The version of the following full text has not yet been defined or was untraceable and may differ from the publisher's version.

For additional information about this publication click this link.
http://hdl.handle.net/2066/63741

Please be advised that this information was generated on 2019-08-29 and may be subject to change.
Majority populations’ attitudes towards
migrants and minorities

Report for the
European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia
Ref. no. 2003/04/01

Dr. Marcel Coenders
Dr. Marcel Lubbers
Prof. Dr. Peer Scheepers

Report 1:
Overview of theories, hypotheses and results on attitudes of majorities towards minorities

Report 2:
Majorities’ attitudes towards minorities in European Union Member States: results from the Standard Eurobarometer 1997-2000-2003

Report 3:
Majorities’ attitudes towards minorities in (former) candidate countries of the European Union: results from the Eurobarometer in (former) candidate countries 2003

Report 4:
Majorities’ attitudes towards minorities in European societies: results from the European Social Survey 2002-2003
DISCLAIMER:
The opinions expressed by the author/s do not necessarily reflect the opinion or position of the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC). No mention of any authority, organisation, company or individual shall imply any approval as to their standing and capability on the part of the EUMC. This Report is provided as information guide only, and in particular does not constitute legal advice.
Preface

It was with great scientific pleasure that we accepted the assignment of the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia to analyse and report systematically on recent cross-national data pertaining to majorities’ attitudes towards minorities. These data have quite recently been collected in so many countries: in European Union member states as well as in (former) candidate member states.

This scientific pleasure arises from the course of our scientific careers. Over the last decade, we have published books and articles on majorities’ attitudes towards minorities based on (cross-sectional and longitudinal) data, often considering just one country at a time. Next, we devoted our attention to cross-national data, comparing an as yet restricted number of countries. But the EUMC assignment provided us with the opportunity to compare many countries as exhaustively and systematically as possible, given the state of the scientific art in this particular scientific domain. This long-term scientific engagement is related to our pre-scientific social commitment. This commitment has, over the course of years, been translated into a vivid commitment to generate and spread robust empirical insights, building on well-elaborated theoretical traditions, into this intriguing social phenomenon.

We accept full responsibility for the contents of these reports. Yet, we would like to thank EUMC staff for their elaborate, critical yet constructive peer reviews on the interim reports that we presented over the course of this project. Their valuable peer reviews have definitely increased the (theoretical) accessibility and (methodological) rigour of these reports. We certainly hope these reports will contribute to gaining the momentum the EUMC strives for in the on-going EU discourse.

The authors,
Nijmegen April 2004.
Overview of theories, hypotheses and results on attitudes of majorities towards minorities

Report 1 for the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia
Ref.no. 2003/04/01

Dr. Marcel Coenders
Dr. Marcel Lubbers
Prof. Dr. Peer Scheepers

University of Nijmegen
Nijmegen Institute for Social and Cultural Research
Department of Social Science Research Methodology
Department of Sociology
# Table of contents

Overall executive summary ........................................ VIII
1 Majorities’ attitudes to migrants and minorities .......... 1
   1.1 Introduction ............................................. 1
   1.2 General questions ....................................... 7
   1.3 General theories on ethnic exclusionism ............ 8
   1.4 From general theories to testable hypotheses .. 10
   1.5 Methodological considerations ....................... 17
   1.6 General results ........................................ 20
List of References .............................................. 26
Overall executive summary

The focus in the compiled reports is on attitudes towards migrants and minorities among the majority populations of European countries. Stances that are conceptually related to the general phenomenon, labelled **ethnic exclusionism**, were systematically analysed with simple and advanced methods, based on extensive secondary cross-national data from many European countries. These data were collected within the frameworks of Eurobarometer and European Social Survey. As such, these databases represent the most exhaustive databases contemporarily available for general statements on levels of ethnic exclusionism across and within societies in Europe. Only stances were taken into consideration that have actually been proven to be valid, reliable and, moreover, equivalent across nations and/or within nations over time.

It turned out that stances related to ethnic exclusionism are actually present among people living in Eastern and Western European societies:

- **resistance to immigrants** is shared by half of the populations
- **resistance to asylum seekers** is supported at a lower level than resistance to immigrants, by almost a third of the general public
- **resistance to multicultural society** is shared by an over time rather stable minority of about a quarter of the Europeans, whereas more and more Europeans perceive that the **limits to multicultural society** have been reached
- **ethnic distance** is present among one fifth in Western and Eastern societies trying to avoid social interaction with migrants both in the public and private domain
- **opposition to civil rights for legal migrants** is supported by an over time rather stable minority of about four out of ten Europeans
- support for **repatriation policies for legal migrants** is growing over time and subscribed to by a minority of about one out of five
- **insistence on conformity of migrants to law** is subscribed to by an over time fast growing majority of about two out of three people.
We found consistent cross-national differences on ethnic exclusionism.

- resistance to immigrants and asylum seekers is widely shared by people living in Mediterranean countries, also by people living in Eastern European societies, whereas people in Nordic countries disassociate themselves.
- resistance to multicultural society and limits to multicultural societies is widely held in Western and Central Europe, also in the Baltic states, whereas it is less widely present in Nordic and Mediterranean countries.
- ethnic distance is strongly present in some Mediterranean countries as well as in some Eastern European societies.
- opposition to civil rights for legal migrants, strongly supported in Western and Central Europe, also in the Baltic states, but less so in Mediterranean and Eastern European countries.
- repatriation policies for legal migrants, strongly favoured in Mediterranean and Central European countries, less so in Nordic and Eastern European societies.
- insistence on conformity to law, favoured by people in Nordic, Western and Central European countries as well as in the Baltic states, less so in Mediterranean and Eastern European countries.

Very consistent were the results regarding the particular social categories supporting ethnic exclusionism:

- people with lower levels of education support ethnic exclusionism consistently with one exception: insistence on conformity to law turned out to be strongly supported by highly educated people.
- people who perform manual labour and self-employed people.
- people who depend on social security.
- people running a household.
- in (former) candidate countries also people performing routine non-manual work.
- those in the lowest income quartile, yet this finding is due to related characteristics such as educational level.
- older people.
- people living in the countryside.
- people regularly attending religious services, yet this finding is due to related characteristics.
National characteristics related to ethnic exclusionism have also been found. However, these findings turned out to be not as consistent as the findings on individual characteristics nor did they in all cases reach levels of significance. Important findings are:

- the more non-national migrants live in the country, the higher the level of ethnic exclusionism is
- net migration into countries induces support for repatriation policies for legal migrants, particularly in (former) candidate countries
- net migration also induces resistance to diversity and support for repatriation policies regarding criminal migrants
- the higher the unemployment rate, the more widespread resistance to multicultural society both member states and (former) candidate countries
- the higher the unemployment rate, the stronger support is for repatriation policies regarding legal migrants in member states
- in many other instances the relationships between the unemployment rate and dimensions of ethnic exclusionism turned out to be non-significant
- for economic prosperity in a country, the effects turned out to be rather consistent: the lower the GDP per capita, the higher the level of ethnic exclusionism.

Finally, we found very consistent effects of individual perceptions. People favour ethnic exclusionism to a stronger extent when

- people perceive decreases in their personal safety
- they distrust other people or their political leaders,
- they consider themselves to be politically on the right wing,
- they perceive ethnic minorities to pose a collective threat.
1 Majorities’ attitudes to migrants and minorities

1.1 Introduction

European governments have put issues related to migration and asylum issues, legal and illegal migrants, social integration of migrants with autochthonous people high on the political agenda. Migration and migrants also feature high on the public agenda of autochthonous people. The influx and presence of ethnic migrants have become major public issues causing much controversy since politicians and the general public have come to realise that it is not simply a temporary problem they have to face and deal with. This growing awareness may stem from knowledge of the historical records of countries, particularly the United States that had been faced with interethnic problems over several centuries, but particularly from the first decades of the previous century on. In his monumental work, Myrdal (1944) focussed on these interethnic problems. That was when he called for attention regarding the contradiction between the ‘high’ values of liberty, equality, justice, and a fair opportunity for everybody, on the one hand, and group prejudices and discriminatory practices against particular groups that obstructed the actual implementation of these ‘high’ values, on the other. We will generally refer to social phenomena such as prejudice and discrimination against migrants as ethnic exclusionism, a general term to encapsulate a multitude of social phenomena related to majorities that try to or set out to exclude minorities.

*Ethnic exclusionism* has had and will have many different aspects and hence different observable social realities. Some of them have been shown to be manifestly present with elaborate, vast empirical evidence, some others have remained latent, as yet observable, but not yet fully and evidently documented. One of the first aspects of ethnic exclusionism previously studied refers to *ethnic prejudices* that have been documented from the second decade of the previous century on (cf. Mencken, 1927). Ethnic prejudices refer to generalised unfavourable opinions on one or more different ethnic outgroups. Ethnic prejudices have been extensively documented in classic studies (cf. Adorno et al., 1950; Allport, 1954) as well as contemporary studies (cf. Jones, 1997). Eventually, ethnic prejudices have been conceptually and empirically refined into various types of prejudice (Pettigrew and Meertens, 1995; Coenders et al., 2001; Verberk et al., 2002). Ethnic prejudices towards other ‘outgroups’ have more than often been shown to be accompanied by prejudices towards one’s ingroup, which has been labelled as *ethnocentrism* ever since Sumner (1907) introduced this concept which was adopted by Adorno et al., (1950) and then became common in the social sciences (Tajfel, 1981; Billiet et al., 1996). Many
theories developed in recent decades can be traced back to this classic phenomenon. This aspect of ethnic exclusionism, i.e. ethnic prejudices and/or ethnocentrism, had first been ‘discovered’ in the United States, just like so many other aspects of exclusionism. Later on, ethnic prejudices and ethnocentrism have also been ascertained in Europe.

A second aspect of ethnic exclusionism, however, is to some extent an exception to the rule that particular aspects of exclusionism were first discovered, described and documented in the US: it refers to the influx of immigrants. This phenomenon has not been that typically present in studies from the United States (cf. Schuman et al., 1997) but instead has prevailed in European studies. The reason is that the United States, as a country of immigrants, had developed immigration policies that had hardly ever been a topic for public debate. European countries, many of which had been more like emigration countries, had not developed immigration policies, and when faced with a growing number of immigrants who knocked on the doors of west-European societies for work or reunification of families, this started many public debates on immigration policies (Pettigrew, 1998). We refer to it as resistance to immigrants. When shortly thereafter growing numbers of asylum seekers from all around the world also found their way to European societies, a related debate came to the fore that we refer to as resistance to asylum seekers. In general, many public debates centred on issues related to multicultural society that many European societies eventually were to become due to the immigration processes taking place. In many of the public debates, European politicians and citizens took a stand against multicultural society, emphasising problems arising from the presence of minorities with different religions and cultures which would eventually affect the stability of the majority’s culture. We refer to this phenomenon as resistance to multicultural society. Others emphasised the disruptive effects of continuous immigration, emphasising societal limits to the acceptance of minority groups which stance we refer to as limits to multicultural society. Since the immigration of both guest workers and their families as well as immigration of asylum seekers has not proven to be a temporary issue, the political and public debate continues and is therefore still relevant to European societies.

A third aspect of ethnic exclusionism does not refer to the influx, but rather to the presence of immigrants in European societies. This aspect of ethnic exclusionism is often referred to as social distance or ethnic distance. This phenomenon was first observed by Bogardus (1933) who studied race relations in the United States. He proposed that the closer minority groups approached majority groups, the stronger majority groups would try to keep minority groups at a distance and try to avoid actual interethnic contact. He found strong evidence for this proposition, and a long lasting research tradition has built that evidence
Overview of theories, hypotheses and results

and led to contemporary studies (cf. Hagendoorn, 1995; Parillo and Donoghue, 2002) which still show similar evidence for ethnic distance.

Another aspect associated with the presence of migrants is also related to the historical records of the United States, where from the 1940s onwards many public debates and actual conflicts centred on equal civil rights for blacks (African Americans), who had been denied such civil rights for decades. Eventually they were granted to them. In Europe, similar debates flared up which we refer to as opposition to civil rights for legal resident migrants. The group of legally administered resident migrants obviously consists of different immigrant groups with different migration as well as integration histories (cf. Pettigrew, 1998). However, they have one important thing in common: they work and live legally in the European country they migrated to, whereas asylum seekers are still in the process of acquiring a legal status. This issue is of particular relevance. Many of these legally administered migrants are entitled to stay in the country and have formally been granted a number of civil rights. Many Europeans, however, do not discuss civil rights for migrants in formal terms. On the contrary: people often oppose granting civil rights to these migrants, and moreover, even favour repatriation policies for legal migrants. Opposition to the granting of civil rights to these legal migrants and even favouring repatriation policies implies social exclusion of migrants, which in turn implies social non-integration that may lead to interethnic tensions. This issue has become widely disseminated throughout the public and political arenas. This political issue was initially only discussed by the political leaders of extreme right-wing parties in European nations, thereby forcing the political leaders of the other parties to take a stand. One extreme position taken in this debate was to actually deny all civil rights to migrants by sending them back to their countries of origin in particular cases, for example, if they became unemployed.

A final aspect of ethnic exclusionism also refers to the presence and the actual process of migrant social integration. Much of this debate has been summarised in a study from the United States which describes the historical process of interracial integration (Gordon, 1964). This study seemed to imply that those, formerly European, ethnic groups that had been the most successful in terms of ‘Anglo-conformity’, hence showing high degrees of assimilation, had been rapidly and strongly accepted by the American majority. Similar views come to the fore in public debates where the statement is made that migrants will be quickly and more smoothly accepted if they deny, at least in public, their own ethnic identity and consequently assimilate into the dominant society, that is if they conform to the law and social conventions of the majority. This phenomenon is referred to as insistence on
conformity of migrants to law, a view that has been consistently presented by many politicians as the ‘easiest’ way for migrants to become accepted in their host societies.

Questions were selected from the Standard Eurobarometer Surveys for Member States (1997-2000-2003) and Candidate Countries (2003), and from the European Social Survey for ‘West’ and ‘East’ European countries (2002-2003), and grouped into ‘dimensions’ of ethnic exclusionism as follows:

Eurobarometer Survey Questions:

Resistance to Multicultural Society
v.1 It is a good thing for any society to be made up of people from different races, religions or cultures
v.3 (COUNTRY’S) diversity in terms of race, religion or culture adds to its strengths

Insistence on Conformity of Migrants to Law and Conventions
v.5 In order to be fully accepted members of (NATIONALITY) society, people belonging to these minority groups must give up such parts of their religion or culture which may be in conflict with (NATIONALITY) law
v.6 In order to be fully accepted members of (NATIONALITY) society, people belonging to these minority groups must give up religious or cultural practices such as polygamy or female circumcision.

Limits to Multicultural Society
v.8 There is a limit to how many people of other races, religions or cultures a society can accept
v.9 (OUR COUNTRY) has reached its limits; if there were to be more people belonging to these minority groups we would have problems

Opposition to Civil Rights for Legal Migrants
v.13 Legally established immigrants from outside the European Union should have the same social rights as the (NATIONALITY) citizens.
v.14 Legally established immigrants from outside the European Union should have the right to bring members of their immediate family in (OUR COUNTRY).
v.18 Legally established immigrants from outside the European Union should be able to become naturalised easily
Favour Repatriation Policies for Legal Migrants

v.16 Legally established immigrants (from outside the European Union – inserted in EU Member States surveys) should be sent back to their country of origin if they are unemployed.

v.17 Legally established immigrants (from outside the European Union – inserted in EU Member States surveys) should all be sent back to their country of origin.

European Social Survey Questions:

Resistance to Immigrants

d.5 Allow many/few immigrants of different race/ethnic group from majority

d.7 Allow many/few immigrants from poorer countries in Europe

d.9 Allow many/few immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe

Favour Repatriation Policies for Criminal Migrants

d.23 If immigrants commit serious crime they should be made to leave

d.24 If immigrants commit any crime they should be made to leave

Perceived collective Ethnic Threat

d.25 Do immigrants take jobs away in (COUNTRY) or create new jobs

d.26 Taxes and services: do immigrants take out more than they put in

d.27 Is immigration bad or good for (COUNTRY’S) economy

d.28 Is the (COUNTRY’S) cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants

d.29 Do immigrants make (COUNTRY) worse or better place to live

d.30 Do immigrants make (COUNTRY’S) crime problems worse or better

Favour Ethnic Distance

d.34 Mind if your boss is an immigrant of the same race/ethnic group as majority

d.35 Mind if a close relative is married to an immigrant of the same race/ethnic group as majority

d.36 Mind if your boss is an immigrant of a different race/ethnic group as majority

d.37 Mind if a close relative is married to an immigrant of a different race/ethnic group as majority

Resistance to Diversity

d.40 It is better for a country if almost everyone share customs and traditions
d.41 It is better for a country if there is a variety of different religions

Resistance to Asylum Seekers

- d.50 Refugee applicants allowed to work while cases considered
- d.54 Financial support to refugee applicants while cases considered
- d.55 Granted refugees should be entitled to bring close family members
1.2 General questions

After this conceptual analysis of ethnic exclusionism, the crucial question is to what extent these aspects of ethnic exclusionism are actually manifested by the general public in a way that is comparable across societies. We will answer this methodological question in the appendices to these reports. Obviously, we can only take into account those aspects that can be evidently shown to be cross-nationally comparable. Next, we will introduce our general questions that we set out to answer in these reports.

1) To what extent does the general public in different countries vary in its support for different dimensions of ethnic exclusionism?

2) Which social characteristics among the general public support different dimensions of ethnic exclusionism?

The third question builds on the second one as we set out to ascertain:

3) Which of the social characteristics mentioned in the previous question are spuriously related to variations in different dimensions of ethnic exclusionism?

This question is of particular relevance if one is primarily interested in assessing decisive determinants of exclusionism by reducing the number of (direct) effects of social characteristics.¹ For reasons of ‘surveyability’, we refrained from testing to what extent the effects of social characteristics varied across countries.²

And finally,

4) To what extent do particular national characteristics affect ethnic exclusionism?
1.3 General theories on ethnic exclusionism

In order to answer these questions, we will use previously accumulated theoretical knowledge to derive typical hypotheses for explaining cross-national and inter-individual differences in ethnic exclusionism. In a series of previous publications (Coenders and Scheepers, 1998; Coenders, 2001; Lubbers, 2001; Scheepers et al., 2002a, 2002b; Lubbers et al., 2002; Gijsberts et al., 2004), we set out to explore two paradigms we consider to be complementary, i.e. Realistic Conflict Theory and Social Identity Theory. Central to Realistic Conflict Theory is the proposition that competition over scarce resources between social groups is considered the catalyst of antagonistic intergroup attitudes, and this has been underlined by two quite different traditions, both dating back to the fifties. Social psychological experiments have shown that competition between groups improves solidarity within a specific group and increases hostility between groups (Sherif and Sherif 1969, 1979). Sociologists have focussed on societal causes of group conflicts as well as on societal conditions under which these conflicts arise. Coser (1956) claimed that each social system is characterised by competition over scarce resources (material resources, power and status) between social groups, such as ethnic groups. In this theoretical tradition, Blalock (1967) made an analytical distinction between, on the one hand, actual competition and, on the other hand, perceived competition. He used ‘actual competition’ to refer to macro- or meso-level socio-economic conditions such as the availability of scarce resources and market mechanisms regulating the distribution of these scarce resources. Moreover, he suggested that actual competition may also refer to a micro level, i.e. competition between individuals from ethnic groups that hold similar social positions, e.g. work in similar niches of the labour market. Blalock proposed that these actual competitive conditions might affect the majorities’ perceptions of competition, that is the subjectively perceived socio-economic threat on the part of ethnic outgroups, which in turn may induce hostile, unfavourable stances toward these outgroups. This argument was explained in a similar fashion by Bobo (1988), building on Blumer (1958), who proposed a relationship between ‘external threat’ and ‘perceived threat’ to explain opposition to racial policies.

Next, empirical studies have shown that hostile, unfavourable attitudes toward outgroups are often strongly related to ingroup favouritism (e.g. Adorno et al., 1950/1982; Levine and Campbell 1972; Brewer 1986; Scheepers et al., 1990). This phenomenon may be explained in terms of a second paradigm we refer to, i.e. Social Identity Theory (Tajfel and Turner 1979; Tajfel 1981, 1982; Turner 1982; Brown, 1995), according to which individuals have the fundamental need to perceive their ingroup as superior to ethnic outgroups. Subsequently, they apply favourable characteristics that they perceive among
members of the ingroup to themselves via mental processes labelled as social identification, and they value outgroups negatively via mechanisms of social contra-identification. It is obvious that these mechanisms may have their effects, even under conditions of actual absence of ethnic outgroups, and therefore may explain the prevalence of anti-Semitism without Jewish people being around in the social contexts of majority people (Tajfel, 1981). Now, we propose that under competitive conditions, Central to Realistic Conflict Theories, these processes may intensify. Therefore, we consider Social Identity Theory to be complementary to propositions from Realistic Conflict Theory, which we refer to as Ethnic Competition Theory, summarised in a core proposition: competition, at an individual as well as at a contextual level, may reinforce the mechanisms of social identification and contra-identification, the eventual outcome of which is referred to as ethnic exclusionism. At the contextual level, competition refers to macro-social conditions. At individual level, competition may be specified in terms of the social conditions of the members of the dominant group; and, it may be specified in terms of the perceived threat of competition which, we propose, mediates the effects of social conditions on ethnic exclusionism. This specification implies a more fully elaborated theoretical model (cf. Scheepers et al., 2002a).

The distinction between actual and perceived competition has often been recognised in mere theoretical terms (cf. Castles and Kosak, 1973; Kinder and Sears, 1981; Hagendoorn and Janssen, 1983; Krauth and Porst, 1984). In operational terms, however, this crucial theoretical proposition is often neglected, although there are some exceptions (cf. Taylor 1998; Scheepers et al., 2002a). Let us refer to some recent studies to underline this argument. Olzak (1992) set out to explain the rate of ethnic collective actions. Her ethnic competition theory boils down to the argument that whenever an ethnic threat arises, be it due to macro-social conditions (like substantial immigration flows or economic contraction) or be it due to meso social conditions (lower ethnic segregation in disadvantaged jobs or the breakdown of ethnic enclaves), majority groups will react with exclusionary measures. They do so because of their threat perceptions (1992:35), obviously considered by Olzak to be the intervening factor that, unfortunately, could not be measured. Quillian (1995, 1996) explicitly proposes regarding racial prejudice as a response to perceived group threat, the latter being measured by factors related to actual competition such as the relative size of the subordinate group relative to the dominant group or a precarious economic situation (1995:591; 1996:820). But then, he emphasises that ‘... surveys to date have not asked questions to measure perceived threat from other racial groups...’ (1996:821) as an intervening variable. This consequently implies that a crucial part of ethnic competition theory has not been tested often so far.
1.4 From general theories to testable hypotheses

Individual conditions
We use Ethnic Competition Theory then used to derive hypotheses with regard to the effects of individual characteristics on ethnic exclusionism. The level of ethnic competition can be expected to vary between social categories. Particularly those social categories that hold similar social positions as ethnic minorities or those social categories that live close to ethnic enclaves may experience higher levels of ethnic competition than average, and may therefore display more widespread support for ethnic exclusionism. In many European countries, the overwhelming majority of non-autochthonous ethnic residents are located in the lower strata of society, very often concentrated in urban areas (Kiehl and Werner, 1998). This means that lower strata members of the European majority population who hold social positions comparable to those of ethnic minorities - that is, those with a low level of education or a low income level, those performing manual labour, those who are unemployed or those who live in urban areas - will have to compete more with ethnic minorities on, for instance, the labour market. These actual competitive conditions might reinforce the process of social identification and contra-identification, which may induce more widespread support of ethnic exclusionism, particularly among the social categories mentioned above. Hence, we expect that

Hypothesis 1

1) Ethnic exclusionism will be strongly prevalent among social categories of the dominant group in similar social positions to the social categories of ethnic outgroups, more particularly among:
   a) People with a low level of education
   b) Manual workers
   c) Unemployed people
   d) People with low income
   e) People living in urban areas

From quite a different perspective, time and again, evidence has been provided that religious people were rather prejudiced in comparison to non-religious people (Gorsuch and Aleshire, 1974). Based on this evidence, Hood, Spilka, Hunsberger and Gorsuch (1996) come to the following broad generalisation: ‘...the more religious an individual is, the more prejudiced that person is...’ (1996: 359). Like many authors before them, they are quick to qualify this broad generalisation. We like to take into account these empirical findings (cf.
Scheepers et al., 2002b), but we have to restrict ourselves to available data which includes the, so-called, practice dimension (cf. Stark and Glock 1968) that refers to, among other aspects, people’s current membership of a denomination and people’s current church attendance. Regarding the relationship between denomination and ethnic exclusionism, we found many inconsistent findings in previous reviews, with one exception: non-members have more than often been found to be less prejudiced. Next, the relationship between another aspect of the practice dimension, i.e. church attendance, and prejudice is regarded as the greatest controversy. Time and again, researchers found rather strong indications that the nature of this relationship was curvilinear: non-attenders and frequent attenders are supposed to be less prejudiced than infrequent to moderately frequent church attenders (Adorno et al., 1950/1982; Allport and Ross, 1967; Smith and Woodberry, 2000). However, in previous research which covered 11 European countries, we found a simple linear relationship: the more frequently people attend church, the more exclusionism they display. Wherever possible, we will control for these religious characteristics, just as we will control for other characteristics that may be related to exclusionism such as gender, age and political orientation.

Individual perceptions
Ethnic competition theorists are likely to claim that the effects of individual characteristics on ethnic exclusionism operate through perceptions of ethnic threat, as we explained above. However, this crucial part of Ethnic Competition Theory has hardly ever been rigorously tested. Moreover, this view may be controversial since other theorists have derived conflicting hypotheses from general propositions of Realistic Conflict Theory. Particularly, the symbolic racism researchers (Kinder and Sears, 1981; Sears and Kinder, 1985; Sears, 1988) have opted for a rather narrow definition of conflicting ethnic interests: racial threat refers to real and tangible threats that blacks pose to whites’ personal lives, i.e. to their short-term material interests. Consequently, they have conceptualised conflicting interests as a tangible personal risk (Bobo, 1988). However, often these symbolic racism researchers found quite moderate effects of threatened personal interests on the implementation of racial change. Yet, we consider these views worthwhile. We will therefore include perceived threats to personal interests as opposed to collective interests. The hypotheses are that

\textbf{(Hypothesis 2)}

2) \textit{Ethnic exclusionism will be affected by}

\textit{a) Perception of collective ethnic threat}
b) Perception of personal threat

The latter determinants may include perceptions on a lack of personal safety. More generally, we will include related determinants on political distrust and more general social distrust. Sniderman et al., (2000) provided empirical evidence for the relevance of the latter determinants, based on the idea that people who do not trust their political leaders or, more generally, members of their ingroup, will surely be prone to ethnic exclusionism pertaining to outgroups. Therefore, we propose to test the hypothesis that ethnic exclusionism will also be affected by

c) political and social distrust

However, relevant data to test these hypotheses are only available in the European Social Survey, on the basis of which we will consider these hypotheses in Report 4.
Contextual conditions

Ethnic Competition Theory offers a straightforward explanation concerning the effects of societal circumstances on exclusionist reactions. This theoretical elegance can be rigorously tested in countries that may be quite different in terms of contextual conditions, both historical and contemporary conditions, such as the (former) candidate countries for the EU. The deduction that follows from the theory is that ethnic exclusionism varies with the level of actual competition within countries. We propose that the level of actual competition may be related to conditions where there are (a) increasing numbers of people competing for, ceteris paribus, approximately the same amount of scarce resources or (b) stable numbers of people competing for a decreasing amount of scarce resources. These conditions all imply, ceteris paribus, a stronger competition for scarce resources between the dominant group and ethnic outgroups. Following this rationale, also suggested by Olzak (1992), Quillian (1995) and Coenders and Scheepers (1998), we propose that:

Hypothesis 3

3) Ethnic exclusionism will be stronger in countries where the actual level of ethnic competition is relatively high, more particularly in contextual conditions of:
   a) A relatively high proportion of resident migrants
   b) A relatively high level of immigrants
   c) A relatively high number of asylum seekers
   d) A high proportion of unemployment

Besides this rationale there are, of course, other rationales on contextual conditions to contribute to the explanation of ethnic exclusionism. For one, there is Castles’ categorisation (1995) who described a number of European countries in terms of the responses of the general public to and policies on immigration and ethnic diversity. He distinguished different ‘ideal types’ of countries. In some countries (e.g. Germany, Austria, Switzerland and Belgium), policies are based on the idea that immigrants are predominantly ‘guest workers’ who can have temporarily access to, for example, the labour market, but who can be denied full social and political rights. In other countries (e.g. France), assimilationist policies have been adopted in which immigrants are awarded full rights, but then they are expected to assimilate fully. In yet other countries (such as the Netherlands and Sweden), policies are based on the idea that immigrants cannot be denied full citizen rights, but are still entitled to keep their own social and religious identity. Unfortunately, such a typology is not as readily applicable as the abovementioned rationale, for several reasons of which we will mention the most important ones. First, the distinction does not
cover all of the countries that we take into consideration. Second, Castles (1995, 306) admits that many countries actually have elements of more than one ideal type. Third, it is difficult, if not impossible, to obtain the empirical evidence for distinguishing the ideal types of countries because this evidence substantially refers to extensive documents regarding official policies on immigrants and multicultural society, which may possibly not be present in all countries under consideration. These documents are, by their nature, incomparable and would require quite substantial scientific effort to make them comparable. Fourth, if such evidence would be available and comparable at some point in time, the changes in such policies that take place over time would also have to be taken into account; changes that may actually be quite severe as we have witnessed in the Netherlands that, since the turn of the century with its political turmoil, can no longer be considered to belong to the ideal type of a multicultural society. Similar or even more severe problems on the empirical cross-national data to test hypotheses on contextual conditions, for that matter, may be established for explanations on cultural and historical differences between countries. These types of substantial and methodological problems make researchers who are interested in testing well-elaborated theoretical frameworks instead of somewhat particularistic explanations based on a restricted number of countries, very cautious about including such rationales on contextual conditions.

There is yet another typology of countries, although it was developed for quite another purpose, that may be useful in this particular context. We propose that the typology developed by Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999), on the extent to which citizens are protected from the social and economic dangers (or decommodified), dangers that may be one of the consequences of competition over scarce resources. This typology may serve to derive hypotheses on contextual conditions related to ethnic exclusionism. Since Esping-Andersen proposed that the extent to which individuals have been decommodified differs strongly between welfare states, we will try to develop a more differential view on the possible effects of living in a particular welfare state on ethnic exclusionism.

The social-democratic state (ideal type: the Nordic countries) is characterised by the highest level of decommodification, with social security benefits for every citizen rather higher than elsewhere. Here, social policy strives to weaken market influences on distribution and its ideal is to maximise capacities for individual independence by granting transfers directly to children and taking responsibility for the care for children, the aged and the helpless (1990: 28) and to minimise or abolish market dependency (1999: 78-79). The liberal state (ideal type: the Anglo-Saxon countries) is characterised by the lowest level of decommodification. Here, the market is considered the arena for the distribution of
resources, and social security benefits are rather modest, and social rights, more in general, are rather poor. This type of state produces a high degree of independence from the state and essentially forces people to rely on family and friends in those cases in which they themselves are incapable of solving social catastrophes.

The conservative-corporatist state (ideal type: France and West-Germany) is shaped by the church with a strong emphasis on traditions - such as the family and the pre-existing class and status structure - that embraced the principle of subsidiarity. This type of state is only likely to interfere in an individuals’ life if the family’s resources to provide help have been exhausted: then, it provides social security benefits related to previous earnings and status. This eventually implies that the family is the dominant locus of solidarity (Esping-Andersen, 1999: 85). However, there is another type of state that may produce even more dependence on family and friends. Some authors (e.g. Bonoli, 1997) argue that Mediterranean countries (ideal type: Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece) should be considered to be a separate type of regime: the Latin Rim. In this type of state, instead of an official level of social security, an underdeveloped system of social security exists, accompanied by a high degree of familialism.

We consider the underlying rationale of this typology to be that welfare states differ from each other to the extent that they provide their citizens with means to get along without the help of family and friends in cases of social catastrophes, which may result from competition over scarce resources with members of their ingroup as well as with members of outgroups (ethnic competition). The hypothesis we propose to derive from this typology is:

Hypothesis 4

4) Ethnic exclusionism will be stronger in countries where the actual level of de-commodification is relatively low, more particularly in contextual conditions where:

a) A relatively low level of the Gross Domestic Product is spent on social welfare arrangements

However, research to find exhaustive data on the level of decommodification for the countries that we would like to compare resulted in data for a rather limited number of countries (Wildeboer Schut et al., 2000). Moreover, data on the proportions of the GDP spent on social welfare arrangements turned out to be rather out of date, such that they may
be no longer valid for the contextual conditions present in the beginning of this century. Fortunately, cross-national comparable data on the GDP are actually available, so that we will be able to take this hypothesis into account. Therefore, we propose to test that *ethnic exclusionism may be high in contextual conditions where:*

b) *The GDP is relatively low,* so that economic prosperity cannot serve to soften or even reduce possible effects of actual levels of ethnic competition.

In the subsequent chapters of these reports we will come back to these hypotheses. However, we have to rely on secondary data that are available. This implies that we cannot test all hypotheses on one set of data since not all sets contain valid measurements of social phenomena on which we have proposed to test hypotheses. Whenever possible, we will relate the results to be reported to these hypotheses.
1.5 Methodological considerations

In order to test the hypotheses that we have outlined above, it is necessary to fulfil a number of methodological conditions, most of which relate to the extent to which the available data are actually comparable, both across different countries as well as longitudinally within countries.

Methodological issues on comparability refer, among other things, to sampling and field work procedures, but also to translation and framing procedures. Given the origin and nature of some of the data that we will use to test our hypotheses, we would like to emphasise that this data is comparable to the extent that the European agencies under the responsibility of the European Commission, that have been and are responsible for the collection of data, have collected this data using comparable procedures.

Eurobarometer

The standard Eurobarometer (59.2) was collected in EU Member States in May and June 2003 by the European Opinion Research Group, on request of the European Commission, Directorate – General Press and Communication, Public Opinion Analysis Unit. We used samples in 17 areas in 15 countries. The samples for Norway and Iceland were not taken into account in our analysis. Separate samples were drawn for Northern Ireland and for East and West Germany, hence we analysed these separately in our (multilevel) analysis. Each target sample was 1000 interviews, except for Northern Ireland (300) and Luxembourg (600).

However, the documentation for the Eurobarometer surveys, both in member states as well as in (former) candidate countries, does not allow for in-depth statements on cross-national comparability. As yet, we rely on the reputation of Eurobarometer data, in the absence of extensive documentation, to check a number of quality standards. There are reports on response rates that we will include in the appendices.

European Social Survey (ESS)

The European Social Survey (ESS, 2004a) is a new survey covering 22 countries. The ESS has two main aims. First, ‘to monitor and interpret changing public attitudes and values within Europe’ and second ‘to advance and consolidate improved methods of cross-sectional survey measurement in Europe and beyond’ (ESS, 2004b). The ESS project is funded by the European Commission’s 5th Framework Programme, the European Science Foundation and academic funding bodies in participating countries. The ESS team emphasises the
exceptionally high standards in the design and operation of the ESS project. In the analyses of Report 4, we selected those countries that either were members of the European Union or a candidate country in winter 2003/2004, when the actual data analyses were executed. All Member States, with the exception of France, were present in the ESS dataset. Four candidate countries have been included here for analysis: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia.

Documentation of data collection within the framework of the European Social Survey allows for statements on quality. Within the ESS framework, explicit high-quality targets have been set and achieved (by the majority of participating countries) on random sampling, well organised field work, strict translation and framing procedures, and moreover on (high) response rates for the main questionnaire (e.g. >70%) and for the drop-off questionnaire (e.g. >90%). These targets have been provided to social science and policy researchers. For general methodological information, we refer to www.Europeansocialsurvey.org. We will include the response rates for the participating countries in the appendices.

Statistical Tests for Comparative Data

There is, however, another crucial issue that we would like to address, with regard to the cross-national comparability of the secondary measurements at stake. The crucial question that a researcher interested in answers to cross-national and/or longitudinal questions has to answer is:

- To what extent are measurements conceptually valid and reliable, and moreover equivalent across nations and over time?

To answer this type of question, we like to use sophisticated methodological tools building on procedures available in structural equation modelling (Jöreskog and Sörbom, 1993a, b). These procedures start with the idea that a number of items, actually measured in one or more than one population or subpopulation of respondents, can be considered to be indicators of one or more underlying theoretical concept(s) or latent unmeasured variable(s). This unmeasured latent variable is a common factor of the empirical relationships between the measured manifest variables, next to a part in the measured variables that is unique to this variable, called the unique factor. Because these procedures are guided by the principle of parsimony, the eventual aim is to distinguish less common latent factors than the number of manifest items available. Therefore, we set out to test whether a set of manifest items that, in terms of face and content validity, have something
Overview of theories, hypotheses and results

in common, e.g. resistance to immigrants, actually can be empirically shown to share this common latent variable. The relationship between the latent variable and the manifest variables is described in terms of so-called factor loadings (standardised regression coefficients, varying between -1.0 and 1.0): the stronger these factor loadings deviate from 0, the higher the content validity of the manifest item is considered to be for the underlying latent variable (e.g. Porst, Schmidt and Zeifang, 1987). It can also be shown that the stronger these factor loadings deviate from 0, the smaller the amount of uniqueness (or measurement error) will be in the manifest variable.

By means of these procedures, we can test to what extent the structure of the relationships between, on the one hand, the set of manifest items and, on the other hand, the latent variable is similar in different subpopulations. These subpopulations can be different cross-sectional samples of respondents of one country who have given answers to the items at different points in time, or it can be different cross-sectional samples of respondents who have given answers to the items in different countries at the same time. This part of the procedure answers the question:

- To what extent are the manifest items in all countries or at all times of data collection related to the same underlying latent dimension?

Next, we can also test to what extent not only the structure of the relationships, but also the strength of the relationships between the manifest items and the latent variable is similar. This part of the procedure answers the question:

- To what extent is the strength of the relationship between a number of manifest variables and the latent variable similar in different countries or at different times?

If the strength of the relationships is similar in different samples, this may be considered evidence for the cross-national or over time comparability of the manifest items.

Since our goal is to eventually have equivalent and hence comparable measurements of different dimensions of ethnic exclusionism, we will take into account only those manifest items underlying particular dimensions that can be evidently shown (a) to be valid, reliable and equivalent across countries (in EU member states and (former) candidate countries) and (b) to be valid, reliable and equivalent over time (1997-2000-2003) in different member states. All other items that do not fulfil these requirements will be dropped from the
analyses and hence from the reports. In such cases, differences in the distributions of these items cannot be safely nor validly nor reliably attributed to actual differences between countries or differences between points in time, since possible differences may also be due to differences related to the structure of the latent dimension or differences in the strength of the relationships between the manifest items and the latent dimension. Moreover, this implies that we will not consider singular items. Instead of singular items, we will construct measurement scales.

1.6 General results

In subsequent reports we will present more elaborate and detailed results, but in this paragraph we will present our results more generally by means of an executive summary considering core results of all reports.

We conceptually distinguished a number of stances related to the general phenomenon labelled ethnic exclusionism. We ascertained that these stances are actually held by people in Western and Eastern societies, and, moreover, were quite consistently related to the conceptual distinctions we proposed above.

- Resistance to immigrants was shared by half of the populations living in Eastern and Western societies whereas resistance to asylum seekers was far less widespread, supported by somewhat less than a third of the general public.

- The view labelled resistance to multicultural society was expressed a rather stable minority of about a quarter of Europeans living in member states as well as by a similar minority of the people living in (former) candidate countries.

- We ascertained a related phenomenon, labelled resistance to diversity, widely shared by nearly half of the people in Western and Eastern societies.

- The view that there are limits to multicultural society turned out to be supported, over time, by a growing majority of nearly two out of three people in member states which turned out to be somewhat less widespread in (former) candidate countries.

- The phenomenon of ethnic distance was found in approximately one fifth of the general public in Western and Eastern societies to avoid social interaction with migrants both in the public and private domain.
We discovered that a stable minority of about four out of ten people living in member states and (former) candidate countries oppose civil rights for legal migrants, this held over each survey period.

In spite of the fact that these legal migrants are in many cases actually entitled to stay in the country, we found a growing minority of about one out of five people living in member states in favour of repatriation policies for legal migrants. A similar number of people supported this in (former) candidate countries. Support for repatriation policies pertaining to criminal migrants was far more widespread.

Over time a growing majority of about two out of three people living in member states were insisting on conformity of migrants to law. This view was far less widely shared by the general public in (former) candidate countries.

As to our first question – To what extent for the general public in different countries vary in its support for different dimensions of ethnic exclusionism? – there was consistency across the data we analysed in subsequent reports. For example:

Some of the exclusionist stances, i.e. resistance to immigrants and asylum seekers, turned out to be widely shared by people living in Mediterranean countries, of which Greece stood out regarding resistance to immigrants. These stances were also rather strongly supported by people living in Eastern European societies, whereas people in Nordic countries turned out to disassociate themselves somewhat from these stances.

Resistance to multicultural society and the view that there are limits to such societies appeared to be widely held in many countries in Western and Central Europe, but also in the Baltic states, whereas these views are less widely present in Nordic and Mediterranean countries, except for Greece.

Avoiding social interaction with minorities, i.e. ethnic distance, was strongly present in some Mediterranean countries as well as in some Eastern European societies.

Opposition to civil rights for legal migrants was ascertained to be strongly supported in countries in Western and Central Europe, also in the Baltic states, but less so in Mediterranean and Eastern European countries.
Repatriation policies for legal migrants were strongly favoured in Mediterranean and Central European countries, whereas Nordic and Eastern European societies hesitated more in their support for such a policy.

Insistence on conformity to law was strongly favoured by people living in Nordic, Western and Central European countries as well as in the Baltic states, whereas people living in Mediterranean and Eastern European countries appeared to insist much less on such conformity.

In general, we can point to some tentative findings in relation to broad geographical differences:

In Nordic societies, in comparison to other countries, many stances of ethnic exclusionism were not strongly supported, with one exception: Nordic societies appeared to insist on conformity of migrants to law. Many societies in Western and Central Europe also tended to insist on conformity of migrants to law, to resist multicultural society and oppose civil rights for their legal migrants. In Eastern societies, resistance to immigrants and asylum seekers appeared to be widespread as well as the inclination to avoid social contacts with migrants. Yet, in these societies we found the opposition to civil rights for legal migrants to be less prevalent as well as the insistence on conformity. In Mediterranean societies we found a similar pattern of ethnic exclusionism as in Eastern societies, yet with one exception: people in Mediterranean societies appeared to favour repatriation policies more strongly than people in Eastern societies. Baltic countries appeared to favour quite consistently most stances of ethnic exclusionism.

As to our second and third questions – Which particular social categories amongst the general public support different dimensions of ethnic exclusionism? Which of these social categories are spuriously related to variations in different dimensions of ethnic exclusionism? – we found rather consistent results across all of the countries we considered. According to the individual categories, the results revealed that:

**Education**

- People who have attained lower levels of education support virtually any kind of ethnic exclusionism.
- People who have prolonged their education disassociate themselves from most exclusionist stances, with one exception to this general finding, both in member states and in (former) candidate countries: insistence on conformity to laws and conventions turned out to be more strongly supported by people with prolonged educational careers. As a result of multivariate analyses we found that the effect of educational attainment
was often non-significant in (former) candidate countries as opposed to the rather strong effect found in member states.

**Occupational categories**

- People performing manual labour and self-employed people support many dimensions of ethnic exclusionism, often joined by people depending on social security and those running a household. Unlike their counterparts in member states, people performing routine non-manual work in (former) candidate countries were also sometimes found to be in favour of some exclusionist stances.

However, insistence on conformity to laws and conventions turned out to be more strongly supported by lower and higher professionals, both in member states and in (former) candidate countries. These occupational differences turned out to be real, i.e. non-spurious in multivariate analyses in member states and (former) candidate countries.

**Income**

- In terms of income, we generally found that those in the lowest income quartile support exclusionist stances to a more than average extent, with the exception of insistence on conformity to law and conventions which was also found to be subscribed to by people in the highest income quartile. However, the results of multivariate analyses showed that these effects were often spurious.

**Age**

- The older one is the more one supports ethnic exclusionism. This result was consistently found for both bivariate and multivariate analyses.

**Locality**

- Nearly all dimensions of exclusionism were more strongly supported by people living in the countryside than by people living in cities. These findings turned out to be non-spurious in multivariate analyses.

**Religiousness**

- People who regularly attend religious services turned out to favour many exclusionist stances, except for resistance to asylum seekers in which case the pattern was the other way around. However, multivariate analyses showed that these differences were often found to be spurious. In (former) candidate countries, non-religious people and people
who never attend religious services were found to support many exclusionist stances. However, these differences were also often found to be spurious.

Political positioning

- People on the right wing of the political spectrum were found to support all dimensions of exclusionism.

Gender

- Initial bivariate analyses found no evidence at all for gender differences. However, results of multivariate analyses showed some very minor differences: many instances of ethnic exclusionism turned out to be somewhat more favoured by men.

As to our fourth question – To what extent do particular national characteristics affect ethnic exclusionism? – we found support for the following propositions:

- The more non-national migrants live in the country, the higher the level of ethnic exclusionism which turned out to hold for member states as well as (former) candidate countries. These effects did not reach significance in all instances, the effects were consistently positive. For instance, the influx of migrants into the country did not turn out to have such consistent effects on all instances of ethnic exclusionism, and this also appeared to hold true for the effects of the influx of asylum seekers.

- Support for repatriation policies for legal migrants was more widespread due to the net migration that had taken place in preceding years, particularly in (former) candidate countries. We also found that net migration was related to resistance to diversity and support for policies for the repatriation of criminal migrants.

- The level of unemployment in a country often appeared to have remarkably negative effects: the higher the national unemployment rate, the lower the level of ethnic exclusionism. Yet, we found some exceptions. First of all, the higher the unemployment rate, the more widespread resistance to multicultural society turned out to be, and this proved true for both member states and (former) candidate countries. Secondly, the higher the unemployment rate, the stronger the support is for repatriation policies for legal migrants in member states.
Moreover, we found rather consistent effects, though not always significant, for economic prosperity in a country: the lower the GDP per capita, the higher the level of ethnic exclusionism.

Finally, we found very consistent effects of individual perceptions: the more people perceive decreases in their personal safety, or the more they distrust other people or their political leaders, or the more they consider themselves to be politically on the right wing, or the more they perceive ethnic minorities to pose a collective threat, the more they favour ethnic exclusionism.
References


Scheepers, P., Gijsberts, M., Coenders, M. (2002a) ‘Ethnic exclusionism in European countries, public opposition to grant civil rights to legal migrants as a response to perceived ethnic threat’, *European Sociological Review*, 18, 1, 17-34.


Summer, G. (1906) *Folkways*. Boston, Ginn.
Notes

1 Significant direct non-spurious effects can be detected by controlling in multivariate analyses for social characteristics that are (strongly) associated to each other like is the case with education, social class and income: people with a higher educational level are likely to reach a ‘higher’ social class and are likely to enjoy a higher income. But then the question remains: which of these characteristics is the more strongly related to ethnic exclusionism and which is merely spuriously related to exclusionism as a ‘by-product’ of being associated with one of the other characteristics. Other examples we derived from a previous study on moral attitudes (Scheepers et al., 2002c), such as the view that pre- and extra-marital sexual relationships as well as homosexual relationships are non-acceptable and the view that abortion is non-acceptable. To explain these conservative moral attitudes, we referred to a crucial theoretical idea that exposure to socialising agents that proclaim moral attitudes, such as the churches, affects one’s own stances. Therefore, we included religious characteristics of the parents of respondents (being a member of a denomination and church attendance during the formative period of their children) as well as of the respondents themselves (being a member of a denomination and church attendance during their formative years as well as their contemporary integration into religious communities, indicated by contemporary church attendance and religious world views). These characteristics are all strongly associated because parents are likely to transmit their religion to their children. Then we showed that the effects on moral attitudes of parental religious characteristics, operating during respondents’ formative years, were largely spurious due to respondents’ contemporary religious characteristics: exposure to the proclamation of conservative moral ideas during formative years is merely spuriously related to one’s contemporary moral attitudes.

2 In previous analyses, we had tested to what extent random slopes of independent variables reached significance and, moreover, to what extent independent variables at the individual level interacted with determinants at the national level (Scheepers et al., 2002a; Scheepers et al., 2002b, Hello et al., 2002). There, we found rather meagre evidence for the propositions behind such analyses. Recently, Kunovich (2004) followed the same procedure and also found some evidence.

3 In the line of research following Adorno et al., (1950/1982) the main argument is that ethnocentrism may be explained in terms of personality characteristics. In spite of the many critical remarks, basic propositions in this line have not been refuted empirically (cf. Scheepers et al., 1990). In this contribution we will leave it aside, mainly for practical reasons: there are no valid measurements available.

4 This elaboration is considered to be odd by some (e.g. Forbes 1997), but underlined by others (Brown, 1995; Jones, 1997). In the early seventies it was found that some level of ingroup favouritism exists even in minimal (experimental) conditions, i.e., in conditions of ‘random’ social categorisation (Tajfel et al., 1971; Tajfel, 1981). This implies that there is some level of ingroup favouritism, even without any actual or perceived competitive conditions. Realistic Conflict Theory states that actual competition between ethnic groups
may reinforce both ingroup favouritism and outgroup hostility, or ethnocentrism.

5 Quillian actually emphasises this conceptual distinction between racial prejudice on the one hand and perceived group threat on the other hand. Very clear in this respect is his statement (1995, 592) that ‘...it is the collective feeling that the dominant group is threatened that leads to prejudice...’. Moreover, in his first hypothesis, he states that ‘prejudice is a function of the perceived threat the subordinate group poses to dominant group’ which clearly implies this distinction: the former variable is the dependent and the latter is the independent or intermediate variable. Quillian also emphasises the conceptual distinction between the actual contextual conditions that may induce perceived ethnic threat when he states (1995: 592) that ‘perceived threat is influenced both by the economic situation and by the size of the subordinate group’. However, this crucial part of the theoretical analysis was not elaborated upon in the empirical analysis.

6 However, Taylor (1998) employs some items to measure perceived economic and political threat, using the 1990 General Social Survey. Moreover, some of the items Quillian (1995: 593) uses, may be considered to be measurements of perceived ethnic threat, such as: ‘they exploit social security benefits’ and ‘their presence is one of the causes of delinquency and violence’, i.e., items that express that some collective goods, such as welfare and order, are being threatened by ethnic minorities.

7 Several distinct mechanisms, others than the one we propose, might be responsible for the relation between low level of education and ethnic exclusionism (for an overview, see Vogt, 1997; Hello et al., 2002; Coenders and Scheepers, 2003). However, the focus is not on these mechanisms as such.

8 Moreover, we can test to what extent the measurement errors of the manifest items are similar. Finally, we can test to what extent the relationships between several latent variables are similar in different countries at the same time or in the same country at different points in time. For the purposes at hand, we refrain from testing these issues.