

Introduction: Postnational Politics in the European Union

OLIVIER KRAMSCH, VIRGINIE MAMADOUH
AND MARTIN VAN DER VELDE

Does it still make any sense to speak of a postnational politics in Europe today? Of a Europe united by a truly postnational *demos* (if not *ethos*)? By daring to pose such questions at this time we feel the terms of debate to be already tensely pre-loaded. Against the backdrop of the recent collapse in attempts to forge an EU-wide constitution, and in light of still-festerling wounds caused by bitter divisions over the war in Iraq, considerations of a Europe Union *beyond* the nation-state carries with it a whiff of anachronism, partaking of that naïve euphoria of the early post-Wall 1990s, and perhaps now meriting the snide cynicism of Robert Kagan's caricature of Europe as a de-territorialised 'post-modern paradise' unable to match the raw territorial might of American power.¹ But precisely because it seems as if the recent return of a European imperial realpolitik would have neatly settled the matter by burying the notion of any postnational order on the Continent, we believe the topic merits fresh unpacking, re-scrutinising and re-framing.

In this special issue of *Geopolitics*² we pursue this line of thinking if only to re-inject a sense of open-endedness and indeterminacy onto an issue that threatens to become banalised through the by-now rote incantation of the continued relevance and hegemonic role of the state in an era of globalisation. We concur that the great globalisation debate of the 1990s, fought largely on the terrain of political economy, was won by those who corroborated the ongoing importance of the state in orchestrating the most recent instantiations of space-time compression and resultant capital-centered restructurings. This has surely been reflected in the ongoing locational predominance of headquarter firms within the advanced countries of trans-Atlantic capitalism and the vast preponderance of trade linking the triad zones of the world economy.³ The

Olivier Kramsch, Nijmegen Centre for Border Research and Department of Human Geography, University of Nijmegen, The Netherlands. E-mail: <o.kramsch@nsm.kun.nl>. Virginie Mamadouh, Department of Geography and Planning, University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands. E-mail: <v.d.mamadouh@uva.nl>. Martin van der Velde, Nijmegen Centre for Border Research and Department of Human Geography, University of Nijmegen, The Netherlands. E-mail: <m.vandervelde@nsm.kun.nl>.

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ongoing political-economic salience of the nation-state has indeed been further vouchsafed through the persistent role of state elites in achieving renewed accumulation-orientated 'spatio-temporal fixes' at sub-national urban and regional scales.⁴ But in conclusively validating the persistent role of the state in international political economy, we believe an equally important debate was thereby short-circuited, one whose analytical starting point should be founded on problematising the imaginative realm of the *nation* as the teleological endpoint for a politics assumed to be isomorphic with the territorial *state* of political-economy.

It is by largely conflating the two, or worse, granting the former a semi-epiphenomenal status with regard to the latter, that we believe political economy-inspired analyses have fallen short in specifying key features of the recent qualitative transformation of the European inter-state system. Compensating for these blind-spots involves more than the liberal intergovernmentalist observation of a shift in the form and function of rule from that of discrete member state governments to one of multi-level and networked *governance*⁵ operating above and below the state. And it requires more than acknowledging the proliferation of interest groups spanning the traditional public/private divide as a core feature of these emergent governance practices, whereby the technocratic allocation of 'values' becomes the primary target for policy-making.⁶ At stake (but rarely articulated) in these shifts, we believe, is the very meaning of politics conceived in an environment which no longer takes the nation-state for granted as its underlying territorial reference point. Indeed, and as wryly put by Peter Taylor: 'Who ever voted for a governance?'.⁷ The question, of course, rather than rally intellectual forces to close ranks around the threatened model of state-centric democratic politics, points out the urgent need to rethink the very meaning of democratic practice under circumstances where it is widely acknowledged that disembedding and politically unaccountable market logics are eroding the nation conceived as a territorialisable 'community of fate'.⁸ Pushed forward imperceptibly, such a question implies that an alternative grounding to political legitimacy in Europe today on the basis of a state-centric representative democratic model is in order. James Anderson thus reminds us in timely fashion that the nation was never mapped fully nor absolutely onto the state, even at the apogee of modernity, and that indeed the very possibility for democratic politics in modern western societies has been predicated upon conveniently 'forgetting' the contingent and always partial nature of such a 'fit'.⁹ For this very reason, an attempt to craft a politics independent of nation-state territoriality throws into question once again the 'natural' status of Europe as a community of shared destiny, bringing into sharp relief the arbitrariness of its origins and future external boundaries. As the accession of ten new member states looms, such considerations with increasing urgency must incorporate as well larger geopolitical questions regarding the specific

identity of Europe within an American-dominated world order, including the ongoing and vexed relationship of the continent with its former colonial territories in *outrémer*.

In this more global context, an adherence to the notion of the state's robustness in steering political-economic change, while preserving some analytical traction, increasingly risks ignoring the very real ways in which underlying questions of identity and difference, legitimacy and accountability, core-periphery relations and resulting new lines of power are currently being reconfigured in the fraught imperial order that is Europe-in-the-world today. Indeed, while continuing to grant prime importance to issues of political economy, such a lens often serves perversely to reinforce the 'contradictory unity' of politics/economics – that separation of the economic sphere from that of the political – lying at the very heart of current neoliberal capitalist logics.¹⁰ We believe that a more culturally inflected approach to the study of contemporary governance dynamics is thus called for, one that engages with the socio-political construction of the nation on its own terms as an open-ended project whose ultimate territorial horizons cannot be foreordained. In this manner, politics is conceived as charged with a degree of autonomy from the more functionalist and instrumentalising accounts of state formation read off from bounded capitalist social relations.¹¹ It is from thinking politics through this emergent space-in-formation, we aver, that the term 'postnational' – rather than merely 'transnational' – acquires its full conceptual weight and enters the world at the present historical moment.

Three roads into the 'postnational' are proposed in the essays that follow. The first examines ways in which the issue of postnational political legitimacy in Europe is currently being addressed across a variety of policy domains. Here, while the nation remains an ongoing and viable analytical category, issues of national identity, space and interest are being reworked in complex and unpredictable ways, reflected in new uncertainties and provocative indeterminacies. These link policy-making processes and multi-level geographical arenas of action, the problematic mapping of national interests and functional market logics, as well as the historically freighted relation between territory and national identity.

Enrico Gualini launches this set by enquiring into current the European 'legitimacy crisis', examining the need for reconstructing an effective and democratic approach to policy making largely neglected in debates focusing exclusively on the constitutional reform of European institutions. Rather than be viewed only in terms of formal institutions, Europe is grasped here in a purposively social constructivist manner, as an emergent, policy-driven entity. European integration is thus seen as the outcome of policies enacted within the European supra-national arena, as well as in the ways such policies are continuously re-interpreted, re-negotiated and re-enacted in the different domains of a multi-level polity extending beyond the respective national geographical

frameworks set by constitutional design. For Gualini, a vital consequence of this approach is the need to 'spatialise' the existing discourse on European reforms, the better to examine innovative features of political geography emerging in the policy-making arena which in turn are producing important feedback effects upon the legitimacy of Europe as a novel 'political space'. With a keen eye to the dynamic spatio-temporal contingencies underlying these varied policy approaches, Gualini traces the lineaments of a profoundly original 'institutional experiment'-in-the-making, one which, extending beyond the narrow remit of sectional policy goals, posits as a condition of its emergence the space of a 'positive integration' acknowledging political pluralism and diversity. For Gualini, only the latter would constitute the requisite foundation for democratic policy making in a self-consciously 'postnational state'. Beyond a merely analytical-descriptive approach, such a perspective assumes the social construction of identity and its geographical expression as vital components of the European 'legitimacy question' in addressing a commitment to institutional experimentation.

In their contribution, Judith Miggelbrink and Marc Redepenning re-visit the *Standort Deutschland* debate of the mid-1990s, considered by the authors as a semantic means for reproducing a certain version of the German nation-state consonant with the imperatives of neo-liberal competitiveness. This debate serves as a point of departure for theorising what they term the production of 'spatial semantics'. Writing against the grain of research which focuses too narrowly on (re)organisational aspects of economic state crises, they address the role and function of space-related terms within mass-media communication. Drawing on Luhmann's version of systems theory, as well as elements of a literature on 'banal nationalism', critical geopolitics and the place concept in humanistic geography, the authors grasp the capability of spatial semantics to transform the uncertainty of the world into seemingly 'natural' verities. By scrutinising articles related to the '*Standort Deutschland*' debate in the weekly newspaper *Die Zeit* between 1995 and 1999, the authors demonstrate convincingly how such sources effectively mediate the contradictory status of the German nation-state as a term unproblematically embedded in everyday life and market logics that in turn threaten to undermine it. Echoing the strategy of Gualini, by refusing to accept the territoriality of the German nation-state as an a priori given, Miggelbrink and Redepenning carefully expose the 'messy' and precarious nature of its semantically derived underpinnings, in which the coherence of 'nation' *Deutschland* can never be fully mapped onto the functionally differentiated 'place' marked by the neo-liberal term *Standort*.

For Stephen Wood, the issue of a putatively postnational European identity is most acutely framed through the application of Community-wide law regarding property ownership in Eastern Europe. Filling an important blind spot in the literature on postnationalism, Wood argues that a consideration of

the possibilities and limits of land as supranational property might offer a more robust test of the potential for constructing a truly pan-European territorial identity, conceived as the *sine qua non* for successful integration. Through the judicious screening of EU documents, and by examining attempts by foreign nationals to acquire lands in Poland and Czech Republic, Wood effectively demonstrates that within this sphere the realisation of a common European legal order is hindered by ongoing misgivings regarding a liberal European-wide space of free access, unrestricted capital movement and indifference to nationality issues. The issue is at its most controversial in the instance where Germans or Austrians wish to acquire property in these Eastern European lands, either via standard commercial transactions or through demands based on historical restitution. In accounting for the reluctance of Poles and Czechs to permit the acquisition of land by foreigners, rather than resort to validating the recalcitrant perdurability of nationalism in Eastern Europe as 'mere vestiges of modernity' (a move that would only repeat the worst historicising tendencies of the mid-1990s in reporting on this part of the world), Wood deftly exposes the mutually constitutive relation binding such reactions to the contemporary 'Europeanisation' of political and legal conceptions of land/property. Moreover, his analysis has the added value of contextualising the current difficulties encountered by the inhabitants of Eastern Europe in mentally detaching territory from state, land from (ethnic) nation, and private citizen from national grouping. Rather than ascribe these to trans-historical and geographically universalisable categories, Wood implies explanatory power must be granted the fraught legacy of socialism, including the semi-colonial relations now being re-enacted between both halves of the continent.

Borders and border regions constitute the second potential arena for the birth of a post-national order in Europe today. Once largely marginal and peripheral to the centralised political and economic space of the nation-state, European borders are in the process of being re-scripted as key nodes and gate-way points within an expanded Europe of cross-border regions (henceforth CBRs), heralded by the Commission as 'laboratories of integration'.¹² Not to be outdone, academic commentators have proposed CBRs as 'anticipatory geographies'¹³ for Europe, as 'alternative states'¹⁴ to those of Europe's traditional Westphalian system. Currently the recipients of enhanced structural funding largesse under the European Community Initiatives framework, CBRs have thus become recent objects of experimentation in transboundary *governance*, challenging the ability of member states to pool sovereignty in the service of intensified cross-border economic networking, technology transfer, cultural collaboration and the establishment of hybrid forms of representative democracy. Three articles in this special issue address this theme. In observing the tri-lingual Maas–Rhine cross-border region (or, in

Brussels-speak: *Eu(ro)region*; in the German-Belgo-Dutch border region), Hans Knippenberg contrasts the somewhat hyperbolic image of the region promoted by Maas–Rhine’s promoters with the reality of actual cross-border mentalities and interactions. Despite attempts by the euroregion to present itself as a historical ‘unity’ only arbitrarily partitioned by national borders, the region remains stubbornly separated according to nationally defined categories. For Knippenberg, although the national border as a physical barrier may have been removed, the unification and integration of citizens living in the region continues to be impeded by conflicting national systems of law and regulations, by communication and information media focused on national issues, by nationally oriented infrastructure, and by the persistence of strongly differentiated national cultures and identities. Sensitive to the dialectically related de-nationalising and re-nationalising tendencies operating within European border regions, Knippenberg suggests a form of ‘bounded integration’ be applied to Maas–Rhine, whereby the re-nationalisation of issues within the Dutch, German and French-speaking parts of the region are attenuated through the strategic use of media and public pedagogy.

Training her attention on the nearby Dutch/German Rijn–Waal CBR, Anke Strüver shrewdly observes that when examining the internal borders of the European Union in the context of their purportedly official demise, academic treatments emphasise structural obstacles to cross-border interaction while ignoring the active borders in people’s minds. Despite the physical removal of borders, she argues that it is people’s perceptions of borders and their contiguous regions which throw up the most intractable obstacles to achieving ‘borderlessness’ and cross-border interaction. These perceptions refer to borders’ ongoing persistence in people’s minds, to their affective, cognitive and imagined meanings assumed to be highly influential in people’s lives. Approaching this lacuna, she proposes to understand borders as being constituted by imaginations and cultural representations, and as undergoing constant reconfigurations through social relations. She pursues this agenda by exploring the meanings of the Dutch–German border expressed in popular representations that commonly employ national stereotypes. Against the sub-disciplinary study of ‘popular geopolitics’, and applying semiotics as methodology, she presents a theatre play on the theme of the Dutch–German border as a complex but popular representation. Analysis of the theatre play also focuses on its audiences and the reception of the play by children. This permits Strüver to address people’s *readings* of popular representations of the border. In so doing, she concludes that while Germans and Dutch cross the border more or less on a regular basis for exceptional and exciting events such as holidays and ‘fun shopping excursions’, or to obtain good bargains, the border continues to exist as both a real and imagined phenomenon created by representations and reproduced by people’s perceptions, interpretations and practices. As suggested in the case

studies offered by Wood and Knippenberg, Strüver's semiological analysis implies that people's nationalising discourses, rather than reflecting archaic and immutable tendencies towards the monolithic replication of state forms, highlight on the contrary a re-working of the nation-state couplet through the complex and often contradictory articulation of localities, regions and micro-social processes to the broader Europeanist discourses within which they are invariably embedded.¹⁵ The politics they evoke, in turn involving a paradoxical cross-border mutual recognition-in-indifference, are a far cry from the unreflective boundedness of their state-centric antecedents, and thus require a radically different optics for them to be grasped in their shimmering contemporaneity.

Finally, Jan Markusse widens the analytical lens on transboundary regionalism beyond the two previous case studies by examining stirrings of cross-border ethno-regional alliances within the Belgo-German border zone, the Basque Country in Spain and France, and the area of the former Habsburg *Kronland* of Tyrol, the latter embracing the Austrian Land of Tyrol and the autonomous region of Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol in Italy. In the context of a perceived diminution in sources of tension and suspicion around Europe's internal borders, and given the acknowledged salience of symbolic and discursive markers in the institutionalisation of cross-border regions, Markusse investigates the possibility that areas where 'interface minorities' and their homelands have been divided by international boundaries might serve as potential breeding grounds for the development of politically active euro-regions featuring strong levels of autonomy from state structures. The results of empirical fieldwork in the abovementioned arenas indicates, however, that given existing institutional asymmetries on either side of the borders under study, states continue to set the parameters for the creation of cross-border ethno-regional alliances (as exemplified in the Belgo-German case). Moreover, states condition ethno-regional CBRs as a means of controlling regional irredentist claims (as in case of Spain regarding the Basque Country) or in subduing potentially destabilising inter-ethnic tensions within border areas (as in the case of Austria vis à vis German-speaking inhabitants and their relation to Italians in South Tyrol). From this, Markusse concludes that one should be careful not to assume that regional actors in a border zone with interface minorities are self-evidently inclined and able to create an ethnic euroregion. Rather, it is more realistic to assume a more complex situation with a heterogeneous field of actors and constraining conditions emanating from the structural and social institutionalisation of states. Markusse's research findings therefore suggest that trans-state drivers for euregional mobilisation must be found outside that of ethno-regional variables, which are still overdetermined by intra-state regional policy criteria.

State borders, while remaining the pre-eminent frontiers within geopolitics, must increasingly be contextualised within the emerging territorialities of

supra-national regional blocs, which in turn are increasingly acquiring frontier characteristics. The two essays that round out this special issue enquire into the particular function and identity of these unique but largely understudied frontiers, which in important ways draw attention to the wider project of Europe as a qualitatively novel political–geographical entity, while interpellating the nature of its relation to neighboring zones. Taking the EU as his focus, William Walters focuses on the regionalisation of borders where transformations in their form and function have been particularly pronounced. After outlining the principal ways in which the regionalisation of borders within the EU has traditionally been framed, he subsequently argues for a different approach, one that develops the concept of frontier-related ‘geostrategies’. Drawing upon a Foucauldian ‘governmentality’ perspective, Walters indicates that each geostrategy corresponds with a particular way of territorialising the space of the border, managing populations within its remit, constructing a certain idea of ‘inside’ and ‘outside’, and of delineating the risks and problems that the border is to govern. While certainly entailing state and sub-state territorialisations, frontier geostrategies equally presuppose particular definitions as to the identity and political rationality of Europe. Walters identifies four geostrategies as currently operative within the European Union: networked (non)borders, marches, colonial frontiers and *limes*. A geostrategic perspective uses contemporary social forms (such as networks) but also historical forms of borders (marches, *limes*) in order to enhance the intelligibility of the frontiers of the EU. In adopting such a geostrategic perspective, and in a move that surely would not be countenanced by Knippenberg, Markusse or Strüver, Walters consciously seeks to overcome a perceived reductionism within contemporary European border research. For Walters, the latter would seek to locate the origins or primary analytical causes of border forms in some kind of transformation located at a privileged scale, either by understanding Europe as a system of states or in terms of a specific political economic formation. A geostrategic perspective, on the contrary, eschews the search for an essence or cause. Instead, it is purposefully irreductionist and entails a multiplication of forms of intelligibility. The territorialisation of frontiers is thus presented in terms of multiple, competing geostrategies. On this account, rather than view borders as the expression of pre-existing state power, we are invited to theorise *from* the border in such a way as to dare pose the question: what and how does a frontier govern?

As if in dialogue with Walter’s query, Browning and Joenniemi provide a case study of the Russian exclave/enclave of Kaliningrad, an area that with forthcoming European Union enlargement to Poland and Lithuania will soon find itself surrounded by the EU and its controversial Schengen wall. In assessing the future role of Kaliningrad within an expanded Europe, the authors argue that a modernist notion of ‘marginality’ can no longer adequately

capture the geopolitical significance of such a space. In modernist discourse, marginality was equated with a lack of power and influence, situated off-centre from decision-making locales, the subject of actions taken in national governments and state capitals. For Browning and Joenniemi, the future positioning of Kaliningrad calls for a re-conceptualisation of the very idea of marginality as providing significant capacities for influence precisely as a function of inhabiting the edge between different polities. Adopting a self-consciously post-structuralist perspective, the authors consider the term ‘margin’ as a discursive construct, the meanings attached to which are constantly open to challenge and change, and which moreover have the tendency to shift normatively according to context. Problematising dominant understandings of territorial sovereignty, margins challenge the very constitution of both Russia and the EU, interrogate the future of European integration and destabilise the character of EU–Russian relations. In this respect, Kaliningrad illustrates how margins, via their mere existence, can be important in setting the agenda for regional politics in this part of the world. By placing the burden of analysis on the discursive construction of marginality, the authors offer a finely nuanced analytical grid capable of differentiating aspects of power – state and non-state, central and peripheral – in the constitution of an active enclave identity. The attitudes of Moscow and Brussels (the key centres to which Kaliningrad relates) have thus been important in variously constraining or enabling the options available to it, but never deterministically so.

Finally, The risks and possibilities for postnational political engagement along the European Union’s southern frontier are assessed by Sharon Pardo in a review of two recently published volumes, *The Emerging Euro-Mediterranean System* (by Xenakis and Chrysochoou) and *The EU’s Enlargement and Mediterranean Strategies* (edited by Maresceau and Lannon). Here, Pardo discusses EU postnational politics in the Mediterranean in the context of a newly adopted Wider Europe-Neighborhood policy.

In the scope and breadth of their findings, the contributions to this special issue sketch the outline of an emergent postnational political realm that richly expands on contemporary political-economic theorising of state restructuring in Europe today. Training their analytical lens on the socially and semantically constructed nature of European state spatiality, the essays grouped under the first theme point to the salience of key institutions, notably the mass media, in weaving representational schemata capable of managing issues of identity and difference, including the legacy of perceived historical injustices, within an expanded European public sphere. Rejecting any a priori basis for territorial representation, the essays collected within the second and third subsections are keen to highlight the changes in perspective afforded theorising politics from Europe’s material and metaphoric borderlands. Indeed, these contributions go far in revealing the degree to which Europe’s internal borders

continue do the 'work' of covering up the arbitrary nature of the nation-state as the endpoint for politics. An open and yet fully to be explored question remains the extent to which those inhabiting border regions within the EU have the capacity to resist national representations orchestrated by state elites in the service of a truly cross-border political imaginary. That the ultimate space for such a politics may increasingly be anchored to a vaster geopolitical terrain than that provided by the European nation-state and associated member-state system is made clear in the final contributions to this special issue. Indeed, it may well be on the newly created external frontiers of Europe that the very notion of an authentic European *demos* is to be re-invented. It is in this charged context that we present three possible roads to a post-national European future, three signposts for a potential democratic politics at the interstices of the European inter-state system. We now invite the reader to engage with the issues raised in this *entrée*.

NOTES

1. R. Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf 2003).
2. The bulk of essays contained in this special issue emerge from conferences co-organised in 2002 by one or another of the co-editors. In an attempt to excavate a 'prehistory' of globalisation by examining the function of cities and regions in Europe prior to the crystallisation of the nation-state as exclusive bearer of political allegiances, Virginie Mamadouh and Hans Knippenberg prepared a special session at the 4th European Social Science History Conference entitled *Challenging Territorial States: 'Global Relations of Cities and Regions in Historical Perspective'* (Den Haag, 27 February–2 March 2002). Problematising the nation-state from the other end of modernity, Wolfgang Zierhofer and Olivier Kramersch convened an international gathering to re-consider the nature of politics and the politics of nature in the wake of the demise of the nation-state as a taken-for-granted container for the contemporary political imagination: *Nature, Nation and Society: Reconsidering Politics in Social and Political Geography*, Katholieke Universiteit Nijmegen, Nijmegen, The Netherlands (13–15 June 2002).
3. S. Sassen, *Loosing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization* (New York: Columbia University Press 1996); P. Hirst and G. Thompson, *Globalization in Question: The International Economy and the Possibilities of Governance* (Cambridge: Polity Press 1996).
4. Drawing on a Marxist urban and regional political economy tradition, see notably K.R. Cox, *Spaces of Globalization: Reasserting the Power of the Local* (New York: Guilford Press 1997); R. Boyer and Y. Saillard, *Regulation Theory: The State of the Art* (London: Routledge 2002); B. Jessop, *The Future of the Capitalist State* (Cambridge: Polity Press 2002); D. Harvey, *The New Imperialism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2003). Within the Anglo-Saxon academic context of the 1990s, those who have engaged in a most sustained and rigorous fashion with the socio-political ramifications of a putatively 'postnational condition' have emerged largely from intellectuals of the post-imperial British diaspora inhabiting anthropology, comparative literature and cultural studies departments located at elite North American and British universities. The work of these scholars has been particularly astute in tracing the trans- or postnational political-economy of cultural forms, and their influence in shaping hybrid communities whose primary sodalities extend beyond the territorial purview of their respective nation-states. These themes would certainly characterise the work of authors such as Paul Gilroy, Homi Bhabha, Arjun Appadurai and, to a lesser extent, Gayatri Spivak and Edward Said. In a development that would merit comparative treatment in its own right, intellectuals reflecting on the post-national question within continental Europe have tended to be much

- more cautious, a somewhat paradoxical development given Europe's self-professed 'borderlessness'. On the need to forge a territorially ambivalent 'constitutional patriotism' for Europe, see J. Habermas, *The Postnational Constellation: Political Essays* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press 2001). In a similarly 'prudent' vein, B. Axford and R. Huggins, while arguing that 'transnational networks and flows are an augury of a postnational polity in Europe, where borders of various sorts are less and less relevant to the conduct of governance and, more contentiously, to definitions of political community and civil society', nevertheless qualify this assertion as a trend rather than as the present reality of the EU: 'for the foreseeable future such developments do not mean the death of the territorial state... Rather, the postnational polity will subsist both as a post-modern *space of flows* and a modern *space of places*.' B. Axford and R. Huggins, 'Towards a Post-National Polity: The Emergence of the Network Society in Europe', in D. Smith and S. Wright (eds), *Whose Europe? The Turn towards Democracy* (Oxford: Blackwell 1999) pp.196–7. For a more decidedly post-modern reading adopting the 'space of flows' argument, see P. van Ham, *European Integration and the Postmodern Condition* (London: Routledge 2001) p.195; R. Cooper, *The Postmodern State and the World Order* (London: Demos/The Foreign Policy Centre 2000).
5. L. Hooghe and G. Marks, *Multi-level Governance and European Integration* (Lanham, MD : Rowman & Littlefield 1996).
 6. B. Kohler-Koch and R. Eising (eds), *The Transformation of Governance in the European Union* (London and New York: Routledge 1999).
 7. P. Taylor, 'Relocating the Demos?', in J. Anderson (ed.) *Transnational Democracy: Political Spaces and Border Crossings* (London and New York: Routledge 2002). Although we agree with Taylor on the need to 'relocate the demos' in Europe today, we nevertheless beg to differ with his conclusion that its most appropriate agents are to be found in the transnational managerial class sitting atop the contemporary world city hierarchy (pp.241–3). For a systematic critique of just such cadre formations, see L. Boltanski and E. Chiapello, *Le nouvel esprit du capitalisme* (Paris: Gallimard 1999). Admittedly, perhaps Taylor's lens indicates the limits of a political geography approach bereft of political-economic insight.
 8. D. Held, A. McGrew, D. Goldblatt and J. Perraton, *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture* (Cambridge: Polity Press 1999) pp.30–31.
 9. J. Anderson, 'The Exaggerated Death of the Nationstate', in J. Anderson, C. Brook and A. Cochrane (eds) *A Global World? Re-Ordering Political Space* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1995).
 10. S. Amin, 'The Challenge of Globalisation', *Review of International Political Economy*, 3/2 (1996) pp.216–59; E.M. Wood, 'The Separation of the "Economic" and the "Political" in Capitalism', in E.M. Wood, *Democracy Against Capitalism: Renewing Historical Materialism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1995); J. Anderson, *Theorizing State Borders: 'Politics/Economics' and Democracy in Capitalism*, Electronic Working Paper Series, WP01, (Belfast: Centre for International Borders Research, Queen's University Belfast 2001).
 11. For a thoughtful framing of such a long-term research project, see G. Steinmetz (ed.), *State/Culture: State Formation After the Cultural Turn* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1999). Compare with the stubbornly state-centric volume edited by N. Brenner, B. Jessop, M. Jones and G. Macleod (eds), *State/Space: A Reader* (Oxford: Blackwell 2003).
 12. Cited in P. Virtanen, 'Facing Challenges on the Eastern Border of the European Union: The Examples of Euregio Karelia and Euregion Pomerania', in O. Kramsch and B. Hooper (eds), *Cross-Border Governance in the European Union* (London: Routledge 2004) pp.38–52.
 13. M. Sparke, 'Chunnel visions': Unpacking the Anticipatory Geographies of an Anglo-European Borderland', *Journal of Borderlands Studies* 15 (2000) pp.187–219.
 14. G. Dijkink and C. Winnips, 'Alternative States: Regions and Postfordism Rhetoric on the Internet', *GeoJournal* 48/4 (2000) pp.323–35.
 15. For a particularly poignant instance revealing the contradictory impact of EU-'borderlessness' discourse on the reinforcement of frontier mentalities along the Iberian-Portuguese border, see J. Sidaway, 'Rebuilding Bridges: A Critical Geopolitics of Iberian Transfrontier Cooperation in a European Context', *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 19 (2001) pp.743–78.