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
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To Paint the Nile Blue:
Factors for success and failure of
UNMIS and UNAMID

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Introduction

In 1955, the year before its independence from the United Kingdom (UK), a civil war started in Sudan which lasted until 1972. Since 1983 Sudan has faced renewed conflict. The focus of international attention has long been the so-called 'North-South' conflict, but since 2003 another region, Darfur, has emerged into the spotlights. After the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in Nairobi in January 2005 between the Government of Sudan (GoS) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), the United Nations (UN) has deployed the peacekeeping operation United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS). At present 8,827 troops, 583 military observers, 696 police, 880 international civilian and 2,566 local civilian personnel, and 253 United Nations Volunteers are working for UNMIS.¹ The operation is mandated by Security Council resolution 1590 (2005) amongst other tasks to support the implementation of the CPA. It is allowed under chapter VII of the Charter 'to take the necessary action' to protect 'civilians under imminent threat of physical violence', and to protect its own personnel and humanitarian workers.²

Security Council resolution 1706 (2006) mandated UNMIS to be deployed in Darfur in order to end the conflict in that region and assist in the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) and the N'djamena Agreement on Humanitarian Cease-fire on the Conflict in Darfur. The actual deployment of UNMIS in Darfur was, however, hampered by the fact that the GoS obstructed it. The Government preferred the continuation of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). Subsequently, talks on Darfur in the Security Council went in the direction of a hybrid operation of AMIS combined with so-called United Nations Light and Heavy Support Packages, and the deployment of a multi-dimensional presence in the border regions in the Central African Republic (CAR) and Chad to prevent a spill-over of the conflict into these two countries. On 31 July the Security Council approved the deployment of the African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). This was followed on 25 September by the approval of the United Nations Mission in the CAR and Chad (MINURCAT) and EUFOR Chad/CAR.³

The research questions and methodology

The Dutch development organisation Cordaid commissioned this study and laid down a number of research questions on the chances for success and failure of UNMIS in the 'North-South' conflict and the lessons that can be drawn from the experiences in this conflict for conflict management in Darfur. These research questions are as follows:

A) The peace process and peacekeeping operation in the 'North-South' conflict

1. What are the most important developments in the peace process in the 'North-South' conflict up to this moment?
2. To what extent does UNMIS satisfy the factors for success and failure as found in research on UN-peacekeeping operations?
3. Are there any case specific factors for success and failure, other factors which play an important and special role in Sudan?

B The lessons from the peace process and the peacekeeping operation in the 'North-South' conflict applied to the conflict in Darfur

- 1 What are the most important developments in the peace process in the Darfur conflict up to this moment?
- 2 How do the general factors for success and failure and the Sudan case specific factors for success and failure, as found under A3, determine the chances for success for the case of UNAMID in Darfur?
- 3 Which recommendations follow from this analysis?

The underlying methodology used in this study has been developed in: Jaïr van der Lijn, *Walking the tightrope: Do UN peacekeeping operations actually contribute to durable peace?* Amsterdam, Rozenberg Publishers, Dutch university Press, Purdue University Press, 2006. The present study is based on a study of literature and relevant documents, as well as on interviews with key-experts and stakeholders, such as academics and representatives from both Sudanese as international Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), the conflict parties, the international community, international organizations and UNMIS. For this purpose a field research was undertaken from 24 October to 17 November in Khartoum and Juba (Sudan) and Addis Ababa (Ethiopia). The interviews during this research were held under the agreement that there would be no direct quotations and that references should not be traceable to persons directly. For these reasons the references have been clustered and the interviewees have been coded. More information on this can be obtained from the author. The research, its findings and the recommendations are those of the authors and can in no way be attributed to Cordaid.

Factors for success and failure of peacekeeping operations

In order to assess the chances for success and failure of UNMIS and UNAMID, this study reviews both operations on the extent to which they fulfil nine factors of success and failure which explain the differences in the contribution of peacekeeping operations to durable peace. Durable peace is defined as absence of physical violence and the sufficient addressing of the causes of conflict.⁴ The probability that a peacekeeping operation makes a positive contribution to durable peace increases if:

1. *The parties are willing and sincere in cooperating with the implementation of the operation:* In order for the conflicting parties to be sincere they need to perceive the operation as an important part of a peace process, which they view as the best alternative for the conflict. The reason for the required willingness and sincerity is that one can start building peace, but if the parties only hope to restart the conflict once the United Nations leaves, the results cannot be lasting.
2. *The operation is able to provide a sufficient sense of security to the parties:* A short-term danger is lurking at the start of an operation, because although the parties may view the projected durable peace as the best alternative, the road towards that future will be perceived, and often is, a bumpy one. The conflict and the history of far before the conflict have often created a perception amongst the parties that the other party is not to be trusted and that one has to provide for one's own security against the threat of the other. In order to stop this spiral and to enable disarmament and demobilisation, an operation needs to provide alternative sources for a sense of security. Parties generally perceive their security to increase if the cease-fire is monitored by a credible, large, well-trained, well-equipped, and robustly mandated force.
3. *The operation has sufficient attention for the causes of the conflict both in depth and in breadth:* One can perhaps reach negative peace, but if the causes of conflict persist, it is likely to eventually flair up again. The probability that an operation contributes sufficiently to the addressing of the causes of the conflict increases if more of these causes are addressed – the breadth – and if more attention is given to each cause – the depth. If not all causes receive sufficient attention, the chances increase that the conflict resumes, and the causes that were addressed intensify again and therefore undo the work that has already been done. In the short term, however, especially state unwillingness and the absence of good governance, and the absence of legitimacy of the state and government are generally important causes of conflict to be addressed.
4. *The operation receives sufficient co-operation from important outside actors and parties:* In particular, the support of the permanent members of the Security Council is important, because they need to accept the necessary resolutions

and mandate, and may also need to pressure proxies into compliance. The co-operation from neighbouring countries is essential, because these countries often support one of the parties, and the implementation of some 'policy tools' implemented in peacekeeping operation requires their assistance.

5. *The operation is timely deployed and at the right time:* If the timing is right, peacekeeping operation can aid and play an accommodating role. If the conflict is not yet ripe, the role of an operation which is supposed to monitor a cease-fire on the basis of the consent of the parties, is much more limited. Furthermore, also timely deployment of an operation is important, because late deployment may allow stable situations to destabilize again. Therefore, the interval between the signing of a peace agreement and deployment of the operation needs to be kept to a minimum in order to maintain the momentum for peace.
6. *The operation has at its disposal competent personnel and leadership, as well as clear command structures:* The leadership is especially important with regard to the continuing mediation role during the presence of an operation. Furthermore, competent personnel is the basis for each 'policy tool' in a peacekeeping operation. Clear command structures are especially important in crisis situations, but also support a fluent decision-making process.
7. *The operation is part of a long-term approach:* In order to contribute sufficiently to negative peace and especially to the addressing of the causes of the conflict, time is needed. Consequently, it should not come as a surprise that many of these processes may be started by a peacekeeping operation, but cannot be finished within the period of its presence and therefore need to be embedded in a wider approach. This means that operations need to build upon policies that have already been applied. Furthermore, in the absence of sufficient follow-up, it is likely that the short period of presence is not enough to allow durable changes to take root and in such a situation the contribution of an operation is likely to be only temporary.
8. *Within the operation and externally the implementation of the 'policy tools' are coordinated:* The implementation of many 'policy tools' within a peacekeeping operation depends on the implementation of other 'policy tools'. Co-ordination between them is essential for optimum implementation. There are two main problems in this respect. First, important processes are sometimes rushed in order to be completed in time for another. Second, two complementary 'policy tools' fail to link up with each other, and consequently too much time may elapse between these two linked processes. External co-ordination is another important factor. Again there are two main problems. First, if all these actions are insufficiently co-ordinated with other organisations present in the field, they may thwart each other. Second, lack of co-ordination with the organisation that is to

take over the task after departure of the operation, may badly affect the sustainability of the contribution.

9. *The operation provides 'ownership'*: 'Ownership' is important both during and after the presence of an operation. Parties, in the end, need to be enabled to decide for themselves what they together deem necessary, in order to ensure that an operation does deliver what they require it to. After the departure of an operation, the former conflicting parties and the population must view and feel the contribution to be something they want to maintain.

The peace process and peacekeeping operation in the 'North-South' conflict

The most important developments in the peace process in the 'North-South' conflict up to this moment

In 1972 the First Civil War in Sudan came to an end with the signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement according to which the South of the country became autonomous. A decade of relative peace followed until in 1983 the Sudanese government wanted to install shari'a rule in the whole country and consequently restrain southern autonomy. A ferocious civil war followed. The immense complexity of the conflict and lack of political will prevented an early resolution. Under the guidance of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) a negotiations process started between the GoS and the biggest armed opposition movement, the SPLM which in 2002 resulted in the signing of the Machakos protocol, in which a broad framework for peace was set out. A second protocol followed in Naivasha in 2003 and the four last protocols were signed in 2004. That same year the United Nations offered its support for the implementation of the Protocols, and the Security Council called for a political mission, the United Nations Advance Mission in the Sudan (UNAMIS), to make an inventory of the operational realities in Sudan and to prepare for a possible peace support operation. The GoS quickly signed an agreement with the United Nations to facilitate UNAMIS, while the SPLM hesitated. The two conflict parties needed until the end of 2004 to resolve the outstanding security issues. On 9 January 2005, the CPA was signed.⁵

The signing of the CPA did not mean the road ahead would be without obstacles. Other regional conflicts in Sudan, like the ones in Darfur and the east, remained, and these might affect the 'North-South' peace process. Tensions and internal divisions in the South, which had been suppressed in the fight against a common enemy, might become possible roadblocks. External forces, like the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), could also influence the peace process. Moreover, the so-called 'other armed groups' had not been dealt with in the negotiations, although they were supposed to be integrated in the two armies. Furthermore, the negotiations of the CPA depended on two key figures, SPLM leader John Garang and GoS Vice President Ali Osman Taha. The latter

was only able to sell the peace accord to his sceptical colleagues as the country's last chance for unity, and as the path to ending Sudan's international isolation.⁶

The Security Council established UNMIS and authorized a maximum size of 10,000 military personnel and an appropriate civilian component. The mandate of the mission consists of four broad components: support the implementation of the CPA; coordinate and facilitate the voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs); assist the mine-action sector; and protect and promote human rights.⁷

On 9 July President Omar Bashir, First-Vice President Garang and Vice-President Taha were sworn-in leading the Government of National Unity (GoNU), the Interim National Constitution was signed and the state of emergency in all States except Darfur, Kassala State and Red Sea State was lifted. Nonetheless, only three weeks later the CPA was put to a severe test when Garang died in a helicopter crash in southern Sudan. In the days after his death the SPLM took swift action to confirm Salva Kiir as its new Chairman. Nonetheless, Garang's death led to serious social unrest in amongst other places Khartoum, and to delays in the implementation of the CPA as the SPLM had to recuperate. At the same time with the death of Garang the star of vice-president Taha dimmed sharply. It became clear that few in the northern governing National Congress Party (NCP) believed in the spirit of the CPA and strong leadership to push it through was not available. In the meantime the deployment of UNMIS lagged behind schedule.⁸

On 22 October the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) was established as a caretaker government, followed by an Interim Constitution at the start of December. At the end of that month also the status-of-force agreement between UNMIS and the GoNU was finally signed. Nonetheless, during this period a number of problems rose. First, the Abyei boundary issue was not resolved as the NCP rejected the report of the Abyei Boundary Commission. The oil-rich region of Abyei requires special attention, because it forms the bridge between the North and the South. Second, the 'other armed groups' had not yet signed the peace agreement, while the deadline for their full integration into the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) was set at 9 January 2006. Third, a number of commissions called for in the CPA were still not established. Fourth, the Joint Integrated Units (JIUs), combined Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and SPLA units, were not formed. Fifth, an anti-United Nations campaign in Khartoum and other cities, in response to UNMIS' criticisms on Darfur, grew. Sixth, a number of external factors played a negative role in the implementation of the peace agreement. The LRA, a Ugandan rebel group remained present in southern Sudan, while the relations of Khartoum with Chad and Eritrea deteriorated.⁹

UNMIS spend a lot of attention to other conflicts in Sudan at the expense of the implementation of the CPA. It monitored the talks between the Sudanese government and the Eastern Front, which led to the Eastern Peace Agreement and strongly improved the Sudanese-Eritrean relations. It was also very vocal

on the issue of Darfur, causing deliberate targeting of UNMIS personnel in the second half of 2006, and was heavily involved in the mediation of the DPA. Nonetheless, at the start of 2007 substantial improvement of the situation in southern Sudan and the 'North-South' conflict had been made.¹⁰

In the autumn of 2007, however, sufficient issues remained open for the SPLM to play hard ball and withdraw from the GoNU. As such it started what has been called 'the troubles'. Two important issues were the Abyei boundary issue and a reshuffle of the GoNU cabinet, which was required by the SPLM. A third important issue, was that on the 9 July deadline, a bit less than 90 percent of the SAF had been withdrawn from the South. As SAF forces stayed behind, Khartoum was in violation of the agreements. The remainder was said to be kept to protect the oil fields until the JIUs were deployed. Although also the SPLA stayed in the North, it was only required to withdraw once the JIUs were present. Both parties, however, send their weaker troops to form the JIUs, and because of this these forces, which were meant to become elite forces, in fact needed extra training. Khartoum does not finance the JIUs and does also not accept technical assistance. At the same time, the SPLM benefits from the fact that the JIUs are not deployed, as it enables it to maintain its forces in the North and does not trigger the deadline for its withdrawal. In spite of these three issues, it is not unlikely that the 'troubles' were more part of a strategy of the SPLM to regain attention of the international community away from Darfur towards CPA implementation, and to hide SPLM infighting. Many of the SPLM leaders have been absorbed into, or at least tight connections with, the Khartoum elites. They now receive a share of the oil income and political power, what they no longer want to give up. As such the CPA has at least become an elite pact. At the same time, the 'troubles' and their rhetoric may have caught their own dynamics in which separation and the restart of the war may become more logical.¹¹

The factors for success and failure of peacekeeping operations applied to the case of UNMIS

The parties are willing and sincere

The CPA is a negotiated solution in the conflict between the GoS and the SPLM/A. Although these two parties were the largest and main parties in the conflict, a number of 'other armed groups' were present in southern Sudan. Efforts to bring these 'other armed groups' into the CPA had initially only limited success. The continuous presence of the LRA remains a security threat in the region, as long as the Ugandan peace process has not come to a conclusion, but is presently in control. A second large 'other armed group', the South Sudan Defence Force (SSDF) has been integrated into the SPLA, through the Juba Declaration. Although the SPLM has not been able to unite all factions in the South, at least they all respect the peace agreement. In the North the National Democratic Alliance, an alliance of 13 political parties of -

amongst others - the Democratic Unionist Party and the Umma Party, committed itself to the CPA as well and joined the GoNU. Consequently, the 'other armed groups' appear to be no longer an issue. Nonetheless, support for the CPA amongst the northern opposition is based on the assumption that it will lead to democracy. Thus far, according to them, it only appears to have provided legitimacy to the NCP and the SPLM, and therefore this support is waning.¹²

The CPA itself was the result of a negotiation process between Taha and Garang. In the course of this process, slowly trust grew in their personal relation, which sped-up the negotiations. In addition, both parties were convinced that they would be able to solve outstanding or new issues personally and consequently did not include a mechanism in the accord in the event that the parties were not able to overcome their differences. The general conviction is that both parties at the time of the signing of the CPA were sincere and willing. Whether they still are is frequently questioned.¹³

The strength and capacity of the NCP, through the GoS and the GoNU, is large compared to that of the governments of countries in which peacekeeping operations are usually deployed. As a result, the influence of UNMIS on the policies and activities of the NCP is inherently more limited. The operation has less leverage and is based upon the consent of Khartoum. Without its cooperation UNMIS is unable to implement much. As a result, for example, the rule of law unit of UNMIS faces large obstacles in implementing its policies, as Khartoum is not interested in cooperation. This makes the importance of the willingness and sincerity of the NCP even greater. Within the NCP, there are those who view the CPA as the only way to maintain the unity of the country and a possibility to integrate the SPLM into the elite. These members are often called the reformers. There are also those who view the CPA as a trap that may cause the loss of power for the NCP. This group is often called the hardliners. Bashir's role resembles that of the chairman of a seminar, searching for consensus between the different factions of his party. He is merely a *primus inter pares*. Already from the start of UNAMIS the NCP was hesitant to fully cooperate with the operation and the GoS deliberately tried to slow down its deployment. It tried to maintain its sovereignty as much as possible. Nonetheless, from the signing of the CPA until the death of Garang, the reformist group was strongest. Thereafter the hardliners group gained in power and the relationship between the NCP and the SPLM came under pressure. Garang was also in the North regarded as a potential leader for a 'new Sudan', and within the NCP at least seen as someone who could be trusted in his wish to maintain the unity of the country. Garang was succeeded by Salva Kiir, who is less able to maintain good relations with the NCP. The position of the NCP towards UNMIS also became less favourable and cooperative. This hesitant position strengthened as the United Nations became more vocal on the issue of Darfur, and UN involvement was advocated as a solution for that conflict. At the beginning of 2006, the NCP supported protests and campaigns against the United Nations. Moreover, the NCP started to frustrate UNMIS' operations. It

opposed UNMIS Radio broadcasting in the North and Darfur. In addition, restrictions were placed on the freedom of movement of UN personnel and Sudanese UNMIS staff was arrested. Furthermore, it was slow to allow full deployment in the mission area and materiel was slow to clear customs. The relations between the United Nations and Khartoum became increasingly tense and eventually culminated when the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Jan Pronk, was declared *persona non grata* in October 2006. Nonetheless, the NCP did make small steps, for example regarding human rights. At the same time it appears that international pressure, if not backed by force or power, only strengthens the hardliners in their sieged castle mentality.¹⁴

Initially the SPLM/A was reluctant towards cooperation with UNMIS. Garang did not trust the international community, the United Nations and NGOs as in the past they had been perceived to cooperate too much with the government. Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) had *de facto* supported the presence of the GoS in southern Sudan, by supporting the garrison towns. For this reason, UNAMIS was not allowed access to the areas under control of the SPLA. After the death of Garang the position of the SPLM started to shift. Kiir is much more in favour of independence for the South. At the same time, he is better able to unite the South and integrate the SSDF into the SPLA, a task Garang would have been less able to perform. At present, however, the battle within the SPLM between the unionists and the separatist is not yet over. Nonetheless, the SPLM/A has become more willing to cooperate with UNMIS, amongst other reasons because it found it had underestimated its own capacity to govern the South. It has started to request a lot of support and became a lot more enthusiastic and open to the international involvement. Still the SPLM only cooperates to the extent that it expects gains. It does not fully open-up and is especially interested in funds. During 'the troubles', however, the SPLM called for a stronger mandate for UNMIS.¹⁵

At present, a number of issues still need resolution and both SPLM/A and NCP have proven to be reluctant to take difficult steps. Their cooperation with UNMIS is related to this. At a national level the parties continue to contest the interpretation of several aspects of the CPA. Nonetheless, this is viewed to be as part of a 'game', by those who play this 'game'. This attitude is not surprising as both the NCP top as the SPLM/A top have a common interest in peace and dividing the spoils of the oil fields. Moreover, the NCP hopes to prevent a war on two or even more fronts. The parties may by now have crossed a point of no return. On the other hand, both parties play the 'game' without pulling their punches, which is extremely dangerous as they may loose control over their power base or may no longer be able to give in without loosing face. Many at the mid-ranks in the SPLM/A have not yet been able to pick the fruits of peace. As they do not see what is in it for them, they may run out of control. At the same time at state level, both parties appear to work quite well together, while on the local level many conflicts between communities are still unresolved.¹⁶

Providing a sufficient sense of security

The role of UNMIS in providing security to civilians is limited. At the start of the operation, security in southern Sudan and the transitional areas remained unsettled. In the areas where UNMIS became active the security situation improved in the course of 2006. With regard to the South, however, at the end of 2006 tensions increased in areas where ‘other armed groups’ continued to operate. In those areas an increased number of violent clashes took place, while the LRA equally remained a destabilizing factor. The protection of civilians by UNMIS was difficult in this widespread insecurity. Now, the situation has improved strongly, although largely due to the SPLA and the Juba Declaration. With regard to the transitional areas, Abyei was less secure at the start of the operation. Especially when the “final and binding” ruling of the Abyei Boundary Commission was refused by the NCP, the situation became tense. UNMIS increased presence in this region helped to stabilize the situation.¹⁷

Both parties do not feel UNMIS can provide them security. Speaker of the house of the GoSS, James Wani Igga, summarizes the general view on UNMIS well, referring to a “leopard without teeth. Once the sheep know this, they will play around.”¹⁸ Indeed UNMIS is not always taken seriously, because when matters turn hot its personnel is said to flee into its barracks. As UNMIS has no robust mandate and ways to punish violators, it is not feared and consequently less respected. This leads the SPLM/A to the argument that their only sense of security “is the SPLA”.¹⁹ Nonetheless, at the time of the CPA negotiations, and even though some may regret it now, in addition to the NCP the SPLM also did not wish to have a robust UNMIS mandate. However, although UNMIS is not mandated robustly under chapter VII of the Charter and with only about 10,000 uniformed personnel, it does contribute to the sense of security of the parties. It does so by mediating and resolving clashes between ethnic groups and armed forces. Its mere presence increases security, similar to the manner in which in marital fights one does not quarrel in front of visitors. The parties do not want to be caught violating the agreement in the presence of a witness.²⁰

Attention for the causes of the conflict

In theory, the CPA, and UNMIS as part of its implementation, provides a solution to a number of Sudan’s causes of conflict. If implemented, the CPA starts a process of political transformation and democratisation in both northern as southern Sudan, that may lead to further addressing the causes of the many conflicts in the country. In addition, it provides in power and wealth sharing agreements between the North and the South, which to a large extent may be sufficient incentives for the South to choose the road of unity.²¹

Also in practise, UNMIS attempts to address a number of causes of conflict. It hopes to improve inter-group relations through facilitation, support, and encouragement of local reconciliation initiatives. In this regard, the United Nations hosted meetings between tribal leaders to talk about the seasonal migration of nomads through farming areas. These discussions led to

agreements, decreased tensions in Abyei and southern Sudan, and migrations of nomads without major incidents. It was, however, the decision of the SPLM/A and the government to incorporate and integrate the 'other armed groups', that mostly improved the inter-group relations. At a national level UNMIS has done little to address discrimination of Africans and non-Muslims in the North. The majority of the northerners does still not regard southerners as equals, but as inferiors.²²

With regard to the strength of the state, the establishment of the GoNU, the swearing-in of the new Presidency, the inauguration of the two Chambers of national legislature and the adoption of the Interim National Constitution were important first steps to recreate a common structure for government in Sudan. With regard to the South in 2005 the GoSS was established to govern the southern states. While the GoSS as a new entity is generally regarded to be lacking capacity, the government in the North is often viewed to be strong. The latter perception is, however, not entirely correct. One might even argue that the government in Khartoum is in fact weak. Nonetheless, society is even weaker. It is a myth that Khartoum is in control of all government structures throughout the country. Quite often it is not, and parts of the government apparatus are either not aware of what other parts are doing, or are even thwarting each other. Moreover, only the security apparatus is, to a certain extent, strong. Other parts of the government are certainly not. Nonetheless, UNMIS directs most of its attention for capacity and institution building to the South, amongst other reasons because the North is less open to assistance. The GoSS, indeed, lacks capacity and educated personnel to direct and implement policies. Consequently, also the process of development is very slow as the region is being build-up from scratch. One has to keep in mind, however, that in Sudan amongst the population the state is not considered popular, due to its violent nature in the past. By cooperating with the state, UNMIS is therefore sometimes viewed to be partisan. The traditional tribal structures, including tribal courts, are barely supported although these do possess a lot of capacity to solve conflicts. One should, however, not idealize the traditional structures, such as the courts, because also these have their (human rights) flaws.²³

Whereas the North is often said to be capable but unwilling, the South is generally viewed to be willing but incapable. This is, however, again a too simple picture. Also the GoSS is sometimes not in favour of some, for example human rights and democratisation, policies of UNMIS. Moreover, the GoSS and the SPLM are often criticized of not being representative of all the ethnic groups in southern Sudan, and being predominantly Dinka. Furthermore, it is remarkable that although the elections are supposed to be the bedrock of the CPA process, an electoral system has not been decided upon. Democratisation although agreed upon in the CPA, is not necessarily a finished business. Both the NCP and the SPLM loose power if this process proceeds, and therefore they may search for loopholes to avoid implementation. Nonetheless, the human rights and democracy situation has improved. Both parties released their political detainees. UNMIS' role in this is, however, limited. Although the

UNMIS Rule of Law Division in southern Sudan has been quite effective, as it has been co-located in the GoSS ministries, its Human Rights Division has been much more directed at Darfur and not so much at the rest of the country. Furthermore, at the end of 2007, UNMIS still had to build its capacity to provide assistance for the 2008/2009 elections.²⁴

Demographic pressure resulting from landmines and IDPs are addressed by UNMIS. Vast areas of southern Sudan were severely polluted by mines and unexploded ordnances. While Khartoum did have the capacity and expertise to deal with this issue, the SPLM/A did not have the right personnel and materiel. For this reason, UNMIS has supported a coordinated national strategy on mine action. Many IDPs are presently better-off in the places where they live than in their places of origin. In absence of social and physical infrastructure and services they are not likely to return. Many also wait and see how the security situation develops. In addition, some do not feel welcome in the South, as they are treated by the SPLM/A as traitors of the North. In practice, many IDPs stay in the cities and become part of an urbanization process. Although many refugees in the region have been repatriated by UNHCR and UNMIS, those who live in the West are more reluctant to return as they are used to higher living standards.²⁵

To address the economic causes of the conflict and to ensure economic recovery, a Multi-Donor Trust Fund was established in 2005. Grant agreements between the GoSS and the GoNU and the World Bank were signed in 2006. Disbursements of donor funds through the Multi-Donor Trust Fund, however, stayed behind expectations. The regulations of the World Bank were too time-consuming and the GoSS lacked capacity to fulfil the whole process. Especially the three transitional areas, Abyei, Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan, which needed recovery most, saw relatively little economic improvement. The Multi-Donor Trust Fund has been directed too much at long-term development, while the situation in southern Sudan still requires emergence assistance. At the same time emergency funds have ended and NGOs have started to withdraw their activities because the situation is no longer considered a humanitarian emergency and Darfur is regarded more important.²⁶

The slow progress with regard to the DDR process in the South is not due to a lack of a sense of security of the SPLM. It is rather the opposite. The SPLM is interested in downsizing its present tribal army into a modern professional conventional one, as it knows that to win a potential next (border)war, it does not need a large guerrilla army. Moreover, it cannot afford its large army anymore, and lack of payments has already caused mutinies and revolts. Nonetheless, the SPLM/A also needs to integrate the 'other armed groups', needs to have alternative jobs for demobilized personnel and needs to satisfy all the tribes. If this is not done, demobilization becomes dangerous, as the forces – SPLA or the 'other armed groups' integrated into it – may revolt. The slow

DDR process in Sudan is as such not so much a security issue, but a developmental problem.²⁷

Cooperation from important outside actors and parties

Troop contributing countries were not very forthcoming in their pledges and those who did were not able to meet the deployment plans, which slowed down the deployment. At the Oslo international donors conference for the reconstruction and economic development of Sudan 4.5 billion US\$ was pledged for the first three years following the signing of the CPA. Disbursements were, however, very slow. In all sectors, humanitarian, recovery and development, needs remained high and urgent, while funds were not sufficient. Worse, since southern Sudan was no longer regarded a humanitarian disaster situation, funds available for the region actually decreased. OCHA for example withdrew from the South.²⁸

International attention for implementation of the CPA and for UNMIS waned, amongst other reasons because it was overshadowed by the crisis in the Darfur. It was no longer a priority. In addition to the fact that Darfur was more 'sexy' and drew attention away, it also meant that in order to get things done in Darfur trade-offs had to be made with regard to the CPA and UNMIS. Moreover, pressuring Khartoum via UNMIS did not coincide very well with its role as an honest broker. In effect, the guarantors of the CPA to a large extent lost interest. The IGAD as mediator in the peace process would have been the organization to support its implementation. Nonetheless, Kenya, the chair at the time of the negotiations, became inward looking, because it had to deal with its own internal political problems. The chairs of IGAD after Kenya were less interested in Sudan. Moreover, as the sub-commission on Sudan had been dissolved, there was no follow-up mechanism left. The permanent members of the Security Council did not speak with one voice. China in defence of its oil interest, needs to stay friends with both parties and can therefore not offend either of them. Moreover, Beijing, alike Moscow, wants to maintain the sovereignty of Khartoum, because of its own internal conflicts and policies. Both China and Russia have obstructed UNMIS a number of times. China, for example, opposed the UNMIS human rights budget and Russia send the radio broadcasting equipment it promised late. The attention of France was much more directed at the spill-over effects on Chad and the CAR of the conflict in Darfur. The UK and the US became much more interested in Darfur itself. Besides, the vocal statements of the US on Darfur were no more than hot air, because Washington placed its bets on the NCP in the war on terror. Consequently, the only international organ able to strengthen the mandate and capacity of UNMIS, did not do so. In addition, the only institution through which the international community could influence the process, the Assessment and Evaluation Commission (AEC), became sidelined not only due to disinterest of its members, but also because the SPLM does not want to use the AEC as this organ reports to the president. Although the AEC was foreseen

during the CPA negotiations as the body that during the implementation could mediate upcoming issues, and it could have functioned as a way for UNMIS to expand and strengthen its mandate, it did not.²⁹

Operation is timely deployed and at the right time

The establishment of UNMIS was at a ripe moment for resolution of the 'North-South' conflict. The GoS and the SPLM had reached a 'mutually hurting stalemate' in which both parties saw no opportunities for a military victory anymore. It appeared, at the time of the CPA, that with the continuation of a peace process more could be won. The SPLM finally received a stake in government, while the NCP in a potential future process of democratisation would need support of the SPLM if it wished to maintain control over its northern 'heartland'.³⁰

Already at an early stage, with the Naivasha Agreement in 2003, the United Nations declared to be willing to monitor the implementation of the peace agreement. An Interdepartmental Task Force was established to follow the peace process closely and serve as a forum for the development of a common strategy for the implementation of the final agreement. In 2004, the Security Council declared its readiness to consider the establishment of a peace support operation and asked the Secretary-General to make the necessary preparations. Shortly after, the Secretary-General appointed Jan Pronk as his Special Representative for the Sudan, followed by the establishment of the special political mission UNAMIS. At the end of 2004, a liaison office was established in Nairobi to ensure continuous United Nations presence at the peace talks, to provide advice and expertise on matters related to its future role in the implementation of an agreement. Everything seemed to be on track for a timely deployment.³¹

In spite of these preparations deployment was delayed, initially because of the absence of a status-of-force agreement and other constraints imposed by both the GoS and the SPLM/A, as well as because the rainy season was an obstacle for transportation, logistical and preparatory activities. As a result, whilst UNAMIS was deployed as an advance mission to prepare for UNMIS, the preparations were in fact rather limited. Half a year into the UNMIS mission only 821 of the 10,000 authorized uniformed personnel was deployed. One year after the start, as a result of delays in the force-generation process, this number had only grown to 4,291. In addition, the deployment was delayed due to the heightened security status south of Juba which blocked transport, and local contractors could not provide sufficient vehicles and barges. It was well into 2007 before UNMIS approached its mandated military strength. By that time the operation continued to struggle to recruit and retain well-qualified international and national civilian personnel, as still more than 1000 of the 4712 posts remained vacant.³² Nonetheless, the operation had finally crossed the critical boundary of a less than 20 percent vacancy rate required to operate

effectively. Now, however, the operation has to fight off its weak and unable image that has been build up during the initial years.³³

Competent leadership and personnel, and clear command structures

As an integrated multidimensional peace support operation UNMIS consists of a wide range of components. The Special Representative takes care of the reinforcement and complementation of the different elements of the United Nations system. The mission area includes six distinct sectors. Each sector is headed by a civilian sector director, supported by a sector commander in charge of all military personnel. There is one headquarter in Khartoum and one special office in Juba. On the military side, command structures within UNMIS are clear. On the civilian side, less clarity exists. Command structures within units and organizations are clear, but especially during the period when UNMIS lacked leadership, its operations lacked coordination and were dependent on cooperation by heads of units at lower levels. This often depended on personal preferences and chemistry. Consequently, where areas of attention of units and organizations overlapped, this frequently resulted in organizational infighting.³⁴

At the start, under Pronk, clear leadership existed and, where required, he used the constructive ambiguity of the UNMIS mandate to stretch it. On the other hand, he did walk the moral ground and, although he may have been right to criticize Khartoum on its non-implementation and especially on Darfur, his approach was less effective in the end due to four factors.

First, he was too direct. He criticized people directly, in strong wordings and in the presence of others. According to Sudanese costumes this is not done. This lack of cultural awareness affected the good will UNMIS initially had acquired in the North. Secondly, he was unable to walk the tightrope of being an honest neutral broker and at the same time criticizing parties. Consequently, he came to be viewed as partisan. Thirdly, as he was occupied with Darfur, he lost support in the South, as the SPLM felt abandoned. Fourth, his strong wordings were not substantiated by strong deeds. In the end, Pronk's outcry did not lead to tougher actions by the United Nations. Worse, the fact that he was declared *persona non grata* in October 2006 was accepted by the Secretary-General, while instead the United Nations should have backed up its local leadership. Subsequently, UNMIS faced a leadership crisis. Few were eager to step in the position Pronk lost, and those who were willing and qualified were rejected by Khartoum. This gap was only filled with the appointment of Ashraf Jehangir Qazi in September 2007, who only became actively involved in Sudan in October-November. For about one year, the Acting Special Representative was only able to manage the operation. Since he was only 'acting' he did not have a lot of political weight, what prevented him from exerting political pressure and stretching the mandate for UNMIS to include mediation between the parties. As a result UNMIS was not able to take up this role during the 'troubles'. The

operation as a whole was forced to lick its wounds, fell back to the letter of its mandate and only few dared to stand up against the NCP out of fear to be expelled. The Acting Special Representative was, however, able to repair part of the relation with Khartoum and reorganized the mission. Nonetheless, Qazi is likely to have a difficult job as an honest broker. The operation is still perceived partisan in the North, while in the South the fact that he is Muslim does not support him. The first signs are, though, that he might be on the right track.³⁵

The quality of the military component differs per contingent. Nonetheless, quit often the contingents are not open in their operations, as they do not sufficiently patrol, and make contact with NGOs and the population. As a result, they often lack the necessary information and are less able to prevent crises. UNMOs, due to their short period of stay, often do not get enough feeling for the situation. Once they start to understand it, they are already on leave or ending their tour. Due to this high turnover and the rotation system, UNMOs are less able to establish contacts and see the deeper trends. In stead, they report strings of incidents. UNMIS has a lot of quality civilian personnel at its disposal and was especially at its start able to employ many of the more experienced international personnel who had already been working in Sudan in OLS and for NGOs. Nonetheless, it faces the problem that international personnel is hesitant to serve in UNMIS, as it is not viewed as a real CV builder. In addition, living conditions, especially in parts of the South do not attract international personnel. Furthermore, as a result of personal appointments the best personnel was not always appointed on the positions where they were needed. Moreover, a number of the experience staff left the organization again, because they became frustrated with it. Part of these frustrations originate from procurement, which is understaffed, less effective and forced to over-regulate by New York. Although these regulations were meant to address corruption, presently they create inertia. With regard to national civilian personnel, the operation faces recruitment problems, as it recruits from the elites, which is often alienated from the rest of the population. Moreover, in the North some of it staff have also been recruited by the national security agencies. In the South especially lack of qualified personnel, education wise, is problematic. Due to its cumbersome recruitment procedures and the focus on qualifications instead of experience, UNMIS is less able to address these problems. Finally, UNMIS is not always sensitive about who and what - be it an UNMO, a civilian police monitor, a civilian staff member or a contingent - it sends where to. Gender, ethnicity, and religion are relevant in this context. For example, the deployment of Egyptian military in South Kordofan is not ideal, as they are viewed by the SPLM and the local population as partisan.³⁶

Operation is part of a long term approach

The overall impact of UNMIS as part of a long term approach will probably be less than what was initially hoped for. It mainly has a monitoring mandate,

which ends with its departure, so that it does not leave behind many sustainable structures. Furthermore, it often does not build on the already existing policies of the UN country team and the multi-donor approach. In the North, this is largely a result from the fact that the NCP is less open to UNMIS, especially under Pronk, while Khartoum has a longstanding working relation with UNDP. In the South, the attitude within UNMIS is sometimes as if Sudan has only recently been discovered, while the country team, OLS and NGOs have already learned many lessons and have many initiatives to build on. Moreover, whereas the country team is active at the state level, UNMIS operates in sectors that are larger than these states, causing it to be less grounded into the lower levels of the country and therefore it often has less knowledge of the local situation. Consequently, UNMIS has often set up new policies from scratch. For example, in the case of disarmament, UNDP had already developed a plan together with the local partners. Nonetheless, when UNMIS was deployed, it came with its own standard blue print, sidetracked the UNDP program and implemented its own strategy. In the end, however, the extent to which UNMIS is part of a long term approach differs per policy instrument. With regard to police training, for example, because of the cooperation between UNMIS, UNDP and the Multi-Donor Trust Fund, there is a potential for sustainability. Also with regard to human rights and humanitarian assistance, UNMIS is more part of a long term approach. The OHCHR and OCHA cooperate relatively well with the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), as they are all part of the United Nations secretariat. However, with regard to human rights, UNMIS does not involve a lot of civil society, does not stimulate a culture of human rights and does not or is unable to build institutions, which is likely to affect its results in the long term.³⁷

Within the operation and externally the different policy instruments are coordinated

As an integrated mission, UNMIS attempts to coordinate all the efforts of the United Nations system via the operation. From their appointment onward, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and his two deputies worked to ensure that the structure of UNMIS became unified and that the special political mission and the country team were integrated. It was intended that the roles and functions of both structures would complement and not duplicate each other. Even before the start of the operation a number of mechanisms were set up to channel all the efforts. An Interdepartmental Task Force was established to serve as a forum for the development of a common strategy for the implementation of the CPA. Furthermore, the Secretary-General appointed several coordinators, to ensure a joint unified strategy among the United Nations components, agencies and programs. Arrangements were made between the World Bank and the United Nations to hold a Joint Assessment Mission after the signing of the peace agreement. Also, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General worked with the United Nations country team to develop a unified structure. Half a year after the start of

UNMIS close cooperation between the mission and UNDP had also been established on a number of subjects.³⁸

In practice, however, the coordination appears to be far from ideal. Complementing processes do not always connect fluently. In DDRR, the DDR is provided by UNMIS, while the reintegration is implemented and paid for by UNDP. As UNMIS is pushed by the Security Council to start the DDR process as soon as possible, coordination with UNDP suffers. Consequently, it becomes questionable whether UNDP is able to reintegrate all the disarmed, demobilized and reinserted ex-combatants. Overlap and duplication are also frequent and different parts of the United Nations system often hamper each other. There is still a lot of competition between organizations with overlapping mandates. To use the example of rule of law, UNDP is supposed to coordinate this field. Its clearing house role is, however, under-performing, at meetings the local government is often absent, while UNDP hopes to become more directive in the content of policies. At the same time the Police Division cooperates well with UNDP, but typically has a more difficult relationship with the Human Rights Section. Another problem is that UNMIS generally lacks funds for programs. As a result, it can provide training for capacity building, but does not have the funds for hotels and meals for participants. This in turn creates credibility problems for the operation, not only amongst the participants of such trainings, but also amongst the country team which gets the impression it is only perceived as a pot of gold. The underlying issue remains the problem of the different funding under the assessed and the voluntary contributions. Furthermore, as personnel from the country team is only integrated on paper and is not formally part of the operation, it has not the same rights and cannot use the same UNMIS services, facilities and security plans. For example, the country team widely complains that UNMIS does not share its logistical and air assets enough, while UNMIS argues it does not have enough capacity. An additional problem is the different perceptions on priorities in Juba and Khartoum. This friction exists throughout the UN system, both in UNMIS and in UNDP. Moreover, in the field stove piping is a problem, as information is sent to Khartoum and local coordination and information sharing is less frequent. Cooperation and coordination between the civilian components and the military component is also not optimal. In the end, integration depends to a large extent on personalities.³⁹

Operation provides 'ownership'

Although the parties were pressured to conclude the CPA and it was a lot more legalistic in its approach than one would expect as a result of Arab or African negotiations, it was their own agreement. They own it and in fact the international community is in search of the role it should play. The United States did pressure the parties into signing, but left the role of the United Nations to the parties. During the negotiations at many points Garang and Taha wanted to prevent too large an influence of the international community.

The NCP wished to maintain sovereignty, and the SPLM felt it should be able to manage the process itself. However, with the death of Garang and the diminished importance of Taha, the parties were no longer as interested in the implementation of the whole agreement. Both parties still own and value the repatriation process. To the SPLM, especially capacity and institution building, the referendum and the possible vote for independence are still very important. To the NCP, peace as such remains useful, as it allows more space to manoeuvre in the Darfur conflict. Nonetheless, for example, the agenda for political transition has lost importance to both parties and is therefore no longer owned by them. Together with parts of the CPA, the 'ownership' of a number of 'policy tools' implemented by UNMIS also waned. Nonetheless, where the SPLM was initially also reluctant to allow a large international role in capacity building, they presently request assistance in many areas. Khartoum, on the other hand, remains far from interested in UNMIS assistance for and presence in its administration.⁴⁰

At the same time, the population has little knowledge of the contents of the CPA and the mandate of UNMIS. The situation has only slightly started to improve since UNMIS Radio Miraya started to broadcast from Juba half 2006. The Khartoum government has, however, still not given a nation-wide authorization to broadcast, while it has held-up broadcasting equipment destined to the South. Moreover, Radio Miraya does not reach all layers of the population, as it only broadcasts in Arabic and English. The northern opposition is disappointed in the implementation of the CPA, because it did not lead to political transformation thus far. Moreover, NCP propaganda has influenced the perception of the Arab population to the extent that UNMIS is for a large part viewed as a western instrument. The southern population initially largely welcomed UNMIS, partly because they misunderstood its mandate. They perceived UNMIS as 'saviour' of the southern population from its Arab 'oppressors'. This perception started to change firstly following the accusations of sexual abuse and secondly after the 9 July deadline, when it appeared that UNMIS would not repel the SAF from southern territory. In absence of large scale development, with too few Quick Impact Projects, and with too little dissemination of information on the role of UNMIS, the operation is increasingly viewed as useless, because its personnel is perceived to do little more than sit in its offices or barracks and drive around in white cars.⁴¹

Case specific factors for success and failure

From the case of UNMIS in the 'North-South' conflict, one case specific factor for success and failure appears that requires extra attention.

Operation is able to provide in an arms control regime

In Sudan, like in Ethiopia, Uganda and Chad, weapons are part of life. Throughout history cattle owners needed to protect their properties, especially in times of scarcity. In an area where cattle raids are common, those whose means of living is cattle cannot live without arms. If one group would disarm, other groups, remnants of militia, or 'other armed groups' may take advantage. This situation can only change if the circumstances improve, if the government is able to provide security, justice, and law and order. At present these circumstances are largely absent. Moreover, as arms can flow freely across borders, it is a regional problem. Civilian disarmament therefore appears to be an illusion in the short term. The two disarmament projects implemented by UNDP to prevent forced disarmament by the SPLA show the potential implications. Although the projects in themselves were successful, the SPLA did not live up to its security guarantees and consequently neighbouring tribes were able to take advantage as the disarmed tribes were left unprotected. It is impossible to disarm every group simultaneously, without creating the broader conditions. Therefore, in small steps the conditions need to be addressed first and only vulnerable groups need to be disarmed simultaneously. Basically this implies that in order to deal with the problem, development is needed and the traditional way of living of the population has to be adapted.⁴²

Concluding remarks

At present a look at the factors for success and failure presents a mixed picture of UNMIS. Since the death of Garang the parties are only willing and sincere to cooperate with UNMIS to the extent that they view its implementation of the CPA in their own advantage. It is too weak to provide the parties a real sense of security, but its presence is very relevant as a guarantee that the parties will not blatantly violate the agreement. Some of the causes of the conflict are partly addressed by UNMIS, but the extent to which democratisation will take place and the power and wealth sharing will become nationwide, depends on the parties themselves. The international community in the meantime has largely lost interest in CPA implementation and turned to Darfur. It even used UNMIS and CPA implementation as a trade-off for the involvement and deployment of the United Nations in Darfur. Moreover, none of the permanent members of the Security Council is sincerely interested and willing to offend the NCP. Although the United Nations was involved at an early stage in the peace process and was even able to deploy the advance mission UNAMIS, both parties were not willing to fully cooperate. Due to successful dragging by

Khartoum, it took until well into 2007, two years after the signing of the CPA, before UNMIS was finally fully deployed. The operation suffered further as a result of the fact that its leadership, Pronk, was declared *persona non grata* and was forced to leave. Consequently, the mission was left headless for one year, what in turn influenced its coordination. The quality of its personnel is mixed. The extent to which the UNMIS is part of a long term approach differs per 'policy instrument'. On some issues the 'policy instruments' are part of a broader approach, while one may question the sustainability of others. Although within the context of the concept of the integrated operation, a lot attention has been given to coordination, in practise duplication, overlap, stovepiping and organisational infighting have been frequent. Nonetheless, the parties fully own CPA implementation and as such UNMIS. The population is, however, much less aware of what they may and may not expect from UNMIS and the CPA. Civilian disarmament, which is not part of UNMIS' mandate, will most likely be an enormous challenge especially because the conditions for arms control are not yet present.

The probability that a peacekeeping operation contributes to durable peace increases if the extent to which it fulfils the factors for success and failure increases. In its performance UNMIS is not very different from an average relatively successful peacekeeping operation. Often operations face tough issues, such as the 'troubles' in Sudan. Even operations which in the end contribute successfully to durable peace often face and overcome similar problems. The extent to which the most successful operations thus far fulfilled the factors for success and failure was often not much different. Many unsuccessful operations have performed much worse. As such, however, like any relatively successful operation UNMIS' quest stands upon the edge of a knife. Stray but a little and it will fail. Hope remains, however, as also a relative successful operation is a walk over the tightrope.

The lessons from the peace process and the peacekeeping operation in the 'North-South' conflict applied to the conflict in Darfur

The most important developments in the peace process in the Darfur conflict up to this moment

The conflict in Darfur is possibly even more complex than the 'North-South' conflict, but also strongly interlinked with it. The largest party is the GoS. The SAF are backed by the Popular Defence Forces (PDF), a paramilitary force which is intended to support the SAF, or other security organs, when these are unable to perform. The Janjaweed, in turn, originate from the PDF and consists of tribal militias that are largely recruited from Baggara nomadic groups. They fight an ever more splintering number of rebel groups. The Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) originates from 2003 and is supported by its military wing the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA). Aim of the SLM was originally a united and democratic Sudan with a separation between religion and the state. The Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) also aims for a democratic united Sudan, has no clear position on the separation between religion and state, has a clear political program for a federal Sudan, and has ties with the political islamist Hassan al-Turabi. Since the end of 2004, new organizations have emerged and since the signing of the DPA especially the SLM has splintered into numbers of factions.⁴³

The outbreak of the conflict coincided with the breakthrough in the 'North-South' dialogue following the signing of the Machakos Protocol, when the SLA attacked government targets. The government overreacted harshly, as throughout the summer and fall of 2003 attacks by Janjaweed and government forces caused death and displacement amongst the Fur, Massalit and Zaghawa tribes. It was argued that the government strategy was to 'drain the swamp' by driving civilians from their villages, thereby denying the rebels sanctuary in much of Darfur. A first humanitarian cease-fire agreement was signed in N'Djamena in September 2003. As the agreement did not hold, the humanitarian crisis worsened. Negotiations restarted in March 2004 in Chad and later in Abuja. Nonetheless, the security situation deteriorated only further. One of the problems at the negotiations table was the fact that the Darfurian rebels were too divided on their positions, and the United Nations was unable to aid them in uniting them. At the same time international NGOs started the

'Safe Darfur' advocacy and accused the GoS of crimes against humanity and even genocide. In April 2004, the African Union decided to establish the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). This operation was, however, plagued from the start. Its mandate limited it to observation only, without proactive protection of civilians. Moreover, it became known for the fact that it was under-everything: under-funded, under-equipped, under-staffed, etcetera.⁴⁴

From October 2004 onwards, the parties negotiated off and on in Abuja. The African Union led these talks, but also the Special Representative of Secretary-General Pronk was engaged in mediation. In the meantime, the government engaged in its own process of tribal reconciliation. The Abuja talks were undermined and disrupted by the lack of commitment of SLM/A and by the continued operations of the GoS. Moreover, the head of the negotiating team of the government, Mahzhub al-Khalifa, was a well-known member of the hard-line group. By April 2005, both JEM and SLM demonstrated signs of deeper internal divisions, what further undermined their ability to contribute to the political process in a coherent and reliable manner. Eventually the SLM/A split into two factions, one of Abdul Wahid and one of Minni Minawi. In spite of all these problems the AU mediation team managed to present a comprehensive draft agreement at the start of 2006 and pressured the parties to sign before a deadline. On 5 May 2006, the GoS and the SLM/A Minawi signed this Darfur Peace Agreement, but the SLM/A Wahid, JEM, G19, NMRD and the National Redemption Front refused to do so. Since the DPA did have a large number of good components for each rebel group, in each group some members were willing to support it. As a result, the DPA splintered all rebel organization further into signatory factions and non-signatory factions. Those factions that did not sign, were subsequently further divided by the government politics of divide and rule. Consequently, at the end of 2007 more than 25 rebel movements were active in Darfur. Although the NCP tried to reintegrate parts of the Darfurian rebel leadership into the Khartoum elite, along the lines it did with the SPLM, it was less successful. Minawi's return to Khartoum was its main achievement. At the same time Wahid became enormously popular amongst the IDPs, exactly because he refused to talk to Khartoum, and demanded individual compensation for the IDPs.⁴⁵

While the ceasefire between the signatories of the DPA was generally maintained, clashes between the SAF, sometimes assisted by Janjaweed militia, and non-signatory forces, as well as between signatory rebels, sometimes supported by the SAF, and non-signatory rebels, occurred. In its attacks the SAF continued to use aerial bombardments, also on civilian targets, in support of its ground battles. Inside the camps, the communities of IDPs splintered along the same lines as the rebel groups in pro- and anti-DPA. The presence of armed groups within the IDP camps made some of these increasingly militarised and insecure. At the end of 2007, the situation had, however, drastically changed from the war before the DPA. From 2003 to 2005 Darfuri villages were burned by the Janjaweed backed by the SAF in the same way the war in the South was fought-out in the past. Although fights between the

government and rebels do still occur, they are of a different kind and of a different intensity. Presently still a number of villages are under threat, but many villages have already been destroyed. In fact the security situation on the ground was recently described as “relatively calm”.⁴⁶ Anarchy is a better description for the situation. The situation depends, however, from region to region. The main issue in the South is the situation in the camps. In a number of cases, as a result of fighting between rebel groups, some have been turned into virtual war zones. The southern region is also stricken by carjacking and criminality, what in turn endangers humanitarian assistance. Whether or not these activities are banditry and criminality or are conflict related, is not very relevant. Quite often also banditry and criminality is conflict related, because the spoils are sold to rebels, or are used to become a ‘rebel’. In the same way, the attack on the AMIS camp in Haskanita was meant to provide the necessary weapons and cars to equip a new splinter group. Moreover, the so-called criminal violence has the same impact on humanitarian assistance. In addition, southern Darfur is faced with Arab-Arab clashes. Many Arab tribes in Darfur shifted from a position of neutrality in the conflict to an alliance with the rebels and the government has started to loose control over the Janjaweed militia. In western Darfur, the tensions on the border with Chad remain very high. Chadian armed opposition groups have crossed the border into Sudan and further destabilize the region. Throughout Darfur, the population and IDPs are still living in a continuous feeling of insecurity. Tribal structures have largely collapsed and leadership is absent. The Darfurians have little in common left to rebuild their region. The running joke in Sudan is presently, that if you have an AK-45, a land rover and a Thuraya, you can call yourself a rebel organization and claim your place at the negotiations table.⁴⁷

In the meantime, in absence of a viable political mediation process the international community turned its attention to improving the peacekeeping operation in the field. Although the AU-secretariat initially opposed the transition of AMIS into a United Nations operation, because it viewed such a transition as loss of face, with the increasing problematic situation for AMIS, it came to see the United Nations as a way out. Already on 12 January 2006, the African Union Peace and Security Council expressed its support for the transition of AMIS into a UN operation. On 3 February such a transition was endorsed by the Security Council for the first time. On 31 August 2006, in its resolution 1706, the Security Council decided to expand the mandate of UNMIS to support implementation of the DPA and the N’djamen Agreement on Humanitarian Cease-fire on the Conflict in Darfur. Nonetheless, the consent of the GoS for the deployment of the operation was invited. Khartoum, however, never gave its consent. It even made crystal clear that it opposed a transition of the Darfur mission from the African Union to the United Nations. It viewed the move as an encroachment on its sovereignty, an attempt at decolonisation and the climax of efforts to undermine the CPA. With resolution 1706, the Security Council had overstepped its sphere of influence and lost face.⁴⁸

Nonetheless, Khartoum did participate in a high-level consultation in Addis Ababa on 16 November 2006, which outlined a three-phased approach for United Nations support to AMIS. First a light support package was to be provided, followed by a heavy support package, after which finally the operation would be turned into an African Union-United Nations hybrid operation. Amongst other reasons, because of Chinese pressure, which partly resulted from the 'genocide Olympics' campaign, on 23 December Bashir reaffirmed his government's readiness to implement these Addis Ababa conclusions. The implementation, however, has been painfully slow. Only in April 2007 did the then Sudanese Foreign minister Lam Akol announce that Khartoum would give permission for the deployment of the heavy support package. It did, however, persist in its call that African troops should still dominate any peacekeeping mission in Darfur. On 5 June 2007, the Secretary-General produced a report which contained the proposal for the deployment of the hybrid operation and on 31 July the Security Council approved the deployment of UNAMID.⁴⁹

Two months later the Security Council decided to deploy the multi-dimensional United Nations presence, in the border regions in Chad and the Central African Republic MINURCAT, which initially is to be supported by EUFOR Chad/CAR. Aim of both operations is to protect the citizens of Chad and the CAR and to ensure that the war does not spill-over. AMIS at the same time was pushed further into a downward spiral. Although initially at the start of its deployment, it had been relatively successful whenever it was active in forward patrolling, as it proved not as effective as hoped for, it lost support of the population and the rebel groups, and came more and more under fire. As a result, it decreased its number of patrols, because these became too dangerous, making it even less effective and therefore even less popular. As the international response had been to call AMIS ineffective and useless, donors withdrew support and started to search for alternatives. AMIS in turn demoralized further, making it even less effective. Moreover, the advocacy for UNAMID and the fact that it was brought as a way out to improve the situation has created high expectations amongst the population, which will be hard to live up to.⁵⁰

The factors for success and failure and the chances for success for the case of UNAMID in Darfur

The parties are willing and sincere

At present the parties are not likely and able to seriously work towards peace and cooperation with UNAMID. The main problem is that because of the splintered rebel factions, no effective political process can be set into motion. Without such an inclusive political process the needed sufficient cooperation of the parties is not likely to be obtained. The inclusiveness of such a process does, however, not necessarily mean all-inclusive. The most important parties need to be included. The SPLM initiative to unite the Darfuri rebels showed that there

is some willingness and sincerity amongst the rebel organizations. It, however, also made clear that the rebel groups are inexperienced. They lack understanding of politics and negotiations and need to establish and agree upon political goals. Those factions that went to Sirte have a stake in long negotiations, because during this period they are paid for their presence. The extent to which Khartoum is really in control of the situation in Darfur is questionable. Its role, ability and capacity in Darfur is generally overestimated. Certain security organizations have their own agenda's and others work together with rebel organizations to establish new power bases. The Janjaweed also have their own interests and stake in the conflict. They, but also the larger Arab tribes are not part of the negotiations process, although they are part of the conflict. In any way, Khartoum is likely to cooperate with UNAMID only to the extent necessary to prevent further sanctions. Some in the NCP are even inclined to solve the question of Darfur, because they hope to get rid of the sanctions. Others fear the deployment of UNAMID, and especially a strong UNAMID, as they fear a repetition of SFOR and KFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. In those two cases, in their perception, in the end the Serbian leadership found it had agreed to allow the deployment of a Trojan horse. An effective UNAMID might, according to them, result in arrests of members of the regime, who may have to face the International Criminal Court in The Hague.⁵¹

On the ground AMIS lost faith of the parties and the population, because it was not able to protect the population and was viewed to be partisan. As everything it did had to be coordinated with the government, the population and the rebel parties no longer viewed it as an honest broker. At present, expectations are high that UNAMID will be able to perform. If it manages to maintain an impartial perception and is able to protect the population, it may receive the cooperation of the parties and the support of the population. To meet these high expectations is very difficult, however, as the majority of the forces are the same African forces that AMIS consisted of. Moreover, UNAMID needs the support of the rebels and the government to be able to fulfil its tasks. As such, the operation will have to cooperate with Khartoum and its local security organisations, and in absence of any leverage, it will probably have to negotiate most of its actions. It is consequently likely to be viewed as partisan. The first signs are dim, as IDPs in the camps have already started to protest against the United Nations.⁵²

The operation is able to provide a sufficient sense of security to the parties

UNAMID has the mandate under chapter VII to:

“support early and effective implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement, prevent the disruption of its implementation and armed attacks, and protect civilians, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of Sudan.”⁵³

This means that the GoS is the first responsible party for the protection of civilians. If the GoS does not fulfil its duties, UNAMID may use force both in case the GoS is not present, or when this is opposed to the wishes of the GoS. UNAMID is, however, neither capable nor mandated to confront the government. As a result UNAMID is not likely to provide the rebels and Khartoum related militia in a sense of security. The Khartoum government does not feel physically threatened by the rebels in the first place, and therefore does not need more security.⁵⁴

Even if the rebel parties and Khartoum related militia do not feel secure and UNAMID does implement the DPA, they may still be willing to cooperate for the time being if the operation has the necessary carrots-and-sticks. For this reason, the rebel parties and the militia are likely to test UNAMID from the start. If it responds weakly they are likely to view it as lacking sticks and therefore as a force not to be reckoned with. If the operation shows teeth, it may be able to at least temporarily partly control the rebel parties and the militia. One can consequently initially expect minor attacks on the operation by rebels and Khartoum related militia. The GoNU itself is, however, more likely to test its boundaries by further foot dragging with visa regulations, et cetera.⁵⁵

The operation has sufficient attention for the causes of the conflict both in depth and in breadth

UNAMID is only likely to contribute to the causes of conflict, if the rebels are united and the political process results in a political agreement. In theory the CPA provides a solution for many of Sudan's causes of conflict. If implemented it starts a process of political transformation and democratisation that also in Darfur may lead to further addressing of the causes of the conflict. It does, however, not provide in power and wealth sharing agreements for the conflicts in the North. It consequently does not address the problem of the marginalisation of Darfur. Worse, the CPA has legitimised the NCP as the political party in power in the North. By giving the NCP and the SPLM ratios in government positions, a mathematical power-sharing model, it has fossilized access to power and made power-sharing more difficult for the northern opposition. In addition, it has given the South the opportunity to secede, which,

if that would happen, places Darfur in a more unfavourable position to the NCP. As Darfur and other marginalized regions would no longer have a partner in the SPLM and the South, their position on the power balance would worsen. Moreover, the ecological causes of the conflict between the farmers and the nomads that determine the underlying conflict at a more local level cannot be addressed at a regional level. These are, however, highly important, as the most violent clashes have taken place in those areas where the ecological issue was most pressing. In addition, it is likely that, as in the case of UNMIS, UNAMID will face the perverse issue that peace for a large number of IDPs and especially refugees is in fact worse than war. The situation in many camps is better than in their places of origin, as sanitation, education and health services are present in the camps and often not in the places of origin. As a result, many IDPs are not likely to want to return and have already started to make their new homes more permanent. The DPA hopes to address some of these problems and causes, but thus far not up to the extent that most of the Darfurian rebels are willing to accept it. Without an inclusive political peace process for Darfur that leads to a peace agreement, it is not likely that any of the causes of the conflict will be addressed and UNAMID will probably not be able to do much more than addressing the consequences of the conflict. Unfortunately, presently the military and political processes are not interlinked and the mediators do not appear to have a solution for many of the causes.⁵⁶

The operation receives co-operation and support from important outside actors and parties

Since 2004, cross-border operations by elements of the Chadian Army and the SAF, but also rebels from both countries, have been reported. Relations between both governments are presently cold, amongst other reasons because both governments support and arm the others rebel organisations. On 28 November 2006 Chad declared itself in a state of war with Sudan over the latter's support of Chadian rebels. Also in the CAR, the Khartoum regime has been accused to support the rebels. The signing of a peace agreement between the government of the CAR and various rebel groups on 28 January 2007 has, however, improved the security situation in that country. Both the governments of Chad and the CAR have agreed to the deployment of MINURCAT and EUFOR Chad/CAR and this is also likely to have a positive impact on security in Sudan. As a result the neighbouring countries are likely to support UNAMID.⁵⁷

With regard to the Security Council, its permanent members are not very likely to act strongly on Darfur. Russia remains a major supplier of weapons to the GoS, and China is a major consumer of Sudanese oil. Although China has become more active after the campaign over the 'genocide Olympics', it is still not willing to increase the pressure further on Khartoum. The vocal position of both the US as the UK is merely hot air, because both countries have an interest in the NCP government as it is an ally in the war on terror. France

directs its attention to ‘*la Francophonie*’ and therefore has mainly interest in preventing further spill-over from Darfur. Although the international community is far from united, the Security Council was able in 2004 to decide in favour of a weak arms embargo and personal sanctions. It also supported the establishment of UNAMID. However, if UNAMID loses the support of the parties and the population, it may, like it did with AMIS, become less supportive.⁵⁸

The operation is deployed timely and at the right time

The deployment of UNAMID does not take place at a ripe moment in the Darfur conflict. Such a possible moment passed when AMIS was deployed. At that time, the moment would have been ripe for an operation similar to UNAMID. Now, only if the political process is successful, the situation may become ripe again. It is, however, not likely that somebody in the establishment of the NCP dares to put his position at stake, like Taha did in case of the CPA. Nonetheless, it is hoped by the United Nations and the African Union that the deployment of the operation may contribute to the peace process, as the deployment may create its own dynamics, tilting the balance of power in favour of peace.⁵⁹

Although UNAMID was supposed to be operational by 1 January 2008, this date was no longer feasible due to three main reasons. First of all the GoNU is not helpful or even obstructive. It has not yet responded to the list of Troop Contributing Countries. It has furthermore slowed down deployment through tiresome visa and customs procedures, as well as through the slow release of land. It is, however, too easy for the United Nations to hide behind the unwillingness of the NCP. The United Nations itself is not capable of early deployment. This is, amongst other things, because of the second reason. The Troop Contributing Countries have thus far not provided the operation with the necessary troops assets and equipment, for example helicopters are still short. In addition, many of the pledged forces still need to be trained and equipped or are in this process. A third reason is that Darfur is an area where basic infrastructure is more or less absent. As a consequence, many of the logistical and information structures and capabilities of the operation could so far not be established. Camps still have to be build, water still has to be provided, etcetera. The engineers required to build the camps for the Heavy Support Package have still not finished and have not even been able to start for UNAMID. This is, amongst other reasons, because the contract with PAE is continued in 2008 by Dynacore, but the Dynacore personnel had at the end of 2007 not yet received their visa. During the period from January to June 2008 Dynacore is likely to be busy preparing for the further deployment of the Heavy Support Package This period, however, is also likely to be decisive for the speed of the deployment of UNAMID and its police force, because ideally during the same period the preparations for these units should also take place.

Nonetheless, in spite of all these obstructions and problems, it is likely that UNAMID will be able to deploy quicker than the two years period that was needed by UNMIS. UNMIS, at the time, did not have any logistical framework in Sudan. UNAMID can use the logistical facilities and networks of UNMIS. UNMIS has presently a network up and running from the harbour in Port Sudan to the airfields in Khartoum and El Genina and therefore this network does not need to be established anymore. Estimates on a realistic date for UNAMID to be operational range from 1 January 2009 to June 2009. Nonetheless, as a consequence of the delays, it is very likely that the only real difference between AMIS and UNAMID on 1 January 2008 has been the ceremony at which the AMIS personnel put on a different colour beret. The first early impact battalions are only likely to be deployed a few months later. These are, however, part of the heavy support package. As a result of the fact that UNAMID is only a 'rehabbed' AMIS, the operation is not likely to be able to live up to the high expectations of the rebel parties and population and therefore it is likely to lose their willingness and cooperation.⁶⁰

The operation has at its disposal competent leadership and personnel, and clear command structures

On paper UNAMID received, in accordance with the *Addis Ababa Conclusions*, unity of command and control. This means amongst others that the operation has one command structure and that these command and control structures and the backstopping is provided by the United Nations. This alone makes UNAMID likely to be more effective than AMIS.⁶¹ Nonetheless, already in his report the Secretary-General wrote:

“bearing in mind that unity of command and control is a basic principle of peacekeeping, further clarity and agreement on the United Nations role in command and control will be required by United Nations troop- and police-contributing countries in order for them to provide personnel for the hybrid operation.”⁶²

According to the structures laid down for UNAMID in the report of the Secretary-General, UNAMID is led by the Joint African Union-United Nations Special Representative for Darfur, Rodolphe Adada of the Republic of Congo. He has the authority over the whole peacekeeping operation in Darfur, and has to oversee the implementation of the mandate. The Deputy Joint Special Representative Henry Anyidoho of Ghana is also appointed by both organizations. They have to report both to the Chairman of the African Union and the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The Force Commander, general Martin Luther Agwai of Nigeria, and the Police Commissioner have been appointed by the African Union in consultation with the United Nations. Both have to report to the Joint Special Representative. The operational leadership is located within the integrated structures of the headquarters of the operation. Part of this headquarters is, amongst others structures, the support

division led by the United Nations Director of Administration. The Force Commander has command and control over the air support assets via the Joint Operations Centre and over the mission enablers via the Joint Logistics Operations Centre and the Chief, of Integrated Support Services. The overall management of the operation is according to the standards, principles and procedures of the United Nations. The AU and UN strategic headquarters of UNAMID is meant to consult effectively with the Joint Support Coordination Mechanism in Addis Ababa.⁶³ Although on paper the command structure may become relatively clear, the Secretary-General warns:

“The operation will be an unprecedented undertaking, which will pose significant challenges for both organizations, including the issue of unity and coherence of command.”⁶⁴

In fact in practice the command structure of a hybrid operation, like UNAMID, is inherently weak. Personnel at the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping operations has already made clear that for them this experiment is once and never again.⁶⁵

The political, military and police leadership of UNAMID is generally regarded to be better qualified than that of AMIS. At least, they made a good first impression and some argue they are top quality. However, the quality of the Force Commander has already been questioned, because he has been accused of appointing friends at higher positions. In addition, he has made promises to the rebel leaders with regard to their MSA, which he could not fulfil, and as a result he may already have lost credibility in their eyes. Moreover, after an initial positive start, he left for New York and left all the important issues to his deputy. The British Chief of Staff is, nevertheless, generally viewed to be excellent. Next to the operation, the political process suffers. It is harmed by its unprofessional approach and the fact that Salim Salim is unhappy in his role.⁶⁶

The quality of the military deployed in UNAMID is likely to suffer as a result of the demand of Khartoum that the force has to be predominantly African. It did so with the reason of making the operation as weak as possible. In practice UNAMID is likely to be AMIS forces to which more African infantry forces are added. The additional forces are, however, presently trained by western countries up to United Nations standards. The recruitment of qualified local civilian personnel in Darfur is likely to be less problematic than in UNMIS, because in Darfur a larger segment of the population is university educated. Also international staff is more likely to apply for this mission, because it is viewed as a CV-builder. Nonetheless, as half of the personnel of UNAMID is required to come from the African Union and half from the United Nations, it is likely to be problematic to find enough qualified African personnel for the higher positions, because they will have to meet United Nations criteria. It is rumoured that this is solved by hiring less-qualified personnel into higher positions and that more capable staff will have to work under less qualified heads. In addition all positions in UNAMID are scaled one position higher than

in UNMIS to ensure personnel can be found. Also, these recruitment issues are likely to cause delays.⁶⁷

The operation is part of a long term approach

At present UNAMID is not part of a political process and it can also not implement either the DPA or any other peace process. Presently, it is therefore too early to say to what extent it is likely to be part of a long term approach. In absence of a political process, UNAMID will mainly be directed at addressing the short-term effects of the conflict. The operation can, however, still evolve.

Within the operation and externally the different 'policy instruments' are coordinated

Apart from the average cooperation and coordination issues a peacekeeping mission always has to deal with, UNAMID faces some extra challenges. First, UNAMID is specifically not an integrated mission. The country team, the developers and the humanitarians decided not to be associated with the operation out of fear for their own security. UNDP, for example, only wants coordination, not integration. At the same time the country team faces a huge organization that is also better paid. It is argued that if UNDP wants to discuss at the same level, it may have to increase the levels of payment of its staff. Second, UNAMID faces significant challenges in managing its own joint African Union and United Nations command structures as a hybrid operation. Already during the planning phase friction developed between the United Nations and the African Union. Representatives of the latter sometimes felt they were the underdog in the cooperation, unhappy with the 'arrogant' position of some of the United Nations staff. The least that can be said on this is that the United Nations staff was not very sensitive to it. The Joint Coordination Support Mechanism, for example, was meant to take decisions, but is presently only used for information exchange. The United Nations hopes to give it a liaison role, while the African Union hopes to make it more leading. In addition, the attitude within the United Nations is that it can largely dictate the rules of the game, since it also pays for it. As the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the Force Commander are paid by the United Nations, they bow more to this organization. Furthermore, both organizations are also in transition and have their own goals and interests. The African Union is a relatively new organization in peacekeeping and still has to learn. The United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operation is in a process of restructuring and the section which has to establish UNAMID is not spared from this. Third, Sudan is the first country where two peacekeeping operations are deployed simultaneously. These operations will have to coordinate their approaches on amongst others rule of law, elections and disarmament. On many of these issues it is very impracticable that UNAMID has a separate mandate from UNMIS. Fourth, UNAMID also will have to coordinate with MINURCAT and EUFOR Chad/CAR, two operations which are basically

deployed to address the same conflict only on a different side of the border. To give an example, disarmament in Darfur is related to disarmament in the rest of Sudan (UNMIS), but also in the whole region (MINURCAT). As arms flow to the disarmament process where most is received per handed-in weapon, a region wide policy is needed.⁶⁸

The operation provides 'ownership'

It is too early to say whether UNAMID is likely to provide 'ownership'. One can, however, say that this depends largely on the extent to which it is able to manage the expectations. With regard to the population, 'ownership' is likely to depend on the dissemination of information on the operation, the extent to which it is visible and effective, the extent to which it is regarded to be impartial, the extent to which it is able to win the hearts and minds of the population by amongst others the implementation of QIPs, the extent to which it will be able to deploy early, et cetera. For the parties to obtain 'ownership' over UNAMID, they will have to reach an agreement. As already said, though, the outlooks are not very positive. Like AMIS, UNAMID is likely to be viewed as partisan by the rebels as everything has to be coordinated with the government. Especially in the short term, the rebel parties and the population are also not likely to see much of a difference with AMIS, because UNAMID is deployed late and with similar forces. If UNAMID does not show its teeth at an early stage, it is likely to fall into the same vicious circle AMIS was trapped in. The IDPs and the civilian population are then likely to have even less 'ownership' over the operation and loose faith in it. At the same time, the government in Khartoum never wanted the operation in the first place, and is therefore not likely to feel any ownership over UNAMID either.⁶⁹

Operation is able to provide in an arms control regime

The lack of arms control allowed Darfur to slide into anarchy. To a large extent much of the violence is presently banditry related. Without the rule of law, it will not be possible to address this sort of violence. At the same time due to the lack of trust amongst the parties, they view also banditry related violence as actions by their opponents. Also the Janjaweed is not likely to disarm without protection, out of fear for revenge. Moreover, as they are not only militia, but also nomads and cattle herders, they need their weapons as a means of survival. In short, there are too many arms in Darfur and the situation is too complex to disarm forcefully. A humanitarian intervention would not have been likely to succeed, but also the implementation of Security Council 1706 (2006) would not have been possible with a force of less than 100,000. Arms control is, however, again dependent on the implementation of a political process. Without a peace agreement that gives attention to this problem, UNAMID is likely to face large long-term problems.⁷⁰

Concluding remarks

If one reviews the factors for success and failure for UNAMID, there is little reason for optimism that it is likely to contribute to durable peace. The parties are not very willing and sincere. Moreover, the rebels are also too inexperienced and incapable and above all too splintered to negotiate. UNAMID is not part of a political process and in absence of such a process topped-off by a peace agreement, the operation can at best give attention to the consequences of the conflict, not to its causes. Whether this is likely to be done within the context of a long-term approach is too early to say, but is unlikely, because there is no political agreement and process. A process of arms control, for example, is not likely to be possible. From the start, the operation is likely to be tested on the extent to which it is willing and capable to act forcefully. If it does not immediately show its teeth, it is not likely to gain the respect of the parties and is unlikely to provide in a sense of security to the rebels, the Khartoum related militia, the civilian population and the IDPs. However, due to the obstruction of Khartoum, but just as much because of the incapability of the United Nations and the unwillingness of the Troop Contributing Countries, the operation is deployed late and likely to be only fully operational by June 2009. Initially, therefore, it is likely to be too weak. In addition, the deployment is not at a ripe moment for the resolution of the conflict, as it is either too late or too early. Although the neighbouring countries are supportive of the operation, the permanent members of the Security Council have not been very supportive of a strong mandate of UNAMID and willing to put pressure upon the parties. They all have to a certain extent interests in the NCP regime and are not likely to give it up. The quality of the force and the leadership is likely to be better than that of AMIS. However, its command structures are inherently weak due to its hybrid structure. Coordination problems between the United Nations and the African Union are inevitable. In addition, the operation is also likely to have enormous coordination problems with the rest of the United Nations system, with UNMIS, and the other peacekeeping operations on the other side of the border. As UNAMID is not likely to live-up to the high expectations, especially of the rebel organisations, the IDPs and the civilian population, these groups are likely to lose faith in it and are unlikely to 'own' its outcomes. UNAMID is thus not likely to be able to contribute to durable peace. At present this is also not primarily its mandate. Its main occupation is to provide a breathing space to the local population and the IDPs.

With the present deployment of UNAMID the international community is fighting the war of 5 years ago. Presently the situation has changed drastically. One might therefore wonder whether the deployment of UNAMID is actually what is presently needed to address the problems in Darfur. However, the train of the international community has finally been set into motion. After a long period of pressure Khartoum has finally given in and allowed the deployment of UNAMID. How could the international community now decide that it is the wrong operation for the present day situation? It is therefore deployed in the hope that if the political process is back on track the force can be regarded as an

early presence. Moreover, as said, it may, if successful, provide a breathing space to the civilian population and the IDPs. On the other hand one has to keep in mind that if also the United Nations loses the support of the rebel parties and the population, no other organisation is likely to be able to do the job. One then has to hope that Darfur will not become another Somalia.

Policy recommendations

As shown above the situations in the ‘North-South’ conflict and the Darfur conflict are very different. The main difference is the phase both conflicts are in. The ‘North-South’ conflict for the time being appears to be in a post-conflict stage. Darfur is clearly still in conflict. UNMIS is therefore clearly a peacekeeping operation largely with the consent of the parties, acting under chapter six of the Charter, implementing a peace agreement. UNAMID for the time being is an operation deployed at a stage where there is no peace to keep, but where war is raging. The implementation of the DPA or any other peace agreement still requires more time before the conflict is ripe for resolution. This means either more negotiations or war. UNAMID is, however, deployed mainly to aid the protection of civilians and IDPs. It has therefore much more a humanitarian task than monitoring and implementing a peace agreement. One might therefore argue that perhaps a lot of lessons can be learned from similar operations in different countries. Nonetheless from this study it appears that there are also many lessons to be learned from UNMIS and the geographical context for the case of UNAMID in Darfur. These lessons combined with the knowledge of the situation in Darfur lead to the following four clusters of recommendations where NGOs should lobby for, and what the United Nations and its member states should do to improve the peace operations in Sudan.

General recommendations on Sudan and its peacekeeping operations

- *Bashing of the NCP does not aid both operations:* The NCP needs to be on board of any solution for the conflicts in Sudan. In absence of any sort of leverage over the NCP, only bashing Khartoum is counterproductive. If international pressure is not backed by anything substantial, it is likely to further strengthen the hardliners. Entering into constructive talks with the NCP, on the other hand, provides insights in what drives who in Khartoum, in where to push and where to pull. In absence of such dialogue and continuously under attack, Khartoum is not likely to become more forthcoming.

- *To aid both operations, more attention needs to be given to the CPA:* The ‘North-South’ peace process and the Darfur peace process are inherently connected. Without a successful CPA process, peace is not attainable in Darfur, while without peace in Darfur the implementation of the CPA is likely to suffer. At this moment international attention for Darfur is disproportionate, it draws away attention for the CPA and even influences NCP commitment to the CPA negatively.
- *Staff and others involved in both operations often needs to better understand the country and its conflicts:* Sudan is a very complex country of which even its population, its government and its rebels do not fully understand all the processes and conflicts. Many donors are under the impression that they understand the situation, while in fact also they have no clue. One needs to be aware of this absence of knowledge and try to study the situation continuously. One has to be aware that every story is partisan and therefore only an opinion. This awareness should, however, not lead to inertia.
- *Both operations need to give attention to arms control instead of disarmament:* To many inhabitants of Sudan weapons are a means of survival, a way to protect cattle and family. This means that militia and civilians cannot be disarmed without a policy of arms control. Consequently, civilian disarmament is an illusion in the short term, both in southern Sudan, as well as in Darfur, and therefore also in the case of the Janjaweed.
- *Both operations need to have more attention for QIPs:* To win the hearts and minds of the population for UNAMID, UNMIS and the peace processes, more peace dividend is needed. Although it is impossible to develop Sudan in the blink of an eye, with QIPs the population can be shown that something is being done.
- *Both operations need to cooperate more with NGOs:* NGOs lack information from UNMIS on what it does and they feel left out from their security and evacuation plans. Where possible this need to be more integrated in both UNMIS and UNAMID.
- *Both operations need more dissemination of information on the role of the peacekeeping operations:* In order to prevent inflated expectations and to guarantee support from the population the United Nations need to make more clear what its role is and what it is doing. Otherwise it may easily loose the hearts and minds of the population.
- *Both operations need better quality of personnel:* The United Nations needs to be enabled to offer qualified personnel better standards, so that they are more tempted to take a job in a mission. It needs to be prevented that less qualified personnel is hired in higher positions, as this is likely to have a negative impact on the operation.
- *Both operations need to have more flexible civilian recruitment:* At present recruitment regulations are strict. Local staff is recruited on basis of education instead of experience, and only via the internet. Both rules are an obstacle for the recruitment of good personnel in areas where both infrastructure and education have been absent for a long time. In addition,

vacancies need to be made public before they are open to ensure that personnel can hand-over tasks in a proper and continuous manner.

- *In both operations the capacity of UNMOs need to be improved:* UNMOs need more thorough pre-deployment training on the history and situation in the country and the conflict. In addition, longer tours need to be preferred, overlap between the presence of UNMOs in order for them to hand-over contacts and experiences is needed, and teams need to be send to the same locations to allow better establishment of contacts and understanding of the situation and the trends.
- *In both operations one needs to be more sensitive in where who is deployed:* Not every contingent, UNMO or civilian personnel member is ideal for deployment in each area. Certain nationalities, ethnicities or religious backgrounds are less ideal for deployment in certain areas. For example Arabs or Muslims may be less welcome in the South, while Westerners may meet obstacles in parts of the North.

Recommendations on UNMIS

- *UNMIS needs the establishment of a forum where the international community speaks and supports the operation with one voice:* At present, as a result of opposing interests in the international political arena, the international community does not speak with one voice. As a consequence, the parties are not pushed further to implement certain parts of the CPA and also mediation opportunities are not picked-up. A forum or friends group may strengthen the role of the international community in assisting the parties towards peace.
- *UNMIS needs to provide more attention to the ‘South-South’ conflict:* It is widely acknowledged that a violent ‘South-South’ conflict is very likely. Presently UNMIS does not give much attention to this potential, as it argues the tribal conflicts are not part of its mandate. The prevention of this conflict, however, needs to be interpreted as part of the UNMIS mandate, because not only is it likely to have an impact upon the ‘North-South’ conflict, but also in the past that conflict has been fought-out by the use of the ‘South-South’ conflict.
- *Donors need to fund the quick start of a reintegration process of ex-combatants:* The DDR-process in the South, needs a pull factor to give the process its own dynamics. Although the SPLA does want to downsize its army, it can only do so if its personnel is provided with an alternative that is more attractive than the army. For this reason, donors need to provide funds for the necessary reintegration of ex-combatants.
- *UNMIS needs more air assets:* To enable UNMIS, country team and NGO staff to make the necessary movements in Sudan, the Military Component need to be provided with more air assets.

Recommendations for UNAMID

- *The UNAMID mandate needs to be robustly implemented:* UNAMID is likely to be immediately tested by the local parties. It is of crucial importance that the operation shows teeth from the start. If it does not, it is likely to become a plaything of the parties, and lose the faith of the parties and the population.
- *UNAMID needs to be quickly deployed:* Slow deployment is likely to have a negative effect upon the perception of UNAMID amongst the conflicting parties and the population. It is hard to change a first impression. If this first impression is a weak or non-present operation, an operation that is no different from AMIS, it is likely to be difficult to repair this image.
- *UNAMID needs to patrol actively:* UNAMID needs to show its presence. It needs to actively patrol its areas of deployment, to provide the population in a sense of security and to show the conflicting parties that it is not to be played with. In this way, it can also win the hearts and minds of the population and as such gain information from them.
- *UNAMID needs to actively use field diplomacy:* In absence of a real understanding of the situation on the ground and without knowledge on who are really in power and who are not, it is necessary to lay contact with the local population. By drinking tea one can learn to understand the situation on the ground. This needs to be done by both the UN military as well as a large Civil Affairs Component and needs to be linked to the overall political process. For this purpose one does, however, need Arab speaking interpreters.
- *UNAMID needs a large civil affairs division:* To establish contact with the population, to mediate their differences and conflicts, and to aid a reconciliation process, a larger civilian affairs division is needed.
- *UNAMID needs to address attention to the use of traditional power structures and conflict resolution instruments:* Although the conflict has sincerely harmed traditional power structures by giving power to the armed and young, and consequently destroyed traditional ways of conflict resolution, it is important to support and rebuild the old power structures as a counter balance to the power of the gun. These structures and instruments may assist in arms control and conflict resolution, amongst others in the field of the ecological conflict.
- *The deployment of UNAMID needs to be more focused:* An integrated operation is not necessarily a large operation. UNMIS shows that overlap can also have negative consequences. An operation in which the country team is more integrated may be smaller in the end. Moreover, one may wonder to what extent each part of UNAMID is necessary in Darfur. For example, the role of the Elections and Rule of Law Units is not yet clear. Blue prints from other operations are not necessarily the right solution for Darfur. The operation needs to start from the needs on the ground.
- *UNAMID needs to stimulate the Darfur-Darfur dialogue:* The rebel parties are presently too splintered to make a peace process viable. Without the

unification and professionalisation of the rebels any political process is likely to fail.

Recommendations for a future peace-building operation and peace process in Darfur

- *A future peace-building operation in Darfur needs a robust mandate:* The parties to the CPA wanted to have a peace operation with a weak mandate. Consequently UNMIS has not been able to push the parties forward when needed. Except for monitoring non-implementation, UNMIS is not able to penalize parties that do not stick to the agreement. A future peace agreement in Darfur needs to provide more powers to the operation in order to keep the parties on track. This does not only mean that the military force needs to consist of more non- African forces, but also the civil implementation needs to be potentially tougher.
- *A future peace-building operation in Darfur needs a continuous mediation role:* No peace process ends with the signing of a peace agreement. Within a future peace agreement a continuous mediation role or follow-up mechanism needs to be provided for, either by an institution acceptable to both parties, or by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. Moreover, the mediators of the agreement need to commit themselves to the implementation of the agreement.
- *The peace process in Darfur needs an inclusive approach:* In this context it is not so much necessary to include all the minor rebel factions, the most important factions will do. However, it is necessary to include into the process the large Arab tribes in Darfur. Not only are they now wrongly perceived to be equal to the Janjaweed, but also they have stakes. In addition, to end the conflict, also the Janjaweed may have to be invited to the negotiations table.
- *The peace process in Darfur needs durable solutions for IDPs:* In the ‘North-South’ conflict many IDPs have become part of an urbanization process. They are no longer interested in returning to their places of origin as the places where they are presently living, are more convenient. In their places of origin education, sanitation, health, et cetera are often absent, while their present living conditions are much better. This is also likely to be the case for many IDPs in Darfur. Many are not likely to want to return to their villages and have already established more or less permanent alternatives. As it is often not obtainable to provide the same services IDPs presently receive in many camps in their places of origin, one will have to anticipate and consider how to manage this ‘urbanization process’.

List of Interviewed

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- 1) Dr. Sergei Andreyev, Chief Joint Mission Analysis Center, United Nations Mission in Sudan, Khartoum, Sudan, 29 October 2007.
 - 2) Lt.Col. Frans A. Anemaet, Defence Attaché, Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 14 November 2007.
 - 3) Sebastian Appenah, Electoral Affairs Officer, United Nations Mission in Sudan, Khartoum, Sudan, 11 November 2007.
 - 4) Lt Col Ollie Barbour, Deputy Military Advisor to the EU Special Representative for Sudan, Council of the European Union, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 15 November 2007.
 - 5) Lt Col Michel Billard, Military Advisor to the EU Special Representative for Sudan, Council of the European Union, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 15 November 2007.
 - 6) Lt Col Donal Bracken, African Union Darfur Integrated Taskforce, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 15 November 2007.
 - 7) Markus Boeckenfoerde, Legal Expert, Assessment & Evaluation Commission, Juba, Sudan, 4 November 2007.
 - 8) Maarten van den Bosch, Second Secretary, Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Khartoum, Sudan, 28 October 2007.
 - 9) Mark Bowden, Director Civil Affairs Division, United Nations Mission in Sudan, Khartoum, Sudan, 11 November 2007.
 - 10) Clement Lado, ICCO, Juba, Sudan, 3 November 2007.
 - 11) Gillian Cull, Special Assistant, Office of the Acting Special Representative of the Secretary-General, United Nations Mission in Sudan, Khartoum, Sudan, 29 October 2007.
 - 12) Marcus Culley, Security Advisor for Southern Sudan, UNDDSS, Juba, Sudan, 7 November 2007.
 - 13) Anyieth Dawol, Policy Officer Governance, Rule of Law & Security Sector, Juba, Sudan, 30 October and 6 November 2007.
 - 14) Charles Manyang Dawol, Under Secretary, Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs, Republic of The Sudan, Khartoum, Sudan, 13 November 2007.
 - 15) Diane de Guzman, Senior Civil Affairs Officer, Focal Point Southern Sudan, United Nations Mission in Sudan, Juba, Sudan, 6 November 2007.

- 16) Lt.Col. Jensch Dietrich, J2 Chief, United Nations Mission in Sudan, Khartoum, Sudan, 11 November 2007.
- 17) Hans Docter, Head of Development Cooperation, Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 14 November 2007.
- 18) El-Ghassim Wane, Head, African Union Conflict Management Center, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 14 November 2007.
- 19) Ferdinand von Habsburg-Lothringen, Technical Advisor Peace and Development, Strategic Advisory Team, United Nations Development Programme, Juba, Sudan, 31 October 2007.
- 20) Dr. Mohammed Haroon, Managing Director Future Trends Foundation for Strategic Studies & Dialogue, Khartoum, Sudan, 12 November 2007.
- 21) Dr. Hayder Ibrahim Ali, Director Sudanese Studies Centre, Khartoum, Sudan, 12 November 2007.
- 22) Alison Hayes, Darfur Humanitarian Program Advisor, Oxfam, Telephone interview, Khartoum, Sudan, 13 November 2007.
- 23) Everest Karambizi, Return, Reintegration & Recovery Planning officer, United Nations Mission in Sudan, Juba, Sudan, 5 November 2007.
- 24) Felicita Keiru, Political/Reporting Officer, United Nations Mission in Sudan, Juba, Sudan, 7 November 2007.
- 25) J. Ray Kennedy, Chief Electoral Affairs Officer, United Nations Mission in Sudan, Khartoum, Sudan, 11 November 2007.
- 26) Isaac Kenyi, Executive Secretary of Justice and Peace Commission, Sudan Catholic Bishops' Conference, Khartoum, Sudan, 27 October 2007.
- 27) James Kok Ruea, President, Sudan Peace and Reconciliation Commission, Juba, Sudan, 1 November 2007.
- 28) Sokol Kondi, Senior Civil Affairs Officer, United Nations Mission in Sudan, Khartoum, Sudan, 29 October 2007.
- 29) Ilkka Laukkanen, Field Security Coordinator Officer, DSA, Juba, Sudan, 7 November 2007.
- 30) Marcel Leroy, Political Advisor to the EU Special Representative for Sudan, Council of the European Union, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 15 November 2007.
- 31) Thomas Linde, Director of Protection of Civilians, Office of Deputy SRSG Humanitarian Coordination, United Nations Mission in Sudan, Copenhagen, Denmark, 10 September 2007.
- 32) David Lochhead, United Nations Development Programme, Juba, Sudan, 6 November 2007.
- 33) Auke Lootsma, Deputy Country Director (Programme), United Nations Development Programme, Khartoum, Sudan, 29 October 2007
- 34) His Grace Paolino Lukudu Loro, Archbishop of Juba, Juba, Sudan, 6 November 2007.
- 35) Riek Machar, Vice-President of Southern Sudan Juba, Sudan, 1 November 2007.
- 36) Zaved Mahmood, Human Rights Officer, United Nations Mission in Sudan, Khartoum, Sudan, 11 November 2007.

- 37) Magdi el Na'im, Human Rights and Advocacy Director, Sudan Development Organisation (SUDO), Khartoum, Sudan, 10 November 2007.
- 38) Akuei Bona Malwal, Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy of the Republic of the Sudan, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 14 November 2007.
- 39) Tim McKulka, Photographer, United Nations Mission in Sudan, Juba, Sudan, 6 November 2007.
- 40) Ivor Morgan, Country Director, Medair, Khartoum, Sudan, 12 November 2007.
- 41) Kenneth Mpyisi, Office Director, Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 15 November 2007.
- 42) Tim Murithi, Senior Researcher, Direct Conflict Prevention, Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 15 November 2007.
- 43) Manfred Öhm, Resident Representative, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Khartoum, Sudan, 8 November 2007.
- 44) Mudawi Ibrahim Adam, Chairperson, Sudan Development Organisation (SUDO), Khartoum, Sudan, 10 November 2007.
- 45) Amaliya Omot Ojullu, Advocacy & Lobby Officer, New Sudanese Indigenous NGOs Network, Juba, Sudan, 5 November 2007.
- 46) John Primrose, Deputy Country Director – Programmes, Medair, South Sudan, Juba, Sudan, 3 November 2007.
- 47) Gérard Prunier, International consultant for Eastern and Central African Affairs, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 15 November 2007.
- 48) BG Aake Roghe, Head of Mission, European Union Team to Police Assistance AMIS, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 15 November 2007.
- 49) Simonetta Rossi, DDR Officer, United Nations Mission in Sudan, Juba, Sudan, 5 November 2007.
- 50) Col. Ajay Sah, Chief of Operations, United Nations Mission in Sudan, Khartoum, Sudan, 12 November 2007.
- 51) Dr. Jerzy Skuratowicz, Country Director, United Nations Development Programme, Khartoum, Sudan, 11 November 2007.
- 52) Sjoerd Smit, Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Khartoum, Sudan, 28 October 2007.
- 53) Jacco Snoeijers, Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 14 November 2007.
- 54) Lt.Col. Sameer Srivastava, Senior Staff Officer Public Information Office (Military), United Nations Mission in Sudan, Khartoum, Sudan, 12 November 2007.
- 55) Andrew Yunda Stephen, Program Coordinator, Fellowship for African Relief, Khartoum, Sudan, 10 November 2007.
- 56) Karén Tchalian, Head of Office, Sector IV, Kadughi, United Nations Mission in Sudan, Khartoum, Sudan, 29 October 2007.
- 57) Brig.Gen. Stanislaus Tembo, Deputy Force Commander, United Nations Mission in Sudan, Khartoum, Sudan, 12 November 2007.
- 58) Redento Tombe, Field Coordinator, Action Africa Help International, Juba, Sudan, 2 November 2007.

- 59) Stadler Trengove, Senior Legal Officer, United Nations Mission in Sudan, Khartoum, Sudan, 28 October 2007.
- 60) Kai Vittrup, UNMIS Police Commissioner, United Nations Mission in Sudan, Khartoum, Sudan, 13 November 2007.
- 61) James Wani Igga, Speaker of the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly, Juba, Sudan, 2 November 2007.
- 62) Alhaj Warrag, Columnist, Khartoum, Sudan, 27 October 2007.
- 63) Leon Willems, Officer-in-Charge, Public Information Section, Head of Radio Miraya, United Nations Mission in Sudan, Khartoum, Sudan, 11 and 12 November 2007.

Executive summary

Chances of success and failure for UNMIS

At present a look at the factors for success and failure gives a mixed picture of UNMIS. Since the death of Garang the parties are only willing and sincere to cooperate with UNMIS to the extent that they view its implementation of the CPA in their own advantage. It is too weak to provide the parties in a real sense of security, but its presence is very relevant as a guarantee that the parties will not violate the agreement too much. Some of the causes of the conflict are partly addressed by UNMIS, but the extent to which the democratisation will take place and the power and wealth sharing will become nationwide, depends on the parties themselves. The international community in the meantime has largely lost interest in CPA implementation and turned to Darfur. It even used UNMIS and CPA implementation as a trade-off for the involvement and deployment of the United Nations in Darfur. Moreover, none of the permanent members of the Security Council is sincerely interested and willing to offend the NCP. Although the United Nations was involved at an early stage in the peace process and was even able to deploy the advance mission UNAMIS, both parties were not willing to fully cooperate. Due to successful dragging by Khartoum, it took until well into 2007, two years after the signing of the CPA, before UNMIS was finally fully deployed. The operation suffered further as a result of the fact that its leadership, Pronk, was declared *persona non grata* and was forced to leave. Consequently, the mission was left headless for one year, which in turn influenced its coordination. The quality of its personnel is mixed. The extent to which the UNMIS is part of a long term approach differs per 'policy instrument'. On some issues the 'policy instruments' are part of a broader approach, while one may question the sustainability of others. Although within the context of the concept of the integrated operation, a lot attention has been given to coordination, in practise duplication, overlap, stovepiping and organisational infighting have been frequent. Nonetheless, the parties fully own CPA implementation and as such UNMIS. The population is, however, much less aware of what they may and may not expect from UNMIS and the CPA. Civilian disarmament, which is not part of UNMIS' mandate, is

likely to be an enormous future task especially because the conditions for arms control are not yet present.

The probability that a peacekeeping operation contributes to durable peace increases if the extent to which it fulfils the factors for success and failure increases. In its performance UNMIS is not very different from an average relatively successful peacekeeping operation. Often operations face tough issues similar to the 'troubles' in Sudan. Even operations which in the end contribute successfully to durable peace often face and overcome similar problems. The extent to which the most successful operations thus far fulfilled the factors for success and failure was often not much different. Many unsuccessful operations have performed much worse. As such, however, like any relatively successful operation UNMIS' quest stands upon the edge of a knife. Stray but a little and it will fail. Hope remains, however, as also a relative successful operation is a walk over the tightrope.

Chances of success and failure for UNAMID

If one reviews the factors for success and failure for UNAMID, there is little reason for optimism that it is likely to contribute to durable peace. The parties are not very willing and sincere. Moreover, the rebels are also too inexperienced and incapable and above all too splintered to negotiate. UNAMID is not part of a political process and in absence of such a process topped-off by a peace agreement, the operation can at best give attention to the consequences of the conflict, not to its causes. Whether this is likely to be done within the context of a long-term approach is too early to say, but is unlikely, because there is no political agreement and process. A process of arms control, for example, is not likely to be possible. From the start, the operation is likely to be tested on the extent to which it is willing and capable to act forcefully. If it does not immediately show its teeth, it is not likely to gain the respect of the parties and is unlikely to provide in a sense of security to the rebels, the Khartoum related militia, the civilian population and the IDPs. However, due to the obstruction of Khartoum, but just as much because of the incapability of the United Nations and the unwillingness of the Troop Contributing Countries, the operation is deployed late and likely to be only fully operational by June 2009. Initially, therefore, it is likely to be too weak. In addition, the deployment is not at a ripe moment for the resolution of the conflict, it is either too late or too early. Although the neighbouring countries are supportive of the operation, the permanent members of the Security Council have not been very supportive of a strong mandate of UNAMID and willing to put pressure upon the parties. They all have to a certain extent interests in the NCP regime and are not likely to give it up. The quality of the force and the leadership is likely to be better than that of AMIS. However, its command structures are inherently weak due to its hybrid structure. Coordination problems between the United Nations and the African Union are inevitable. In addition, the operation is also likely to have enormous coordination problems with the rest of the United Nations system, with UNMIS, and the other peacekeeping operations on the other side of the

border. As UNAMID is not likely to live-up to the high expectations, especially of the rebel organisations, the IDPs and the civilian population, these groups are likely to lose faith in it and are unlikely to 'own' its outcomes. UNAMID is thus not likely to be able to contribute to durable peace. At present this is also not primarily its mandate. Its main occupation is to provide a breathing space to the local population and the IDPs.

With the present deployment of UNAMID the international community is fighting the war of 5 years ago. Presently the situation has changed drastically. One might therefore wonder whether the deployment of UNAMID is actually what is presently needed to address the problems in Darfur. However, the train of the international community has finally been set into motion. After a long period of pressure Khartoum has finally given in and allowed the deployment of UNAMID. How could the international community now decide that it is the wrong operation for the present day situation? It is therefore deployed in the hope that if the political process is back on track the force can be regarded as an early presence. Moreover, as said, it may, if successful, provide a breathing space to the civilian population and the IDPs. On the other hand one has to keep in mind that if also the United Nations loses the support of the rebel parties and the population, no other organisation is likely to be able to do the job. One then has to hope that Darfur will not become another Somalia.

Lessons and recommendations

The situations in the 'North-South' conflict and the Darfur conflict are very different. The main difference is the phase both conflicts are in. The 'North-South' conflict for the time being appears to be in a post-conflict stage. Darfur is clearly still in conflict. UNMIS is therefore clearly a peacekeeping operation largely with the consent of the parties, acting under chapter six of the Charter, implementing a peace agreement. UNAMID for the time being is an operation deployed at a stage where there is no peace to keep, but where war is raging. The implementation of the DPA or any other peace agreement still requires more time before the conflict is ripe for resolution. This means either more negotiations or war. UNAMID is, however, deployed mainly to aid the protection of civilians and IDPs. It therefore has much more a humanitarian task than monitoring and implementing a peace agreement. One might therefore argue that perhaps a lot of lessons can be learned from similar operations in different countries. Nonetheless from this study it appears that there are also many lessons to be learned from UNMIS and the geographical context for the case of UNAMID in Darfur. These lessons combined with the knowledge of the situation in Darfur lead to the following four clusters of recommendations where NGOs should lobby for, and what the United Nations and its member states should do to improve the peace operations in Sudan.

General recommendations on Sudan and its peacekeeping operations

- Bashing of the NCP does not aid both operations.
- To aid both operations, more attention needs to be given to the CPA.
- Staff and others involved in both operations often need to better understand the country and its conflicts.
- Both operations need to give attention to arms control instead of disarmament.
- Both operations need to have more attention for QIPs.
- Both operations need to cooperate more with NGOs.
- Both operations need more dissemination of information on the role of the peacekeeping operations.
- Both operations need better quality of personnel.
- Both operations need to have more flexible civilian recruitment.
- In both operations the capacity of UNMOs needs to be improved.
- In both operations one needs to be more sensitive in where who is deployed.

Recommendations on UNMIS

- UNMIS needs the establishment of a forum where the international community speaks and supports the operation with one voice.
- UNMIS needs to provide more attention to the ‘South-South’ conflict.
- Donors need to fund the quick start of a reintegration process of ex-combatants.
- UNMIS needs more air assets.

Recommendations for UNAMID

- The UNAMID mandate needs to be robustly implemented.
- UNAMID needs to be quickly deployed.
- UNAMID needs to patrol actively.
- UNAMID needs to actively use field diplomacy.
- UNAMID needs a large civil affairs division.
- UNAMID needs to address attention to the use of traditional power structures and conflict resolution instruments.
- The deployment of UNAMID needs to be more focused.
- UNAMID needs to stimulate the Darfur-Darfur dialogue.

Recommendations for a future peace-building operation and peace process in Darfur

- A future peace-building operation in Darfur needs a robust mandate.
- A future peace-building operation in Darfur needs a continuous mediation role.
- The peace process in Darfur needs an inclusive approach.
- The peace process in Darfur needs durable solutions for IDPs.

Notes

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- ¹ United Nations website, Sudan – UNMIS – facts and figures, <<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unmis/facts.html>>.
- ² UN DOC S/RES/1590/2005, 24 March 2005; and UN DOC S/RES/1706/2006, 31 August 2006.
- ³ UN DOC S/RES/1706/2006, 31 August 2006; UN DOC S/PRST/2007/2, 16 January 2007; UN DOC S/PRST/2006/55, 19 December 2006; UN DOC S/2007/42, 25 January 2007; UN DOC S/RES/1769/2007, 31 July 2007; and UN DOC S/RES/1778 (2007), 25 September 2007.
- ⁴ Jaïr van der Lijn, *Walking the tightrope: Do UN peacekeeping operations actually contribute to durable peace?* Amsterdam, Rozenberg Publishers, Dutch university Press, Purdue University Press, 2006.
- ⁵ UN DOC S/2004/453, 6 and 22; UN DOC S/2004/763, 5; UN DOC S/2004/881, 43; and UN DOC S/2005/57, 19.
- ⁶ UN DOC S/2005/57, 24; UN DOC S/2005/411, 6; and Alex de Waal, “The Wars of Sudan. The crisis in Darfur cannot be resolved without a North-South agreement”, *The Nation*, 11 (2007), p. 17.
- ⁷ UN DOC S/RES/1590, 4.
- ⁸ UN DOC S/2005/579, 5 and 24; and Alex de Waal, ‘The Wars of Sudan’, p. 18.
- ⁹ UN DOC S/2005/411, 11; UN DOC S/2005/821, 7; and UN DOC S/2006/160, 3, 10, 15, 17, 26, 37, 81 and 96.
- ¹⁰ UN DOC S/2006/728, 22 and 29; and UN DOC S/RES/1714.
- ¹¹ Interview 1; Interview 2; Interview 3; Interview 4; Interview 5; Interview 6; Interview 7; Interview 8; Interview 9; Interview 10; Interview 11; Interview 12; Interview 13; Interview 14; Interview 15; and Interview 16.
- ¹² UN DOC S/2005/411, 6; UN DOC S/2005/821, 3; John Young, *The South Sudan Defence Force in the wake of the Juba Declaration*, Geneva, 2006; *Juba Declaration on Unity and Integration between the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) And the South Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF)*, 8 January 2006; Interview 7; Interview 17; and Interview 18.
- ¹³ Interview 3; Interview 7; Interview 10; Interview 19; and Interview 20.
- ¹⁴ UN DOC S/2006/160, 96; UN DOC S/2006/728, 39; UN DOC S/2007/42, 17 and 65-67; Interview 3; Interview 7; Interview 10; Interview 14; Interview 19; Interview 20; Interview 21; and Interview 22.
- ¹⁵ UN DOC S/2005/10, 57; Interview 3; Interview 7; Interview 8; Interview 10; Interview 14; Interview 19; Interview 20; Interview 22; Interview 23; Interview 24; and Interview 25.
- ¹⁶ UN DOC S/2006/728, 2; UN DOC S/2007/42, 2; Interview 1; Interview 8; Interview 10; Interview 15; Interview 16; Interview 26; and Interview 27.
- ¹⁷ UN DOC S/2005/411, 23; UN DOCS/2006/728, 6; S/2007/42, 49; and Interview 28.

18 Interview James Wani Igga.
19 Interview 29; and Interview 30.
20 UN DOC S/RES/1590, 16; UN DOC S/2007/42, 30; Interview 18; Interview 30;
Interview 31; Interview 32; Interview 33; Interview 34; and Interview 35.
21 This does, however, imply that one expects there is a North and South which in
practice is not such a clear cut divide. So-called Northern groups have fought on the so-
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22 S/2005/411, 12; UN DOC S/2005/821, 16-18; UN DOC S/2006/160, 16-28; Abdul-
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25 UN DOC S/2005/411, 15; Interview 41; Interview 42; and Interview 43.
26 UN DOC S/2005/821, 46; UN DOC S/2006/160, 72-73; UN DOC S/2007/42, 56;
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27 Interview 11; Interview 14; Interview 17; Interview 23; Interview 24; Interview 33;
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28 UN DOC S/2005/579, 27; UN DOC S/RES/1574, 4; UN DOC S/2005/821, 73-74;
UN DOC S/2006/160, 76; UN DOC S/2006/728, 53; Interview 12; Interview 14;
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29 Interview 3; Interview 4; Interview 9; Interview 10; Interview 17; Interview 19;
Interview 20; Interview 35; and Interview 44.
30 Interview 3; Interview 20; and Interview 35.
31 UN DOC S/RES/1547, 3-4 and 11; UN DOC S/2004/453, 1; UN DOC S/2004/703, 2;
and UN DOC S/2004/881, 59.
32 UN DOC S/2005/411, 26-28; UN DOC S/2005/579, 24-26; UN DOC S/2005/821,
26; UN DOC S/2006/160, 30-31; UN DOC S/2007/42, 17-29 and 63; Interview 14;
and Interview 35.
33 Interview 25.
34 UN DOC S/2007/57, 33-37; Interview 33; and Interview 34.
35 UN DOC S/2005/57, 6; Interview 3; Interview 4; Interview 7; Interview 8; Interview 9;
Interview 14; Interview 17; Interview 18; Interview 19; Interview 20; Interview 21;
Interview 25; Interview 27; Interview 33; Interview 34; Interview 35; and Interview 43.
36 Interview 5; Interview 6; Interview 12; Interview 14; Interview 17; Interview 24;
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37 Interview 9; Interview 14; Interview 17; Interview 22; Interview 35; Interview 38;
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39 Interview 1; Interview 2; Interview 4; Interview 5; Interview 6; Interview 9; Interview
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- ⁵² Interview 27; Interview 35; Interview 56; Interview 57; Interview 58; and Interview 59.
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- ⁵⁴ Interview 21.
- ⁵⁵ Interview 21; and Interview 31.
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