is that the organizational and discursive dynamics in this variety of preservation arrangements can be understood as outcomes of the interplay between day-to-day policy practices and the process of political modernization in Western society. This hypothesis asks for a comparative study of preservation arrangements in different Western states. Accordingly, this study involves an internationally comparative approach and a multiple case study design. The selection of preservation arrangements that is compared in this thesis is accounted for in section 3.5. This section deals with the implications of an internationally comparative research design.

It is important to note that the aim of this study is not to compare different countries but to compare emerging developments in different preservation arrangements. The different countries are seen as different contexts in which people do similar things, that is, preserving cultural heritage. The fact that they do these things in different ways makes the comparison interesting, because it enables policy actors to reflect upon the way they act. In other words, a comparison of different policy arrangements exposes implicit assumptions that are taken for granted within those arrangements and may show that more policy options are available (cf. Verhage 2002). In addition, a maximum variation of cases offers the possibility of making context-dependent statements, as I stated in the previous section. It enables me to understand the similarities and differences between the emerging developments in a variety of policy arrangements in the field of cultural heritage preservation.

The choice to carry out a study cross-nationally is often considered to bring along a whole range of methodological problems (Øyen 1990, Teune 1990). A first methodological problem is related to the differing contexts of the cases. These contextual differences are bigger when the cases are chosen in different countries. A general difficulty in this respect is that the units of comparison may have dissimilar meanings in different countries. A way to deal with this problem is to use one uniform research approach in the different cases. For this reason, I carried out my three case studies using the same conceptual framework and, as much as possible, according to the same procedure (see section 3.6). At the same time, it is important to note that the various meanings of cultural heritage and the variety of perspectives or discourses on cultural heritage preservation in the three different countries are an important theme in this study.

Second, the issue of ethnocentrism plays an important role in internationally comparative research. Ethnocentrism is the tendency to view reality primarily through the perspective of one’s own culture. From a perspective of reflexivity, any research should be based on some awareness of the researcher’s cultural biases: “Researchers must guard against imposing their own cultural perspective on the research design, data collection, interpretation and analysis” (Usunier 1998: 42). As it is impossible to completely rule out one’s own frame of reference, the only way to deal with the problem of ethnocentrism is awareness of and sensitivity for country-specific qualities and characteristics. For this reason, I stayed in Norway and in Arizona for a relatively long period of time (three months) in order to become aware of the specific characteristics of the Norwegian and Arizonan ways of life and to become sensitive for the specific ways of thinking about and dealing with cultural heritage. Furthermore, in order to minimize the influence of
a typical Dutch preservation perspective on my interpretations of policy practices in Norway and Arizona, I carried out the Norwegian and Arizonan case studies before starting with the in-depth study of the Dutch case.

The use of language plays a crucial role as well. In general, the complicated situation of different languages being used in research processes is simplified by the use of English and by the means of translation, which is supposed to lead to similar meaning. However, “[…] comparing across cultures without awareness of language always results in biased and impoverished findings” (Usunier 1998: 49). Therefore, it is very important to determine whether the words that are used have similar meaning across the different countries that are studied. In this study, I am confronted with three different languages: Norwegian, English and Dutch. To avoid bias and oversimplification in the analysis of the three cases, I use the original Norwegian, English and Dutch words and concepts as much as possible. Where translations are necessary for reasons of readability, I show the original words and concepts between brackets.

### 3.5 Selection of Cases

Now the reasons for and the implications of applying an internationally comparative case study strategy have been discussed, this section deals with the way in which the three cases have been selected. To start with, a selection of at least three cases enables me to make a useful comparison of the developments emerging in current cultural heritage preservation in Western society. At the same time, given the restricted amount of time and funding available for this study, a selection of three (as opposed to four or more) cases still allows me to thoroughly analyze the preservation arrangements. As formulated in chapter 2, the central hypothesis in this study is that the process of political modernization in Western society is related to a growing internal diversity in current preservation arrangements. In order to test this hypothesis, I analyze and compare organizational and discursive dynamics in three very different preservation arrangements. In other words, my selection of cases is based on the principle of maximum variation in the independent variable: the initial characteristics of the preservation arrangements in the early 1990s.

The three cases under study in this thesis are the preservation arrangements in Norway, Arizona and the Netherlands. On the one hand, these three states have enough in common to be compared, but on the other hand, they differ considerably so that they can be contrasted. Norway, Arizona and the Netherlands all have an advanced economy, a democratic system and a high technological development in common. However, they vary considerably with regard to historical, geographical and social-political characteristics and as a result, I assume that they also differ regarding the nature and amount of cultural heritage sites, the main threats to these sites, the development of cultural heritage preservation and accordingly, the type of policy practices that prevail in the field of cultural heritage preservation. In the remainder of this section, I specify the main characteristics of the selected preservation arrangements in the early 1990s. This information is based on a quick scan that I carried out prior to my definitive case selection. In this quick scan, I consulted informants, policy documents and websites, which provided me with a good impression of the most important features of the three preservation arrangements (see table 3.1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3.1</th>
<th>Contexts and characteristics of preservation arrangements in early 1990s</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Amount and nature of built heritage sites</strong></td>
<td>Netherlands: About 50,000 historic buildings and 350 urban and rural landscapes are protected under the National Monuments and Historic Buildings Act. They cover windmills, water works, city gates, castles, fortresses, public buildings, churches, farmhouses and private houses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Main threats to built heritage</strong></td>
<td>Netherlands: Demolition due to high development pressure (in both urban and rural areas).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Development of cultural heritage preservation</strong></td>
<td>Netherlands: Monumentenzorg developed from private initiatives to a public task in the second half of the nineteenth century.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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52 TRACES OF CHANGE 53 METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK
Clearly, the Netherlands is primarily selected as a case because it is my home country. The Dutch built heritage is famous for the characteristic windmills and ingenious water works, and of course Amsterdam’s historic inner city with its canals, canal houses and bridges. Other important categories of built heritage in the Netherlands include city gates and towers, castles, fortresses, public buildings, churches, farmhouses and private houses. Under the 1988 National Monuments and Historic Buildings Act, approximately 50,000 historic buildings and structures are listed as national monuments (rijksmonumenten) and 350 urban and rural landscapes are designated as protected towns- and villagescapes (beschermde stads- en dorpsgezichten). As the Netherlands is a relatively small and extremely densely populated country, the main threat to the Dutch built heritage is the high development pressure, both in urban and rural areas. Cultural heritage preservation or monumentenzorg gradually developed from private initiatives to a public task in the second half of the nineteenth century. An important argument for selecting the Netherlands is that the Dutch monumentenzorg arrangement in the early 1990s differs from preservation arrangements in other Western countries. In accordance with the traditions of consensus democracy that prevail in the Dutch social-political context, many different actors have a role and a certain amount of power in the field of monumentenzorg. For example, a number of preservation tasks and responsibilities have been decentralized to the local and regional government level, although the national government still has a crucial role in the selection and preservation of historic properties and sites. In addition, a large number of non-governmental organizations are involved in the Dutch field of monumentenzorg, a few of which even have official tasks and responsibilities. In conclusion, the Dutch monumentenzorg arrangement of the early 1990s resembles a neo-corporatist policy arrangement, in which power is shared between governmental actors and a limited number of non-governmental organizations, who jointly develop and implement policies (cf. Liefferink 2006).

One of the reasons to select the State of Arizona, beside the practical motive of having connections within the Arizona State University, is that Arizona is a relatively young state with a fast growing population. In the metropolitan areas of Phoenix and Tucson, the development pressure is high, which poses a big threat to the built heritage in these cities. Famous features of Arizona, besides the Grand Canyon, are its ancient Native American cultures on the one hand and its relatively short Anglo-American history on the other. Arizona’s built heritage clearly reflects this cultural and historical divide as it combines prehistoric ruins of the ancient Hohokam culture with relatively young remains of the Anglo-American settlement period from the 1870s onwards (houses, neighborhoods, churches, public buildings, industrial complexes). Approximately 1,260 historic properties in Arizona are currently listed in the U.S. National Register of Historic Places, including more than 200 historic districts. Compared to the Netherlands, this is a rather small number, both in absolute and in relative terms (in relation to population size, land area and building stock). Being a relatively young state in Anglo-American terms, most people do not perceive Arizona as having a rich history or a significant built heritage. Consequently, there is no broad support for ‘historic preservation’ in Arizona. In the second half of the twentieth century, preservation laws and policies were basically established pursuant to requirements deriving from federal legislation. Another important argument for selecting Arizona as a case is that it is part of the American Southwest, which is featured by a predominant individualist mentality, a widespread distrust in governmental authorities and highly valued private property rights. Consequently, the State of Arizona, like the other states in the American Southwest, has a relatively decentralized preservation arrangement in which private property owners are fairly powerful because of their well-protected property rights. Whereas the Arizona state government must rely on grant programs and tax incentives, local governments typically apply planning and zoning instruments in order to preserve historic resources. Only a few advocacy organizations are active in the field of historic preservation in Arizona. In summary, the Arizona preservation arrangement of the early 1990s resembles a liberal-pluralist policy arrangement, in which no single actor dominates and crucial power resources are spread over a wide array of public and private parties, who promote conflicting views or discourses in open competition (cf. Liefferink 2006).

Finally, it is important to note that the reason to concentrate on a single state like Arizona and leave out the rest of the United States (or the American Southwest) is that in the U.S., cultural heritage preservation is not a federal but primarily a state and local matter. From state to state, the policy practices differ considerably and on the basis of this study, it is not possible to say anything about the different historic preservation arrangements in the United States.

A first argument for selecting Norway is that it is a relatively large country with a small population. Whereas in the urbanized Southeast, the built heritage is primarily threatened by a high development pressure, in West- and North-Norway, depopulation and abandonment form the main threats. Apart from its numerous fjords, most people associate Norway with brightly colored wooden buildings and the ancient Viking culture with its dragon ships and stave churches. Important categories of Norway’s built heritage are (state) churches and monasteries, public buildings, fortresses, farmhouses and private houses. Under the Cultural Heritage Act of 1978, approximately 5,600 historic buildings are currently protected as cultural monuments (kulturminner). This is far more than in Arizona, but compared to the situation in the Netherlands, it is still a relatively small number (also in relative terms, given population size, land area and building stock). Similar to the development of Dutch monumentenzorg, Norwegian kulturminneforvaltning (cultural heritage management) gradually developed from a series of private initiatives to an official public task in the second half of the nineteenth century. This development was closely related to the process of ‘nation building’ that emerged after Norway’s independence from Denmark in 1814. Another argument for selecting Norway as one of my cases is that, contrary to the preservation arrangements in Arizona and the Netherlands, the Norwegian kulturminneforvaltning arrangement is relatively centralized and hierarchical in the early 1990s. The national government has the main responsibility, through strict laws and regulations, to select and preserve a representative sample of Norwegian heritage. Regional governments mostly play an advisory role in the selection and protection of heritage sites, although they have the authority to develop regional preservation policies. Most of the municipalities in Norway, having enormous amounts of land but only a small number of inhabitants, lack the necessary resources and know-how to develop preservation policies. Finally, only a limited number of non-governmental organizations have access to decision-making processes regarding the preservation of Norwegian heritage. To sum up, the Norwegian...
In order to reconstruct the organizational and discursive dynamics in the three preservation arrangements, I systematically and thoroughly analyzed the texts of laws, regulations, policy documents, websites, interviews, discussions, meetings, hearings and conferences. In these texts, I focused on explicit statements about and implicit references to (developments in) the dimensions of the preservation arrangement: (a) the (coalitions of) actors that are involved in cultural heritage preservation; (b) the division of power between these actors; (c) the formal and informal rules that indicate what policy processes are about and how they are organized; and (d) the ideas that the actors involved have about cultural heritage and cultural heritage preservation.

In the course of my research project, my knowledge of and experience with conducting case study research improved. Moreover, in the Norwegian and Arizonan cases, the collection of data was not entirely optimal due to limited time and means. As a final point, the three case studies were conducted in different periods of time for the simple reason that I am unable to be in different places at the same time. Obviously, this has some serious and unavoidable consequences for the comparability of my cases. I have tried to overcome these problems by keeping in contact with informants and respondents in order to keep my data topical and up-to-date until 2005, when I ended my empirical research.

For my case study in Norway, I stayed in Oslo for approximately three months in the autumn of 2002. During my stay, I traveled to Kristiansand, Stavanger, Trondheim and Steinkjer to have interviews with informants and representatives of policy actors involved in the field of cultural heritage preservation and to gather relevant laws, regulations and policy documents. During my stay in Norway, I carried out all interviews in English. In addition, I was able to collect some policy documents on kulturminneforvaltning in English, but obviously, most of the relevant documents are in Norwegian, which I am able to read. In an attempt to make accurate interpretations in English, I have translated the relevant concepts and phrases as literally as possible.

In order to explore the Arizonan case, I stayed in Tempe, a city in the Phoenix metropolitan area, for approximately three months in the spring of 2003. During my stay, I collected relevant laws, regulations and policy documents, and conducted interviews with informants and representatives of policy actors in the field of historic preservation. In my Arizonan case study, clearly, all policy documents were in English. The interviews were carried out in English as well. Being a non-native English speaker, I paid special attention to the meaning of concepts in the Arizonan context.

My case study in the Netherlands basically started when I began my research project in March 2000. Since then, I have collected large numbers of policy documents, I have met numerous preservationists and I have visited various meetings, conferences and courses on the topic of cultural heritage preservation. However, to minimize the influence of a typical Dutch preservation perspective on my interpretations of preservation practices in Norway and Arizona, I waited with the in-depth study of the Dutch case until after the analyses of the Norwegian and Arizonan cases. Clearly, most of the policy documents that I gathered are in Dutch and, being a native Dutch speaker, I also conducted my interviews in the Dutch language. In the analysis, I carefully interpreted the meaning of texts and concepts and I paid special attention to their English translations.
2. **What are the main similarities and differences between the organizational and discursive dynamics in the three preservation arrangements?**

Clearly, this question is comparative in nature. It calls for a comparison between the results that are presented in the three empirical chapters. This comparison is provided in chapter 7. First, section 7.2 provides a comparison of the initial characteristics of the three preservation arrangements in the early 1990s in terms of actors and coalitions, rules of the game, division of power and policy discourses. Subsequently, section 7.3 compares the organizational and discursive developments that have emerged in the three preservation arrangements since the early 1990s.

3. **To what extent can the organizational and discursive dynamics in the three preservation arrangements be understood in relation to the political modernization process in Western society?**

This question asks for a (partial) understanding of the emerging developments in the three preservation arrangements. In order to answer this question, section 7.4 relates the developments in the three preservation arrangements to the ongoing process of political modernization in Western society. One of the main challenges in this study is to determine the extent to which everyday policy practices in the field of cultural heritage preservation are related to the political modernization process. Accordingly, when comparing the dynamics in the three preservation arrangements in Norway, Arizona and the Netherlands, the aim is to analyze their distinct organizational and discursive features and identify them as elements from the first or the second phase of political modernization.

4.1 Introduction
Without a doubt the most recognized elements of the Norwegian built heritage are the medieval stave churches (stavkirker), as symbols of both Viking culture and early Christianity. The 28 remaining stave churches in Norway comprise the country’s most important contribution to world architectural history. Other famous elements of Norway’s built heritage are the characteristic, brightly colored wooden houses and farms. Easy access to high-quality timber has resulted in a long tradition of building in wood in Norway, both in the countryside and along the coast. In the Middle Ages, Norwegians also began to build in stone. Examples of early stone architecture include several medieval cathedrals and churches in Oslo, Trondheim, Bergen and Stavanger, and various medieval monasteries in the southern region of Norway, including the Utstein Monastery that was described in chapter 1. At present, approximately 5,600 historic buildings are protected as cultural monuments (kulturminner) under the Cultural Heritage Act. Important categories of kulturminner, besides private houses, farmsteads and religious structures are public buildings and industrial complexes.

This chapter analyzes recent dynamics in the Norwegian kulturminneforvaltning arrangement. First, I present the history of cultural heritage preservation in Norway in the following section. Section 4.3 describes the characteristics of the kulturminneforvaltning arrangement in the early 1990s and in section 4.4, I discuss the developments that have emerged from the early 1990s onwards. Section 4.5 presents my conclusions as regards change and stability in the Norwegian case.

4.2 The History of Kulturminneforvaltning
Norwegian kulturminneforvaltning dates back to the early nineteenth century. The growing interest in the preservation of cultural heritage in those days was closely related to the ideology of national romanticism and the process of state and nation building that emerged after 1814. In that year, Norway had become independent from Denmark and had entered a union with Sweden (see textbox 4.1). The process of Norwegian state and nation building, involving the development of an independent nation, was most of all a political phenomenon, organized by the cultural elite and those who dominated the public sphere. Their national romanticism was based on a systematic cultivation of the origin and development of the Norwegian people throughout history. Particularly the peasant culture of the inland valleys was perceived to be the authentic singularity that made Norway a unique state. Accordingly, the earliest efforts to preserve cultural heritage in Norway, initiated by the same political and cultural elite of the nineteenth century, were focused on heritage sites from the countryside, such as farmhouses and stave churches (Burgess 2001, Mangset 2000, Vestfold Fylkeskommune 2004).

TEXTBOX 4.1 Norway’s Independence
Norway’s history as a separate, independent nation has been relatively short. It was not until 1814 that Norway became independent from Denmark and the following dynastic union with Sweden was dissolved only a century ago, in 1905 (Allardt et al. 1981). During the reign of the Swedish king, the Norwegians succeeded in adopting their own constitution (in 1814). A parliamentary system was introduced in 1884 and in 1916, a Danish prince was elected and crowned as the new king of Norway (Alnæs 2001, Gstöhl 2002, Kommunenes Sentralforbund 2000). Today, Norway is a constitutional monarchy under King Harald V, with a parliamentary democratic form of government. Although the Norwegian monarchy has no actual political power, it provides a sense of national identity and is widely respected throughout the country. The executive power in Norway is exercised by a cabinet of ministers, referred to as the Council of State (Statsråd). The prime minister, who is formally appointed by the monarch, is usually the leader of the largest party in parliament. The legislative power resides with parliament (Storting). It consists of 165 members who are elected every four years (Kommunenes Sentralforbund 2000).

The rising nationalism and interest in Norwegian cultural history contributed to the development of a more conscious thinking about cultural heritage preservation from the 1840s onwards. Systematic preservation of cultural heritage in Norway started in 1844. In that year, the Society for Preservation of Norwegian Historic Monuments (Foreningen til norske Fortidsminnes-merkers Bevaring), mostly referred to as Fortidsminneforeningen, was founded (Aasland et al. 2002, Vestfold Fylkeskommune 2004). It was the first (non-governmental) organization in the field of kulturminneforvaltning (Mangset...

In its early years, Fortidsminneforeningen aimed primarily at the preservation of Norway’s prehistoric and medieval monuments, such as the stave churches that were rapidly vanishing in the course of the nineteenth century. In 1860, the NGO was granted an annual sum from the Norwegian government to cover the salary of a full-time official. The position eventually became a permanent appointment within the national government. In the end, this led to the establishment of the Central Office for Historic Buildings in 1912, the forerunner of the current Directorate for Cultural Heritage (Riksantikvaren). The Central Office for Historic Buildings was made responsible for the preservation of Norway’s national heritage. From that moment on, kulturminneforvaltning had become a governmental responsibility. The NGO Fortidsminneforeningen now started to focus on the protection of buildings dating from after the Reformation (1537), which is seen as the end of the Middle Ages in Norway (Fortidsminneforeningen 2002, Vestfold Fylkeskommune 2004).

Although many other European countries established legislation for cultural heritage preservation at the end of the nineteenth century, Norway witnessed a strong opposition against the introduction of such legislation. The protection of private property rights was still strong in those days. However, in reaction to the recognition of several important historic objects and sites in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, the Norwegian authorities realized that something needed to be done in order to protect these nationally significant and valuable properties from alterations and demolition. In 1905, the Act on the Protection and Preservation of Antiquities (Lov om Fredning og Bevaring av Forstidshistorier) was approved by the Norwegian parliament (Randers 2005, Vestfold Fylkeskommune 2004). The first legislation regarding the protection of historic buildings in Norway passed in 1920: the Building Protection Act (Bygningsfredningsloven). On the basis of this legislation, protection orders could be issued for the protection of individual buildings of historic or architectural value that were older than 100 years (Mangset 2000, Vestfold Fylkeskommune 2004). The then established Antiquarian Building Committee comprised five members who registered and protected a large number of buildings in the 1920s (Vestfold Fylkeskommune 2004).

The work to revise the 1905 and 1920 Acts began in 1939, but was postponed because of the start of the Second World War. One of the reasons for a revision was that the existing legislation protected only individual historic buildings and not their surroundings, unlike the acts in Sweden and Denmark. Accordingly, the Ancient Monuments Act (Lov om fornminne or Forminneloven) of 1951 included the protection of historic buildings and their surroundings. Meanwhile, the postwar period was characterized by the rebuilding and reconstruction of the country. Cultural heritage preservation did not receive much attention. The Central Office for Historic Buildings (Riksantikvaren) concentrated mostly on urgent conservation tasks (Randers 2005, Tschudi-Madsen 2002, Vestfold Fylkeskommune 2004).

Because the 1951 Ancient Monuments Act did not satisfy the preservationist’s original intentions, in 1967 a committee was established with the task to write a proposal for yet another new act. The committee’s proposal involved a stronger protection of the cultural landscape surrounding historic buildings. The new proposal was based on a combination of the Ancient Monuments Act (Forminneloven) and the Building Protection Act (Bygningsfredningsloven). Eventually, the Cultural Heritage Act (Kulturminneloven) was established in 1978, providing a strong protection against the disturbance, alteration or demolition of national heritage sites and their surroundings (Mangset 2000, Randers 2005, Vestfold Fylkeskommune 2004). The purpose of the 1978 Cultural Heritage Act is: “(...) to protect archaeological and architectural monuments and sites, and cultural environments in all their variety and detail, both as part of our cultural heritage and identity and as an element in the overall environment and resource management” (CHA: §1). Under the 1978 Act, the responsibilities in the field of kulturminneforvaltning were divided over Riksantikvaren and the regional museums. Other important elements of the new act were a more encompassing definition of the selection criteria that should be the basis for protection, and a stronger legal protection for Sami heritage, representing the cultural history of the indigenous Sami people (Vestfold Fylkeskommune 2004).

With the establishment of the Ministry of the Environment (Miljøverndepartementet) in 1972, the responsibility for kulturminneforvaltning was taken over from the Ministry of Church Affairs and Education (Kirke og undervisningsdepartementet). Cultural heritage preservation became an element of environmental management and land use planning in general. In 1988, Riksantikvaren lost its position as independent government agency and was put as a directorate under the Ministry of the Environment (Vestfold Fylkeskommune 2004).

From the mid 1970s, a comprehensive national program for the registration of monuments and sites was put in motion through SEFRAK (Office for the Registration of Built Heritage) (Mangset 2000). The period from the mid-1970s also witnessed a strong growth in preservation efforts at regional and local level. Local involvement and stimulation from the state led to a rapid growth in the number of local history museums. Many municipalities spent large sums of money on compiling ‘bygdebøker’, books containing a detailed history of a specific area or community. Moreover, a large number of local (non-governmental) history societies (historielag) were established (Mangset 2000). The parliamentary report ‘Bygnings- og forminnovernet’ (Protection of Buildings and Cultural Monuments) of 1987 laid the basis for the development of a cultural heritage administration at county level (Miljøverndepartementet 2005). As a result, in 1989, the responsibility for the actual maintenance of protected buildings and sites, as well as the authority to prepare protection orders for valuable heritage sites and to ensure that protected heritage sites are considered in regional and local land use plans, were decentralized from the Directorate for Cultural Heritage to the county authorities.

4.3 Initial Characteristics of the Kulturminneforvaltning Arrangement

This section discusses the characteristics of the kulturminneforvaltning arrangement in the early 1990s in terms of the actors and coalitions that were involved (4.3.1), the division of power between these actors (4.3.2), the prevailing rules of the game (4.3.3) and the dominant policy discourses (4.3.4). Table 4.1 presents an overview.

4.3.1 Actors and Coalitions

In the early 1990s, the actors involved in the Norwegian kulturminneforvaltning arrangement were the Ministry of the Environment, the Directorate for Cultural Heritage,
County authorities, local authorities, several NGOs and historic property owners. There were no fixed coalitions between these actors.

Under the preservation of Norway’s cultural heritage lay with the Ministry of the Environment (Miljøverndepartementet). In practice, the Directorate for Cultural Heritage (Riksantikvaren) implemented the objectives as laid down by parliament (Storting) and the Ministry. This meant that the Directorate had the responsibility to ensure that valuable monuments and sites were preserved for future generations. Under the Cultural Heritage Act, the Directorate could impose protection orders on buildings, groups of buildings and cultural environments. In addition, the Directorate was responsible for seeing that cultural heritage considerations were taken into account in all land use planning processes at national, regional and local levels.

At regional level, there were two separate county authorities in Norway with different spheres of responsibility (see textbox 4.2). They were (a) the fylkeskommune, a county administration governed by a council of locally elected politicians and (b) the fylkesman, a state administration run by a county governor who was appointed by the national government. The tasks and responsibilities related to the field of kulturminneforvaltning at regional level primarily lay with the fylkeskommuner. Their task was to ensure that protected heritage sites and cultural environments were taken into consideration in local land use planning processes. Furthermore, the county governments prepared protection orders for the Directorate for Cultural Heritage and they could issue a provisional protection order in order to gain time for evaluating whether a building threatened by demolition should be granted a permanent protection order (Riksantikvaren 2003). The county governments received an annual grant from the Directorate for Cultural Heritage for preservation efforts in the county, such as the repair and maintenance of protected buildings and sites, making these accessible to the public, and providing information or advice to owners or users. This also meant that the grant scheme for the maintenance and restoration of protected kulturminner was administered by the county governments. Subsidies for major projects or special programs, however, were administered centrally by the Directorate for Cultural Heritage. Under the Planning and Building Act (Plan- og bygningsloven), each county government was obliged to make a four-yearly plan (fylkeplan) in which the preservation of heritage sites could be one of the many themes. In this plan, the county government pointed out where particular heritage sites were and how they should be handled in local land use plans. In practice, the actual preservation policies varied between the 19 county governments in Norway, but all had specialists who were responsible for directing and assisting local authorities and private actors in the preservation of cultural heritage sites.

The state administration at county level (fylkesman) was the responsible body for all other tasks involving the physical environment: environmental policy, infrastructural policy, agricultural policy and nature conservation. There were no official rules or regulations concerning the cooperation between the two county authorities and in some counties, the two authorities were not even situated in the same city. In practice, it depended on the initiatives of individual people working at county level whether any form of coordination was established and accordingly, the amount of collaboration varied from county to county.

Local governments (kommuner) had no tasks or responsibilities under the Cultural Heritage Act and there were major differences between local governments as to the way they dealt with cultural heritage issues. Only the largest cities in Norway (Oslo, Bergen, Stavanger and Trondheim) had their own cultural heritage department (byantikvaren). Most local governments lacked necessary resources and know-how to develop autonomous preservation policies or to apply the Planning and Building Act for preservation purposes (see section 4.3.3).

Several NGOs were active at national, regional and local levels in the early 1990s. They acted as watchdogs over heritage sites and as lobbyists to governmental authorities. One of the oldest NGOs in Norway is Fortidsminneforbundet. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, it played an important role as pioneer in the field of kulturminne- forvaltning (see section 4.2). In the early 1990s, it still had a rather influential position,

TEXTBOX 4.2 Local and Regional Government in Norway

Local government was established in Norway with the adoption of the Alderman Act in 1837. This Act implied that decision making regarding important local issues was transferred from central government to locally elected bodies. However, it was not before 1976 that independent county authorities (fylkeskommuner) came into existence in Norway. Prior to that, a county constituted a legal, economic and administrative union of the municipalities within the county (Kommunenes Sentralforbund 2000). Norway is divided into 19 counties (fylker) and 434 municipalities (kommuner), including the municipality of Oslo that also exercises county functions within its boundaries. According to the Norwegian Local Government Act, all counties and municipalities in Norway must have a council, a chairman of the council (mayor) and a head of administration (chief executive officer). The council is the supreme body and is elected for four years. It appoints and determines the duties of the executive committee (Kommunal- og Regionaldepartementet 2004, Kommunenes Sentralforbund 2000).

Both the municipalities and the counties in Norway vary substantially regarding land area and population density. Despite these differences, all municipalities and all counties are given the same rights and responsibilities. Moreover, local and regional authorities in Norway have the same administrative status, whereas central government has the overriding authority and supervision of local and regional administration. The main representative of central government supervising local authorities is the county governor (fylkesman) (Kommunal- og Regionaldepartementet 2004). In the 1970s, reforms were carried out in Norway involving the decentralization of several tasks from the national to the regional and local government levels. At present, county authorities (fylkeskommuner) have responsibilities in the fields of regional development, infrastructure, education, health care, social services and cultural heritage preservation. Local authorities (kommuner) are responsible for the fields of education, health care, social welfare, culture and leisure, environmental issues, agriculture, infrastructure and water works, land use planning and public housing (Gstøhl 2002, Kommunenes Sentralforbund 2000).
especially at national level, as it had close ties with the Directorate for Cultural Heritage. The organization owned several medieval stave churches and other historic buildings that it had purchased or received as donations. It maintained a full-time secretary in Oslo and had local branches in most counties. Fortidsminneforeningen was financed by members’ subscriptions and a government grant. Other important NGOs in the field of kulturminneforvaltning were the Coastal Association (Forbundet Kysten) and the Norwegian Association for Historic Vessels (Norsk forening for fartøyvern). The Coastal Association, which was founded in 1979, aimed for the preservation of coastal culture. It was a national association for 80 local groups (kystløger), which were very active in initiating preservation projects. The Norwegian Association for Historic Vessels was founded in 1985 with the purpose of encouraging the protection of historic vessels and the cooperation between owners of vessels. Finally, many local historic groups (historieløger) were active in Norwegian kulturminneforvaltning. They had typically been established around individual monuments, either for a specific task or on a permanent basis for the running and maintenance of the building or site.

Finally, historic property owners were involved as they had a right to be informed about and to comment on the protection of their property under the Cultural Heritage Act. Once their property had a protected status, they could apply for a maintenance grant from their county government. However, the amount of grant money available was generally considered insufficient to support historic property owners to the extent that was needed. Therefore, most people were not so positive about owning a protected property, because the extra costs for restoration and maintenance which the protected status brought about were not adequately compensated.

4.3.2 Division of Power
In the early 1990s, the kulturminneforvaltning arrangement was primarily dominated by state actors at national level. The Ministry of the Environment (formally) and the Directorate for Cultural Heritage (in practice) had the main authority to select and preserve Norway’s heritage through a system of protection orders. A protection order represented a powerful instrument as it provided a heritage site with legal protection under the Cultural Heritage Act, which implied that the site was protected against any changes (see section 4.3.3). Once a property was protected, it was very rare that anybody wanted to change that property. One could apply for the demolition of the historic building, but that would mobilize protesters and involve long procedures, whereas the chance of success was small. Because the Directorate for Cultural Heritage had no sufficient budget to compensate historic property owners for the extra costs related to the protection however, there was often debate about when and where to impose a protection order and the instrument was not applied in all proposed cases.

As a result of the reorganization of the field of kulturminneforvaltning of 1989 (see section 4.2), county governments (fylkeskommuner) had the responsibility to prepare protection orders for valuable heritage sites, to take care of these protected sites, and to ensure that they are considered in regional and local land use plans. This meant that the county governments were responsible for the actual maintenance of cultural heritage sites once they had a protected status under the Cultural Heritage Act. Nevertheless, the Directorate for Cultural Heritage ultimately decided whether a building or site was protected or not, whereas county governments basically played an advisory role in the selection process. In most cases, the Directorate for Cultural Heritage would follow the advice of the county governments. It was very seldom that the Directorate refused to protect a building or site that was proposed for protection by a county government.

Local authorities (kommuner) could play an important role in kulturminneforvaltning as the Planning and Building Act provided local governments with relatively powerful instruments: (a) the authority to make binding land use plans in which they could designate protected areas (municipal master plan); (b) the authority to formulate provisions for the design and use of historic buildings and sites (local development plan); and (c) the authority to grant (or refuse) building applications (Mangset 2000). If a local land use plan did not deal with cultural heritage values sufficiently, the county government (fylkeskommune) could make an objection (innsgjølve). If the county government did not reach agreement with the municipality, the plan was sent to the fylkesman, the state authority at county level. If they did not agree either, the plan was sent to the Ministry of the Environment. The Ministry never solved a cultural heritage issue without consulting the Directorate for Cultural Heritage. The objection instrument was used on a regular basis by the county authorities and the Directorate for Cultural Heritage.

**TEXTBOX 4.3 Social-Cultural Characteristics**

In the nineteenth century, most Norwegians worked in farming, forestry or fishing, but Norway industrialized rapidly in the twentieth century. Until the 1970s, Norway’s industrialization was mainly based on the availability of inexpensive waterpower resources and raw materials harvested from farms, forests and seas. Norway’s current prosperity is largely due to the North Sea oil fields that were discovered in the late 1960s (Utenriksdepartementet 2004). Besides its considerable prosperity, another striking feature of Norwegian society is the strong egalitarian attitude and the relative absence of social divisions. This can be explained by the fact that feudalism was never really established. For centuries, Norway was governed by a small class of civil servants (Allardt et al. 1981, Alnæs 2001).

Additionally, Norway is often classified as among the strongest of (neo-)corporatist systems. There is a large voluntary sector in Norway in terms of the number of NGOs that actively participate in decision making and policy formation, especially via the system of committees. Norway has been described as ’the country of a thousand committees’. Committees are set up by the cabinet and used to generate proposals for parliament. Nevertheless, civil society interpreted as ‘the grassroots of society’ is relatively weak in Norway. Most NGOs do not have a strong base in society (Dryzek et al. 2003).

As regards the role of NGOs, Norway had a strong corporatist tradition in which a selection of NGOs, including the labor, trade and business unions and the farmers and fishermen associations, had very good access to policy- and decision-making processes (see textbox...
4.3) The NGOs in the field of cultural heritage preservation, however, were not part of the corporatist system. Only one NGO (Fortidsminneforeningen) had good access to decision-making processes, as it had close ties with the Directorate for Cultural Heritage. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, it played an important role as pioneer and was the predecessor of the current Directorate for Cultural Heritage. In the early 1990s, it still had a rather influential position, especially at national level. However, the NGO had no broad base in society. Other NGOs and historic property owners mainly had access through formal participation procedures and the informal lobby circuit.

4.3.3 Rules of the Game
In the early 1990s, hierarchy and central steering and coordination by the national experts of the Ministry of the Environment and the Directorate for Cultural Heritage were the prevailing rules of the game. Both the Cultural Heritage Act and the Planning and Building Act provided rules for the Norwegian kulturminneforvaltning arrangement that involved hierarchical steering and coordination by national state actors. Cultural heritage preservation traditionally was considered to be primarily a matter for the political and cultural elite in Oslo. Another important rule of the game was that cultural heritage considerations must be taken into account in all land use planning processes.

The Cultural Heritage Act (Kulturminneloven) of 1978 provided several formal rules for the kulturminneforvaltning arrangement. The Act provided two types of protection for cultural heritage sites (kulturminner): (a) automatic protection (automatisk fredning); and (b) protection by individual protection order (vedtaksfredning). All properties dating from before 1537, as well as standing structures from the period 1537-1650, were automatically protected. The year 1537 was considered to mark the end of the Middle Ages in Norway (Mangset 2000, Riksantikvaren 2003). Automatic protection implied that no one was allowed to "[...] initiate any measure which is liable to damage, destroy, dig up, move, change, cover, conceal or in any other way unduly disfigure any monument or site that is automatically protected by law or to create a risk of this happening" (CHA: II-§3). Anyone who intended to do anything affecting an automatically protected monument or site was obliged to notify the responsible authority (county authority or Directorate for Cultural Heritage), which then decided whether and in what way the measures may be carried out (CHA: II-§8). Similarly, when a public or large private project was being planned or when a land use plan was being prepared, the initiator had a duty to find out whether the project or plan would affect an automatically protected property. If this was the case, the responsible authority was entitled either to determine in what way the project or plan must be altered or to withdraw the protection (CHA: II-§9). As a general rule, the costs involved in investigating automatically protected monuments or sites, or in implementing special protective measures to safeguard them, must be borne by the initiator of the plan or project (CHA: II-§10). Finally, the automatic protection of properties implied that, when the owner or user had been notified, the competent authority (the Directorate for Cultural Heritage or county authority) was free to examine, record, maintain, restore, move or enclose an automatically protected monument or site and take the necessary steps to preserve it (CHA: II-§11).

All properties dating from 1537 onwards (and standing structures from 1650 onwards) required individual protection orders, which were granted on a case-to-case basis (Mangset 2000, Riksantikvaren 2003). As I mentioned earlier, the Ministry of the Environment (i.e. the Directorate for Cultural Heritage) decided what properties are valuable and protection-worthy. Usually, the protection applied to the construction and the exterior of a historic building, but it could also include its interior and/or surroundings. In a protection order, the Ministry of the Environment could prohibit or otherwise regulate all kinds of measures that ran counter to the purpose of the protection. If the protection order did not include further provisions, it was stated in the Cultural Heritage Act that "[...] no one may dismantle, move, extend, alter, change materials or colors, or undertake other changes over and above ordinary maintenance" (CHA: III-§15). As a rule, a permit was required for all exterior construction work that was not considered to form part of ordinary upkeep (CHA: III-§20). If an owner or user took measures in contravention of the order or damaged a protected structure or site, he or she could be ordered to restore the monument or site to its previous condition (CHA: III-§16). In addition, if a protected structure was falling into decay due to lack of maintenance, the owner or user could be ordered to take steps to prevent this, unless the owner or user was financially unable to do so. The Ministry of the Environment (i.e. the Directorate for Cultural Heritage or the county authority) could give the owner or user a grant towards maintenance or towards alterations approved by the authority appointed (CHA: III-§17). Finally, in the areas surrounding protected monuments and sites, the responsible authority (county authority or Directorate for Cultural Heritage) could undertake whatever upkeep is necessary to achieve the purpose of the protection. However, the owner or user must be notified before the upkeep is undertaken (CHA: III-§21).

When the work on a protection order started, the Directorate or county government must seek cooperation with all interested parties (CHA: IV-§22). First, the authorities involved discussed the delimitation of the area and the details of the protection provisions. Furthermore, the authority responsible for the protection must publish a notice in at least two newspapers with wide local circulations, describing the intended protection order and its likely consequences. Property owners and rights holders must be informed and given a reasonable time limit for comment before the protection order was drawn up. When a protection order had been drawn up, notice must be given in the Norwegian Gazette (Norsk Lysingsblad) and in at least two newspapers with wide local circulations. The notice must include a description of what the proposal comprises and it must set a reasonable time limit for comment. As far as possible, landowners and rights holders in the area must be informed by letter. Before a protection order was finalized, the proposal must be submitted for comment to the municipal council. The Ministry of the Environment (i.e. the Directorate for Cultural Heritage or the county authority) could impose a temporary protection order until the definitive order became effective (CHA: IV-§22).

With regard to the owners of historic properties, the Cultural Heritage Act had a number of implications. For example, the automatic protection of historic buildings and sites implied that the Directorate for Cultural Heritage or the responsible county government (fylkeskommune) was free to examine, record, maintain, restore, move or enclose an automatically protected monument or site and take the necessary steps to preserve it. In addition, protection through a protection order implied that, if owners or users took measures in contravention of the order or damage a protected structure or site, the responsible authority could order them to restore the monument or site to...
its previous condition. If a protected structure was falling into decay due to lack of maintenance, the owners or users could be ordered to take steps to prevent this, unless they were financially unable to do so. Moreover, the Directorate for Cultural Heritage could give the owners or users a grant towards maintenance or towards alterations approved by the authority appointed. In practice, the county authorities (fylkeskommuner) provided grants on the basis of applications from historic property owners. However, the amount of grant money available was considered to be insufficient (see section 4.3.1).

An important rule in kulturminneforvaltning was that cultural heritage considerations must be taken into account in all land use planning processes at national, regional and local levels. Accordingly, the Planning and Building Act (Plan- og bygningloven) of 1958 emphasized that planning in Norway not only involved providing the necessary conditions for land use developments, but also for the use and protection of resources such as cultural heritage sites (Johansen and Sandvik 2001). Under the Planning and Building Act (PBA), each county government (fylkeskommune) in Norway was obliged to prepare a county plan (fylkesplan), consisting of objectives and long-term guidelines for development in the county (PBA: V§19.1). Cultural heritage preservation could be one of the many themes in the county plan (Johansen and Sandvik 2001). When appropriate, a county plan could be prepared for specific policy areas or parts of the county (PBA: V§19.1), for example for cultural heritage preservation or specific heritage sites (Johansen and Sandvik 2001).

Under the Planning and Building Act, local governments (kommuner) were obliged to prepare a municipal master plan (arealplan) (PBA: VI§20.1). This master plan was an important instrument for cultural heritage preservation (Johansen and Sandvik 2001). It not only designated building areas, agricultural areas, nature areas, areas for open air recreation, but also areas that were reserved for “(...) specifically defined purposes pursuant to this or another Act (...),” such as the Cultural Heritage Act (PBA: VI§20.4). The municipal master plan must comprise programs of action (handlingsprogrammer) for specific areas of activity, including the protection of monuments and sites (PBA: VI§20.1). The municipal master plan must only contain provisions for the protection of monuments and sites (PBA: VI§20.1). The municipal master plan could only protect areas that had already been designated as protected areas (PBA: VI§20.1). Therefore, local governments were obliged to prepare a local development plan (reguleringsplan) for the areas where, pursuant to the municipality master plan, development could take place. A local development plan was a detailed plan “(...) that regulates the use and preservation of land, watercourses, sea areas, buildings and the external environment in specific areas in a municipality (...)” (PBA: VII§22). A local development plan established different kinds of zones, among which “(...) areas with buildings and installations which should be preserved on account of their historical, antiquarian or other cultural value (...)” (PBA: VII§25). In addition, a local development plan could contain provisions concerning the design and the use of areas of land and buildings in the area, for instance related to the preservation of cultural heritage values (PBA: VII§26). The local development plan was the only land use planning instrument that had direct legal consequences (both rights and limitations) for the public. Like I mentioned in the previous section, if local governments did not deal with cultural heritage values well enough, they could be overruled by their county government, which often occurred in Norway. Ultimately, the issue would be resolved by the Ministry of the Environment, in close consultation with the Directorate for Cultural Heritage. In sum, the kulturminneforvaltning arrangement was rather hierarchically organized in the early 1990s.

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<tr>
<th>Table 4.1 Initial characteristics of the Norwegian kulturminneforvaltning arrangement</th>
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<td><strong>Actors and coalitions</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Ministry of the Environment</td>
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<td>• Directorate for Cultural Heritage</td>
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<tr>
<td>• County authorities</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Local authorities</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Historic property owners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• NGOs: Fortidsminneforeningen, Coastal Association, Norwegian Association for Historic Vessels, local historic groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• No fixed coalitions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Division of power</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Ministry of the Environment and Directorate for Cultural Heritage controlled the selection of protected heritage sites and the protection of heritage sites through protection orders and local land use plans</td>
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<tr>
<td>• County authorities were responsible for the distribution of grants, had an advisory role as regards the selection of protected sites and had a monitoring function as regards local land use plans</td>
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<td>• Local authorities had authority to establish binding land use plans in which heritage sites could be designated as protected areas</td>
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<tr>
<td>• NGO Fortidsminneforeningen was relatively influential as it had close ties with state authorities</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Other NGOs and historic property owners had access through (formal) participation procedures and (informal) lobbying</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Rules of the game</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Hierarchical steering and central coordination by Ministry of the Environment and Directorate for Cultural Heritage</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Cultural heritage values must be taken into account in all land use planning processes</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Dominant policy discourse</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• What: nationally significant buildings and sites representing the Norwegian peasant culture from the inland valleys</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Why: source of national identity, association with historical events, beliefs and traditions</td>
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<tr>
<td>• How: protection against unwanted developments through system of protection orders</td>
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4.3.4 Policy Discourses
The dominant policy discourse in the kulturminneforvaltning arrangement of the early 1990s emphasized the preservation of historic buildings and sites that represented ‘real Norwegian’ culture. Because the Norwegian national identity had always been closely linked to a peasant culture, the efforts to preserve the Norwegian cultural heritage mainly focused on the rural heritage from the inland valleys: farms and stave churches (Eriksen 1996, Mangset 2000).

Furthermore, the kulturminneforvaltning arrangement of the early 1990s was primarily object-minded. The Cultural Heritage Act defined cultural heritage sites (kulturminner) as: “[…] all traces of human activity in our physical environment, including places associated with historical events, beliefs and traditions” (CHA: 1§2). Although historic objects as well as their immediate surroundings could be protected under the act, there was no holistic perspective in the sense that cultural landscapes as a whole were considered protection worthy. Examples of the predominant object-based perspective on heritage values in the 1990s were the foundation of NGOs for specific categories of objects, such as the Norwegian Association for Historic Vessels (Norsk forening for fartøyvernn) that was founded in 1985, and the Norwegian Association for Historic Lighthouses (Norsk Fyrhistorisk Forening), founded in 1997. Other examples were the various programs of the Directorate for Cultural Heritage dealing with certain categories of historic objects, such as the protection plan for technical and industrial complexes (Verneplan for tekniske og industrielle kulturminner) of 1994, the protection plan for lighthouses (Norske Fyr) of 1997, and the program for stave churches (Riksantikvarens stavkirkeprogram) of 2001.

Finally, the dominant policy discourse of the early 1990s emphasized that all valuable cultural heritage sites must be protected against any unwanted changes. Modern developments such as urbanization, changing farming practices, and the mass migration from Norway’s rural areas were considered to be major threats against which the national built heritage should be protected through a system of protection orders under the Cultural Heritage Act.

4.4 Recent Dynamics in the Kulturminneforvaltning Arrangement
In this section, I discuss recent developments in the kulturminneforvaltning arrangement in terms of actors and coalitions (4.4.1), division of power (4.4.2), rules of the game (4.4.3) and policy discourses (4.4.4). Table 4.2 gives an overview of the dynamics that have emerged since the early 1990s.

4.4.1 Shifts in Actors and Coalitions
With regard to the actors and coalitions that participate in the Norwegian kulturminneforvaltning arrangement, a few developments have taken place since the early 1990s.

First, a few new organizations have been established within the existing kulturminneforvaltning establishment. In 1993, the NGO Norwegian Heritage (Norsk Kulturarv) was founded. Norwegian Heritage is an initiative of a group of farmers who own large historic complexes. They felt they were not getting enough financial support from the state to take good care of their properties. The NGO managed to get a fair amount of money from the state to support historic property owners. The aim of Norwegian Heritage is to supplement public grants with private money, for example by giving new functions to historic buildings and thereby creating additional ‘use value’. The motto is ‘preservation through utilization’ (Norsk Kulturarv 2003).

In 1994, a separate institution was set up to take over the cultural heritage research previously undertaken by the Directorate for Cultural Heritage: the Norwegian Institute for Cultural Heritage Research (Norsk institutt for kulturminneforskning or NIKU). The idea behind this was to separate research from administration (European Heritage Network 1998).

In 2001, a distinctive Department for Cultural Heritage Management was established within the Ministry of the Environment. Hereby, the relative position of the preservation sector as distinct from other environmental fields has improved (Aasland et al. 2002). A representative of the NGO Fortidsminneforeningen explains: “When the Ministry of the Environment was established 30 years ago, it was very much oriented towards the green values. There was no section under the Ministry dealing with cultural heritage. In 2001, we got a separate cultural heritage department within the Ministry, consisting of 12 people. This is very important for us. Now we have very good access to the Minister himself, to the political system. They are representatives on behalf of the cultural heritage within the Ministry that are actually able to argue the case in competition with the others.”

Also in 2001, a new, separate policy arrangement was established for the preservation of Sami heritage. Since then, the responsibility for cultural heritage preservation in the most northern counties of Norway (from Hedmark to Finnmark) has been divided over the northern county authorities and the Sami parliament (Aasland et al. 2002). It is important to note that the characteristics of and dynamics within this separate preservation arrangement for Sami heritage preservation are not studied in this thesis.

Finally, in 2002, the Norwegian government created a Cultural Heritage Fund (Kulturminnefondet) under the Ministry of the Environment. The fund aims to stimulate local and regional preservation projects, especially those initiated by private actors. It functions as a supplement to other government grant schemes and aims at developing flexible forms of public-private cooperation and co-financing. An official of the Directorate for Cultural Heritage says: “What this government is trying to do is to establish a fund of co-finance between state and private money. It is a small fund at the moment, the plan is to enlarge it.” In 2003, the expenses of the fund (operating expenses and grants) added up to €844,000. In the years 2004 and 2005, the expenses of the fund amounted to approximately €1.7 million (Miljøverndepartementet 2002b, 2004).

A second development since the 1990s is that a number of actors from other policy sectors have become more and more involved in the field of cultural heritage preservation. As regards the preservation of agricultural heritage, the Directorate for Cultural Heritage has increasingly cooperated with the Directorate for Agriculture. During the past decade, the latter has adapted laws, regulations and economic support systems for preservation purposes and has developed a policy to provide farmers with information on cultural heritage preservation. A researcher of the Norwegian Institute for Cultural Heritage Research (NIKU) says: “There is a government grant that stimulates farmers to take care of the environmental resources on their farms, including cultural heritage values. Farmers can apply with the county authorities for extra money. The applications are dealt with by a group of people from the agricultural authorities, the nature authorities, and the cultural heritage authorities, together with a representative of the farmers’ unions. In fact, about 30% of all the
money comes from the agricultural authorities.” Similarly, for the preservation of coastal heritage, such as historic harbor complexes and lighthouses, the Directorate for Cultural Heritage has sought cooperation with the Coastal Directorate. An official of the Directorate for Cultural Heritage says: “The Coastal Directorate is willing to cooperate with us on the preservation of historic harbor complexes, but at the same time, their main responsibility is safety and new navigation techniques. So cultural heritage does not have their highest priority.”

Third, NGOs have gained a more prominent role, especially at regional and local levels, by placing preservation issues on public and political agendas, initiating preservation projects, or cooperating with public authorities in joint preservation projects. Also preservation authorities at all levels have increasingly sought cooperation with NGOs in preserving and maintaining historic buildings and sites. They have become more and more aware of the valuable role NGOs can play in the actual maintenance of heritage sites. An official of the Vest-Agder county government comments: “We have put a lot of effort in cooperating with voluntary organizations in a constructive manner. But there is a tendency that governmental bodies are trying to use the voluntary organizations in a more instrumental way: ‘You only get access to our money if you do as we say’. Voluntary organizations are tempted by all this money. (...) And that is okay as long as they do not become dependent of it.”

Market actors such as property developers or recreation and tourism businesses have not been very active so far. Preservation projects have not represented an attractive enough market for these actors. An official of the Vest-Agder county government says: “In other countries, a lot of preservation efforts are taken care of by private corporations. In Norway, this is not the case, which has to do with Norway being a small country. The commercial market is not as big as it would be in a country like Holland or England. So we have to seek solutions within the administrative framework, within our local or regional communities.” Furthermore, there is no broad public support for cultural heritage preservation in Norway. The general public is not willing to pay for preservation efforts. An official of the City of Oslo explains: “In general, the attitude of the Norwegian people is more into sports than into culture, that is, if it involves the investment of their money. They say that they value their cultural heritage, but when it comes to it, they do not want to pay for its protection.” Similarly, a researcher of the Norwegian Institute for Cultural Heritage Research (NIKU) says that the public support for kulturminneforvaltning has diminished in recent years as a result of individualization and the rise of a right-wing political movement: “The general political interest in cultural and environmental issues has diminished very much in Norway. We had a strong wave in the late 1980s and around 1990 and then it diminished dramatically. (...) It has to do with a general right-wing trend in Norway. (...) It is becoming the responsibility of the individual owner to take care of cultural heritage values, and not of the authorities. They are not willing to invest money in these issues.” At the same time, other preservationists claim that the public awareness of the value of cultural heritage is increasing. For example, the cultural heritage conservator of the City of Stavanger says: “The wooden buildings here [in the historic center of Stavanger] have suffered a lot from a lack of knowledge about style, quality in materials and so on. During the last 10-15 years, citizens have become very interested in doing it correctly and they ask for a lot of advice.”

4.4.2 Shifts in the Division of Power

As regards the division of power in the Norwegian kulturminneforvaltning arrangement, I have only found a few small shifts since the early 1990s. During the past decades, there has been an ongoing discussion in Norway about the decentralization to local governments of several environment-related tasks and responsibilities, including cultural heritage preservation. However, this has not led to actual changes in the division of preservation tasks and responsibilities so far. Many preservationists, especially from national and county authorities and nationally oriented NGOs such as Fortidsminneforeningen, argue against decentralization. They fear that a majority of the 434 municipalities in Norway do not have the competence nor the resources to develop an adequate cultural heritage policy. Furthermore, they emphasize that in small municipalities, it is hard for local officials to make objective decisions on cultural heritage matters, especially unpopular decisions such as the rejection of permit applications. A representative of Fortidsminneforeningen says: “Norway has got 4.5 million people and it has got a distance from north to south the same distance as from Oslo to Rome. We have about 435 local communities (...) and out of those 435, there are less than 50 that have any sort of professional stuff dealing with cultural heritage.” A researcher of the Nord-Trøndelag Research Institute (in Northern Norway) says: “The cultural heritage authorities are afraid of giving more power to the local authorities, because they think that they have no competence to deal with these tasks. And they are afraid that they are not able to handle the pressure from other local interests when they have to make decisions in those kinds of cases.”

Other preservation experts, who characterize present decision making in Norwegian kulturminneforvaltning as centralized, hierarchical and expert-driven, emphasize that at least some kind of reorganization is necessary in order to make the field more transparent and accessible for the general public, historic property owners, NGOs and local governments. A researcher of the Norwegian Institute for Cultural Heritage Research (NIKU) claims: “The decentralization that we have had to the county level [in 1989] has shown to be a success. A lot of mistakes were made, but many mistakes were made before as well. And we have managed to get a lot more enthusiasm in the regions. And that may also follow from decentralization to the municipalities.” A researcher of the Nord-Trøndelag Research Institute summarizes: “Although the small communities will never be able to have a professional staff, neither will Riksantikvaren ever be able to realize a sound cultural heritage management locally from its central position.” So far, the debate on the decentralization of preservation tasks has remained unresolved.

Clearly, essential resources in the field of cultural heritage preservation are the availability of knowledge, expertise and funding for research. Access to up-to-date information as to where valuable heritage sites are and what state they are in is crucial for an adequate preservation policy at all levels. For this reason, from 2000 onwards, the Norwegian register of historic buildings has been available to local authorities through the GAB register of property ownership, addresses and buildings (Grunnrundnings-, Adresse og Bygningsregister). This enables local governments to take heritage values into consideration in local land use and development plans. However, the availability of up-to-date information on the whereabouts and state of valuable heritage sites is a major problem in Norway. The available database of heritage values held by the Directorate for Cultural Heritage does not go further than the year 1990. An official of the Direc-
Accordingly, the traditionally dominant role of the Directorate for Cultural Heritage as to the availability of knowledge and expertise has begun to decline, since the Directorate is increasingly dependent of regional and local authorities and NGOs for the availability of up-to-date information on heritage sites. A preservation expert of the University of Tromsø claims: “The fylkeskommuner are the most influential policy actors in the field of cultural heritage management. [...] There are more competent people at the fylkeskommuner than at Riksantikvaren. They find their work much more meaningful, they are much more in contact with the real heritage.”

Finally, a number of NGOs have claimed a more prominent role in the actual preservation of heritage sites and in the development of new preservation approaches, by cooperating with public authorities in, or independently initiating, innovative restoration and redevelopment projects. As a result, a certain shift in power has emerged from state actors to actors from civil society. For example, with financial support from regional and local government authorities, the Coastal Association (Forbundet Kysten) has redeveloped a number of coastal heritage sites and has successfully turned them into coastal heritage centers (kystkultursenter). Similarly, the NGO Fortidsminneforeningen has set up a system in which heritage sites, including two historic farms in the UNESCO world heritage site Røros, are redeveloped as tourist facilities on a commercial basis. According to a representative of the NGO, the project has been a success, both from an economic and a preservation point of view. He explains: “One of our main problems is what to do with our buildings once they are restored. [...] Now we are actually starting a commercial business in tourism. [...] and it is a success. [...] We get a 40% return of our money, which is very good.”

4.4.3 Shifts in the Rules of the Game

Regarding the prevailing rules of the game in the Norwegian kulturminneforvaltning arrangement, the rules of (a) hierarchical steering and central coordination and (b) integration of cultural heritage values in all land use planning processes have both remained dominant. Especially the first is firmly rooted in the historical and social-geographical context of the field. Traditionally, cultural heritage preservation is considered to be a matter for the experts at national (and country) level. Decentralization of preservation tasks and responsibilities to local authorities has not taken place, mainly because a majority of the municipal organizations in Norway are very small and lack sufficient competences and resources (see previous section). Moreover, both rules are embedded in the Cultural Heritage Act and the Planning and Building Act (see section 4.2.3). In recent years, however, these rules have been complemented by a focus on public-public and public-private cooperation. As I mentioned in the previous section, county governments, local governments and NGOs have gained a more prominent role as to the availability of up-to-date information on heritage sites, the actual maintenance of sites, and the development of new preservation approaches. At the same time, state actors have become more and more aware of the importance of regional and local actors, both public and private, in the field of cultural heritage preservation and they have increasingly sought cooperation. As a result, public-public and public-private cooperation has become an important rule of the game that has been advocated in several official publications since the early 1990s.

In 1997, the Ministry of the Environment published a report on environmental policy, entitled ‘Environmental policy for a sustainable development. Joint efforts for the future’ (Miljøvernpolitikk for en barekraftig utvikling. Dugnad for framtida). During the handling of the report in 1998, a majority in parliament felt that the existing preservation policy was not sufficient to safeguard the Norwegian heritage for future generations. Accordingly, in 1999, the Norwegian government appointed a cultural heritage committee to evaluate the existing goals, strategies and instruments in cultural heritage preservation. The committee consisted of 17 members, representing a variety of governmental and non-governmental actors involved in the field. In 2002, the cultural heritage committee presented its report ‘The Past Forms the Future. Challenges for a New Cultural Heritage Policy’ (Fortid former framtid. Utfordringer i en ny kulturminnepolitikk) to the Ministry of the Environment. It contains an array of recommendations for the cultural heritage sector in Norway (Aasland et al. 2002). First, the committee emphasizes that different people and groups in society judge cultural-historical values differently, based on different interests and perspectives. Moreover, not all people and groups in society have the same possibility to be heard in public debates. Therefore, the committee advocates a broad and numerous selection of protected cultural monuments and environments and a broad participation and local involvement in decision-making processes concerning cultural heritage (Aasland et al. 2002).

In response to the report of the cultural heritage committee and the subsequent hearings, in 2005 the Norwegian government presented to parliament a White Paper entitled ‘Living with cultural heritage sites’ (Leve med kulturminner). The White Paper involves an action plan for the field of kulturminneforvaltning for the period until 2020. Among other things, the Norwegian government argues that private owners of protected cultural monuments and voluntary parties do priceless work in safeguarding this cultural heritage. The Norwegian government aims to provide these actors with better conditions and increases the annual support for protected monuments in private ownership. The establishment of the Cultural Heritage Fund (see section 4.4.1) is part of this policy. In addition, the government announces that it will strengthen cooperation between owners and public authorities and assign a stronger role to voluntary organizations in the development and implementation of cultural heritage policies (Miljøverndepartementet 2005).

4.4.4 Shifts in Policy Discourses

Besides the organizational dynamics that I described in the previous sections, three discursive developments have emerged in the Norwegian kulturminneforvaltning arrangement since the early 1990s. First, a shift in focus has taken place from cultural heritage sites that primarily represent the Norwegian peasant culture of the inland valleys to sites representing every-day life of all Norwegians, including coastal sites. During the past decades, there has been serious debate about what Norwegian culture and identity actually are, partly as a result of the debate about European integration (see textbox 4.4). This has had important implications for the dominant perspective on heritage values.
In the report ‘The Past Forms the Future’ of 2002 (see section 4.4.3), the cultural heritage committee advocates a broad selection of protected heritage sites as well as a broad involvement of local actors in decision-making processes (Aasland et al. 2002). Also in the view of the Directorate for Cultural Heritage, the existing list of protected monuments and sites should better reflect everyday life and activities in Norway (Riksantikvaren 2004). In the Strategic Plan for the period 2000-2005, the Directorate formulated the following policy goal: “The geographical, social, ethnic and historical variety of permanently protected monuments and cultural environments shall increase, so that poorly represented or missing categories will be represented by more objects by the year 2004 [compared to the situation in 1998]” (Riksantikvaren 2000: 8).

**TEXTBOX 4.4 Norway and the EU**

Norway's national identity is marked by the country's long struggle for independence. During the past decades, this has formed an important obstacle to intergovernmental integration. Norway's experience as the weaker part of several 'unions' with other countries led to strong opposition to any form of foreign interference in Norwegian affairs. Although Norway applied for EU membership twice in the 1960s and again in 1992, the referenda in 1972 and 1994 both had a negative result. Fears of losing the traditional Norwegian culture and way of life have always played a prominent role in the debates on European integration. In addition, many Norwegians fear that EU membership threatens Norway's prosperity, welfare policies and support for peripheral regions. At the same time, a growing number of people, particularly in the larger cities and the southern part of the country, recognize that Norway is increasingly affected by processes and rules that were determined in EU forums, in which it was not fully represented. Therefore, they feel that Norway should apply for EU membership once again. All in all, the character of Norway's place within Europe remains a divisive and unresolved issue (Eriksen 1996, Göstöhl 2002).

In recent years, it is especially perceived as a problem that heritage sites from coastal Norway, such as harbours, fishing villages, shipyards and lighthouses, are poorly represented in the list of protected buildings and sites. An official of the Directorate for Cultural Heritage says: “In Norway, almost 90% of the people are living along the coast. Fishing and the ship building industry, those have been important industries in Norway from the very beginning. So it was obvious that we had to put more focus on the coastal landscape.” By far the biggest part of the protected monuments and sites are from inland Norway, whereas it should have been the opposite, because coastal Norway has always been far more densely populated and, as a consequence, is very rich in cultural-historical values (see textbox 4.5). An official of the Vest-Agder county government says: “The monuments and sites that are protected under the Cultural Heritage Act do not reflect the importance of the maritime culture. It is not a good balance. […] It is a long way to go, because Norwegian history is written from inland. It has always been like that.”

From the 1980s onwards, several voluntary organizations including the Coastal Association (Forbundet Kysten) and the Norwegian Association for Historical Vessels (Norsk forening for fartøyer) have emphasized the need to protect the Norwegian coastal heritage. In addition, successive cabinets (both right-wing and social-democrat) have been urging the Directorate for Cultural Heritage to make the necessary additional efforts. An official of the Vest-Agder county government says: “It has not been the cultural heritage authority itself that has been the main drive behind this process. It has come from the voluntary organizations. They have sort of pushed the attention that way.” Similarly, an official of the Directorate for Cultural Heritage claims: “It was the pressure from outside, from politicians and from the people, that actually forced us to change our policy. So all these coastal culture plans and money for ship preservation, that is because somebody outside this house told us to focus more on it. It is not our own idea actually. We were told to do so.”

Since the early 1990s, several initiatives have been launched to preserve Norway's coastal heritage. For instance, several coastal environments were included in the Plan for Preservation of Technical and Industrial Monuments (1994) and lighthouses were dealt with in the National Plan for Preservation of Lighthouses in Norway (1997). As a result of the plan for the preservation of lighthouses, 83 lighthouses are now protected under the Cultural Heritage Act. Furthermore, the Norwegian Cultural Heritage Year 1997 was dedicated to the heritage associated with the coast and waterways and in 1999, the Directorate for Cultural Heritage initiated the project ‘Conservation of Monuments and Sites along the Coast’. Finally, a substantial budget has been provided for the restoration of valuable vessels and the establishment of three national vessel conservation centers (Bessesen 1999, Miljøverndepartementet 2002a). However, despite the growing attention and the increased funding for the preservation of Norway's coastal heritage, the shift in focus from inland to coastal heritage requires a fundamental change in perspective from the preservationists within the Directorate for Cultural Heritage. An
Another important factor is that the protection of cultural environments require a protection order to rule how the cultural landscape is to be managed and how the buildings are to be maintained. Management plans are drawn up to ensure that all the elements within a cultural environment are maintained as part of an integrated whole (Riksantikvaren 2004). The preservation of cultural environments is based on an awareness that all the features of an area are related and form an integrated whole, and that all parts of the environment have a meaningful relationship to each other. This way of thinking about cultural heritage has been inspired by the Sami culture of northern Norway. A preservation expert of the University of Tromsø says: “The Sami government has a much wider definition of the cultural heritage concept than the Norwegian government does. According to the Sami, it is the stories told about an object that constitutes it as a monument, whether it is a natural or a cultural object.”

In practice, the preservation authorities in Norway are having difficulties with the implementation of the cultural environment concept. A researcher of the Norwegian Institute for Cultural Heritage Research (NIKU) claims: “There is a very strong willingness to do holistic management. But I am not sure if the capability is strong as well. (...) The problem is how to deal with those meanings. (...) What is being done now, is that we have a number of projects that try to define how cultural environments are to be defined. However, Riksantikvaren has not dealt with that in a very transparent way.” Another important factor is that the protection of larger environments often implies the involvement of several landowners and rights holders in the process of preparing protection orders and making management plans. These different landowners and rights holders might have different interests in the matter and different interpretations of the cultural-historical values involved. Consequently, it is rather difficult to reach the necessary consensus about the practical implications of a protection order. Moreover, there is a tradition of hierarchical and expert-based decision making in Norwegian cultural heritage preservation, and the cultural heritage authorities lack experience in more bottom-up, cooperative decision-making processes. Their rather authoritarian attitude is mentioned as the cause of serious deadlock situations on a number of occasions, among which the case of the Utstein cultural environment that was described in chapter 1. An official of the Directorate for Cultural Heritage states: “There are some other cases ‘on the way’ to protection. But they are very time consuming processes. (...) When the actual protection is there and people start to realize what it means, then official of the Directorate for Cultural Heritage claims: “We say we are now going to do something about the coastal heritage. But it does not come off. For 100 or 150 years, we have been focusing on the valleys, the inland heritage. And it is not so easy to just change the course of the whole preservation system. (...) But we are trying.”

A second discursive development since the early 1990s is that the focus in the Norwegian kulturminneforvaltning arrangement has shifted from the protection of individual buildings to the conservation of integrated cultural environments (kulturniløyer). This shift has been institutionalized by an amendment to the Cultural Heritage Act in 1992, which established the protection of cultural environments. In the revised act, cultural environments are defined as: “(...) any area where a monument or site forms part of a larger entity or context” (CHA: I-§2). As of 1992, the Cultural Heritage Act has provided the possibility to protect a cultural environment because of the value of the area as a whole, even if protection of the individual elements would not be justified. Cultural environments require a protection order to rule how the cultural landscape is to be managed and how the buildings are to be maintained. Management plans are drawn up to ensure that all the elements within a cultural environment are maintained as part of an integrated whole (Riksantikvaren 2004). The preservation of cultural environments is based on an awareness that all the features of an area are related and form an integrated whole, and that all parts of the environment have a meaningful relationship to each other. This way of thinking about cultural heritage has been inspired by the Sami culture of northern Norway. A preservation expert of the University of Tromsø says: “The Sami government has a much wider definition of the cultural heritage concept than the Norwegian government does. According to the Sami, it is the stories told about an object that constitutes it as a monument, whether it is a natural or a cultural object.”

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### Table 4.2 Organizational and discursive dynamics in kulturminneforvaltning

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<th>Actors (and coalitions)</th>
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<td>• NGO Norwegian Heritage</td>
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<td>• Department for Cultural Heritage Management</td>
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<td>(Ministry of the Environment)</td>
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<td>• National Institute for Cultural Heritage Research (NIKU)</td>
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<td>• Cultural Heritage Fund (Ministry of the Environment)</td>
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<td>• Directorate for Agriculture</td>
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<td>• Coastal Directorate</td>
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<td>New coalitions:</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Public-private partnerships</td>
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<tr>
<th>Division of power</th>
<th>Small shifts in the division of power:</th>
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<td></td>
<td>• Debate on decentralization to local governments has not been resolved</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Directorate for Cultural Heritage increasingly depends on regional and local authorities and NGOs for up-to-date information on heritage sites</td>
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<td>• NGOs have claimed prominent role in preservation of heritage sites and development of new preservation approaches</td>
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<th>Rule(s) of the game</th>
<th>New, additional rule of the game:</th>
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<td>• Public-public and public-private cooperation</td>
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<th>Dominant policy discourse</th>
<th>New dominant policy discourse:</th>
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<td>• What: heritage sites and cultural environments representing everyday life, including coastal heritage</td>
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<td>• Why: regional and local identity, spatial quality, economic growth</td>
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<td>• How: viable and sustainable (re)use and (re)development</td>
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the real problems arise. So one important lesson is that the protection decision of the Ministry of Environment and the management plan should be prepared parallel, at the same time. In that way, people will know what they are up against from the beginning.”

Third, there has been a discursive shift towards the (re)use and (re)development of cultural heritage sites. As cultural heritage sites are under severe pressure due to new building plans and developments (in the larger cities) or loss of function and decay (in the rural areas), the focus has shifted to plans that combine the protection of historic buildings and sites with the (re)development of new functions for those properties. An official of the Vest-Agder county government argues: “Listing is a legal way to preserve a historic building. But it is not magic, a monument can fall down even if it is listed. (...) The difficult part of it is to really preserve it. So what we are doing now, is to find another use for...
The Directorate for Cultural Heritage works on environmental and economic research in order to show that the conservation of historic buildings can contribute to sustainable development. In the view of the Directorate for Cultural Heritage, proof of such positive effects will make it easier to gain support for the preservation of historic buildings, sites and cultural environments (Riksantikvaren 2004). An official of the Directorate for Cultural Heritage says: “It is a new focus: try to see cultural heritage as something with real value. It may not be possible to measure how many kroner you can make out of it, but the whole society will benefit of using the old buildings for new purposes. That is a new way of thinking, to use the old buildings instead of destroying them.” The Vest-Agder county government also advocates the (re)development approach. The county aims to redevelop historic lighthouses in Vest-Agder into facilities for recreation and tourism. An official says: “A lot of the lighthouses could be sold to private people or companies, but then you would lose them as public places. Therefore, we must try to find alternative uses that keep them open for the public. That is our main goal.”

4.5 Conclusions

Reviewing the developments in the Norwegian kulturminneforvaltning arrangement since the early 1990s, I conclude that both the content and the organization of the arrangement have gradually broadened over the years. Moreover, the shifts that have occurred in the content and the organization are strongly interrelated (see figure 4.1).

Clearly, the biggest changes have occurred in the content of the kulturminneforvaltning arrangement. The dominant policy discourse has broadened in three ways since the early 1990s. First, a shift in focus has taken place from heritage sites representing Norway’s inland, peasant culture to sites representing everyday life in Norway, including the coastal culture. Second, the emphasis has moved from individual buildings to buildings and sites placed within their surroundings and large-scale cultural environments. Third, there has been a shift in focus towards the (re)use and (re)development of cultural heritage sites. As cultural heritage sites are under severe pressure due to new building plans and developments (in the larger cities) or loss of function and decay (in the rural areas), the focus has shifted to plans that combine the protection of historic buildings and sites with the (re)development of new functions for those properties.

These discursive shifts cannot be seen apart from the organizational changes that have emerged since the early 1990s. The widening scope of kulturminneforvaltning is connected with the arrival of new actors (especially the NGO Norwegian Heritage, the Directorate for Agriculture and the Coastal Directorate). Furthermore, the arrival of new actors and new policy discourses is strongly interrelated with the introduction of a new rule of the game (public-public and public-private cooperation). Several NGOs have claimed a bigger role, either independently implementing preservation projects or cooperating with public authorities in joint restoration and redevelopment projects. At the same time, preservation officials at national level have become increasingly aware of the importance of cooperation with other actors, including NGOs, regional and local governments, and actors from other policy sectors (Directorate for Agriculture, Coastal Directorate). The Ministry of the Environment and the Directorate for Cultural Heritage depend on these actors for the actual maintenance of (protected) heritage sites and the development of new preservation approaches that combine mere protection with (re)use and (re)development. Accordingly, the predominant rule of hierarchical steering by national state actors has been complemented by a focus on public-public and public-private cooperation. All in all, this means that the traditionally hegemonial position of the Ministry of the Environment and the Directorate for Cultural Heritage has begun to decline.

Despite this variety of discursive and organizational dynamics, we have seen that several features of the Norwegian kulturminneforvaltning have remained relatively stable since the early 1990s (see figure 4.2). First, the actors of the early 1990s are still active in cultural heritage preservation today. Second, the prevailing rules of the game of the early 1990s, being (a) hierarchical steering and central coordination and (b) integration of cul-

![Figure 4.1 Dynamics in the Norwegian kulturminneforvaltning arrangement](image-url)
cultural heritage values in land use planning, have continued to be important. Especially the first is firmly rooted in the historical and social-geographical context of kulturminneforvaltning. They are both embedded in the Cultural Heritage Act and the Planning and Building Act. Third, the division of power between actors has hardly changed between 1990 and 2005. Although there has been an ongoing debate during the past decades about the decentralization of cultural heritage preservation responsibilities to local governments, this has not led to an actual change in the formal division of tasks and responsibilities. The Ministry of the Environment and the Directorate for Cultural Heritage are still the most powerful actors in the Norwegian kulturminneforvaltning arrangement.

Figure 4.2 Stability in the Norwegian kulturminneforvaltning arrangement
THE HISTORIC PRESERVATION ARRANGEMENT IN ARIZONA
5.1 Introduction
Because of its relatively short Anglo-American history, most people do not associate Arizona with having a rich and significant built heritage. At the same time, Arizona is not only famous for its spectacular scenery of deserts, rock formations and the Grand Canyon, but also for its variety of Native American cultures, which have been there for thousands of years and have left a significant legacy of indigenous design. Accordingly, the state’s built heritage combines prehistoric ruins of ancient Native American cultures with relatively young remains of the Anglo-American settlement period from the 1870s onwards. The latter category consists of houses and neighborhoods, churches, public buildings and industrial complexes, such as the Hayden Flour Mill (see chapter 1). It also includes more recent sites, among which are the various subdivisions with characteristic ranch houses that were constructed in Phoenix and Tucson in the 1930s and 1940s. Currently, about 1,260 historic properties in Arizona are listed in the U.S. National Register of Historic Places, including more than 200 historic districts.

This chapter discusses recent dynamics in Arizona’s historic preservation arrangement. In the following section, I describe the history of historic preservation in the United States and in Arizona. Section 5.3 deals with the characteristics of Arizona’s historic preservation arrangement in the early 1990s, whereas section 5.4 focuses on the developments that have emerged from the early 1990s onwards. In section 5.5, I present my conclusions about change and stability in the Arizonan case.

5.2 The History of Historic Preservation
This section draws the history of historic preservation in the United States (5.2.1) and in Arizona (5.2.2) from the earliest preservation practices in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.

5.2.1 Historic Preservation in the United States
In the United States, the historic preservation movement developed mainly locally and in an unorganized, fragmented way. Its early development in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century involved a large number of typically private and elitist efforts to save individual structures and sites. Occasional actions of the federal government were mainly restricted to the acquisition and establishment of national parks. This changed in 1906, when the federal Antiquities Act was established. The 1906 Act provided for the designation as National Monuments of historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric structures, and objects of historic or scientific interest. The legislation was broadened in 1933 with the introduction of the Historic Sites, Buildings and Antiquities Act, which aimed at the development of a national policy “(...) to preserve for the public use historic sites, buildings, and objects of national significance for the inspiration and benefit of the people of the United States” (Culminatingworth 1997: 114). The 1935 Act called upon federal agencies to take account of preservation needs in their programs and plans and promoted the surveying and identification of historic sites. This became the base for the National Register of Historic Places some 30 years later (Culminatingworth 1997, Fowler 1987, Stipe and Lee 1987, Tyler 2000).

The Depression years, the Second World War and the early post-war period were a bad era for historic preservation in the United States. Due to poverty and urban decay on the one hand and urban renewal projects and highway construction on the other, many historic properties were destroyed. It was this destruction however, that caused a burst of historic preservation activity in the mid-1950s. One of the outcomes was the publication of a provocative and influential report called ‘With Heritage So Rich’ by the U.S. Conference of Mayors and the National Trust for Historic Preservation in 1966. The report illustrated what had been lost of American architectural heritage and proposed an expanded role for historic preservation supported by the federal government. Some of its recommendations were immediately implemented by the 1966 National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), including the introduction of a National Register of Historic Places (Brown Morton 1987, Culminatingworth 1997, Stipe and Lee 1987, Tyler 2000). The National Register is the official list of historic properties that are considered significant in American history, architecture, archeology, engineering or culture (Culminatingworth 1997, Fowler 1987, Miller 2000). Properties eligible for listing in the National Register must be at least 50 years old. Properties that are less than 50 years of age must be ‘exceptionally important’ to be considered eligible for listing (National Park Service 2003a). Included among the nearly 79,000 listings that make up the National Register at present are all (approximately 450) historic areas in the national park system, more than 2,500 national historic landmarks and all historic properties that have been nominated because they are significant to the nation, a state or a community. In Arizona, 1,258 historic properties are currently listed in the National Register, including more than
The 1966 National Historic Preservation Act was enacted during a period of general awakening to the environment in the United States. Signed into law the same day was the Department of Transportation Act, which establishes stringent safeguards for a wide range of natural and cultural resources, including significant historic properties. Three years later, in 1969, the U.S. Congress passed the National Environmental Policy Act, establishing a national policy to protect the environment (Fowler 1987). Although the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) is primarily viewed as an environmental law, it also regulates major federal actions affecting significant historic and cultural resources (Cullingworth 1997, Miller 2000).

The importance of the National Historic Preservation Act for the development of historic preservation in the United States should not be underestimated. First, the NHLA requires federal agencies to take into account the effects of federally regulated or funded activities on historic properties that are listed in the National Register (Brown Morton 1987, Cullingworth 1997, Stipe and Lee 1987, Tyler 2000). In addition, the Act has encouraged the establishment of historic preservation offices in all states. Furthermore, the NHLA has promoted the concept of locally regulated historic districts. Before its establishment in 1966, local communities interested in historic preservation hardly had any ties with preservation activities at the state and federal levels, and preservation activities mainly focused on individual landmarks. This changed as a result of the NHLA (Tyler 2000).

Besides the establishment of a federal act, the authors of ‘With Heritage So Rich’ had also proposed a system of incentives, including a federal fund to support preservation projects and a revision of the federal tax code to encourage private preservation efforts (Fowler 2003). Accordingly, in 1967, the federal Historic Preservation Fund (HPF) was established, involving a federal matching grant program. The HPF aims to encourage investments in historic preservation by providing grants to state historic preservation offices (SHPOs) and the National Trust for Historic Preservation. In addition, the Tax Reform Act of 1976 introduced a system of tax credits for the rehabilitation of historic buildings (a tax credit lowers the amount of income tax owed and thus differs from a tax deduction, which lowers the amount of income subject to taxation) and created an increase in the ‘tax cost’ of demolition (as a disincentive to the demolition of a historic property). The use of preservation tax incentives increased enormously after the passing of the Economic Recovery Act of 1981, which introduced a new and highly attractive system of tax credits. President Reagan’s Tax Reform Act of 1986 drastically cut these incentives but still, thousands of historic buildings have been rehabilitated with the aid of tax credits (Cullingworth 1997). Following the Tax Reform Act of 1986, taxpayers can earn their rehabilitation expenses back only if they meet certain criteria.

In addition to the federal legislation related to historic preservation, state and especially local policies also play a crucial role in the field. In 1956, the State of New York became the first to authorize municipalities to pass historic preservation legislation. However, until the Supreme Court’s decision in the ‘Penn Central Transportation Company versus City of New York’ case of 1978, there was doubt as to the constitutionality of local preservation policies.

In the Penn Central court case, the U.S. Supreme Court explicitly confirmed that states and cities may enact land use restrictions or controls to enhance the quality of life by preserving the character and desirable aesthetic features of a city (Cullingworth 1997, Tyler 2000). In the Supreme Court’s view, preserving historic resources is an entirely permissible governmental goal and restrictions on property for the purpose of preserving structures and areas with special historic, architectural or cultural significance are a valid use of governmental authority (Howard 1987, Miller 2000, Tyler 2000). The Court highlighted three important criteria that local historic preservation ordinances must meet in order to be found constitutional: (a) they must promote a valid public purpose; (b) they must not be so restrictive as to deprive a property owner of all reasonable economic use of his or her property; and (c) they must honor a citizen’s constitutional right to due process (Cox 2002).

5.2.2 Historic Preservation in Arizona

In the U.S. state involvement in historic preservation activities traditionally focuses on the implementation of federal government programs. Pursuant to the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), each state has established a historic preservation office, a historic preservation review board and a scheme for adequate public participation (Cullingworth 1997, Miller 2000, Tyler 2000). The State of Arizona complied with the NHPA requirements in the late 1960s. The State Historic Preservation Office was set up as a division of Arizona State Parks, which is a department that manages and protects Arizona’s natural, cultural and recreational resources (see textbox 5.1). Furthermore, Arizona has adopted two historic preservation laws of its own, referred to as the Antiquity Act and the Historic Preservation Act. The Arizona Antiquity Act, first established in 1960, mainly governs archeological resources and is administered by the Director of the Arizona State Museum. It requires state agencies to inventory significant resources on state land and to assess

TEXTBOX 5.1 The Grand Canyon State

Worldwide, the state of Arizona is known as ‘the Grand Canyon State’. Among Americans, Arizona and the other Southwestern states are often referred to as ‘the Sunbelt’. Evidently, Arizona is famous for its hot, dry climate and its abundance of natural resources. Besides the Grand Canyon, there is a range of scenic attractions including deserts, meandering streams and rivers, mountain ranges, historic towns and archeological sites, which annually draw thousands of tourists from all over the world. Most of the Arizonians themselves live in the hot desert metropolitan areas of Phoenix and Tucson. Furthermore, Arizona has the third largest Native American population (after California and Oklahoma) and about 26% of the state is reservation land (Mihesuah 1996). The southern part of the state has always had particularly close ties to Mexico. Consequently, the arts and architecture in Arizona are strongly influenced by both Native American and Hispanic cultures.
The protection of private property rights is highly valued in the U.S. and even more so in a Southwestern state such as Arizona (see textbox 5.2). This implies that the governmental authorities in Arizona have only limited control over land and land use. Under these circumstances, most land use related policies, including historic preservation, have focused on the instrument of zoning (Cortner and King 1996, Delahanty and McKinney 1985, Lew and Hawley 1996). The U.S. Constitution grants the zoning authority to the states, which in turn delegate it to the local governments (Cullingworth 1997). Whereas early zoning ordinances classified land into three zones (residential, commercial and industrial), at present, most municipalities have at least a dozen different types of zones, including historic preservation zones. In the different zones, certain uses are permitted, other uses are only allowed under certain conditions, and yet other uses are excluded. Moreover, zoning ordinances may dictate design regulations for certain zones (Lew and Hawley 1996).

Before adopting zoning regulations, a local government must complete a comprehensive land use plan providing the policies for community development over time (Lew and Hawley 1996, Miller 2000). The Arizona Legislature (see textbox 5.3) did not grant authority for communities to establish land use plans until 1973. This meant that virtually all communities in Arizona lacked an effective land use plan until very recently, which resulted in zoning practices based on case-by-case and site-by-site circumstances. In the 1980s however, concern over rapid population growth, loss of the desert environment and a deteriorating quality of life caused a change in attitude toward land use policies in Arizona. Citizen participation in the planning process increased and the state’s larger cities established strategic planning departments and developed truly comprehensive plans addressing a range of community needs. Although the laissez-faire ethics still remain strong, innovative planning and design controls are becoming more and more widespread in Arizona (Lew and Hawley 1996).

TEXTBOX 5.3 Arizona’s Constitution

Arizona is a young state. It was annexed by the United States at the conclusion of the Mexican-American War in 1850 and it was given a separate territorial status in 1863. However, it was not before 1912, when President Taft signed the state’s Constitution, that Arizona officially became one of the United States of America (Brown and Jones 1996, Goldschmidt 1996). Among the things that are defined in Arizona’s Constitution are the powers of the State Legislature and the State Governor. The State Legislature incorporates a Senate of 30 members and a House of Representatives of 60 members, which are elected every two years. Generally, the Legislature has powers to pass laws, initiate amendments to the Arizona Constitution, determine taxes and regulate the courts, local governments and businesses.

In comparison to other states, the Arizona Legislature has relatively moderate powers and operates under rather strict constitutional limitations (Brown and Jones 1996, Stacy 1983). As the ceremonial head of government, the State Governor performs many of the same functions at state level as the president does at federal level. As in most states, Arizona budgetary powers are shared by both the Governor and the Legislature. Nevertheless, the Governor’s power to veto legislative bills is very strong in Arizona. To override a Governor’s veto, a two-thirds majority in both the Senate and the House of Representatives is required (Lindstrom and Robar 1996, Stacy 1983).

In the field of historic preservation, the City of Phoenix has been an influential example for other communities in Arizona. Like many American cities, Phoenix discovered the preservation ethic as the result of a federal highway project. Between 1974 and 1975, more than 600 old residences were eliminated by the construction of the Papago Freeway. The destruction of these homes triggered a group of citizens who eventually succeeded in listing several residential historic districts and a group of commercial properties on the National Register of Historic Places (Cox 2002). In 1984, the Mayor and City Council appointed the Ad Hoc Committee on Historic Preservation to make recommendations for a citywide historic preservation policy. Among the committee’s recommendations was the adoption of a historic preservation ordinance. Accordingly, the first Historic Preservation Ordinance was adopted by the City Council in 1985. The ordinance established...
Because of their growing concern for the quality of life in Arizona, in 1990, the citizens of Arizona voted for the establishment of the Arizona Heritage Fund. They supported the idea of using a portion of the profits from the Arizona lottery for the preservation of Arizona’s natural and cultural resources. Of the $20 million (about $16 million) that is allocated to the Heritage Fund each year, $10 million ($8 million) is assigned to Arizona State Parks, of which $1.7 million ($1.4 million) is designated for historic preservation (State Historic Preservation Office 2000a, 2000d).

5.3 Initial Characteristics of the Historic Preservation Arrangement

In this section, I discuss the characteristics of Arizona’s historic preservation arrangement in the early 1990s in terms of actors and coalitions (5.3.1), division of power (5.3.2), rules of the game (5.3.3) and policy discourses (5.3.4). Table 5.1 provides an overview.

5.3.1 Actors and Coalitions

In the early 1990s, the actors involved in the historic preservation arrangement in Arizona were the National Park Service, the State Historic Preservation Office, the Arizona Historic Sites Review Committee, the Arizona State Parks Board, local governments and local historic preservation commissions, the Arizona Preservation Foundation, local preservation groups and historic property owners. The coalitions between these actors varied from case to case.

Under the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, the National Park Service (NPS) was responsible for listing historic properties in the National Register of Historic Places. The NPS provided the criteria to evaluate the significance of properties that were nominated for the National Register. Furthermore, the NPS operated the Historic Preservation Fund, providing grants to states and local governments to assist in their preservation efforts (surveys and studies, historic preservation plans, National Register nominations, educational materials, as well as restoration development projects).

Under section 101 of the National Historic Preservation Act, the State Historic Preservation Office (SHPO) had the responsibility: (a) to inventory historic properties and sites and nominate eligible properties to the National Register; (b) to prepare and implement a state-wide historic preservation plan; (c) to administer the federal HPF grant program for preservation projects; and (d) to review applications for federal rehabilitation tax credits (Cullingworth 1997, Miller 2000, Lyon 1987, Tyler 2000). The SHPO also administered the Arizona Historic Preservation Act, under the supervision of the Arizona State Parks Board (ASPB). The ASPB was appointed by the Governor for a period of six years and consisted of seven members, who were selected “(…) because of their knowledge of and interest in outdoor activities, multiple use of lands, archeology, natural resources and the value of the historical aspects of Arizona (…)” (A.R.S. 41-511A). The board held meetings throughout the year, guiding the SHPO staff, in accomplishing their mission. In practice, this meant that the board approved the plans and budgets for the SHPO, set guidelines and rules for SHPO programs, and managed the Arizona Heritage Fund (State Historic Preservation Office 2000b).

Nomination forms for the National (and Arizona) Register were generally prepared by the staff of the SHPO and were then submitted to Arizona Historic Sites Review Committee (HSRC). The committee held public meetings three times a year to review nominations and advise the SHPO on properties that must be placed in the National and Arizona Registers of Historic Places. Once a nomination had been reviewed and approved by the HSRC, the property was placed in the Arizona Register of Historic Places and forwarded to the Keeper of the National Register at the NPS for a final review and listing in the National Register of Historic Places (State Historic Preservation Office 2000a).

Under the Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.), local authorities could establish historic preservation ordinances (see textbox 5.4). In most communities, the historic preservation ordinance was administered by a historic preservation commission (HPC) (Miller 2000, Cox 2002). For example, the Phoenix Historic Preservation Ordinance provided guidelines and mechanisms for historic designation, historic preservation overlay zoning, design review and demolition delay. All permit applications were evaluated by the Historic Preservation Office. The Historic Preservation Commission served as the appeals body, ruling on a project when a property owner wishes to protest a staff decision. It also served as the policy-making body for the City, setting priorities for historic district designations, approving design guidelines for historic districts, holding public hearings and managing the Phoenix Historic Preservation Bond Fund (Cox 2002).

**TEXTBOX 5.4 Local Government**

In the United States, state governments establish the legal framework within which local and county governments operate. The state of Arizona encompasses 15 counties and 86 local communities. Counties are primarily administrative subdivisions of the state and are responsible for administering a number of state programs, including social services, public safety and roads (Cotthran 1996, Stacy 1983). Local governments provide a wide range of services in Arizona, including environmental protection, transportation, police and fire protection. Especially the City of Phoenix is influential because of its large population (over 1.3 million in 1996; currently 1.5 million) and the large number of representatives that it sends to the State Legislature (Cotthran 1996).

The National Historic Preservation Act and the Arizona Historic Preservation Act provided that property owners (as well as local governments) must be given the opportunity to comment on the nomination of their historic properties for the National and Arizona Register of Historic Places. Once their historic properties were listed (or declared eligible for listing) in the National Register, private owners could apply for grants (from the Historic Preservation Fund or Arizona Heritage Fund) and (federal or state) tax credits with the SHPO to compensate for restoration and maintenance costs.
In the early 1990s, there was only one statewide NGO involved in historic preservation in Arizona: the Arizona Preservation Foundation. This NGO was founded in 1979 to preserve Arizona’s historical, archeological, architectural and cultural resources. In 1990, the foundation initiated a yearly list of the most endangered historically significant sites within the State. By calling attention to the most threatened historic sites in Arizona, the organization aimed to increase public awareness of preservation issues (Arizona Preservation Foundation 2003). In addition to the statewide Arizona Preservation Foundation, there were a large number of locally organized historic preservation groups in Arizona. Although a vast majority of them were active in the field of archeology, a number of groups were dedicated to preserving specific historic properties throughout the state.

5.3.2 Division of Power

In the early 1990s, crucial power resources in Arizona’s historic preservation arrangement were divided between state actors at federal, state and local level and private property owners. Being responsible for listing properties in the National Register and operating the Historic Preservation Fund, the National Park Service (NPS) clearly had an influential position in Arizona’s historic preservation arrangement. The Historic Preservation Fund involved a federal matching grant program, which aimed to encourage investments in historic preservation by providing grants to the SHPOs and the National Trust for Historic Preservation. Funding was most often used to pay part of the costs of statewide historic preservation plans, National Register nominations and ‘bricks and mortar projects’. Besides grants, the federal government also provided tax credits for preservation purposes. Nevertheless, the NPS did not have the resources to actually protect historic properties from unwanted developments. Although section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act required federal agencies to take into account the effects of all federally regulated or funded activities on historic properties that were listed or eligible for listing on the National Register, this did not prevent federal agencies from taking such actions ultimately. Moreover, the National Historic Preservation Act did not provide the NPS with the authority to impose restrictions on private property owners as to the use of their historic properties.

The SHPO had an important role as advisor to the National Park Service, but also to state agencies, local governments and historic property owners. However, similar to the NPS, the SHPO did not have the resources to actually protect historic properties against unwanted developments. Under the National and Arizona Historic Preservation Act, the SHPO did not have any authority to impose restrictions on other state agencies, local governments or private property owners regarding the use of historic properties, unless federal or state funding was involved. Instead, the SHPO operated a variety of grant programs, tax incentives and education programs encouraging local governments to develop local historic preservation programs and stimulating private property owners to adequately maintain their historic properties. For example, the Arizona Heritage Fund provided economic incentives for the rehabilitation of National Register (eligible) properties, the development of historic context studies, inventories and nomination of properties to the Arizona Register, and public education activities. In addition, the State of Arizona offered property tax incentives for the maintenance of historic properties. Local governments applied planning and zoning instruments to protect significant heritage sites. Although local historic preservation ordinances and the use of historic preservation overlay zoning varied widely from place to place, for example because of differing levels of political support for historic preservation, they provided a much stronger protection for historic resources than the federal and state laws, which were predominantly procedural in character and only directed governmental action. For instance, once a property in Phoenix was zoned as historic, owners could no longer alter it without the permission of the local Historic Preservation Office, and demolition of the property was only allowed after a waiting period during which alternative actions to save the building were explored (City of Phoenix 2003a). For this reason, local authorities played a crucial role in the historic preservation arrangement in Arizona.

In contrast, NGOs did not play an important role in the 1990s. The historic preservation movement was relatively undeveloped due to the fact that Arizona was a relatively young state, its oldest resources were only a hundred years old, and most people did not perceive Arizona as a state with a significant history. The fact that Arizona was one of the fastest growing states in America did not contribute to a strong sense of history either. People came to Arizona thinking it was a new place where they could make a fresh start. They did not have any connection with the state’s past. All in all, historic preservation was not given a high priority in Arizona. In other parts of the United States, where the built heritage was much older and people had a much stronger sense of history, the historic preservation movement was much more entrenched in civil society. Moreover, the historic preservation movement in Arizona never really developed because cities like Phoenix and Tucson had already taken the responsibility for historic preservation. The only statewide NGO in the field of historic preservation, the Arizona Preservation Foundation, was relatively young: it had been established in 1979. It aimed to influence decision-making processes by lobbying the state government, calling attention to threatened historic sites, assisting in their preservation and increasing public awareness of preservation issues.

Finally, historic property owners possessed very powerful resources in Arizona’s historic preservation arrangement of the early 1990s: their protected private property rights under the U.S. Constitution. The notion of a common good was not shared very broadly in Arizona. People had a strong tendency to distrust government and did not want the government to interfere with their private property rights. There was often strong opposition against historic designation from the side of property owners who feared they could no longer do what they wanted with their property once it was designated. In the Midwestern and Eastern parts of the United States, people generally accepted a much greater governmental authority than in the Southwest. For instance, most local governments in the Midwest and East had the authority to deny the demolition of a historic property, whereas in Arizona, local governments only had the authority to temporarily delay a proposed demolition and suggest an acceptable alternative. In addition, both historic designation and historic preservation overlay zoning in Arizona were basically voluntary. A majority of property owners needed to agree with the historic designation of their neighborhood and most local governments in Arizona only zoned a neighborhood against the will of the owners when it involved exceptionally significant properties that were immediately threatened. Furthermore, owners of private property
that was listed in the National or Arizona Register were free to maintain, manage or dispose of their property as they chose.

5.3.3 Rules of the Game
In the early 1990s, the State of Arizona was featured by a predominant individualist mentality and a widespread distrust in governmental authorities. The National Historic Preservation Act, the Arizona Historic Preservation Act revealed a strong attachment to the rules of minimum state intervention and protection of private property rights.

The National Historic Preservation Act of 1966 provided several formal rules that were relevant for the historic preservation arrangement in Arizona. The act required federal agencies to locate, inventory and nominate historic properties to the National Register, to assume responsibility for preserving historic properties, and to use historic buildings to the maximum extent possible. In addition, the NHPA established a protective review process, known as ‘section 106 review’, to ensure that federal agencies take into account the effects of all federally regulated or funded activities on historic properties that were listed or eligible for listing on the National Register (Miller 2000). The kinds of actions requiring section 106 review were broad and could affect historic resources directly or indirectly. However, it is important to note that, although section 106 was an effective tool in focusing attention on federal actions that affected historic resources, it did not prevent federal agencies from taking such actions ultimately. Section 106 merely required that federal agencies comply with certain procedural requirements (Miller 2000, Tyler 2000). This meant that the NHPA did not provide the NPS, the SHPO or other preservationists with the authority to protect historic properties against unwanted developments.

Another significant rule provided by the NHPA was that federal, state and local historic preservation programs must rely on the voluntary cooperation of property owners and must not interfere with their private property rights. This meant that owners of private property that was listed in the National Register were free to maintain, manage or dispose of their property as they chose (National Park Service 2003d). In other words, listing in the National Register was primarily honorific. It did not prevent historic properties from being altered, damaged or even demolished. Nevertheless, the National Register played a central role in the section 106 review process and it enabled property owners to qualify for federal (and state) tax benefits and grants (Cullingworth 1997, Miller 2000). If the owner of a private property (or the majority of private property owners for a property or district with multiple owners) objected to the inclusion of the property in the National Register, this did not prevent the application of laws affecting historic properties that were eligible for listing in the National Register, such as the section 106 review process.

Finally, the NHPA provided rules for Arizona’s SHPO. Under section 101 of the act, the SHPO had the responsibility to identify and inventory historic properties and sites within the state and nominate eligible properties to the National Register. Furthermore, the NHPA provided SHPO with the responsibility to work with federal agencies in implementing the section 106 review process. In addition, the SHPO was responsible for preparing and implementing a state-wide historic preservation plan, assisting in the preservation efforts of local agencies, certifying local governments who wished to have specific responsibilities under the NHPA, and providing public information, education and technical assistance. Finally, SHPO had the authority to administer the federal Historic Preservation Fund grant program for preservation projects and to review applications for federal rehabilitation tax credits (Cullingworth 1997, Miller 2000, Lyon 1987, Tyler 2000).

Additional rules for the historic preservation arrangement in Arizona were provided by the Arizona Historic Preservation Act (Arizona Revised Statutes, title 41, section 861-864), which was established in 1982. The state act was modeled after the National Historic Preservation Act. Similar to section 106 of the NHPA, which required that SHPO reviewed all federal plans affecting historic properties listed on or eligible for listing on the National Register, the Arizona Historic Preservation Act required that SHPO reviewed all state plans involving properties listed on or eligible for listing on the Arizona Register of Historic Places (A.R.S. section 41-864). In analogy with the National Register, the Arizona Register of Historic Places was the state’s list of districts, sites, buildings, structures and objects worthy of preservation. Arizona had adopted the National Register criteria for evaluating eligibility for the state register (State Historic Preservation Office 2000a).

The Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) also provided important formal rules for local authorities as regards the preservation of historic buildings and districts. Under the A.R.S., local authorities had the possibility to establish a historic preservation ordinance (A.R.S. 9-462). Local historic preservation ordinances contained criteria and procedures regarding the designation, use, alteration and demolition of historic properties. In most communities, the historic preservation ordinance was administered by a historic preservation commission (HPC) (Cox 2002, Miller 2000). Generally, these commissions had the authority to designate historic districts and individual landmarks as local monuments. While designations could include the entire historic structure, many communities extended protection only to the exteriors of such properties and in some cases, only to those facades that were visible from a public road. Commissions could also identify properties as contributing or non-contributing in historic districts. Contributing properties generally enjoyed full protection, while changes to non-contributing property (including vacant land) were approved only if they are compatible with the character of the historic district (Miller 2000). Furthermore, historic preservation ordinances could empower commissions to review applications for alteration or demolition of historic properties. The applications were evaluated at a public hearing. Permission was typically granted in the form of a permit or ‘certificate of appropriateness’. Many communities only allowed the demolition of a historic property when it imposed an economic hardship on its owner or when it formed a safety threat. Some communities however, permitted property owners to demolish historic properties after a specific waiting period, during which a city or town, along with private preservation groups, could explore alternative actions to save the building (Miller 2000).

In practice, historic preservation ordinances alone were insufficient to protect historic resources, especially when other governmental programs such as transportation or housing favored new developments over rehabilitation alternatives. Therefore, preservationists considered comprehensive land use planning and overlay zoning as important tools to contribute to effective historic preservation. In a comprehensive land use plan, local governments could identify historic preservation as a community goal or as a means to promote economic development by providing neighborhood stability and tourism.
opportunities. In addition, they could apply historic preservation overlay zoning to preserve historic properties and districts. Zoning involves the process of assigning certain land use rights to properties, based on their location and proximity to other properties (Lew and Hawley 1996). For preservation purposes, properties and districts could be rezoned ‘historic’. In these historic zones, local governments could impose restrictions on the use of privately owned historic properties so that the risk of unwanted developments was effectively prevented (Miller 2000).

Under the U.S. Constitution, all historic preservation laws, whether enacted at the federal, state or local level, were subject to review by the courts. Historic preservation lawsuits could involve statutory or constitutional claims. Statutory claims addressed issues such as whether a historic preservation commission exceeded its authority or whether a rational basis existed to support a commission’s decision. Constitutional claims arose most frequently under the takings, due process and equal protection clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Under the takings clause, property owners could argue that historic preservation laws involved a ‘taking’ of private property, for instance when a permit application concerning the use of their property had been denied. The Fifth Amendment provided that private property must not be taken by the government without the payment of just compensation. The due process clause protected individuals from arbitrary governmental action by ensuring that the process of making, applying and enforcing laws was fair. The most fundamental requirement of due process was the opportunity to be heard. Accordingly, in preservation cases, a hearing was generally held before property was designated for protection under a local historic preservation ordinance, and when an application to alter or demolish a designated property was discussed. Finally, the equal protection clause provides that similarly situated property must be treated equally under the law. Different treatment of similar property was sustained if a reasonable ground exists for the disparity, such as the uniform application of written criteria and standards following a local historic preservation ordinance (Howard 1987, Miller 2000). Clearly, the courts played a significant role in historic preservation in the United States. This was basically a result of the strong attachment to property that is protected under the U.S. Constitution (Cullingworth 1997).

5.3.4 Policy Discourses

The dominant policy discourse of the early 1990s focused on properties and districts that were at least 50 years old and that were associated with historic events or the lives of significant persons, that characterized a type, period of method of construction, and had high artistic values, or that yielded important historical information. The National Historic Preservation Act of 1966 defined a historic property or resource as “(...) any prehistoric or historic district, site, building, structure, or object included in, or eligible for inclusion on the National Register, including artifacts, records and material remains related to such a property or resource” (NHPA section 301: 5). A historic conservation district was defined as “(...) an area which contains historic properties, buildings having similar or related architectural characteristics, cultural cohesiveness, or any combination of the foregoing” (NHPA 1966, section 201: 9). The criteria that the NPS and the SHPO used for evaluating the significance of properties that were nominated for listing in the (Arizona and) National Register were:

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<th>Table 5.1 Initial characteristics of Arizona’s historic preservation arrangement</th>
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<td><strong>Actors and coalitions</strong></td>
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<td>National Park Service (NPS)</td>
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<td>Coalitions varied</td>
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<td><strong>Division of power</strong></td>
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<td>Federal and state authorities controlled National and Arizona Register and economic incentives</td>
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<td>Local authorities were in charge of historic preservation overlay zoning</td>
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<td>NGOs and preservation groups played no important role</td>
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<td>Historic property owners had powerful position through protected private property rights</td>
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<td><strong>Rules of the game</strong></td>
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<td>Protection of private property rights</td>
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<td>Minimum state intervention</td>
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<td><strong>Dominant policy discourse</strong></td>
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<td>What: significant buildings and districts that were at least 50 years old</td>
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<td>Why: historic, artistic or scientific value, economic benefits</td>
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<td>How: protection against unwanted developments through listing and historic designation, historic preservation overlay zoning and economic incentives</td>
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In the past, the strong belief in private property rights and the relatively young history of the State of Arizona were perceived as the main threats to the preservation of valuable heritage sites. As most Arizonans did not want the government to interfere with their private property rights, there was often strong opposition against listing (in the National or Arizona Register) or historic designation (through overlay zoning) of historic properties from the side of property owners. Furthermore, there was no broad public and political support for historic preservation because a majority of ‘new’ Arizonans did not have any connection with the state’s history and consequently, preservation of the few historic buildings was not regarded as significant. Accordingly, preservationists typically used economic arguments to promote the listing, historic designation and preservation of historic buildings and districts. For example, they argued that the rehabilitation of a historic building saved a lot of money when compared to demolition and new construction and that it could also save a lot of time by avoiding lengthy review processes and local neighborhood opposition. In addition, the availability of economic incentives was emphasized as an important impetus for people to have their property or neighborhood listed on the National or Arizona Register.

5.4 Recent Developments in the Historic Preservation Arrangement

This section deals with recent developments in the historic preservation arrangement in Arizona in terms of actors and coalitions (5.4.1), division of power (5.4.2), rules of the game (5.4.3) and policy discourses (5.4.4). Table 5.2 gives an overview.

5.4.1 Shifts in Actors and Coalitions

With regard to the actors and coalitions that participate in Arizona’s historic preservation arrangement, a few developments have taken place since the early 1990s. First, a new NGO has been established: the Arizona Heritage Alliance. The Arizona Heritage Alliance was created in 1992 as a guardian of the Arizona Heritage Fund. The approximately 250 members of the Arizona Heritage Alliance reflect a variety of interests, including environmental conservation, outdoor sports and historic preservation. Most of the members are advocacy organizations; others are commercial businesses, city governments and private persons. About the role of the Alliance, the Executive Director states: “There is not a town in this state that has not been affected by the Heritage Fund. But a lot of times, people do not realize where the money is actually coming from. So it is important to let people know in how many different ways the Heritage Fund affects life in Arizona.” In the past, the Arizona Legislature made several attempts to cut the Heritage Fund. With regard to the most recent attempt in 2003, the Arizona Heritage Alliance claims: “(Our members have generated hundreds of calls and letters supporting the program, and successfully maintained the integrity of the Heritage Fund)” (Arizona Heritage Alliance 2003). In 2002, the other statewide NGO in the field of historic preservation, the Arizona Preservation Foundation, was able to hire its first full-time executive director through a Challenge Grant from the National Trust. The director’s mission is to advocate historic preservation throughout Arizona, to lobby the State Legislature and other governmental agencies for historic preservation efforts, and to create awareness among the general public (Arizona Preservation Foundation 2003).

A second development as regards actors and coalitions is that private property owners have increasingly invested in the preservation of Arizona’s built heritage. More and more of them aim for the designation of their properties as historic buildings in the National Register, mainly because of the economic benefits it brings about. Besides grants and tax incentives, the designation of a historic property or neighborhood has proved to bring about rising property values. The designated historic districts in downtown Phoenix, for example, are extremely popular among homebuyers because they provide a pleasant and centrally located place to live, and because they are protected from unwanted encroachment by commercial businesses and so-called Mc Mansions, which are newly built, oversized houses. The property values in some of the historic districts in downtown Phoenix have increased by 200 to 300 per cent over the years. As a result, many other neighborhoods in Phoenix aim for historic designation as well. Some preservationists consider this to be a positive development. They argue that, as historic properties become valuable resources, property owners will invest more money in their rehabilitation and maintenance. Whereas 20 or 30 years ago, many historic buildings in Phoenix were cut up in apartments and badly maintained by an absentee landlord or slumlord, at present, many high-income people are moving back into the historic downtown neighborhoods and there is an increasing amount of owner-occupied, well-maintained historic properties. For many people in Phoenix, living in a historic district has become a source of pride.

Besides private property owners, also a number of builders and property developers in Arizona have discovered the benefits of refurbishing historic structures, including the availability of grants and tax benefits, and the establishment of a good public image. The Orpheum Lofts project in downtown Phoenix is a good example, involving a 1931 Art Deco office building that is being transformed by a private property developer into a high-profile apartment building with 90 luxurious lofts. The developer comments: “We believe Orpheum Lofts present a once-in-a-lifetime, exclusive opportunity to live the urban lifestyle in one of Phoenix’s well-recognized historic landmarks across from the (historic) Orpheum Theater in the heart of downtown” (Willis 2003: 4). And the project architect states: “Our goal is to preserve the original exposed brick, decorative terra cotta and remarkable detail in the interior, and to protect the original exterior” (Willis 2003: 2). Another example is the Fontenelle Lofts project, concerning a rehabilitation project of an old apartment building in the Roosevelt Historic District in downtown Phoenix (City of Phoenix 2003b, 2003c).

5.4.2 Shifts in the Division of Power

In the period between 1990 and 2005, we have seen no actual shifts in the division of power between actors in Arizona’s historic preservation arrangement. Since the early 1990s, local governments have become more proactive in the field of historic preservation as they have increasingly applied their zoning powers to designate historic districts and protect them against unwanted developments. For example, with the 1992 Historic Preservation Ordinance, the City of Phoenix introduced one of the most ambitious historic preservation programs in the United States (Gammage 1999). Starting from zero in 1985, by 1996 the City had designated more than 4,500 historic structures, which is 40% of its eligible building stock, the highest percentage of any big city in the United States. An important part of what is designated are the twentieth century subdivisions of single-
family bungalows and ranch houses that would elsewhere be considered urban sprawl (Gammage 1999). However, this has not changed the fact that private property owners still control a crucial power resource: their protected private property rights under the U.S. Constitution. Although local authorities can impose restrictions on the use of privately owned historic properties through historic preservation overlay zoning, this instrument is generally not applied against the will of the owners (unless it involves an exceptionally significant property that is immediately threatened). For that reason, a growing number of local governments have proactively consulted with private owners about the designation and preservation of their historic properties. For example, in Scottsdale, property owners are actively involved in the designation of their neighborhoods as historic districts. The Scottsdale Historic Preservation Officer comments: “If you put together a good benefit package, and you put together a process in which people feel they have been ‘chosen’, that this has not been forced upon them, that they have been selected and then you reward them with programs and support, then you get support and competition of people who want to be designated. So I think a lot of it is just how you do it, not the fact that it is being done.”

Despite the strong belief in private property rights and minimum state intervention, several historic preservation professionals emphasize that a growing number of people in Arizona recognize the value of the historic resources in their community. They claim that the public and political support for historic preservation has grown considerably during the past decade and that accordingly, it is given a much higher political priority. A staff member of the Phoenix Historic Preservation Office comments: “I think we made a lot of progress over the last 10 years (...). Historic preservation is here to stay and it is something that the majority of the citizens want and have really embraced.” Another official of the City of Phoenix states: “Some of the elected officials, who might not have been as interested in the past, now have residents who are focused on and interested in (...) historic preservation. So there probably is more interest now with the elected body (...) than there has been in the past.” In Scottsdale, the historic preservation program was established because of a growing demand from civil society after too many historic buildings had been lost to demolition or decay. The Scottsdale Historic Preservation Officer comments: “The reason the historic preservation program was created was because of citizens’ unhappiness with the fact that there was no protection. And so they elected some officials in City Council who were supportive of creating a program.”

5.4.3 Shif ts in the Rules of the Game

In Arizona’s historic preservation arrangement, the most important rules of the game have always been minimum state intervention and the protection of private property rights under the U.S. Constitution. Nevertheless, preservation officials increasingly acknowledge the importance of proactively involving private property owners and other interested parties from civil society and the market sector in the selection, designation and maintenance of historic buildings. Accordingly, the rule of public-private cooperation has gained importance during the past decade. For example, there are a number of locally organized historic preservation groups in Arizona dedicated to preserve specific historic properties throughout the state. Some of them cooperate with governmental agencies, such as the federal National Park Service and Bureau of Land Management, to preserve historic resources and generate funding. The Deputy Historic Preservation Officer for the federal Bureau of Land Management (BLM) in Arizona states: “We have developed partnerships with some (local) groups. (...) They go out and solicit grant money for us. On behalf of the Empire Ranch for example, (...) the Empire Ranch Foundation (…) has gone out and gotten private donations and grants that we can use to match federal funding. We have been able to get a 93,500 dollar Save America’s Treasures grant from the Department of the Interior that way.”

Similarly, the rule of public-private cooperation is advocated in the first comprehensive Historic Preservation Plan of the State of Arizona, which was adopted by the Arizona State Parks Board (ASPB) in 1996 and was updated in 2000. The plan provides the preservation community with a set of policy guidelines and emphasizes the importance of the relationship between the network of preservationists in Arizona and the general public (State Historic Preservation Office 2000b). The plan provides the foundation upon which SHPO programs are carried out. Following the plan, SHPO’s vision statement is: “We envision an Arizona in which an informed and concerned citizenry works to protect our irreplaceable cultural heritage. They will be supported by a coordinated, statewide historic preservation network providing information and assistance that enables them to undertake successful projects and long-term preservation planning” (State Historic Preservation Office 2000b: 1). In other words, SHPO aims at establishing a proactive preservation network in which non-governmental organizations or individuals and governmental agencies cooperate in protecting Arizona’s cultural heritage. In the plan’s framework for action, eight policy goals are formulated, among which are: (a) informed supportive public, by promoting widespread participation of citizens in historic preservation and supporting historic preservation advocacy groups; (b) informed supportive policy-makers, by educating policy makers of the economic and social values of historic preservation and keeping them informed on current historic preservation issues; and (c) informed trained professionals, by collecting current research information and advising preservation professionals on current policies and techniques (State Historic Preservation Office 2000b).

A growing number of preservationists in Arizona advocate a more transparent and proactive approach to historic preservation as a new rule of the game. They argue that in many cases, opposition against historic preservation efforts results from inadequate or poorly operated historic preservation programs. They mention situations where the historic preservation staff omits to explain or discuss with owners, users and other stakeholders which historic properties should be designated and why. In addition, they refer to circumstances where the procedures for historic designation and historic preservation review are perceived as unfair, inaccessible and time-consuming by most historic property owners. Accordingly, it is argued that if local governments would operate a more transparent and appealing program in which the historic preservation staff presents itself as an independent advocate on behalf of the community’s historic resources, people would be more willing to cooperate and there would be more support for historic preservation. A historic preservation consultant argues: “In many communities, there is opposition to being designated. But usually, that is because the way the program is operated. (...) So I spend a lot of time helping people re-write their ordinances and improve their processes. Because if you have an efficient, effective program where you are seen as the advocate on behalf of historic properties, then you get support from the property owners and you get people who want their
properties to be designated.” Another problem perceived by the advocates of a more transparent and proactive approach is that the preservation establishment in Arizona spends too much time reacting to threats and unwanted developments, such as the alteration or demolition of historic properties, instead of preventing such developments. They emphasize that preservationists in Arizona should develop historic preservation programs through which they can proactively survey, select and preserve the historic resources that are most significant or that are the best examples of a certain style or time period, instead of waiting until the majority of them have been altered or demolished. The historic preservation consultant comments: “My slogan is “Why don’t we save the best and not just save what is left?” But that is not the mode our profession is in, because it is easier to save the few, the charming, the last, (...) as opposed to doing things proactively and figure out in advance (...) what we should pick to preserve.”

Nevertheless, the rules of private property rights protection and minimum state intervention have remained dominant during the past decade. State and local governments still largely rely on incentive-based policies, although there has been a lot of debate about the (dis)advantages of existing incentive programs. On the one hand, many preservation experts perceive the availability of grant programs and tax credits as an important argument for property owners to participate in historic preservation programs. On the other hand, a SHPO staff member emphasizes that the tax program is voluntary in nature and does not offer any substantial protection to historic properties. If property owners do not follow the rules of the tax program, that is, if they do not properly maintain their historic property or if they make too radical changes, the SHPO staff simply takes the property off the program and off the National Register. In addition, several preservationists in Arizona mention that for most property owners, the current historic preservation incentives are not attractive enough. The Tempe Historic Preservation Officer, for example, states that the existing incentive programs in Arizona do not have a stimulating effect on historic preservation efforts in Tempe (an urban community in the Phoenix metropolitan area). He argues that most property owners and developers in Tempe are discouraged from pursuing the rehabilitation grants provided by the Arizona Heritage Fund because of the restrictions that are attached to them: “When somebody comes in to a property with the luxury of just wanting to preserve a historic building, then the grant makes sense. (...) But most of the property developers that talk to us about the grants are discouraged of pursuing them because of the restrictions and constraints on their pro forma [construction method] and their time frame.” In addition, because property taxes are relatively low in Arizona (the State of Arizona uses sales tax as its basic funding mechanism), the property tax reductions are not an attractive incentive either. Consequently, the set of incentives that are currently operated by the SHPO (grants and tax credits for restoration and maintenance costs) are not being used in Tempe. More fundamental criticism with regard to the existing historic preservation incentives in Arizona comes from the side of historic preservation skeptics. They argue that it is discriminatory and unjust to provide grant programs and tax incentives to a group of citizens who are not really in need of financial assistance. In addition, historic preservation skeptics argue that the designation of more and more properties on the National Register seriously undermines the state’s property tax base.

5.4.4 Shifts in Policy Discourses
Two discursive developments have occurred in Arizona’s historic preservation arrangement between 1990 and 2005. First, we have seen a shift in focus towards more recent heritage sites, especially from the post-war period (1945-1960), when Arizona’s population started to grow rapidly and many new suburbs were built in the Phoenix and Tucson areas (see textbox 5.5). A growing number of preservation practitioners believe that these post-war suburbs are a far more significant phenomenon than is generally realized. They argue that never before in the history of the United States had such a large share of the population been able to afford homes that were as convenient, private and spacious as in the period after World War II (Longstreth 2000). The post-war suburbs with the characteristic ranch houses are said to represent the fulfillment of the dream of home ownership and material well being for a majority of families (Finbraaten 2003). However, as a result of the NHPA 50 years-rule, several resources from the post-World War II era are not yet old enough to be listed on the National Register. Moreover, many of the post-war properties are easy targets for demolition, because they are generally not appreciated by the general public, their original functions have become outdated, they begin to require expensive repairs and the land they are situated on is very popular among developers. In addition, several preservationists mention that it is hard to convince other people and even colleagues that post-war structures are worth saving. At Arizona’s Statewide Preservation Partnership Conference of June 2003, the Historic Preservation Officer for Phoenix commented: “In the ’50s and ’60s, architects and preservationists struggled with Victorian houses. Today, we struggle with ranch houses.”

Due to the fact that most of the post-war subdivisions entail hundreds or even thousands of ranch houses, it requires a huge effort to survey, evaluate, designate and review all of them. The 2000 Update of the Arizona Historic Preservation Plan stresses that...
much remains to be done, at both state and local levels, in identifying and evaluating Arizona’s historic resources. It is considered a great challenge to develop a preservation strategy that addresses properties from the recent past, especially from the early post-World War II period (State Historic Preservation Office 2000b). A staff member of the Phoenix Historic Preservation Office says: “There are so many houses and neighborhoods from 1945 on. It has not been that difficult prior to WW II, because anything that is left (from that period) and is still intact is probably eligible for designation. (...) But when you get into (the period) after WW II, (...) the number of properties increases exponentially. And so we really have to figure out what is significant from this time period, from a historical, architectural, developmental and cultural standpoint.” At Arizona’s Statewide Preservation Partnership Conference in June 2003, the Phoenix Historic Preservation Officer stated that the following factors will play an important role in the selection of eligible post-war districts in Phoenix: (a) the significance of properties and their National Register potential; (b) the extent to which particular types of property styles are disappearing; (c) the materials used and the durability of properties; (d) the extent to which other land use priorities and interests are at stake; and (e) the limited amount of government resources, which make it impossible to review all properties in all districts.

A second discursive shift in Arizona’s historic preservation arrangement since the early 1990s is that historic buildings and sites are increasingly seen as sources of spatial quality and economic development. Accordingly, there has been a shift in focus from historic designation, overlay zoning and incentives towards viable (re)use and (re)development of cultural heritage sites. During the past decade, a growing number of historic sites has been (re)developed as tourist attractions, more and more private property developers have discovered historic buildings as profitable opportunities for the development of luxurious ownership housing, and preservation efforts are increasingly linked with neighborhood revitalization and the creation of housing for low-income groups.

Many local communities in Arizona appreciate their historic resources as valuable tourist attractions and important sources of income. According to the staff at the SHPO, several communities participate in the Certified Local Governments (CLG) program because they recognize that tourism is an important basis for their economy and that their historic properties are their greatest asset. An official of the SHPO mentions mining communities that lost their economic basis when their mines were shut down; farming communities where the advent of corporate agriculture caused a high rate of unemployment; railroad towns that lost their supply function with the advent of the Interstate Freeway System; and towns that used to be attached to Route 66 but today hardly attract visitors since they are by-passed by the new Highway 40. At present, many of these towns focus on heritage tourism as a new way to generate income. They perceive historic preservation as an important tool to improve their attractiveness for tourists. According to the SHPO official, a negative impact of this tourism-based approach is that historic preservation has become too successful in some of these towns. For example, several of the smaller communities in Arizona are re-building their Main Street again, in order to revitalize their commercial district and to make it more attractive for tourists. By adding certain nostalgic elements that in reality were never there, such as brick sidewalks and iron streetlamps, the SHPO official claims that these communities are creating a false sense of history and that they are compromising an accurate interpretation of history. “There is a growing approach to restoring places, turning them into a previous appearance, even if this appearance (…) is not authentic. It is really just to make it look historic, in other words, to create a false history.”

Similar to the notion of establishing a linkage between historic preservation and recreation and tourism, several preservation experts in Arizona support the idea of linking historic preservation efforts with the creation of luxurious ownership housing. Again others link the rehabilitation of historic properties to neighborhood revitalization and the creation of housing for low-income groups (affordable housing). By using historic preservation as a mechanism to create affordable housing, the preservationists argue that multiple goals are achieved: historic buildings and neighborhoods are preserved, affordable housing is created, entire neighborhoods are revitalized and even urban sprawl is reduced.

According to a private property developer who uses affordable housing tax credits in several rehabilitation projects in Phoenix, the main incentive to redevelop historic properties is their market value. More and more people appreciate a historic atmosphere and are willing to pay for a historic home in a historic environment. Nevertheless, he

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<th>Table 5.2 Organizational and discursive dynamics in historic preservation</th>
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<th>Actors (and coalitions)</th>
<th>New actors:</th>
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<td>• NGO Arizona Heritage Alliance</td>
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<td>• Growing number of private property owners</td>
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<td>• Builders and property developers</td>
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<td>New coalitions:</td>
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<td>• Public-private partnerships</td>
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<th>Division of power</th>
<th>Small shifts in the division of power</th>
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<td>• Growing number of local governments proactively apply historic preservation overlay zoning authority and consult private owners on designation of their historic properties</td>
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<td>• Public and political support for historic preservation has increased</td>
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<th>Rule(s) of the game</th>
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<td>• Public-private cooperation</td>
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<td>• Transparent and proactive approach to historic preservation</td>
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<th>Dominant policy discourse</th>
<th>New dominant policy discourse:</th>
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<td>• What: more recent historic buildings and sites, also from the post-war period</td>
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<td>• Why: spatial quality, economic development</td>
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<td>• How: viable (re)use and redevelopment</td>
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emphasizes that the existing tax incentives and grant programs in historic preservation and affordable housing are not sufficient to compensate for the many extra costs and the extremely time-consuming historic preservation review process. He concludes that for property developers in Arizona, rehabilitation projects for affordable housing are not an attractive option. Developers can make more profit much faster through new construction in the suburbs: “If you are a housing developer, you can make a lot more money a lot faster by working on the perimeter. If you find a raw piece land, you build 200 apartments, you make a couple of million bucks, you move on. You do not have a lot of neighborhood involvement, you do not have to deal with asbestos, you do not have to deal with public safety issues on how to adapt a historic structure. You are building something of wood, frame and stucco. That is a much more profitable business than what I am doing.” In addition, even though Arizona’s affordable housing tax credit program supports projects that combine affordable housing with historic preservation, rehabilitation projects for luxurious ownership housing, such as the Orpheum Lofts and Fontenelle Lofts projects, are much more profitable.

5.5 Conclusions

Looking at the developments in Arizona’s historic preservation arrangement since the early 1990s, I conclude that the arrangement has gradually become wider in scope, both discursively and organizationally. Similar to the Norwegian case, the biggest changes have occurred in the content of historic preservation. First, we have seen a shift in focus from sites representing prehistoric Native American cultures and the Anglo-American settlement period towards more recent heritage sites, among which are the typical post-war subdivisions with their characteristic ranch houses. Second, cultural heritage sites are increasingly seen as sources of spatial quality and economic development, besides being appreciated for their historic, artistic and/or scientific values. Hence, there has been a shift in focus from historic designation, overlay zoning and incentives towards viable (re)use and (re)development of heritage sites. More and more historic properties have been (re)developed as tourist attractions, discovered as profitable opportunities for the development of luxurious ownership housing, and connected with neighborhood revitalization projects and the creation of housing for low-income groups.

In addition, I conclude that the shifts in the content and the organization of historic preservation are strongly interconnected (see figure 5.1). The discursive shifts that have occurred are clearly related to the organizational developments that have taken place since the early 1990s: the arrival of new actors (private property owners, builders and property developers) and the introduction of new rules of the game (public-private cooperation, more transparent and proactive approach). First, the new focus on spatial and economic development through viable (re)use and (re)development of historic properties is closely connected with the fact that private property owners, builders and property developers have become increasingly involved in the preservation of Arizona’s built heritage. Because of the economic benefits it brings about (grants, tax benefits and, most of all, rising property values), more and more private property owners aim for the designation of their properties and/or neighborhoods as historic buildings and/or historic districts in the National Register. Also a growing number of builders and property developers in Arizona have discovered the benefits of reusing and redeveloping historic properties (grants, tax benefits, recycling of building materials, good public image). Second, as a result of the shifting focus towards more recent heritage sites, including the large numbers of post-war properties, preservation authorities increasingly acknowledge the importance of proactively involving private property owners and other interested parties from civil society and the market sector in the selection, designation and actual maintenance of historic properties. Accordingly, the rules of (a) public-private cooperation and (b) a more transparent and proactive approach to historic preservation have gained importance.

Although we have seen several interrelated dynamics in Arizona’s historic preservation arrangement, I also conclude that a number of features have shown a remarkable stability since the early 1990s (see figure 5.2). For example, the actors that were involved in the early 1990s are still active in historic preservation today. Second, the prevailing rules of the early 1990s, private property rights protection and minimum state intervention, have remained dominant during the past decade, despite the fact that they have been complemented by two new rules. Also the division of power has been mostly the same since the early 1990s. Although the public and political support for historic

![Figure 5.1 Dynamics in Arizona’s historic preservation arrangement](chart.png)
preservation has increased and local governments have increasingly applied the instrument of historic preservation overlay zoning, private property owners still control a crucial power resource: the protection of their private property rights under the U.S. Constitution.

2. Division of power:
- Federal and state authorities control National and Arizona Register and economic incentives
- Local authorities are in charge of historic preservation overlay zoning
- NGOs and local preservation groups play no important role
- Historic property owners have powerful position through protected private property rights

1. Actors and coalitions:
- National Park Service
- State Historic Preservation Office
- Arizona Historic Sites Review Committee
- Arizona State Parks Board
- Local historic preservation offices
- Local historic preservation commissions
- Arizona Preservation Foundation
- Local preservation groups
- Historic property owners
- Coalitions vary

3. Rules of the game:
- Protection of private property rights
- Minimum state intervention

Figure 5.2 Stability in Arizona’s historic preservation arrangement
6.1 Introduction

Probably the most famous elements of built heritage in the Netherlands, besides the characteristic windmills, are the various water works. The ingenious systems of dykes, canals, reservoirs, outlet sluices, pumping stations and mill networks in the Dutch polders are known all over the world. They represent the extraordinary efforts made by Dutch engineers and architects to drain and create new land and to protect the people and their land against the natural forces of water. Other important categories of built heritage in the Netherlands include city gates and towers, castles, fortresses, public buildings and parks, churches and monasteries, industrial complexes, farms and private houses. The age of these sites varies largely: from 50 to 1,000 years. Under the 1988 National Monuments and Historic Buildings Act, approximately 50,000 historic buildings and structures are listed as national monuments (rijksmonumenten) and 350 urban and rural landscapes are designated as protected town- and villeges (beschermde stads- en dorpgemeente).

This chapter deals with recent dynamics in the Dutch monumentenzorg arrangement. In the next section, I describe the history of monumentenzorg in the Netherlands. Section 6.3 analyzes the characteristics of the monumentenzorg arrangement in the early 1990s and in section 6.4, I discuss the developments that have emerged in the monumentenzorg arrangement from the early 1990s onwards. Section 6.5 presents my conclusions with regard to change and stability in the Dutch case.

6.2 The History of Monumentenzorg

Systematic care of cultural heritage in the Netherlands started in the second half of the nineteenth century (Nelissen 1993, 1996). During the Industrial Revolution, many historic structures such as castles, city gates, churches and medieval houses had been demolished because they no longer served a purpose and the demand for space for new houses, factories, roads and railways had grown enormously. In response to this development, more and more people, typically belonging to the social-economic and intellectual elite, supported the idea of preserving the built remains of Dutch history. Several private initiatives were taken to preserve historic buildings and a variety of private organizations came into existence (Ministerie van OCW 2003, Van der Doe and Spijkerman 1996).

The nobleman Victor de Stuers (1843-1916) is generally regarded as the founder of Dutch monumentenzorg. Under his leadership, a number of volunteers started to list and document the most significant historic buildings in the Netherlands (Richel-Bottinga 2001). Their inventory ultimately led to the Provisional List of Dutch Monuments of Art and History (Voorlopige Lijst der Nederlandsche Monumenten van Geschiedenis en Kunst), which was drawn up under governmental authority between 1903 and 1933. It was the predecessor of the current Register of National Monuments (Monumentenregister). Starting point for the Provisional List in 1903 was that buildings and sites needed to be at least 50 years of age in order to have some historic value. As a consequence, until very recently, the Register of National Monuments only consisted of buildings and sites from before 1850 (Nelissen 1993, 2002b, Richel-Bottinga 2001).

In 1874, monumentenzorg became an official task of the Dutch national government (see textbox 6.1). In that year, an item was added to the national budget for “(…) the preservation and superintendence of memorials of Dutch History and Art (…)” (Ministerie van OCW 2003: 95) and a special Arts Department (Afdeling Kunsten en Wetenschappen), headed by Victor de
They were inspired by the large arrangement in (De Boer 2000, Nelissen 1996, 2000, 2002b).

For example, the Rijksdienst voor Monumenten, NRF (De Boer 2000, Nelissen 1996, 2000, 2002b).

It was not until after the Second World War that monumentenzorg really got off the ground in the Netherlands, driven by the need to restore war-damaged historic buildings (Ministerie van OCW 2003). The National Department for Conservation (Rijksdienst voor de Monumentenzorg) was set up in 1947, with the protection and conservation of historic buildings as its primary task. However, legislation was still missing. The Royal Dutch Antiquarian Society (Koninklijke Nederlandsche Oudheidkundige Bond), a non-governmental organization established in 1899, played an important role as advocate for protective legislation (Nelissen 1993, 1996, Van der Doe and Spijkerman 1996). In 1950, a temporary act on cultural heritage preservation (Tijdelijke Wet Monumentenzorg) was finally established, which prohibited the demolition of or alterations to all objects included in the Provisional List of Monuments, without the consent of the then Minister of Education, Art and Sciences. The temporary act would form the basis for the Historic Buildings and Monuments Act of 1961 (Monumentenwet 1961) (Van der Doe and Spijkerman 1996).

The 1961 Act provided legal protection by the state not only of exceptional historic buildings but also of valuable historic town- and villagescapes (stads- en dorpsgezichten). It regulated the tasks and responsibilities of the public sector and the rules that the owners of protected national monuments (rijksonderwijs) must obey. For example, the Act required a list of historic buildings to be drawn up for each municipality, a task which was completed in 1970 by the National Council for Monuments (Monumentenzorg). In addition, the Act prohibited any alterations to or demolition of listed buildings without the Minister’s consent (Ministerie van OCW 2003, Nelissen 2002b, Richel-Bottinga 2001).

A significant feature of the 1961 Historic Buildings and Monuments Act was that it put all responsibilities with regard to the selection and preservation of monuments with national importance. However, local and provincial governments became more conscious of their role in the field of monumentenzorg. They were inspired by the large number of publications and activities in the European Architectural Heritage Year 1975, an initiative of the Council of Europe (see textbox 6.2) that aimed to highlight the built heritage as an important factor for the quality of life in communities. Especially the cities with a large number of cultural heritage sites wanted more influence on the selection of national monuments and the allocation of restoration permits and grants (Nelissen 1996, 2000, 2002b).

Against this background, and in line with a general trend towards decentralization in the Netherlands, in 1984, the then Minister of Welfare, Health and Cultural Affairs proposed a partial decentralization of tasks and responsibilities from the national to the local level, under the precondition that local governments would establish both a preservation ordinance (monumentenverordening) and a preservation committee (monumentencommissie). Accordingly, with the renewed Historic Buildings and Monuments Act of 1988 (Monumentenwet 1988), a number of tasks were delegated to the local level, the most important of which was issuing permits for the demolition or alteration of national monuments. The task of designating national monuments and historic town- and villagescapes remained with the national government (Nelissen 1996, 2000, Richel-Bottinga 2001).

Together with the 1988 Act, a new funding system was introduced via the Government Grant Schemes for the Maintenance and the Restoration of Monuments (BRDM or Besluit Rijks subsidiering Onderhoud Monumenten and BRRM or Besluit Rijks subsidiering Restauratie Monumenten). Whereas the BRDM decree was intended to promote the maintenance of historic buildings, with the BRRM decree, more tasks were delegated to the local level. Local governments now had the authority to prepare long-term restoration programs and to guide actual restorations. Moreover, the BRRM decree replaced most of the restoration grants by low-interest loans and tax deductions. To administer the new funding system, a private foundation was established in 1985: the National Restoration Fund (Nationaal Restauratiefonds, NRF) (De Boer 2000, Nelissen 1996, 2000, 2002b).

**6.3 Initial Characteristics of the Monumentenzorg Arrangement**

This section deals with the characteristics of the Dutch monumentenzorg arrangement in the early 1990s as regards actors and coalitions (6.3.1), division of power (6.3.2), rules of the game (6.3.3) and policy discourses (6.3.4). Table 6.1 gives an overview.
Under the 1988 Monuments and Historic Buildings Act, the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science (OCW) was primarily responsible for the preservation of the Dutch cultural heritage. The National Department for Conservation (RDMZ), which operated under the Ministry of OCW, was responsible for the actual implementation of the ministerial tasks associated with the 1988 Act (Nelissen 2002b, Richel-Bottinga 2001). These included selecting and designating national monuments and town- and village-scapes, advising municipalities on permit applications for the alteration of national monuments, and issuing grants for the maintenance or restoration of national monuments.

Provincial governments (see textbox 6.3) had an advisory task as to (a) the designation of national monuments and town- and village-scapes; (b) the alteration or demolition of national monuments in the rural areas; and (c) the distribution of grants over ‘small’ municipalities (municipalities with fewer than 100 designated national monuments within their territories). Furthermore, the provinces played an important role in the field of land use planning, both as intermediaries between national and local governments and as autonomous planning authorities. As such, they could employ their authority over provincial and local land use plans and developments in order to protect cultural heritage values against unwanted developments.

With the decentralization of tasks and responsibilities in the late 1980s, local governments (see textbox 6.4) were given a key role in the Dutch monumentenzorg arrangement. Under the 1988 Act, local governments that had established a preservation ordinance and a preservation committee had the authority to (a) advise the RDMZ as to the designation of national monuments; (b) issue permits for the restoration, alteration or demolition of national monuments; and (c) establish a land use plan that regulates the protection of protected town- and village-scapes (De Boer 2000). In addition, several local governments, mostly larger cities, operated autonomous preservation programs, including a local register and a local grant scheme.

Under the Monuments and Historic Building Act of 1988, historic property owners had the right to be heard by the local government in case of a proposed designation of their property as national monument. In addition, they must be given the opportunity to object to the listing of their property in the Register of National Monuments. Furthermore, once their properties were registered as national monuments, they were eligible for maintenance or restoration grants under the BRM and BRM programs.

In the 1990s, numerous NGOs were active at national, regional and local levels. Nearly every municipality had its own historic group or society. Similarly, in all provinces, NGOs were active to protect specific categories of monuments such as churches, windmills, castles or fortifications. At national level, advocacy organizations existed for almost all categories of monuments, as well as NGOs with more general preservation goals (Nelissen 2002b). The most important NGOs in the Dutch monumentenzorg arrangement were the Royal Dutch Antiquarian Society, the Heemschut Alliance, the National Contact Monuments Foundation, the Monument Watch Federation and the National Restoration Fund.

The Royal Dutch Antiquarian Society (KNOB) is the oldest national advocacy organization in the Dutch monumentenzorg arrangement. It was established in 1899 and immediately played an important role in the establishment of a national preservation policy in the Netherlands (Nelissen 2002b). From the very beginning, the KNOB worked not only on the preservation of heritage sites, but also on the improvement of rules and
regulations and the establishment of restoration principles. It considered the enhancement of expertise and awareness as its main task (Koninklijke Nederlandse Oudheidkundige Bond 2004).

The Heemskhut Alliance was founded in 1911 to protect the beauty and characteristics of the built heritage and the historic landscape in the Netherlands. The NGO had separate divisions in every province. It went into action or supported existing initiatives whenever a protected monument or site was threatened by neglect, demolition or dissonant new construction. In addition, the NGO aimed to influence any governmental policy affecting the cultural heritage (Van der Haagen 1991).

The National Contact Monuments Foundation (NCM) was established in 1972 as an umbrella organization and consultative platform for all individuals, groups and organizations working in the cultural heritage sector. The NCM dedicated itself to the improvement and professionalization of cultural heritage preservation in the Netherlands. It acted as an intermediary between its member organizations and the Dutch government (Ministerie van OCW 1998, Stichting Nationaal Contact Monumenten 2004a).

The Monument Watch Federation (Monumentenwacht) was established in 1973 to prevent historic buildings from falling into decay by regularly inspecting them and making small repairs. The Monument Watch started with a small team of part-time inspectors and a workload of about 20 historic buildings. Within a year, the number of historic buildings had grown to more than 150 and the inspectors needed to work full-time (Luijendijk 2000). The Dutch government welcomed the idea and has subsidized the organization ever since (Asselbergs 2000). In the 1990s, there were eleven independent provincial branches of the Monument Watch that inspect historic properties and take preventive measures when necessary (Ministerie van OCW 2003). In total, the Monument Watch annually inspected over 15,000 historic buildings, which was about a quarter of all national monuments in the Netherlands (Asselbergs 2000, Luijendijk 2000).

Finally, the National Restoration Fund (NRF) was a private foundation established in 1985 to encourage the preservation of national monuments by offering financial support for the restoration and maintenance of historic properties and developing financial instruments on behalf of various governmental authorities. With the introduction of the National Restoration Fund, the distribution of all government grants related to cultural heritage preservation was privatized. A significant feature of the NRF was its revolving fund, which was formed from the governmental BRRM budgets. The fund was used for the distribution of low-interest loans called ‘restoration mortgages’ (restitueringshypotheken). As the repayments and interest payments provided the funds for new loans, every euro in the revolving fund could be spent numerous times (Nelissen 2002b).

6.3.2 Division of Power

The Dutch monumentenzorg arrangement of the early 1990s was primarily dominated by state actors at national and local levels, a selection of NGOs, and historic property owners. Under the Monuments and Historic Buildings Act of 1988, the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science (OCW) was primarily responsible for the preservation of the Dutch cultural heritage. This implied that the Minister of OCW (in practice this was the State Secretary of Culture and the Cultural Heritage Department) was in charge of strategic decision making, long-term policymaking, and budgeting in the field of cultural heritage preservation. All other actors in the field depended on the Ministry of OCW for the availability of funds for restorations and maintenance works. The National Department for Conservation (RDMZ), responsible for the actual implementation of the ministerial tasks associated with the 1988 Act, was another powerful actor. The heritage experts of the National Department ultimately controlled the listing of heritage sites in the National Register as well as the allocation of permits for the alteration of registered heritage sites.

In the early 1990s, the provincial governments only had moderate responsibilities in the field of cultural heritage preservation. As I mentioned earlier, they had an advisory task as to the designation of national monuments and protected town- and villagescapes, the alteration or demolition of national monuments that are located in the rural areas, and the distribution of BRRM grants over municipalities with fewer than 100 designated national monuments. Finally, the provinces could use their power over provincial and local land use plans in order to protect cultural heritage values.

With the decentralization of tasks and responsibilities of the 1980s, local governments that met certain conditions were given the authority to: (a) advise the RDMZ as to the designation of national monuments; (b) issue permits for the restoration, alteration or demolition of national monuments; (c) guide owners of designated monuments with the maintenance and restoration of their properties; (d) establish a land use plan to regulate protected town- and villagescapes; and (e) manage their own BRRM budgets. Clearly, the extent to which local governments were involved in cultural heritage preservation depended primarily on the quality and quantity of cultural heritage sites within their territories. In the 1990s, a substantial number of local governments, mostly larger cities, operated autonomous preservation programs, including a local register and a local grant scheme. Finally yet importantly, local governments had powerful resources in the field of land use planning. Under the Spatial Planning Act (Wet op de Ruimtelijke Ordening, WRO), the local zoning plan (bestemmingsplan) was the most powerful land use plan in the Netherlands. It was the only plan that was legally binding for both governments and private property owners. However, there was great diversity in the extent to which local governments used their planning authority to protect cultural heritage values against unwanted developments.

TEXTBOX 6.5 The Dutch Consensus Model

A significant feature of Dutch politics is the multi-party system. Since the introduction of universal suffrage, no political party has ever succeeded in winning a parliamentary majority and it is unlikely that this will ever happen in the future. Consequently, a practice of ‘consensus democracy’ has developed in order to maintain stability in government. (Neo-)corporatism is another important characteristic of Dutch politics, meaning that the relation between governmental actors and interest groups is based on exchange and cooperation rather than competition (Andeweg and Irwin 2002). In this respect, the Dutch political system resembles its Norwegian counterpart, which is also featured by a multi-party system and (neo-)corporatist decision making.
In line with the Dutch consensus model (see textbox 6.3), a few NGOs played an important role in the monumentenzorg arrangement of the early 1990s. Some operated as partners of the Dutch government in developing and implementing cultural heritage policies. For example, the Monument Watch was an important partner of the Dutch monumentenzorg authorities in maintaining national monuments. The National Restoration Fund (NRF) operated all governmental grant programs, including the BRRM and BROM. Together with the NRF, the National Contact Monuments Foundation (NCM) cooperated with the National Department for Conservation in a broad variety of courses for preservation practitioners. Other NGOs, including the KNOB and Heemschut, played a more informal but significant role as watchdogs over the Dutch cultural heritage. They tried to get cultural heritage issues on the public and political agenda and lobbied with public and private actors in order to protect cultural heritage values against unwanted developments. The extent to which they were successful differed from case to case.

Under the Monuments and Historic Building Act, historic property owners had a number of rights, which provided them with an influential position regarding the actual preservation of heritage sites. In case of a proposed designation of a historic property as national monument, the owners (and other interested parties) had the right to be heard by the local government. In addition, they must be given the opportunity to object to the listing of the property in the Register of National Monuments. If the National Department for Conservation decided to designate a property, the owner could lodge an appeal or plead for financial compensation (Elbers 2003). The designation of a historic property did not imply that any measure or alteration was automatically prohibited. If owners wished to demolish or make alterations to a listed building, they must obtain a permit from the local government, which consulted the National Department before deciding. If the application was rejected, the owner could lodge an official complaint and if necessary, go on to lodge appeal proceedings in court (Ministerie van OCW 2003). Finally, the preservation authorities did not have the possibility to force owners to restore or maintain their designated historic properties. They could only encourage them to do so by providing grants and tax benefits as compensation for the costs of restorations and maintenance works. Therefore, in practice, historic property owners played a crucial role when it came to the actual maintenance of national monuments.

6.3.3 Rules of the Game

In the early 1990s, subsidiarity and cooperation between state actors and actors from civil society were the main rules of the game in the monumentenzorg arrangement, in accordance with the Dutch traditions of consensus democracy and neo-corporatism. The rule of subsidiarity implied that formal tasks and responsibilities were divided between state actors at all levels and a substantial number of tasks had been decentralized to local government level. At national level, the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science (OCW) was primarily responsible for the preservation of the Dutch cultural heritage, whereas in practice, the National Department for Conservation (RDMZ) was in charge of the actual implementation of the ministerial tasks associated with the 1988 Act (Nelissen 2002b, Richel-Bottinga 2001). These were: (a) identifying, selecting and designating national monuments, after consultation with the municipalities involved and the Council for Culture (an advisory board to the Dutch government on cultural matters); (b) designating town- and villagescapes in cooperation with the Minister of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment (VROM); (c) advising municipalities on permit applications for the alteration of national monuments; and (d) issuing BRRM and BROM grants for the maintenance or restoration of national monuments. At regional level, provinces had an advisory task as to the designation of national monuments, the alteration or demolition of national monuments that were located in the rural areas, and the designation of protected town- and villagescapes. In addition, the provinces drew up an integral Estimate of Restoration Needs and an Annual Restoration Program (Restaauratiebehoefteraming and Provinciaal Restauratie Uitvoeringsprogramma) for municipalities that had less than 100 designated national monuments, and they advised the RDMZ on the distribution of grants over those municipalities. At local level, municipalities had the authority to (a) advise the RDMZ as to the designation of national monuments; (b) issue permits for the restoration, alteration or demolition of national monuments; (c) guide owners of designated monuments with the maintenance and restoration of their properties; and (d) establish a land use plan to regulate protected town- and villagescapes (De Boer 2000). In order to acquire the powers under the 1988 Act, local governments must meet two conditions. First, they must establish a preservation ordinance (monumentenverordening) that regulated the way cultural heritage was dealt with within the municipality. Second, through this ordinance, a special preservation committee (monumentencommissie) must be set up to advise the local government on all preservation issues (De Boer 2000, Nelissen 2002b). In order to manage their own BRRM budgets, municipalities must have more than 100 national monuments within their territories (Stichting Nationaal Contact Monumenten 2005).

The 1988 Monuments and Historic Buildings Act provided rules regarding the way in which cultural heritage sites should be preserved. Under the 1988 Act, the protected status of a monument in the Register of National Monuments (Monumentenregister) implied the obligation for its owner or user to apply for a permit for any significant alterations. This did not mean that no alterations whatsoever were allowed to listed monuments. In other words, the register did not offer absolute or unlimited protection, although it did imply a limitation of private property rights. For any alteration, a historic property owner was obliged to apply for a permit under article 11 of the 1988 Act. This article stated that it was forbidden (a) to harm or destroy a protected monument; and (b) to demolish, disturb, replace, alter, restore or use it in a way that damaged or jeopardized the monument, without having a permit to do so. Such permits were to be issued by the local government. The Monuments and Historic Buildings Act also determined how policymaking processes in the monumentenzorg arrangement were structured, what parties were involved, and how tasks and responsibilities were allocated. First, the 1988 Act determined the procedure for listing historic properties in the Register of National Monuments. The procedure involved a number of steps, including the possibility (for everyone) to submit an application for a historic property to be designated as national monument, and the possibility for others (owners, users or other interested parties) to object to the proposed designation. When the application was approved by the National Department for Conservation (RDMZ), the object was added to the Register of National Monuments.
Another important rule of the game in the Dutch monumentenzorg arrangement of the early 1990s was cooperation between state actors and actors from civil society. This rule was firmly rooted in the Dutch tradition of consensus democracy (see textbox 6.5). In the monumentenzorg arrangement, the consensus model implied that a selection of NGOs worked as official partners of the Dutch government in developing and implementing cultural heritage policies. The National Restoration Fund (NRF) operated all governmental grant programs, including the BRRM and BROM. Together with the NRF, the National Contact Monuments Foundation (NCM) cooperated with the National Department for Conservation in organizing courses for local preservation practitioners, whereas the Federation Monument Watch was an important partner of the Dutch monumentenzorg authorities in the maintenance of national monuments.

**Table 6.1 Initial characteristics of the Dutch monumentenzorg arrangement**

| Actors and coalitions | • Ministry of Culture  
|                        | • National Department for Conservation  
|                        | • Provincial authorities  
|                        | • Local authorities  
|                        | • NGOs at all levels  
|                        | • Historic property owners  
|                        | • Coalitions varied  
| Division of power      | • National authorities were in charge of listing, permit system and grant programs, in deliberation with (regional and) local authorities  
|                        | • (Provincial and) local authorities were in charge of land use planning and had responsibility in issuing permits and distributing restoration and maintenance grants  
|                        | • Historic property owners and NGOs had access through (formal) participation procedures and (informal) lobbying  
|                        | • Selection of NGOs worked as official partners of the Dutch government in developing and implementing cultural heritage policies  
| Rules of the game      | • Subsidiarity: substantial number of tasks had been decentralized to local government level  
|                        | • Cooperation between state actors and NGOs  
| Dominant policy discourse | • What: nationally significant buildings and town- and villagescapes  
|                        | • Why: intrinsic artistic, aesthetic or historic value  
|                        | • How: protection against unwanted developments through registration, permit system and grant program  

6.3.4 Policy Discourses

The dominant policy discourse of the early 1990s focused on historic buildings and structures and on historic town- and villagescapes. The Monuments and Historic Buildings Act defined national monuments as “all properties created at least fifty years ago that are of public interest because of their beauty, their scientific importance or their cultural-historic value” (Mw 1988 art. 1b). The act defined town- or villagescapes as “groups of immovable properties that are of public interest because of their beauty, their mutual spatial or structural coherence or their scientific or cultural-historic value, and in which one or more monuments are situated” (Mw 1988 art. 1f). In the early 1990s, there were approximately 50,000 listed national monuments and 350 designated town- and villagescapes under the National Monuments and Historic Buildings Act. The majority of national monuments were private houses. Other major categories were farms, churches, windmills, earthworks and public buildings.

In addition, the dominant discourse emphasized the idea that historic properties and sites represent an intrinsic value that cannot be compensated for if they were to be altered, damaged or demolished. Accordingly, valuable heritage sites must be protected against unwelcome developments through registration, a permit system and a grant program. NGOs typically used this argument when protesting against new local land use developments or buildings plans. The Heemschut Alliance, for example, fulfilled a watchdog function from the point of view that cultural heritage values and sites must not be touched. The NGO surveyed developments that posed a threat to cultural heritage sites and took action, or supported existed initiatives, against such developments.

6.4 Recent Developments in the Monumentenzorg Arrangement

This section deals with recent developments in the Dutch monumentenzorg arrangement in terms of actors and coalitions (6.4.1), division of power (6.4.2), rules of the game (6.4.3) and policy discourses (6.4.4). Table 6.2 gives an overview of the dynamics since the early 1990s.

6.4.1 Shifts in Actors and Coalitions

In the period between 1990 and 2005, a few new actors and coalitions entered the Dutch monumentenzorg arrangement. In line with the Belvedere policy that was introduced in 1999 (see sections 6.4.3 and 6.4.4), the ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment (VROM), the ministry of Agriculture, Nature Management and Food Quality (LNV) and the ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management (VenW) accepted a responsibility to incorporate cultural heritage values in land use planning for both urban and rural areas. Under the wings of the Ministry of LNV, which develops policies for the rural areas in the Netherlands, a temporary project bureau has been set up to promote the Belvedere philosophy among provinces, municipalities, property developers and other parties involved.

Second, the umbrella organization of the twelve provincial governments, the Interprovincial Consultative Council (IPO) has become more and more involved in the monumentenzorg arrangement. Through its coordinating and advising role, the Interprovincial Consultative Council has a considerable degree of influence on provincial preservation policies. In addition, the IPO lobbies the national government to emphasize the importance of the provincial governments in the field of cultural heritage preservation (Inter-
provinciaal Overleg 2004b, Nelissen 2002b). Similarly, the Association of Dutch Municipalities (VNG) has increasingly intervened in national preservation policies on behalf of the local governments. Through the support which the VNG provides for local governments, the organization exercises considerable influence on local preservation policies (Nelissen 2002b). Moreover, the VNG speaks on behalf of the Dutch municipalities and puts forward the interests of local governments in order to influence policies of the national government by lobbying the Ministry of OCW. For example, regarding the recentralization of preservation tasks from provincial and local governments to the National Department for Conservation (see 6.4.2), both the IPO and the VNG have intensively lobbied the Ministry of OCW.

A third development involves the establishment of regional support centers. In all provinces, regional support centers have been established to support local governments in their preservation efforts. Following the decentralization of tasks in the late 1980s, it became clear that many small municipalities in the Netherlands lacked personnel and expertise to adequately implement their new tasks in the field of cultural heritage preservation. For that reason, in 1995, the national government introduced the idea of installing regional support centers. The aim of the regional support centers is to support local governments in the implementation of their local preservation tasks and to form a cooperative platform for all parties involved in cultural heritage preservation, including the three levels of government and several non-governmental organizations. Since the late 1990s, regional support centers have been established in all provinces, although there is a great diversity in the way that they are organized and the services they provide (Nelissen 1996, 2000, 2002b).

Furthermore, in 2004, the National Inspection for Heritage Conservation (RIM) was established under the Ministry of OCW. The task of the RIM is to monitor the performance of cultural heritage preservation at the national, provincial, and local government level. The idea behind the establishment of the RIM is to strengthen the position and improve the image of the cultural heritage sector. An official of the Ministry states: “It is a matter of [interconnected] vessels. With the quality control system, the control function of the national government will decrease. The local governments will be considered capable to do more and more by themselves. The provinces and regional support centers play a role, of course, in assisting the local governments.”

Finally, more and more market actors such as property developers, builders, and tourism businesses have become actively involved in preservation projects, either independently or in partnership with governmental actors. Influenced by the Belvedere policy that was introduced by the national government in 1999, state authorities and NGOs increasingly recognize market actors as potential partners, especially in large-scale and costly redevelopment projects. At the same time, a growing number of property developers consider the redevelopment of monuments to be an attractive market. For example, a representative of the developer AM Wonen, the second largest producer of houses in the Netherlands, stated at a national preservation conference (Den Haag, October 2003): “Monuments can only be preserved if they have a current function. Our aim is to preserve monuments while adding current functions that will both respect and strengthen their value. (...) The essence is to find good users who respect the ‘original story’ of the monument.” Another property developer that invests in cultural heritage redevelopment projects is Bouwfonds. Being one of the largest property developers in the Netherlands, Bouwfonds presents itself as the guardian of the built heritage in the Netherlands (Bouwfonds 2004a, 2004b).

6.4.2 Shifts in the Division of Power

Regarding the division of power in the Dutch monumentenzorg arrangement, a remarkable shift has emerged since the early 1990s. It is the result of the introduction of the new BRIM grant scheme, which replaces the BRRM and BROM grant programs as of 2006.

In the course of the 1990s, the BRRM grant program could not prevent a major backlog building up in the restoration of national monuments owing to decreasing budgetary resources for cultural heritage preservation since the early 1980s. In 1995, the Dutch government halted this downward spiral by providing an additional one-off sum of €125 million for the restoration of national monuments. In addition, a renewed BRRM decree came into force in 1997 with the intention to eliminate the restoration backlog within a period of 15 years. With the BRRM-1997, the national government intended to establish a more effective funding system, based on long-term estimates of restoration needs and annual local or provincial restoration programs (Gemeentelijk Restauratie UitvoeringsProgramma of Provinciaal Restauratie Uitvoeringsprogramma). In this way, the available restoration funds would be spent where they were most needed (Ministerie van OCW 2003, Nelissen 2002b).

In 2004, the Dutch government announced another revision of its grant schemes for the preservation of national monuments. The BRRM and BROM grant schemes had led to a disproportionate focus on restoration, whereas in the opinion of the Ministry of OCW, systematic maintenance is crucial for the sustainable preservation of national monuments. Moreover, the BRRM was believed to have caused a lot of red tape as it engaged all three tiers of government. Notwithstanding the fact that there is no extra budget available to eliminate the continuing restoration backlog, the State Secretary presented to the parliamentary committee of culture a new, integral grant scheme for the preservation of national monuments (June 2004). “It is very simple. I have no financial resources. I cannot resolve the restoration backlog. And I could decide to do absolutely nothing, to wait until we have dissolved the restoration backlog in the years to come and only then, initiate the new preservation policy. Or I could get rid of the red tape” (statement by the State Secretary of Culture).

As of 2006, the Government Grant Schemes for the Preservation of Monuments (Besluit Rijkssubsidiering Instandhouding Monumenten, BRIM) replaced the BRRM and BROM grant programs. With the BRIM grant scheme, provinces and municipalities no longer have a role in the planning and issuing of restoration grants, nor in the guidance of restoration projects. These tasks are re-centralized to the National Department for Conservation (RDMZ). The new BRIM grant scheme is grounded on the following principles: (a) simple rules and fast procedures; (b) integration of maintenance and restoration; and (c) stimulation of structural and systematic maintenance. The National Department for Conservation emphasizes that the new BRIM grant scheme will provide a qualitative impulse for cultural heritage preservation. “For the National Department, this implies a lot less administrative rigmarole. (...) We can concentrate on our main task: the preservation of monuments in its widest sense” (Nationaal Restauratiefonds 2002: 6). However, there has
been a lot of debate about the new BRIM grant scheme. The Interprovincial Consultative Council (IPO), which emphasizes the important role of the provinces in cultural heritage preservation, has argued that the current distribution of tasks and responsibilities in the field of monumentenzorg does not do justice to the area-oriented director’s role of the provinces in the Netherlands: “We conclude that the BRIM scheme is centralistic in nature. We feel that with this approach, the valuable administrative involvement and expertise of the provinces regarding national monuments will be lost. Especially with the current financial shortage, cooperation and coordination between governments is very important in the field of monumentenzorg” (Interprovinciaal Overleg 2004c: 2). The National Contact Monuments Foundation (NCM) perceives a problem in the fact that with the new BRIM grant scheme, the conditions that will be set by the National Department for Conservation for historic property owners to receive a restoration grant could conflict with the conditions that are set by the local governments for those owners to get a restoration permit (Stichting Nationaal Contact Monumenten 2004b). For that reason, the NCM emphasizes that cultural heritage preservation should remain a shared responsibility of the different tiers of government, according to the rule of subsidiarity.

Despite their modest budgetary responsibilities under the Monuments and Historic Buildings Act and the new BRIM grant scheme, all twelve provinces in the Netherlands have increasingly considered cultural heritage preservation as being part of their core business. The increased interest of the provincial governments in cultural heritage preservation dates back to the early 1990s, when the provinces were closely involved in the realization of the Historic Buildings Survey Project (MIP, see 6.4.4). Furthermore, the formation of the regional support centers has been an important impulse for provincial governments to invest in preservation policy. Today, all provinces have developed their own cultural heritage preservation program, although there are substantial differences with regard to content and available budget (Nelissen 2002b, Stichting Nationaal Contact Monumenten 2005). Also local governments still have an important role in monumentenzorg. A majority of them, especially the larger cities, have established their own preservation programs.

6.4.3 Shifts in the Rules of the Game

In the Dutch monumentenzorg arrangement, state authorities and NGOs have a long tradition of deliberation and cooperation. Since the early 1990s, public-private cooperation has become even more important as rule of the game. New examples of public-private partnerships in the monumentenzorg arrangement are the regional support centers in which both governmental authorities and NGOs cooperate to support local governments in the implementation of their preservation tasks and responsibilities. The Ministry of OCW stresses the importance of the regional support centers to assist local governments that lack the budget, staff and expertise to perform their preservation tasks. Also in the view of the National Department for Conservation (RDMZ), the network of regional support centers plays a crucial role in assisting local governments in their preservation efforts. The then head of the RDMZ stated at a national preservation conference (Den Haag, October 2003): “I consider the network of support centers indispensable for a well functioning monumentenzorg and thus, it should be further developed.”

The Association of Dutch Municipalities (VNG) promotes increased cooperation between governmental authorities and private owners of historic properties. The VNG emphasizes that private property owners play a crucial role in the preservation of cultural heritage: “Owners (or users) are most directly involved in monuments. They live in them and they know them inside and outside. They are the ones who have the strongest influence on the vicissitudes of monuments. Therefore, owners must receive good support in and information on the preservation of their monuments” (Karstens and Snellen 2001: 5). Not surprisingly, the VNG considers local governments to be the most appropriate authority to provide private property owners with the necessary support and information regarding monuments: “(…) There should be one office where owners can go for all information and expertise regarding monuments. This office should be situated as near as possible to the owner, which is, logically speaking, with the local government” (Karstens and Snellen 2001: 5).

As regards public-private partnerships between governmental authorities, NGOs and property developers, a representative of the developer AM Wonen argues at a national preservation conference (Den Haag, October 2003) that there is still a lot of distrust among governments and NGOs towards private property developers. Nevertheless, AM Wonen promotes increased public-private cooperation in order to establish an integral, area-oriented approach and to create win-win situations. The property developer considers it to be a great challenge for the future to cooperate with a broad variety of partners and to realize multiple goals, including the preservation of cultural heritage.

A second shift in the prevailing rules of the game since the early 1990s is related to the introduction of the Belvedere policy. In the policy document ‘Belvedere’ of 1999, the Dutch government emphasizes that cultural heritage should be an increasingly important factor in land use planning. The aim of Belvedere is to use cultural heritage more effectively and deliberately as a factor that determines the quality of the living environment and to deal with cultural heritage in a development- and design-oriented manner. As a result of this policy, a new rule in the Dutch monumentenzorg arrangement is that cultural heritage values must be taken into account in land use plans and developments at all levels, in both urban and rural areas. The Ministry of OCW promotes the development of an integral spatial quality management that focuses on the fine tuning between ‘old’ and ‘new’ in the built environment. In a joint publication with the Ministry of VROM, OCW emphasizes the importance of an integral approach of cultural heritage and new developments: “The unity and the identity of cities benefit from new impulses of architecture and urban development that are connected with the features and qualities of existing structures and buildings. This means (…) that in the policy for built heritage, preservation through development has become the main task” (Ministerie van OCW and Ministerie van VROM 2004: 7).

In line with the ‘Belvedere’ policy of the national government, all provincial governments have drawn Cultural-Historical Value Maps (Cultuurhistorische Waardenkaart, CHW). These are inventories of all significant cultural heritage values within their territories, which they use as a starting point for new land use plans and future developments. Similarly, a growing number of Dutch municipalities have incorporated the cultural heritage factor into their local zoning plans.

Moreover, cultural heritage has also become a factor in the Dutch policy regarding rural areas, for which the Ministry of LNV is primarily responsible. Currently, the
Ministry of LNV administers a number of grant schemes that support the preservation of historical elements in the Dutch landscape, among which are the Grant Scheme for the Restoration of Historic Country Estates (Regeling Herstel Historische Buitenplaatsen, HHB) and the Grant Scheme for Area Oriented Policy (Subsidieregeling Gebiedsgericht Beleid, SGB). As of 2007, the Investment Budget for the Rural Area (Investeringsbudget Landelijk Gebied, ILG) will integrate all existing grant schemes for the rural area in the Netherlands. Under this new scheme, the preservation of historic elements in the Dutch landscape will be one of the criteria for the allocation of grants (Ministerie van VROM 2005).

Nevertheless, the Ministry of OCW recognizes that the Belvedere philosophy has not yet been fully adopted and implemented by practitioners at local level. In an attempt to stimulate the connection between cultural heritage preservation and land use planning, OCW and VROM have included a ‘cultural impulse’ in the second Investment Budget Urban Renewal (ISV II). “We wish to realize an improvement of the living environment by both utilizing and safeguarding cultural qualities within the practice of urban renewal” (Ministerie van OCW and Ministerie van VROM 2004: 7).

6.4.4 Shifts in Policy Discourses

From the early 1990s onwards, four discursive shifts have emerged in the Dutch monumentenzorg arrangement. First, a discursive shift has taken place from individual buildings and sites towards more comprehensive areas and landscapes that provide a sense of identity and spatial quality. In the view of the National Department for Conservation, for example, cultural heritage values should not be interpreted in relation to individual objects, but as qualities of the Dutch cultural landscape as a whole, comprising elements of archeology, historical geography and built culture. According to the National Department, surrounding areas provide the context for individual objects and, therefore, the focus should be on entire areas instead of individual objects. In a lecture on future monumentenzorg at a national preservation conference (Den Haag, October 2003), the former head of the RDMZ even proposed that the legal protection of larger areas, other than historic town- and villagescapes, should be added to the Historic Buildings and Monuments Act.

Similarly, in the vision of the National Restoration Fund (NRF), the Dutch cultural heritage goes beyond national monuments and protected town- and villagescapes as cultural-historical values are also present in the rural areas. To protect these values against the growing development pressure in the Netherlands (see textbox 6.6), the NRF argues that the national government should establish a national register for ‘landscape views’ (Noordhollands Dagblad 2004). Also in the perspective of the National Contact Monuments Foundation (NCM), cultural heritage covers more than individual monuments alone. It is important because it contributes to the identity and spatial quality of areas: “Besides the preservation of monuments, the NCM increasingly focuses on the preservation of cultural-historical values in a much broader sense. [...] For these elements make a substantial contribution to the identity and spatial quality of neighborhoods, villages and regions” (Stichting Nationaal Contact Monumenten 2004a: 10). Also in the view of the Association of Dutch Municipalities (VNG), cultural heritage plays a very important role in municipalities as a source of identity and by providing possibilities for economic development: “The built and archeological monuments and the historic landscapes are the backbone of a municipality.

A second discursive development involves a shift in focus towards more recent heritage, among which are numerous properties from the post-war reconstruction period. The awareness has grown that also more recent architecture, urban and rural developments may be worthy of conservation (Nelissen 1993, 1996). Because the Register of National Monuments had always had the year 1850 as end (see section 6.2), properties and sites from later periods were poorly represented. Moreover, the knowledge of later periods in architecture, urban and rural design was not as good as that of the pre-1850 period. To overcome this problem, a survey of historic buildings and structures from the 1850-1940 period was carried out (Monumenten Inventarisatie Project, MIP), which was completed in 1992. The most valuable buildings, townscapes and villagescapes were then selected for listing in the Register of National Monuments (Monumenten Selectie Project, MSP), a project that was completed in 2001 (Ministerie van OCW 2003). Of the approximately 175,000 that were surveyed, about 12,000 buildings and sites were added to the Register of National Monuments.

In 2004, the national government announced a comprehensive re-valuation and re-selection of the currently listed national monuments in order to achieve a more representative and better manageable selection of monuments in the Netherlands (Ministerie van OCW 2004a). In the view of the Ministry of OCW, a major problem is that the Register...
of National Monuments has become out of balance and outdated. As the existing restoration backlog shows, the preservation of all listed national monuments is no longer manageable. In addition, the Ministry of OCW foresees that several new categories will become eligible for designation in the near future, among which an enormous number of sites from the post-war reconstruction period. While stressing the importance of anticipating these new developments, the Ministry states that not all historic structures can be protected. Accordingly, OCW stresses that the current selection of cultural heritage as reflected in the Register of National Monuments needs to be revised. The ultimate aim is to establish a manageable volume of cultural heritage, based on newly developed selection criteria, which will be developed in close cooperation with the National Department for Conservation (Ministerie van OCW 2004b). Likewise, in the opinion of the Monument Watch Federation, the criteria for the selection of monuments should accommodate to changing insights. The federation argues that the current framework for selecting monuments is too rigid. It should be possible to de-list monuments when according to modern standards they are no longer considered to be valuable. A representative says: “However, the entire discussion about de-listing has been anxiously avoided so far. […] Of course, they [governmental actors] fear that every procedure for de-listing will result in a full appeals procedure.”

Third, we have seen a shift in emphasis from restoration to planned maintenance. This has even led to a revised government grant scheme for the preservation of national monuments (BRIM), which replaces the BRRM and BROM grant schemes as of 2006 (see section 6.4.2). According to the National Department for Conservation (RDMZ), the emphasis in monumentenzorg should be on preventive maintenance instead of curative restorations. “What we need is a policy based on regular routine-maintenance, to prevent unnecessary decay. […] Without regular maintenance, you run the risk of needing a restoration again in ten years’ time” (Asselbergs 2000: 55). Similarly, in the view of the Monument Watch Federation, regular, preventative maintenance by qualified craftsmen is a necessary precondition for the preservation of monuments (Luijendijk 2000).

A fourth discursive development since the early 1990s is related to the introduction of the Belvedere policy in 1999 (see section 6.4.3). Besides the integration of cultural heritage values in land use planning, the Belvedere philosophy emphasizes re(use) and (re)development instead of strict conservation of heritage values. The Dutch government promotes the development of an integral spatial quality management that focuses on the fine tuning between ‘old’ and ‘new’ in the built environment (Nelissen 1993, 1996). In a joint publication with the Ministry of VROM, OCW emphasizes the importance of an integral approach in accordance with the Belvedere philosophy ‘preservation through development’. “The unity and the identity of cities benefit from new impulses of architecture and urban development that are connected with the features and qualities of existing structures and buildings. This means […] that in the policy for built heritage, preservation through development has become the main task” (Ministerie van OCW and Ministerie van VROM 2004: 7).

In accordance with the Belvedere philosophy, the National Department for Conservation emphasizes that cultural heritage preservation will be more and more about (re)uses instead of restorations. In order to keep monuments vital amid other real estate, a development-based approach is needed, in which monuments are provided with present-day functions. Also according to the Interprovincial Consultative Council (IPO), cultural heritage values should be incorporated in new land use developments and the policy field of cultural heritage preservation should be closely connected with that of land use planning (Interprovinciaal Overleg 2003, 2004a). Furthermore, in the view of the IPO, cultural heritage preservation should be placed in a broader societal perspective. “It is not only about an effective management of monuments by financially well-facilitated owners but also about function, context and teamwork with other managers and investors. This broad perspective is an important precondition for effective preservation” (Interprovinciaal Overleg 2004c: 1).

In order to strengthen the position of cultural heritage in society and to provide a source of income for preservation efforts, the NCM promotes cultural heritage tourism. “Cultural tourism offers many advantages for cultural heritage in the sense that it contributes to the social position and it offers a source of income. Furthermore, cultural heritage offers opportunities for the tourist sector as it attracts visitors” (Stichting Nationaal Contact Monumenten 2004a: 10). Likewise, in the view of the RDMZ, the Dutch cultural landscape should be promoted as an attractive and accessible destination for tourism and recreation in order to raise the public awareness of and interest in the cultural heritage
Like in Norway and in Arizona, the biggest changes have emerged in the content of the monumentenzorg arrangement. The dominant policy discourse has broadened in no less than four ways since the early 1990s. First, a discursive shift has taken place from individual buildings and sites towards larger (urban and rural) areas and comprehensive landscape structures. Second, the focus has shifted from sites dating back to 1850 and earlier towards more recent heritage, among which numerous sites from the post-war reconstruction period. In addition, we have seen shifts in emphasis from restoration to planned maintenance, and from strict conservation to the (re)use and (re)development of cultural heritage sites.

The broadening content of monumentenzorg is closely connected to the organizational shifts that have emerged since the early 1990s, which involve the arrival of new actors and the introduction of new rules of the game. First, the shifting focus from strict conservation towards (re)use and (re)development of heritage sites is intrinsically related to the fact that more and more market actors such as builders, property developers and recreation and tourism businesses have become actively involved in restoration and redevelopment projects, either independently or in partnership with governmental actors. Both state actors and NGOs increasingly recognize market actors as suitable partners, especially in large-scale and costly redevelopment projects. Whereas state actors and NGOs have a long tradition of cooperation, in recent years, public-private cooperation has become even more important as a rule of the game. Second, the discursive shift from individual buildings and sites towards larger (urban and rural) areas and comprehensive landscape structures is strongly interrelated with the arrival of actors from other policy sectors (the ministries of VROM, LNV and VenW). In addition, it is connected with the introduction of a new rule of the game: cultural heritage values must be taken into account in land use plans at all levels.

Another organizational shift has occurred apparently in relative isolation from the other developments. With the introduction of the new BRIM grant scheme, a shift in the division of power has occurred: regional and local authorities lost their say over the distribution of grants as of 2006. By (re)centralizing the distribution of grants to the National Department for Conservation, the latter became even more influential than it already was in the early 1990s. Nevertheless, all twelve provinces in the Netherlands have increasingly considered cultural heritage preservation as being part of their core business. The formation of the regional support centers has been an important impulse for provincial governments to invest in preservation policy. Today, all provinces have developed their own cultural heritage preservation program, although there are substantial differences with regard to content and available budget. Similarly, local governments have kept a key role in monumentenzorg and a majority of them, especially the larger cities, have established their own preservation programs.

In spite of the various discursive and organizational dynamics that have emerged, we have seen that certain features of the Dutch monumentenzorg arrangement have not changed since the early 1990s (see figure 6.2). First, the actors that were involved in the early 1990s are still active in the field today. Furthermore, the rules of subsidiarity and cooperation between state actors and non-governmental organizations have remained important. They are firmly rooted in the Dutch traditions of consensus democracy and neo-corporatism. Third, the division of power has remained relatively stable since the
early 1990s. Although the distribution of grants has been recentralized from regional and local level to the National Department for Conservation, regional and local authorities have increasingly developed their own preservation programs. Overall, the balance of power has stayed the same.

2. Division of power:
   - National authorities are in control of listing, permit system and grant programs
   - (Provincial and) local authorities are in charge of land use planning and have responsibility in issuing permits and distributing grants
   - Historic property owners and NGOs have access through participation and lobbying
   - Selection of NGOs work as official partners of Dutch government in developing and implementing cultural heritage policies

1. Actors and coalitions:
   - Ministry of Culture
   - National Department for Conservation
   - Provincial authorities
   - Local authorities
   - NGOs at all levels
   - Historic property owners
   - Coalitions vary

3. Rules of the game:
   - Subsidiarity: substantial number of tasks decentralized to local government level
   - Cooperation between state actors and NGOs

Figure 6.2 Stability in the Dutch monumentenzorg arrangement
7.1 Introduction
In the case study chapters 4, 5 and 6, I analyzed the developments that have occurred in the preservation arrangements in Norway, Arizona and the Netherlands since the early 1990s. This chapter compares the dynamics in the three cases and addresses the emergence of political modernization. The aim is to answer the second and third research questions of this study, which are:
1. What are the main similarities and differences between the organizational and discursive dynamics in the three preservation arrangements?
2. What are the main similarities and differences between the organizational and discursive dynamics in the three preservation arrangements be understood in relation to the political modernization process in Western society?

In order to be able to answer research question 1, I first discuss the similarities and differences between the initial characteristics of the three preservation arrangements in the early 1990s in the next section. Given the initial situation in the three cases, section 7.3 compares the developments that have emerged in the three preservation arrangements from the early 1990s onwards. Section 7.4 deals with research question 2 by placing the dynamics in the three cases against the background of the political modernization process. It addresses the main hypothesis of this study, which is: the process of political modernization in Western society is related to a growing internal diversity in current preservation arrangements. In doing so, it aims to understand change and stability in the three cases.

7.2 Initial Characteristics Compared
This section compares the initial characteristics of the three cases in the early 1990s in terms of actors and coalitions, division of power, rules of the game and policy discourses. Table 7.1 provides an overview of the comparison.

With regard to the actors and coalitions that were involved in the early 1990s, the three preservation arrangements essentially showed a similar picture. The actors involved in all three cases were state authorities at different levels, NGOs and historic property owners, whereas coalitions between these actors varied from case to case. An important dissimilarity between the three cases, however, lay in the number of and the variety in the NGOs that were involved. Both in the Norwegian kulturminneforvaltning arrangement and in the Dutch monumentenzorg arrangement, cultural heritage preservation developed from private initiatives in the nineteenth century and in the early 1990s, numerous NGOs were active at national, regional and local levels. They acted as watchdogs over heritage sites and/or as lobbyists to governmental authorities. In contrast, Arizona’s historic preservation arrangement, only one NGO was active (Arizona Preservation Foundation). As Arizona is a relatively young state, a majority of the people were not aware of the state’s cultural heritage and accordingly, there was no broad support or civil society movement for historic preservation. Unlike the nineteenth century’s grassroots development of cultural heritage preservation in both Norway and the Netherlands, Arizona’s historic preservation laws and policies were basically established pursuant to the federal requirements of the National Historic Preservation Act in the second half of the twentieth century.

What do we find when comparing the division of power in the three cases? The Norwegian kulturminneforvaltning arrangement of the early 1990s was dominated by state actors at national level. The Ministry for the Environment and (in practice) the Directorate for Cultural Heritage (Riksantikvaren) had the main responsibility to select and preserve Norway’s heritage through a system of protection orders and permits. Regional authorities (fylkeskommuner) were responsible for the actual maintenance of heritage sites but merely played an advisory role in the selection of heritage sites, whereas most local authorities (kommuner) lacked necessary resources and know-how to develop autonomous preservation policies and/or to apply the possibility under the Planning and Building Act to protect historic sites through the establishment of local land use plans. Moreover, only one NGO (Fortidsminneforeningen) had actual access to decision-making processes regarding the selection and preservation of Norway’s heritage, as it had close ties with the Directorate for Cultural Heritage. Other NGOs and property owners mainly had access through formal participation procedures and the informal lobby circuit. In Arizona’s historic preservation arrangement, the division of power between actors revealed a different picture. Here, crucial power resources were spread over governmental actors at federal, state and local level and private property owners. Especially private property owners had a powerful position in decision-making processes regarding the selection and preservation of heritage sites, as the protection of their private property rights was the main rule of the game in Arizona (see next paragraph). Therefore, both the federal government (NPS) and the Arizona state government (SHPO) basically relied on grant programs and tax incentives, whereas local governments typically applied zoning instruments to preserve significant heritage sites. The NGO that was active in the field of historic preservation was relatively young (established in 1979) and played no important role. It merely had access to decision-making processes by lobbying the state government. Finally, in the Dutch monumentenzorg arrangement, power was shared between state actors at national, regional and local levels and a selection of NGOs. The national government experts of the National Department of Conservation (RDMZ) played a key role as they controlled the listing of heritage sites in the National Register and the allocation of permits for the alteration of registered heritage sites. However, the responsibility for the distribution of restoration and maintenance subsidies had been decentralized to (regional and) local authorities in the late 1980s. Moreover, a number of NGOs were closely involved in policymaking, a few of which had official tasks such as the administration of state subsidies (Nationaal Restauratiefonds) and the education of local preservation officials (Nationaal Restauratiefonds and Nationaal Contact Monumenten). Like in the Norwegian kulturminneforvaltning arrangement, other NGOs and property owners mainly had access to policymaking through formal participation procedures and the informal lobby circuit. In sum, the division of power between the actors involved in the three preservation arrangements was rather dissimilar in the early 1990s.

Also regarding the prevailing rules of the game in the early 1990s, the three preservation arrangements differed greatly. In the Norwegian kulturminneforvaltning arrangement, hierarchical steering and central coordination by the national experts of the Ministry for the Environment and the Directorate for Cultural Heritage and integration of cultural heritage values in national, regional and local land use planning processes were the prevailing rules of the game. Cultural heritage preservation had always been considered to be primarily a matter for the political and cultural elite in Oslo. In contrast, the State of Arizona was characterized by a predominant individualist mentality and a widespread
The dominant policy discourse emphasized the preservation of heritage arrangements of the early 1990s, arguing that protection against unwanted developments was crucial. For that reason, they must be protected against such unwell developments through registration, a permit system and a grant program. As to the organizational and discursive dynamics compared, the initial characteristics of the three preservation arrangements in the early 1990s primarily showed organizational diversity and discursive uniformity. Although the division of power and the prevailing rules of the game demonstrated significant differences between the three cases, I have found a remarkable similarity in the dominant policy discourses (see Table 7.1).

### Table 7.1 Initial characteristics compared

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Norwegian kulturminneforvaltning arrangement</th>
<th>Arizona’s historic preservation arrangement</th>
<th>Dutch monumentenzorg arrangement</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Actors and coalitions</strong></td>
<td><strong>Actors and coalitions</strong></td>
<td><strong>Actors and coalitions</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ministry of the Environment</td>
<td>National Park Service</td>
<td>Ministry of Culture</td>
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<td>Directorate for Cultural Heritage</td>
<td>State Historic Preservation Office</td>
<td>National Department for Conservation</td>
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<td>County authorities</td>
<td>Local historic preservation offices</td>
<td>Provincial authorities</td>
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<td>Local authorities</td>
<td>Local historic preservation commissions</td>
<td>Local authorities</td>
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<td>Historic property owners</td>
<td>Arizona Preservation Foundation</td>
<td>NGOs at all levels</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fortidsminneforeningen, Coastal Association, Norwegian Association for Historic Vessels, local historic groups (NGOs)</td>
<td>Local preservation groups</td>
<td>Historic property owners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No fixed coalitions</td>
<td>Historic property owners</td>
<td>Coalitions varied</td>
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<td><strong>Division of power</strong></td>
<td><strong>Division of power</strong></td>
<td><strong>Division of power</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>National government controlled selection and protection of heritage sites</td>
<td>Federal and state authorities controlled National and Arizona Register and economic incentives</td>
<td>National authorities were in control of listing, permit system and grant programs</td>
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<td>County authorities were responsible for distribution of grants and monitoring local land use planning</td>
<td>Local authorities were in charge of historic preservation overlay zoning</td>
<td>(Provincial and) local authorities were in charge of land use planning and had responsibility in issuing permits and distributing grants</td>
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<td>Local authorities had authority to designate protected areas in binding land use plans</td>
<td>NGO and local preservation groups played no important role</td>
<td>Property owners and NGOs had access through participation procedures and lobbying</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fortidsminneforeningen was relatively influential</td>
<td>Historic property owners had powerful position through protected private property rights</td>
<td>Selection of NGOs worked as official partners of Dutch government in policy making</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other NGOs and historic property owners had access through participation procedures and lobbying</td>
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<td><strong>Rules of the game</strong></td>
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<td>Hierarchical steering and central coordination</td>
<td>Protection of private property rights</td>
<td>Subsidiarity</td>
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<td>Integration of heritage values in land use planning</td>
<td>Minimum state intervention</td>
<td>Cooperation between state actors and NGOs</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Dominant policy discourse</strong></td>
<td><strong>Dominant policy discourse</strong></td>
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<td>What: nationally significant sites representing inland peasant culture</td>
<td>What: significant buildings and districts that were at least 50 years old</td>
<td>What: nationally significant buildings and town- and villagescapes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Why: national identity, association with historical events, beliefs and traditions</td>
<td>Why: historic, artistic or scientific value, economic benefits</td>
<td>Why: intrinsic artistic, aesthetic or historic value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How: protection against unwanted developments through protection orders</td>
<td>How: protection against unwanted developments through historic designation, overlay zoning and incentives</td>
<td>How: protection against unwanted developments through registration, permit system and grant program</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Dutch citizens were distrustful of governmental authorities. Accordingly, minimum state intervention and the protection of private property rights were crucial rules of the game in the historic preservation arrangement. Still, other rules dominated the Dutch monumentenzorg arrangement. Here, subsidiarity and cooperation between state actors and actors from civil society were the main rules of the game, in accordance with the Dutch traditions of consensus democracy and neo-corporatism.

Contrary to the division of power and the rules of the game, the dominant policy discourses in the three preservation arrangements of the early 1990s were similar. They had a similar focus on the protection against unwanted developments (how) of individual buildings and sites (what) that had national significance because of the intrinsic artistic, aesthetic and/or historic values they represented (why). To be more specific, in Norwegian kulturminneforvaltning, the dominant policy discourse emphasized the preservation of historic buildings and sites that represented ‘real Norwegian’ culture (for example, stave churches, Viking ships and farmhouses). Modern developments such as urbanization, changing farming practices and the mass departure from Norway’s rural areas were considered to be major threats against which Norway’s national heritage must be protected through protection orders and a permit system. In Arizona’s historic preservation arrangement, the dominant policy discourse perceived the strong belief in private property rights and the relatively young history of the State of Arizona as the main problem for historic preservation. In order to create more public support for historic preservation and to protect significant historic buildings and districts (i.e. Arizona’s earliest houses, public buildings and neighborhoods) against alteration or demolition, the emphasis lied on an array of economic incentives and on the voluntary character of historic preservation. Finally, in the Dutch monumentenzorg arrangement of the early 1990s, the dominant preservation discourse emphasized the idea that historic buildings (city gates, castles, churches, farms, windmills and private houses) and historic town- and villagescapes (such as Amsterdam’s inner city with its canals, canal houses and bridges) represented an intrinsic value that could not be compensated for in any way when altered, damaged or demolished. For that reason, they must be protected against such unwell developments through registration, a permit system and a grant program.

All things considered, I draw the conclusion that the initial characteristics of the three preservation arrangements in the early 1990s primarily showed organizational diversity and discursive uniformity. Although the division of power and the prevailing rules of the game demonstrated significant differences between the three cases, I have found a remarkable similarity in the dominant policy discourses (see Table 7.1).

### 7.3 Organizational and Discursive Dynamics Compared

This section provides a comparison of the developments that have emerged in the three preservation arrangements between 1990 and 2005. Table 7.2 provides an overview of the dynamics in the three cases.

As to the actors and coalitions that participate, in the Norwegian kulturminneforvaltning arrangement, state actors at national, regional and local levels have more often and more intensively cooperated with NGOs (for example Kysten Forbundet, Fortidsminneforeningen) in joint preservation and redevelopment projects. However, market actors such as builders, property developers or recreation and tourism businesses have not been
very active so far. Preservation and redevelopment projects have not represented an attractive enough market for these actors. In Arizona’s historic preservation arrangement, first private property owners have increasingly invested in the preservation of Arizona’s built heritage as more and more of them aim for the designation of their properties as historic buildings in the National Register, mainly because of the economic benefits it brings about (grants, tax benefits, rising property values). Second, a growing number of builders and property developers in Arizona have discovered the benefits of redeveloping historic structures (grants, tax benefits, good public image). Also in the Dutch monumentenzorg arrangement, more and more market actors such as property developers, builders, and recreation and tourism businesses have become actively involved in preservation projects, either independently or in partnership with governmental actors. In line with the Belvedere policy that was introduced by the national government in 1999, state authorities and NGOs increasingly recognize market actors as suitable partners, especially in large-scale and costly redevelopment projects. In sum, it can be concluded that in all three preservation arrangements, more non-state actors have become actively involved since the early 1990s.

Despite the shifts that have emerged in the actors and coalitions involved in cultural heritage preservation, the division of power has been comparatively stable in the three cases since the early 1990s. Moreover, the few shifts in power that have occurred are relatively small. In the Norwegian kulturminneforvaltning arrangement, a number of NGOs have claimed a more prominent role, especially at regional and local levels, by independently implementing preservation projects or by cooperating with public authorities in joint restoration and redevelopment projects. Although there has been an ongoing debate during the past decades about the decentralization of cultural heritage preservation responsibilities to local governments, this has not led to an actual change in the division of tasks and responsibilities. Nevertheless, the traditionally hegemonial position of the Directorate for Cultural Heritage has started to decline, since the Directorate increasingly depends on regional and local actors, both public and private, for the availability of up-to-date information on heritage sites. In Arizona’s historic preservation arrangement, we see a similar picture. Changes have emerged in the division of roles between actors but we have seen no real shifts in the division of power. Since the early 1990s, local governments have become more proactive in the field of historic preservation as they have increasingly applied their zoning powers to designate historic districts and protect them against unwanted developments. In addition, more and more local governments have proactively consulted with private owners about the designation and preservation of their historic properties. The public and political support for historic preservation has grown. However, this has not changed the fact that private property owners still control a crucial power resource: their protected private property rights. The most significant shifts have occurred in the Dutch monumentenzorg arrangement. With the new BRIM grant scheme, regional and local authorities lose their say over the distribution of grants as of 2006. By (re)centralizing the distribution of grants to the National Department for Conservation, the latter (re)gains control over the actual preservation (restoration and maintenance) of heritage sites and becomes even more influential than it already was in the early 1990s. Nevertheless, local governments have kept a key role in Dutch monumentenzorg and what’s more, all twelve provinces have developed autonomous cultural heritage policies. Overall, the balance of power has hardly changed in the three preservation arrangements.

The prevailing rules of the game in the three preservation arrangements have shown stability as well, although in all three cases the rule of public-private cooperation has gained importance since the early 1990s. In Norwegian kulturminneforvaltning, the rules of central steering and integration of heritage values in land use planning have remained dominant, but have been complemented by a focus on public–public and public–private cooperation. Preservation officials have become more aware of the importance of NGOs in the actual maintenance of heritage sites. This has led to a growing amount of public–private initiatives at regional and local levels. In Arizona’s historic preservation arrangement, the most important rules of the game have always been minimum state intervention and the protection of private property rights. Nevertheless, state and local preservation officials increasingly acknowledge the importance of proactively involving private property owners and other interested parties from civil society and the market sector in the selection, designation and maintenance of historic buildings, especially when it comes to the large number of post-war properties in Arizona. Accordingly, the rule of public-private cooperation has gained importance here as well. In Dutch monumentenzorg, state authorities and NGOs have always had a tradition of cooperation on the selection, designation and preservation of heritage sites. In recent years, public-private cooperation has become even more important as a rule of the game. New examples of public-private partnerships in the field of monumentenzorg are the regional support centers in which public and private organizations cooperate to support local governments in the implementation of their preservation tasks and responsibilities. Another new rule, related to the introduction of the Belvedere policy in 1999, is that cultural heritage values must be taken into account in land use plans and developments at all levels.

What do we find when we compare the dynamics in the dominant policy discourses in the three cases? In Norwegian kulturminneforvaltning, first, a shift in focus has taken place from heritage sites that represent Norway’s inland, peasant culture (farm houses and stave churches) to sites representing every-day life in Norway, in particular the coastal culture (harbors, shipyards and lighthouses). Second, the emphasis has moved from individual buildings to sites placed within their surroundings and large-scale cultural environments. Third, we have seen a shift towards approaches that combine more protection with (re)use and (re)development of cultural heritage sites. In Arizona’s historic preservation arrangement, first, we have seen a shift in focus towards more recent heritage sites, especially from the post–World War II period. Second, cultural heritage sites are increasingly seen as sources of spatial and economic development. Third, there has been a shift in focus from historic designation, overlay zoning and incentives towards viable (re)use and (re)development of heritage sites, for tourism, luxurious ownership housing, or housing for low-income groups. In Dutch monumentenzorg, first, a discursive shift has taken place towards new categories of cultural heritage: from individual buildings and sites towards more comprehensive areas and landscapes and towards more recent heritage, among which numerous sites from the post-war reconstruction period. In addition, we have seen a shift in emphasis from restoration to planned maintenance. A third discursive development in Dutch monumentenzorg is related to the introduction of the Belvedere policy and involves the integration of heritage values in
Table 7.2 Organizational and discursive dynamics compared

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Norwegian kulturmimne-forvaltning arrangement</th>
<th>Arizona’s historic preservation arrangement</th>
<th>Dutch monumentenzorg arrangement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>New actors (and coalitions)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Shifts in division of power</strong></td>
<td><strong>Additional rule(s) of the game</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- NGO Norwegian Heritage</td>
<td>- Directorate for Cultural Heritage</td>
<td>- Public-public and public-private cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Department for Cultural Heritage Management</td>
<td>- Growing number of local governments</td>
<td>- Public-private cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- NIKU</td>
<td>- proactively apply zoning</td>
<td>- Transparent and proactive cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Cultural Heritage Fund</td>
<td>- and consult owners of historic properties</td>
<td>- Integration of cultural heritage values in land use planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Directorate for Agriculture</td>
<td>- Public and political support for historic preservation has grown</td>
<td>- Public-private cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Coastal Directorate</td>
<td>- Regional governments have established their own preservation programs</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Public-private partnerships</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Additional rule(s) of the game</strong></td>
<td><strong>New dominant policy discourse (what, why and how)</strong></td>
<td><strong>How:</strong> viable and sustainable (re)use and (re)development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Public-public and public-private cooperation</td>
<td>- What: heritage sites and cultural environments representing everyday life, including coastal heritage</td>
<td>- How: viable and sustainable (re)use and (re)development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Public-private cooperation</td>
<td>- Why: regional and local identity, spatial quality, economic growth</td>
<td>- How: viable (re)use and (re)development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Transparent and proactive cooperation</td>
<td>- Economic growth</td>
<td>- How: planned maintenance, viable (re)use and (re)development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Integration of cultural heritage values in land use planning</td>
<td>- Industrial heritage, post-war neighborhoods, and cultural landscapes</td>
<td>- What: what, why and how</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>- Why: regional and local identity, spatial quality, economic growth</td>
<td>- New dominant policy discourse (what, why and how)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- How: viable (re)use and (re)development</td>
<td>- What: what, why and how</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Economic growth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- How: planned maintenance, viable (re)use and (re)development</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on this comparative analysis, I draw three conclusions. First, I conclude that the organizational dimensions of the three preservation arrangements to a large extent have maintained their previous diversity (see table 7.2). The changes that have occurred, however, are rather similar. They involve the emergence of new coalitions between public and private actors and, correspondingly, the introduction of a new rule of the game: public-private cooperation. My second conclusion is that the discursive dynamics that have emerged in the three cases show remarkable similarities. Similar new policy discourses have recently emerged in the three preservation arrangements, next to the existing policy discourses of the early 1990s, which were similar to each other as well. Third, I conclude that the organizational and discursive developments that have occurred in the three preservation arrangements since the early 1990s are strongly interrelated. The arrival of market actors and coalitions of public and private actors is closely connected to the introduction of a new rule of the game: public-private cooperation, and to the discursive shift towards the (re)use and (re)development of heritage sites for spatial quality and economic development purposes.

Does this mean that the three preservation arrangements are increasingly growing alike? Based on my results, I conclude that this is not the case. Although I found similarity in the discursive shifts that have occurred in the three cases and I discovered a few similar organizational shifts, the division of power and rules of the game in the three preservation arrangements have kept their previous diversity. In fact, the comparative analysis of organizational and discursive dynamics in the three cases points to the phenomenon of ‘institutional void’ since the prevailing rules of the game and especially the division of power in the three preservation arrangements have not (yet) changed corresponding to the discursive shifts that have emerged. In the course of the next section, I search for explanations for the organizational stability in the three cases.

### 7.4 Political Modernization

In this section, I relate the dynamics in the three preservation arrangements in Norway, Arizona and the Netherlands to the two phases of political modernization. In chapter 2, I operationalized the two phases of political modernization by characterizing them in terms of the four dimensions of preservation arrangements (see table 2.1). In the first phase, the actors and coalitions involved typically belong to the social and cultural elite. The division of power and the prevailing rules of the game depend on the predominant form of steering in society (statism, corporatism, liberalism). In the dominant policy discourses, cultural heritage refers to historic buildings and sites that are authentic, beautiful or created by a great artist, which are considered protection worthy as sources of national pride, identity and unity. Cultural heritage preservation is primarily about...
Table 7.3a Political modernization in Norway’s kulturminneforvaltning arrangement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First phase</th>
<th>Second phase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Actors and coalitions</strong></td>
<td><strong>New actors and coalitions:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial actors and coalitions:</td>
<td>• Ministry of the Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Directorate for Cultural Heritage</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• County authorities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Local authorities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Historic property owners</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• National and local NGOs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• No fixed coalitions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Division of power</td>
<td>Small shifts in the division of power:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial division of power:</td>
<td>• Directorate for Cultural Heritage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• National government controls selection and protection of heritage sites</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• County authorities are responsible for distribution of grants and monitoring local land use planning</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Local authorities have authority to designate protected areas in binding land use plans</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Fortidsminneforeningen is relatively influential</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Other NGOs and historic property owners have access through participation procedures and lobbying</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rules of the game</td>
<td>Initial rule of the game:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial rule of the game:</td>
<td>• Hierarchical steering and central coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Integration of heritage values in land use planning</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional rule of the game:</td>
<td>• Public-public and public-private cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominant policy discourse</td>
<td>New dominant policy discourse:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial policy discourse:</td>
<td>• What: nationally significant sites representing inland peasant culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Why: national identity, association with historical events, beliefs and traditions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• How: protection against unwanted developments through protection orders</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New dominant policy discourse:</td>
<td>• What: heritage sites and cultural environments representing everyday life, including coastal heritage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Why: regional and local identity, spatial quality, economic growth</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• How: viable and sustainable (re)use and (re)development</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The protection of national heritage against any unwanted developments. In the second phase, a broad variety of actors from state, market and civil society have access to policy making processes. All of these actors possess important resources and accordingly, they depend on each other for the achievement of their goals. Deliberation and cooperation are important rules of the game. The policy discourses that dominate the second phase of political modernization typically reflect the idea that the whole of the landscape may have significance as a source of local and regional identity, spatial quality, economic prosperity and social cohesion. The focus is on preserving a representative sample of heritage values by providing them with viable (new) functions. At this point, my goal is to analyze whether the dynamics in the three cases represent convincing evidence for the political modernization process, in the sense that they reveal a growing diversity of preservation practices within each country. Tables 7.3a, 7.3b and 7.3c relate the dynamics that have emerged since the early 1990s in respectively Norway’s kulturminneforvaltning arrangement, Arizona’s historic preservation arrangement and the Dutch monumentenzorg arrangement to the first and second phases of political modernization. Table 7.3d provides a comparative overview.

In Norway, a number of developments have taken place since the early 1990s that clearly reveal the emergence of the second phase of political modernization. Both the organization and the content of the kulturminneforvaltning arrangement have gradually broadened over the years. First, as regards policy actors and coalitions involved, more NGOs at regional and local levels have become involved in joint preservation and redevelopment projects with regional and local authorities. Second, the predominant rules of hierarchy and central steering have been complemented by the rule of public-public and public-private cooperation. Preservation officials at national, regional and local levels have become more aware of the importance of NGOs in the actual maintenance of heritage sites, which has led to a growing amount of public-private partnerships. Third, with regard to the dominant policy discourse, we have seen a shift in focus from heritage sites that represent Norway’s inland, peasant culture to sites representing everyday life in Norway, in particular the coastal culture. In addition, a shift in emphasis has taken place from individual buildings to sites placed within their surroundings and large-scale cultural environments. Finally, we have witnessed a discursive shift towards the (re)use and (re)development of cultural heritage sites.

However, I also conclude that certain dimensions of the Norwegian kulturminneforvaltning arrangement have been relatively stable since the early 1990s. First, market actors such as builders, property developers or recreation and tourism businesses have not been very active so far. Preservation and redevelopment projects have not represented an attractive enough market for these actors in Norway. Second, although several regional and local authorities have taken a more proactive stance in the selection and preservation of regionally and locally significant heritage sites and have developed autonomous preservation policies, this has not led to a decentralization of preservation tasks and responsibilities. Moreover, although NGOs have gained a more prominent role at regional and local levels by cooperating with public authorities in innovative restoration and redevelopment projects, an actual shift in power from the state to civil society has not occurred. Finally, the rule of hierarchical steering and central coordination has remained dominant in Norwegian kulturminneforvaltning.
### Table 7.3b Political modernization in Arizona’s historic preservation arrangement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>First phase</th>
<th>Second phase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Actors and coalitions</strong></td>
<td>Initial actors and coalitions: National Park Service, State Historic Preservation Office, Local historic preservation offices, Local historic preservation commissions (HPC), Arizona Preservation Foundation, Local preservation groups, Historic property owners, Coalitions vary</td>
<td>New actors and coalitions: NGO Arizona Heritage Alliance, Growing number of private property owners, Builders and property developers, Public-private partnerships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Division of power</strong></td>
<td>Initial division of power: Federal and state authorities control National and Arizona Register and economic incentives, Local authorities are in charge of historic preservation overlay zoning, NGO and local preservation groups play no important role, Historic property owners have powerful position through protected private property rights</td>
<td>No shifts in the division of power, despite: Growing number of local governments proactively apply zoning and consult owners of historic properties, Public and political support for historic preservation has grown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rules of the game</strong></td>
<td>Initial rules of the game: Protection of private property rights, Minimum state intervention</td>
<td>Additional rules of the game: Public-private cooperation, Transparent and proactive preservation practices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dominant policy discourse</strong></td>
<td>Initial policy discourse: What: significant buildings and districts that are at least 50 years old, Why: historic, artistic or scientific value, economic benefits, How: protection against unwanted developments through historic designation, overlay zoning and incentives</td>
<td>New dominant policy discourse: What: more recent buildings and sites, also from the post-war period, Why: spatial quality, economic development, How: viable (re)use and redevelopment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Arizona, several developments have emerged since the early 1990s that reveal the emergence of the second phase. The historic preservation arrangement has gradually become wider in scope, both organizationally and discursively. First, we have seen a growing involvement of non-state actors. For example, more and more private property owners have aimed for the designation of their properties as historic buildings in the National Register, mainly because of the economic benefits it brings about. Furthermore, a growing number of builders and property developers in Arizona have discovered the benefits of redeveloping historic structures, whereas state and local preservation officials increasingly acknowledge the importance of proactively involving owners and other interested parties from civil society and the market sector in their preservation efforts. Accordingly, the rule of public-private cooperation has become more important since the early 1990s. Finally, as regards the dominant policy discourse, we have seen a shift in focus towards cultural heritage sites from the post-war period. In addition, cultural heritage sites are increasingly seen as sources of spatial and economic development, as tourist attractions and as opportunities for luxurious ownership housing and neighborhood revitalization.

Despite these developments, some dimensions of the historic preservation arrangement in Arizona have been relatively stable. First, we have seen no shifts in the division of power. Despite the fact that local governments have increasingly applied their zoning powers to protect historic districts against unwanted developments and despite the fact that more and more local governments have proactively consulted with private owners about the designation and preservation of their historic properties, the powerful position of private property owners in historic preservation has not been affected. Second, the most important rules of the game have remained minimum state intervention, incentive-based steering and the protection of private property rights under the U.S. Constitution.

Also in the Dutch monumentenzorg arrangement, a few developments have taken place that correspond to the political modernization process in Western society. Both the organization and the content of the arrangement have shown a growing diversity. First, with regard to actors and coalitions, more market actors such as property developers, builders and recreation and tourism businesses have invested in preservation projects, either independently or in partnership with governmental actors. In addition, under the influence of the Belvedere policy that was introduced in 1999, state authorities and NGOs increasingly recognize market actors as suitable partners, especially in large-scale and costly redevelopment projects. Accordingly, the rule of public-private cooperation has gained importance in recent years. New examples of public-private partnerships are the regional support centers in which public and private organizations cooperate to support local governments in the implementation of their preservation tasks and responsibilities. A third development that clearly reflects the emergence of the second phase of political modernization is related to the dominant policy discourse. Since the early 1990s, a discursive shift has taken place towards new categories of cultural heritage: from individual buildings and sites towards more comprehensive areas and landscapes and towards more recent heritage, among which numerous sites from the post-war reconstruction period. In addition, we have seen a shift in emphasis from restoration to planned maintenance and from strict conservation to viable (re)use and (re)development of cultural heritage values.
Table 7.3c Political modernization in the Dutch monumentenzorg arrangement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First phase</th>
<th>Second phase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Actors and coalitions</strong></td>
<td><strong>New actors and coalitions:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial actors and coalitions:</td>
<td>• Ministries of VROM, LNV, VenW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Ministry of Culture</td>
<td>• IPO and VNG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• National Department for Conservation</td>
<td>• National Inspection for Heritage Conservation (RIM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Provincial authorities</td>
<td>• Builders and developers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Local authorities</td>
<td>• Public-private partnerships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• NGOs at all levels</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Historic property owners</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Coalitions vary</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Division of power</strong></td>
<td><strong>Small shift in the division of power:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial division of power:</td>
<td>• Regional governments have established their own preservation programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• National authorities are in control of listing, permit system and grant programs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• (Provincial and) local authorities are in charge of land use planning and have responsibility in issuing permits and distributing grants</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Property owners and NGOs have access through participation procedures and lobbying</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Selection of NGOs work as official partners of Dutch government in policy making</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shift in division of power:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Recentralization of grant distribution from (regional and) local to state authorities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rules of the game</strong></td>
<td><strong>Additional rules of the game:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial rules of the game:</td>
<td>• Public-private cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Subsidiarity</td>
<td>• Integration of cultural heritage values in land use planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Cooperation between state actors and NGOs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dominant policy discourse</strong></td>
<td><strong>New dominant policy discourse:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial policy discourse:</td>
<td>• What: industrial heritage, post-war neighborhoods and cultural landscapes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• What: nationally significant buildings and town- and villagescapes</td>
<td>• Why: regional and local identity, spatial quality, economic growth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Why: intrinsic artistic, aesthetic or historic value</td>
<td>• How: planned maintenance, viable (re)use and (re)development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• How: protection against unwanted developments through registration, permit system and grant program</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Nevertheless, certain dimensions of the Dutch monumentenzorg arrangement have been relatively stable since the early 1990s. Moreover, we have even seen an organizational shift that reflects a transformation from the second to the first phase of political modernization. With the introduction of the BRIM grant scheme, a recentralization of preservation tasks has taken place from regional and local authorities to the National Department for Conservation. Regional and local authorities have lost their say over the distribution of maintenance and restoration grants. Nevertheless, local governments have kept a key role in Dutch monumentenzorg and all twelve provincial authorities have developed autonomous cultural heritage policies. In sum, the overall balance of power has stayed the same.

Altogether, the organizational and discursive dynamics that have emerged in the three preservation arrangements in Norway, Arizona and the Netherlands since the early 1990s indeed suggest a process of political modernization, yet only partially. As regards the dimensions actors and coalitions and dominant policy discourses, we have seen a full emergence of the second phase of political modernization in the three cases. The dimensions rules of the game and division of power, however, have only shown a partial emergence of the second phase between 1990 and 2005.

At this point, the question remains: how can we understand the fact that the emergence of the second phase of political modernization in the three cases has not been completed? On the basis of my three case studies, I draw the conclusion that the explanation must be sought by looking at the specific contexts in the three states. Especially the rules of the game and the division of power are relatively stable as they are strongly rooted in their specific historical, geographical and social-political backgrounds. In the remainder of this chapter, I will go further into the relationship between the specific backgrounds on the one hand and the features of the three preservation arrangements on the other.

To start with, the Norwegian kulturminneforvaltning arrangement has always been strongly influenced by the fact that the development of the policy field in the second half of the nineteenth century was closely related with the process of nation building in Norway, which was a project of the social-political elite in Oslo. One of the results is that heritage sites from central, inland Norway, such as stave churches and farmhouses, have long dominated the national register. Another consequence is that the kulturminneforvaltning arrangement has always reflected the idea that national cultural heritage experts have a crucial role in cultural heritage preservation. This has provided the national experts of the Directorate for Cultural Heritage with considerable structural power.

Norway’s geographical and social-political contexts have further strengthened the idea that national cultural heritage experts have a crucial role in cultural heritage preservation. As Norway is a sparsely populated country with a very uneven distribution of the population, national preservation officials have always held on to central steering and coordination as crucial rules of the game (see sections 7.2 and 7.3). Until today, most local governments lack the necessary budget, staff and know-how to implement local preservation tasks and/or to develop autonomous preservation policies. Only the large
Table 7.3d Political modernization compared

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Norwegian kulturminneforvaltning arrangement</th>
<th>Arizona’s historic preservation arrangement</th>
<th>Dutch monumentenzorg arrangement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First phase</td>
<td>Division of power:</td>
<td>Division of power:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• National government controls selection and</td>
<td>• National authorities are in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>protection of sites</td>
<td>control of listing,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• County authorities are responsible for</td>
<td>permit system and (as of 2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>distribution of grants and monitoring</td>
<td>distribution of grants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>local land use planning</td>
<td>(Provincial and) local</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Local authorities have authority to</td>
<td>authorities are in charge of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>designate protected areas in binding land</td>
<td>historic preservation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>plans</td>
<td>overlay zoning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Fortidsminneforeningen is relatively</td>
<td>• NGO and local preservation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>influential</td>
<td>groups play no important</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Other NGOs and historic property owners</td>
<td>role</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>have access through participation procedures and lobbying</td>
<td>Historic property owners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Rules of the game:</td>
<td>have powerful position</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Hierarchical steering and central</td>
<td>through protected private</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>coordination</td>
<td>property rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rules of the game:</td>
<td>Minimum state intervention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Protection of private property rights</td>
<td>Rules of the game:</td>
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<td></td>
<td>New coaltions:</td>
<td>• Subsidarity</td>
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<tr>
<td>New coalitions:</td>
<td>• Public-private partnerships</td>
<td>• Cooperation between state</td>
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<tr>
<td>New rule of the game:</td>
<td>New rule of the game:</td>
<td>actors and NGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New coaltions:</td>
<td>• Public-private partnerships</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New dominant discourse:</td>
<td>New dominant discourse:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New dominant discourse:</td>
<td>• What: more recent buildings and sites,</td>
<td>• What: industrial heritage,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What: heritage sites and cultural</td>
<td>also from the post-war period</td>
<td>post-war neighborhoods and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>environments representing everyday life,</td>
<td>Why: spatial quality, economic development</td>
<td>cultural landscapes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>including coastal heritage</td>
<td>How: viable (re)use and redevelopment</td>
<td>When: regional and local</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Why: regional and local identity, spatial</td>
<td></td>
<td>identity, spatial quality,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>quality, economic growth</td>
<td></td>
<td>economic growth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How: viable and sustainable (re)use and</td>
<td></td>
<td>How: planned maintenance,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(re)development</td>
<td></td>
<td>viable (re)use and development</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Cities in Norway have established local preservation departments (byantikvar) and their own preservation policies. A few preservation tasks, however, have been decentralized to the county authorities (fylkeskommuner). They include the authority to prepare protection orders, to issue provisional protection orders and to administer the grant scheme for the maintenance and restoration of protected heritage sites.

Besides the prevailing rules of hierarchy and central steering, other striking features of the Norwegian kulturminneforvaltning arrangement include the relatively influential position of the NGO Fortidsminneforeningen and the relative absence of market actors. The first can be explained by the historical development of Norwegian kulturminneforvaltning. As the NGO Fortidsminneforeningen is basically the founder of the policy field and the predecessor of the Directorate for Cultural Heritage, it traditionally has close ties with state authorities. Until today, the organization has managed to keep its influential position. Second, the explanation for the relative absence of market actors essentially lies in the specific economic situation. Preservation and/or redevelopment projects are not perceived as an attractive business by the private sector in Norway, mainly because the relatively small population does not represent a large enough market for cultural heritage recreation or tourism.

The historic preservation arrangement in Arizona has always been strongly influenced by the fact that it is situated in the American Southwest, which is characterized by a predominant individualist mentality, a widespread distrust in governmental authorities and highly valued private property rights. As a result, the State of Arizona, like the other states in the American Southwest, has a liberalist system of historic preservation in which individual historic property owners have substantial structural power since the protection of private property rights and minimum state intervention are the main rules of the game.

In addition to the social-political situation, Arizona’s specific geographical situation and historical background also hold an important explanation for the organizational features of the historic preservation arrangement. First, as Arizona is one of the youngest and fastest growing states in the U.S., a large part of the population is not aware of the state’s history and cultural heritage. Consequently, there has never been broad public or political support for historic preservation and only a small number of NGOs have become active in the field. The lack of public and political support and the relative absence of civil society actors in historic preservation also explain why the preservation laws and policies in Arizona were only established pursuant to federal legislation. It was only after requirements of the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966 that the State of Arizona established a state historic preservation office and a state register of historic places in the late 1960s. Moreover, and not surprisingly, the Arizona Historic Preservation Act of 1982 is largely modeled after the National Historic Preservation Act.

Also the Dutch monumentenzorg arrangement has been strongly influenced by its specific historical, geographical and social-political background. First, it was the massive destruction of historic buildings and sites during the Second World War that gave a major impulse to NGOs and the Dutch government to further develop preservation laws, policies and grant schemes. From the post-war period onwards, a high population growth and increasing development pressure in both urban and rural areas in the Netherlands have become new urgent threats to the Dutch cultural heritage. As a consequence, the
**Table 7.4 Partial emergence of political modernization explained**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Historical development</th>
<th>Norwegian kulturminne-forvaltnings arrangement</th>
<th>Arizona’s historic preservation arrangement</th>
<th>Dutch monumentenzorg arrangement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Development of the field was closely related to nation building process</td>
<td>• Relatively young history of Arizona</td>
<td>• Grassroots development of monumentenzorg in nineteenth century</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National cultural heritage experts traditionally have powerful position</td>
<td>• Low public awareness of heritage values</td>
<td>• Relatively strong civil society</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fortidsminneforeningen traditionally has close ties with state authorities</td>
<td>• Relative absence of civil society actors in historic preservation</td>
<td>• Need for strict preservation laws and central coordination by national heritage experts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fortidsminneforeningen has influential position</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>National cultural heritage experts traditionally have powerful position</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geographical situation</th>
<th>Norwegian kulturminne-forvaltnings arrangement</th>
<th>Arizona’s historic preservation arrangement</th>
<th>Dutch monumentenzorg arrangement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low population density, uneven distribution of population, large number of small communities</td>
<td>• Rapid population growth: increasing majority of population are not aware of the state’s cultural heritage</td>
<td>• High population density and high development pressure in urban and rural areas</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hierarchical steering and central coordination is prevailing rule of the game</td>
<td>• Low public awareness of heritage values</td>
<td>• Need for strict preservation laws and national coordination</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Relative absence of civil society</td>
<td></td>
<td>National cultural heritage experts traditionally have powerful position</td>
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</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social-political and -economical background</th>
<th>Norwegian kulturminne-forvaltnings arrangement</th>
<th>Arizona’s historic preservation arrangement</th>
<th>Dutch monumentenzorg arrangement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Majority of local authorities lack resources and knowledge</td>
<td>• Predominant individualist mentality, widespread distrust in government and highly valued private property rights</td>
<td>• Traditions of consensus democracy and neo-corporatism (poldermodel)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hierarchical steering and central coordination is prevailing rule of the game</td>
<td>• Minimum state intervention and protection of private property rights</td>
<td>• Cooperation between state actors and (selection of) NGOs is important rule of the game</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preservation is not perceived as attractive market by private sector</td>
<td>• Private property owners possess structural power</td>
<td>• Broad division of power</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Relative absence of market actors</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
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**Key to symbols**

- Explanatory factor (specific historical, geographical or social-political context)
- Consequence or outcome (characteristic of the preservation arrangement)

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Need for strict preservation laws and central coordination by national cultural heritage experts has always been strongly felt in the Dutch monumentenzorg arrangement. This explains why the national experts of the National Department for Conservation traditionally have considerable structural power.

Besides the historical development and geographical situation, also the Dutch social-political context has been an important factor. First, the monumentenzorg arrangement has been strongly influenced by a widespread (neo)corporatist mentality and the prevalent practice of consensus democracy in the Netherlands, which is often referred to as the Dutch ‘poldermodel’. Consequently, from the very beginning, various NGOs have played an important role in the development and implementation of Dutch preservation laws, policies and grant schemes. Moreover, mutual support and cooperation between state actors and (a selection of) NGOs has always been an important rule of the game. Second, the general decentralization and privatization of public tasks in the Netherlands in the 1980s have led to a relatively broad division of tasks and responsibilities between different tiers of government and NGOs. The Dutch monumentenzorg arrangement still reflects the notion that cultural heritage preservation is a shared responsibility of state and civil society at all levels, despite the key role of the national cultural heritage experts of the National Department for Conservation.

All in all, I come to the conclusion that the dynamics in the three preservation arrangements in Norway, Arizona and the Netherlands since the late 1990s only partly reveal a process of political modernization. Although we have seen a full emergence of the second phase of political modernization in the dimensions actors and coalitions and dominant policy discourses, the dimensions rules of the game and division of power have only shown small shifts between 1990 and 2005. This only partial emergence of political modernization can be explained by the differing historical, geographical, social-political and -economical backgrounds of the three preservation arrangements, in which the prevailing rules of the game and the division of (structural) power are firmly rooted. Table 7.4 summarizes my conclusions regarding the rather stable ‘fit’ or ‘congruency’ (cf. Boonstra 2004) between these particular features of the three preservation arrangements in Norway, Arizona and the Netherlands on the one hand and their specific historical, geographical and social-political backgrounds on the other.
8.1 Introduction

This book deals with recent dynamics in the field of cultural heritage preservation. It started in chapter 1 with the observation that since the early 1990s, there have been some remarkable developments in this policy field. We saw that new definitions of cultural heritage have emerged, new preservation approaches have been introduced, and new players have claimed a role. In chapter 1, I introduced the idea that these developments are related to general social-political transformations in Western society, which I refer to in this study as the process of political modernization. It involves the shifting relationships between state, market, and civil society and the arrival of new ideas about and new forms of governance. In chapter 2, I formulated the hypothesis that the process of political modernization is related to a growing internal diversity in Western preservation arrangements.

The case study chapters 4, 5, and 6 presented analyses of recent developments in the preservation arrangements in Norway, Arizona, and the Netherlands respectively. Conclusions regarding (the interplay between) the organizational and discursive changes that have occurred in each case between 1990 and 2005 were presented in the last sections of these chapters. In chapter 7, I compared the results of the three case studies by characterizing the developments in each of the preservation arrangements’ dimensions and by relating the dynamics in the preservation arrangements to the political modernization process in Western society.

In this final chapter, I reflect on the implications of my research results. First, section 8.2 provides a brief summary of my main findings. In section 8.3, I evaluate the usage of the policy arrangement approach as conceptual framework by addressing its merits and drawbacks for the analysis of developments in the field of cultural heritage preservation. Special attention is paid to my operationalization of the concepts of power and political modernization. Section 8.4 discusses the relevance of my research results for policymakers and practitioners in the field of cultural heritage preservation. In this final section, I assess the implications of my findings for cultural heritage preservation in the twenty-first century.

8.2 Traces of Change

What traces of change have I found in the three preservation arrangements in Norway, Arizona, and the Netherlands between 1990 and 2005? How can I understand these changes against the background of the political modernization process in Western society? Has the process of political modernization brought about a growing internal diversity in the three preservation arrangements?

In all three cases, the dimensions actors and coalitions and dominant policy discourses have clearly shown the emergence of the second phase of political modernization. More non-state actors have become actively involved since the early 1990s and we have seen the emergence of new coalitions between public and private actors. The dominant policy discourses in the three preservation arrangements have revealed a shift in focus towards the preservation of buildings, complexes, and landscapes that represent everyday life (what), which are valued as significant sources of local or regional identity, spatial quality and economic growth (why), by investing in sensible (re)development projects and by searching for viable new uses (how). The dimensions rules of the game and division of power have only shown a partial emergence of the second phase between 1990 and 2005.

The few changes that have occurred in these dimensions are relatively small, yet most of them indicate a gradual shift towards the second phase of political modernization. In all three cases, the rule of public-private cooperation has gained importance. The shifts in the division of power are more diverse, yet the balance of power has stayed the same in the three preservation arrangements. Overall, the three case analyses showed that most of the organizational and discursive developments that have occurred in the three preservation arrangements are strongly interrelated. The arrival of non-state actors and new coalitions of public and private actors is closely connected to the introduction of a new rule of the game, public-private cooperation, and to discursive shifts towards the (re)use and (re)development of cultural heritage sites for spatial quality and economic development purposes.

In chapter 7, I concluded that the dynamics in the three preservation arrangements in Norway, Arizona, and the Netherlands since the late 1990s indeed reveal a process of political modernization, yet only partially. The partial emergence of political modernization (i.e. the relative stability of the rules of the game and especially the division of power) can be explained by the differing historical, geographical, social-political and –economical backgrounds of the three preservation arrangements, in which the prevailing rules of the game and the division of (structural) power are firmly rooted. Nevertheless, the results of my case studies have supported the hypothesis that the process of political modernization is related to a growing internal diversity in Western preservation arrangements. The arrival of new actors and coalitions, new rules of the game and new dominant policy discourses has led to the gradual introduction of new preservation practices (public-private initiatives involving sensible redevelopments and new, viable uses of heritage sites), which currently coexist with traditional practices (protection of heritage sites against unwanted developments by designation, permit system and grant program).

8.3 Reflections on the Conceptual Framework

In chapter 2, I presented the conceptual framework of this study, based on the policy arrangement approach. I formulated two requirements for the conceptual framework. First, it must enable me to analyze dynamics in and between both the organization and the content of preservation arrangements. Second, it should allow me to address the relationship between day-to-day interactions of policy actors on the one hand and structural transformations in society on the other. In this section, I deal with the question whether these two requirements are met by the conceptual framework I constructed in chapter 2. Chapter 2 also addressed four pitfalls of using the policy arrangement approach as conceptual framework. They are related to (i) the analysis of ‘minor’ policy discourses, ‘immature’ policy arrangements and ‘institutional voids’; (ii) the separate analysis of the four dimensions of policy arrangements; (iii) the concept of power; and (iv) the concept of political modernization. This section discusses whether and how these pitfalls have hindered me during the (comparative) analysis of the three cases. Furthermore, I discuss the extent to which my study has contributed to further refinement of the policy arrangement approach.

Regarding the first requirement for the conceptual framework, I conclude on the basis of my three case studies that the policy arrangement approach has been very useful.
for a comparative analysis of both organizational and discursive dynamics in three different preservation arrangements. In the empirical chapters 4, 5 and 6, I unraveled (a) the initial characteristics of the preservation arrangements in Norway, Arizona and the Netherlands in the early 1990s and (b) the emerging shifts in these three cases from the early 1990s onwards, by systematically addressing the four dimensions of the arrangements (actors and coalitions, division of power, rules of the game and policy discourses), separately and in interaction. This resulted in a balanced analysis of change and stability in both the organization and the content of cultural heritage preservation in the three cases. It is important to note that only a combined analysis of both organizational and discursive developments could reveal that the process of political modernization has emerged in the three preservation arrangements, yet only partially. Whereas the actors and coalitions and the dominant policy discourses in the three cases have convincingly revealed the emergence of the second phase of political modernization, the rules of the game and the division of power have merely shown a partial emergence of the second phase. Moreover, only an integrated analysis of both organizational and discursive developments in the three cases could show that the dynamics that have emerged in the organization and the content of the three preservation arrangements between 1990 and 2005 are strongly interrelated. I concluded that the arrival of new coalitions of public and private actors and the introduction of a new rule of the game, public-private cooperation is closely connected to the discursive shifts towards the (re)use and (re)development of cultural heritage sites for spatial quality and economic development purposes.

As to the second requirement, the policy arrangement approach made it possible to analyze and compare the emerging developments in three different preservation arrangements against the background of the general political modernization process in Western society. The policy arrangement approach, which is based on the idea of ‘duality of agency and structure’, focused my attention to the interrelation between the day-to-day efforts of individual actors (agency) on the one hand and more structural social-political processes (structure) on the other. In this way, the approach enabled me to understand the dynamics in the three preservation arrangements in Norway, Arizona and the Netherlands as conditional outcomes of the interplay between day-to-day preservation practices and the ongoing process of political modernization in Western society. Nevertheless, the political modernization concept has only provided a partial understanding of the dynamics in the three cases. Additional understanding was found by looking at other, relatively autonomous processes and specific contexts of the three preservation arrangements. In conclusion, a downside of the policy arrangement approach is that it tends to overlook contextual factors, circumstances and developments other than the political modernization process in understanding change and stability in preservation arrangements. In this study, the multi-layered definition of power provided a solution for this problem (see further).

As regards downsides of the policy arrangement approach, chapter 2 recognized the risk of overlooking ‘minor’ policy discourses, ‘immature’ policy arrangements and ‘institutional voids’. The level of abstraction in this thesis, which analyzes developments in state-level preservation arrangements, indeed implied a focus on more or less general shifts within the dominant policy discourses at state level. ‘Minor’ discursive shifts emerging at lower territorial levels, within the context of a particular region, county or city, were not taken into account in the analyses. Then again, the analyses of discursive shifts in the three cases in fact pointed to ‘institutional voids’ since I concluded that the prevailing rules of the game and especially the division of power in the three preservation arrangements had not (yet) changed corresponding to the discursive shifts that had emerged.

A second risk that I mentioned in chapter 2 in relation to the use of the policy arrangement approach is that it could result in a relatively static analysis of the four separate dimensions of preservation arrangements. In this study, I avoided this problem by explicitly focusing on the dynamics of and the interrelations between the different dimensions of the three preservation arrangements. This could not prevent, however, that the descriptions of the ‘initial characteristics’ of the three cases are relatively static in nature.

Other shortcomings of the policy arrangements approach that were addressed in chapter 2 are related to the concepts of power and political modernization. By introducing new operationalizations of these two concepts, the conceptual framework of this study has contributed to the further development of the policy arrangement approach. To start with, the refinement of the concept of power as presented in chapter 2 has led to a better understanding of change and stability in the three preservation arrangements. In this study, three interconnected layers of power were distinguished: relational, dispositional and structural power. Actors were considered to have a certain amount of power if the prevailing rules of the game, the existing division of power resources (legal rights or responsibilities, information, money or property), and/or the specific geographical, historical, social-political and -economical context of the preservation arrangement provided them with a relatively autonomous position and hence, the capacity to influence policy outcomes. This multi-layered definition of power has played a significant role in understanding the stability of the three preservation arrangements, a phenomenon that could not be understood by applying the political modernization concept. By focusing our attention on the specific geographical, historical, social-political and economical contexts of preservation arrangements as an important basis for structural power, it enabled me to understand the relative stability in the rules of the game and the division of power in the three cases. For example, in the case of Norway’s kulturminneforvaltning arrangement, I was able to understand the invariably powerful position of the national heritage experts of the Directorate for Cultural Heritage as the outcome of Norway’s specific historical, social-political and social-geographical context. Likewise, I explained the continuous autonomy of private property owners in Arizona’s historic preservation arrangement as the result of the prevailing rules of minimum state intervention and protection of private property rights, which are both firmly rooted in the historical and social-political context of the American Southwest. Finally, I was able to understand the relatively broad division of power in the Dutch monumentenzorg arrangement by referring to the specific historical and social-political context in the Netherlands, whereas the traditionally powerful position of the heritage experts of the National Department for Conservation could be explained by the historical and social-geographical context. In further research on change and stability in preservation arrangements, I recommend that contextual factors such as the specific historical, geographical, social-political and -economical backgrounds of these arrangements are given a more prominent place in the analysis (see figure 8.1).
A second refinement to the policy arrangement approach that stems from my conceptual framework is related to the concept of political modernization. This study’s operationalization of political modernization has led to a better insight in current developments in the field of cultural heritage preservation and their relation with general social-political transformations in Western society. In the policy arrangement approach, two phases of political modernization are distinguished, each of which characterized by specific interrelations between state, market and civil society and by specific discourses on steering. These phases are not seen as two separate, consecutive worlds but as coexistent modes of policy making. In this study, I further specified the two phases of political modernization in relation to the field of cultural heritage preservation. Moreover, I related the two phases of political modernization to the four dimensions of a policy arrangement. This operationalization of political modernization in terms of the actors and coalitions, division of power, rules of the game and dominant policy discourses in the field of cultural heritage preservation enabled me to systematically analyze the dynamics that have emerged in three different preservation arrangements since the early 1990s as elements of general social-political transformations in Western society. This resulted in a subtle, contextual analysis of change and stability in the field of cultural heritage preservation in Norway, Arizona and the Netherlands. In other words, the pitfalls related to the concept of political modernization that I mentioned in chapter 2 (it is too abstract, it is normative and it suggests a linear development of societal progress) were successfully avoided in this thesis by introducing a new operationalization of political modernization.

Nevertheless, the political modernization concept has only provided a partial understanding of the dynamics in the three cases. One could conclude that the period 1990-2005 is too short to find a full emergence of the second phase of political modernization. Whereas the three preservation arrangements in Norway, Arizona and the Netherlands have revealed a partial emergence of the second phase of political modernization between 1990 and 2005, one might expect that the three cases will show a full emergence of the second phase in the years to come. This would imply that the three preservation arrangements are in the middle of a destabilization process, which gradually undermines their traditional, first phase characteristics and paves the way for the stabilization of new or additional, second phase features. However, it is important to note that in this study, the concept of political modernization and the two phases that are distinguished are used as perspective to analyze recent developments in Western preservation arrangements, not as theory to predict nor as normative framework to prescribe such developments. This means that we cannot predict the future of the three preservation arrangements on the basis of the political modernization concept.

Moreover, this study has convincingly shown that the specific historical, geographical, social-political and -economical contexts of the three preservation arrangements have had at least as much effect on change and stability within these arrangements as the ongoing process of political modernization in Western society. Based on these results, I expect that in the near future, newly emerging preservation practices, representing the second phase of political modernization, will continue to go hand in hand with more traditional preservation practices that stem from the first phase of political modernization and/or that are firmly rooted in their specific historical, geographical, social-political
and -economical contexts. This means that the differing contexts of preservation arrangements will continue to serve as filters to the political modernization process and lead to national variations in the design and implementation of preservation practices. To study future developments in Western preservation arrangements, I recommend to apply the policy arrangement approach (a) refined with the new operationalizations of power and political modernization that were introduced in this study and (b) supplemented with a focus on contextual factors such as the historical, geographical, social-political and -economical backgrounds of preservation arrangements (see figure 8.1).

8.4 Cultural Heritage Preservation in the Twenty-First Century

At the end of this book, the question arises as to what the implications are of my research results for day-to-day preservation practices in the twenty-first century. First, I would like to emphasize that, as I already mentioned in chapter 3, it is up to the readers to decide whether the results of my study are relevant for the preservation arrangement they are involved in. Having said that, I think the relevance of this study for policymakers and practitioners lies in the various perspectives from which recent dynamics in the field of cultural heritage preservation are seen. In this book, preservation arrangements and their dynamics were viewed from the angle of (i) the actors that are involved and the coalitions they build, (ii) the prevailing rules of the game, (iii) the division of power and (iv) the variety of discourses and they were placed against the backdrop of (a) their specific historical backgrounds, geographical situations and social-political and -economical contexts and (b) general social-political transformations in Western society. This multi-layered and multi-focal insight in change and stability in the field of cultural heritage preservation helps policymakers and practitioners to reflect on their own positions, roles, resources, rules, ideas and actions. Furthermore, it provides them with the necessary insight for influencing or changing (the different dimensions of) the preservation practices they are involved in, so as to achieve the policy outcomes they prefer. Within constraints of the specific historical, geographical and social-political context, policymakers and practitioners have the possibility to build (new) coalitions, to introduce new actors, or to launch new ideas in order to influence the existing division of power, the prevailing rules of the game, or the dominant policy discourse in the preservation arrangement.

The three examples of preservation practices that I described in chapter 1 may serve as sources of inspiration for policymakers and practitioners who wish to change the preservation practices they are involved in. The Utstein Monastery and its surrounding landscape in Rennesøy (Norway), the Hayden Flour Mill complex in Tempe (Arizona) and the Hessenberg area in Nijmegen (the Netherlands): each of these three examples involved a recent, relatively complex and much-discussed heritage redevelopment project at regional or local level. Moreover, all three examples illustrated attempts to change existing policy practices in order to create more transparency, openness and public involvement in policy making. In the first example, the Rogaland county government set up a regional, participative policy process in an attempt to establish a broadly supported preservation plan for the maintenance, use and development of the Utstein Monastery complex and its surrounding landscape. The second example involved an initiative of Tempe’s city government to start a participative planning process for the redevelopment of the Hayden Flour Mill complex. The initiative was a reaction to the many protests from citizens against a prior redevelopment plan, which supposedly would have had adverse effects on the heritage values of the industrial complex and the neighboring Hayden Butte. Similarly, in the third example, Nijmegen’s city government set up a participative process to establish a broadly supported redevelopment plan for the historic Hessenberg area. This was after a coalition of residents, shopkeepers, historical societies and environmental groups successfully held back an earlier plan that included the demolition of an old Roman Catholic orphanage and chapel.

My study has shown that the emergence of new preservation practices has been hindered by the specific historical, geographical, social-political and -economical contexts of the preservation arrangements in Norway, Arizona and the Netherlands. In the three examples of chapter 1, the actors involved tried to overcome these structural barriers by building new coalitions, introducing new ideas, and dismissing the prevailing rules and division of power. For example, in the case of the Utstein Monastery, the Rogaland county government tried to set aside the prevailing rules of hierarchy and central steering by national heritage experts in order to reach a broadly supported management plan for the surroundings of the monastery complex. The case of the Hayden Flour Mill showed that the citizens of Tempe effectively withstood the predominant rule of minimum state intervention in their struggle for the preservation of the industrial complex and the numerous archeological sites on the neighboring Hayden Butte, since Tempe’s city government eventually decided to acquire the property to secure a sensible re-use. In the case of the Hessenberg area, local NGOs built a strong coalition with neighboring residents and shopkeepers and ultimately succeeded in turning around the decision of Nijmegen’s city government to rigorously redevelop the area. In this way, the three examples of chapter 1 serve as sources of inspiration for policymakers and practitioners who wish to change the preservation practices they are involved in, so as to create more transparency, openness and public involvement and reach new, integral solutions in the field of cultural heritage preservation.

Based on my research results, I expect that the three preservation arrangements in Norway, Arizona and the Netherlands will increasingly face the emergence of preservation practices that represent the second phase of political modernization, similar to the three examples that I described in chapter 1. These practices typically involve public-private initiatives aiming at the viable (reuse) and sensible (re)development of a representational sample of cultural heritage sites for the purpose of local and regional identity, spatial quality and economic development. On the other hand, I expect that these newly emerging preservation practices will continue to coexist with more traditional practices that stem from the first phase of political modernization and that are rooted in their specific historical, geographical, social-political and -economical contexts. The latter category typically involves expert-driven state efforts to protect nationally significant cultural heritage sites from unwanted developments through listing or designation because of their intrinsic artistic, aesthetic or historic value.

A major disadvantage of these traditional, first phase preservation practices is that they are relatively closed and elitist in nature and that the voices of other people than the dominant group remain unheard. As I mentioned in chapter 1, cultural heritage values are socially constructed. Any definition or selection of cultural heritage sites depends on the perspective or discourse from which it is made. This means that other
discourses than the dominant discourse within a preservation arrangement may not be represented in the selection of preserved cultural heritage sites. In my view, the challenge for policymakers and practitioners is to create a representative collection of preserved heritage sites, including those that are important to people other than the dominant group. Accordingly, state actors should stimulate a strong involvement of all groups in society and facilitate a wide range of private preservation initiatives in order to create a broad base for cultural heritage preservation in society. In other words, I argue that all actors, whether from state, market or civil society, should have access to decision making, that cooperation between these actors should be the main rule of the game, and that the main goal should be to preserve, (re)use and (re)develop a selection of cultural heritage sites that represents all groups in society.

Nevertheless, a certain extent of central steering and coordination by national or regional heritage experts is necessary to ensure that all nationally and/or regionally significant heritage sites are preserved in a sustainable way and that cultural heritage values are taken into consideration whenever new land use plans or projects are being developed and implemented. In this sense, legal protection and economic incentives are important instruments. However, they are not sufficient to protect cultural heritage sites from unwanted developments nor to provide them with sustainable (new) functions. Equally important are a broad public support and a strong involvement of NGO’s and the private sector. Accordingly, I argue for a wide variety of preservation practices that combine legal protection and economic incentives with a proactive involvement of all groups in society, NGOs and private actors. In Norway and the Netherlands, this means that the traditionally influential position of national heritage experts should be balanced by increased involvement of local actors, including local governments (in Norway), local NGOs and private actors (property owners and users, builders, property developers, tourism and recreation businesses, etcetera). In Arizona, the powerful position of private property owners should be counteracted by increased intervention and proactive involvement of state and local governments and NGOs. Moreover, policymakers and practitioners in Norway, Arizona and the Netherlands should strive for more reflexivity, transparency and openness in the field of cultural heritage preservation by proactively involving all groups in society, stimulating a wide range of private initiatives and facilitating an ongoing public-private debate at all levels in society on what are important cultural heritage values and on how they should be preserved.

Ultimately, I envision a future where cultural heritage preservation is a joint effort of various actors representing state, market and civil society. These actors bring together the best of two worlds: they combine an expert’s with a layman’s perspective on cultural heritage, they mix cultural heritage sites of national significance with sites that provide regional and local identity, they confront the discourse of the dominant group with those of minority groups, and they combine legal protection and economic incentives with the pursuit of broad public support, strong private sector involvement and an ongoing collective debate.
Sporen van verandering

Dynamiek in monumentenzorgarrangementen in Noorwegen, Arizona en Nederland

Sinds het begin van de jaren '90 hebben zich in de monumentenzorg een aantal opvallende ontwikkelingen voorgedaan. Op de eerste plaats is de definitie van cultureel erfgoed geleidelijk verschoven van individuele historische gebouwen van nationaal belang naar historische structuren en landschappen op regionaal en lokaal niveau. Bovendien zijn er nieuwe benaderingen van monumentenzorg geïntroduceerd. We zien bijvoorbeeld een trend van behoud, restauratie en minimale interventie naar inventief (her)gebruik en aanpassing aan hedendaagse wensen. Ten slotte zijn er nieuwe actoren betrokken geraakt bij het beleidsveld. Vooral private actoren, zoals monumenteneigenaren, bouwbedrijven en projectontwikkelaars, hebben een grotere rol gekregen. In hoofdstuk 1 spreek ik de verwachting uit dat deze verschuivingen in de organisatie en de inhoud van monumentenzorg gerelateerd zijn aan algemene sociaal-politieke transformaties in de Westerse samenleving. Het doel van mijn onderzoek is dan ook het analyseren, vergelijken en begrijpen van recente ontwikkelingen in de organisatie en de inhoud van monumentenzorg in Noorwegen, Arizona en Nederland tegen de achtergrond van algemene sociaal-politieke veranderingen in de Westerse samenleving sinds het begin van de jaren '90.


Deze onderzoeksvragen worden beantwoord in de empirische hoofdstukken 4 t/m 6 (vraag 1) en in het vergelijkende hoofdstuk 7 (vragen 2 en 3). Hoofdstuk 8 gaat in op de wetenschappelijke en maatschappelijke relevante van mijn bevindingen. In hoofdstuk 3 verantwoord ik het methodologisch kader van mijn onderzoek. Ik bespreek achtereenvolgeng de kenmerken van een reflectieve benadering van beleidsanalyse, de casestudy als onderzoeksstrategie, het internationaal vergelijkende karakter van mijn onderzoek, de selectie van de drie casus en de gehanteerde strategie per onderzoeks vraag. De hoofdstukken 4, 5 en 6 analyseren de organisatorische en discursieve ontwikkelingen in de drie monumentenzorgarrangementen in Noorwegen, Arizona en Nederland tussen 1990 en 2005.

In het Noorse cultuurministeriearrangement (hoofdstuk 4) van begin jaren '90 domineerden nationale overheden. Het Ministerie van Milieu (Miljøverndepartementet) en het Directoraat voor Cultureel Erfgoed (Riksantikvaren) waren verantwoordelijk voor het selecteren en beschermen van het Noorse cultureel erfgoed. Belangrijkste spelregels waren centrale sturing, coördinatie en het integreren van cultuurhistorische waarden in ruimtelijke plannen. In het dominante discours stond het behoud van de ‘echte’ Noorse cultuur centraal, die nauw verbonden was met het boercultuur uit het binnenland van Noorwegen. De nadruk lag op individuele gebouwen en objecten zoals

worden beslissingen over cultureel erfgoed genomen in onderhandeling tussen betrokken partijen (staat, markt en samenleving). Monumentenzorg omvat vooral het behoud van een representatieve selectie van erfgoedwaarden door deze te voorzien van duurzame (nieuwe) functies. Centrale gedachte is dat het gehele landschap waardevol kan zijn als bron van lokale of regionale identiteit, ruimtelijke kwaliteit, economische ontwikkeling of sociale cohesie.

Beleidsarrangementen definiere ik in dit onderzoek als de tijdelijke stabilisering van de organisatie en de inhoud van monumentenzorg in een bepaald land. Vier dimensies kunnen worden onderscheiden: (i) de betrokken beleidsactoren en de coalities tussen deze actoren, (ii) de geldende spelregels, (iii) de verdeling van macht en (iv) de diversiteit aan beleidsdiscoursen. Het begrip institutionalisering verwijst naar het voortdurende proces waarin inhoud en organisatie van monumentenzorg geïntegreerd en institutionaliseerd worden, als gevolg van interacties tussen actoren en het politieke moderniseringsproces. Op basis van het conceptueel kader heb ik in hoofdstuk 2 de volgende onderzoeks vragen geformuleerd:

1. Welke ontwikkelingen hebben zich sinds de vroege jaren '90 voorgedaan in de monumentenzorgarrangementen in Noorwegen, Arizona en Nederland met betrekking tot actoren en relaties, spelregels, verdeling van macht en beleidsdiscoursen?
2. Wat zijn de belangrijkste overeenkomsten en verschillen tussen de organisatorische en discursieve dynamiek in de drie monumentenzorgarrangementen?
3. In hoeverre is de dynamiek in de drie monumentenzorgarrangementen gerelateerd aan het politieke moderniseringsproces in de Westerse samenleving?

Deze onderzoeksvragen worden beantwoord in de empirische hoofdstukken 4 t/m 6 (vraag 1) en in het vergelijkende hoofdstuk 7 (vragen 2 en 3). Hoofdstuk 8 gaat in op de wetenschappelijke en maatschappelijke relevante van mijn bevindingen.
boerderijen en staatkloven (stavkirker). Deze moesten beschermd worden tegen onge- wenste ontwikkelingen door middel van individuele beschermingsbesluiten onder de Monumentenwet (Kulturmiljøloven) van 1978.

Tussen 1990 en 2003 zien we in het Noorse kulturmiljøvervaltnings arrangement de volgende organisatorische en discursieve ontwikkelingen. Om te beginnen zijn de nationale, regionale en lokale overheden vaker en intensiever gaan samenwerken met maatschappelijke organisaties (NGO’s). NGO’s hebben een grotere rol naar zich toegedroken door ook zelf steeds meer restauratie- en herontwikkelingsprojecten te initiëren. Desondanks is geen verschuiving opgetreden in de verdeling van macht tussen actoren. Ook de belangrijkste spelregels zijn hetzelfde gebleven, al zijn ze aangepast met een nieuwe spelregel: publiek-private samenwerking. De Noorse overheid is zich de afgelopen jaren bewust geworden van het belang van private partijen en NGO’s voor het dagelijkse onderhoud van monumenten. Dit heeft geleid tot een toename van het aantal publiek-private samenwerkingsconstructies. De grootste veranderingen sinds de jaren ’90 hebben plaatsgevonden in het dominante discours. Zo is de aandacht verschoven van monumenten die de ‘echte Noorse’ boercultuur vertegenwoordigen naar monumenten die het leven van alledag in Noorwegen symboliseren en in het bijzonder de kustcultuur (havens, scheepswerven, vuurtorens etc.). Daarnaast heeft er een verschuiving plaatsgevonden van individuele gebouwen naar de plaats van monumenten in hun omgeving en grootschalige cultuurlandschappen (kulturmiljøer). Op de derde plaats hebben we een verschuiving gezien naar benaderingen die wettelijke bescherming combineren met hergebruik en herontwikkeling van monumenten.

Het historic preservation arrangement Arizona (hoofdstuk 5) werd begin jaren ’90 geken- merkt door de invloedrijke positie van private eigenaren en de minimale rol van NGO’s. Bescherming van privaat eigendom en minimaal overheidsingrijpen waren de belangrijkste spelregels. De federale en statelijke overheid (National Park Service en State Historic Preservation Office) hielden een register bij van waardevolle historische gebouwen en wijken. Ze gebruikten voornamelijk economische instrumenten (subsidies en belastingvoordelen) om onderhoud en restauratie van deze monumenten te stimuleren. Lokale overheden hadden de mogelijkheid historische gebouwen en structuren te behouden tegen ongewenste ontwikkelingen door middel van planologische bescherming. De focus lag op historische gebouwen en wijken die tenminste 50 jaar oud waren en een intrin- sieke historische, artistieke of wetenschappelijke waarde vertegenwoordigden. Doel was deze monumenten te beschermen tegen ongewenste ontwikkelingen door ze op te nemen in het National Register of Historic Places (Arizona Register of Historic Places of door ze op lokaal niveau de planologische bestemming historic preservation te geven.


Het Nederlandse monumentenzorgarrangement (hoofdstuk 6) had begin jaren ’90 de volgende kenmerken. De Monumentenwet van 1988 verdeelde de belangrijkste taken en verantwoordelijkheden tussen de nationale overheid (Ministerie van OCenW en Rijksdienst voor de Monumentenzorg) en lokale overheden (gemeenten). Daarnaast was er een grote diversiteit aan maatschappelijke organisaties actief op het gebied van monumentenzorg. Een aantal van hen vervulde een officiële rol, zoals het Nationaal Restaurantsfonds (uitvoering subsidieregelingen) en het Nationaal Contact Monumenten (verzor- ging cursussen voor gemeentebesturen in samenwerking met de Rijksdienst en het NRF). Belangrijkste spelregels waren subsidiariteit en samenwerking tussen overheden en NGO’s. De nadruk lag begin jaren ’90 op historische gebouwen en stads- en dorpsge- richten met een intrinsieke artistieke, esthetische of historische waarde. Deze moesten beschermd worden tegen ongewenste ontwikkelingen door opname in het Monumentenregister, een vergunningensysteem en een subsidieprogramma.

Sinds 1990 zijn de organisatie en de inhoud van het Nederlandse monumentenzorg-arrangement verbreed. We hebben de provinciale overheden een grotere rol op zich genomen en hebben veel, vooral grote gemeenten een eigen monumentenbeleid ontwik- keld. Deze ontwikkelingen lijken overigens op gespannen voet te staan met het gegeven dat de nationale overheid met ingang van 2006 de verantwoordelijkheid voor het verenigen van onderhoud- en restauratiesubsidies weer naar zich toe heeft getrokken. Daarnaast zijn er, net als in Arizona, meer private partijen (bouwbedrijven, projectontwikkelaars, toerisme- en recreatieondernemers) betrokken geraakt bij monumentenzorg; Publiek- private samenwerking is een nog belangrijker spelregel geworden. Een nieuwe spelregel is dat cultuurhistorische waarden meegewogen moeten worden in alle ruimtelijke plannen. De grootste verschuivingen zijn tot slot ook hier van discursieve aard. Zo is de aandacht verschoven van individuele gebouwen en structuren naar grotere gebieden en complete cultuurlandschappen. Ook is de focus veranderd van monumenten van voor 1850 naar recentere erfgoed, onder andere uit de naoorlogse wederopbouwperiode. Bovendien is er een verschuiving geweest van restauratie naar planmatig onderhoud en van strikte bescherming naar (her)gebruik en ontwikkeling van monumenten.

In hoofdstuk 7 vergelijk ik de dynamiek in de drie monumentenzorgarrangementen tegen de achtergrond van het politieke moderniseringproces. Het hoofdstuk begint met een vergelijking van de initiële kenmerken van de drie casus in de vroege jaren ’90. De verdeling van macht en de geldende spelregels in de drie arrangementen waren in die periode zeer verschillend, maar er waren belangrijke overeenkomsten in de betrok- ken actoren (overheden op verschillende niveaus, NGO’s en monumenteneigenaren) en
vooral in de dominante beleidsdiscoursen. Deze discoursen hadden eenzelfde focus op bescherming tegen ongewenste ontwikkelingen van individuele gebouwen en structuren die van nationale betekenis zijn vanwege hun intrinsieke artistieke, esthetische of historische waarde.

De vergelijking in paragraaf 7.3 van de organisatorische en discursive dynamiek in de periode 1990-2005 levert drie conclusies op. Ten eerste hebben de organisatorische dimensies van de drie monumentenzorgarrangementen hun oorspronkelijke diversiteit in grote mate behouden. De enkele veranderingen die zich hebben voorgedaan zijn echter wel vergelijkbaar. Het betreft de opkomst van nieuwe coalities van publieke en private actoren en, in samenhang hiermee, de introductie van een nieuwe spelregel: publiek-private samenwerking. Grote veranderingen in de verdeling van macht tussen actoren hebben zich in geen van de drie casus voorgedaan. Mijn tweede conclusie is dat de discursive ontwikkelingen in de drie casus opvallende overeenkomsten vertonen. Vergelijkbare nieuwe discoursen hebben hun intrede gedaan. Deze benadrukken het behoud van gebouwen, structuren en landschappen die het leven van alledag vertegenwoordigen en die waardevol zijn als bron van lokale of regionale identiteit, ruimtelijke kwaliteit en economische groei, door te investeren in duurzaam (her)gebruik en (her)ontwikkeling. Ten derde concludeer ik dat de organisatorische en discursive ontwikkelingen in de drie casus nauw met elkaar verbonden zijn. De komst van marktpartijen en coalities van publieke en private partijen is nauw gereguleerd aan de introductie van de nieuwe spelregel publiek-private samenwerking en aan de discursive verschuiving richting (her)gebruik en ontwikkeling van historische structuren. Op basis van mijn bevindingen kan overigens niet worden geconcludeerd dat de drie monumentenzorgarrangementen meer op elkaar zijn gaan lijken in de periode 1990-2005. Wel wijst mijn analyse op het verschijnsel ‘institutionele leegte’ in de drie casus, aangezien de geldende spelregels en de verdeling van macht (nog) niet mee veranderd zijn met de discursive verschuivingen die zich hebben voorgedaan.

In paragraaf 7.4 relateer ik de organisatorische en discursive dynamiek in de drie casus aan het politieke moderniseringsproces in de Westerse samenleving. Dit leidt tot de conclusie dat de dynamiek in de drie monumentenzorgarrangementen in Noorwegen, Arizona en Nederland gedeeltelijk een proces van politieke modernisering laat zien. De dimensies actoren en coalities en dominante beleidsdiscoursen in de drie casus vertonen overduidelijk de kenmerken van de tweede fase van politieke modernisering. De dimensies geldende spelregels en verdeling van macht zijn de afgelopen jaren slechts in beperkte mate kenmerken van de tweede fase van politieke modernisering gaan ver- nen. De gedeeltelijke politieke modernisering (de relatieve stabiliteit van spelregels en machtsverhoudingen) kan ik verklaren door de verschillende historische, geografische, sociaal-politieke en economische achtergrond van de drie monumentenzorgarrangementen, waar de spelregels en de verdeling van (structurele) macht stevig in geworteld zijn.

Toch bevestigen mijn onderzoeksresultaten de centrale hypothese van dit onderzoek: het politieke moderniseringsproces in de Westerse samenleving is gerelateerd aan een toenemende interne diversiteit in monumentenzorgarrangementen. De komst van nieuwe actoren en coalities, nieuwe spelregels en nieuwe dominante beleidsdiscoursen hebben geleid tot nieuwe monumentenzorgpraktijken (publiek-private initiatieven gericht op (her)gebruik en ontwikkeling van monumenten), naast de bestaande, traditionele praktijken (bescherming van monumenten tegen ongewenste ontwikkeling door wettelijke en/of planologische bescherming en subsidieprogramma’s).

In hoofdstuk 8 reflecteer ik op het gebruik van de beleidsarrangementenbenadering als conceptueel kader. Ik constateer dat de beleidsarrangementenbenadering heeft voldaan aan de twee voorwaarden die ik in hoofdstuk 2 heb geformuleerd. Juist de geconjonneerde analyse van organisatorische en discursive ontwikkelingen heeft tot het inzicht geleid dat (a) het politieke moderniseringsproces gedeeltelijk heeft plaatsgevonden in de drie monumentenzorgarrangementen en (b) de organisatorische en discursive ontwikkelingen in de drie arrangementen nauw met elkaar verbonden zijn.

In hoofdstuk 2 noemde ik ook enkele zwakkere punten van de benadering, waaronder de neiging om ondergeschikte beleidsdiscoursen, ‘onvolgroeide’ beleidsarrangementen, en ‘institutionele leegten’ over het hoofd te zien. Het abstractieniveau van mijn onderzoek, dat ontwikkelingen in monumentenzorgarrangementen op nationaal niveau analyseert, leidde er inderdaad toe dat de aandacht uitging naar ontwikkelingen in de dominante beleidsdiscoursen op nationaal niveau. Discursive ontwikkelingen op lagere schaalniveaus, binnen de context van een bepaalde provincie, regio of gemeente, heb ik buiten beschouwing gelaten. Daarentegen heeft mijn vergelijkende analyse wel degelijk ‘institutionele leegten’ aan het licht gebracht (zie eerder). Een tweede risico dat ik in hoofdstuk 2 noemde was dat de beleidsarrangementenbenadering kan leiden tot een statische analyse van de vier dimensies van monumentenzorgarrangementen. In dit onderzoek heb ik dit probleem vermeden door de aandacht expliciet te richten op de dynamiek van en wisselwerking tussen de verschillende dimensies van de drie monumentenzorgarrangementen. Hiermee kon ik echter niet voorkomen dat de beschrijvingen van de initiële kenmerken van de drie casus in het begin van de jaren ’90 relatief statisch van aard zijn.

Andere tekortkomingen van de beleidsarrangementenbenadering waar ik in hoofdstuk 2 melding van maakte, zijn gerelateerd aan de begrippen macht en politieke modernisering. Door nieuwe operationaliseringen van deze begrippen te introduceren heeft dit onderzoek bijgedragen aan een verdere verfijning van de beleidsarrangementenbenadering. Zo heeft de meerlagige definitie van macht, die onderscheid maakt tussen relationele, dispositionele en structurele macht, een belangrijke rol gespeeld in het begrijpen van de stabiliteit in de drie monumentenzorgarrangementen tussen 1990 en 2005. Deze kon niet begrepen worden door het toepassen van het concept politieke modernisering. Door aandacht te besteden aan de specifieke geografische, historische, sociaal-politieke en economische context van monumentenzorgarrangementen als een belangrijke basis voor structurele macht, werd het mogelijk de relatieve stabiliteit van spelregels en machtsverhoudingen in de drie casus te begrijpen.

Een tweede verfijning van de beleidsarrangementenbenadering komt voort uit mijn operationalisering van het concept politieke modernisering. In dit onderzoek heb ik de twee fasen van politieke modernisering nader uitgewerkt voor het beleidssrein monumentenzorg en in termen van de vier dimensies van een beleidsarrangement. Hierdoor werd het mogelijk de ontwikkelingen die zich tussen 1990 en 2005 hebben voorgedaan in de drie monumentenzorgarrangementen systematisch te analyseren als elementen
van algemene sociaal-politieke transformaties in de Westerse samenleving. Dit heeft geleid tot een genuanceerde analyse van dynamiek en stabilité in de drie casus.

Zoals gezegd heeft het concept politieke modernisering slechts een gedeeltelijk begrip opgeleverd van de aangetroffen dynamiek en stabilité in de drie monumentenzorgarrangementen. We zouden kunnen concluderen dat de periode 1990-2005 te kort is om een volledige manifestatie van de tweede fase van politieke modernisering te kunnen aantreffen. In dat licht is het denkbaar dat de drie casus de komende jaren alsnog een volledige manifestatie van de tweede fase van politieke modernisering zullen laten zien. Hier dient echter opgemerkt te worden dat het concept politieke modernisering en de operationalisering van de twee bijbehorende fasen in dit onderzoek bedoeld zijn als perspectief op en analysekader voor hedendaagse veranderingen in Westerse monumentenzorgarrangementen, en niet als theorie om dergelijke veranderingen te voorzien of als normatief kader om dergelijke veranderingen voor te schrijven. Bovendien heeft dit onderzoek overtuigend bewijs opgeleverd voor het feit dat de specifieke historische, geografische, sociaal-politieke en economische context van de drie monumentenzorgarrangementen minstens zo bepalend is geweest voor de aangetroffen dynamiek en stabilité in deze arrangementen als het politieke moderniseringsproces.

Op basis van mijn bevindingen verwacht ik dan ook dat in de nabije toekomst nieuwe monumentenzorgpraktijken die de tweede fase van politieke modernisering vertegenwoordigen, hand in hand zullen blijven gaan met meer traditionele monumentenzorgpraktijken die hun oorsprong hebben in de eerste fase van politieke modernisering en/of stevig geworteld zijn in hun specifieke historische, geografische, sociaal-politieke of economische context. Om deze toekomstige ontwikkelingen te bestuderen adviseer ik het toepassen van de beleidsarrangementenbenadering (a) verfijnd met de nieuwe operationalisering van de begrippen macht en politieke modernisering en (b) aangevuld met een focus op contextuele factoren zoals de specifieke historische, geografische, sociaal-politieke of economische context van monumentenzorgarrangementen.

Tot slot reflecteert hoofdstuk 8 op de betekenis van mijn onderzoeksresultaten voor beleidsmakers en mensen uit de praktijk. Ik benadruk dat het aan de lezers is om te besluiten of mijn resultaten ook relevant zijn voor de monumentenzorgarrangementen waar zij zelf bij betrokken zijn. Daarnaast kom ik tot de slotsom dat de relevantie van mijn onderzoek vooralsnog ligt in de verscheidenheid aan perspectieven van waaruit hedendaagse ontwikkelingen in de monumentenzorg worden belicht. Dit gebeurt vanuit de invalshoek van (i) de betrokken actoren en coalities, (ii) de geldende spelregels, (iii) de verdeling van macht en (iv) de diversiteit aan beleidsdiscoursen, die bovendien tegen de achtergrond worden geplaatst van (a) hun specifieke context en (b) algemene sociaal-politieke transformaties in de Westerse samenleving. Dit meerlagige en multifocale inzicht in dynamiek en stabilité in monumentenzorgarrangementen helpt betrokkenen te reflecteren op hun eigen positie, rol en (inter)acties, hulpbronnen, regels en ideeën. Bovendien biedt het hen inzicht in de mogelijkheden om de monumentenzorgpraktijken waar ze bij betrokken zijn te veranderen. Binnen de beperkingen die de gegeven historische, geografische, sociaal-politieke en economische context hen oplegt, hebben ze de mogelijkheid (nieuwe) coalities te vormen, nieuwe actoren te introduceren, nieuwe ideeën te berde te brengen met als doel de bestaande machtsverhoudingen, geldende spelregels of dominante beleidsdiscoursen te beïnvloeden.

Op basis van mijn onderzoeksresultaten voorzie ik zoals gezegd dat traditionele, eerste fase monumentenzorgpraktijken zullen blijven bestaan naast nieuwe, tweede fase monumentenzorgpraktijken. Een groot deel van deze traditionele monumentenzorgpraktijken is dat ze relatief gesloten zijn en weinig ruimte bieden voor de inbreng van belangen en ideeën van minderheidsgroepen in de samenleving. Naar mijn mening is het dan ook een belangrijke taak van beleidsmakers om te zorgen voor meer reflexiviteit, transparantie en openheid in de monumentenzorg. Een zekere mate van centrale sturing en coördinatie door nationale of regionale experts blijft tegelijkertijd noodzakelijk om te garanderen dat alle belangrijke cultuurhistorische waarden op een duurzame manier beschermd worden en dat deze waarden meegewogen en geïntegreerd worden in nieuwe ruimtelijke plannen en projecten. Wettelijke bescherming en economische prikkels zijn daarbij belangrijke instrumenten, maar ze zijn niet afdoende om monumenten daadwerkelijk te beschermen tegen ongewenste ontwikkelingen noch om ze van duurzame (nieuwe) functies te voorzien. Van even groot belang zijn een breed maatschappelijk draagvlak, een sterke betrokkenheid van maatschappelijke organisaties en private sector en een voortdurend collectief debat over wat belangrijke cultuurhistorische waarden zijn en op welke manier ze beschermd moeten worden.

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References


Appendix 1 Sources

The Kulturminneforvaltning Arrangement in Norway
Legislation

- Cultural Heritage Act (CHA): 

- Nature Conservation Act (NCA): 

- Planning and Building Act (PBA): 
  Plan- og bygningslov, LOV-1985-06-14-77, Act No. 77 of 14 June 1985, with amendments, the most recent by Act No. 85 of 11 June 1993.

Interviews and Consultations

Jan G. Auestad
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Nord-Trøndelag Research Institute, Department of Resource Sciences

Ragnhild Skogheim
Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research (NIBR)
The Historic Preservation Arrangement in Arizona

Legislation

- National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), as amended, an act to establish a national policy for the environment, to provide for the establishment of a council on environmental quality, and for other purposes.
- National Historic Preservation Act of 1966 (NHPA), as amended through 2000, an act to establish a program for the preservation of additional historic properties throughout the nation, and for other purposes.

Interviews and Consultations

Debbie Abele  City of Scottsdale, Historic Preservation Officer / Acros Inc., historic preservation consultant
John Akers  City of Tempe, Tempe Historical Museum
Todd Bostwick  City of Phoenix, City Archeologist
Reid Butler  Butler Housing Company / Phoenix Historic Preservation Commission
Erika Finbraaten  Arizona State Historic Preservation Office
Robert Frankeberger  Arizona State Historic Preservation Office
Grady Gammage  Gammage & Burnham Attorneys / Arizona State University, College of Architecture and Environmental Design and College of Law
Kevin Harper  National Park Service, Support Office
Pamela Jones  Arizona Heritage Alliance / Arizona Preservation Foundation
Doug Kupel  City of Phoenix, Law Department
Charles Randall Morrison  Arizona State University, School for Public Affairs
Rick Naimark  City of Phoenix, City Manager’s Office
Joseph Nucci  City of Tempe, Historic Preservation Officer
Ira Rubins  Arizona Parks and Recreation Association
Scott Sollday  Historic preservation consultant
Barbara Stocklin  City of Phoenix, Historic Preservation Officer
Gary Stumpf  Arizona Bureau of Land Management
Mark Vinson  City of Tempe, City Architect
Jannelle Warren-Findley  Arizona State University, Public History Department
Kevin Weight  City of Phoenix, Historic Preservation Office
Liz Wilson  Historic preservation consultant and property owner in the Campus Homes neighborhood in Tempe
Casey and Lloyd Yunker  Property owners in the Encanto Vista Historic District in Phoenix

Lectures


Conferences and Meetings

- Defense of the MA Thesis Post World War II Homebuilding: An Industrial Revolution by E. Finbraaten before the Public History Department of the Arizona State University, May 7th 2003, Tempe.
- Meeting of the City of Tempe Historic Preservation Commission, June 5th 2003, Tempe.
- Meeting of the City of Phoenix Historic Preservation Commission, June 30th 2003, Phoenix.
- Statewide Preservation Partnership Conference A Sense of Place, June 26th-28th 2003, Chandler.

Appendix 1 Sources

The Monumentenzorg Arrangement in the Netherlands

Legislation


Interviews and Consultations

Fons Asselbergs  National Department for Conservation
Pieter Baars  National Restoration Fund
Jan Willems van Beusekom  National Contact Monuments Foundation
Klaas Boeder  Monument Watch Federation
Mark Bressers  National Department for Conservation
Saskia van Dockum  National Department for Archeology

Lectures

Lectures (selection)


Conferences and Meetings (selection)

- General meeting of the Parliamentary Committee of Education, Culture and Science with the State Secretary of Culture about new governmental policy on cultural heritage preservation, June 28th 2004, Den Haag.
- Preservation Conference Actualiteiten in de monumentenzorg, October 9th 2003, Den Haag.
## Appendix 2 Acronyms and Abbreviations

### The Kulturminneforvaltning Arrangement in Norway

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CHA</td>
<td>Lov om kulturminner (Cultural Heritage Act)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAB</td>
<td>Grunneieendoms-, Adresse og Byggningsregister (Register for Property Ownership, Addresses and Buildings)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCA</td>
<td>Lov om naturvern (Nature Conservation Act)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIBR</td>
<td>Norsk institutt for by- og regionforskning (Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIKU</td>
<td>Norsk institutt for kulturminneforskning (Norwegian Institute for Cultural Heritage Research)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NOU</td>
<td>Norges Offentlige Utredninger (Norway’s Official Reports)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBA</td>
<td>Plan- og bygningslov (Planning and Building Act)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEFRAK</td>
<td>Sekretariatet For Registrering Av faste Kulturminner (Bureau for the Registration of Built Heritage)</td>
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</table>

### The Historic Preservation Arrangement in Arizona

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A.R.S.</td>
<td>Arizona Revised Statutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASPB</td>
<td>Arizona State Parks Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>BLM</td>
<td>Bureau of Land Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>CLG</td>
<td>Certified Local Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>HPC</td>
<td>Historic Preservation Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>HPF</td>
<td>Historic Preservation Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>HPO</td>
<td>Historic Preservation Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>HSRC</td>
<td>Historic Sites Review Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEPA</td>
<td>National Environmental Policy Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>NHPA</td>
<td>National Historic Preservation Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPS</td>
<td>National Park Service</td>
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<td>SHPO</td>
<td>State Historic Preservation Office</td>
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### The Monumentenzorg Arrangement in the Netherlands

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BRIM</td>
<td>Besluit Rijkssubsidiering Instandhouding Monumenten (Government Grant Scheme for the Preservation of Monuments)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BROM</td>
<td>Besluit Rijkssubsidiering Onderhoud Monumenten (Government Grant Scheme for the Maintenance of Monuments)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRRM</td>
<td>Besluit Rijkssubsidiering Restauratie Monumenten (Government Grant Scheme for the Restoration of Monuments)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPO</td>
<td>Interprovinciaal Overleg (Interprovincial Consultative Council)</td>
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Appendix 3 List of Photographs

Cover  Holiday home ‘t Abbesje (1901) in Oostkapelle, the Netherlands (no protected status)
Page 13  Mining town Røros in Norway (Unesco World Heritage)
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Traces of change
Sara de Boer was born in Nieuwkoop on the 29th of March 1976. She completed secondary education in 1994 (Alkwin Kollege in Uithoorn) and that same year, she started as undergraduate student at the Faculty of Policy Sciences of the University of Nijmegen (nowadays Nijmegen School of Management, Radboud University Nijmegen). In 1999, she graduated in Political Sciences of the Environment. Her Master’s thesis analyzed the noise nuisance problem around Schiphol Airport. One year later, she also graduated in Public Administration with a Master’s thesis in which she evaluated Dutch policies at the interface of cultural heritage preservation and land use planning.

In 2000, Sara de Boer started working as PhD student on dynamics in cultural heritage preservation at the Department of Public Administration, Radboud University Nijmegen. Besides working on her PhD project, she participated as tutor and visiting lecturer in the Bachelor’s and Master’s programs of the Department of Public Administration. She worked as policy advisor to clients in the field of cultural heritage preservation, and she contributed to a joint publication with the Department of Political Sciences of the Environment.

From 2005 until 2008, she worked as public administration researcher at Alterra, Wageningen University and Research Center. During this period, her focus shifted from preservation arrangements at national level to regional policy processes on nature, landscape, environment and water. She managed research projects on the diversity of nature and landscape policy practices in the Netherlands, the governance capacity of Dutch nature policy, and the implementation of European environmental directives. In addition, she participated in research projects on methods of policy evaluation and the policy evaluation of the Reconstruction Sand Areas (Reconstructie Zandgebieden).

At present, Sara de Boer is senior policy advisor at the regional water authority Waterschap Aa and Maas in ’s-Hertogenbosch, where she works on the fields of cultural heritage preservation and climate change adaptation. Instead of analyzing policy processes, she currently participates in and manages them.