**Article 25fa pilot End User Agreement**

This publication is distributed under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act (Auteurswet) with explicit consent by the author. Dutch law entitles the maker of a short scientific work funded either wholly or partially by Dutch public funds to make that work publicly available for no consideration following a reasonable period of time after the work was first published, provided that clear reference is made to the source of the first publication of the work.

This publication is distributed under The Association of Universities in the Netherlands (VSNU) ‘Article 25fa implementation’ pilot project. In this pilot research outputs of researchers employed by Dutch Universities that comply with the legal requirements of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act are distributed online and free of cost or other barriers in institutional repositories. Research outputs are distributed six months after their first online publication in the original published version and with proper attribution to the source of the original publication.

You are permitted to download and use the publication for personal purposes. Please note that you are not allowed to share this article on other platforms, but can link to it. All rights remain with the author(s) and/or copyrights owner(s) of this work. Any use of the publication or parts of it other than authorised under this licence or copyright law is prohibited. Neither Radboud University nor the authors of this publication are liable for any damage resulting from your (re)use of this publication.

If you believe that digital publication of certain material infringes any of your rights or (privacy) interests, please let the Library know, stating your reasons. In case of a legitimate complaint, the Library will make the material inaccessible and/or remove it from the website. Please contact the Library through email: copyright@ubn.ru.nl, or send a letter to:

University Library  
Radboud University  
Copyright Information Point  
PO Box 9100  
6500 HA Nijmegen

You will be contacted as soon as possible.
8 The Europeanization of national environmental policy: A comparative analysis

Andrew Jordan, Duncan Liefferink and Jenny Fairbrass

Introduction

The European Union (EU) affects domestic politics, policies and administrative structures. Even ten years ago, this statement might have generated controversy in some quarters. But today, it is almost axiomatic that the EU ‘matters’, sometimes hugely, in the daily political life of its citizens. This shift in perceptions about the EU’s importance has helped to open up a new and important research frontier in social sciences. The ‘Europeanization turn’ is exciting because it provides a fresh perspective on some very old debates within European studies. Traditionally, the EU has been researched and taught using the theoretical models and organizing principles of International Relations. It was, as Stephen George explains, entirely logical to have proceeded in this way because ‘what was taking place ... was an experiment in putting inter-state relations on a new footing’ (1996: 11). The primary aim of the work was to understand the development of institutions and policies at the European level. The steadily growing size and importance of the EU policy competences in fields ranging from trade and finance, through to energy and the environment, has now prompted scholars to investigate the rebound effect of European integration (that is the process through which decision-making powers are pooled in the EU) on the Member States. In particular, there is a growing awareness that European integration is not simply something which occurs at the European level, ‘above the heads’ of states, but has developed to the extent where it now impacts on the basic building blocks of the EU; that is the very states that initially created it. In other words, the EU has, it is widely claimed, begun to ‘Europeanize’ national cultures, legislatures and policy systems.

The aim of this chapter is to document the Europeanization of national policy in 10 Member States, namely Austria, Ireland, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the UK, since 1970. Given that our aim is to explore how common policies adopted by...
the EU are refracted by national institutional forms, we have opted to focus on one sector, namely environmental policy, rather than looking at the Europeanization of many sectors in one single country. Our selection of countries constitutes a representative sample of ‘new’ (i.e. post-1995) and older Member States, environmental ‘leaders’ and ‘laggards’, and northern and southern states, to understand the main dynamics at work. By national ‘policy’ we mean the content of policies (the paradigms of action, the objectives and the policy instruments), the legal and administrative structures that have been established to oversee them, and the dominant style in which policy is made and implemented. The chapter builds upon ten country studies first presented at a three day workshop held in Cambridge (UK) in the summer of 2001.

An obvious question to ask is: have some national environmental policies been more Europeanized than others? It seems reasonable to expect that states that are relatively good at nationalizing or ‘domesticating’ (Wallace 2000: 369–70) EU policy, i.e. exporting ideas and standards to Brussels, will be little touched by Europeanization, whereas net importers will have to significantly adjust their policy systems under the influence of Europeanization. Similarly, which aspects of national activity have been most significantly Europeanized: structures, styles or policies? Has Europeanization proceeded faster and further in some sub-sectors (e.g. water) than others and what are the causal factors? Furthermore, has Europeanization affected the relationship between different national actors, both vertically (i.e. between levels of governance – European, national and sub-national) and horizontally (i.e. between environment and cognate policy sectors such as transport and energy)? Finally, who have been the main losers and winners to emerge from the Europeanization process?

This chapter proceeds as follows. The next section discusses some basic aspects of our research approach, such as the definition of Europeanization we utilize, the reasons for taking environmental policy as our case, and the basic categories for ‘measuring’ the degree of Europeanization. The main findings of our comparative analysis of the Europeanization of national environmental policy in ten EU Member States are presented in the next section and then further analysed in the following section. Finally, we draw together the main conclusions and consider their implications for the study of Europeanization.

What is Europeanization?

Definitions of Europeanization

To date, there is no single, all-encompassing ‘theory’ of Europeanization, and even its basic meaning remains contested (see Radaelli 2000). However, the mainstream opinion is that Europeanization research
should seek to understand the domestic impacts of European integration. For instance, Heritier et al. define it as ‘the process of influence deriving from European decisions and impacting member states’ policies and political and administrative structures’ (2001: 3). Boerzel simply describes it as a ‘process whereby domestic policy areas become increasingly subject to European policy making’ (2002a: 6). According to this view, Europeanization concerns the process through which European integration penetrates and, in certain circumstances brings about adjustments to, domestic institutions, decision-making procedures and public policies. Of course, this definition begs many more questions than it answers, some of which we return to below.

In adopting this particular interpretation of Europeanization, we are consciously choosing not to frame our research in order to explore two other possible interpretations of that term. The first holds that Europeanization is really about the accumulation of policy competences at the EU level. This particular definition was particularly popular in early studies of member state-EU dynamics (e.g. Rehbinder and Stewart 1985: xx), but it was recently resurrected by Cowles et al., who defined Europeanization as ‘the emergence and development at the European level of distinct structures of governance’ (2001: 2). The main problem with this particular definition is that it risks eliding Europeanization with the source of domestic change – European integration.

The second interpretation views Europeanization as a ‘two way street’, in which states affect the EU at the same time as the EU affects states (e.g. Boerzel 2002a, b). While the argument that the flow of influence between states and the EU is reciprocal and continuous is essentially unimpeachable, it is nonetheless difficult to fashion it into a rigorous research strategy (i.e. where does the analyst start to look for the causes and consequences of change if they are reciprocally interconnected?) (but see Boerzel 2002a, b; Jordan 2002a). In the language of more positivistic social science, a two-way definition of Europeanization lacks a set of dependent and independent variables.

**Why environmental policy?**

There are three good reasons for taking environment policy as a case of Europeanization, two of them theoretical, the third pragmatic. First, it is one of the EU’s most well developed areas of competence. Most of the early measures of the 1970s were tied quite closely to the logic of creating an internal market in goods. However, EU environmental policy soon broke free of the legal and political constraints that linked it to the internal market, to encompass areas that had never been comprehensively regulated at the national level before such as access to environmental information, the protection of natural habitats and systems of environmental impact assessment (Liefferink et al. 1993; Jordan 2002b). Con-
sequently, many have claimed that national systems have been deeply and irreversibly Europeanized as a result of their involvement in EU policy making (Haigh 1984; Lowe and Ward 1998). The 30-year time period thus spanned gives a sufficiently long timeframe to comprehensively assess the impacts of Europeanization. It would be much more difficult (though no less important) to study Europeanization in sectors where the EU does not have such a long and intensive history of involvement such as defence or foreign affairs.

Second, contra Moravcsik (1994), national policy was already relatively well developed when the EU started to develop its own environmental powers. This allows us to construct a policy ‘baseline’ for the ten countries for the year 1970, against which we can measure any subsequent EU induced effects. It will be much harder (though not impossible) to study Europeanization in sectors where EU and national policy have co-evolved.

Finally, a huge amount of good empirical work has already been conducted on the implementation of EU environmental policy in national contexts. The purpose of this paper and its underlying country studies is to build upon that substantial empirical base, by looking for broad patterns in the national adaptations to the EU (i.e. Europeanization) and searching for causal mechanisms.

The Europeanization of national environmental policy

How then, does Europeanization take place in the environmental sector? Throughout the history of the EU environmental policy, states have tried to shape European rules to ensure they are aligned with their own national approaches and practices. By working to ensure a ‘goodness of fit’ (Cowles et al. 2001) between the two, states hope to reduce adjustment costs, achieve ‘first mover advantages’ and reduce political and legal uncertainty by minimizing the extent of Europeanization. The ‘regulatory competition’ (Héritier et al. 1996) between the fifteen Member States to set the ‘rules of the game’ at the European level, defines the scope of European integration. Crucially, this process inevitably creates instances of institutional ‘misfit’ when European requirements conflict with the way in which states have traditionally organized their domestic environmental affairs – i.e. the structures, style and philosophy of national policy. It is commonly argued that these ‘misfits’ are pre-requisite for Europeanization (Cowles et al. 2001).

The logical implication of this argument is that more proactive states can forestall Europeanization by exporting, uploading or projecting (Bulmer and Burch 1998) their preferred national policy approach to the EU. After all, if (as has often been the case with the more environmentally progressive states such as the Netherlands (Liefferink 1996) and Germany (Weale 1992)) European rules are based on the core features of national rules, the misfit is likely to be low and the degree of Europeanization
correspondingly weak. By contrast, states that consistently download EU policies which are modelled on alien institutional systems, will find themselves under European and domestic pressure to fall into line. The gradual accumulation of misfits will eventually produce serious implementation problems, significant political crises and, possibly, sudden domestic transformations (Risse et al. 2001: 8). To summarize the argument thus far, ‘policy shapers’ in the EU seek to ensure that the two logics of action – the European and the national – are as closely aligned as possible, whereas as ‘policy takers’ struggle to achieve such a fit. Consequently, they find themselves under pressure from national actors such as environmental pressure groups, as well as EU bodies such as the Commission and the European Court of Justice (ECJ), to adapt their policy systems to EU requirements. Generally speaking, the larger the ‘misfit’ the greater the likelihood of domestic change (see Table 8.1).

However, several observers have correctly pointed out that the presence of a ‘misfit’ is only ever a necessary but an insufficient condition for Europeanization (i.e. domestic change). This is because EU policy is a complex amalgam of different national approaches (i.e. a ‘patchwork’ (Rehbinder and Stewart 1985: 254)). Weale claims that EU environmental standards are:

neither a reflection of a dominant coalition of countries pushing their own national style of regulation, nor a merry go round, in which different countries have a go at imposing their own national style in a sector that is of particular importance to them. Instead they are the aggregated and transformed standards of their original champions modified under the need to secure political accommodation from powerful veto players.

(2002: 209–10)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 8.1 Degrees of domestic policy change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Extent of policy ‘misfit’</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absorption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accommodation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transformation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Based on Boerzel and Risse 2000.
The obvious implication of this is that no state can ever be perfectly aligned to every requirement listed in a single Directive, let alone every Directive in the whole acquis – that is, there will always be some misfits. Somehow, other intervening variables need to be included in the analysis to account for the specific patterns of Europeanization that we see unfolding in different Member States (see Cowles et al. 2001; Boerzel 2002a). These variables include, among others: the extent to which features of national policy are institutionally rooted (Knill and Lenschow 2000; Knill 2001); the number of ‘veto points’ that have to be passed at the domestic level (Haverland 2000); the presence of national pressure groups able and willing to ‘exploit’ misfits; the national societal support for environmental protection and the national societal support for European integration.

Measuring the Europeanization of national environmental policy

In this chapter, the combined effects of Europeanization and domestication will be assessed along three distinct but subtly interrelated variables, namely policy content, policy structure and policy style.

Following Hall (1993), policy content can be divided into three different levels. The first relates to the precise setting of policy instruments, e.g. the level of emission standards or taxes, the chemicals included in ‘grey’ and ‘black’ lists, etc. The second is the instruments or techniques by which policy goals are attained, e.g. direct regulation, fiscal instruments, or voluntary agreements. The third level comprises the overall goals that guide policy. These goals operate within a policy paradigm or a ‘framework of ideas and standards that specifies not only the goals of policy and the kind of instruments that can be used to attain them, but also the very nature of the problems they are meant to be addressing’ (Hall 1993: 279).

The concept of policy structure is potentially very broad, which raises some problems defining its boundaries, not least in relation to policy style. National institutional structures range from the basic building blocks of the state (departments, agencies, etc.) through to policy co-ordination networks, codes, guidelines, and ‘ways of working’ (Peters, 1999: 28, 146; Bulmer and Burch 1998, 2000).

The more cultural aspects of national policy structure – the norms and values associated with administrative work (e.g. Bulmer and Burch 1998, 2000) – will be dealt with here separately as policy style. Following Richardson, Gustafsson and Jordan, a society’s ‘standard operating procedures for making and implementing policies’ (Richardson et al. 1982: 2) can be characterized along two axes:

1 a government’s approach to problem solving, ranging from anticipatory/active to reactive,
2 a government’s relationship to other actors in the policy-making and
implementation process, characterized by their inclination either to reach consensus with organized groups or to impose decisions.

With the help of these two axes, dynamic changes in national policy styles due to Europeanization can be ‘mapped’.

Findings of the comparative study

This section presents a comparative analysis of the Europeanization of national environmental policy in ten EU Member States (namely, Austria, Ireland, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the UK) on the basis of detailed country studies to be published in full elsewhere (see Jordan and Liefferink 2004).

Policy content

Table 8.2 summarizes the main impacts of Europeanization on environmental policy content in the ten countries. The single most obvious point is that the EU has affected some aspect of policy content in all 10 states, even the most environmentally progressive or ‘leader’ states such as Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands. At a very general level it is possible to identify instances where the EU has Europeanized all three levels of policy content as well as the overarching policy paradigms of national action. In terms of policy paradigms, the EU has undeniably promoted a more preventative, source-based approach to policy making, which fitted neatly with common practice in countries such as the Netherlands and Germany, but clashed with (and required changes to be made to) everyday practice in, for example, Ireland and the UK. A raft of water and air pollution Directives dating back to the 1970s have also helped to bring about a fundamental shift in the goals of national policy. Countries such as the UK, Finland, France and Greece have had to adapt their domestic arrangements, which contained relatively few explicit emission standards or focused on attaining pre-determined levels of environmental quality through the setting of environmental quality objectives (EQOs). However, the environmental acquis also contains some EQOs and environmental quality standards (e.g. the Directives relating to bathing water, freshwater fish and shellfish, as well as to air quality, and the application of sewage sludge to agricultural land), which have disrupted arrangements in countries such as Germany and Sweden which had traditionally relied upon emission limits.

The EU has also introduced entirely new policy instruments in some countries (e.g. air quality standards for SO₂ and smoke, lead and NO₂ in many Member States including the Netherlands and the UK; ‘emission bubbles’ and restrictions on the total production of certain chemicals such as CFCs). It has also altered the manner in which existing tools are
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Goals</th>
<th>Dominant instrument(s)</th>
<th>Calibration of instruments: additional EU effect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Still source-based</td>
<td>Still mostly regulation, but various NEPIs/ procedural instruments</td>
<td>Little overall change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>Increasingly source-based</td>
<td>Still mostly regulation, but some NEPIs</td>
<td>Tighter standards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Increasingly source-based</td>
<td>Still mostly regulation, but various NEPIs</td>
<td>Tighter standards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Still mainly source-based</td>
<td>Still mostly regulation, but various NEPIs/ procedural instruments</td>
<td>Little overall change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Increasingly source-based</td>
<td>More regulation but also more procedural instruments</td>
<td>Significantly tighter standards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>More source-based</td>
<td>More regulatory, but several NEPIs</td>
<td>Tighter standards (but implementation problems)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>Still mainly source-based</td>
<td>Still mostly regulation, but several NEPIs</td>
<td>Little overall change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>More source-based</td>
<td>Still mostly regulation, but various NEPIs/ procedural instruments</td>
<td>Significantly tighter standards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Still mainly source-based</td>
<td>Still mostly regulation, but more procedural instruments</td>
<td>Little overall change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The UK</td>
<td>More source-based</td>
<td>Mostly regulation, but some NEPIs</td>
<td>Tighter standards</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Country studies, see note 2.
applied (e.g. the use of environmental impact assessment (EIA) in Sweden). The tools that have caused the most disruption are those that belong to the new generation of less interventionist, ‘bottom-up’ instruments, sometimes referred to as ‘new environmental policy instruments’ (NEPIs) (Jordan and Worzel 2003; cf. Knill and Lenschow 2000). Many of them are mainly procedural in nature, for example the Directives on access to environmental information, environmental impact assessment and environmental management. Although these have been fairly comfortably accepted in countries such as the UK, they have misfitted with everyday practice in states such as Sweden, Germany and Austria. In these states, environmental policy objectives have traditionally been implemented through the setting of strong, source-based controls and the adoption of the ‘best available technology’ (BAT).

Finally, the EU has tightened the level at which these instruments are formally calibrated or ‘set’. In some countries the overall extent of domestic adaptation has been relatively limited (e.g. the Netherlands, Austria, Sweden and Germany), whereas in others it has been quite dramatic (namely Greece, Ireland and Spain). The rest (e.g. France, Finland and the UK) have been forced to raise their standards by an intermediate amount.

In fact, the EU’s influence extends well beyond the three main levels of our definition of policy content. For instance, the EU has introduced entirely new policy issues in some countries. The best examples are probably Ireland (waste management), and Spain (fisheries), though the EU could also be said to have championed a formalized system of biodiversity protection that is alien to several member states (namely France, the UK, Sweden and Ireland among others). The EU has also forced member states to alter the importance that they place on particular sub-categories of environmental protection. For instance, the EU forced the UK, which had a well developed corpus of policy relating to land use planning and nature conservation, to pay much more sustained attention to controlling industrial pollution at source.

Policy structure

As in the case of policy content, the single most obvious point to make about the Europeanization of environmental policy structures (Table 8.3) is that the EU has affected some aspect of policy structure in all 10 countries, including the most environmentally progressive or ‘leader’ states. It is immediately obvious that the policy pressures arising from membership of the EU, have forced all states to develop new environmental policy coordination mechanisms. These take the form of committees or networks at the domestic level, whose purpose is to ensure that national negotiators present one, single coherent point of view or position in EU negotiations. Similar arrangements have had to be created in, or involving the national permanent representations to co-ordinate the national position in,
Brussels. The most striking feature of these arrangements is that while they are ‘new’, they often represent only a very slight modification of the pre-existing networks that traditionally linked different departments. The degree and suddenness of these changes has been greatest in countries which joined the EU only very recently (e.g. Sweden and Finland), or had traditionally relied upon a much less co-ordinated approach to EU policy making (e.g. Germany and the Netherlands). The need for better co-ordination has not been nearly so pressing in hierarchically structured states such as the UK, which have simply fine-tuned their existing arrangements to respond to EU pressures.

Similarly, most states have created new institutional procedures to consult with their national parliaments throughout the course of a negotiation on a particular dossier. Again, many of these are new, but they do not represent a dramatic or wholesale break with the past; they are a modification of existing practices and structures. However, there is a common perception among many of the country study authors that the highly technical nature of much environmental decision making and the EU, the speed at which dossiers are moved through the EU system, and the physical remoteness of Brussels and Strasbourg, have combined to reduce national parliamentary scrutiny of EU policy making.

The Europeanization of the content of national policy has also vastly increased the workload in most national environmental departments. Consequently, some have grown in size relative to less-Europeanized cognate departments (e.g. the UK). Membership has also created new political opportunities and points of leverage for national environmental departments to exploit. In less strongly co-ordinated national governments, the Europeanization of environmental policy making allows national environment ministries to agree to ambitious proposals in the Environment Council, which can then be presented to cognate departments as a fait accompli. In more tightly co-ordinated national systems (e.g. the UK), Europeanization has strengthened the arm of environment ministries in inter-departmental conflicts with cognate departments which set the agreed, cross-governmental position (Jordan 2001, 2002a).

In addition to that, the country studies confirm that Europeanization has helped to centralize policy making responsibilities into the hands of central government departments (e.g. the UK), and technical agencies (e.g. Sweden) at the expense of sub-national pollution control bodies, and local or regional government (e.g. Germany). Finally, Europeanization has generally increased opportunities for environmental NGOs. The possibility to lodge formal complaints with the Commission against imperfect implementation of EU law has created an important additional route for them to ‘fight’ their own national governments (Fairbrass and Jordan 2001). Most well-known in this context are cases where NGOs have tried to stop building projects in natural areas with reference to EU directives (e.g. the UK, Spain and the Netherlands).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Arrangements for EU and foreign environmental policy co-ordination</th>
<th>Importance of national parliament in environmental policy</th>
<th>Strength of national environment ministry</th>
<th>Importance of sub-national level in environmental policy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>+ Some new structures added</td>
<td>− Weaker</td>
<td>++ Significantly stronger</td>
<td>− − Länder and ‘social partners’ weaker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>++ Strengthened domestically and in the EU</td>
<td>−</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>??</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>++ New co-ordination structures created; attempt to be more pro-active</td>
<td>− − Increasingly marginalized</td>
<td>+ Empowered</td>
<td>− Weaker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>++ Strengthened domestically and in the EU</td>
<td>+/−</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+/− Länder initially weaker, later partly reclaimed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>++ Strengthened domestically and in the EU</td>
<td>+/−</td>
<td>++ Creation of Environment Ministry</td>
<td>??</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>+ Some new co-ordination structures</td>
<td>+/−</td>
<td>+/− More powerful but still relatively small</td>
<td>+/−</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>++ Strengthened domestically and in the EU</td>
<td>− Still low</td>
<td>+ Growing c.f. MFA</td>
<td>+/− Still low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>++ Strengthened domestically and in the EU</td>
<td>+/−</td>
<td>++ Creation of Environment Ministry</td>
<td>+/−</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>++ Strengthened domestically and in the EU</td>
<td>+/−</td>
<td>+/−</td>
<td>+ Increased importance of technical agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The UK</td>
<td>+ Existing structures strengthened</td>
<td>−</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>− − Significantly lower</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Country studies, see note 2.

Notes
Meaning of signs
++ significantly more; + slightly more; +/- unchanged; − slightly less; − − significantly less.
The overall pattern is one of slow and steady adaptation, with very few obvious discontinuities or sudden step changes. The two most dramatic changes to arise from EU membership are as follows. The first is probably the creation of integrated environmental ministries in Greece and Spain, and larger technical enforcement and monitoring agencies in the UK, France and Spain. However, in none of these cases was the EU the only motivating factor. The second is the deep Europeanization of national legal structures, which is of course, a general feature of many policy areas, not just the environment. In the case of Regulations the extent of Europeanization is effectively total, because EU law is directly applicable and in effect automatically becomes national law. With Directives the extent of Europeanization is not nearly so great as each country usually relies upon its own approach to transposition. However, nowadays, the Commission is usually very quick to commence infringement proceedings against states that do not adapt their national legal systems to fit EU legislative requirements. The practice of using administrative circulars to transpose Directives, which was common in Germany, Ireland and France, has been outlawed by the ECJ. In effect, the Commission has succeeded in preventing states from evading or otherwise masking the Europeanization of legal structures.

Finally, our study identifies the same overall pattern of winners and losers as that identified by other analysts (e.g. Rometsch and Wessels 1996). Of the main winners, the most prominent in the environmental sectors are national environmental departments, sub-national technical agencies (e.g. France and Sweden) and environmental pressure groups. The main losers are national parliaments, which have seen their importance further denuded by the centralization of policy making, foreign ministries (which are no longer solely responsible for determining the content of national foreign policy), and local and regional government.

**Policy style**

In sharp contrast to the content of national policies, national policy styles appear not to have changed that much under the EU’s influence (see Table 8.4). On the whole the dominant style remains consensual rather than adversarial, and has become more proactive in a number of member states. The latter appears to be restricted mainly to some of the environmental ‘leader’ states; such as Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and France. However, this suggests that there has been an autonomous trend rather than an EU effect. In Finland, by contrast, the increasing role of the EU in agenda-setting seems to have led national policy actors to behave in a more reactive way. The basically reactive style of Greece, Spain, Ireland and the UK, moreover, appears to be hardly affected by Europeanization. This is intriguing because the aim of many EU environmental policies (and established principles of several Action Programmes)
is to prevent environmental problems before they appear and become serious, and to promote public consultation and public participation. We speculate on possible explanations below.

One other anomaly is worthy of note, namely the shift towards a more adversarial style of politics in countries that have traditionally been highly consensual. The two most obvious examples here are Austria and Sweden and, to a lesser extent, Finland. The explanation offered by the respective authors is that the deadlines governing EU policy making have speeded up the domestic policy process, reducing the scope for extensive consultation with affected interests.

Apart from the latter, quite specific change, the overall impact of the EU on national policy style appears to have been quite limited; or at least it is very difficult to disentangle the ‘EU effect’ from other domestic and/or socio-economic causes of change. These include the post-industrial demand among national publics for higher environmental standards, financial budgetary pressures (Austria, Ireland, Germany and Finland), domestic political change (namely the election of right wing governments promoting variants of new public management, e.g. the UK) and long-term economic transformations (e.g. the rapid development of the tourist industry in Greece and Spain).

The Europeanization of national environmental policy: general patterns and processes

Table 8.5 summarizes these general patterns of Europeanization in the ten countries using the measures introduced above (Table 8.1). It reveals that the impact of the EU is indeed differentiated between sectors and between countries. The EU effect on the content of policy appears to have been the deepest and most profound, whereas policy structures and policy
style appear to have been much less affected. In general, the effects of Europeanization can be identified at the level of policy paradigms, policy goals, policy tools and the calibration of those tools. The impact on structures has been less dramatic, incremental and mostly path dependent. With some exceptions (see above), the basic building blocks of the state remain remarkably untouched. In fact, recent research even on the most ‘Europeanized’ parts of state structures (i.e. those co-ordinating EU policy within Brussels) (Kassim et al. 2000, 2001) has found that each country essentially retains its own, distinctive approaches and procedures. Thus, national co-ordination mechanisms come in very different sizes, have very different ambitions and interface with national actors in markedly contrasting ways. The really big ‘machinery of government’ changes have arisen because of domestic and mostly ‘non environmental’ political demands. Finally, it is very difficult to make firm statements about the Europeanization of policy style, given the difficulties of disentangling the ‘EU effect’ from the many other causal factors.

The most obvious explanation for this pattern is related to the *modus operandi* of the EU. First and foremost, the EU disseminates policy content, not policy structures and a policy style. To use Alberta Sbragia’s apt phrase, the EU has taken a ‘vow of poverty’; it steers by issuing regulations (Sbragia 2000). Some policy instruments may, of course, imply a change in policy style (e.g. the dissemination of emission limits and EIA procedures is supposed to promote more anticipatory policy style), but do not of themselves directly require it. The EU has in fact very little ability to dictate the operation or structure of national public administrations (Bossaert et al. 2001: 3; Goetz 2001: 1040), or directly influence the policy style of a country. Directives (the main instrument of EU environmental policy) are, of course, mainly output orientated – they specify the ends to

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Policy structures</th>
<th>Policy content</th>
<th>Policy style</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Accommodation</td>
<td>Accommodation</td>
<td>Absorption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>Absorption</td>
<td>Accommodation</td>
<td>Absorption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Accommodation/</td>
<td>Accommodation</td>
<td>Absorption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>transformation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Accommodation</td>
<td>Accommodation</td>
<td>Absorption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Accommodation</td>
<td>Transformation</td>
<td>Absorption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>Accommodation</td>
<td>Transformation</td>
<td>Absorption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>Accommodation</td>
<td>Absorption</td>
<td>Absorption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Accommodation</td>
<td>Transformation</td>
<td>Absorption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Accommodation</td>
<td>Absorption</td>
<td>Absorption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The UK</td>
<td>Absorption</td>
<td>Transformation</td>
<td>Absorption</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note
For meaning of terms, see Table 8.1.
be achieved, but not the means of doing so. European integration is, at
the end of the day, a legal process, enshrined in and underpinned by
written legal texts. Therefore, it is not at all surprising to find that national
legal systems have been the most Europeanized (Alter 2001; Snyder 2001).

Another aspect of Europeanization we sought to understand was the
overall geographical pattern of change. Simplifying greatly, the well-
known ‘pioneers’ (Andersen and Liefferink 1997) in our sample (i.e.
Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden), have had to adapt the least,
whereas some aspects of policy in Spain, Greece and Ireland have been
completely transformed by EU membership. These two groups could be
crudely labelled as policy ‘shapers’ and policy ‘takers’. The UK initially
belonged to the group of heavily Europeanized policy ‘takers’ but started
to adopt a more active stance in EU environmental policy from the 1990s.
An intermediate grouping of states comprising France, Finland and
Austria have neither consistently ‘shaped’ nor ‘taken’ EU policy since
joining. They have nevertheless been able to limit the impact of the EU on
national environmental policy as compared with the group of policy
‘takers’. The overall pattern is shown in Figure 8.1, which provides a ‘snap-
shot’ of the situation around 2000.

At a very general level it is possible to explain this pattern in terms of
the regulatory competition between states to set the European ‘rules of
the game’. Every single country has at times – alone or together with other
states – sought to upload aspects of policy content to the EU. The Nether-
lands has been conspicuously concerned with promoting long-term stra-
tegic planning, environmental impact assessment and ‘good governance’.
These are very similar to the UK’s priorities. Germany in particular sought
to promote uniform emission limits and the use of BAT, as well as meas-
ures to reduce car pollution. France and Germany on the other hand were
early advocates of stronger water pollution controls. Still other states have
tried to upload generic issues rather than specific approaches, for
example chemicals (Sweden), transport (Austria), water supply (Spain
and Greece). Finally, deeply Europeanized states (i.e. Spain, Greece and
Ireland) have not consistently uploaded anything, although Ireland has
long standing reservations about nuclear power (especially in the UK),
and Greece and Spain have successfully argued for EU cohesion funding
(i.e. a subsidy for fitting domestic pollution control facilities). If anything,
Figure 8.1 suggests that those countries that have been engaged most con-
sistently in uploading policies to Brussels have generally been least Euro-
peanized. However, this by no means suggests a direct link between the
two. With the exception of the UK’s shift from the late 1980s, perhaps,
countries do not decide to invest in uploading only or mainly in order to
limit the degree of Europeanization. There are many variables intervening
in this process. To mention just a few: a generally positive attitude towards
European integration is likely to increase the willingness to put consider-
able effort in uploading (or ‘constructive pushing’, cf. Liefferink and
Andersen 1998; e.g. in Germany and the Netherlands), whereas a high public and political profile of environmental issues ‘at home’ may have a similar effect (e.g. Sweden and the UK since the late 1980s). On the other hand, those countries that have generally set their priorities on other issues of European integration than the environment are more likely passively to ‘take’ policies suggested by the EU in this particular field (the Mediterranean countries, Ireland and, to a lesser extent, Finland). The figure thus shows an end effect rather than a direct causal relationship (for an alternative discussion of essentially the same relationship, see Boerzel 2002b).

However, these very broad patterns mask a number of interesting sub-dynamics. The first relates to the timing of change. Generally speaking, the element of national policy to be Europeanized first is policy content. Much later, states react to the emergence of politically embarrassing or financially costly misfits by making structural and tactical changes to better ‘shape’ EU policy. The best examples are to be found in the Netherlands and Germany (which improved their respective internal coordination capacities) and the UK (which took a strategic decision to domesticate the EU by uploading national ‘success stories’). Similarly, traditional policy styles in Austria, Germany and Sweden are coming under pressure to adapt to cope with the Europeanization of their respective national policies.

The second relates to specific items of legislation which, in certain circumstances, can have anomalous impacts. It is obvious that specific Directives can and often do provoke significant national adaptations even in those countries that have been much less Europeanized than the norm. A number of Directives stand out as having caused problems in almost all states. These include the drinking and bathing water Directives, the nitrates Directive, and the habitats and wild birds Directives. This suggests that there are some Directives that misfit with most, if not all, national policies – that is, almost all states find them deeply problematic. This finding has potentially important implications for the continuing debate about which actors exert the strongest control in the EU (see below). Moreover, even the original champions of these particular Directives have been Europeanized to an important extent. There are various examples of an uploaded policy ‘backfiring’ in unexpected ways, causing much more

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weakly Europeanized</th>
<th>EU policy taker</th>
<th>EU policy maker</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Austria, France, Finland</td>
<td>The Netherlands, Germany, Sweden</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Europeanized</th>
<th>EU policy taker</th>
<th>EU policy maker</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ireland, Greece, Spain</td>
<td>The UK</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 8.1 Patterns of domestic action and domestic impact in c.2000.*
domestic change (i.e. Europeanization) than the original champion originally intended, e.g. in the UK (IPPC), the Netherlands (nature conservation), and Germany (various air pollution Directives). These and other sub-dynamics cannot be properly understood without more detailed comparative empirical research.

Third, as touched upon above, the extent to which states ‘take’ or ‘shape’ policy has varied over time. The UK is a good example of a ‘taker’ that has transformed itself into much more of a ‘maker’. Germany on the other hand has shifted in the other direction, ‘making’ important areas of EU policy in the 1980s only then to lapse into a more passive mode of behaviour in the 1990s which has culminated in a significant ‘proceduralization’ of national policy. The behaviour of other states has remained much more constant, be they ‘shapers’ (the Netherlands) or ‘takers’ (Greece, Ireland and Spain). There are country-specific reasons for these changes, but the important overall point is that they cannot be understood simply as a response to ‘outside pressures’ from the EU, or ‘inside out’ pressure exerted by states on the EU (e.g. by uploading successful national policies). Rather, they demonstrate the intricate interrelationships between European integration and Europeanization. For example, European integration may lead to a series of politically and economically costly domestic adaptations. One way states seek to circumvent future ‘misfits’ is to adopt a more proactive mode of behaviour, although uploading policies to the EU may still result in unforeseen ‘rebound effects’ at some future point. When viewed over longer periods of time, it is possible to appreciate that national and EU policy systems are, in fact, mutually co-evolving. However, above we identified the difficulties that mutual causality poses for the design of EU research.

It has been suggested above that Europeanization is the outcome of an external pressure (or combination of pressures) exerted on member states by the EU. When states adapt to that external pressure by adjusting their domestic policy arrangements then Europeanization has occurred. Therefore, a discontinuity or ‘misfit’ between what the EU requires and pre-existing national policy arrangements, has to be a necessary (though not a sufficient) condition for Europeanization to take place. If this view is correct, what additional, intervening variables might predict whether that change actually occurs or not?

A reasonable predictor of national change appears to be the level of domestic political support for environmental protection. Thus the most Europeanized states in Table 8.5 (namely Spain, Greece, Ireland and the UK) have generally exhibited lower than average levels of political support for environmental protection. On the other hand, ‘leader’ states with more environmentally demanding publics such as Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands and Austria have been far less Europeanized across all three domains of policy. There are two possible flaws in this line of argument. The first is that although levels of environmental ambition are negatively
correlated with the depth of Europeanization, one is still left to explain the differential Europeanization of the three components of national policy, or, indeed, the variations within any one component (e.g. policy content). Second, levels of environmental ambition may simply be another way of measuring the level of misfit (i.e. more environmentally progressive societies tend to have more progressive environmental policies which fit with what the EU demands).

A more important intervening variable is the presence of actors who are sufficiently well motivated to exploit any misfit between EU and national policy. At this point, it becomes very difficult to identify \textit{a priori} the precise conditions under which a misfit will translate into domestic change. Much depends on what is being Europeanized. Clearly, some changes (e.g. the amendment of national legal structures) are fairly easy for states to make, or are patently in their self-interest to make (e.g. the improvement of internal co-ordination arrangements). Others (e.g. the wholesale re-organization of national permitting systems or the commitment of large amounts of new investment in environmental improvement) require harder choices and are less likely to occur without sustained political pressure. This explains why the EU appears to have succeeded rather better at Europeanizing (i.e. harmonizing) national legal systems, than national polities or policy outcomes (see below). Clearly, national actors do have to exploit misfits to exert political pressure on states. Environmental pressure groups served this purpose in the UK and, to a much lesser extent, Spain, Greece and Ireland. Interestingly, also producers of environmental technology or ‘progressive’ industries with a competitive interest in strict environmental policies have at times played this role (so-called ‘helpers interests’, cf. Prittwitz 1990). However, there must also be personalities in EU institutions willing to respond to these demands. The most important locus for these conflicts is the Commission’s infringement procedure. Often, unless and until this process is triggered, ‘paper’ misfits will not translate into domestic change (cf. the ‘pull-and-push’ model of implementation, developed by Boerzel 2000). It is very difficult to generalize because in the final analysis Europeanization (or, to be more precise, EU demands) are often just an input to domestic political processes, of which there is no single, commonly agreed model.

**Conclusions**

The main finding of this chapter is that each and every state has been Europeanized to some extent. Overall, the EU has had a much deeper impact on the content of national policy than policy structures or the style in which they function. The impact is, of course, highly differentiated across countries and the three dimensions of national policy because states began from different starting positions. The level of ‘fit’ or ‘misfit’ between the EU and national policies provides a crude predictor of the
overall level of Europeanization. Thus states such as the Netherlands, Sweden and (until recently) Germany have always been quite closely aligned to EU policies and have not been that deeply Europeanized. However, conscious human agency also plays an important part in modulating the long-term effect of any misfit. The most obvious action a state can take to circumvent misfits is to upload policies of its own to the EU. The UK has employed this strategy to particularly good effect since the early 1990s. However, the relationship between the depth of Europeanization and the eagerness to ‘make’ (rather than ‘take’ EU rules) is not clear cut (Figure 8.1). There are, for instance, deeply Europeanized states such as Spain, Greece and Ireland that continue to ‘take’ policy from the EU; i.e. they show little willingness to circumvent Europeanization by uploading national policy models to the EU. At the same time there are very weakly Europeanized states such as the Netherlands and Sweden that continue to pursue a highly proactive environmental stance in the EU.

Do these findings imply that studying Europeanization is somehow unimportant or unnecessary? Our response is emphatically ‘no’. First, even though the EU has not completely overturned domestic structures and policy styles, its influence has been hugely significant over such a comparatively short period of time. National politics (as distinct from policy) has been deeply transformed by EU membership and to that extent cannot be properly understood outside of an EU framework of analysis. Future analysis might seek to describe and explain the patterns of Europeanization in other, non-environmental sectors, in order that cross-sectoral comparisons can be made. Such research might explore how far the depth of Europeanization in various sectors can be related to the length of the EU’s involvement (i.e. is it less significant in policy areas where the EU’s competence is less well or more recently developed?), or the mode of the EU’s action (i.e. positive or negative integration?)

Second, there are many instances where the EU has directly affected national policy. These provide fairly clear-cut symptoms of Europeanization at the national level (and particularly on the content of national policy), and their timing and distribution deserve to be documented empirically, not least because they provide such an important trigger of national policy and politics. However, having looked in some detail at Europeanization in the ten countries, one is struck by the extent to which states and the EU are involved in a highly dynamic set of two-way interactions. It is more meaningful, we would argue, to use the term ‘Europeanization’ to describe national adaptations to EU requirements, and use other terms (e.g. benchmarking, policy transfer etc.) to describe and explain the horizontal (i.e. predominantly state to state) flows of influence which occur in the EU. Having said that, future Europeanization research now needs to question whether it is appropriate to bracket off the ‘inside out’ impact of states on the EU, and treat the EU as an independent variable. To the extent that states use the EU to upload their
preferred policies (and thereby circumvent Europeanization), the EU is at best only an intervening variable.

Finally, irrespective of these new debates, Europeanization research is worth pursuing because it sheds much new light on the old debate about European integration. The old debate between intergovernmentalism and its critics reached an impasse in the 1990s. By studying Europeanization it is possible to better understand the extent to which states genuinely do achieve their objectives in the EU, although this feedback effect on integration is not always that well developed in the existing literature on Europeanization. One of the striking findings of this chapter is that for many countries (and not just the weakly co-ordinated, policy ‘takers’), Europeanization has been a hugely unexpected, unpredictable and, at times, chaotic process. This casts doubt on the intergovernmentalist claim that states are remote from (and largely in firm control of) the integration process (e.g. Moravcsik 1998). Our conclusion is that such an argument imputes to Member States far more autonomy and human agency than everyday experience suggests they actually have.

Notes
1 This chapter presents the preliminary findings of a three-day workshop held in Cambridge (UK) in the summer of 2001. We would like to thank the participants as well as the European Science Foundation, the UK Economic Research Council (R000237870) and the University of Nijmegen for kindly providing joint funding.
2 This chapter draws upon a series of national case studies written by: Volkmar Lauber (Austria), Brendan Flynn (Ireland), Rauno Sairinen and Arto Lindholm (Finland), Henry Buller (France), Rüdiger Wurzel (Germany), Maria Kousis and Joseph Lekakis (Greece), Mariëlle van der Zouwen and Duncan Liefferink (the Netherlands), Susana Aguilar Fernández (Spain), Annica Kronsell (Sweden) and Andrew Jordan (the UK) (for details, see Jordan and Liefferink 2004).

References


