of Cloyes led some thousands of followers to St Denis, whence they were sent home by royal command. Some of the French *pueri* seem to have made their way (though this can still only be inferred) to Cologne where a second youth called Nicholas also recruited a large following. The association of the *devocio* with the recovery of Jerusalem and the True Cross (both lost to Saladin in 1187) now became explicit, and Nicholas’s host crossed the Alps where the arrival of bands of *pueri* was recorded at Genoa and Piacenza. After that silence descends. The last trace of the actual movement that we currently possess dates from 1220, when Pope Honorius III issued an ex-*puer* called Otto with a dispensation of the crusading vow that he had sworn. The *devocio* of the *pueri* left numerous tantalising loose ends. How had it come about? Was it the fruit of devotion or the devil? What happened to its followers? In the 1200s Alberic of Trois-Fontaines, Matthew Paris and Vincent of Beauvais were the main commentators who applied their minds to explaining things, and the elements of nearly all the later myths originated with them: that the *pueri* were seduced by magicians, betrayed and sold into Muslim slavery, even recruited for the service of the Assassins. In practice the movement’s links with ‘official’ crusading were closer than distant critics like Paris liked to believe. Not only was the French *devocio* triggered by processions promoted for the cause of crusade, but many *pueri* took the cross, and Otto’s need to secure a papal dispensation in 1220 shows that their vows could not simply be set aside. Dickson makes a strong case for the *devocio* of 1212 as the most spectacular offspring of the long period of wrenching grief felt by the Catholic west for the loss of Jerusalem and the True Cross; one crusade preacher in the immediate aftermath of 1212 pointed to the enthusiasm of the *pueri* as worthy of emulation. Were the *pueri* children? On this Dickson hedges his bets. Admittedly the German hosts contained many older people, but even these groups were characterised by contemporaries as movements of *pueri*: ‘Nearly all the chroniclers single out the youthful *pueri* as its core group, as well as its most visible and most remarkable element.’ Not a Children’s Crusade then, but certainly a youth movement. Its appropriation by the rebels of the ’60s, fellow devotees of the impossible, was not so far wide of the mark.

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Modern scholars so far have agreed that Robert Grosseteste was a biblical-moralistic theologian who resisted the new fashion for scholastic reasoning and stuck to the trusted method of biblical allegory. This book challenges this consensus. It argues that Grosseteste was not only fully aware of the new developments in the philosophy of science, based on Aristotle’s *Posterior analytics*, but also that, if we look at the whole of the work that he wrote while regent master at Oxford, it is immediately obvious that he based much of his own work on Aristotle’s concept of science. He was the first theologian to voice an opinion on the subject matter of theology and the unity of theology as a science. Grosseteste also gave thought to the matter of the first principles of theology, and, although he does not say so explicitly, he seems to have come to the conclusion that the articles of faith, as summed up in the Apostles’ Creed,
constitute in theology the true and indemonstrable premises that Aristotle requires as the basis of any science. Finally the author shows that Grosseteste in many of his theological works made use of syllogistic reasoning, based on modern logic. The conclusion is that Grosseteste was not an outsider but that his work was completely in tune with intellectual developments of the first half of the thirteenth century. There is much to recommend this new appraisal of Grosseteste as a theologian. But perhaps the author exaggerates a little in saying that the consensus is that Grosseteste was simply old-fashioned. No one doubts that he was deeply read in Aristotle. He was intimately acquainted with the new trends in philosophy and he at least asked himself how far they could be applied to theology. The fact that he discusses the subject matter of theology extensively confirms that point. The author is less convincing when trying to show that Grosseteste accepted that the articles of faith constituted the *principia* of theology. He seems to say that the twelve articles are a summary of the faith, but saying that is not the same as maintaining that they are the premises of a theological science. But my main objection to the author’s picture of Grosseteste as a full-blooded speculative theologian is Grosseteste’s outspoken opposition to syllogistic argumentation in theology, as expressed in the introduction to the *Hexaëmeron*, his most important theological treatise. There he states that every statement in the Bible is equally credible, and that, therefore, we should not try to deduce one thing from another through syllogisms, nor should we reduce its contents to a number of axioms. The rest of the commentary is proof that he takes these assumptions very seriously. The modernity of the *Hexaëmeron* lies in that the explanation of the letter is improved by using the most modern insights of natural science, but it is not an example of advanced syllogistic argument. The author has convinced me that Grosseteste is not the survivor of an earlier age, but he has not convinced me that we must see him as standing in the tradition of scholastic theologians of his own age; he followed his own path.

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