THE EUROPEANIZATION OF THE CIVIL SERVICE CRAFT

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Researchers:

Prof. Dr. P. ‘t Hart
Dr. K. Geuijen
Dr. S. Princen
Dr. K. Yesilkagit
Utrecht School of Governance – Universiteit Utrecht

Drs. E. Mastenbroek
Department of Public Administration – Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen
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1.1 Background and aims of this study

‘Europeanization’ is definitely one of the contemporary buzzwords in the world of government and public policy makers throughout Europe, just like ‘globalization’ is to economists. It is more than just a buzzword, however. Although agreement among experts about the precise figures turns out to be surprisingly difficult to obtain, there is little question that in recent decades a significant portion of hitherto national regulation and policy development is now being produced in European arenas. These Europeanized policymaking processes involve an intricate and often complex interplay between actors at the (sub)national and EU level. Europeanized policy arenas have developed distinctive rules, norms and practices that govern this interplay. Knowing how to leverage these distinct features is a crucial condition for any actor – be it a national ministry, a trans-national pressure group or a multinational firm – seeking to wield influence over European policymaking processes.

A sophisticated policy management capacity at the European stage is something that all Member States seek to achieve. They know that in order to safeguard their national interests, they need their representatives to understand and manipulate the peculiar agenda-setting mechanisms, institutional rhythms, opportunity structures and veto points of European policy making. It is what ministers whose portfolios are in highly Europeanized policy domains expect their civil servants to deliver. These expectations are not always met: numerous studies in different countries show that knowledge, institutional capacity and effective coordination at the national level are often lacking.

Despite its long experience as founding member of the EU, the Netherlands is often depicted as a country that has not been particularly successful in gearing its national machinery of government for effective performance in European arenas. The Dutch attitude towards the European integration process has long been characterized by a fundamental optimism, both regarding its general thrust as well as about its
government’s own capacity as founding member to help steer European institutional development in desirable directions. With ‘Europe’ regarded as fundamentally unproblematic, the management of European affairs was largely left to pockets of specialized expertise – at the Foreign Office, at the Dutch Permanent Representation in Brussels, at the international affairs units in certain ministries, among the regular participants in the relevant interdepartmental coordination committees, or simply the discretion of individual officials whose highly specialized portfolios required participation in European working groups and committees. Outside this relatively small world of ‘repeat players’ European affairs engendered little interest among politicians and civil servants. Going to work in or on ‘Europe’ was hardly a route to career advancement – more likely the opposite.

This attitude has changed markedly in recent years. In 1995, the secretaries-general of the Dutch ministries published a report in which they called attention to the relative neglect of developments at the European level in the Netherlands, and argued that these were nevertheless quickly becoming one of the key forces shaping the future of the Dutch civil service. This report was followed by a series of high-level reports and academic studies concerning the Dutch place in Europe. The progressive widening and deepening of the European integration process that took place throughout the nineties sent a clear message to all the Member States, the Dutch included: ceteris paribus, getting things done at the European level was becoming much more difficult. Whilst the scope of European involvement in public policymaking was expanding markedly, the rules of the European policymaking game were changing fast. States that could not or would not adapt and raise their game would find themselves outmanoeuvred by others and/or by the European institutions. In this study, we examine if and how this message has sunk in. It differs from most other studies on Dutch EU policymaking undertaken so far in that it does not focus on the preparation of the Dutch position in European arenas. The key formal EU coordination mechanisms in Dutch central government have been scrutinized repeatedly, and their strengths and weaknesses have been clearly articulated (Soetendorp and Hanf, 1998; Andeweg and Soetendorp, 2001; Raad voor het Openbaar Bestuur, 2004; De Zwaan, 2005; cf. Kassim, Peters and Wright, 2000; Kassim, Menon, Peters and Wright, 2001). In this study, we regard Europeanization of national policymaking not just as an intra- and interdepartmental coordination challenge but as an emergent, differentiated set of political and professional practices,
which participants in European policy processes need to be aware of and master in order to be effective at the European level (Heritier et al, 2001; cf. Becking and Hopman, 2005). This has been much less researched in the Netherlands (but see Schout, 1998; Sie Dhian Ho and Van Keulen, 2004) than in some other countries (see for example Smith, 2000, 2001; Jacobson, Laegreid and Pedersen, 2004; Baetens and Bursens 2004a and 2004b).

Specifically our chief research aim is twofold. We want to find out: a) how individual Dutch civil servants who operate in Europeanized/Europeanizing environments experience their craft as participants in multilevel policy processes: how they think it works, what sort of expertise and experience it requires, how much time they devote to it, how they seek to achieve successes and avoid failures at the European stage; b) but how these national ‘Eurocrats’ are facilitated and constrained in doing their jobs by the organizational contexts in which they work, i.e. the degree to which their home departments or ministries are ‘Europeanized’ in their routines and practices.

This is clearly not just a matter of academic interest. The findings of this study bear directly upon policies for recruitment, training, career development, knowledge management and organizational (re)design in the Dutch civil service. Our insights and recommendations regarding these will be formulated in the final chapter of this report. In the remainder of this first chapter we describe the design of this study and foreshadow the contents of the report.

1.2 Research questions and study design

Looking more closely at the research aim stated above, one may observe that it harbours four distinct, but related puzzles: which civil servants in the Netherlands are involved in European policy processes, how do they approach their European tasks, what do they actually do, and how are their beliefs and practices shaped by the organizations in which they work? Producing credible answers to this four-fold question is not an easy task. The Dutch central government is vast and heterogenous by itself. More importantly, the European policymaking processes that national officials are involved in are numerous, varied and often complex, mobilizing different clusters of officials in different arenas and often spanning long periods of time.
Finally, access to some of these actors and arenas is not always easy to gain: key people are busy, certain issues can be sensitive, and some arenas can be closed off to outsiders.

Coming to terms with such an ambitious research aim is a challenge that researchers can best meet by cutting it up in manageable pieces. These can then be studied by the use of multiple, complementary methods of data gathering and analysis. We have done likewise. After exploratory research provided indications of what was possible and feasible, two main research questions were elaborated:

1. How do individual Dutch civil servants experience and practise the craft of policymaking for and in European arenas?
2. To what extent and how are these civil servants facilitated and constrained by existing ways of organizing European affairs in their respective organizations?

The first question regards the individual dimension of the European civil service craft. This question pertains to the implications of working in multi-level/European settings for the identity and performance of national officials, a subject that has generated much research in the last decade (see the overview in chapter 2). We have operationalized it in the following key issues:

- role orientations: what do national civil servants see as their chief tasks and aims when participating in European policy processes?
- activity and contact patterns: how big a part of their daily work is taken up by European matters, and how do they spend that time?
- arenas and channels: where does ‘European’ policymaking ‘happen’ for these civil servants?
- formal and informal ‘rules of the game’: how does policymaking unfold in these arenas?
- measures of quality and effectiveness: what do Dutch civil servants consider to be ‘a proper job’ in operating at the European stage?
- knowledge and expertise: what in their experience are crucial competencies for national civil servants operating on the European stage?
The second question pertains to the organizational dimension. This question fits into the ongoing interest in the effects of European integration on the structure and modus operandi of national administrative systems in European states (see chapter 2 for an overview of existing research findings). Again, we have identified a number of key issues associated with this dimension:

- **job structure**: do civil servants feel they have sufficient time and opportunity to devote themselves to the European dimension of their portfolio?
- **education and training**: what facilities and incentives exist within the civil servants’ organizations for acquiring the skills necessary to be an effective player in European policy arenas?
- **career development**: to what extent are placements in Europe and posts that have a strong European component considered to be ‘good career moves’ in the civil servants’ organizations?
- **instruction and guidance**: how are policy priorities to be achieved at the European level developed and communicated to the civil servants who operate in European arenas? What degree of discretion are they given?
- **feedback and accountability**: how do civil servants who operate in European arenas report about their activities to their ‘back offices’, and how is their performance ascertained and evaluated there?
- **top management commitment**: to what extent do the top echelons of the organization accord proper priority to European issues, and to what extent do they get personally involved in European arenas if and when needed?
- **resources**: do civil servants involved in European policy work find there is enough funding and staff support from their organizations for them to be able to operate effectively?

We have examined these issues using four different, complementary methods of data collection:

1. We have studied the relevant reports, documents and academic literature on the subject. The academic literature in particular has not just been scanned for contributions pertaining to the Dutch situation, but for relevant research findings in other countries as well.
2. We have incorporated several questions into a large survey on job characteristics, satisfaction and public sector motivation administered by the Dutch Ministry of the Interior (the co-called POMO survey). The survey was conducted in the first months of 2006 and was completed by 4502 civil servants working in central government organizations (a response rate of 45%). Through this survey, we have been able to obtain a unique, quantitative assessment of the number and type of civil servants involved in EU decision-making, as well as their judgment of the organizational aspects of their tasks (for the questions on Europeanization included in the survey, see Appendix I).

3. We have conducted structured, thematic interviews with over 46 middle-ranking and top officials covering two policy sectors (see below for explication) coming from four different ministries, their associated executive agencies and the Dutch Permanent Representation in Brussels. We asked them about their experiences in ‘doing’ European policymaking (and, to a lesser extent, policy implementation) in The Hague, in Brussels, and anywhere else that their jobs took them. The interviews were recorded on tape and later transcribed. All interviewees agreed to be cited by name, but we have generally refrained from doing so unless the quotes were clearly recognisable as coming from a particular person (for the list of interviews, see Appendix II).

4. We have engaged in non-participant observation of the Europe-related work routines of officials in different parts of the Dutch police, the ministry of the Interior, the ministry of Justice, and the Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority.

5. After completing all this, and having drawn preliminary conclusions on the basis of the survey and the two case studies, we conducted five expert meetings with middle-ranking and top-level officials from throughout the Dutch government, in order to check on the broader salience of these initial findings, and further deepen our insights on what it means to be, and organize, national ‘Eurocrats.’ A total of twenty seven officials participated in these sessions, which lasted 2.5 hours each. They were taped and transcribed.
For step 3 and 4, we adopted a comparative case research strategy. This strategy entailed comparing civil service practices in two policy domains that met two conditions:

a. Both should involve more than one Dutch ministry’s responsibilities, so as to enable comparison of two different Dutch civil service organizations operating within one and the same European domain;
b. The two domains should differ in terms of the timing and degree of Europeanization of regulatory and policy activity. This enabled us to examine if Europeanized civil service practices differ across the various governance regimes (‘pillars’) that the EU harbours, as well as if Dutch public organizations that have been dealing in Europe for decades show more effectiveness and maturity in doing so than those whose involvement is much more recent.

These considerations led us to select two policy domains for further study: *veterinary policy* (ministries of Agriculture and Health; old, first pillar, high degree of Europeanization) and *European police cooperation* (ministries of Interior and Justice; new, third pillar, low degree of Europeanization). It should be stressed here that the comparative strategy chosen here implies that this part of our analysis is only valid for the organizations examined. Its findings were used as a starting point for further exploration in the expert meetings covering officials working in a large number of other domains, but the case findings as such do not apply to these other domains.

Although these limitations of our research design are not to be overlooked, to our knowledge it is by far the methodologically most ambitious effort to penetrate the craft of ‘doing business in Europe’ as a national official/organization (see further chapter 2).

1.3 Overview

In chapter 2 we first report the results of our academic groundwork: the literature review. Readers not interested in the academic state of the art with respect to the nexus between Europeanization, national administrative organizations and individual
civil servants can read this diagonally. Those that don’t, will find an overview of current insights concerning the activities, role perceptions and organizational contexts of national civil servants and experts who operate in EU arenas.

The main findings of our own field research are reported in chapters 3-5. Chapter 3 presents the findings of the survey study, mapping the phenomenon of ‘Europeanization’ in the Dutch central government machinery by identifying the distribution of people and organizations doing (degrees of) European policy work. It also explores the correlates of Dutch civil servants’ EU activities. Whereas the survey study thus aims to capture the ‘ballpark’ of Europeanization in the Dutch civil service, it cannot tell us much about what people actually do and how they experience their involvement in EU policy processes. This requires a more close up view. Such views are offered in chapters 4 and 5, which describe the findings of the qualitative study – the interviews and observations. Chapter 4 focuses on the veterinary policy arena, and looks at the practices of Dutch ‘Eurocrats’ in it through the lens of strategic behaviour. It identifies and discusses three basic strategies employed by Dutch veterinary Eurocrats in seeking to influence the chief arena in the policy process in the First Pillar of the EU: signalling, front-loading and coalition formation. Chapter 5 turns to the domain of European police cooperation and looks more closely at the day-to-day work practices of Dutch Eurocrats in this field. It identifies and discusses two markedly different styles of doing business in Europe: the bureaucratic-diplomatic and the street-level entrepreneurial style.

In the final chapter, we summarize and compare the findings of the study and place them in a broader context with the aid of the findings obtained from the expert meeting discussions. We return to the two main questions and the related clusters of issues stated earlier in the current chapter to interpret these findings, and draw general conclusions.

Above all, this study emphasizes the multi-faceted and differentiated nature of ‘Eurocratic’ work, both domestically and in European arenas. European policymaking simply cannot be captured in a single institutional formula (‘expertocracy’, ‘transnational bargaining’). It takes place in different clusters of networks with different characteristics and ‘rules of the game’ that national civil servants need to know how to play by in order to be effective in their jobs. And depending on their specific positions in the wider fabric of the policymaking process, different types of national Eurocrats face different types of opportunities and constraints shaping Dutch
positions and European policies. The final chapter ends with a set of policy recommendations for improving Dutch civil service performance in Europe that acknowledge this essential variety.

1.4 Acknowledgements

The researchers would like to thank a number of people for their support during the process of doing this study. First, we would like to thank the Dutch Ministry of the Interior (BZK) for its financial support and the members of the supervisory group for their comments and suggestions during our discussions in The Hague. We would like to extend a particular thanks to Tanja Timmermans, who was our contact at the Ministry and helped us get into contact with the right people on several occasions, and to Daphne de Groot, who took over this role during the final stages of the process.

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Drafts of some of the chapters of this report were commented on by fellow scholars. In particular we would like to thank Mirko Noordegraaf (Utrecht University), Rod Rhodes (Australian National University), Dvora Yanow (Free University of Amsterdam), and Jane Mansbridge (Harvard University) for useful feedback and advice.

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CHAPTER 2
STREET-LEVEL DIPLOMATS AND THE MAKING OF EU POLICY: KNOWNS AND UNKNOWNS

2.1 Street-level diplomats in the European Union

In this study we examine how national civil servants operate in EU policy arenas and how their work is embedded within their home organizations. Perhaps surprisingly, these are quite novel questions in the fields of EU research and international diplomacy. At the same time, these fields do contain useful insights which form a useful starting point for further analysis. Below we review several strands of literature: on diplomacy and diplomatic history, on international ‘government networks’, on policymaking in the EU, and on the impact of the EU on domestic administrations. We focus on insights about what we will call ‘street-level diplomats’: individual civil servants from specialized policy departments who represent their government in international arenas.

The concept ‘street-level diplomat’ borrows from Lipsky’s (1980) famous study of street-level bureaucrats: civil servants who deliver government services in direct contact with clients, such as social workers and policemen. Using the metaphor of ‘street-level diplomats’ for the kind of civil servants we are interested in highlights a number of issues and questions that are important to our study. First, it turns the focus towards the work practices of individual civil servants, and the way these practices are shaped by and embedded in their organizational context. Second, it turns our attention to certain tensions and dilemmas that are inherent in the work of street-level diplomats. These tensions and dilemmas stem from the position of street-level workers in the ‘front line’ of service delivery (in Lipsky’s study) and in direct contact with representatives from other governments (in our study), respectively.

We proceed as follows. The rise of ‘street-level diplomats’ is closely related to changes in countries’ international representation over the years. In section 2, we will outline these changes by presenting two contrasting models of diplomatic representation. Section 3 will take a closer look at the analogy between street-level bureaucrats and street-level diplomats in order to spell out its implications for our thinking on street-level diplomats. Section 4 then looks at the empirical evidence regarding the importance of street-level diplomats and the types of networks within
which they operate. Section 5 discusses the work practices of individual street-level diplomats and the way governments try to co-ordinate their activities. Finally, section 6 draws a number of conclusions and identifies the implications for our study.

2.2 Two models of diplomatic representation

The organization of a government’s international representation arguably oscillates between two extremes or ‘models’ of international representation. The first model, which conforms to the traditional image of ‘foreign policy’, sees international representation as distinct from other areas of government policy. It is conducted by professional diplomats, who claim to have the specific expertise needed to deal with the diplomats of other states. In this model, the external relations of states are dealt with exclusively by civil servants who have specialized in relations with foreign counterparts. Other civil servants only deal with domestic affairs. Insofar as ‘domestic’ policies have an external dimension, this external dimension is the responsibility of diplomats. For example, in this model environmental specialists develop domestic environmental policies, but diplomats carry out negotiations on international environmental agreements. Moreover, the diplomatic service is highly formalized and hierarchical, with clear channels of command and accountability. This allows governments to exert a high degree of control over their external relations and to maintain a ‘single voice’ toward other governments. We will call this model the ‘diplomatic model’ of international representation.

The other model sees international relations as carried out by a multitude of civil servants, each of them dealing with their own area of expertise. Not only do environmental civil servants develop domestic policies but they also conduct international talks and negotiations on these topics. Taken to its extreme, this implies the absence of a single chain of hierarchy in the international field. There may be hierarchical relations within a policy area, but there is not one overarching formal structure of hierarchical accountability and control in international affairs. In this model, therefore, governments ‘dissolve’ in their constituent components and maintain a multitude of (independent) ties with their counterparts in other governments. We will call this the ‘functional model’ of international representation.
The ‘diplomatic model’ of international representation evolved from the 17th century onwards and had three defining characteristics (cf. Coolsaet 1998: 3; see also Melissen, 2006). First, diplomacy was considered to be a specific profession, apart from policy-specific or ‘technical’ expertise. This premise was derived from ‘the notion that all the most important foreign policy decisions were essentially political, and that the skills required to handle them were derived from intuition and experience’ (Hamilton and Langhorne 1995: 218). In terms of organizing a country’s diplomatic service, this implied that diplomacy was meant to be a lifetime career, and that each diplomat had to enter the service at the lowest level (Kennan 1997: 200). Second, diplomats operated within a centralized organization led by a Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This system allowed information from different sources to be processed in one place and to ensure a consistent voice in the state’s external relations. Third, the diplomatic model took bilateral relations between states as its foundation.

The diplomatic model was built on a conception of the state as a single unit. A diplomat was supposed to be ‘speaking for the supreme source of power in his own country’ (Kennan 1997: 204). Moreover, foreign policy and domestic policy were supposed to be completely separate. Foreign policy focused on ‘the double agenda of diplomacy for centuries: commercial issues and security’ (Coolsaet 1998: 4). Insofar as international commitments impinged on domestic policies, it was assumed that ‘some single coherent and responsible center of power [the supreme power in the quote above] (…) was in a position to compel the country’s other authorities to play their part in meeting any commitments made through the diplomatic process’ (Kennan 1997: 204).

The diplomatic model in its pure form has always been subject to challenges (Craig, George and Lauren, 2006). In the literature these challenges have been explained with reference to two developments: the growing scope and complexity of the international policy agenda and the rise of multilateralism. The growing international policy agenda has led to a tension between the conception of diplomacy as a distinct, ‘non-technical’ profession and the need for specialized policy-specific knowledge to deal with issues of a highly technical nature. This tension has run parallel with the blurring between foreign policy and domestic policy. In the years between and directly after the two world wars, the main challenge to traditional diplomacy came from economists, which were placed in embassies to deal with the
growing importance of international economic policy co-ordination (Hamilton and Langhorne 1995: 169-170 and 203-204). Since then, the international agenda has come to encompass a wide range of issues that in earlier times were thought to be domestic in scope, such as environmental policy, social policy, or health. This has undermined one of the basic assumptions underlying the diplomatic model, that is, the separation between foreign and domestic policy. Furthermore, it has led to a proliferation of direct contacts between policy-specific departments in different countries, which Berridge (2002: 15) has described as ‘direct-dial diplomacy’.

Other authors (e.g. Coolsaet 1998) identify the rise of multilateralism as the driving force behind the rise of a new type of diplomat. Since multilateral forums typically deal with specific issues, countries tend to staff them with specialists in those areas who, moreover, often report directly to a policy-specific department rather than the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Kennan 1997: 207). Nowhere is this trend clearer than in the European Union (EU), which has established a plethora of specific forums to deal with almost any conceivable policy area.

This way of organizing a country’s international representation can be seen as a shift toward the ‘functional model’ of international representation. In its purest form, this model has quite a different set of characteristics than the diplomatic model. To begin with, international representation is seen as an integral part of a policy area, and the main claim to professional knowledge is related to substantive technical expertise rather than diplomatic expertise. As a result, a country is represented by environmental civil servants in talks and negotiations on international environmental policies or by criminal justice experts in international crime policies. Second, the government’s external representation is not organized in a single hierarchical system. There is not one ‘foreign office’ that co-ordinates all external relations. Rather, governmental representatives report directly to their ‘own’ department and have little to do with representatives from other departments. Insofar as co-ordination among them is to take place, this can only occur through the mechanisms that are available for domestic policy co-ordination, not through a Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As Coolsaet (1998: 21) notes, this development ‘gives the current diplomatic structure and organization a cobweb-character, without main threads as it seems’. And finally, then, the functional model is not primarily built on bilateral diplomatic relations but on a combination of bilateral and multilateral relations, in which the emphasis often lays with the latter.
In terms of underlying assumptions, the functional model also stands diametrically opposed to the diplomatic model. The state is not seen as a single unit, embodied by a ‘supreme power’ but as a collection of government agencies. In Slaughter’s words, the state has become a ‘disaggregated state’: ‘it is disaggregating into its component institutions’, which maintain a multitude of ties with their counterparts in other countries (Slaughter 2000: 178; 2004: 12-15). As a corollary, as was already explained above, the functional model in its pure form does not assume a distinction between foreign policy and domestic policy, but treats these as two components of a given policy area.

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Table 1. Two models of diplomatic representation

An overview of the characteristics of and assumptions underlying the two models of diplomatic representation is presented in table 1. These two models are extremes, ‘ideal types’, which in their pure form have never existed in reality. Still, in recent decades the ‘functional model’ seems to have gained in importance relative to the ‘diplomatic model’, because of the widening scope of issues that are discussed at the international level, and the increase in the level of specialized knowledge required to deal with these issues in international (often multilateral) forums.
Nevertheless, elements of both models can be identified in the international representation of most states. The functional model presents itself most clearly in terms of the multitude of specialized civil servants participating in working groups, expert groups and other types of committees in the EU and other international organizations. In addition, government agencies have established direct links with their counterparts in other countries, more often than not bypassing their Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The diplomatic model is present in the attempts at co-ordinating the national input in international forums. This is exemplified by the central co-ordinating role that Ministries of Foreign Affairs formally play in their states’ international policies (Hocking and Spence, 2002). At embassies, the officials from specialized departments operate under the aegis of an ambassador who has normally made his or her career in diplomatic service. These elements of formalization and hierarchy based on the ‘diplomatic model’ serve to guarantee at least some unity of voice in international arenas, predicated on the idea that there is an overarching ‘national interest’, which supersedes the specific interests that may exist in the various policy areas.

This duality in international representation creates a tension. Looked at from the ‘diplomatic model’, parallel and non-hierarchical representation may easily lead to lack of accountability, unwanted and unforeseen commitments, and contradictory inputs that may weaken the overall effectiveness of a country in the international arena. Looked at from the ‘functional model’, formalization and hierarchy will lead to inflexibility and a loss of expertise that, in turn, will undermine the effectiveness of the government’s activities in international affairs.

This tension becomes most visible at the level of the individuals representing a government in an international forum or vis-à-vis their counterparts in another country. In the end, it is at the individual level that choices are made and organizational arrangements are put in practice. A central claim of our study is therefore that a focus on individuals will help us to learn more about the way governments’ diplomatic representation operates nowadays. Moreover, we claim that the rise of the ‘functional model’ has given rise to a specific kind of diplomat: the ‘street-level diplomat.’ Before proceeding to analyse the work conditions and work practices of street-level diplomats, we will therefore first show why and how we have borrowed this concept for the purposes of our analysis.
2.3 Street-level bureaucrats and street-level diplomats

Lipsky’s classic study of ‘street-level bureaucrats’ analysed work practices of lower-level workers in service delivery organizations (such as policemen, teachers, and welfare workers). These workers operate in an environment that is characterized by five conditions (Lipsky 1980: 27-28):

- Inadequate resources;
- Increasing demand for services;
- Ambiguous, vague or conflicting agency goals;
- Goal achievements that are difficult to measure;
- Nonvoluntary clients.

As a result, street-level bureaucrats operate under high levels of discretion and autonomy. At the same time they experience strong tensions between ideal and reality in their work. Lipsky analyses the patterns of practice in their dealings with clients that street-level bureaucrats develop in response to these tensions.

At first sight, the analogy between ‘street-level bureaucrats’ and ‘street-level diplomats’ may seem somewhat far-fetched. There are two reasons, however, why the ‘street-level’ concept captures many important aspects of the work of individual diplomats in what we have called the ‘functional model’ of diplomacy. The first reason is that many characteristics of both types of street-level officials stem from the great autonomy they enjoy in their work. The second reason is that the position of the two types of street-level officials (between superiors and clients or between superiors and colleagues, respectively) leads to a number of tensions in their day-to-day work that deserve further analysis. By focusing on street-level workers, Lipsky invites us to look at the beliefs and work practices of individual civil servants. Such a focus also has great relevance for the study of street-level diplomats.

To start with, the work of street-level diplomats is also characterized by a great deal of discretion and autonomy. Street-level diplomats typically operate in the international arena with relatively little direct control from hierarchical superiors (cf. Coolsaet 1998: 20). There are three reasons for this. First, the work of street-level diplomats often requires specific expertise, which makes it difficult for others than the street-level diplomat properly to assess the processes and outcomes that take place in
the international arena. Second, hierarchical superiors often concentrate their scarce time and resources on a limited number of salient issues. Since expertise-driven, international policy issues are normally not high on the domestic administrative and political agenda, hierarchical superiors may take a ‘fire alarm’ approach to the work of street-level diplomats, only interfering when clear problems arise (cf. McCubbins and Schwartz 1984). Third, in their interaction with colleagues from other states, street-level diplomats may form networks that they can use to strengthen their position vis-à-vis their hierarchical superiors. In domestic settings, they may represent an ‘international consensus’ which they can use to reinforce claims ‘at home’ (cf. Haas’ analysis of ‘epistemic communities’; Haas 1989; 1990). Moreover, since decisions are taken in international networks, the work of street-level diplomats suffers from what scholars of public accountability have called ‘the problem of the many hands’: when many people contribute to a single outcome and individual contributions are difficult to distinguish, it is almost impossible to keep a single person responsible for the outcome (cf. Bovens 1998: 45-52).

As to the second point, street-level diplomats are similar to street-level bureaucrats in the sense that both types of officials have to deal with a range of tensions arising from their position as an intermediary – be it between bureaucracy and client or between domestic bureaucracy and international counterparts. This intermediary position tends to expose the street-level official to opposite claims from the ‘two sides’ as well as to tensions between personal autonomy and (attempts at) organizational control. A crucial element of our analysis of street-level diplomats therefore is how they deal with these tensions, given the characteristics of their working environment.

At the same time, we should also note the limits to the comparison between the two types of street-level workers. These limits stem from the fact that many of the characteristics of street-level bureaucrats derive from the fact that they are engaged in service delivery to clients. The five specific characteristics of street-level bureaucrats outlined above reflect this service delivery character. Street-level diplomats, by contrast, don’t act on the ‘streets’ of society but on those of international policy arenas. These have little in common, except one crucial point: both are far removed – physically as well as psychologically – from the world of politics and bureaucracy as usual. Hence in terms of work conditions there is a crucial commonality between the two, which we shall explore further below.
2.4. Managing external relations in the disaggregated state

2.4.1 The shift toward functional diplomacy

The two models of diplomatic representation are ideal-typical in the sense that neither exists in reality in its purest form. In practice, we may observe elements of both in the way governments conduct their policies with other governments. However, these models bring out well the different logics underlying modes of international representation and allow us to analyse the consequences of shifts from one model to the other.

These shifts have been widely documented in the literature on diplomacy and international relations. For instance, Berridge (2002: 14) notes that ‘it is rare for [a Ministry of Foreign Affairs] now to have the same authority in the conduct of foreign relations relative to other ministries that it once had’ and ‘in all states the “line ministries” – trade, finance, defence, transport, environment and so on (…) – now engage in direct communication not only with their foreign counterparts but also with quite different agencies abroad’. On a similar note, Hamilton and Langhorne (1995: 217) claim that ‘diplomatic inflation has tended (…) to modify the role of the professional generalist. The pace of technological change, the speed of modern communications, and a heightened awareness of regional and global interdependence, have meant increased involvement in external affairs by domestic ministries’. For Coolsaet (1998: 18), ‘the declining role of the ministry of Foreign Affairs as the central channel for diplomatic relations with other states’ is ‘a central characteristic’ of the way states have adapted to the rise of multilateral forums.

It is more difficult to pinpoint the shift between the two models in quantitative terms, but some figures exist. In 1997, George Kennan (1997: 206) estimated that around 70 per cent of all personnel in U.S. diplomatic missions came from other departments and agencies than the U.S. Department of State. The relative importance of these departments and agencies also varies over time. For instance, between 1986 and 1996, the number of employees from the U.S. Departments of Health, Justice and Transportation in foreign U.S. missions increased strongly, while the number of employees from the U.S. Agency for International Development, the Department of Agriculture and the U.S. Information Agency declined (Talbott 1997).
The most fertile ground for functional diplomacy is the European Union – both because its remit extends to a wide range of policy issues and because it is the world’s strongest supranational organization. Under the aegis of the EU, thousands of national civil servants meet regularly in a wide range of committees and working groups to discuss and decide on European policies and regulatory standards. The exact number of Commission expert groups, ‘comitology’ committees and Council working parties is difficult to assess, since some groups may be dormant while others do not appear in official overviews. Wessels and Rometsch (1996: 331) estimate that around 25,000 national officials were involved in Council and Commission working groups in 1994. Drawing on a Commission overview from 2004, Brandsma (2006) counts some 1090 expert groups, excluding sub-groups and working groups of these expert groups. In addition, the number of Council working parties is estimated at around 160, while the number of ‘comitology’ committees, in which member state representatives monitor the implementation of EU law by the European Commission, stands at around 320. Most of these groups are typically attended by lower-ranking civil servants who are specialists in their policy field or even on a specific policy issue. In addition to departmental civil servants, these groups may also include representatives from independent agencies in the member states.

The most systematic data on participation in EU policymaking by domestic civil servants can be found in surveys conducted in Nordic countries. In a survey among officials from ministries and directorates in Norway, not even an EU member state, around 45% of respondents (both in ministries and in directorates) indicated that they were affected ‘to some extent or more’ by the EU and/or the EEA Agreement (to which Norway is a party). In the Ministry of Foreign Affairs this was even 61% (Egeberg and Trondal 1999: 135). Although impact does not imply that an official is active within the EU, the figure does attest to the importance of the EU for domestic civil servants.

In a survey among governmental units in Norway, Iceland, Sweden and Finland (two EU members and two non-members), Lægreid et al. (2004) report figures about the perceived impact of the EU, as well as about contacts with the EU institutions and participation in EU committees. The number of respondents who perceive ‘the overall consequences of EU/EEA policies and regulations on their department’ to be ‘fairly large/very large’ ranges between 31% (for Norway) and 64% (for Iceland), with 57% for both Sweden and Finland. In terms of actual contacts,
their results show that most contacts are with the Commission (up to 43% of respondents in Sweden), while participation in EU committees ranges between 7% (for comitology committees among Finnish respondents) and 26% (for Commission expert committees, again among Finnish respondents). These figures are likely to overestimate the level of contacts since the survey was conducted among the ‘EU specialists’ of each governmental unit. Still, they indicate the wide range of officials within those countries’ governments who are active in EU policymaking.

2.4.2 Forms of functional diplomacy

In her study of government networks, Slaughter (2004) identifies several types of government networks. She defines a network as ‘a pattern of regular and purposive relations among like government units working across borders that divide countries from one another and that demarcate the “domestic” from the “international” sphere’ (Slaughter 2004: 14). These networks come into existence because ‘businesses that cross borders must be regulated across borders. The increasing transnational nature of services and the recognition of the extraterritorial dimension of domestic regulation mean that regulators often simply cannot do their job without cooperating with one another’(39). These networks are populated by top officials or career civil servants who possess a specific expertise on a particular subject. Slaughter thinks that the most concentrated site for these kinds of networks is the European Union. She cites Dehousse to describe ‘the basic paradox of EU governance: “increased uniformity is certainly needed: [but] greater centralization is politically inconceivable, and probably undesirable.” The response is regulation by networks – networks of national officials’ (50).

The first distinction Slaughter makes among different types of government networks is between horizontal and vertical networks. In horizontal networks links are made between counterpart national officials across borders. Vertical networks are formed between national government officials and their supranational counterparts. In vertical networks state delegate their sovereignty to an institution above them. Horizontal networks are easy to detect. Vertical government networks are less frequent, but potentially very important, according to Slaughter.

Apart from this distinction between horizontal and vertical networks, Slaughter also identifies types of networks with different tasks. There are information networks, enforcement networks and harmonization networks. These may be
horizontal or vertical. They may have overlapping functions: harmonization and enforcement networks also exchange information and offer assistance (52).

Information networks bring together civil servants to exchange ideas, techniques and experiences and to collect best practices. As a by-product, officials in these networks then also start to exchange ideas and experiences concerning professional competences, quality, and integrity. Influence in these networks is exercised through knowledge and persuasion.

In enforcement networks ‘talks lead to action – direct aid in enforcing specific regulations against specific subjects’ (51). Enforcement networks are mostly found among those government officials whose job is actually law enforcement: police officers, customs officials, drug agents. An example of a criminal enforcement network within the EU was created as far back as 1976: Trevi. An example Slaughter gives of a vertical enforcement network are the relations between national courts and the European Court of Justice, which consist of close ties between supranational officials and their domestic counterparts.

Harmonization networks bring regulators together to ensure that the rules in a particular substantive area conform to a common regulatory standard. Harmonization networks are always authorized by a treaty or executive agreement. They do not arise spontaneously or bottom up. Harmonization is often politically controversial because harmonizing distinctive national regulations may have significant policy implications. The European Union has developed a system of regulation by networks in order to respond to the challenges of trying to harmonize or at least reconcile the regulations of its diverse and growing membership. This is located in the EU Council of Ministers and closely connected to the process of ‘comitology’ that surrounds council decision-making (43).

According to Slaughter civil servants working in these types of networks inside and outside of the EU ‘genuinely are the new diplomats’ (63).

2.5 Work practices in street-level diplomacy

2.5.1 Beliefs and role conceptions of street-level diplomats
Studies on beliefs and role conceptions of what we have called ‘street-level diplomats’ have mainly been conducted in the context of the EU. These studies focus
on the question whether national representatives in European venues adopt an ‘intergovernmental’ or a ‘supranational’ role conception (Beyers 2002; Beyers and Trondal 2004; Egeberg 1999; Trondal 2002; Trondal and Veggeland 2003). An intergovernmental role perception means that officials feel the greatest loyalty toward their national government. During meetings in Brussels, officials then feel that they are primarily there to represent their member state. A supranational role perception means that officials feel the greatest loyalty toward the EU. They then feel that they are there to help move the EU forward and solve EU problems (cf Thedvall, 2006).

These studies are based on surveys among participants from national governments in either Commission expert groups or Council working parties. The N in these studies is typically of an intermediate size: 26, 46 and 95 for Norwegian, Swedish and Belgian officials, respectively, in Beyers and Trondal (2004), 28 and 70 for Norway and Sweden in Trondal and Veggeland (2003), a total of 160 Danish, Norwegian and Swedish officials in Trondal (2002), 95 Belgian and 106 non-Belgian officials in Beyers (2002), and 47 in Egeberg’s (1999) study of five smaller member states.

These studies present two interesting conclusions. First, they point out that besides intergovernmental and supranational role perceptions, officials may also hold ‘functional expert’ role perceptions. In that case, officials feel the greatest loyalty toward their policy area or area of expertise. This role perception is, in principle, neutral as to the level of decision-making. In that sense, it ‘transcends’ the national-supranational divide (Egeberg 1999; see also Thedvall, 2006, who reports an intensive, observation-based case study rather than survey data).

Second, they show that the role perception depends on the context in which an official operates. Thus, an official may adopt an intergovernmental role perception in some situations, and a supranational role perception in another. Officials therefore have ‘ambiguous’ role perceptions that are (at least partly) determined by contextual factors. Most studies look at institutional factors to explain variations in the prevalence of role perceptions.

In his analysis of ‘government representative’ (= ‘intergovernmental’) versus ‘functional expert’ roles, Egeberg (1999) distinguishes between different institutional contexts at both the domestic and the EU level. At the domestic level, he argues, officials from cabinet-level departments are more likely to adopt an intergovernmental role perception than officials from agencies that are separated from the cabinet level.
At the EU-level, officials are more likely to adopt an intergovernmental role perception in Council Working Parties, in which the national backgrounds of officials are emphasized in several ways, than in Commission Expert Committees, in which national backgrounds are de-emphasized. ‘Comitology’ committees are in between these two.

Empirically, Egeberg only analyses differences between Council Working Parties and Commission Expert Committees, and finds that officials indeed show greater allegiance to their own government in Council Working Parties than in Commission Expert Committees. In another study, Trondal and Veggeland (2003) find strong evidence for differences in role perceptions between officials from cabinet-level departments and officials from independent agencies in Sweden. At the same time, all studies show that the member state remains the main point of reference for all national officials, and supranational loyalties are only secondary (Beyers and Trondal 2004; Egeberg 1999; Trondal and Veggeland 2003).

In addition to this broad difference among institutional context, several studies have also looked at more specific variables that may affect officials’ role perceptions. According to Egeberg (1999), greater participation on an EU-level committee leads to greater loyalty towards that committee (but not to the EU as such) (see also Trondal 2002). Beyers (2002), by contrast, finds no such relationship between prolonged participation and role perception among Belgian officials. His analysis points to the greater importance of domestic characteristics and domestic socialization in explaining role conceptions.

In a comparison of Swedish and Belgian officials, Beyers and Trondal (2004) review eight hypotheses on the impact of domestic institutional contingencies. They argue, for instance, that specialized officials and officials from sectoral departments are more likely to adopt supranational roles than non-specialized officials and officials from the Foreign Office. Also, officials are more likely to adopt supranational roles if the number of veto players among principals at the domestic level is greater and the relations between these veto players is more competitive. Their empirical results suggest support for these hypotheses, but their analysis is weakened by the fact that they only look at institutional differences at the aggregate country-level and not at the individual level. Interestingly, Trondal (2002) finds little support for the effect of national co-ordination mechanisms on the role perceptions of national officials. In the (Scandinavian) countries he has studied, stronger co-ordination
mechanisms do not lead (automatically) to stronger identification with national interests. Again, Beyers’ (2002) study of Belgian officials shows a different outcome: his results indicate a correlation between ‘low organizational self-esteem’ (including weak national co-ordination) and supranational role conceptions.

2.5.2 Co-ordinating and organizing street-level diplomacy

Even though street-level diplomats enjoy considerable autonomy in their work, they are embedded within an organizational framework that affects what they do and how they do it. Within the literature, this has mainly been dealt with in the context of the co-ordination of a state’s diplomatic representation. With the erosion of their dominant role in international representation, this type of co-ordination has become the main activity for many Ministries of Foreign Affairs (Coolsaet 1998: 19).

Berridge (2002: 15-16) identifies seven strategies by which Ministries of Foreign Affairs have aspired to exercise a co-ordinating role in the state’s international representation:

- By channelling reports from officials from other departments through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
- By placing officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in special committees that deal with foreign affairs;
- By retaining the authority to check and, possibly, veto any international agreement concluded by another department;
- By requiring officials from other departments to give notice of trips abroad;
- By creating and chairing interdepartmental committees to deal with certain foreign policy issues;
- By stimulating exchange of personnel with other departments;
- By merging the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with other departments that have important foreign policy functions.

Not all of these strategies are used in any single country, but each has been used at least in some countries. The co-ordination of international policies has been studied most extensively in the EU. This literature builds mainly on comparisons of single studies of national co-ordination systems (see Kassim et al. 2000, a key text in the field, for a good example of this approach). Studies that systematically compare co-ordination systems of several member states, using the same methods and approaches,
are rare (for a comparative case study of France and the Netherlands, see Harmsen 1999).

This literature has highlighted a number of differences between co-ordination structures. The main difference lies in the degree of centralization of co-ordination, whereby the UK and France are presented as examples of relatively centralized systems while, for instance, the Netherlands is presented as a system that relies more on horizontal co-ordination between departments. A recent comparative study of delegation practices between Swedish and French central administrations and their Permanent Representations documents in great detail that the French system operates in a more centralized and more formalized fashion than the Swedish one – and that it is far more efficient for that reason (Larue, 2006). It argues that although the French system is generally more efficient, it too cannot escape the problems that beset principals in delegation relations vis à vis their agents: not knowing in detail what agents do, and not being able to control their behaviour. These findings highlight our assertion that national Eurocrats – in this case those who operate the permanent representations to the EU - are, indeed comparable to street-level bureaucrats in their elusiveness to hierarchical control and accountability mechanisms.

One should not overstate the differences between centralized and fragmented national coordination structures. As Peters and Wright (2000: 165) note, these differences may be more real on paper than in practice: co-ordination may be more fragmented in the UK and France than their formal structures suggest, while the relatively fragmented Dutch system in practice shows a significant degree of informal co-ordination. In both systems, centralized co-ordination is complemented by direct links between departments and EU institutions (mainly the Commission). The extent of these direct links is arguably determined by the nature of the issue: politically salient issues will be dealt with at higher levels in the domestic administration, while more technical issues are usually left to specialized departments (cf. Peters and Wright 2000: 166). This conforms to differences in decision-making processes at the EU-level, in which politically salient issues are dealt with in the higher-level institutions (European Council and Council of Ministers), while the less salient issues are dealt with in the multitude of working groups and expert groups that are attached to the Commission and the Council. According to this argument, then, the role of street-level diplomats and their room for manoeuvre will be greatest in issues that are technical and politically not so salient.
Of course, this argument begs the question why certain issues are more ‘political’ than others. For some issues this is quite obvious: treaty negotiations will normally involve higher political levels than talks on technical standards for machinery. Still, in between these extremes, member states may attach different political priorities to different issues. The room that organizations allow to street-level diplomats is therefore also the result of political and organizational choices within domestic departments: a weak interest from higher echelons will increase this role, while a greater interest will weaken it.

In terms of effectiveness, greater co-ordination is often assumed to be more effective (Larue, 2006). This may not be the case, however, since centralized co-ordination may reduce the flexibility of representatives in Brussels, which may impede their effectiveness. In addition, the effectiveness of co-ordination is also affected by the resources and expertise of the co-ordinators (Peters and Wright 2000: 170).

A weakness of the existing literature is that it focuses on comparisons of national systems as a whole. As a result, it tends to look exclusively at co-ordination mechanisms at the national level and it tends to juxtapose two models: co-ordination that is centralized at one point nationally and co-ordination that is dispersed among many horizontal units. This focus obscures the fact that co-ordination can take place at several levels within government and that, in principle, the same types of issues and tensions arise at each of these levels.

The analysis can be extended by looking both at the degree of centralization and the organizational level at which centralization takes place, as is done in Table 2 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of government</th>
<th>Degree of co-ordination</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>National centralization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unit</td>
<td>Individual autonomy</td>
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Table 2. Levels and degrees of co-ordination
The rows indicate the organizational level at which co-ordination takes place. This can be at the level of the government as a whole, at the level of departments or at the level of individual units. The columns indicate whether the degree of co-ordination is strong or weak. The two extremes are formed by the left upper-hand cell, which signifies strong co-ordination at the level of the government as a whole, and the right lower-hand cell, which signifies weak co-ordination at unit level (and thus, by implication, a high degree of autonomy for individuals in that unit).

At each of these levels, there is tension between the benefits of centralization/co-ordination versus decentralization/autonomy. An interesting question is why some organizations choose for a more centralized approach to conducting their international business – and to examine what consequences this has for their effectiveness in the EU arena and for other values such as accountability and organizational continuity.

2.5.3 The impact of the EU on domestic administrations

The co-ordination of street-level diplomats within national administrations is only one of the ways in which the EU may have affected domestic administrations. Another, potentially more far-reaching question concerns the extent to which the EU has affected the overall organization of national executive systems. Have there been changes to internal structures and functioning of ministerial departments? Or have the co-ordination structures that have been set up created parallel structures while leaving the existing national administrative structures intact? These questions have been studied as part of a broader research agenda on ‘Europeanization’: the impact of the EU on domestic policies, politics, and institutions. A lot of work has been done under this rubric in and beyond the Netherlands (cf. Van Keulen, 2006), targeting different levels and objects of analysis.

At a macro-level of analysis, one group of scholars has examined the extent to which Europeanization has caused a convergence of national administrative systems. Despite decades of EC/EU evolution and despite the pouring out of European legislative output after the Single European Act and Treaties of Amsterdam and Maastricht, divergence, not convergence of the different member states’ national administrations turned out to be the dominant pattern. Organizational adaptation to the EU has been incremental at best, and changes that have occurred all fitted well within
the cores of the national administrative styles and practices (Harmsen 1999; Rometsch and Wessel 1996; Hanf and Soetendorp 1998; Bulmer and Burch 1998; Olsen 2003). On top of this, empirical studies old and new show that national administrations treat European policies as ‘national business as usual’ (Yesilkagit and Blom-Hansen forthcoming), making no distinction between domestic and European policies (Siedentopf and Ziller 1988; Metcalfe 1994; cf. Van Keulen, 2006). This has led Harmsen to posit that the diverse trajectories of national administrative adaptation to the process of European integration must ‘be understood in terms of national political-administrative models. States will both seek to export aspects of those models to the European level and be faced with more or less severe problems of institutional adaptation when the choices made at the European level depart from those models’ (Harmsen 2000: 71).

At a meso-level of analysis, where the configuration of the executive and the organization of ministerial departments are examined, scholars have found that the EU has had effects on the national administrations (Kassim et al. 2000; Hanf and Soetendorp 1998). All studies found some variations in terms of the extent of change, and reflect the observations on the co-ordination of EU-related work made above. The most important findings are that (1) heads of government have gained prominent co-ordinating capacities in EU affairs; (2) foreign affairs ministries have undergone an erosion of their positions as they were overshadowed by their prime ministers; and (3) interministerial structures have been set up to co-ordinate and manage European policies.

An important finding concerning ministerial departments is that they have adapted themselves through the establishment of EU units, personnel policies to prepare their civil servants for ‘Brussels’ and other quite functional adaptations. More than adaptation, however, ‘ministerial administrations … are directly involved in the preparation, the making and the implementation of EC decisions … The national administration, together with the administration on the European level, with the help of its expertise and qualified staff, has become one of the key actors in the European integration process’ (Rometsch and Wessels 1996: 360). But changes have not been spectacular. Hanf and Soetendorp (1998) concluded that no radical shift or change has taken place in the way that things were done in national administration after as compared to before EU membership. Adjustments were generally made in an
incremental way, administrative traditions and arrangements that were already in place were used as the foundations for the new structures.

An important contribution to the study of the effect of Europeanization on national ministries is produced by a number of Scandinavian surveys and case studies. By using surveys, these studies attempt to estimate the degree in which specific parts of the central governments were touched by European policies. Egeberg (2005: 10), for example, found that ‘parts of the national administrations on certain occasions function as part of a Community administration, while on other occasions fulfill their traditional obligations as servants of national political authorities’. Larsson and Trondal (2005) show that the EU institutions have a differentiated impact on national administrative systems. Whereas the Commission’s procedures weaken domestic politico-administrative leadership, i.e., prime minister and foreign offices, the Council procedures work to strengthen these. Laegreid et al (2004) and Jacobsson et al (2001), finally, find that the number of EU co-ordinators has overall increased within individual ministries and the set-up of collegial interdepartmental bodies has risen at different levels for the co-ordination of EU policies. They conclude that Europeanization has led both member and non-member Scandinavian national administrations to adapt in a significant but non-radical way to the requirements of the EU policy making system. More pervasive and centralized, but still quite ‘improvised’ coordination does take place in the run-up to special events, for example prior and during a term as EU President (Elgström, 2003; Ekengren, 2004; Van Keulen, 2004) – but it tends not too last: with the pressure of the Presidency project behind them, national systems tend to veer back to more decentralized arrangements.

Finally, at a micro-level of analysis, Smith’s (2001) case study of the Europeanization of the Scottish Office confirms the findings above, observing that: ‘“Europeanization” did not involve a homogenizing journey towards a common “European” administrative style and infrastructure. Instead, accretive and incremental modifications took place within the context of national and departmental conventions.’ These conclusions were echoed in Sundelius and Ekengren’s (2004) survey of trends in the Europeanization of national foreign policies (and departments). A few scholars have focused on the impact of Europeanization on the culture of ministerial departments. Moreover, it is interesting to see that the cultural impact of Europeanization has allegedly been much deeper. As Jordan (2003) concludes: ‘[T]he EU has helped to make the DoE [‘Department of the Environment’] a more
environmental department than it would otherwise have been. In a sense, the EU helped the DoE to find a culture.’ (Jordan 2003: 280). This was effected in particular by the recurring ‘misfits’ between European environmental policies and the British practice: ‘as the number of “errors” began to stack up, the DoE found itself in the awkward (and eventually untenable) position of having to implement selectively or very slowly directives it had sanctioned’ (Jordan 2003: 280).

All in all, then, the literature on Europeanization confirms that domestic civil servants have become linked to European networks. At the same time, these developments have generally not affected the ‘core’ of administrative organization in the member states. Rather, insofar as changes to the organization have been made, they have been largely functional and non-radical, adapting specific parts of the organization to the new requirements posed by EU-related activities. However, as Jordan’s study of the DoE shows, the EU may have had a more profound impact within specific pockets of national administrations, in particular where it has affected elements of the organization’s understanding of its own role within the overall administration.

2.6 Conclusions: dilemmas and tensions in street-level diplomacy

This chapter has made a number of related claims. First, building on long standing observations in the literature on diplomacy, we have argued that the international representation of states oscillates between two models of diplomatic representation: a ‘diplomatic model’, in which diplomatic representation is the province of a specialized, hierarchically organized diplomatic service, and a ‘functional model’, in which the state is represented by a variety of (technical) experts who deal with specific international policy issues and who operate with great autonomy and report directly to their (policy) department or agency. This functional model has led to the rise of what we have called ‘street-level diplomats’, policy specialists who deal directly with their counterparts in other countries, often working with great autonomy.

These two models are ideal-types and the organization of governments’ international representation shows characteristics of both. On the one hand, the number and autonomy of policy experts in diplomatic representation is undeniable. On the other hand, however, governments (and more in particular Ministries of
Foreign Affairs) still strive to co-ordinate their international presence. There are good reasons for this duality in the diplomatic representation of states. The rise of new issues that require greater technical expertise has undermined the traditional claim to distinctive skills and knowledge on the part of professional diplomats. At the same time, the various issues that are dealt with by technical experts are related and overlap in a number of ways. At the higher, ‘political’ levels of diplomacy, in particular, governments still trade off one issue for another and have to ensure a degree of consistency in the claims they make in various international forums.

The current literature shows two main gaps or weaknesses that we will address in our empirical study. First, there is little systematic knowledge of the (quantitative) scale of street-level diplomacy. How many civil servants are involved in these kinds of activities and how important are these activities relative to ‘traditional’ diplomacy? What we know either rests on educated guesses based on numbers of forums or on the presence on foreign missions of officials from departments other than the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. We will seek to fill this gap through the survey that is reported on in chapter 3.

Second, we have little insight into daily work practices of street-level diplomats. What do these officials do when they interact with colleagues from other countries? How do they deal with the tensions inherent in their position as interlocutors between their own department and their foreign peers? Some of the answers to these questions can be derived from the valuable survey work that has been done by a small group of scholars in the EU. In addition, however, we need to study more closely the work of street-level diplomats in their ‘natural habitats’, for instance by engaging in observation. This may also yield more insight into the way these officials are embedded in their organizations. Most studies of the co-ordination of international policies tend to analyse systems of co-ordination from a top-down perspective, focusing on organizational structures and channels of control. The effect that these structures have on the ‘street-level’ of diplomacy is much less understood, however, while there are ample indications that co-ordination practices may diverge substantially from co-ordination structures. In our study, we will address these issues in the interviews and by observing civil servants ‘at work’ when in Brussels. The results from these research activities are reported in chapters 4 and 5 of this report.
CHAPTER 3
TOWARD A EUROPEANIZED CIVIL SERVICE?
A SURVEY STUDY

3.1 Introduction

Who are the Dutch civil servants involved in EU-related work? How many of them are there? Do they differ from the ‘average’ civil servants and, if so, how? And how is their work embedded in and facilitated by their organizations? These are the questions that we addressed in a large-scale survey held among Dutch civil servants in 2006. This survey offers a unique opportunity to obtain an insight into the quantitative dimensions of a ‘Europeanized civil service craft’.

In this chapter, we will report on the results of this survey. In doing so, we will follow the distinction among two main questions that was made in chapter 1. We will first discuss the activities and characteristics of individual civil servants. Based on the survey data, we will show how many civil servants are involved in EU-related activities and how much time they spend on these activities. Furthermore, using various background characteristics, we will develop a profile of Europeanized civil servants and try to assess whether this profile differs from that of civil servants who are not involved in EU-related activities. Finally, we will analyse whether different types of EU-related activities tend to be carried out by different civil servants or whether they tend to be combined within one job.

After discussing individual civil servants, we will turn to the way in which individual activities are organizationally embedded and facilitated. We will assess the organizational embeddedness by looking at the degree of isolation of EU-related work. Is EU-related work embedded broadly within government departments or is it carried out by pockets of EU specialists? Subsequently, we will analyse the degree of organizational support for EU-related work that is offered by governmental organizations, and the differences in organizational support among different (types of) organizations.
The questions that will be answered in this chapter are summed up in the text box below. Before presenting the empirical findings, however, we discuss how the survey was designed and carried out.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overview of research questions in this chapter</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Individual EU-related activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- What percentage of Dutch civil servants carry out EU-related activities?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- How much time do Dutch civil servants spend on EU-related activities?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- What is the relative importance of different types of EU-related activities?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Do civil servants involved in EU-related work differ from the ‘average’ civil servant?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- To what extent do individual civil servants engage in different (types of) EU-related activities?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Organizational embeddedness and support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. To what degree are EU-related activities broadly embedded or, rather, isolated within the organisation?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. How well are EU-related activities supported organizationally?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. To what extent does organizational support differ between different types of organizations?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.2 Survey design

3.2.1 Survey design
For our study, we had the opportunity to connect to the Personnel Survey (‘POMO Survey’) carried out by the Dutch Ministry of the Interior (‘BZK’). This is a large-scale survey that aims at investigating the satisfaction, motivation, and mobility of civil servants, so as to assess and improve the attractiveness of the civil service as an employer. The survey is held biannually; for the present research we have used the 2006 edition.

In the 2006 edition, we included a number of questions pertaining to the EU’s impact on civil servants’ work. These questions have not been asked to the entire sample. The Dutch civil service is a very heterogeneous group, which does not only comprise national, regional, and local levels of government, but also various public sectors like academic hospitals, universities, and the police. As we are primarily interested in Europeanization of central government, we have targeted our questions at this subset of the population.

The sample of respondents working in central government consisted of 10,000 civil servants working within central government for at least a year. Each of these
respondents received the same questionnaire including the EU-related questions. They could fill out the questionnaire on paper or on the Internet. In the end, 4502 respondents completed the questionnaire, a response rate of 45%.

3.2.2 Measuring EU-related activities by individual civil servants

In order to assess the extent to which individual civil servants deal with the EU in their work, we included three questions into the survey. The precise wording of each question can be found in Appendix I. Starting with *EU-related activities by individual civil servants*, we included the question whether or not a respondent deals with the EU in his or her work, so as to assess civil servants’ *EU involvement* (question 1 in Appendix I). Moreover, we asked respondents to provide an estimate of the time spent per week on EU-related affairs (question 3). As to the *types of EU-related activities* carried out, we distinguished between several activities in the stages of EU policy-making and consecutive policy implementation. Concerning policy-making we distinguished between preparation of the Dutch input into EU-level meetings, participation in Council working groups, participation in European Commission meetings, bilateral consultations, and involving local government in EU-level policy-making. Related to the policy-implementation stage, we discerned three items: transposition, practical application/enforcement of EU policies, and taking into account EU policies during national policy-making. These activities are reflected by the eight items under question 2. We asked the respondents to indicate the importance of these activities in their work, on a 5-point Likert scale.

3.2.3 Measuring organizational embeddedness and support

Concerning the organizational dimension of EU-related work, we were interested in two variables: organizational embeddedness and organizational support. In order to assess *organizational embeddedness*, we have constructed a ‘dispersion index’ on the basis of the questions on EU-involvement and time spent. The dispersion index shows the extent to which EU-related activities are spread among civil servants within an organization. The construction of this index will be explained as part of the empirical analysis. As to the *organizational support* for EU-related activities, we incorporated six statements into the questionnaire relating to the way in which employers facilitate EU-related activities. For each statement, respondents could indicate whether they agreed/did not agree on a five-point scale (question 4 in Appendix I). The assumption
is that the more important employers deem the EU, the better they will facilitate EU-related activities.

We distinguish between two types of organizational support, relating to personnel management and policy management. To begin with, personnel management is an important aspect of organizational support because for a long time most Dutch departments had a somewhat dual career system for Europeanized and ‘national’ civil servants. We assume that, when the EU has indeed become more important for the Dutch civil service, these paths will become mixed, and EU experience will become a general asset for career development. To gauge the importance of the EU in personnel management, we asked to what extent a respondent’s employer offers sufficient EU-related training opportunities, uses EU experience as a personnel selection criterion, and treats EU experience positively with an eye on career development.

In addition, we conceptualized organizational support in terms of policy management, i.e. the way the policy process is designed and controlled. When top bureaucrats and politicians deem EU affairs unimportant or even peripheral to their policy field, it can be expected that there is no systematic attention for EU-related activities. In this respect, there has been much discussion in the Netherlands about the failure of the coordination system for EU negotiations. It is often said that the mandates given for negotiations are unclear, due to a low political priority. The same is said about EU-related activities more generally; these are thought to receive less political support than ‘national’ activities. A final alleged problem pertains to the existence of ‘Chinese walls’, or limited coordination between those civil servants who negotiate about EU policies, and those who carry them out subsequently. Statements relating to each of these issues were included in the questionnaire.

3.2.4 Explaining activity patterns: Background variables
The questions on EU-related work were part of a larger questionnaire that included a range of background variables on each respondent. This allows us to analyse the way in which these background variables affect EU-related activities. The choice of these variables to be included in the analysis was somewhat arbitrary insofar as little systematic research has so far been done on the characteristics of individual civil servants. As a result, we could not rely on an existing body of tested hypotheses. In order to avoid simply lumping a whole range of ‘usual suspects’ into the analysis, we
therefore relied on a combination of (informed) common sense and the preliminary findings from the qualitative study reported in chapters 4 and 5.

In constructing a profile of Europeanized civil servants, we believe that three categories of variables are potentially important. First, we expect *individual characteristics* of civil servants to play a role. The types of activities that civil servants undertake are shaped by their past experiences and the position they occupy within an organization. Hence, we included four variables in our analysis that capture most of this individual background: age, seniority, education and rank. *Age* may play a role in EU-related activities insofar as younger civil servants may have grown up in a more self-evidently international or Europeanized environment than older civil servants. If this is true, we would expect younger civil servants to be involved relatively more often in EU-related activities than older civil servants. The respondent’s age was calculated on the basis of the survey question on the year in which the respondent was born.

Second, *seniority* may have an impact in the sense that EU-related activities may be entrusted to more or, by contrast, less experienced civil servants. We did not expect any specific direction beforehand. Seniority was calculated on the basis of a survey question that asked since when the respondent has held his or her current job.

Furthermore, we expect EU-involvement to increase with higher *levels of education* since EU-related work involves skills, such as a command of foreign languages and an understanding of the legal and institutional build-up of the EU, that require a high-level training. In the questionnaire, the level of education was measured by a question that asks respondents to indicate the highest level of completed education from among nine levels, ranging from low (primary education) to high (PhD).

Finally, we include *rank*. It had been pointed out to us in interviews that the upper echelons in the Dutch civil service tend to be less involved in EU-related work than the levels lower down. Prior studies (Noordegraaf, 2000; ‘t Hart et al, 2002) suggest that top-ranking civil servants operate very closely to the Dutch political arena and are therefore allocate more attention to national than to European issues (which have long tended to be relatively unimportant in Dutch politics). In order to explore this contention, we include a measure of rank in our analysis. Since rank cannot be derived directly from the questionnaire (and is difficult to compare across different organizations within central government), we included gross monthly
income as a proxy. This variable was divided into nine categories from less than € 1500 to more than € 5000.

The second category of background variables that we included pertains to a respondent’s job type. The group of civil servants working in central government is highly heterogeneous, ranging from managers via policy officials to those working in support functions, such as secretaries. The questionnaire included a question in which respondents were asked to characterize their job in one of eight categories: policy preparation, oversight, management, research, policy implementation, secretariat, support, and other. This question is used to assess the variation in EU-related work across job types. In doing so, we expect secretarial and support staff to be least involved since most EU-related activities by member state civil servants relate to substantive policy-making and implementation.

As a third category, we expect differences in EU-involvement between the several organizations within central government. After all, some policy areas are more heavily Europeanized than others and it may therefore be expected that civil servants working in those fields are involved in EU-related work more often. In addition, we may expect there to be a difference between policy departments, which formulate policies, and executive agencies, which carry them out. Since the EU is primarily a policy-making institution, we could expect civil servants in policy departments to be involved in EU-related work more often than civil servants in executive agencies. On the other hand, in a survey among Norwegian civil servants, Egeberg and Trondal (1999) did not find any significant difference between Norwegian ministries and agencies. For analysing differences between organizations, we used a survey question that required respondents to indicate for which organization within Dutch central government they worked. Respondents had a choice among eighteen organizations, including all ministries (with the exception of the Ministry of Defense). This variable was later used to construct a dichotomous variable that distinguished between policy departments and executive agencies.

In analysing the organizational dimension of EU-related work, we also seek to explain differences in organizational support for this type of work in the various organizations involved. In doing so, we rely on three background variables that were also used for analysing individual involvement. First, we look at the respondent’s job type, using the same categories that were outlined above. This allows us to see if civil servants in different types of jobs experience different levels of organizational
support. Second, we look at the difference between policy departments and executive agencies. Third and finally, we analyse organizational support as a function of the overall degree of Europeanization of the organization a respondent works for.

3.3 Finding ‘Eurocrats’ in the Dutch civil service

Let us now present the findings of the survey. We start with the first main issue: how big does EU-related work loom in the daily existence of Dutch central government bureaucrats. How many of them can be called national ‘Eurocrats’ – people for whom dealing with EU matters is part of their professional core business – and for how many is the EU merely something they hear about as citizens?

3.3.1 EU involvement and time spent on the EU

In the survey, we first asked respondents whether they dealt with the EU in their work. As is shown in table 1, around 30% of respondents answered ‘yes’ to this question. To distinguish these respondents from those who reported no involvement with the EU, we will refer to them as ‘Europeanized civil servants’.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU involvement</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>3066</td>
<td>68,1</td>
<td>69,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1329</td>
<td>29,5</td>
<td>30,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valid total</td>
<td>4395</td>
<td>97,6</td>
<td>100,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>2,4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4502</td>
<td>100,0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. EU involvement among civil servants (N=4502)

Within the group of Europeanized civil servants, the vast majority spends relatively little time on EU-related activities. This is indicated in figure 1, which shows the average number of hours a week spent on EU-related activities by Europeanized civil servants. As Figure 1 shows, a bit more than half of all Europeanized civil servants
spend 2 hours or less a week on EU-related activities, and almost 75% spend less than 10 hours. On the other side of the spectrum, there are peaks at 30 hours, 36 hours and 40 hours. The latter two answers presumably reflect a full working week for those respondents, making them the real ‘Eurocrats.’.

Figure 1: Time spent per week on EU-related activities among Europeanized civil servants (N=1244)

A note on means and medians
The mean (average) time spent on EU-related activities among Europeanized civil servants is 7.81 hours a week. This number is biased, however, by the relatively small group of respondents who report a high number of hours. As a result, some 69% of all respondents spend less than the mean 7.81 hours a week on EU-related activities. An alternative way of summarizing the data is therefore to look at the median time spent. The median is obtained by ordering all respondents starting with the ones who reported 0 hours and ending with those who reported the highest number of hours, and then taking the respondent who lies precisely in the middle. For the group of Europeanized civil servants (the 30% of respondents who indicated they dealt with the EU), the median number of hours spent on the EU is 2, which reflects the fact that an overwhelming number of these respondents spend relatively few hours on EU-related activities.

We can also look at the time spent on EU-related work by dividing the reported number of hours by the contractual working week of each respondent. We then obtain
the time spent on EU-related activities relative to the total working week. Table 2 shows the time shares of EU-related activities divided among four classes, ranging from less than 25% to more than 75%.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Share of contract time spent on EU</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage of all respondents</th>
<th>Percentage of Europeanized civil servants</th>
<th>Cumulative Percentage of Europeanized civil servants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than 25%</td>
<td>918</td>
<td>20,4</td>
<td>73,9</td>
<td>73,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-50%</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>2,5</td>
<td>9,1</td>
<td>83,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-75%</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>1,7</td>
<td>6,1</td>
<td>89,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 75% ^1</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>3,0</td>
<td>10,9</td>
<td>100,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1242</td>
<td>27,6^2</td>
<td>100,0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Time share of EU-related work among all respondents and Europeanized civil servants (N=4502)

The majority of Europeanized civil servants (73.9%) spend less than 25% of their contract time on the EU, while 10.9% spend more than 75% of their working week on EU-related activities. The categories between 25% and 75% combined account for the remaining 15.2%. These findings indicate that EU-related activities are dispersed among a wide range of Europeanized civil servants, but that a small group spends relatively much time on the EU.

3.3.2 Understanding patterns of EU involvement

What determines whether a civil servant will be involved in EU-related activities? And do the characteristics of Europeanized civil servants differ from those of non-Europeanized civil servant? Above, we outlined three sets of variables on which Europeanized and non-Europeanized civil servants may differ: individual

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^1 For a small number of respondents, the EU-related time share exceeds 100%. This may be due to the fact that they regularly make overtime, or that they hold more than one job (since the contractual working time is calculated on the basis of the respondent’s main job).

^2 The total percentage is less than the 30% of respondents who reported that they were involved in EU-related work (see table 1). The reason for this is that some of those respondents failed to answer either the question on the number of hours spent on the EU or the question on the number of contract hours, leading to missing values for the time share of EU-related activities.
characteristics of civil servants, job type, and the type of organization in which civil servants work. We will first explore the relationship between these sets of variables and EU involvement by looking at the relevant cross tables. These cross tables will give an indication of how EU-related work is distributed among different types of civil servants. Subsequently, we will look at all potential explanatory variables together in a logistic regression analysis.

To explore the relationship between age and EU involvement, Table 3 shows the numbers of Europeanized respondents in eight age classes. The table shows both the percentage of respondents in each category that indicated they were involved in EU-related activities and the median time spent on those activities among Europeanized civil servants. Respondents between the ages of 35 and 45 report most often that they are involved in EU-related work, but the differences between the age classes are fairly small and not significant.\(^3\) The median number of hours spent on EU-related activities by Europeanized civil servants is also fairly similar, with higher age categories reporting slightly higher numbers of hours (3 versus 2 hours). The youngest age category reports a much higher median time spent. This outcome should be treated with caution, however, because the number of respondents in this category who report being involved in EU-related activities is rather small (only 12).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total number of respondents</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Hours</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25 years and younger</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 – 30 years</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 – 35 years</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36 – 40 years</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>602</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41 – 45 years</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>763</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46 – 50 years</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>829</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51 – 55 years</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56 years and older</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>586</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>1327</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>4381</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. EU involvement by age class (N=4381)

The pattern for seniority also shows little systematic variation, as is shown in Table 4. Seniority is measured in terms of the number of years a respondent has worked in his

\(^3\) Cramer’s V=.054 (not significant).
or her current job. We have grouped the responses together in eight classes. There seems to be a slight decrease in EU-involvement as people occupy a position for more than 20 years, but differences are small. Moreover, people who have been in their current job for more than 30 years report a higher median time spent (although, again, this outcome may be biased by the relatively small number of respondents in those categories).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Seniority (years)</th>
<th>Involved in EU-related work</th>
<th>Median time spent (among Europeanized civil servants only)</th>
<th>Total number of respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Hours</td>
<td>Hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 5 years</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>614</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 – 9 years</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>368</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 – 14 years</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 – 19 years</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 – 24 years</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 – 29 years</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 – 34 years</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 years and more</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>1319</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4. EU involvement by seniority (number of years in current job) (N=4359)

Clearer differences are found when we look at the level of education enjoyed by respondents. Table 5 shows EU involvement across nine levels of education (plus a category ‘other’). The levels are indicated with their Dutch abbreviations and roughly ordered from lower to higher levels of education. The table shows clear increases in EU involvement as respondents have completed higher levels of education. The only exception is the ‘Havo/VWO’ category, which scores higher than ‘MBO’ and ‘HBO’. It is questionable, however, whether ‘MBO’ should be regarded as a ‘higher’ level of education than ‘Havo/VWO’. In addition to the numbers of civil servants involved in EU-related work, the median time spent also shows a gradual rise as the level of education increases. Hence, the two measures of EU-involvement reinforce each other.

4 As is also borne out by the (statistically not significant) Cramer’s V of .050.
5 Cramer’s V for this table is .219 and highly significant at p<.001.
6 The median time spent shows a peak at ‘WO Bachelor’. As in the tables above, this peak may be a result of the relatively small number of respondents in that category, so one should not impute too much substantive meaning to this outcome.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education Level</th>
<th>Involved in EU-related work</th>
<th>Median time spent (among Europeanized civil servants only)</th>
<th>Total number of respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>Hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary education</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LBO</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mavo</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Havo, VWO</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MBO</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HBO</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WO Bachelor/Kandidaats</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University (Doctoraal)</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PhD (gepromoveerd)</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>1329</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5. EU involvement by educational level (N=4388)

An association with EU involvement can also be seen for income, which can be treated as a proxy for the rank a respondent occupies within the civil service. Table 6 shows the levels of EU involvement across nine categories of gross monthly income. An association with EU involvement can also be seen for income, which can be treated as a proxy for the rank a respondent occupies within the civil service. Table 6 shows the levels of EU involvement across nine categories of gross monthly income. The level of EU-involvement consistently increases as income rises, from less than 20% for incomes below € 2000 to a bit more than 50% for incomes of more than € 5000. Contrary to expectations, higher ranks therefore seem to be associated with higher levels of EU-involvement. The median number of hours reported by Europeanized civil servants shows a somewhat erratic picture, although generally respondents in higher income classes tend also to report somewhat higher numbers of hours spent on EU-related activities.

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7 In the survey, there were separate classes for less than € 1250, € 1251-1500, € 1501-1750 and € 1751-2000. In order to obtain fixed intervals, these four classes were combined into two classes of less than € 1500 and € 1501-2000, respectively.
8 As a result, Cramer’s V is .230 and significant at p<.001.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Monthly Income</th>
<th>Involved in EU-related work</th>
<th>Median time spent (among Europeanized civil servants only)</th>
<th>Total number of respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than € 1500</td>
<td>15% 42</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>€ 1501 – 2000</td>
<td>20% 99</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>505</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>€ 2001 – 2500</td>
<td>22% 190</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>883</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>€ 2501 – 3000</td>
<td>29% 161</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>552</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>€ 3001 – 3500</td>
<td>33% 194</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>588</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>€ 3501 – 4000</td>
<td>35% 129</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>€ 4001 – 4500</td>
<td>38% 143</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>€ 4501 – 5000</td>
<td>49% 94</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than € 5000</td>
<td>51% 195</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>30% 1247</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>4143</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6. EU involvement by gross monthly income (N=4143)

In addition to these individual characteristics, we can also look at the type of work a civil servant does, as we may expect different types of civil servants to be differentially involved in EU-related activities. As is shown in table 7, this is indeed the case. Almost half of the officials working on policy preparation deal with the EU in one way or another. Interestingly, this is less so the case for officials working on policy implementation; in this group, only one third indicates his or her work has a European dimension to it. A large percentage of managers also indicate their work has been Europeanized. Not surprisingly, those holding support and secretarial functions deal with EU affairs least often. These differences also hold when we look at the median time spent on EU-related activities by those civil servants who indicated they are involved in EU-related work. Median civil servants involved in policy preparation and oversight spend most time on EU-related activities while Europeanized civil servants involved in secretarial or support work score well below the overall median.
We can do the same for the different organizations within the Dutch central government that are covered in the survey. In addition to all ministries (except the Ministry of Defense), the survey includes some of the larger executive agencies (the tax service (‘Belastingdienst’), the immigration service (IND), the prison service (DJI) and ‘Rijkswaterstaat’), as well as the ‘Hoge Colleges van Staat’. The organizations are shown in Table 8, starting with the organization that has the highest percentage of Europeanized civil servants and so on. Dutch abbreviations and names are used to identify each organization (they will explained in the text below).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Involved in EU-related work</th>
<th>Median time spent (among Europeanized civil servants only)</th>
<th>Total number of respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>Hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LNV</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BZ</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V&amp;W</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EZ</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SZW</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VROM</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financiën (not including Belastingdienst)</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IND</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VWS</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belastingdienst</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>386</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
From Table 8 we can derive a ‘league table’ of the ÉU-ness’ of Dutch public organizations. Three clusters can be distinguished:

- **Eurocratic bulwarks.** Four organizations have more than 50% Europeanized civil servants: the Ministries of Agriculture (LNV), Foreign Affairs (BZ), Transport, Public Works and Water Management (V&W), and Economic Affairs (EZ). The median time spent on EU-related work reported by respondents from these organizations is also above the ‘overall’ median of 2.0 hours (up to 8.0 hours in the Ministry of Agriculture). From these four organizations, LNV, BZ and EZ are among the departments that have traditionally been identified as strongly involved in EU policymaking. The high number of Europeanized civil servants in the Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management is perhaps a bit more surprising. On the other hand, in their survey among Norwegian civil servants, Egeberg and Trondal (1999) also found that the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Transport, and Industry & Energy were most affected by the EU, so the high score for V&W may reflect a wider pattern.

- **Eurocratic runners-up.** A second group is formed by a number of organizations that have between 30 and 40% Europeanized civil servants. Of these organizations, the Ministries of Social Affairs (SZW), Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment (VROM) and Finance (Financiën) score close to 40%, while the Immigration Service (IND), the tax service (Belastingdienst), the Water Management Service (Rijkswaterstaat), as well as the Ministries of Health (VWS) and the Interior (BZK) are closer to 30%. The differences within this group are relatively small, however. The same is true of

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government Organization</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Euros</th>
<th>Hours</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rijkswaterstaat</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BZK</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hoog College van Staat</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCW</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justitie (not including DJI and IND)</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>687</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AZ</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DJI</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>554</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>1326</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>4388</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8. EU involvement by government organization (N=4388)
the median time spent on EU-related activities, which is 2.0 hours for most organizations (but lower for SZW at 1.5 hours and higher for the Ministry of Finance and the tax service at 4.0).

- **National champions.** The third group, finally, is formed by a number of organizations that score well below 30% Europeanized civil servants. Apart from the ‘Hoge Colleges van Staat’ (which include, among others, Parliament and the Accounting Office), this group includes the Ministries of Education and Culture (OCW) and Justice (Justitie), the Prime Minister’s Office (AZ), and the Prison Service (DJI). The median time spent on EU-related activities also tends to be lower than the overall median with the exception of OCW, which scores exactly on the overall median of 2.0 hours. What is most surprising about this group is the Justice Department, as justice has been one of the key areas in EU policymaking over the past few years.\(^9\)

In contrast to the high-scoring organizations, our survey differs from the results of Egeberg and Trondal (1999) when it comes to organizations that are least affected by the EU. The lowest-scoring organizations in the Norwegian survey were the Ministries of Children & Family Affairs and Health & Social Affairs. There is no equivalent in Dutch central government for the former ministry, but both the Ministries of Social Affairs and Health score relatively higher in the Dutch survey. It is not clear why.

We can break down the results on organizations in a different way, focusing on the common distinction between executive agencies (Belastingdienst, Rijkswaterstaat, IND and DJI) and policy departments (all government ministries plus the Hoge Colleges van Staat).\(^10\) Table 9 shows the number of Europeanized civil servants in each category.

---

\(^9\) A partial explanation for this is that the category ‘Justitie’ also includes support staff in the judiciary, which is less likely to be involved in EU-related activities. Based on the survey data, we cannot directly differentiate within the Justitie category. However, we can look at the work location of each respondent. Taking ‘working in The Hague’ as a proxy for ‘working at the policy department of Justice’, we indeed find that respondents working in The Hague are more often involved in EU-related work than those working outside of The Hague (26% as compared to 15%). This, however, is a crude measure, as the number of respondents working in The Hague is lower than what could be expected on the basis of the total number of employees in the Department of Justice. Moreover, even if we take this as a valid proxy, the Ministry of Justice scores lower than other ministries.

\(^10\) The ‘other’ category is left out of this distinction.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Involved in EU-related work</th>
<th>Median time spent (among Europeanized civil servants only)</th>
<th>Total number of respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Frequency Hours</td>
<td>Frequency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive agency</td>
<td>26.1%</td>
<td>583</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy department</td>
<td>34.3%</td>
<td>717</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>1300</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9. EU involvement by executive agency vs. policy department (N=4322)

N.B. Cramer's V=.089 (p<.001)

This shows that policy departments count a somewhat higher number of Europeanized civil servants than executive agencies (34.4% vs. 26.1%), while the median number of hours spent on EU-related activities is the same in both types of organization. This difference is statistically significant, but not overwhelmingly large (as indicated by Cramer’s V of .089). These findings are in line with the Norwegian surveys, in which civil servants in ministries indicated a slightly higher impact of the EU on their work than civil servants in agencies. A caveat in interpreting these results is that we have only been able to look at some executive agencies, because independent ‘quango-type’ executive agencies (‘ZBO’s’ in the Dutch administrative system) were not included in the survey.

### 3.3.3 Profiling Dutch Eurocrats: an integrated approach

Useful as these tables may be for exploring the differences in EU involvement among different types of civil servants and organizations, they do not allow for a more integrated assessment of differences in EU involvement. To that end, we need to look at the impact of several potential explanations simultaneously. We have done this through a logistic regression. This is used to find out which factors explain whether a respondent falls in one of two categories (such as answering ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to the question on EU involvement).

For explaining this outcome, we included three blocks of variables:

- The four variables that indicate *individual characteristics*: age\(^{11}\), income\(^{12}\), seniority\(^{13}\) and educational level (which was recoded into a dichotomous variable with values ‘high’ and ‘low’\(^{14}\)).

---

\(^{11}\) In the logistic regression, we did not use the categories of Table 3, but the age in years.

\(^{12}\) We used the categories of Table 6, which can be treated as an interval-level variable.
• The type of work a civil servant does (see Table 7). Because this variable has eight categories, it was split up into dummies that indicated ‘yes’ or ‘no’ for each of the types of work. These dummies were subsequently included in the logistic regression analysis. Because we expect support staff to be least involved in EU-related work (an assumption that is also borne out by Table 7), the category ‘support staff’ was taken as the baseline category, against which all other categories are compared.

• The organization a civil servant works for (see Table 8). Here, too, we had to split the variable into dummies for each organization. In the analysis, we took the Ministry of the Interior (BZK) as our baseline, which implies that all other organizations are compared against BZK.

The results of the logistic regression are shown in Table 10. A separate text box gives some guidance on interpretation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B Exp B</td>
<td>B Exp B</td>
<td>B Exp B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.025*** 0.975***</td>
<td>-0.024*** 0.977***</td>
<td>-0.026*** 0.975***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>0.231*** 1.260***</td>
<td>0.199*** 1.220***</td>
<td>0.156*** 1.169***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seniority</td>
<td>0.012* 1.012*</td>
<td>0.006 1.006</td>
<td>0.007 1.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education level</td>
<td>0.159 1.172</td>
<td>0.095 1.100</td>
<td>0.090 1.094</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy preparation</td>
<td>0.882*** 2.416***</td>
<td>0.933*** 2.541***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oversight</td>
<td>1.116*** 3.054***</td>
<td>1.138*** 3.120***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management</td>
<td>0.409** 1.506**</td>
<td>0.548*** 1.730***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research</td>
<td>0.770*** 2.159***</td>
<td>0.811*** 2.251***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy implementation</td>
<td>0.603*** 1.828***</td>
<td>0.688*** 1.989***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretariat</td>
<td>0.232 1.261</td>
<td>0.346 1.414</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other types of work</td>
<td>-0.011 0.989</td>
<td>0.168 1.183</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LNV</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.367*** 3.924***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BZ</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.100** 3.004**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V&amp;W</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.723* 2.060*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EZ</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.730* 2.074*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

13 In the logistic regression, we did not use the categories of Table 4, but the precise number of years in the current job.
14 ‘High’ includes Polytechnics (‘HBO’) and university degrees; ‘low’ includes all other types of education. The category ‘other’ was treated as missing.
15 Because of the low numbers of respondents in them, the Prime Minister’s Office, the ‘Hoge Colleges van Staat’ and the category ‘other’ were combined into a new category ‘other’.
16 The analysis of residuals and of influence statistics (Cook distances, leverage values, and DFBetas) revealed no undue influence on the model from outliers or specific cases. Multicollinearity diagnostics give some cause for concern regarding the organizational dummies ‘Belastingdienst’, ‘Justitie’ and ‘DJI’ – this will be noted in the discussion of the results where appropriate.
Interpreting the logistic regression model in Table 10

The most interesting columns in Table 10 are labeled ‘exp B’. These columns show how each variable affects the likelihood of a civil servant being involved in EU-related work. An exp B greater than 1 indicates that as the variable increases (for variables such as age and income), a civil servant is more likely to be involved in EU-related work. An exp B smaller than 1 indicates that the likelihood of being involved in EU-related work decreases.

For dummy variables, the interpretation is slightly different: an exp B greater than 1 indicates that civil servants are more likely to be involved in EU-related work if they belong to the group coded by the dummy compared to the group that we selected as our baseline (here: ‘support staff’ and ‘BZK’).

The asterisks (*, **, and *** ) indicate whether the exp B is statistically significant. If there is no asterisk behind the exp B, this means there is a serious probability that the exp B value may actually point in a different direction than the value we found (that is, it may actually be smaller than 1 although we found a value greater than 1, and vice versa). In that case, we cannot say that the variable in question has an effect on the likelihood of being involved in EU-related work. If there is an asterisk behind the exp B, however, we may be confident that the variable does have an effect, and the more asterisks the better.

The bottom rows show some overall measures of the three models. The χ² shows the contribution the model makes to explaining the likelihood that a civil servant is involved in EU-related work. The ‘model χ²’ does so for all variables taken together; the ‘step χ²’ does so for the new variables that were added to the model in comparison to the previous step. The asterisks have the same meaning as they had for the values of exp B.

The R²’s also give a measure of the overall explanatory power of a model. They range between 0 and 1, with 1 meaning complete explanation and 0 meaning no explanation whatsoever.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Exp B</th>
<th>95% CI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.981***</td>
<td>0.375*** -1.353*** 0.259*** -1.208*** 0.299***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step χ²</td>
<td>245.740***</td>
<td>121.809*** 258.175***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model χ²</td>
<td>367.549***</td>
<td>625.724***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R² (Hosmer &amp; Lemeshow)</td>
<td>.049</td>
<td>.074 .126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R² (Cox &amp; Snell)</td>
<td>.059</td>
<td>.087 .143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R² (Nagelkerke)</td>
<td>.083</td>
<td>.122 .202</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 10. Logistic regression model for EU involvement, using forced entry with three blocks of variables (N=4059) * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001.
In Table 10, the three models represent the three steps in which the variables were added, relating to individual characteristics, type of work, and organization, respectively. The model shows the following things:

- From the *individual characteristics*, ‘age’ and ‘income’ are significantly related to the likelihood that civil servants are involved in EU-related work:
  - The older a civil servant, the less likely he or she is to be involved in EU-related work. This may be surprising given the figures shown in Table 3, but two points are in order here. First, even though age is significantly related to EU involvement, the impact is rather small (which is borne out by an exp B close to 1). Second, the lower age classes in Table 3 contained relatively few respondents, so the scores in older age classes have a greater impact than the scores in low age classes.
  - The higher a civil servant’s income (indicating a higher rank), the more likely he or she is to be involved in EU-related work. This conforms to the findings of Table 6.

- Seniority and education level are not significantly related to the likelihood of being involved in EU-related work. For seniority, this confirms the conclusions drawn from Table 4 above. For education, it implies that the differences between levels of education are explained by the other variables.\(^{17}\)

- The *type of work* a civil servant does adds significantly to explaining the likelihood of being involved in EU-related work. We took ‘support staff’ as a baseline. Looking at the individual dummies for type of work, we find that:
  - Civil servants involved in policy preparation, management, oversight, research and policy implementation are significantly more likely to be involved in EU-related work than support staff;
  - Civil servants involved secretarial or other types of work are not significantly more or less likely to be involved in EU-related work than managers.

  This confirms the conclusions drawn from Table 7.

- The set of dummies coding for the *organization* a civil servant works for makes a statistically significant contribution to explaining the likelihood of

\(^{17}\) In addition, the dichotomization of the education variable for the logistic regression may have reduced the impact of this variable.
being involved in EU-related work. Moreover, this contribution is relatively large, as can be seen from the step $\chi^2$. This means where a civil servant works is a more important determinant of EU-involvement than the type of work (s)he does. Looking at the individual organizations, the model largely confirms the impressions from Table 8:

- Civil servants from LNV, BZ, V&W and EZ are significantly more likely to be involved in EU-related work than civil servants from BZK;
- Civil servants from OCW and DJI are significantly less likely to be involved in EU-related work than civil servants from BZK.

Civil servants from all other organizations are not significantly likely to be more or less involved in EU-related work than civil servants from BZK.\(^{18}\)

The R\(^2\)'s listed in the bottom rows of the table indicate the total explanatory power of the models. A value close to 1 indicates that the model fully explains whether or not civil servants are involved in EU-work, while a value close to 0 indicates the model does not explain anything. The values found are moderate, indicating that in the end the variables included in the models can only explain EU-involvement to a limited extent.

In sum, our analysis implies that Europeanized civil servants do not differ very much from non-Europeanized civil servants. Insofar as they differ, it is mainly in terms of the organizations they are likely to work for, the type of job they do, and (to a very limited extent) age and income.

### 3.3.4 What do civil servants do when they deal with EU matters?

In addition to EU-involvement and the number of hours spent on EU-related activities, respondents were also asked to indicate how important certain specific EU-related activities were in their work. As can be seen in Appendix I, eight specific activities were discerned:

- Preparation of EU meetings

---

\(^{18}\) Compared to Table 8, ‘Justitie’ and ‘Other’ are not significantly different from ‘BZK’. There may be two explanations for this:

- The model takes into account a whole range of variables at the same time. Hence, any difference between organizations may also be explained by differences in other variables between these organizations;
- Multicollinearity diagnostics identify a potential multicollinearity problem between ‘Belastingdienst’, ‘Justitie’ en ‘DJI’. This may have suppressed the impact of the ‘Justitie’ dummy.
- Participation in Council Working Groups
- Participation in Commission Working Groups
- Bilateral contacts with colleagues from other member states
- Transposition of EU law
- Enforcement of EU law
- Taking into account EU policies during national policy-making
- Involving local governments in EU policymaking or implementation

For each activity, respondents could indicate whether it was completely unimportant, not so important, neutral, fairly important or very important in their work. These answers can be used to gain a better understanding of the kinds of activities civil servants engage in and how these activities are related. For analytical purposes, these answer categories were later recoded into a separate dichotomous variable with the following two categories:

- ‘Important’: answer categories ‘very important’ and ‘fairly important’ in the original question;
- ‘Unimportant’: answer categories ‘completely unimportant’, ‘not so important’ and ‘neutral’ in the original question.

Table 11 gives an overview of the importance of each of the eight specific activities among Europeanized civil servants. As follows from the table, ‘top-down’ activities are the most important EU-related activities. Two thirds of Europeanized civil servants indicate that implementation is an important aspect of their work. More than half point towards the importance of considering EU policies in national policy preparation and 44 % of the respondents are involved in transposition. The activity that is least widespread amongst the respondents is the participation in Council working groups, which is an activity 17 % of Europeanized civil servants say is important in their work.
An interesting follow up question is how these activities relate to each other: do respondents specialize in one or a few of these activities or is there considerable overlap and do civil servants tend to do most of these activities at the same time? A first stab at this question can be obtained by looking at the associations between the various activities. If we do so, a number of things become apparent:

- There are very strong associations among the activities that are related to decision-making in the EU. ‘Preparation of EU meetings’, ‘participation in Council Working Groups’ and ‘Participation in Commission Groups’ have a Cramer’s V of at least .550 among themselves, and the relationships with bilateral contacts are also very strong.\(^{19}\)
- ‘Transposition’ and ‘enforcement’ are fairly strongly associated, although less so than the decision-making activities among themselves.
- There is also a fairly strong relationship between ‘transposition’ and each of the decision-making activities, indicating considerable overlap between these activities.
- ‘Taking into account EU policies’ and ‘involving local governments’ have fairly strong relationships with each of the other activities.

The strength of associations between the activities gives some idea about the extent to which activities go together. It does not show, however, what precise form these associations take. To find this out, we need to examine the cross tables between the

\(^{19}\) Cramer’s V is a measure that can be used to establish the strength of associations between categorical variables. A value close to 0 indicates that there is no relationship between the two variables; a value close to 1 indicates a very strong relationship. The numbers reported in the text were calculated on the basis of the dichotomized variables. Calculating Cramer’s V with the original five-point variables yields almost identical outcomes. However, the dichotomized variables are used here because the accompanying cross tables are easier to interpret.
activities. Doing this for all possible combinations would yield an unwieldy number of cross tables, so we will look at a cross table that is representative of the broader pattern in the data.

Table 12 shows the cross table for ‘participation in Council Working Parties’ and ‘participation in Commission Working Groups’. The columns show the percentage of respondents that find participation in Commission Working Groups unimportant and important, respectively. The rows indicate how many respondents find participation in Council Working Groups (un)important. The percentages behind ‘% within Council Working Groups’ add up to 100% across rows, while the percentages behind ‘% within Commission Working Groups’ add up across columns. As can be seen from the percentages in the table, the association between the two activities is not completely symmetrical. The vast majority of those who find participation in Council groups important also find participation in Commission groups important (85%). Yet a much smaller proportion of those who find participation in Commission groups important also find participation in Council groups important (57%).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participation in Council Working Groups</th>
<th>Unimportant</th>
<th>Important</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participation in Commission Working Groups</td>
<td>% within Council Working Groups</td>
<td>87,0%</td>
<td>13,0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within Commission Working Groups</td>
<td>87,0%</td>
<td>13,0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Important</td>
<td>% within Council Working Groups</td>
<td>14,8%</td>
<td>85,2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within Commission Working Groups</td>
<td>3,3%</td>
<td>57,0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>935</td>
<td>314</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 12. Cross table between ‘Importance of participation in Council Working Groups’ and ‘Importance of participation Commission Working Groups’, based on the dichotomous variables for each (N=1249)

This pattern can be explained by taking into account the absolute number of people who indicated that they find these two activities important. As was shown in Table 11, 25% of Europeanized civil servants found participation in Commission working groups important, compared to only 17% who said the same of Council working
groups. Hence, participants in Council Working Groups may form a subset of the (larger) group of participants in Commission Working Groups.

This interpretation is supported by the fact that similar patterns can be found between preparation of EU meetings (which scored higher still in Table 11) and participation in Council and Commission groups. Moreover, the same holds true for the relationship between ‘transposition’ and ‘enforcement’: 88% of respondents who indicate that transposition is important also indicate that enforcement is important, but the other way around only 58% of respondents who say enforcement is important also say transposition is important. This pattern even holds for the two ‘extremes’ in Table 11: 78% of respondents who indicate Council Working Groups are important also say enforcement is important, but the other way around it is only 20%.

The pattern of activities therefore resembles a Russian Matryoshka doll, in which the smaller dolls (here: activities less frequently mentioned as important) fit into the larger dolls (here: activities more frequently mentioned as important), but not vice versa.

A closer look at the way the specific activities relate to each other can be had by doing a factor analysis on these activities. A factor analysis is a statistical technique designed to find out if there are clusters of variables that are strongly related. A factor analysis extracts a number of factors (i.e. clusters) from the data and shows how the individual variables relate to those factors.

Table 13 shows the outcomes of the factor analysis. The analysis was carried out on the original questions on specific activities with five answer categories. Since we used a technique called ‘principal component analysis’, the factors are called ‘components’. The analysis revealed two underlying clusters of activities (components 1 and 2). Table 13 shows how closely each of the activities is related to these two components (the so-called ‘factor loadings’ of each activity). The closer a factor loading is to 1, the stronger an activity is related to that component. Factor loadings have only been indicated if they are greater than .4.

Component 1 consists of all activities related to EU decision-making. Each of these activities has a factor loading of more than .85, indicating a strong correlation. Moreover, ‘involving local governments’ and ‘taking into account EU policies’ also

20 The factors were extracted using Principal Component Analysis. Factor rotation was carried out using direct oblimin, because all activities are correlated to some extent. Factors were extracted if their eigenvalues were greater than 1.0. Tests for multicollinearity and sample size adequacy all scored well above minimally required values.
load highly onto this component. In addition, transposition loads fairly highly on component 1, although it loads more on component 2. As a result, we can interpret component 1 in two ways, in a broader and a stricter sense:

- In a broader sense, component 1 shows that most EU-related activities are related. Hence, if respondents find one activity important, they are likely also to find other activities important (with the exception of enforcement).
- In a stricter sense, component 1 relates to EU decision-making or, stated differently, the Dutch input into EU decision-making.

Component 2 consists of enforcement (which loads most highly onto this component), transposition (more so than onto component 1) and ‘taking EU policies into account’ (but less so than onto component 1). The most obvious interpretation of this component is therefore that it relates to the implementation of EU policies or, stated differently, EU input in Dutch regulation and policymaking.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>'Dutch input into EU policymaking'</td>
<td>0.930</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparation of EU meetings</td>
<td>0.920</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral contacts</td>
<td>0.878</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council Working Groups</td>
<td>0.878</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Involving local governments</td>
<td>0.624</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taking into account EU policies</td>
<td>0.498</td>
<td>0.453</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transposition</td>
<td>0.455</td>
<td>0.581</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enforcement</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.904</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 13. Factor loadings of the specific EU-related activities on the two extracted components (factor loadings shown if they are greater than 0.4; the total explained variance is 73%).
Having completed our analysis of individual work patterns, let us now move on to explore our second key question in this chapter: the organizational dimension of ‘Eurocracy’ in the Dutch civil service.

3.4 The organizational contexts of Eurocrats

3.4.1 Dispersion of EU-related activities within organizations

Above, we showed how many civil servants are involved in EU-related work and how much time they spend on these activities. Apart from this overall EU involvement, it is also important to look at the way these activities are embedded within the broader organization: is the EU the province of a small number of specialists or are EU-related activities spread across a wide range of civil servants? The figures on time spent already indicated that although almost 30% of respondents report EU involvement, most of these respondents spend 2 hours or less on EU-related activities a week, while some spend up to 40 hours a week.

In order to take a closer look at the spread of EU-related activities and at differences between organizations, we have constructed a ‘dispersion index’. The dispersion index ranges from 0 to 1. If it is 1, all respondents in an organization spend exactly the same amount of time on the EU, so EU-related work is widely dispersed. If, by contrast, the index is close to 0, EU-related work is concentrated in one or a few respondents, indicating a low dispersion. The way in which this index was calculated is explained in a separate text box. For purposes of interpretation, it is important to keep in mind that dispersion is not the same as EU involvement. For example, if in an organization everyone spends 1 hour a week on the EU, the dispersion index will be 1. If, however, half of the people spend 10 hours a week and the other half 30 hours, the index will be 0.8. Even though EU involvement is much higher in the latter case, dispersion is lower because some people spend more time on the EU than others.

Table 14 shows the dispersion indexes for each organization in Dutch central government and for the whole sample. It also repeats the levels of EU-involvement reported in Table 8.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Involved in EU-related work</th>
<th>Dispersion index (total)</th>
<th>Dispersion index (among Europeanized civil servants)</th>
<th>Number of respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LNV</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BZ</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V&amp;W</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EZ</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SZW</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VROM</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financiën (not including Belastingdienst)</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IND</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VWS</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belastingdienst</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>1237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rijkswaterstaat</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BZK</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hoog College van Staat</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>(0.49)</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCW</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justitie (not including DJI and IND)</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>687</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AZ</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>(1.00)</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DJI</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>554</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>4388</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 14. EU involvement and dispersion indexes by government organization (N=4388)

Calculating the dispersion index

The dispersion index is based on the measure for the ‘effective number of political parties’ in the political science literature. This number is calculated by dividing one by the sum of squares of the shares of votes each party has in parliament (or elections). In a formula:

\[
\text{Effective number of parties} = \frac{1}{\sum v_i^2}, \quad \text{in which } v \text{ is the share of votes a party has (and ‘i’ stands for ‘the i-th party’).}
\]

For instance, if there are three parties in parliament that each have one third of the votes, the effective number of parties will be 3. But, if one party has 50% of the votes and the two others each have 25%, the effective number of parties will be 2.67. A similar formula can be used to calculate the ‘effective number of Europeanized civil servants’ in an organization, using the time spent by each civil servant as a share of the total time spent on EU-related activities in that organization. This share then becomes the \( v_i \) in the formula. Since the size of organizations differs considerably, the ‘effective number of civil servants’ does not tell us much. Hence, we divide it by the total number of civil servants from that organization to obtain a figure between 0 and 1. The formula then becomes:

\[
\text{Dispersion index} = \frac{1}{n \sum v_i^2}, \quad \text{in which } v_i \text{ is the share of the i-th respondent in the total amount of time spent on EU-related work, and } n \text{ is the total number of respondents.}
\]
The figures in the column ‘Dispersion index (total)’ have been calculated on the basis of all respondents from a given organization, whether they indicated that they were involved in EU-related work or not.\(^{21}\) The pattern of dispersion indexes more or less follows that of EU-involvement (the percentage of respondents involved in EU-related work) in the sense that higher levels of EU-involvement tend to go together with higher levels of dispersion. Nevertheless, within this broader pattern, some organizations score relatively high on dispersion (e.g. LNV and VWS) while others score relatively low (e.g. SZW, IND and Justitie).

Since overall EU-involvement and overall dispersion tend to be associated, we can obtain a clearer picture of the extent to which dispersion is higher or lower than expected by looking at the dispersion of EU-related work among Europeanized civil servants only. This is done in the column ‘Dispersion index (among Europeanized civil servants)’. Since these figures have been calculated only among respondents who reported EU-involvement, they are not influenced by the overall level of EU-involvement in the organization.

This column shows even more clearly where the differences are. LNV now has by far the highest level of dispersion (at 0.47), while most organizations between BZ and OCW score between 0.30 and 0.40. Organizations with relatively low levels of dispersion are SZW, IND, BZK, Justitie and DJI.\(^{22}\) Put differently, in organizations with relatively low levels of dispersion, EU-related work is concentrated relatively strongly among a small number of civil servants.

Overall, the dispersion index reinforces the ‘league table’ derived from Table 8. LNV is the most highly Europeanized government organization, in terms of EU-involvement, median time spent and dispersion. BZ, V&W and EZ are also fairly strongly Europeanized. The group behind these shows a more mixed picture, with organizations scoring higher on some indicators than others. In general, however, the level of Europeanization tends to be lower among organizations in the justice side of central government (Justitie, DJI and, perhaps, IND). The other organizations are in between and may be characterized as ‘moderately Europeanized’.

\(^{21}\) For the purposes of calculation, all respondents who indicated they were not involved in EU-related work were assumed to spend 0 hours on EU-related activities.

\(^{22}\) AZ and the Hoge Colleges van Staat score even higher than LNV but given the small number of Europeanized civil servants in these organizations these figures are not very meaningful. For instance, AZ has a score of 1.00 because two respondents indicated EU-involvement and they each spend 1 hour a week on EU-related activities.
3.4.2 Organizational support for EU-related work

As a final element in the survey, we asked respondents to react to six statements about the way EU-related activities are embedded in their organization. These six statements read as follows:

- My organization offers sufficient training opportunities for EU-related activities
- When selecting candidates for EU-related activities, my employer takes sufficient account of European experience
- Experience with EU-related activities offers an advantage for my career development
- When I participate in EU-level meetings, I receive a clear negotiation mandate
- In my organization, EU-related activities have a lower priority than purely national activities
- In my policy area, there is sufficient co-ordination between those who negotiate at the EU-level about European policies, and those who are responsible for transposing and implementing those policies

For each statement, respondents had a choice of five answers: ‘completely disagree’, ‘largely disagree’, ‘neither agree nor disagree’, ‘largely agree’ and ‘completely agree’.

Table 15 shows the distribution of answers across the five original answer categories for each of the six statements. The statements are indicated with key words that refer to the full statements listed above.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Completely disagree</th>
<th>Largely disagree</th>
<th>Neither agree nor disagree</th>
<th>Largely agree</th>
<th>Completely agree</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>810</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selection</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>661</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Career</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>772</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mandate</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>504</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Priority</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>802</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-ordination</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>668</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 15. Overall responses to the six statements
Two things can be noted about these overall patterns:

- As can be seen in the last column (‘N’), the non-response to these statements was considerable. Out of a total of 1329 respondents who indicated that they dealt with the EU in their work, the number of respondents reacting to the statements ranged from 504 (for the statement on mandates) to 810 (for the statement on training). This may reflect the fact that not all statements are relevant to all Europeanized civil servants (e.g. the statement on mandates is only relevant if one is involved in EU-level meetings). This also means, however, that we should be cautious about the extent to which the answers reflect broader patterns in our sample, let alone in the wider population.

- Substantively, the results show a mildly positive response to all statements (bearing in mind that the statement about priority was formulated in a negative way, so that ‘disagree’ becomes a positive statement).

At the same time, there are no clear differences between the overall responses to the statements. A more interesting question is therefore whether there are differences among respondents from different types of organizations. We have analysed this by dividing the responses according to:

- The type of work respondents do
- Whether they work for a policy department or an executive agency
- Whether they work for an organization that is Europeanized to a great, moderate or limited extent.

In sum, it turns out that analysing the responses by individual organizations does not deliver many clear insights, since most organizations only had relatively few respondents who reacted to the statements. As a consequence, it is more useful to look at aggregated results. Moreover, these aggregated outcomes give an indication of why differences in responses occur, something that cannot be derived from differences between individual organizations per se. For the purposes of the analysis, the five original answer categories for the statements were recoded into a new variable with three categories: ‘disagree’, ‘neutral’ and ‘agree’.

### 3.4.3 Organizational support and type of work

One may assume that the responses to the statements differ between different types of respondents in terms of the work they do. To analyse this further, we took the eight
types of work that were introduced in Table 7 to see if there were any systematic
differences between the groups. In analysing these differences, we relied on the
recoded variable with three (rather than five) answer categories. The number of
respondents for ‘secretarial work’, ‘support staff’, ‘research’ and ‘other’ was too
small to make any meaningful comparisons, so we will concentrate on the other four
Each of these groups comprised at least 100 respondents for each statement.23

Table 16 lists the percentage of respondents in these four groups who were in
the ‘agree’ category for each of the six statements. Because the statement on priority
was formulated negatively, the significant percentage is that of respondents answering
‘disagree.’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Management</th>
<th>Policy preparation</th>
<th>Implementation</th>
<th>Oversight</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selection</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Career</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mandate</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Priority</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-ordination</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 16. Percentage of respondents answering ‘agree’ to each of the statements, by type of work
(Note: for the statement on priority, the percentage of respondents answering ‘disagree’ has been taken)

The statements on training opportunities and the priority accorded to EU-work show
very little variation among the four groups, so apparently there is little difference in
the way these issues are perceived by each of the four groups. The other statements
show clearer differences, however. A number of patterns can be seen in these
answers:

- Respondents who describe themselves as working in management or policy
  preparation tend to answer more positively than those working in
  implementation or oversight.
- This ‘split’ is clearest for the statements on mandate and co-ordination. Here,
  those working in management and policy preparation answer much more often
  positively than those working in implementation and oversight. This can be

23 The only statement for which some of these groups fall below this threshold is the statement on a
mandate for EU-level meetings. Here, three groups have less than 100 respondents, with the smallest
group (implementation) comprising 77 respondents.
seen most clearly for the statement on mandates, where 46% of managers and 52% of policy officials indicate they receive a clear mandate, as compared to only 20% and 9% for implementation and oversight officials, respectively. The implications of the differences are probably different for these two statements:

- For the statement on mandates, the differences seem to imply that respondents working in management or policy preparation are generally more closely tied to organizational mandates than respondents working in implementation or oversight positions.
- For the statement on the co-ordination between EU negotiations and implementation, the answers may reveal a gap in perception, with managers and policy officials (who will tend to work mostly on the development of EU policies) being much more positive than implementers and oversight officials (who work on the implementation of EU policies).

For the statement on the extent to which European experience is taken into account when selecting people for EU-related work and the statement on the importance of EU-related experiences for one’s career, the split between management/policy preparation and implementation/oversight also exists, but here one group clearly scores higher than the others:

- For the statement on selection, managers indicate much more often that European experience is taken into account than the other three groups.
- For the statement on career prospects, officials involved in policy preparation indicate a much greater importance than the other three groups.

### 3.4.4 Organizational support and type of organization

The differences between responses to the statements may also be related to the type of organization civil servants work in. One way of distinguishing between the organizations in our sample is by dividing them into policy departments and executive agencies. As we saw in Table 10 above, respondents in policy departments tend to be involved a bit more often in EU-related work than respondents in executive agencies, but these differences are not particularly large. Table 17 shows how respondents in these two types of organization responded to each of the six statements.
Table 17. Responses to the six statements by respondents in executive agencies and policy departments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive agency</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy department</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selection</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive agency</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy department</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>387</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Career</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive agency</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy department</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>438</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mandate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive agency</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy department</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Priority</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive agency</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy department</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-ordination</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive agency</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy department</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>388</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As above in the analysis according to type of work, the answers to the statements on training opportunities and the priority of EU-related work show little difference between executive agencies and policy departments. For each of the other four statements, however, respondents in policy departments tend to answer much more often in the ‘agree’ category than respondents in executive agencies, although the differences are much smaller in the ‘disagree’ category. This implies that:

- European experience is taken into account in job selection for EU-related activities more often in policy departments than in executive agencies;
- EU-related work experience is better for the career of respondents in policy departments than in executive agencies;
- Respondents in policy departments receive clearer mandates for EU meetings than respondents in executive agencies;
- Co-ordination between negotiation and implementation is viewed more positively by respondents in policy departments than in executive agencies.

These outcomes reinforce the results we found for the different types of work in Table 16. In fact, they may reflect the fact that relatively many implementation and oversight officials work in executive agencies.
3.4.5 Organizational support and the organizational degree of Europeanization

In addition to the differences between policy departments and executive agencies, differences in organizational support may also result from differences in the degree to which organizations as a whole have been Europeanized. In Table 9 above, three groups of organizations could be discerned: the Eurocatic bulwarks (high: >50% Europeanized civil servants), the euroratic runners-up (moderate: between 30 and 40%) and the national champions (low: <30%). Table 18 shows the answers to the statements from respondents working in each of these three types of organization.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
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<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree</th>
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<td>43%</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 18. Responses to the six statements by respondents in organizations that a Europeanized to a high, moderate and low degree

As before, the responses to the statement on training hardly show any difference, although respondents from national champion type organizations are a bit more critical than the others.²⁴ Contrary to what we found above, however, differences do turn up for the statement on priority: respondents in Eurocratic bulwarks disagree more often than those in runner-up organizations, while respondents from national

²⁴ Using Cramer’s V to assess the strength of the association does not reveal a statistically significant difference between the cells.
champions disagree least often. For the ‘agree’ category, the differences are less clear but still fairly sizeable.

For the other four statements, the following patterns can be observed:

- In the ‘disagree’ category, the differences between groups are as expected (i.e., with more highly Europeanized organizations scoring lower), although the differences are not large.
- In the ‘agree’ category, bulwark organizations score highest (as can be expected), but national champions score higher than runners-up.

The latter outcome is a bit puzzling, since we would expect the order to be ‘high’-‘moderate’-‘low’ on each statement. There is no plausible theoretical explanation for this pattern. The most reasonable conclusion to draw is perhaps that the crucial difference is between bulwarks and the rest. In EU bulwarks, European experience plays a greater role in selecting people for EU-related work, is more important for one’s career development, civil servants going to EU meetings receive clearer mandates, and the co-ordination between negotiations and implementation is seen to be better than in the other two clusters of organizations. Moreover, in bulwarks EU-related work is much less often accorded lower priority than national activities. All of these outcomes seem to reflect the fact that in bulwarks, EU-related work has been integrated much more strongly into organizational structures and daily work routines.

3.5 Conclusions

Let’s sum up what we have found in this survey study. Firstly, as regards the EU-involvement of individual civil servants, the data enables the following observations to be drawn:

- Overall some 30% of Dutch civil servants are involved in EU-related activities to some degree or other.
- However, the vast majority of these ‘Europeanized civil servants’ only devote relatively few hours to EU-related activities.

These differences are statistically significant, with Cramer’s V=0.110 (p<0.01).

Since respondents from the tax service (‘Belastingdienst’) make up a large proportion of respondents in the ‘moderate’ category, we re-ran the analysis without the tax service. This reduced the differences between the moderate group and the others somewhat, but it did not reverse the order between these groups.
In terms of background characteristics, Europeanized civil servants do not differ greatly from non-Europeanized civil servants. Of all individual and organizational background variables that we took into account, differences in EU involvement are associated most strongly with the organization for which a civil servant works, followed by the type of job the civil servants holds. Individual characteristics account for very little, although age and income show a significant association with EU involvement.

The questions on specific EU-related activities show that there are two clusters of activities, one centered on the Dutch input into EU policymaking, the other on implementation of EU law and policies.

Yet, these clusters are also strongly related among themselves, indicating that respondents to whom one activity is important also tend to find other activities important.

The general pattern of relationships among activities that emerges from the analysis is one of nested activities or a ‘participation ladder’ of EU-related activities. The bottom rungs of the ladder consist of activities that are important to a relatively broad range of Europeanized civil servants (in particular enforcement and ‘taking into account EU policies’). Going up the ladder, civil servants who engage in more specific activities (culminating in participation in Commission or Council Working Groups) tend also to find the lower rungs important but not the other way around.

In terms of organizational embeddedness and support, a second set of observations can be made:

- EU-related work tends to be spread more evenly among employees in organizations in which the overall EU involvement is higher (even if we correct for this higher level of overall involvement). As a result, EU-related work will tend to be embedded more strongly in those organizations. In organizations with a low overall level of EU involvement, EU-related activities also tend to be concentrated among a smaller number of civil servants.

- Overall, slightly more respondents make a positive than a negative assessment of the organizational support for EU-related work in their organization.
• Managers and civil servants involved in policy preparation are more positive about the organizational support for their EU-related activities than respondents involved in policy implementation or oversight.
• Respondents working in policy departments are generally more positive about the organizational support for their EU-related activities than respondents working in executive agencies.
• Respondents generally answer more positively when they work in highly Europanized organizations.
• In terms of specific aspects of organizational support, the following observations are relevant:
  o The assessment by respondents of training opportunities does not show any systematic variation between types of respondents.
  o The co-ordination between EU-level negotiations and the implementation of EU policies is evaluated more positively by those on the ‘policy-making side’ of the process (managers, civil servants involved in policy preparation, and respondents working in policy departments) than by those on the ‘implementation side’ (civil servants involved in policy implementation or oversight, and respondents working in executive agencies). The perception of co-ordination therefore differs substantially according to the position a respondent occupies.

Overall, then, our findings suggest that there is a ‘virtuous circle’ of Europeanization in Dutch civil service organizations: the more civil servants are involved in EU-related work and the more evenly this involvement is spread across the organization, the better EU-related work is supported. This, one may assume, will in turn lead to greater awareness of EU-related activities within the organization and, hence, greater EU involvement. The findings also suggest that there may be a critical threshold for this effect to occur. Our data show small differences between moderately and weakly Europeanized civil servants, but a strong difference between highly Europeanized organizations and the rest.

Of course, the extent to which an organization is involved in EU-related activities is determined by the policy area that organization is working in and the
specific responsibilities it has. It is no more than logical that the Ministry of Agriculture should show higher levels of EU-involvement than, for instance, the Ministry of Education. The key challenge in organizational terms is therefore how to assure sufficient support for EU-related work in organizations for which the EU is not a central concern.

Since organizational support for EU-related activities is linked to the existence of a ‘critical mass’ of Europeanized civil servants, efforts to improve the organizational support of EU-related work could focus on creating that critical mass. This could be achieved by building networks of civil servants working on EU-related activities in organizations that are not strongly Europeanized. Through these networks, best practices can be developed and shared among organizations that deal with EU-related activities. Moreover, EU-related work can be strengthened by giving more attention to the implementation and enforcement of EU policies. After all, this is the activity through which most civil servants deal with the EU in their work. Moreover, from the perspective of those working in implementation-related activities, the co-ordination between policy-making and policy implementation is an area that is open to improvement.
4.1 Representing the ‘national interest’ in Brussels: introduction

This chapter looks at the work of Eurocrats through the lens of the representation of national interests. It zooms in on one particular aspect of EU policy work: the manoeuvring that takes place during the early stages of the policymaking process in First Pillar settings, e.g. when the Commission is considering formulating a proposal. At this stage of the policy process, the Commission has the exclusive right to set the agenda, launch new policy ideas, and draft and submit proposals to the Council and European Parliament.

This chapter, in other words, examines how individual Dutch civil servants practise public policy-making for and within European arenas. Through this focus, we seek to find out where ‘European’ policy-making ‘happens’ and how Dutch civil servants ‘make it happen’. Herewith this chapter will address a substantial part of the topics listed under question 1 section 1.1. We will, however, extend beyond the work and practice of individual civil servants. Strategic interaction with other civil servants is part and parcel of a civil servant’s work, i.e. with colleagues from other member countries, their superiors at their home departments, and the officials of the Commission. In other words, acting towards getting things done in Europe is a collaborative effort in which the embedding of individual civil servants within their departments is a prerequisite for successful strategic interactions. Hence, by looking at strategic manoeuvring, a number of topics listed under research question 2 (i.e. instruction and guidance, feedback and accountability, top management commitment) will also be dealt with in this chapter.

National governments have ‘strong incentives … to monitor the Commission services so that when the early signs of action are detected the interested departments at home can be alerted and begin to take steps to decide a policy’ (Kassim 2001: 16). Throughout the many interviews and the 5 expert meetings with Dutch officials we held, the importance of this stage, and the possibilities it offered to even small states such as the Netherlands to exert their influence in the shaping of EU policy, were emphasized time and again. Remarkably, however, there is scant attention within the
academic literature to the strategies member state governments employ during the proposal formation (or pre-proposal) stage. The majority of studies on the European policy process focus on the formal structures of national position coordination after the Commission has launched its position (Kassim et al 2001, 2003) or deals exclusively with the decision-making process at the supranational level (Thomson et al 2006). Although Trondal (2000, 2002), Rhinard (2002), Egeberg et al (2003), Trondal and Veggeland (2003), Laegreid et al (2004), and Larsson and Trondal (2005) do focus on the role of national governments during the policy initiation phase, their focus rests either on the ‘democratic legitimacy’ of the European committee system, participation and networking patterns, or the role allegiances and identities of national civil servants attending European committees. One notable exception is the study report of Larsson (2003) but his report exclusively focuses on the workings of expert committees at the various stages of the European policy process.

The omission of member state governments’ strategic behaviour during a crucial phase of the EU policy process becomes more striking when it is compared to the study of private interest group lobbying within the EU (see Woll 2006 for a review of this literature). There is a growing literature on the styles and patterns of private interest that lobby the European Commission that examines the channels of access of national and supranational federations of interest groups, and variations of lobby strategies across various sectors and issues (Mazey and Richardson 1993; Van Schendelen 1998; Coen 1998). The absence of studies on the strategic behaviour of national civil servants during the pre-proposal phase misleadingly suggests that member state governments define and advocate their interest solely through their ‘Byzantine coordination mechanisms’ (Schneider and Baltz 2005: 23). However, for member states the stakes during European policymaking are high in so far as they have conflicting views and interests regarding the modes of governance and the substantive policies that are to be adopted by the EU and implemented by the member states (Heritier et al 1996; Kohler-Koch and Eising 1999). Rational member state governments, as we will show in this paper, can not afford to sit back and wait for the Commission to move first and leave the choice for a mode of governance up to the Commission. And it is up to national civil servants to do so on their behalf. It is this aspect of the Eurocratic craft that we shall study more carefully in this paper.

Although we will mainly limit our focus on the proposal formation process we do conceive of this pre-proposal or policy development phase (Larsson 2003;
Rometsch & Wessels 1996) as a process that is connected to the formal EU decision-making phase in the same sense as ‘connected’, ‘two-level’ or ‘nested’ games (Putnam 1988; Pahre 1997 Mayer 1992; Tsebelis 1990). In this chapter we thus employ the logic of connected games to elucidate the strategic choices of a single (representative of a) ministerial department within a member state in the initial stages of European policymaking. However, the situation in which member states find themselves with regard to the pre-proposal phase does not entirely accord with the formal situation that the logic of two-level games addresses. In contrast to the highly formalized arena of legislative decision-making at the supranational level, the proposal formation process is a highly informal arena with little formal rules and procedures that guide the policy process. In other words, the rules of the game are loose and a broad set of strategic options exist for member states. A central question addressed in this paper is hence which strategic options are available to national civil servants and which of these options they are inclined to use in this phase.

In order to answer this question, we shall start with a stylised model of the pre-proposal phase first. In brief, the main elements of the proposal game are the following. The outcomes of the game are modes of governance that must be adopted by member states in order to harmonize the internal market. Regarding each specific policy issue, the players are the Commission and the member states’ national ministries with responsibility for the policy area. Both Commission and the member state governments have preferences over what mode of governance the Commission should propose to the Council and European Parliament. Knowing that the content of Commission proposals can only be defined or amended under stringent decision rules by the Council and European Parliament, member states will employ strategic options to determine the content of the proposal before it is formally submitted to the Council and European Parliament.

Our findings on the strategic behaviour of national civil servants in EU settings pertain to the case of the Dutch Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Security, particularly its civil servants who are responsible for veterinary policy. Veterinary policy is an old and well-established field of EU activity and part of the First Pillar of the EU. This implies that the Commission is a crucial actor. Furthermore it represents a highly institutionalized regime and one in which a technocratic orientation is dominant, although sometimes things tend to get politically explosive. This chapter will therefore offer a nice comparison with the next chapter.
where the focus will rest on officials involved in making and implementing European police cooperation on behalf of the Dutch government. Police cooperation is a Third Pillar issue area, which means that it is governed by a much less ‘transnationalized’ regime of collective decision making than the First Pillar area of veterinary policy. In other words, we first examine a highly institutionalized and technocracy-oriented policy area in order to be able to compare this area to the less institutionalized and more volatile domain of European police cooperation.

We conducted interviews and participatory observations with civil servants for this purpose. From these interviews, we found that these civil servants employed three main types of strategies in trying to articulate and secure Dutch interests during the embryonic stages of the formation of EU policy proposals. We label these as follows: **frontloading**, **signalling** and **coalition formation**. With frontloading we mean the instrumental secondment of national civil servants within the agencies and directorate-generals of the European Commission that were of interest to the Agriculture ministry. Signalling is the systematic networking and informing of Commission officials by national civil servants. Finally the coalition formation strategy refers to the formation of coalitions during expert committee meetings by member state’s representative in order to forge a small but effective group of like-minded member state representatives for the purpose of backing of one’s national interests.

This chapter unfolds as follows. The first section discusses the outcomes of the EU policy process. The following section discusses the logic of the pre-proposal phase, using simple game theoretic situations modelled after battle-of-the-sexes games. It also discusses the design of our field study. The key section in the chapter presents our findings regarding strategic behaviour of Dutch national civil servants operating within the field of veterinary policy. At the close of the chapter we draw some theoretical and practical conclusions.

4.2 The stakes of the game: Determining EU modes of governance

Studies on the domestic impact of Europeanization have produced several insights into how member states are ‘hit’ by and react to the policies of the EU (Börzel and Risse 2000; Green Cowles et al 2001; Heritier et al 2001; Knill 2001; Featherstone &
Both the mechanisms of domestic impact as well as domestic response are highly variable (Knill and Lehmkuhl 2002) as ‘[D]omestic structures and policy legacies provide a mixture of resilience and flexibility’ (Radaelli 2000:15). The responses to the policies of the EU are found to vary between inertia, absorption, accommodation, and even retrenchment (Radaelli 2000). While our insight into the ‘downloading’ of EU policies by member states has increased because of these studies we still relatively know little about how member states partake in the ‘upload’ of their most preferred policy preferences. Given the connectedness of the EU policy process, which we will discuss in more detail below, one may expect that factors influential in the determination of the uploading of national preferences into the EU policy process may have an effect on how the subsequent decisions of the EU are downloaded. Simply put, when a member state succeeds in uploading its most preferred policy, then, ceteris paribus, the probability that it will absorb the resultant EU policy will be much likelier than inertia or retrenchment.

The neglect of studies on the strategic choices of member states during the pre-proposal or policy initiation phase is thus remarkable given the high stakes of the EU policy process. The study of the EU policy process (and domestic impact studies in particular) could benefit from the factors that affect the actions of member states and the outcomes that emerge very early within the EU policy process. This requires a systematic analysis of so-called pre-proposal or policy development phase as an arena where member states display strategic behaviour in order to influence the domestic impact of the EU (Larsson 2003). The pre-proposal phase is an arena where struggles over the preferred mode of governance or the regulatory styles that will be adopted by the EU take a start. It is a phase where rational member states will try to ‘upload’ their preferred regulatory style. The starting point of the EU policy process is in fact a pluralist setting with divergent ‘modes of governance.’ In the words of Eising and Kohler-Koch (1999: 271)

‘EC decision-making does not start in a vacuum, but in a setting of varying national modes of governance. And precisely because the EC is still in its formative phase, the actors are struggling to introduce what they consider to be the most appropriate mode of governance… The negotiation of Community policies is always a competition about modes of governance.’
In this setting member states are in (latent) competition over the best models of integration. The conflicts are partly ideological, as it pits liberals versus pro-interventionists against each other, partly it has to do with the consequences of negative, respectively, positive coordination policies for different member states, policy sectors and powerful interest groups (Hix 2002: 215).

Next the competition between member states, the pre-proposal phase is also set within a delicate balance of power between the member states on the one hand and the supranational actors on the other hand. Especially the Commission, being the ‘engine of integration’ (Pollack 2003) has interests of its own that may contrast with those of the member states and the European Parliament.

‘If member states are united in their opposition to Commission initiatives, or if highly salient national interests are strongly divergent, European solutions will be blocked, regardless of the involvement of Commission and Parliament. The role of supranational actors will be significant, however, in constellations where national interests diverge but are not highly salient or … in constellations where member governments disagree over the substance of a European solution but still would prefer a common solution over the status quo.’ (Scharpf 2001: 13).

In conclusion, the early phase of the EU policy process requires strategic insight of Commission and member states whenever integration is required but the direction of it is unclear. This phase not only effectively filters policy initiatives that can reckon with the support of a the majority of the community but also offers strategic actors to upload their preferred policies at the expense of other member states.

4.3 Strategic behaviour during the pre-proposal phase: Theoretical considerations

We consider the process from the first development of a proposal until its formal launch and the subsequent transformation of the proposal into EU legislation as a connected or nested game. The hallmark of such games is that the same actors are
involved in a whole network of games, with the outcome of one game having consequences for the start of another game. Actors hence play simultaneously or sequentially multiple games and thereby they continuously contemplate not only the strategies of other actors and the outcomes of current games but also the actor strategies and outcomes of games that follow-up or take place parallel to the current game (Tsebelis 1990; Putnam 1988; Mayer 1992). Relationships between the EU and member states have sometimes been modelled as two, even three, level games (Pahre 1997; Payne 2000). Pahre (1997) for example examined how domestic institutions in parliamentary systems tie hands of national governmental negotiators when bargaining with European intergovernmental or supranational actors. Payne (2000) has employed a three-level game structure to understand why the negotiations between member states and fishermen on the one hand and member states and supranational institutions on the other hand have subsequently led to prisoner dilemma’s causing a failure of the Common Fisheries Policies within the EU. The characteristics of these two- or three level games, then, is that they are based on situations where international negotiations are followed by domestic (formal or informal) ratification procedures.

Our focus here lies on the strategic behaviour of member states during the pre-proposal stage. This stage follows the formulation of the national domestic position (cf. Schneider and Baltz 2005) and immediately precedes the official launch of the proposal by the Commission. As we will exclude a games connected to the pre-proposal phase that nevertheless may have an impact on the game played during the pre-proposal phase we make a number of assumptions. The first is that we assume that the national positions of member states have purely emerged from the constellation of domestic interests only. In other words, we assume that member states will not for strategic reasons adopt a second- or third-best position on the basis of position of other member states.27 The second assumption is that member states are rational forward-looking actors (Horn 1995), i.e. that member states are aware of the temporal connectedness of the various EU policy phases and ‘calculate’ the consequences of each stage’s outcome for the process and outcomes of the following

27 In reality, in many policy areas there exist networks of contacts between national civil servants of various member states. Also, international networks between pressure groups that in turn exert influence on their respective national governments is another channel through which the formulation of national positions may be connected. However, for reasons of keeping the model simple, we hold these connections constant.
phases. Third, we also assume that member states have unique (Euclidean) ideal positions that remain fixed during the entire policy process. Some EU policy process stretch out over long time periods, longer than domestic electoral cycles. Often member state governments therefore change colour after elections and time inconsistencies may occur when a new government adopts a new position towards a policy (cf. Shepsle 1992).

The rules of the game during the decision-making process and the pre-proposal phase are different. While the rules governing the decision-making process are formal rules that precisely specify the inter-institutional roles and capacities of the Council, Commission and Parliament, the rules governing the pre-proposal process are in comparison vague and not clearly specified. Among the few clearly stated formal rules is the Commission’s right to initiate proposals that makes the Commission the first mover in the pre-proposal phase. When a proposal is accepted by the Commission, and this proposal is channelled to the decision-making stage of the EU, the policy process becomes a highly institutionalized setting (i.e. the consultation, assent or co-decision procedures). In this stage, specified procedures and decision rules deem it very difficult for the actors involved to reject or change (parts of) the Commission’s proposals. We can in fact argue that the moment the proposal is officially launched by the Commission it becomes locked-in and very difficult to change. For example, Hull (1993) once estimated that 80% of the text of Commission proposals survives the final stage of Council decision-making.

Given this, even forward looking member states who understand the crucial importance of the pre-proposal phase for translating their preferences into EU policies will find it very difficult to successfully compete for their preferred mode of governance. During the process of proposal formation, the Commission has a variety of discretionary authorities to shape the content of the final proposal (Larsson 2003). For example, the Commission enjoys the power to initiate and control expert committees. The Commission herewith not only learns the positions of member states through inviting their experts to these committees, but also benefit from the expertise to improve the quality of their proposal. Or as Wessel and Rometsch (1996: 226) argue, the ‘Commission controls the game in this phase and its basic strategy is one of “engrenage”… i.e. to include relevant national civil servants and
representatives of lobby groups early enough in its work to get additional information and insights … From the point of view of the national civil servants, there is an expectation that there input will be taken seriously by the Commission and that its later proposals will not include unpleasant surprises for them.’

Even when mutuality forms the underlying culture of the relationship between the Commission and the national civil servants, the relationship is in fact unequal, to the advantage of the Commission. First, for example, the Commission may

set up an expert group to find out whether the Member States and interest groups are interested in trying to formulate a common position. But should the Commission discover … that the support for a common approach is rather weak or seems to go in an unwanted direction, it can hold the group on hold, waiting for the right moment to reactivate it (Larsson 2003: 18).

Other powerful instruments are the selection of the chairman and the selection and appointment of the participants; as Larsson (2003: 18) also wrote ‘allowing just a few experts, interest groups or Member States’ representatives to be part of a group … is a strategic decision that may affect the result and functioning of an expert group profoundly.’

From the perspective of member states, the chances of having their preferred mode of governance translated in the text of the Commission proposal seem slim. Moreover, it seems that the powers of the Commission are overwhelming vis-à-vis the member states. Through the Commission’s power of initiative and the various channels of influence on the proposal formation phase that are hitherto discussed within the literature it seems that the member states are left to merely participate at this stage and react to the proposals only when it enters the Council deliberations; in other words, when the text of the proposal is largely written into a direction wanted by the Commission and only to be amended marginally by the member states and the Parliament. For the member states, the choice is between rejecting the proposal – and have the Commission refrain from starting a new proposal; or to accept a proposal that may lie at a distance from a member state’s ideal point but that is still preferred to
the status quo. The setting within which the member states and the Commission interact accords in fact to the logic of a battle of the sexes game (see figure 1; cf. Scharpf 1997, 2001).

**Figure 1. Battle of the sexes game during the pre-proposal phase**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Option 2</th>
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<td>Option 1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member state 1</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Option 2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member state 1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Member state 1 prefers option 1 to option 2
Member state 2 prefers option 2 to option 1

Member state 1’s ideal point is reflected by option 1, member state’s ideal point by option 2. When both member states choose their most preferred option they will end up with an outcome (1,1) that is worse for both member states. In the case of one member state realizes its preferred option the other member state must accept the option that has a lesser payoff than when its ideal option was chosen – and vice versa: (4,3) or (3,4). This situation is usually been solved when the number of player is small as in this example, the game is an iterated game instead of a one-shot game, and when package deals are permitted. In reality, however, the number of member states is large, the distribution pf votes across the various member states make the calculation of majorities and blocking minorities extremely complex. In addition, the Commission also consults non-central and non-governmental actors during the pre-proposal phase as well. Hence, to secure the support of the majority of the actors for its proposal, the largest common denominator is translated in the proposal, resulting in the least preferred thinkable payoff for the member states (1, 1).
Given this situation, we expect that forward looking member states will seek for strategies to influence the content of the Commission proposal that in the worst case produces an outcome that is not too far from their ideal position. In other words, rational member states will choose strategies that control the damage of the pre-proposal phase. Given the structure of the pre-proposal phase, two types of strategies are possible. A member state can either (1) try to forge a critical mass of member states that during the pre-proposal phase forces the Commission to adopt a proposal that is closer to a policy that is acceptable to this critical mass of member states or (2) to act before other member states do and have the Commission formulate a proposal that is closest to its own ideal position. Both situations are given in, respectively, figures 2 and 3.

Figure 2. Member state forges a critical mass during pre-proposal phase

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Option 1</th>
<th>Option 2</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Option 1</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Member state 1</td>
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<td>Option 2</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member state 1</td>
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Member state 1 prefers option 1 to option 2
Member state 2 prefers option 2 to option 1

The situation in figure 2 still has the basic logic of a battle of the sexes game, except that the damage that occurs when the least preferred outcome is selected is to some extent controlled for both member states: (2, 2) instead of (1,1). Member states will still play their dominant strategy and choose their most preferred policy, but the policy that the Commission now ultimately sets has a payoff that is closer to the member states most preferred pay-off. Member states have managed this through forging a coalition of a critical mass of member states that agree that the null option, i.e. the choice of the Commission when no majority for a single option exists, makes
them at least better off than the least common denominator policy the Commission would have adopted when such a critical mass failed to exist.

Figure 3 shows the outcomes of a game where member state 1 moves first and manages to manipulate the position of the Commission such that the latter discloses a proposal that is close to the position of member state 1 (option 1). The upper right-hand and the lower left-hand cells show the payoffs for both member states when the Commission after consultations with the member states and possibly other interest actors at the pre-proposal stage formally adopts a proposal. We see that for each time member state 1 plays its dominant strategy of choosing option 1, it is better off then member state two. In general, moving before another member state does in order to have the Commission adopt a final position will not result in the most optimal outcome for the first moving member state, but it enables the first mover to choose its most preferred strategy under all circumstances.

In brief, the argument unfolded so far is as follows. The EU policy process enters a highly formalized stage once a Commission proposal is launched in the inter-institutional decision-making or legislative process. The content of proposal locks in as changes to the text of the initial proposal occur seldom. As the content of the proposal concerns fundamental battles among member states over the mode of
governance on the one hand and the member states and the Commission on the other hand, member states must act strategically during the pre-proposal phase to exert influence on the Commission proposal. Given the battle of the sexes nature of the EU policy process, we expect two basic member state strategies:

1. A member state will form coalitions with member states with similar ideal positions close to each other in order to shift the ideal position of the Commission closer to the point where the proposal will be acceptable to these members; or

2. A member state will move first and push the Commission adopting an ideal position that is close to that member state’s own ideal position.

4.4 From theory to practice: research design

Now let us turn to the practices of Dutch ministerial and agency bureaucrats in the veterinary policy field to illustrate the plausibility of these claims. Data for this research is collected from interviews with 21 civil servants working within the field of veterinary policies, especially on issues concerning animal welfare, animal diseases and consumer safety. We conducted semi-structured in-depth interviews\textsuperscript{28} between November 2005 and July 2006 with 11 civil servants from the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Safety (further: Agriculture), 1 from the Ministry of Public Health, Welfare and Sports (further: Public Health)\textsuperscript{29}, 3 the Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority (\textit{Voedsel en Warenautoriteit}; further VWA), 1 working at the institute of Food Safety (further: IFS), and 2 respondent at the Dutch Permanent Representation at Brussels.; three respondents were from the VWA; finally, the remaining 16 respondents were part of the Agriculture. This group of respondents includes higher civil servants as well as civil servants with middle-level positions from both the ministries and the agencies. The sample also covers a variety

\textsuperscript{28} The interview topics were as follows: (1) career developments; (2) success interventions in the EU policy process; (3) role orientations and conflicts; and (4) the departmental organization of EU policy process. The data for this paper are mainly drawn from the responses on topics (2) and (4).

\textsuperscript{29} The section dealing with animal diseases and welfare within this ministry amounted only to 3.5 full time equivalent strong at the time we conducted our interviews.
of backgrounds: scientific veterinary experts, policy coordinators and directors and
generalist departmental managers.

The observations are from a single policy area. The health and welfare of farm animals are a precondition for bilateral or multilateral trade. Institutionalization of animal health and welfare regulations predates the establishment of the EEC and became an integral part of the EU’s agricultural policies. Further, agriculture is the most Europeanized policy area compared to other policy sectors within member states (for various countries see Page 1998; Christensen & Blom-Hansen 2004; Bovens & Yesilkagit 2005). For these reasons, we must be cautious with inferring general observations taken from this single policy area. Still, this policy (sub)area constitutes an important area for study. Issues of regulations of animal disease and welfare are centerpiece not only within international trade conflicts (e.g. export bans on ill animals) but also within disputes between consumer organizations and/or animal rights organizations and the government. Finally, this policy area is rife with debate between member states because the regulation of animal disease and welfare is part of a fundamental debate between member states on regulatory styles or modes of governance (cf. Knill 2001). To give an example, the Netherlands prefers the deregulation of meat hygiene inspections, whereby the state devolves the sound treatment of animals and the hygiene at the slaughterhouses to firms whereas Italy for example insists on direct public supervision of the slaughterhouses by departmental inspectors.

Veterinary policy may thus be somewhat of an atypical case. However, being a fully Europeanized and institutionalized area, the strategic behaviour at the pre-proposal phase may reveal the shape of things to come in other Europeanizing policy areas. The insights gained from this research may indicate the ‘natural’ evolution of strategic behaviour of other national ministries the more their policy areas are integrated into the EU. In other words, we may expect that as more governments and departments are confronted with the (forced) implementation of EU policies that are less preferred, the more we may expect goal-seeking strategic interaction at this initial phase of the policy process.

30 The Office International des Epizooties (OIE) is an intergovernmental organization created by the International Agreement of 25 January 1924. In 1924 only 28 countries were members, currently is has more than 160 members.
4.5 Strategic behaviour in veterinary policy-making: Frontloading, signalling and coalition formation

On the basis of the nature of the EU policy process, which is essentially a negotiation process between member states with a unique preference for a single style of regulation on the hand and the Commission on the other hand, we expected that member states would opt from between two basic strategies: forming a coalition with other member after the Commission has initiated a proposal or to influence the position of the Commission before it initiates a proposals. Our interview data yields three concrete strategic choices, of which two are strategies of the latter type and one of the former. We refer to the latter type as signalling and frontloading, and the former type simply as coalition formation.

**Signalling** the Commission is the targeting and information of Commission officials who work on policy issues that are important to the member state and/or the national ministerial department. The lobby of the designated Commission services by civil servants working at the permanent representatives is an example of this strategy. They inform commission officials about their department’s position. Provided that the member states’ information is valuable to the Commission, the latter may use the information as an input to the proposal. **Frontloading** is a strategy that goes a step further than signalling. It concerns the exertion of substantial and substantive influence on the writing and the text of the proposal. The appointment of seconded national officials within the relevant Commission directorate-general is the central strategic instrument for frontloading. A seconded official is either instructed by his superiors to steer the proposal towards the department’s ideal point or it is expected that the seconded official will ‘automatically’ choose his or her national-cultural perspective as a point of reference when writing the proposal.

Once the Commission has initiated a proposal a member state can seek to form **coalitions** with other member states if the position of the Commission is further away from a member state’s position. This strategy will typically unfold during committee meetings with national experts and civil servants (Larsson 2003; Rhinard, 2002). However, we expect this strategy to be less preferred compared to the other two. As already discussed, it requires the forging of a critical mass of member states with not
too divergent preferences. Moreover, the Commission is well-positioned to dominate the committee, as it can decide who is to sit on the committee, who its chairs will be, and so on (Larsson 2003: 73). In the remainder of this section we will offer examples from all three strategies. We will discuss how they are used and what the perceived pitfalls with each of the strategies are.

4.5.1 Signalling the Commission
In its basic form, signalling is the strategy whereby a sender chooses to send a message to a receiver upon which the receiver chooses to act upon that message. Within the context of this paper, civil servants representing their national department send a message to the relevant Commission official with the purpose of persuading him to choose an action that will benefit the former. This is the basic principle underlying all lobbies. In the practice of EU policy process civil servants engage in lobby activities just as much private interest groups. Signalling could also be well described as the lobbying of the Commission, not by private interest but by member states themselves. Research to member state lobbying of the Commission is rare. The best account is from Kassim et al’s volume on the role of permanent representations (2001). Located at the heart of the Union, permanent representatives fulfil many tasks for the various departments within their respective member states, such as foreseeing opportunities, collecting and circulating information, and elaborating negotiation strategies (Kassim 2001: 11). The role of civil servants at the permanent representative is crucial specifically at the pre-proposal phase if they ‘propose action before the Commission has considered it or before it has drafted a text… This requires the assiduous cultivation of contacts by national officials in the permanent representation and domestic ministries with their opposite numbers in the Commission’ (Kassim 2001: 16).

According to one of our respondents, signalling increasingly occupies an important place within the job descriptions of civil servants working at the permanent representation. Signalling forms the core business of these diplomat-civil servants at Brussels, the Permanent Representative. They know Brussels and their task is to inform and to be kept informed on all matters that are relevant to their field of expertise and that are of interest to their department. Civil servants at the permanent representation are expected to successfully put
‘issues on the agenda of the Commission that are of importance to the Netherlands. In this way we help the Commission with experience we have as a member state and you immediately learn it when the Commission does not think much of the information’ (civil servant at the Dutch permanent representation at Brussels).

More than just agenda-setting, signalling involves ‘talking to the people in the Commission who are going to write the proposal’ (civil servant at the Ministry of Agriculture) and thus to direct the text of the final proposal closer to the preferences of the department. However, signalling is not a one-way process, but based on reciprocity. Information is a most precious asset, to both sides.

‘The Commission always wants to be kept informed. That is an issue that is often forgotten in The Hague. When something happens in a member state [e.g. outbreak of a animal disease], other member states contact the Commission. The Commission always wants to provide answers to those member states. If the Commission fails to do so, danger exists that member states will take action by themselves, something that is not desired, of course. This way unity will be lost. I always try to prevent this by having contact [with the Commission] as much as I can so that I can contact them each time something occurs. So I can keep the Commission updated’ (civil servant at the Dutch permanent representation at Brussels).

Signalling as described above is not only a part of the job of permanent representation officials, but increasingly that of civil servants at The Hague as well. This signalling can take different forms, varying from ‘just giving a call’ asking for a draft of an upcoming report or to ‘step into a Commission official’s office’ when a national civil servants happens to be in Brussels for a meeting (a civil servant at the VWA). The nationality of the Commission officials is then an important issue. Although our respondents told us that nationality played no major role in the approaching of a Commission official, it was clear from their further explications that the presence of Dutch within the Commission services (both permanent as well as seconded national civil servants; see below more) can make difference. Dutch Commission officials more often contact their countries’ department in case of getting information on specific subjects and vice versa they are more easily approachable by national civil servants and permanent representatives. But Dutch commission officials consider
themselves to act very stringent in obeying the Commission guidelines concerning loyalty and neutrality.

Signalling seems most effective when it is embedded in enduring relationships between national civil servants and Commission officials. From our interviews ‘trust’ turns out to be the most important asset in building and maintaining lasting and effective relationships between national and Commission officials.

‘I work a lot with personal relationships. I know two Commission directors very well. When I come, they know that something is happening. When there were conflicts I always was keen on seeing the problems from their perspective as well and not only tried to get the most out of it for the Netherlands’ (senior civil servant at the Ministry of Agriculture).

The same respondent, a higher civil servant within the department, explicated this through the following event that took place several years ago.

‘Often the first meeting with these people [the higher Commission officials] occurs during an incident. In my case I built up trust during the handling of a crisis concerning the presence of hormones in animal fodder. The Commission proposed to destroy all animals that had been fed by the contaminated fodder. … I told them that we just have had foot and mouth and a lot of animals had been killed, but that this time there was not an immediate urgency public health situation. In the end we only had to destroy a far smaller portion of the animals than initially discussed. I then implemented the decisions we had taken carefully and transparently’ (senior civil servant Ministry of Agriculture).

In conclusion, signalling is a strategy applied both by agriculture civil servants at the permanent representation as well as departmental civil servants. The permanent representation of veterinary affairs involves more than a ‘post box’ function for the department back home, but it is becoming actively a lobbyist for Dutch veterinary interests. The building up of networks by national civil servants with Commission officials is a way to institutionalize the signalling strategy. Just like in the case of private interests lobbies at Brussels, easy and swift access to officials coordinating or writing the text of the relevant proposals is an important asset for national ministries to build up. However, as to the effectiveness of this strategy we can not conclude that
signalling is a single strategy to rely on. From the perspective of the single national department, signalling may appear as a relatively cheap and direct strategy. From the perspective of the Commission officials, that is the target group of signalling, the use of this strategy by member state officials may have a different effect. Commission officials receive a large amount of signals from different sources. They are signalled not only by civil servants from other member states but also from private interest organizations. When the number of signals from a variety of sources increases, it will become more difficult for Commission officials to properly assess the value of these signals. From a certain level of signals, the value of signalling may decrease for member states.

4.5.2 Frontloading proposals
Frontloading concerns the exertion of substantial and substantive influence on the writing and the text of the proposal. The strategy that yields member states direct access to the process of writing a Commission proposal is the secondment of national civil servants at the targeted directorate-general. Seconded national officials are one of three categories of Commission officials. The first category consists of the permanent staff of the Commission services (i.e. grade A officials) who are recruited for the service after having successfully passed the ‘concours’. Seconded national civil servants stay for a temporary period. They form part of the directorate general where they are appointed and work on a specific file for a period of three years. One of the pragmatic reasons for their appointment is that SNEs aid the staff of the Commission services and bring expertise on issues of which the Commission lacks knowledge of or as the official logic behind secondments puts it

‘Seconded National Experts (SNEs) have a dual role: to bring to the Commission their experience of the issues they are used to dealing with and to take back to their home administration the knowledge of Community issues which they acquire during their secondment. They are seconded in order to let the Commission benefit from the high level of their professional knowledge and experience, in particular in areas where such expertise is not readily available in various fields’ (EC, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/personnel_administration/sne_en.htm, 24 July 2006).
Research on seconded national civil servants is sparse, let alone their strategic position and roles. Seconded national officials to the EU are often alluded to in studies of the European Commission services, but have rarely been subject of as actors within the EU policy process. Trondal argues that seconded national officials are treated as ‘the under-researched “Cinderella” of the Commission’ within the academic literature, but in fact deserve the attention as being a ‘parallel administration’ within the Commission (Trondal 2001). He concludes that ‘[S]econded personnel to the Commission are likely to put particular emphasis on pre-established national and sectoral senses of belonging due to their primary institutional affiliations at the national level of governance’ (Trondal 2001: n.p.).

Our interviews with civil servants at the agricultural department as well as the officials seconded from this department sheds a somewhat different light on the phenomenon of secondment. Although it is often officially denied by the Dutch civil service, the Ministry of Agriculture does strategically second civil servants to directorates-general of interest to the ministry. The ‘official’ denial stems from the fact that the Dutch perspective on the Commission has for long been that the Commission is a supranational body that should operate impartial to member states. One of our respondents told us that strategic use of secondment is something the French do, and not a Dutch thing to do:

‘The French government positions civil servants at the Commission with an assignment. If they fail, they can shake [sic] the rest of their careers. We are less tougher, but we have our discussions on this issue’ (civil servant at the Ministry of Agriculture).

We found that this view is ‘on-the-record’ policy. Off the record, secondment is perhaps the most important strategic instrument the Dutch Ministry of Agriculture employs in order to influence the contents of Commission proposals. This is expressed by one of the top officials, a director-general, at the department:

‘The position one [a seconded national official] has is not chosen by coincidence. It [secondment] is not just [an instrument] for the careers of civil servants. Secondment is of course good for their careers, but the position they occupy is also of importance to the department. They are in a place where we have interests. The places are strategically chosen. You don’t give them instructions, but you may do anything to have them keep a feeling with the
department. But you also deliver a Dutchman to Brussels who will work from a Dutch perspective’ (senior civil servant at the Ministry of Agriculture).

The salience of secondments as a strategic instrument is signified by the fact that a special working group is established that coordinates secondments to the EU and other international organizations that are relevant to the policy areas of agriculture. At the end of the 1990s, the Directorate of International Affairs set up a Working Group for Mobility, headed by the vice-director of IA, to coordinate the appointment of SNEs. As a respondent from this unit told us

‘Within this department we consider international mobility to be very important. We have people sitting on positions who participate in important decisions. They do not directly deal with the Dutch position, but they are placed there strategically, so not a coincident at all. Secondments are strategic’ (civil servant at the Ministry of Agriculture).

The strategic importance of SNEs is also recognized by the Food and Consumer’s Safety Agency. The ultimate goal of secondments is here also the ‘pre-cooking’ (Larsson 2003) of Commission proposals.

‘We [VWA] are in the process of developing [outcome-oriented] regulatory policies. I do not want our policies to be battered because the Commission decides to have the lowest common denominator. So what I want is that the Commission starts conceiving regulatory policy the way as we see it here at VWA. I ‘d like to steer the Commission to the direction we are heading to…I have permission from Agriculture to station two of our people [from VWA] at the Food and Veterinary Office at Dublin for a few years…I think the change [from output to outcome control] we have set in to be a very promising one. Therefore I try to exert influence at the source [of the policy process], to exert influence on the writing side…’ (senior civil servant at the VWA).

The question is: how is this done? How is this strategy executed? It would not be entirely true to perceive the issue of strategic appointments as single-sided process.
Reciprocity between international organizations and national governments seems to be necessary condition for secondments.

‘Often, international organizations want to address a problem, but have insufficient manpower at that time. The deal that we make is that we find it interesting as well [sic]. We second someone to the organization and pay all or part of the expenses. They then can deliver important work [e.g. against an outbreak of bird flu], that is of importance to the Netherlands as well. In this manner, can we acquire influence on things that are important to the Netherlands’ (civil servant at the Ministry of Agriculture)

But this does not imply that the Ministry of Agriculture can freely choose from among the available positions:

‘The input from the Netherlands should add to the work of the Commission. In the case of animal diseases and animal welfare, the Netherlands has a good reputation. The Netherlands stands a good chance of acquiring positions in these areas if the department decides to lobby for them’ (civil servant at the Dutch permanent representation at Brussels).

Active lobbying involves a good network and preferably personal relationships between Dutch and European officials. ‘I know the director of the Food and Veterinary Office very well’, one respondent told us, ‘and he asked me for personnel. I immediately arranged that’ (higher civil servant at VWA).

To what extent is this strategy effective in terms of policy outcome? Do seconding civil servants steer the direction of the policy process? Or is the ultimate benefit of having seconded officials within the Commission ‘to take back to their home administration the knowledge of Community issues’ as is the official statement of the Commission? Seconded national civil servants are expected to be loyal to the Commission and through their frequent interactions with the permanent staff to develop supranational identifications. Some of our respondents are clear about the role of seconded national servants: once they work they should be loyal to the Commission and they should not be put under pressure by their other departments. But actually no respondent denies the benefits that accrue to the department from
having a seconded official at a strategic position. One such benefit is that through a seconded official, the mother department can build a large network for the entire department:

‘We try to stimulate the directors of the SNEs to visit the SNEs at location. The SNE makes an appointment with his unit head, the director of the unit where he works, and if possible, with the director-general or the vice-director-general. They first talk about the project, but then will come to discuss a whole range of other issues. The purpose of these meetings is to get to know one another. It is much easier to pick up the phone when you know someone personally’ (civil servant at the Ministry of Agriculture)

The goal is to use the SNE and his position to pave way for high level networks. SNEs are further provided the basic technical facilities to keep in touch with the mother department. They have the possibility to enter intranet and to mail easily with their colleagues, so that both sides are kept informed. The tightening of networks at the Hague occur through yearly ‘come back days’ where all SNEs stationed over international organizations around the world are invited for a two-day meeting. SNEs are asked to give seminars on ongoing affairs. Directors-general are excepted to attend these meeting. The two-day meeting is closed with an informal dinner with the DGs and SG. The presence of the top-level is to signal the rest of the department that this is an important meeting.

The strategy of seconded national officials is not just for the sake of networks. Sometimes, if managed well and the situation allows it, a coordinated network of SNEs can lead to the exertion of significant influence on the policymaking process, even to agenda setting. One such instance occurred during a meeting on crisis management on avian influenza (bird flu) at the first half of March 2006. A higher civil servant of the Agriculture ministry was called to attend a meeting at Rome at the office of the FAO

‘I have someone seconded at the FAO for avian influenza, someone at OIE and a couple persons at DG SANCO. What has happened is that suddenly all these organizations were occupied by avian influenza. Last week I was called to a conference at FAO to come and talk about crisis management in case of
avian influenza outbreak. The United States was invited, but also the Dutch lady from my directorate seconded at OIE, the European Commission through one of my people at [name of DG], Louise Fresco\textsuperscript{31} also with someone of my directorate and me. I said, “let’s hold the meeting in Dutch with an English translation” (senior civil servant at the Ministry of Agriculture).

The overt representation of Dutch officials, of whom a majority were our respondent’s seconded officials, could of course not be the result of a benign forecast by our respondent, but it does show that the purposive strategic use of seconding may lead to situations where a (small) national state can have a substantial impact on decision-making and agenda-setting.

But also more substantial results can be booked. Seconded national civil servants bring their own national belief systems to Brussels. They carry with them the Dutch ‘norms and values’ to Brussels. ‘I think that everyone from the Netherlands, whether he is a seconded official or not, approach their work from the perspective of the Dutch norms and values. That is of great value. Therefore I think that as a member state you can gain influence here if a member state has a lot of officials seconded to the Commission, so that the process at Brussels becomes similar to that of your own country’ (a seconded national civil servant).

This occurred to some extent when the Dutch were invited to second a national civil servant to work on the meat hygiene control dossier. The official was seconded at DG SANCO and has worked three years on preparing a proposal for meat hygiene control that was part of the General Food Law. The Netherlands has been in favour or developing and implementing a regulatory style whereby hygiene inspections are longer executed by the state but by the private sector itself. The core of this system is that the Dutch government only assumes ‘system responsibilities’, stays aloof from physical inspection of the slaughterhouses and meat processing industries, but only inspects the systems designed by the private sector itself. The proposal the

\textsuperscript{31} The Dutch Louise Fresco was until 1 June 2006 FAO’s Agricultural Department’s Assistant Director General.
Commission submitted to the EOP and Council contained the mode of governance preferred by the Netherlands. ‘However’, our respondent explains,

‘the European Parliament took out a number of essential issues out of the proposal. This can mainly be attributed to the rapporteur. He was a former East-German veterinarian with a strongly developed ‘statist’ outlook. He took out a number of essential issues. The EP’s Environment, Public Health and Food Safety Committee rejected some of the rapporteurs proposals but left others intact. The most essential element of the proposal that did not make it was the proposition that slaughterhouses would be allowed to control the hygiene of their meat themselves, under the control of a veterinarian. The EP preferred that government officials should do this …The amendments of the EP were quite a drawback to the Netherlands. It came very inconvenient for the sector, because this was the mode of governance preferred by the Netherlands’ (*a seconded national civil servant*).

Despite this ANFS and the sector were content to some extent, as the surviving propositions left sufficient room for the Netherlands to implement the crucial elements of the preferred mode of governance within the Netherlands. This case illustrates that even though seconded nationals can not forge a preferred position, they can redirect the course of policy development in a specific direction. ‘Although our main points were tackled … we though the final result was a very modern regulation that enabled us to work with system-level monitoring of meat hygiene’ (*civil servant at the Ministry of Agriculture*).

Until now, we described the secondment of national officials as a strategic tool for influencing the Commission proposal. However, this should not give the impression that the Commission can be simply manipulated or steered into the direction desired by a national ministry or agency that seconds its civil servants. Seconded national officials are confronted with opportunities as well as constraints when they work for their departments. Due to the information of seconded officials, national departments are better informed about the positions of other member states and oversee potential dilemmas and difficulties of shifting towards a certain of mode of governance. However, the Commission is very well aware of potential dangers with entrusting files to its seconded national officials as the seconded respondents we
interviewed. Seconded national officials have to operate in a highly political environment where the stakes for the Commission and member states can be very high. An example illustrates this. It concerns the dilemma of how to treat confidential information:

‘When do you give what kind of information to the home front? The Commission makes internal reports of its negotiations. The Commission then says that the reports are internal we won’t share it with the member states. Well, on certain occasions, for example, the Netherlands wants to learn the content of that report. One thing you could do then is to give an oral summary of the report. A step further is that you do this by mail. Or you could just send the entire piece. You can do all this the day after the release of the internal report, or you could do this a month later. There is whole grey area of options and what the effects of it are is dependent on the number of interests that play a role. If the negotiation just concern a single country – well, in that case you could inform that member state what the Commission intends to do. But it changes when several member states, with diverging preferences are involved. As a seconded official, if you do not act carefully or according to rules of loyalty [which every seconded national official has to sign upon assuming office] you could awfully bang your head to the wall’ (a seconded national civil servant)

Therefore, if the Commission

‘has files that ought to remain secret, they give it to that person [a seconded official] and see what happens then. I don’t know whether the Commission does this consciously, but they are of course not naïve’ (a seconded national civil servant).

Seconded officials, as already written above, are ‘hired’ for working on a specific file. As also stated above, they bring their own norms and values with them. Often this is because the Commission wants a representative of certain member state to work on a proposal. The moment a seconded official enters his or her directorate general, he/she will experience a clash of governance modes.
‘There was much ado when I was appointed at Brussels. A storm broke out in 
Italy as it was fiercely opposed against the Dutch approach to meat hygiene 
controls. They felt that the Netherlands squandered their meat inspection by 
privatizing the inspection and giving the state only a small role. The Italian 
CVO [Chief Veterinary Officer] has invested a lot of effort to prevent my 
secondment’ (*a seconded national civil servant*).

The secondment could not be battered anymore, but our respondent did not have an 
easy start at Brussels.

‘My secondment was looked upon very sceptically, especially by colleagues 
from Southern Europe. They were very suspicious and critical. It was my 
“patron” a Fleming, my head of unit, and director who supported me. My 
direct colleagues were most suspicious. Most of them were French or Italian. 
They were sceptical about the Dutch way of thinking about meat 
inspections…They were not instructed by their governments to oppose my 
work. It was their natural attitude. They have been brought up differently’ (*a 
seconded national civil servant*).

To be successful in these circumstances requires a lot from the individual. Our 
respondent happened to be actively and passively fluent in French and Italian and this 
surely helped our respondent to establish cordial relationships with his colleagues. 
Our respondent also gave talks on meetings on this subject in Italy – in Italian – to 
explain the Dutch approach. And perhaps above all, ‘You have to show that you’re 
not a bad guy’ (*a seconded national civil servant*).

In sum, the use of secondments is a highly preferred and strategic instrument 
for influencing the content and direction of Commission proposals, but it does not 
lead automatically to a successful outcome. Working as a seconded national civil 
servant is fraught with pitfalls and the Commission is constantly alert to check upon 
the loyalty of its seconded officials.
4.5.3 Coalition Formation

Given the power of the Commission to shape the process and outcomes of the committee deliberations (Larsson 2003), we expect the pre-proposal process in which member states wait until the expert committees will produce an outcome that is the least preferred outcome from the perspective of the member states (see figure 1). However, despite the overwhelming constraints for member states to forge their preferred mode of governance within the final Commission proposal, our interviewees with experience in expert committee meetings still did point at a strategic possibilities that could be employed to increase the likelihood of achieving a proposal that would be more preferred than when no strategy would be pursued (see figure 2). This is coalition formation strategy, namely the forging of small coalitions with member states with more or less similar preferences and to act as a block during expert committee meetings. This strategy typically takes off when the representatives of the relevant national ministries for the first time convene during a committee meeting. A respondent gave us an impression of such a meeting, which was concerned with the draft of the regulation on control of foodstuff and animal fodder as part of the General Food Law:

‘On the basis of a raw draft of the Commission we [a number of experts from different departments] took a look at the various draft provisions considering what the position of the Netherlands should be… We put our ideas on paper and went to Brussels and submitted our points very explicitly… The meeting begins with a round during which each member state makes clear its views. During this round, you immediately pick your potential allies on different issues. You decide on an issue-basis who your allies will be. The views of the member states remain quite stable throughout the subsequent committee meetings later on. So you find yourself in agreement with country A on issue X and with country B on issue Z. At the coffee machine you then exchange further ideas in a very informal manner.’ (civil servant at Ministry of Agriculture)

Before a committee meeting takes place it is often very unclear what the positions of other member states are on the various issue. It is even more unclear who your allies will be and what the outcomes of the meetings will be.
A more activist stance is possible, however. In this respect we had interviews with respondents who explicated alternatives to letting the outcome of committee meetings be determined by the course the meeting assumes itself. Many of our respondents who regularly travelled back and forth between Brussels to participate in Commission committees (and Council working groups) stressed the importance of informal discussions ‘around the coffee machine’ at breaks, the lunches, as well as the drinks and, occasionally, the dinners before or after a meeting. However, the informal circuit will be more effective if it is not confined to moments when the committee meets, as one of our respondents told us. This respondent, who worked on the inspection aspects of hygiene measures of the General Food Law, set-up and coordinated a so-called ‘four-country consultations’. Somewhere in 2004, during the presidency of Luxembourg, German, Dutch, Belgian, and Luxembourguian civil servants began to meet the day before the committee meeting in order to discuss the agenda of the meeting next day, and to coordinate issues regarding the import of veterinary products.

‘During these meetings we look for issues on which we can reach an agreement and where our views diverge. On issues where we agree with each other we support each other…. For these issues we take a similar position. And we discuss tactics: who will say what and when… The last time [committee meeting] it went it so well that we dominated the meeting…We had an alliance. What happened then was that none of the new member states said something – something that is not unusual. But it also occurred that countries such as France and the United Kingdom remained silent. The other countries then [apparently] think ‘when Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium already agree’ the issue is closed. We have to be careful with this, however. We must not get too dominant. We must sometime seek for variations. That is that we should sometimes openly say “I don’t agree with you”. You must not create the impression that the three of us have pre-cooked everything already on beforehand. I don’t think the Commission will be pleased with this. But we nevertheless keep doing it!’ (civil servant at VWA).

32 The informal circuit is, by the way, underexploited by the Dutch civil servants. Brussels is too close to The Hague and hence to stay overnight. Evening programs, such as drinks and dinners, and meetings with fellow participants over breakfast at hotels are generally missed by Dutch civil servants.
The ‘consultation’ between the four countries and the subsequent ‘domination’ of the committee meeting, it must be admitted, occurred during the rather weak Presidency of Luxembourg. A small group of member states managed to ‘pre-cook’ a position and presented themselves as closed front vis-à-vis the Commission and the remaining member states. Under a ‘normal’ presidency the room to operate strategically as this will be much lesser and the costs of coordination and negotiation between the member states higher. Nevertheless, this example shows that in a setting with a large number of member states, coalition formation and the pre-cooking of a common position a small core of member states can form a front against the Commission and overwhelm other member states.

However, the above cited example of close cooperation between a limited number of member states is an incidence that depends for a large extent on the weakness of the presidency but also the personal relationships between the involved civil servants. They often held informal meetings and if this for financial reasons could not take place in a restaurant, they cooked something themselves. As our respondent admitted, the chemistry between the officials was extremely well: ‘The German and Luxembourghian colleagues offered to cook a meal themselves, whereas I wrote that I love German apple pie!’ Nevertheless it show the basic logic of the of our argument very well, namely that well-informed actors may seek ways to limit the entry of players to a battle of the sexes game and so limit the set of alternatives to those that are closer to their own ideal point.

In a more general sense, expert committee meetings further impede strategic action by member states because of the lack of information of other member states’ initial positions. Add to this the complex voting structure and it is not difficult to imagine that it has become difficult to estimate what kind of coalitions are possible, let alone to predict the outcome of the meeting or the final decision of the Commission what to do with the information that has emanated from the meetings. One important point should be stressed here, however. Our interviews were conducted two years after the enlargement of the EU. Before the enlargement coalitions were predictably clustered around the larger member states. Since enlargement, agreements within this arena are very difficult to predict. But since the EU has been enlarged with the ten Central and Eastern European countries:
strategic insight is no longer important. In the old days the voting blocks were almost as fixed. If the Netherlands were in favour of something, the Italians opposed. Then we approached the Germans to advocate our point and when Germany said it, the issue became settled. We only needed to sit back and relax and say nothing. Also, you used to have member states with so and so many votes that you could make calculations. Nowadays, it has become so complex that it is not worth to do something about. With twenty-five member states, calculations have become impossible. With which variants do you achieve a blocking majority? The number of parameters has grown so large that strategic interactions with representatives of other member states within the committee has become useless. Too many variants are possible’ (civil servant of the VWA).

In conclusion, despite the options for the forging of small blocks of likeminded countries and the possibilities to dominate the meeting and have the Commission adopt parts of the positions expressed this way, expert committee meetings will still be less effective than frontloading and signalling. Expert groups are established once the Commission has already adopted a direction. It requires a civil servant’s networking skills and long-term personal devotion to an issue to invest in coalition formation in order to bend the discussion within an expert group in the direction of his country’s interests. But still then the Commission remains in the driver’s seat and determines to large extent the substance of the proposal it submits to the Council and Parliament.

4.6 Eurocatic work as strategic behaviour: Conclusions

This chapter explored the strategic behaviour of national civil servants during the pre-proposal phase. Not only does it contribute to the research on a relatively unexplored phase of the EU policy process but also to the study of organizational and individual behaviour of national ministries and civil servants of the EU member states. Hitherto, ministerial departments have been examined by students mainly for the purpose of
mapping an assessing the effects of Europeanization on the structure and functioning of national administrative systems. Civil servants enjoy more and more attention from students of Europeanization, but following the studies on (changing) role perceptions and attitudes of EU civil servants (Hooghe 2001) the focus has mainly rest on the role perceptions and attitudes of Europeanizing national civil servants. The attention that political scientist devote to the politics of the EU policy process at the supranational level has enjoyed, however, has not been given to the politics of the proposal formation phase.

This chapter is perhaps one of the first studies of the strategic behaviour of national ministries and civil servants during this phase. The pre-proposal phase is conceptualized as a crucial phase where the first-mover advantages of member states can be disproportionably high. If a member state manages to move successfully before the Commission initiates a proposal for a directive or regulation, our theoretical argument goes, it can impose its preference on the other member states through forming the text of the proposal. For other member states to alter the text and bend the position within the proposal is required a forging of a coalition with a critical mass of other member states during subsequent committee meetings. Given the powers of the Commission during this phase and the difficulties of successful coalition formation (i.e. due to a battle-of-sexes game), the first moving member states actually succeeds to lock-in its ideal position when the Commission formally submits the proposal to the Council and European Parliament.

This chapter has identified three strategic options on the basis of this logic. Two of those options yield first-mover advantages. The first of these is signalling. We found that in contrast to the literature that signalling is not only the main task of civil servants at the permanent representation of the Netherlands, but also actively employed by departmental civil servants. Moreover, not only middle-level civil servants but also the higher civil servants we interviewed reported that actively contacting and informing Commission officials constituted an important part of their work practices. A difference is the lower frequency with which higher civil servants as compared to the middle-level civil servants meet their counterparts at Brussels. At all levels, then, individual civil servants are required to practice within and develop informal networks across a variety of policy-making arenas at Brussels. They have to
know what is going on at their home departments and which Brussels arenas and channels are best to signal their message.

As regards to frontloading, we are able to report that secondment is actually considered a highly strategic instrument during the pre-proposal phase, a point that has largely remained unexplored in research on SNEs. Secondments will surely to some extent affect role perceptions of seconded national officials and eventually, upon their return to their own departments, instigate a process of Europeanization of the culture and social practices at national departments. What has been overlooked hitherto is the strategic use of seconded national civil servants in the uploading of national preferences into the EU policy process. In our interviews we found that the ‘natural’ national perceptions and outlooks of the seconded national experts more than top-level instructions were considered as the most important mechanism through which national preferences are translated into Commission proposals. Once uploaded and launched into the supranational policy process, the preferences of the member state are locked into the highly institutionalized policy process at this level, leading to the ‘survival’ of the core of the ideas laid down in the proposal (80% according to Hull 1993). In addition to the individual skills and practices that civil servants have to develop and foster when employing the signalling strategy, frontloading requires their departments to organize for influencing Brussels. The departments need to make available sufficient resources to staff Brussels’ positions, recruit and motivate their skilled people, and top management commitment to the networks that evolve through seconded officials.

Finally, the findings we presented on the coalition formation strategy of member states during the proposal formation phase underscore the findings in the literature thus far. The Commission has extensive formal and informal powers during the pre-proposal phase; it has not only the right to initiate proposal but also capacities to steer and shape the committee deliberation process during the pre-proposal phase. The growing number of member states and the risen complexity of voting weights of the member states within the Council working groups during the subsequent decision-making phase has deemed it almost impossible for member states to operate strategically during the proposal formation phase. The only successful we reported above is in a sense exceptional therefore; the coordination of national positions during the four countries occurred in one specific area during a weak presidency. Like
signalling, individual civil servants are ‘alone out there’ negotiation with their counterparts from other member states; they need to know how the game is played and master sufficient knowledge and expertise to earn the necessary standing and reputation. However, the coalition formation strategy will fail if civil servants do not have clear mandates with clearly specified discretionary authorities. Top management therefore needs to guide and steer the efforts of their civil servants at the Brussels floor.

As studies of the politics of the pre-proposal phase have been scarce, our study has been explorative more than explanatory. We have chosen for conceptualizing the pre-proposal phase as a battle-of-the sexes game and fleshed out a number of possible strategies that may emerge out of a situation that is conceptualized in this way. Future studies should critically assess the theoretical underpinning of this study that led us to focus on two main strategies. To be more precisely, we need a better understanding of the rules of the game during the pre-proposal phase. In contrast to the supranational decision-making process where the process is highly structured and can easily be constructed as a game structure, the structure of the pre-proposal phase is less well understood.
CHAPTER 5
EUROCRATS AS DIPLOMATS AND AS ENTREPRENEURS:
GETTING THINGS DONE IN EUROPEAN POLICE
COOPERATION

'I am here to represent The Netherlands, and my colleagues back home sometimes have difficulties in appreciating that. They do the individual ministries’ bidding. Their arena is about pulling and hauling between ministries. Here the arena is about pulling and hauling between countries’ (An official at the Dutch Permanent Representation to the EU).

Q: Are you a Dutchman, a European, or a Euregional citizen?
'I am first and foremost a Euregional policeman. As far as my organizational back office is concerned I am embedded in the Dutch system, but the actual job lies in this transnational region, and this is on the increase. So I have to play chess simultaneously on two boards: the Dutch and the Euregional board. That implies an additional work load.’

Q: Do you behave differently because of this?
'There is no hierarchy in the cooperation with the other countries. It is more a social, network-like thing. Cooperation is all you’ve got. It is much less direct than working in a national command hierarchy. You must actually place yourself in the other person’s shoes’ (A senior police official in the Dutch province of Limburg).

5.1 Another logic of Eurocratic work?

The European Union has often been called a governance system sui generis, and a veritable industry of scholars attempts to grasp what one of them, Thomas Risse Kappen (1996), has referred to as ‘the nature of the beast.’ Our contribution to this effort is to look at European governance through the eyes of people who routinely ‘do’ European governance as part of their jobs as national civil servants. We want to know how these civil servants operate in European arenas and in which way this EU related work is embedded in and facilitated by the organizations they are part of. To attain insights into this we selected two cases to study in depth. They seemed to us to be most different cases with which it would be possible to compare at least two very different ways of doing European governance. In the previous chapter we examined the case of veterinary policy. We selected this case for several reasons. One of them being that veterinary policy is part of the First Pillar of the EU. This implies that the Commission is a crucial actor. Furthermore it became clear that this is a highly institutionalized regime and that the technocratic arena is dominant, although sometimes things get to be politically explosive. Examples include BSE and avian influenza. We demonstrated that in this context Eurocrats sense the opportunity to act as tacticians. They strategically move to influence proposals by signalling,
frontloading and coalition formation. In this chapter we focus on officials involved in making and implementing European police cooperation on behalf of the Dutch government. They reside mainly at the ministries of Interior and Justice, in the 25 regional and single national police force; a few of them are stationed at the Dutch Permanent representation in Brussels or at organizations like Europol. Police cooperation is a Third Pillar issue area, which means that it is governed by a much less ‘transnationalized’ regime of collective decision making than the First Pillar area of veterinary policy. We suspect such an arena offers national Eurocrats different types of incentives for ‘getting things done’ than faced by their veterinary counterparts described in chapter 4. Hence we expect there to be differences in the craft of being a national Eurocrat between these two sectors.

The quotes cited above illustrate what we want to argue here: that the role orientations and rules of thumb that the officials who work on police cooperation have developed in the course of their European experiences vary markedly. They ‘do Europe’ in very different ways. We shall demonstrate that holistic concepts such as ‘Europeanization,’ ‘European policymaking’ or ‘Eucrocrat’ hold little sway as tools for understanding the practical realities and experiences of national officials. Depending on the issue area and their positions, they operate in very different kinds of policy networks at the European level which performing markedly distinct functions. Grasping these different logics and examining how they complement and conflict with one another is pivotal to understanding what it takes to operate at the nexus between national and transnational policymaking.

5.2 The case of data availability: ‘messy’ policymaking in Europe

Data availability is a hot topic on the agenda of European Justice and Home Affairs institutions. Transnational sharing of information on anything – such as people, communication data, (stolen) vehicles, arms, explosives, poison, money - that might lead to a threat of safety and security in Member States is widely considered vital by all governments. Yet plans to facilitate this information sharing have aroused serious privacy concerns, fears about a loss of sovereignty in this key domain of state activity, as well as charges that these measures may undermine the rule of law. Different national viewpoints on data sharing have surfaced repeatedly in the preparations for
the European Council of JHA Ministers, and as such this case provides us with a
poignant view on how Dutch Eurocrats deal with such a hot topic. Below we report on
our observations and interviews in several arenas where this issue gets processed and
plays out in terms of both policy making and implementation.

5.2.1 An expert committee: Working Party on Police Cooperation
On 25 January 2006, a meeting was held at the Dutch Ministry of the Interior in The
Hague. Its purpose was to prepare the Dutch position on a proposal from the Austrian
Presidency for a European Council decision on improving police cooperation between
Member States of the European Union. A major part of the proposal concerned
procedures for improving transnational information-sharing among police forces. The
leader of the Dutch delegation would have to present the Dutch position on the
proposal the day after, during a meeting of the Police Cooperation Working Party, one
of the countless committees that prepare and help implement European policies and
programs. The delegation leader was a senior official from the Interior Ministry and
he was chairing the discussion. Attending it were four of his counterparts from the
Ministry of Justice (the ministries of Interior and Justice share responsibility for
Dutch policing policy). There were also two representatives from the Dutch National
Police, both veterans who had seen their last operational action years ago.

They discussed the Austrian proposal. There was much talk about technical
aspects: could the Dutch police departments meet the requirements envisaged in the
proposal, would they have to adjust their information systems, and could one expect
other countries’ police forces to do likewise? The relevant treaties which might bear
upon the measures proposed were presented. No mention was made of ministerial or
parliamentary decisions or opinions on the subject. There was no real debate about
anything on the agenda: the participants seemed to agree, and the ‘Dutch position’
simply emerged from that consensus. Some of the policemen present did not seem to
be fully aware of European procedural ‘nitty-gritty’ of the European policymaking.
They asked about the role the European Parliament plays in all of this. With narrowly
concealed condescension, one of the civil servants of the Justice Department
suggested they attend ‘a course on European matters’ that would be taught soon.

The next day, 26 January, the meeting of the Police Cooperation Working
Party took place in Brussels. The meeting was a full-day affair in the same enormous
conference room where the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Council of Ministers
meets, the eventual ‘end station’ for all these preparatory meetings. Every participant could speak in native tongue as interpreters translated to and from all official languages of the Member States. All participants wore earphones throughout the meeting. Cameras were an essential part of the interaction process: everyone had a screen on their desk on which the speaker appeared in close up, for everyone to read his facial expression. There were also several enormous screens hanging from the ceiling on which the same picture appeared. The Dutch delegation was small. Next to the delegation leader sat an official from the Dutch Permanent Representation to the EU. The most striking part of the meeting ritual was that participants were referred to not by their own name, but by their country’s. Every participant was seated at a huge oval table, behind a shield which bore the country’s name. A participant who wanted to make a statement put this shield on its side for everybody to see. The chairperson would then grant him permission to speak, saying things like ‘The Netherlands, the floor is yours,’ and would close the interjection by words like ‘Thank you, the Netherlands.’ Another striking thing was the little amount of contact between people of different delegations. Everybody was polite but controlled, and sticking strictly to known formulae. There were only few informal greetings or casual asides. Participants also acted very formally toward the chair. The Presidency had just changed hands, as it does every six months in the EU. And so, all speakers prefaced their opening remarks by formally wishing the Austrian presidency well and expressing their intention to co-operate with the presidency. And the politeness was reciprocal: all participants had found some small presents at their desk when arriving in the conference room, bureaucratic gifts like a tie or a booklet with the logo of the new presidency on it.

Nor was there any sign of the much vaunted Brussels lunching-cum-lobbying circuit. The members of the Dutch delegation had lunch together at the Salle Blue, one of the restaurants within the building: bread and a salad, pasta or baked potatoes with meat. The delegation leader did leave lunch before the others to have a talk with the Irish delegation on a project the Irish proposed which partly overlapped with a Dutch proposal that was also up for discussion. He also made a phone call to The Hague with one of his colleagues to check on something.

During the meeting the various proposals on the agenda were discussed in depth. It was a long day with arcane technical matters receiving sustained attention. The key proposal under scrutiny had been discussed before in other Council working
groups like ENFOPOL, ENFOCUSTOM, CRIMORG and COMIX. Remarkably, hardly anyone ever referred to these discussions in other forums; it appeared as if the participants had not been briefed about them.

The Austrian chairperson meanwhile tried to reach agreement on as many parts of the proposal as possible. She had little asides with her assistants and members of the Secretariat of the Council and then would propose a different wording of some part of the proposal. This meeting was about weighing, shaping and bending words until everybody agreed. At the end of the discussion the chairperson gave a short summary of the suggested changes to the proposal on which she took there to be general agreement. She also summed up issues for which no consensus-inducing words had been found. The proposal was now forwarded to next week’s Comité de l’Article Trente-Six (CATS), a coordinating committee of more senior civil servants. CATS would zoom in on those parts of the proposal on which no consensus had been reached, i.e. what were now referred to as the more ‘political’ parts of the proposal. After CATS had discussed, perhaps modified and signed off on it, the resultant proposal would be sent further up the European policymaking hierarchy, to the Comité de Représentants Permanents (COREPER), the meeting of the Member States’ ambassadors to the European Union. Once approved there, the proposal would finally come up for political decision in the JHA Council of ministers.

5.2.2 A high-level committee: CATS

An official from the Ministry of Justice and formerly at the Permanent Representation in Brussels who participated in the preparation of the CATS committee pointed out that he was acutely aware of the disjointed nature of the working group system. He thought the European Commission actually exploits the ‘organized anarchy’ in the third pillar by offering its proposals to different working groups, hoping that at least one of these channels will serve to lead this proposal up to the Council. Yet the leader of the Dutch delegation to the CATS committee disagreed with the idea that the Commission was playing the system. He thought it would be a great improvement if all proposals to the Council in the third pillar would be made by the Commission. This would at least bring some consistency in the messiness if there would be one actor in this process who maintains an overview of the entire terrain. Currently there is none. His chief concern with the current system was that political pressures might lead the high-level actors in CATS and JHA to fall for a hasty, patchy proposal.
coming ‘from nowhere.’ According to him, ‘the culture of the European arena is such that any decision is considered better than taking no decision at all’. He deplored the adhocracy this tended to bring about, citing instances in which decisions taken clearly conflicted with prior CATS decisions, or with a decision made by another forum in the JHA field.

The Dutch delegation leader also observed another form of pressure on the CATS committee process. At the end of the day all participants in CATS are accountable to their national bureaucratic constituencies. Hence he and all his counterparts from other countries is to vet each proposal put before them with one key criterion in mind: is there something in it for ‘us’? The bottom line of the CATS meetings is that all participants are first and foremost national civil servants, and feel compelled to act as such - or face uncomfortable questions back home.

The CATS delegation leaders identify themselves first and foremost as national civil servants, at least as much as the participants in the Working Party on Police Cooperation described earlier, even though they seem to know each other better than their lower-level counterparts do, addressing each other (by way of the chairperson) by their first names during the meeting. The Dutch delegation leader said that he himself would like to act more as a genuine ‘European’, taking the common good instead of the Dutch interest as his reference point for judging proposals and taking positions. Unfortunately, he said, his colleagues in The Hague, as well as his counterparts in forums such as CATS are overwhelmingly locked into their national perspectives and seem primarily intent on preserving their existing national policies, procedures and judicial systems. He welcomed the pressure put on his colleagues by the Foreign Ministry and Permanent Representation, ‘who regularly argue that something has to happen, some improvements have to be made. If it weren’t for that, everybody would simply lay back and wait.’

A member of the Permanent Representation confirms this point of view: ‘There is very little vision on which way to head in police cooperation. The general idea is to try to avoid inconveniences because of anything new. It would be so much better to try and benefit from new initiatives.’ A colleague from the Ministry of Interior hints at why civil servants seem to act the way they do: ‘As long as there is no clear political vision about a certain theme, there is not much vision developed among civil servants either. We stick to the political vision.’ This, he said, breeds
conservatism: ‘We are against a proposal because we have always been against it even if no one knows anymore what exactly was the reason for taking that position.’

The CATS delegation leader considered himself lucky to have a ‘Europe-minded’ minister. This gave him a lot of support in urging his colleagues to ‘get on with it’. The Dutch Minister for Justice had made crime fighting his top priority and is strongly aware of its European dimension. After the CATS meeting he pointed out that this provided him with opportunities. ‘Within the Netherlands, you often act as representative of an EU position: you overact your European allegiance in order to create room to manoeuvre. You do the reverse in Brussels, by saying: “I cannot possibly take this back to my superiors at home.”’

5.2.3 An operational arena: Europol

As far as data availability is concerned, it is all about trust, according to many policemen – as indeed is the case in other areas of European police cooperation. Even if police officers are aware of the necessity of international collaboration in fighting crime, they will not necessarily share information with foreign colleagues. They cite various reasons. First, professional jealousy: ‘why should we allow others to show off in cracking cases that we did all the work on?’ Second, reputation: ‘who knows what police departments in “funny” countries will do with our information?’ The new Member States especially are treated with considerable caution. Most policemen we spoke cite this as the main reason why any EU decisions on making data available to police forces from states other than a carefully selected batch of trusted and liked ones would prove difficult to implement - even when the political pressure to comply is enormous. A case in point is Europol, a Europe-wide agency specifically set up to advance transnational information sharing and police cooperation. Politicians and high ranking civil servants wanted to create a central data system to analyze key criminal and terrorist threats. In practice, police departments in most Member States deliver too little data too late for the system to getup and running: ‘They just don’t do it,’ observed a recently retired Dutch policeman who had spent years at Europol, and ‘this is a source of enormous frustration to the management board of Europol.’

The bumpy road of Europol’s efforts to advance information sharing and its own stifled institutional development bear testimony to an iron law of police cooperation: police officers need to feel an operational urgency (and payoff) to cooperate, and to be able to trust one another. If one of these is so much as doubtful,
they won’t move – whatever is being decided in Brussels and national capitals. This is worsened by practices at Europol’s Management Board. There has been little interest for Europol in the Dutch police; only recently one of the regional police chiefs has taken up the task to represent the Dutch police force at Europol’s Management Board. The chair of the Dutch delegation is head of a department at the Ministry of Justice. By way of an example, we recount the second day of a two-day meeting of Europol’s Management Board in The Hague. It started at 10 a.m. with a closed session on who should be formally proposed to the JHA Council as replacement of one of the deputy directors of Europol. Only delegation leaders were allowed into the conference room. The rest of the delegation members were waiting outside in the lounge. The Dutch delegation had four members waiting outside. At 11.30 there was a coffee break and the delegation leader mentioned that the discussion was still going on about the first candidate out of three. Representatives of some Member States were quarrelling despite intensive prior quite diplomacy and agreements. At 13.00 there was another break, now for lunch. Discussion restarted at 14.00 and finally at 15.00 the closed session was finished. As was envisioned by one of the delegation members during the closed session, after about half an hour some participants began leaving the meeting in order to be able to catch their planes at Schiphol airport to be able to get back home that same day. At 17.00 when the chair wanted to discuss and confirm minutes of the last meeting there were not enough participants left to have a qualified majority.

5.2.4 Cooperation on the ground: Euroregional policing

Yet another transnational site where data availability is considered to be pivotal is in the so-called ‘Euregions:’ border areas where, for example, police officials from the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany collaborate closely to combat trans-border organized crime. These policemen are in the thick of that fight and they consider the sharing of information about criminals and criminal acts with their foreign colleagues essential to make headway. They don’t care about legal niceties, they want workable procedures. They are convinced that these are impossible to design for 25 Member States at once, as the civil servants at the working group meetings attempt to. They instead have formed ‘experimental’ multinational teams with their neighbouring colleagues to find out what is possible, legally speaking, and what works for them. They have formed units like the Bureau of Euregional Cooperation in Maastricht in which the judicial base for this cooperation is laid out and a unit called Epic in which
police representatives from all three countries work to accommodate information requests from their partners.

Epic is located in Heerlen, a city near Maastricht. It is a pretty unique situation. There is no fixed hierarchical structure. Rules of the game evolve as they go along. People from all three countries sit mixed at large round tables with computer screens in front of them. In stead of formally having to formulate information requests, they just ask for the necessary information across the table. Legal experts are available to handle the requests for legal assistance from other countries.

The linguistic mechanics of making it work are fascinating. The Dutch living in the south of the country speak a dialect resembling German. The Dutch, German and Flemish speaking Belgian policemen communicate with each other in German or Dutch dialect. The French speaking Belgians are mostly assisted by the Flemish speaking Belgians, or by some of the Dutch who do speak French.

One of the Dutch policemen who had initiated the Euregional Bureau said that the key ingredients for successfully starting it were: practical expertise on crime fighting, personal relationships, intercultural respect, a sense of urgency to make a difference in tackling universally abhorred crimes such as child pornography, and the ability to align working methods across borders. Seen from up close, Epic’s every day practice is still quite mundane. About 80 percent of its work remains confined to answering to simple requests like identifying car owners by checking license plates. Moreover, cops from one country are legally not allowed to search each other’s data systems. Once this changes, Epic must gear up to the much more complicated task of not only rapidly delivering information on request, but also analyzing the available information in the more than 90 data banks it can enter. Its current staff - mostly officers who have left operational service because of one problem or another - is hardly up to that. But the ambition is clearly there, as is the knowledge that the current political mood – information sharing is widely advocated as a pivotal component in the ‘wars’ on crime and terrorism - is ticking in Epic’s favour.

5.3 Species of Eurocrats

The case of data availability illustrates that ‘European governance’ or ‘Europeanized policymaking’ is produced in a series of loosely coupled arenas, whose participants
are not necessarily aware of their counterparts’ existence, postures and decisions. Nor are they always well-informed about the bigger institutional configuration in which these are embedded. Working on European data availability and police cooperation mobilizes very different sorts of national civil servants driven by different rationales, operating in different ‘European’ arenas, often with considerable discretion, employing different notions of the ‘rules of the game’ in ‘doing police cooperation’.

The data availability case and many others like it suggest that conventional accounts describing it as ‘governing by committee’ (Christiansen and Kirchner, 2000) and ‘expertocracy’ where policies are crafted by ‘epistemic communities’ of experts (Haas 1992) are only partially correct. It would be more accurate to describe the EU governance as evolving through multiple, loosely coupled, multi-level networks (cf. Egeberg, Schaeffer and Trondal, 2003).

To be sure EU working groups and committees constitute focal points for crafting European policies. They are multi-national settings in which national civil servants operate as both policy experts and representatives of their countries, and in that way as the functional diplomats we wrote about in chapter 2. Although the policies they agree on are post-national in the sense that these are more than just piling up national policies and regulations, the policy process through which they arrive at this is multi-national (Thedvall 2006). Although working groups and committees are often said to be about experts talking to experts, our observations and interviews strongly suggest that they still are first and foremost about countries talking to countries, through their representatives.

The multi-national perspective is being reinforced by the rituals that are performed during the meetings. As we saw, for example, participants are referred to not by their own but by their country’s name. Some representatives seek coalitions with others in order to get the meeting to adopt the policies or regulations they prefer. This is not only done during the official meetings, but also during lunches, dinners, and coffee-breaks: these constitute the back stage of European committee governance, which is much more intense in first pillar affairs than in the third pillar. Sometimes representatives come together the evening before the meeting with the intention to prepare the meeting and form allegiances. Sometimes they sound one another out by e-mail or telephone prior to meetings.

The national outlook of Eurocrats dominates not only their encounters with their counterparts in working groups and committees, it also governs their relations
with the primary representatives of a post-national logic of European policymaking: Commission officials. Representatives of Member States come in with a focus on their national interests and somehow have to arrive at post-national policies through deliberative and negotiating processes. This can be time-consuming, and the compromises and package deals that emerge from it may produce watered down policies that satisfy no one. The Commission wants to maintain speed and focus in the policymaking process by intervening in discussion in working groups and delivering a steady stream of post-national proposals, which representatives of Member States time and again interpret as attempts to control their national affairs.

National Eurocrats experience a dilemma in all of this. Some of our Dutch interviewees expressed a sense of despair at the predictable and stifling way in which all representatives of Member States seem to only want to agree upon policies that fit their national systems. They detest the ‘conservatism’ that it breeds, as one of them labelled it. However, at the same time they are trapped in doing exactly the same themselves. At the end of the day, they too define their professional success in terms of getting their national positions to prevail – and at least to avoid them being disregarded altogether. After all, this is what they are held accountable for by their peers and in their national back offices. And so they too display reluctance to embrace truly post-national solutions, and play the tedious game of multi-national bargaining instead.

So far so good. But to leave it at this would obscure as much as it reveals about how Dutch officials do their European business. The various Dutch policing Eurocrats we studied were engaged in rather different types of international transactions. The nature of what it was they cooperated on across borders seemed to reflect the kinds of transnational network arrangements in which they did so.

5.3.1 Bureaucrat-diplomats
Take the data availability issue that was just presented. The Brussels’ working party on police cooperation and the CATS committee represent what we may call bureaucratic-diplomatic arenas of making European policy. The craft of the Eurocrats that populate these arenas revolves around two stages: first, as bureaucrats at home they need to construct a national position out of an often heterogeneous sets of views and preferences of various (sub-) departmental and other stakeholders (i.e. the police), often without clear political positions steering them; then, as diplomats, they need to
represent and defend those national positions whilst bargaining with representatives of
other member states. To some this is simple stuff. One ministry of Justice official
boasted:

‘Working in EU settings is actually very straightforward. Everybody knows
this but it is rarely ever said aloud. When you go to Brussels you say to your
colleagues at home: “It will be tough to achieve this.” When you are in
Brussels you tell your fellow committee members: “I must be able to sell this
at home.” And so you always have an explanation for the result you achieve.’

The bureaucratic-diplomatic view of Eurocratic work corresponds closely to the
traditional picture of the EU as a multilevel system of committee governance. We
found it to be prevalent among two groups of Dutch officials. Firstly, among ministry
officials of the kind labelled ‘policy bureaucrats’ by Page and Jenkins (2005):
academically trained professionals charged with policy development and maintenance
in particular issue areas. Their involvement in European policy processes flows from
their portfolio responsibilities and is issue-based, sporadic and often does not
constitute a major part of their working week. They are not specifically interested in
EU institutions and processes, nor have they received any formal training in their
modus operandi. They are just ‘following their dossiers:’ to preparatory meetings
within and between Dutch ministries, and occasionally to expert or working group
meetings in Brussels. To many, acting at the European stage may be a regular, but
quite often infrequent part of their jobs. Nor is it necessarily the most important part
of their jobs. Much depends, as always, on the priority given to the topic by the
departmental hierarchy.

In many cases, these policy bureaucrats are not particularly well-prepared for
the new world they are about to enter when they are first assigned EU-related tasks.
We cite two voices from a much bigger chorus:

‘They just let you go to Brussels. It isn’t a very structured thing. You just go
there and begin to operate. You learn by doing, and by observing others doing
it.’

And:

‘I stumbled into the European scene in 1985 because my portfolio required me
to attend meetings in Brussels. Your older colleagues or your head of unit
would give you some coaching. They would come with you once or twice and after that it was “you’re on your own now - good luck with it.”

Some of these officials may continue to be charged with European portfolios for long periods of time. In the organizations studied, this was far more likely to happen to officials at the Agriculture and Justice ministries than to their colleagues at the Interior and Health ministries. Those that do, build up considerable experience in the do’s and don’ts of operating in Brussels. Taken together, this constitutes a potentially valuable body of rules of thumb and ‘survival techniques’ that could be codified and transmitted much more systematically from EU veterans to EU novices within the various departments. At present, this does not seem to happen. People are sent to courses at the Dutch Institute of International Affairs (Clingendael) or the National Government Training Institute (ROI). This is deemed useful by many to get a grip on the institutional framework of the EU, learn about intercultural negotiation and so on. Such formal training remains useful even for those with hands-on experience, as one official confirmed:

‘After two years on the Brussels circuit I went to the Dutch Institute of International Affairs to do a course. It was interesting to finally get the bigger picture about the entire EU project – how all the pieces of the puzzle are supposed to fit. If you are only attending committee meetings you don’t grasp this at all.’

The second group which practices and espouses the bureaucratic-diplomatic view of Eurocratic work are the ‘EU insiders’: EU coordinators at ministries, officials attached to the Permanent Representation, and high-level officials who chair delegations to high-level meetings. For all the differences between their ‘average working days,’ all of these people describe their work as proceeding in more or less scripted, predictable fashion. Theirs is the world of institutionalized bargaining – both at home and in multilateral forums. In that world, which they regard as not very unlike that of other multilateral institutions such as the UN or the WTO, the scope of the possible is determined by existing treaties, agreements and regulatory frameworks, as well as by balances of power, veto players and coalitions. Knowledge about these things tends to be widely shared among the participants, all socialized over time to become EU insiders.
Being effective in this world, these civil servants hold, requires astute anticipation of the institutional balance between Council, Commission, Parliament and Member States. Preparatory work may also involve ‘massaging’ key gatekeepers within EU institutions, particularly Commission policy bureaucrats who are shaping the proposals, but also pivotal MEPs. More generally it requires smart ‘venue shopping’ within these constituent forces: talking to the right people in the right bodies at the right time in the right way. The actual EU working group, committee and Council meetings are seen as pivotal occasions for bargaining and issue by issue coalition-building that build on this preparatory work. Those that do their homework well ought not to be surprised by what transpires there, and they should be well-placed to shape their decision-making processes, if only by short-circuiting them in advance (as became clear in some of the examples we gave above. By virtue of their institutional and tactical know-how, EU insiders are ideally able to foresee how particular issues will play out, and take timely action to steer the process in desired directions. However, the sheer complexity of the processes involved, makes fool-proof prediction and control of the policy process difficult to achieve.

In the domestic ‘back office’ of EU policymaking, Eurocratic work boils down to aligning departmental and interdepartmental policy coordination to the rhythms, procedures and routines of scheduled EU meetings. In these preparatory meetings ‘the national interest’ and therefore the ‘national position’ on any given topic on the EU agenda get defined. Civil servants attending these preparatory meetings formulate what the national interest is, often in the absence of clearly articulated ministerial preferences, let alone cabinet policy. They are flying blind quite a lot of the time.

On touchy topics like data availability and information sharing in the criminal justice field Ministers do formulate opinions, but on politically less salient issues the civil servants at the meeting construct a ‘national perspective’ all by themselves. They brief Dutch delegation leaders in the working group or committee in Brussels on these positions. Delegation leaders then make their own judgments on how to interpret the instruction; they know full well that much of what The Hague feeds them does not come straight from the top, and thus can be taken with a grain of salt.

Discretion is the name of the game in this process. A representative in the Multidisciplinary Working Group on Organized Crime observed:

‘Often it is individuals themselves who determine the national position. I think that is weird. If something does not have a fire-alarm character or very high
priority you can decide yourself what to do. [The delegation leader] does that a lot of the time. But he also discusses it. When he decided no longer to defend a certain position in CATS he came by to tell me. That was a unique occasion. Generally you never hear about anything again...In the international arena your autonomy is bigger than in the national arena. That is because it has less priority. The national and the international are completely separated.'

A Head of Delegation to one of the committees echoed this:

‘You must know your instruction well, but you should also know the entire process that produced the instruction in order to gauge the weight of the various interests involved. You try to achieve your instruction, and if that’s impossible you try to at least achieve its bottom line. However, the instructions are often useless, frankly. The official who actually attends the working group knows its dynamics best. You must not lose on the really vital issues. You have a lot of discretion, but you must of course anticipate the Hague’s reactions.’

The coordinators at ministries are at the hub of this process of defining positions, drafting instructions and monitoring outcomes. As one puts it:

‘Most EU dossiers touch upon the work of two or more parts of this ministry: the EU’s way of dividing up policy issues does not correspond perfectly with the Dutch departmental division of labour. There is a need for a “sorting station.” That’s what we do.’

In some ministries (Justice, Agriculture) these units provide a comprehensive, centralized system of coordinating EU policy matters across the full range of the ministry’s portfolio. Others, such as the Ministry of the Interior, have opted a more hybrid system where a central coordination unit focuses on procedural matters, whereas international sections within some of the policy or executive decisions deal more closely with the substantive preparation of meetings in specific issue areas (such as policing and intelligence). Yet others, such as the Ministry of Health, have no such coordination unit at all. The domestic EU affairs coordinators we encountered seem to agree that two things are particularly important in their job. The first is getting those that matter in one’s own department to accord appropriate priority to the issues. This may be an uphill struggle. In the four ministries examined here, differences in
ministerial involvement were marked: low, passive and almost non-existent in Health and Interior; the opposite in Agriculture and Justice. When ministers have other priorities, the ministry’s top officials tend to have likewise.

The second part of a coordinator’s job is to develop a clearly articulated departmental position on any given issue, and making sure this position carries weight in interdepartmental coordination processes prior to EU meetings. Bureaucratic politics does not stop at borders: the domestic coordination of EU policy is a known bureaucratic battleground in many countries (Kassim et al, 2000). The Netherlands is certainly no exception to this rule: its ministries are big and internally heterogeneous, and where ‘joined up government’ has proven an elusive ideal at best, and where the machinery of interdepartmental coordination of EU affairs has been the subject of repeated investigations, discussions and tugs of war between the Foreign Ministry and the Prime Minister’s department.

As on any policy issue of significance, interdepartmental scuffles are no exception in the run-up to high-level European meetings.

‘We at the Ministry of Interior often prepare texts to be delivered by our minister at the JHA Council. Sometimes our minister decides not to attend the meeting because of limited time when few of the decisions to be taken are in the domain of the Interior. Then he leaves it to the Minister of Justice to represent us. The Minister of Justice always does that very well. He is very much internationally orientated, and communicates well with his colleagues from other countries. But it weakens the position of the Ministry of Interior vis-à-vis the Ministry of Justice.’

Those who sit in the hot seat as delegation leader in Brussels obviously have leverage over the other departments and other stakeholders whose interests are at stake in these meetings. That is why interdepartmental sensitivities like the one mentioned above occur. Ministries whose top ranks do not accord high priority to European issues tend to be on the losing side of the interdepartmental scuffles. It is hard for the EU coordinators in these ministries to get their organization’s voice listened to in the interdepartmental preparations for EU meetings. They lack their ‘prize-fighters’ that can be brought into the ring if other departments attempt to grab and wield power, e.g.
by securing Head of Delegation spots in crucial EU committees and working groups, and by dominating the crafting of Dutch positions on important issues.

5.3.2 Street-level entrepreneurs

How different is the world of the other species of Eurocrat we encountered. These were people whose main orientation was their profession, whose natural habitat the operational practices in the field (e.g. ‘street-level’), and whose main drive to engage themselves on the international/European stage was to solve practical problems they encountered in these practices in whichever way that works (e.g. ‘entrepreneurs’).

Eurocratic work is experienced quite differently by people working in the Euregional Bureau. Theirs is an entrepreneurial perspective: forging street-level cooperation aimed to solve pressing problems in public service-delivery. Entrepreneurial Eurocrats are busy setting up of trans-border investigations or enforcement measures and officer training programs.

The dichotomy of national versus post-national identities (with traces of departmental identities) that bureaucrat-diplomats struggle with does not capture the role orientation of these operational practitioners: they are, above all, experts in their field. Technical knowledge and professional skills are their stock in trade, and form the prime lens through which they view and assess their foreign counterparts and the possibilities for cooperative ventures. Combining an expert’s knowledge with a zealot’s drive in a context of at best embryonic European institutions and policies circumscribing what is to be done and how, can get a national Eurocrat a long way in shaping policies with a small band of kindred spirits. Here is what police commissioner Ad Hellemons, director of European Affairs of the Transport Police Division of the Dutch National Police Agency, told us when we asked him to describe a ‘typical working day on the European circuit’. He picked one and recounted:

‘My alarm clock goes off at 3 AM. I live in the west of Brabant (in the Southwest of the Netherlands) and can hop in and out of Paris in a day. I am in my car half an hour later and get to Paris in time to beat the rush hour. I reach the Gendarmerie’s headquarters well on time to share a coffee with the duty officers in the General’s secretariat. I know them from previous visits and since I am reasonably fluent in French I can chat a bit to get a sense of the mood of the day. I visit the French that day to get them to commit certain new initiatives of TISPOL [see box, auth], which I helped found and was president
of for many years. When I get there I know that my immediate counterpart in
the French traffic police division is already on board, but the French hierarchy
dictates that the matter has to be taken all the way up to the very top before
anything happens. I know I have to open the conversation with the General in
such a way as to enable him to conduct himself in French without having to
draw attention to his limited fluency in English. That hurdle taken, we make
some small talk. Then I gently steer the conversation to the topic at hand. I
stress the pivotal importance of French “leadership”, you know the stuff he
likes to hear. In fact, it is not all that difficult to get people like the General’s
to cooperate. They know I am not a loose canon. TISPOL has a good
reputation because since its inception the number of road deaths in Europe has
started falling dramatically. An hour later my business is done. I hit the road
and am back home in the early afternoon.’

Hellemons epitomizes the ideal-type of the ‘other Eurocrat’: the doers, the
experimenters, the rule-benders, the venue shoppers. People like him were most
conspicuous in the police cooperation field: police commissioners and public
prosecutors in border regions, narcotics and road safety specialists, police educators.

The open, not yet highly institutionalized, non-supranational structure of Third Pillar
policymaking invites this kind of behaviour. Officials of this ilk are mainly people
driven to reduce trans-border threats to safety affecting their forces’ day-to-day
operations which they could not possibly tackle all by themselves. They need
information and collaboration from foreign colleagues to be able to do their core
business. Cooperation to them is a means to a clear end rather than a generic, ongoing
task of managing Dutch participation in the EU committee system and working group,
as it is for the bureaucrat-diplomats in ministerial back offices and at the Permanent
Representation.
TISPOL Mission Statement

"The TISPOL Organisation has been established by the traffic police forces of Europe in order to improve road safety and law enforcement on the roads of Europe. Our main priority is to reduce the number of people being killed and seriously injured on Europe's roads. We believe the enforcement of traffic law and education, where appropriate, will make a significant contribution to reducing the carnage on our roads. This is evident in a number of TISPOL member countries."

The objectives of TISPOL

1. To reduce road deaths and casualties on European Roads.
2. To bring together the Roads and Traffic Police Forces in Europe to work together and exchange best practice.
3. Organizing and co-ordinating pan-European operations and campaigns
4. To encourage enforcement and education based on research, intelligence and information so as to establish an effective and targeted education and enforcement programme.
5. Initiating and supporting research on road safety
6. Providing an informed and co-ordinated police opinion on road safety issues

TISPOL, the object of Ad Hellemon’s Eurocratic entrepreneurship is by all accounts very successful. He explained how it came about:

‘The problem of transport policing in Europe is that roads and mobility policy is made by our cousins in the First Pillar whereas our family inhabits the Third Pillar. This implies that the policy and rules that the transport police is supposed to enforce, are made in the First Pillar, in the complete absence of the enforcers. That Third Pillar is a monstrosity with unanimity rule and a serious lack of interest in policing matters. If it is not about terrorism or organized crime, they ignore it, but the reality is that no less than 30% of all the cops’ available time in Europe is involved in traffic one way or another.
Contact between the First and Third pillar on this issue is non-existent. When
decisions are taken in your absence, all you get to do as police organization is
to clear up the mess afterwards, e.g. having to enforce policies that are
unenforceable or outright self-defeating. Activities in these two pillars should
be linked, but that wasn’t happening. And so we as traffic police forces have
drawn an arrow from the Third to the First Pillar. That arrow constitutes my
role orientation… we have set up three different networks, but the biggest and
most developed is TISPOL. It has all the EU members on board as well as
several candidate states and Switzerland and Norway. It is fully financed from
First Pillar money… for me it means driving a lot. Trips such as that one to
Paris. They are about making contact, looking the other guy in the eye. Use
old contacts as a stepping stone for making new ones. This network has been
built and is now fully financed by the Commission. It is officially a British
foundation and we have a president, financial director and executive board. I
am the executive director. The owners are all the participating police forces.
We have five working groups for exchanging information, develop joint
training programs, develop pilot projects and reporting systems, and plan joint
operations. We are quite operational. We run 50 to 60 pan-European
enforcement operations each year… To fund various projects we compete for
Commission money by submitting proposals. We maintain good contacts with
Commission officials and have had about 19 of our proposals funded. We
compete for funding these projects

Q: How did you get into the Commission on this?

Very simply: you check on the Web who are dealing with traffic safety issues
and you walk in. To give you an idea: there are only seven people in the entire
Commission doing road transport and they all sit in adjacent rooms. Each of
them is happy to do business with you. We feed them with ideas and proposals
that help them achieve the stated Commission objective in this policy domain,
which is to reduce road deaths in Europe by 50% in 2010. The Commission
put this on paper but had no idea how… At that time we stepped in and the
Commission discovered that it needed the police, and needed the know how
from certain countries…. And things are marching along beautifully now: we
are at the midway point in the time line and we are right on schedule. And this
is about a structural annual reduction in the number of road deaths of no less than 11,000.’

TISPOL’s director is clearly a man with a mission: to reduce traffic deaths and casualties by beefing up prevention and enforcement on a pan-European scale. Operational necessity got it going, but trust among professionals across borders is what makes it tick. The same goes for all the other police cooperation networks we studied: with trust, they can be vibrant – as in the case of Epic case described above - but when trust is lacking – as in the Europol case - progress is limited. The following exchange with another senior Dutch police officer highlights this:

Q: Is there such a thing as a policy framework that dictates whether or not you engage in cooperation with other countries’ police forces?
   Yes. It is very simple: do you trust someone or not? It begins with the people involved, and only after that it becomes a matter of organizations or countries.

Q: What must I do to gain your trust?
   Be open and transparent. You get to know people through international committees and networks. It all starts with interpersonal relationships.

Q: This trust appears to be very personal. Isn’t there some sort of guideline?
   There is a kind of division, for example through Interpol: we do business with so and so, and not with these others – there is a list of this kind. But most of it is individual. You look at the other person’s country’s democracy and all that.

Q: What is the ultimate aim for the Dutch police when it comes to international police cooperation?
   It would be good if policemen and the mayors and public prosecutors who work with them take international cooperation as something that is self-evident. This implies that they should also be convinced that they should devote time to it and be courageous in doing it. It means they will cooperate on the basis of solid agreements and institutionalized trust. Most of all, it is about cooperation becoming taken for granted.

Street-level entrepreneurs have no intrinsic commitment to the EU project and its main institutions. They try to work through these institutions, but often run up against legal and political constraints. This is especially relevant in the Third Pillar, where
development of EU-wide cooperation is slow and the main advocate for truly post-
national policies, the Commission, occupies a weaker position vis-à-vis the Member
States. Street-level Eurocrats in this domain are constantly confronted by the gap
between their felt needs for deeper cooperation and the murky realities of EU
practices: they want things for which there are no policies in place yet. Their coping
strategy is one of circumvention: by-passing the obstacles of working within the EU
institutions by developing alternative forms of cooperation, showing that these do the
job, and over time trying to integrate them into the EU mainstream.

They tend to strive for autonomy, and regard the role of ministries as
gatekeepers to participation in relevant EU networks as unhelpful meddling in affairs
that could more effectively be settled among professionals. A police chief: ‘I don’t
think that the current government’s orientation on putting the citizens first by letting
the professional do their job is properly safeguarded by having us represented in
Brussels predominantly by departmental bureaucrats. They are not sufficiently on top
of the substance of the issues, which can be quite intricate. It is easy to get it wrong or
gloss over the important ‘details’ if you’re not a professional yourself. Besides, it is
much easier to build transnational rapport among professionals in a particular field.’
They are not comfortable with the world of instructions, mandates, interdepartmental
coordination, procedural intricacies, forced inclusiveness and logrolling strategies that
is part and parcel of the bureaucrat-diplomats’ cooperation paradigm.

They instead prefer to build cooperation from the ground up by nurturing
personal and professional networks and creating prototypes of practical joint problem-
solving that work. One police commissioner put it so eloquently that it is worth
quoting him at length:

‘Since the process of developing European regulation is so extraordinarily
time-consuming in the Third Pillar, we at the operational level simply need to
create movement in smaller entities. You must of course respect state
sovereignty and all that, but within these boundaries you must create facts.
Take the example of “joint hitting” in serious crime investigations: we first
formed a cross-border team and only asked for The Hague’s permission to do
so after the fact… In a way it is all about seduction. Take a concrete shared
headache first. You start with sharing information. You start small: concrete
and feasible projects. And you take ‘safe’ forms of cooperation first, such as
liaison officers and joint education and training. Then you just happen to
organize a conference with your partners from other countries, and then you get the ball rolling… The trick is to transpose the operational sense of urgency towards the strategic level, the politicians and the very top of the civil service. If at all possible I try to keep the tactical level of middle-level officials out of it, since they tend to be the ones producing all the hurdles. They are more engaged in fighting one another about who gets to head the delegation to the Brussels committees than in facilitating practical cooperation. They are like a thick, impenetrable layer of clay that mutes every movement… They have another set of roles and responsibilities than we do. They are to safeguard the uniformity and coherence of Dutch law and policy; we represent the voice of professional service delivery to citizens. And it is a pity that our does not get heard sufficiently directly in Brussels. This is why we are lobbying hard to establish a national “Police House” in Brussels. We number 54,000 policemen and women in this country; if we are not prepared to invest in freeing up some 100 to 150 of them to deal with international cooperation and EU affairs in all their various manifestations, we will simply miss the boat.’

5.4 Understanding national Eurocrats: conclusions

In this chapter we have studied Dutch Eurocrats in the field of European police cooperation in order to understand the worlds they work in, and the ways in which they define and do their work. We suspected that in the relatively open institutional environment of a Third Pillar sector such as police cooperation, Eurocratic work is less focused on the influencing the European Commission and the drafting of its policy proposals then in a First Pillar sector such as veterinary policy, as the Commission has little scope for such initiative under the Third Pillar. So ‘getting things done’ must entail a different type of craft, to be practiced in different types of arenas. The research reported in this chapter bears out this expectation. It does however yield a differentiated picture – there is no single, shared notion of ‘European policymaking’ and ‘Eurocratic work’ in this sector, there are multiple ones which co-exist. Strategic behaviour on the part of member state officials is certainly part of this, but it takes rather different forms than the tactics described in chapter 4 on veterinary Eurocrats.
Looking closely at the world of police cooperation, we distilled two quite distinct logics of the Eurocratic craft (see figure 1). In seeking an answer on our first research question, we found civil servants operating in different ways in different European arenas. We found bureaucrat-diplomats at the ministries as well as in working groups and committees in Brussels, bargaining about national positions. We found street level entrepreneurs building transnational coalitions of the willing, as they are confronted with transnational crime. These are, of course, stylized, ideal-typical pictures, whereas real-life officials may display these traits to different degrees and in all sorts of hybrid combinations. But we think the distinction is useful for analytical and policy purposes.

In part, these different role conceptions simply reflect individual differences, and differences between ‘policy bureaucrats’ and operational ‘do-ers’. But they are also shaped by the differentiated nature of the European polity. European governance is produced in bundles of highly different types of policy networks of functional diplomats, depending on the nature of the collaborative challenge at hand (such as exchange, regulation, enforcement, see Slaughter, 2004) the institutional context in which joint action was being shaped (e.g., the position of the issue area in the EU Pillar structure), and the level of action involved (policymaking versus operational collaboration). And so, when compared to the ‘old’ and deeply institutionalized world of EU veterinary policy or the equally scripted world of the Brussels committee system, there are few precedents and rules to observe for those involved in developing European police cooperation from the ground up. In that arena there is considerable scope for bottom-up agenda-setting and experimentation. There are no fixed allegiances; the challenge is to build coalitions of the willing and find resources to get them going. So this is part of the answer on the second research question we posed: the way in which the European work is organizationally embedded and facilitated is hugely differentiated.
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<td><strong>Natural habitat</strong></td>
<td>Formal working parties and committees and national preparatory process.</td>
<td>Networks in which information and good practices are exchanged and which strengthens enforcement.</td>
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<td><strong>Role orientations</strong></td>
<td>Preparing and representing national positions in multilateral forums</td>
<td>Getting things done</td>
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<td><strong>Activity and contact patterns</strong></td>
<td>Centred around scheduled national preparatory meetings and scheduled EU-level working group and committee meetings</td>
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<td><strong>Measures of quality and effectiveness</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Knowledge and expertise</strong></td>
<td>Knowledge of formal and informal rules of the game in EU system</td>
<td>Professional know-how</td>
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<td>‘Classic’ diplomatic skills (intercultural empathy, language, negotiation, networking etc.)</td>
<td>Broad trans-border and/or trans-national network in own professional domain</td>
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<td>Broad network across the various EU institutions, particularly Commission and EP</td>
<td>Knowing where to get money and how to overcome potential obstacles in EU system</td>
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<td>Bureau-political skills and clout in the domestic preparatory coordination process</td>
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<td>Sound grasp of issue substances</td>
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Figure 1: Dutch Eurocrats: two ideal-types

What is more, bureaucrat-diplomats and street level-entrepreneurs clearly inhabit worlds apart. Street level-entrepreneurs complain about bureaucrat-diplomats knowing too little about ‘the real work’ (which is about preventing crime and catching criminals in whichever works); bureaucrat-diplomats complain about street level-entrepreneurs’ tunnel vision and zealotry disrupting the even-handed development of policy across the full range of the dossiers that together constitute the police cooperation portfolio.
Whereas the departmental civil servants are focused on articulating and defending the national point of view in multilateral forums, operational zealots seek to create vehicles for cooperation in truly post-national fashion. Their sense of interdependence is strong, simply because the nature of the phenomena they deal with makes it impossible to belie this. Treading cautiously in the formal EU committee settings is not for them, and they seek to work around them. One way to do so is to draw on the ambitions and the fleshpots of the European Commission to gain support for smaller-scale ‘experiments.’ A related way is to build informal ‘coalitions of the willing’ to find out if and how new forms of cooperation across borders can be made to work, both on the ground and in legal terms. In doing so, they hope to create irreversible facts. The Bureau of Euregional Cooperation in Maastricht described above is one such attempt.

Currently, street-level entrepreneurs rather than bureaucrat-diplomats are the main engines of cooperation and ‘integration’ in the police cooperation dossier. This may not last. Paradoxically, highly dynamic and successful street-level entrepreneurs to some extent sow the seeds of their own demise. As the operational practices they create become more visible and elaborate, pressures to formalize, regulate, and embed them in EU-wide institutional arrangements will grow. To make sure these formalization processes unfold in desired directions is not something that street-level entrepreneurs are inclined or indeed equipped to do. It will be up to their bureaucratic-diplomatic counterparts to secure and consolidate the fruits of their labour.

Some bureaucrat diplomats go even further. They are no longer inclined only to produce new rules and regulations, but show a growing awareness that it is part of the problem in police cooperation that for every problem new regulation is decided on. These ‘new’ bureaucrat diplomats are aware that to facilitate police cooperation in a way that the police themselves perceive as useful, devising new regulation is not enough. According to them, national departmental officials should cooperate with the police and the European Commission in focusing on practical aspects like facilitating exchange of information, producing handbooks and who-is-who lists. Perhaps they are representative of a broader phenomenon: national bureaucrat diplomats who share the typical street-level official’s sense of urgency to beef up functional cooperation in areas where it can make a big difference, and in doing so revitalizing the European project. Some street-level bureaucrats have expressed a similar need for such new ways of cooperation. If their numbers increase, perhaps the various species of
Eurocrats discerned in this paper will blend into a hybrid - the ‘complete street-level diplomat.’ But for the time being, the day-to-day reality of national administrations seeking to get things done in Europe will continue to involve a delicate balancing act between the different outlooks and operating styles of bureaucrat diplomats and street-level entrepreneurs.
CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS AND REFLECTIONS

6.1 Introduction

In chapter 1, we formulated the following two main questions for our study:

1. How do Dutch civil servants experience and practice the craft of policymaking for and in European arenas?
2. To what extent and how do these civil servants consider themselves to be facilitated and constrained by existing ways of organizing European affairs in their respective organizations?

Each of these questions was specified in a number of more specific research questions, which were then tackled by employing an intricate mix of analytical perspectives and research methods (survey, interviews, observations).

In this chapter, we will review the evidence about each of the specific questions gathered through the various research methods. In doing so, we aim to achieve three things. First, we will summarize some of the points brought forward in the preceding empirical chapters. Second, we will bring together and compare the findings from the survey and the two qualitative case studies in order to arrive at a more comprehensive understanding of the issues raised in chapter 1 and draw a number of overarching conclusions. Finally, we will confront our empirical results with the outcomes of the expert meetings that were held at the end of our research. These expert meetings were meant to provide a sounding-board for our observations, allowing us to assess better to what extent they were shared by people working on EU-related matters within a wide range of organizations in central government. Hence, they may serve to corroborate our conclusions, as well as to specify them or place them into the proper context.

We will structure our discussion along the lines of the specific research questions of chapter 1, starting with the questions on the individual ‘EU craft’ and then moving on to the organizational context within which individual activities take place. Subsequently, we will draw two overarching conclusions that come out of our study. The chapter will end with a number of reflections with a view to strengthening the Eurocratic craft within the Dutch administration.
6.2 Eurocracy as individual craft

In chapter 1, Question 1 about the individual dimensions was broken down into six specific research questions. These will be discussed in turn below.

6.2.1 Role orientations

The original question here was: what do national civil servants see as their chief tasks and aims when participating in European policy processes? This study clearly shows that there are different ways of conceiving of Eurocratic work, which conform to the two main categories of ‘street-level diplomats’ discerned in chapter 5. A majority of bureaucrat-diplomats see themselves as having a dual role:

- In EU arenas, their role is to articulate and represent ‘the Dutch interest’ vis-à-vis other member states and the European institutions;
- In the Netherlands, they see their role as ‘selling’ the EU to their colleagues and creating a better understanding of the possibilities and constraints inherent in European co-operation.

These people are truly intermediaries, who operate on the cutting edge of two worlds: the world of European co-operation and the world of domestic policymaking. These dual role requirements may conflict when there are clear tensions between Dutch preferences and EU’s policy directions. At the same time, various interviewees confided that they often use that tension creatively, telling constituents in one arena that they are under severe pressure from the other, and vice versa. The job is perhaps more difficult for policy bureaucrats operating in organizations where the overall degree of Europeanization is low, and where ‘doing business in Europe’ enjoys much lower interest and prestige than ‘doing business in The Hague.’ They face constant scepticism from colleagues and quite often their direct superiors when trying to raise their awareness of the significance of EU arenas and policies to the work of their section - let alone when trying to argue the case for investing more time, expertise and money in developing an EU presence.

In contrast, most street-level entrepreneurs within departments or executive agencies are more driven to see their roles at the European/international stage as simply an extension of their generic drive to ‘get things done’ with regard to concrete
needs, problems and opportunities arising at the ‘shop floor’ of policy implementation and service delivery. Their sense of identity when acting in European arenas is more complex than that of bureaucrat-diplomats as they seek to marry their ‘Dutchness’ with their sense of ‘professionalism’ in the exchange with their peers at the Commission and from other countries.

These observations tie in with the literature on role conceptions of street-level diplomats discussed in chapter 2, which shows that participants in EU decision-making tend to oscillate between representing national positions, on the one hand, and the beliefs and ambitions of their own policy area, on the other. Moreover, our study confirms the conclusion from earlier research that purely supranational (i.e. EU-related) loyalties tend to be scarce among national civil servants: their allegiance is primarily with their own government and/or with their policy area. What our study adds to this literature is our identification of predominant role conceptions with certain types of civil servants, who operate within specific types of international policy networks. This may help to understand why certain role conceptions are dominant.

In terms of practical daily policymaking, the contrast between the two types of civil servants is clear, and each presents a distinct 'risk'. Fully Eurocratized policy bureaucrats tend to risk being seen to have ‘gone native’ vis-à-vis ‘Brussels’, and to focus more on the formal and diplomatic exigencies of European policymaking than on the practical needs of people working in their policy field. Operational experts, by contrast, have to be careful not to be seen as using their roles as Dutch representatives in expert committees to indulge in professional hobbyism with like-minded foreign experts, whilst eluding hierarchical control designed to induce them to represent Dutch rather than collegial outlooks and interests with regard to the matters at hand.

6.2.2 Activity and contact patterns
How big a part of civil servants’ daily work is taken up by European matters, and how do they spend that time? The survey study demonstrated that, although around 30 per cent of respondents indicate that they are involved in EU-related activities, most of these ‘Europeanized civil servants’ only devote a small segment of their average working week (0-2 hours) on EU-related work. A much smaller but still sizable group counts it among its going concerns and spends a significant amount of their time on it. An even smaller number of ‘fully Eurocratized’ civil servants (around 10 per cent of
all respondents indicating that they are involved in EU-related activities) have EU-work as their core business and spend all or very large chunks of their time on it. The survey also revealed important differences in the degree of ‘Europeanization’ among central government organizations. Generally speaking, in organizations in which more civil servants were involved in EU-related activities, respondents also spent more time on those activities and the activities tended to be dispersed more widely across the organization, while the opposite held true for organizations with fewer Europeanized civil servants.

The three general clusters of Europeanized civil servants were reflected in the results of the comparative case study into the veterinary and police cooperation domains:

- In veterinary policy, interviewees find it difficult to distinguish between time allotted to EU-related and non-EU-related activities, since their policy area has been thoroughly Europeanized. As a result, ‘EU-related’ and ‘domestic’ policies and activities have become intertwined and concrete activities relate to both levels at the same time. This is not only true for the relation between the EU-level and the domestic level: veterinary policy is also embedded in global networks, blurring the distinction between the EU and the global level.

- In police co-operation, the distinction between ‘domestic’ and ‘EU-level’ work is much clearer. Large parts of police work and criminal policy are firmly domestic in scope. As a result, officials in the field of police co-operation tend to differentiate more sharply between activities that relate to each of these levels. Within the field of police co-operation, the extent of involvement in EU-related activities depends on one’s position within the organization. EU-related activities appear to be allocated to a small number of specialized officials who have made it their main job. For them, EU-related activities take up a considerable part of their work, whereas for others it is only a minor or negligible part of their daily work.

In terms of contact patterns, e.g. what working on EU-related matters actually entails in terms of the ways they spend their time, another distinction emerges:

- Some officials operate in the ‘front line’ of contacts with officials from other governments and the EU institutions. They are the true ‘street-level diplomats’
we discussed in chapter 2. This group encompasses both the bureaucrat-diplomats and the street-level entrepreneurs of chapter 5.

- Others officials, let us call them departmental coordination bureaucrats, occupy a ‘back office’ position. They co-ordinate EU-related work inside their own departments and in relation to other departments, but rarely engage in direct contacts with foreign counterparts themselves. They mainly interact with their departmental colleagues (including the departmental liaison at the Permanent Representation in Brussels) as well as with their counterparts from other ministries.

The two types of jobs are very different in terms of activities and required skills, but both are relevant in terms of understanding patterns of activity around the EU in Dutch central government. Any attempt to enhance about EU-focused ‘capacity-building’ within the Dutch administration should take this into account. You need Eurocratically astute street-level entrepreneurs and bureaucrat-diplomats; but you also need well-positioned, well-resourced, effectively joined-up EU coordination bureaucrats.

6.2.3 Arenas and channels
Where does ‘European’ policymaking ‘happen’ for Dutch civil servants? Again, the answer is a qualified one. Where their European work takes them depends on what kind of job civil servants have. As the survey showed, most civil servants who deal with the EU do so in terms of policy implementation and transposition or are confronted with EU policies in making domestic policies. A smaller number of civil servants are involved in EU policymaking processes, be it directly in European forums or indirectly in the process of preparing and coordinating the Dutch input into EU decision-making.

The activities of civil servants involved in EU policymaking were the focus of our case studies. Based on these cases, we can discern three main ‘loci’ of EU-related policymaking activity:

- For coordination bureaucrats, European policymaking happens in The Hague. They form the central figures in (inter)departmental networks that are involved in EU policymaking and/or the implementation of EU law and policies.
• For bureaucrat-diplomats, European policymaking happens in Brussels. They go to committee, working group and high-level meetings in Brussels and meet their colleagues there. In the case of police co-operation, which falls under the EU’s third pillar, contacts with foreign counterparts outside of these formal meetings are comparatively rare. In veterinary policy, which falls under the EU’s first pillar, contacts also take place outside of the formal meetings in order to form coalitions for decision-making in the committee.

• For Dutch street-level entrepreneurs, European policymaking may happen anywhere in Europe. These officials are actively engaged in forming networks with foreign counterparts in order to exchange information, enhance mutual understanding, and undertake joint action in response to commonly felt problems. These informal networks and their joint activities may be formalized in EU decision-making forums, but often this is not the case, or EU actors only come in as targets for lobby activities, sponsors or simply ‘people to talk to.’

6.2.4 Formal and informal rules of the game
How does policymaking unfold in these arenas? The literature on EU committees has pointed out that different policymaking arenas within the EU operate under different ‘rules of the game,’ and that these differences matter for how their participants can operate within them. As demonstrated in chapter 5, in Council Working Parties, the nationality of participants is much strongly emphasized, leading to stronger ‘national’ role perceptions by member state representatives, whereas in Commission expert groups, national backgrounds are de-emphasized, leading to a stronger identification of the participants with the EU or their professional roles. Also, prior research has emphasized that institutional changes to the EU fabric such as enlargement and the diffusion of co-decision procedures greatly affect the incentive structures for individual member states and their representatives.

Our study echoes these findings in so far as it pertains to these formal EU arenas. During the expert meetings, several participants noted that the advent of co-decision in their issue areas has meant that they are now channelling more efforts into lobbying MEPs than they used to. The same goes for the outreach to national parliamentarians: as national parliaments are brought more and more into the loop of
European policymaking, national Eurocrats (will have to) adjust their support-building strategies.

In sum, the officials interviewed and observed in this study emphasized how the context within which they operate shapes their behaviour in different ways:

- The coordination process prior to and following European meetings: departments oscillate between centralized and decentralized models of coordinating their EU-related work, choices which obviously influence the discretion and support experienced by individual Eurocrats.

- The main basis for engaging with foreign counterparts: formal EU arenas have acquired their own institutional momentum and encourage and constrain particular forms of ‘street-level diplomacy’; at the same time, officials operating in Third Pillar and/or implementation settings emphasize the pivotal role played by informal networks, driven not by formal decision rules but by strongly motivated, proactive individuals from various countries and the ‘coalitions of the willing’ they are constantly seeking to build and maintain.

- The implicit understanding of participants in terms of which roles Eurocrats should play when and where, and which roles they can expect their domestic and foreign counterparts to play. These expectations pertain, among others, to the (de)emphasizing of national, departmental and professional identities and loyalties, or to the allocation of attention to particular arenas, networks and relationships at the European level.

Different loci of European decision-making differ in terms of these elements, as highlighted by the comparison of civil servants’ beliefs and practices in the veterinary and policing field, respectively. The former were clearly focused on the Commission-led process of proposal development and formal decision making that characterizes First Pillar contexts. The latter, operating in the less institutionalized, more pluralistic Third Pillar context naturally gravitated more towards informal networking as a predominant mode of doing business in Europe.

The expert meetings confirmed this picture. The closer officials are to formal EU decision-making and the more closely they are integrated into the departmental organization in The Hague, the more formalized the rules of the game will be and the more strongly these officials will see themselves as representing the interests of The
Netherlands as a member state and/or of their ‘native’ department. Likewise, the more peripheral officials and their operative domains are to formal EU decision making and to the core international agenda of their departments, the less formalized the rules of mutual cooperation, the greater the discretion accorded to the individual issue experts, the greater the reliance on interpersonal ties between (often long-standing) members of ongoing expert committees, and the more strongly officials will see themselves as representatives of an international profession dealing with common, borderless problems.

6.2.5 Measures of quality and effectiveness

What do Dutch civil servants consider to be ‘a proper job’ in operating at the European stage? In chapter 4 we started from the presumption that individual civil servants simply strive to achieve European policies that accord with the national preferences they are tasked with representing. Achieving these national preferences then is the overriding measure of effectiveness. In chapter 5, we further disaggregated this general measure of effectiveness, by empirically discerning two main views of success among the two types of civil servants working on EU-related activities:

- The ‘bureaucratic-diplomatic view’ counts success in terms of getting things on the agenda and factoring Dutch interests into EU decisions. This view is held by most departmental coordination and policy bureaucrats, the latter representing The Netherlands in formal EU decision-making arenas;
- The ‘street-level entrepreneurial view’ counts success in terms of solving (operational) problems in co-operation with foreign counterparts. This view is held by the bulk of the more operational bureaucrats who participate in expert and comitology committees.

These views reflect different ideas about the role and purpose of European cooperation. They also reflect different work contexts within which these civil servants operate. Officials who hold a ‘bureaucratic-diplomatic’ view operate within a set of incentives and constraints that closely resembles the preoccupations of civil servants working on domestic issues within central government departments: contributing to the shaping of policy decisions and helping the minister to shine or at least to avoid
problems. Particularly in policy areas that are fairly politicized at the European level, these classical imperatives of departmental bureaucratic life become more important.

Those who hold a ‘street-level entrepreneurial view’ tend to be faced with a different set of incentives and constraints that focuses much more on daily service delivery, which translates in a different set of criteria for quality and effectiveness. When the two worlds meet, there is often a certain degree of friction, as these different logics of EU policymaking are not necessarily easily aligned. Hence entrepreneurial executive agency officials frequently expressed bemusement at the ‘meddling’ and ‘limited added value’ of the departmental middle managers they were forced to deal with. Likewise, departmental officials said they were sometimes exasperated with the go-at-it-alone instincts of operational experts, as well as with their ‘inability to grasp the big picture’ of European policy in a particular domain.

The expert group meetings provided a corrective to the analyses of chapters 4 and 5. They harboured three lessons. First, the national position is not always clearly and unambiguously formulated, and the dynamics of EU meetings may be such that individual representatives have to make on the spot decisions about how to interpret the national position in as yet unanticipated contexts. Without a clear picture on what to maximize, maximization becomes difficult and improvisation begins. To the extent that this is considered undesirable, efforts should be made provide Eurocrats with more, more detailed but above all ‘smarter’ (clear yet versatile) instructions and guidelines on what to aim for under various contingencies during the negotiation processes in and around EU meetings.

Second, Eurocrats’ motivation structures are more complex than simply achieving their brief. Grand statements about ‘representing the national interest’ do not hold sway in the complex realities of EU policymaking. The expert meeting participants agreed that civil servants’ perceptions of their aims – and thus the criteria for judging whether they perform effectively in their roles - may be a matter of ‘where one stands’ with respect to the issues and policy domain at hand. Where one stands is, as always, partly determined by where one ‘sits’ in the larger fabric of the organization: strategic departmental actors go for ‘big pictures’ and are willing to make complex trade off; operational experts feel they succeed only when European policies produce workable and helpful ‘street-level’ practices.

In addition, Eurocrats’ aims are influenced by issue characteristics, e.g. concrete ones that are dealt with in discrete and reasonably speedy decision processes
versus complex ones that evolve gradually in fuzzy and drawn-out processes. In the former instance, the predominant success criterion can and should be the extent to which Dutch preferences can be found in the eventual EU outcomes (policies, standards, rules, time tables, budget allocations), as implied in chapter 4. In the latter instance, however, success is much more difficult to assess, particularly in the short run. Several next-best criteria were proposed during the expert meetings, ranging from simply getting one’s voice heard during meetings; being taken seriously by the Commission and/or other member states in the relevant EU arenas; and, more ambitiously, controlling the (evolving) framing of the issues on the agenda of the relevant EU arenas.

Finally, what can be aimed for is also determined by strategic political stakes involved. One distinction kept popping up. There are ‘defensive’ issues, where the strategic aim is to prevent EU policies from coming into being that require changes to existing and valued Dutch ones. And there are ‘offensive’ issues where the aim is to further the adoption of certain EU measures seen as advantageous to the Dutch interest. In both cases Dutch Eurocrats have to engage in advocacy work, but clearly trying to block, delay or modify something presupposes a different set of trade-offs and tactics than trying to make something happen.

6.2.6 Knowledge and expertise

What do civil servants who work intensively in the EU domain regard as crucial professional competencies for operating on the European stage? When asked about crucial competencies, interviewees come up with a list of relatively unsurprising items:

- One should be able to operate in networks. ‘People skills’ are important in this regard;
- One should have a solid understanding of how the European arena works: the formal as well as the informal rules of the European governance game;
- One should speak at least one foreign language well but preferably more.
- One should be able to empathize with and ‘read’ one’s foreign counterparts, e.g. by being informed about their various national systems, practices and policy priorities.
Surprisingly, in both the interviews and the expert meetings even the most experienced Eurocrats play down the specific nature of the knowledge and expertise required at the European level when compared to the national level. Of course, they say, there is some specific knowledge about European policy processes that people who work in or with ‘Brussels’ need to have, but acquiring this knowledge is no big deal. Any capable civil servant can learn most of that quickly. Likewise, language skills are sometimes mentioned as a great asset but, significantly, a lack of multilingualism is not generally seen as debilitating effective operating in the EU (particularly in the more formal decision arenas). This observation is also borne out by the results of the survey, in which respondents evaluated the facilities for training most positively among the six statements on the organizational context of EU-related work.

Virtually all of the officials we spoke emphasized that the real key lies in generic networking skills (sociability, empathy, reciprocity, reliability), and add that in this regard there are no fundamental differences between what is required ‘in Europe’ and what is required in The Hague and environs. They did note that not everyone possesses these skills. All recounted instances of having worked in EU settings with Dutch colleagues who clearly lacked some of these essential qualities – and duly created problems for themselves and for the Dutch position. These experiences were not highly frequent, however, and in many cases a ‘quiet word’ was sent back via the appropriate channels to their superiors, encouraging them to find replacements or get the individuals involved to lift their game.

These findings may of course be read in two different ways, depending upon one’s own vantage point and preconceptions. They can be taken as a much-needed ‘demystification’ of Eurocratic civil service work, breaking through the conspiracy of insiders and calling into question the key role that the Foreign Office tends to see for itself in the European domain. Yet they can also be interpreted as evidence of the casual, off-handed, almost cavalier approach that Dutch civil servants apparently take towards the role of training and skill development in enhancing their capability to operate effectively in European policy processes.
6.3 Organizational preconditions for successful Eurocratic work

Our second main question in chapter 1 related to the organizational context within which civil servants operate. We broke that question down into seven more specific ones. Our findings with regard to each of them are presented below.

6.3.1 Job structure

Do civil servants feel they have sufficient time and opportunity to devote themselves to the European dimension of their portfolio? As indicated above, the survey showed that EU-related activities are either an integral part of the activities in one’s organization and job or concentrated in a limited number of specialized officials within the department. Either way, the question is not so much whether individual jobs allow sufficient time to be devoted to EU-related activities but whether EU-related activities are integrated into the departmental work in such a way that the organization devotes sufficient attention to them. The correlation is evident: the various officials who noted during interviews that they felt they should devote more time to European issues and arenas tended to work in organizations (or parts of organizations) where such activities did not enjoy a high priority.

Likewise, the survey findings reported in chapter 3 revealed a consistent relationship between the degree of Europeanization and the priority accorded to EU-related work in an organization. Based on the three-fold distinction between ‘Eurocratic bulwarks’ (highly Europeanized organizations), ‘Eurocratic runners-up’ (which are moderately Europeanized) and ‘national champions’ (which are hardly Europeanized), we found that the more highly Europeanized an organization is, the higher the priority accorded to EU-related work. This outcome is all the more striking, since there are no systematic differences between respondents in terms of the type of work a respondent is doing or whether s/he is working in a policy department or an executive agency.

Moving from empirics to evaluation, an important question is whether ‘national champions’ devote too little attention to the EU. If so, it would be tempting to label these organizations ‘Eurocratic laggards’ (in neat semantic contrast with the two other clusters of Eurocratic bulwarks and Eurocratic runners-up), but this would be unfair. We ended up calling them ‘national champions’ to reflect the reality that these departments/agencies tend to bear responsibility for policy portfolios that at
present are simply not Europeanized. Like any other organization in Europe, public or private, they too are bound by EU law in many and important aspects of their operation. As such they need to have a degree of awareness and skill in dealing with the consequences of that reality. But to the extent that these organizations do not really have a core role in making or implementing EU policy, their low degree of Europeanization does not reflect a parochial or backward attitude at all. It is simply a logical by-product of the institutional division of responsibilities and powers in their portfolio domains.

When should the few remaining ‘national champions’ prepare themselves to join the ranks of the ‘Eurocatic runners-up’ and thus start to invest more heavily in freeing up and enabling their members to become more active in European arenas? This is not an easy call. Ten years ago, when the speed of the integration process was high, it seemed there was a ‘EU domino effect’ of sorts on the march. It seemed only a matter of time before each and every hitherto national policy domain would be Europeanized. Not preparing for that onslaught would have been bad management. Nowadays, the pace has decreased, and the imperative to ‘shape up’ is perhaps somewhat less compelling. However, looking back at the long-term dynamics of European integration suggests that the process has always gone in spurts interrupted by periods of impasse. We are now clearly at such an impasse, but if history is anything to go on in preparing for the future the lesson here is that sooner or later there will be a further ‘deepening’ of the European Union. National departments and agencies currently not yet in the European front line would do well to anticipate this and continue to invest in capacity-building.

6.3.2 Education and training
What facilities and incentives do departments and agencies offer to civil servants when it comes to acquiring the skills necessary to be an effective player in European policy arenas? As was already noted above, the statement on training elicited the most positive responses of all six statements on organizational context and facilitation that were included in the survey. Almost half of all respondents ‘largely’ or ‘completely’ agreed with the statement that their organization ‘offers sufficient training opportunities for EU-related activities’. Also, in contrast to the other statements, there are no systematic differences in the answers among respondents according to the type of work they do, whether they work in a policy department or an executive agencies,
and whether their organization is highly Europeanized or not. These findings indicate that training opportunities are seen as relatively unproblematic, in all types of jobs and organizations.

The same picture arises from our qualitative empirical materials. Some mentioned and valued formal coursework they had engaged in at places like Clingendael and ROI, but few if any regarded such educational experiences as truly essential for operating in European arena. Many were thrust into European dossiers and jobs with little preparation and encouraged by their superiors and peers to learn through observation and experience. During the expert meetings it became clear that most departments currently have or work towards some sort of ‘EU for beginners’ course. No one disputed the relevance of such courses. But all said that the more important investments were in facilitating on the job learning (through mentoring by EU veterans, purposeful use of international secondments, frequent and well-run feedback meetings and so on).

### 6.3.3 Career development

To what extent are placements in Europe and posts that have a strong European component considered to be ‘good career moves’ in the civil servants’ organizations? The survey revealed important differences in this regard between respondents in ‘Eurocratic bulwarks’, on the one hand, and respondents is less Europeanized organizations, on the other. Civil servants in Eurocratic bulwarks indicated much more often that experience with EU-related activities offered an advantage for their career development than civil servants in other types of organizations.

Similar differences emerged between the departments we studied in the two case studies:

- In the Ministry of Agriculture, which we included in the case study on veterinary policy, having European experience is considered to be good for one’s career. This Ministry distinguishes itself by an active placement policy to place people with European experience in important positions within the Ministry. European experiences are therefore an integral part of one’s career development, and the Ministry actively seeks to integrate these experiences in its HRM policies.
• At the other end of the spectrum, in the Ministry of Health, which was included in the veterinary policy case study, and the Ministry of the Interior, which was included in the police co-operation case, European experience is much less valued in the career development of officials. In these departments, it was even felt that a spell at the EU-level could be an impediment for one’s further career and that officials themselves actively had to search for a new position if they had worked in Brussels and wanted to return to The Hague. The same was true for officials working within the police organization, although several key police interviewees said there were clear signs of a change there towards an ‘upgrading’ of European/international job experiences.

Overall, the role of European experiences in the career development of individual civil servants appears to be directly linked to the priority accorded to EU affairs by the political and administrative leadership of a department (see further below). But as the expert meetings revealed, even in highly Europeanized departments (‘EU bulwarks’ in chapter 3) factoring in European expertise and placements abroad into HRM policy in general and MD policy in particular proves to be a tough nut to crack. Several key challenges were identified:

• Out of sight out mind: departments tend to ‘lose sight’ of the civil servants seconded to post in Brussels and elsewhere. Not so much in a policy sense – departments are increasingly organizing ‘comeback sessions’ for all their staff placed abroad to compare notes, coordinate policy positions and to convey departmental priorities – but in a career planning sense. People lose track of how long someone’s secondment was planned to be and how long they have been away for. Directors looking to fill positions will be more aware of people they see on a regular basis, and there are few institutional mechanisms of reminding them that there are possible candidates for the job currently working abroad.

• The same goes, to some extent, for the civil servants involved. Many of them get drawn into their new lives, acquire a taste for operating in the fast lanes of Brussels and other foreign capitals, and bank on sticking around. As a result
they may not be as proactive in maintaining the informal networks in their home ministries as needed to keep their careers afloat.

- The tendency to send out people who are ‘too old’, e.g., occupy relatively senior positions in the department. By definition, the number of jobs for them is smaller than for relatively junior staff, which makes them more difficult to place back into the department upon their return from abroad. The added complication that at both lower and middle-management levels there is much less interdepartmental job mobility than at the highest levels. Many people’s career focus is within their own silo. As a result of these factors, the average returnee from the EU circuit tends to fish in a relatively small pond.

- This being the case, each department has various cases of EU returnees who ended up stuck between a rock and a hard place, career-wise. Stories about these cases circulate around the organization, and provide a disincentive for others to go down the route of a European placement.

### 6.3.4 Instruction and guidance

How are policy priorities to be achieved at the European level developed and communicated to the civil servants who operate in European arenas? What degree of discretion are they given? In the survey, respondents were asked whether they received a clear mandate when participating in EU-level meetings. The answers to this question varied in two ways. To begin with, respondents in policy departments indicated much more often that they received a clear mandate than respondents in executive agencies. Furthermore, respondents in European bulwarks said they received clearer mandates than respondents in other types of organizations.

These survey results offer a broad-brush picture of the perceived clarity of mandates among civil servants, but they hardly give an insight into the dynamics of mandate formation in day-to-day EU-related work. These dynamics came out more clearly in the two case studies, however. In both of the case studies it was found that civil servants enjoyed a considerable degree of discretion in determining the Dutch position in European forums. Several officials indicated that they wrote their own mandates and that interference from higher political and administrative levels was limited. The backgrounds for this are somewhat different in the two cases:
Veterinary policy is part of a closely-knit expert community in which officials have considerable leeway to determine their own priorities and positions. As a result, officials experience only limited steering from the department’s political and administrative leadership;

European police co-operation has a rather low priority, particularly within the Ministry of the Interior. As a result, officials dealing with the trans-border policing, particularly police officers in the field, have considerable discretion to formulate their own positions and take their own initiatives. Officials were not particularly happy with this way of working, however, since they felt they lacked the strategic ministerial support needed to be effective at the EU-level. In the ministry of Justice, the degree of centralization of EU policy formulation was considerably bigger, partly because of the minister’s personal interest, and partly because that ministry occupies the head of delegation role in several crucial European arenas in this policy domain.

The expert meetings confirmed this picture of variety in the origins, specificity and significance of official instructions and other coordination mechanisms such as departmental ‘dossier teams.’ Some officials prided themselves on their status as a virtual ‘free agent’:

‘Q: Suppose you feel that EU developments in your area are moving in a certain direction and that a Dutch position is called for, what do you do?
A: I then prepare a memo for my minister. I obtain his signature on my proposal. Whether he actually reads it is a different matter, but I have the political mandate I need.’

This is perhaps a defensible strategy for highly specialized, technical, low-politics issues. But what might be an arcane technical matter at the time when EU policy is prepared and decided upon, may evolve into a more public and politicized affair further down the track. Several participants to the expert meetings noted that new governments/ministers may sometimes redefine their EU priorities. They also had experienced that incidents and disturbances in hitherto technical policy domains can propel them to sudden political prominence on the wings of sudden publicity about hitherto hidden costs and risks of European policies, and the parliamentary interest
this generates. To take a recent example: when major construction projects had to be scrapped or delayed because of some ‘obscure’ EU environmental guideline, the political equation regarding that issue area changed overnight. In cases such as this one, critical questions get asked about how and why the Netherlands had agreed to now contentious pieces of EU regulation. It does not reflect well if the key answer to these questions is: “because Mr. X in subsection A, who normally handles these matters, thought it was a good idea.” Other tactical reasons for ensuring oneself of more substantial ministerial commitment and involvement were also mentioned:

‘If you have ideas and want to create a Dutch position on an issue, it is essential that the minister agrees to it. If and when it needs to be defended at the strategic level, the minister needs to be able to do so with full conviction. Suppose I go out on my own and fight hard for a position, and I ask the minister for backup and he responds “oh well, let’s forget about it” because I have not really kept him into loop. The net result of this is that other Member States will take me and the Dutch position less seriously the next time around.’

To make sure all the bases are covered in the drawing up of instructions, most departments now haven begun working with broad-based ‘dossier teams’ on issues deemed important by their leaderships. These teams are generally considered to be effective vehicle for exchanging information, coordinating a single and balanced departmental position, and being effective in the interdepartmental arena, where ultimately ‘the’ Dutch position ought to be negotiated (various participants noted that the producing the latter can be an arduous task in the ‘organized anarchy’ of Dutch horizontal policy coordination). However, as any solution to anything, it is not without potential problems of its own. Two stand out, and need to be addressed at the strategic level of the organizations involved:

- at any point in time, one can have only so many of them, raising the question who decides on which grounds if an issue qualifies to be given this kind of systematic and sustained attention;
- not each and every bundle of relevant expertise may be represented on the dossier teams, the often understaffed and overworked legal divisions of departments being a case in point.
6.3.5 Feedback and accountability
How do civil servants who operate in European arenas report about their activities to their ‘back offices’, and do these ascertain and evaluate their performance? We can be brief here, since the answer to this question runs parallel to the answer given to the question about instruction and guidance. Instruction and feedback run in tandem: without clear instructions there is no clear feedback mechanism. The main reason for this is that both are the result of priorities and interest from the departmental leadership in. We will turn to this point next.

6.3.6 Top management commitment
To what extent do the top echelons of the organization accord priority to European issues, and to what extent do they get personally involved in European arenas if and when needed? The survey study showed that most civil servants feel that European issues enjoy low to moderate priority in their organizations, although there were clearly distinctions between various clusters of organizations. In the case studies, it became clearer that top management commitment to EU affairs does differ greatly between departments:

- In the Ministry of Agriculture, the EU is part of daily work and is therefore an integral part of the department’s commitment and priorities.
- In the Ministry of Justice, EU affairs have gained greater importance because of the current minister’s commitment to them. Still, EU activities are less integrated in the Ministry’s day-to-day operations than in the Ministry of Agriculture. As a consequence, commitment from top management is much more contingent on the personal or political choices of the top management than of organizational routines.
- In the Ministries of Health and the Interior, EU affairs have a relatively low priority. As a result, interest in and commitment to EU issues by top management is limited.

Discussions in the expert groups confirmed the idea that differences in top management’s commitment to EU issues and activities can have significant consequences for Eurocratic work:
• Lack of commitment makes their work more difficult. Interviewees indicate that (active) political support from one’s minister is crucial to get something done. This is true both at the EU-level proper (e.g. when a minister is willing to make a phone call to a colleague from another member state in order to speed up decision-making or generate support for the Dutch position) and in relations with other departments in the Netherlands.

• Lack of commitment leads to a peripheral position of officials working on EU-affairs within the department. This, again, has two consequences:
  o It means that EU activities are separated from other, ‘domestic’ activities in the department. The EU becomes an add-on to the department’s activities, rather than an integral part of it;
  o It means that European experiences hardly play a role in the department’s policies toward career development of individual civil servants (see also above).

It was also noted that management commitment is not just about management rhetoric – these days, no sensible department leader will deny the importance of the EU in the affairs of his organization – but about management also ‘walking the talk’ in terms of its role in setting strategic priorities, allocating their personal attention to EU dossiers when needed, demonstrating by example personal ambition and competence in the European domain, and creating proper incentives for staff to do the same.

6.3.7 Resource availability

Do civil servants involved in European policy work find there is enough funding and staff support from their organizations for them to be able to operate effectively? As noted earlier, the answer to this question depends crucially on the way EU activities are integrated in a department’s organizational routines. Where the EU is an integral part of a department’s day-to-day work, there is hardly a distinction between domestic and EU-related activities, and issues of funding and staff support become part of more general debates about funding for specific government activities. Where the EU is a more isolated element in a department’s activities, funding and staff support become more of an issue in themselves. The number of staff dedicated to EU-related activities then becomes a direct result of the relative importance accorded to EU issues by the
departmental leadership. As stated above, the main problem then is not the low amount of funding and personnel available for EU-related tasks as such, but the lack of support for these organizations’ Eurocrats from other parts and higher levels in the organization.

6.4 Summing up: types of civil servants and degrees of Europeanization

Drawing together the various specific conclusions discussed above, two clear overall conclusions arise, one relating to individual EU-related activities and one relating to the organizational context of EU-related work. With regard to individual EU-related activities, the key observations in this study relate to differences in types of civil servants. EU-related work in the Netherlands is carried out by three types of civil servants: those working in highly formalized EU decision-making forums (‘bureaucrat-diplomats’), those working in informal, task-related networks (‘street-level entrepreneurs’), and those working in the ‘back office’ of The Hague departments, coordinating EU-related work within and across organizations (‘departmental coordination bureaucrats’).

The distinction between these types of civil servants runs through almost all aspects of individual EU-related activities: it is relevant for their role orientations, for their daily activities and contact patterns, for the arenas in and channels through which they are active, for the formal and informal rules of the game they have to cope with, and for the measures of quality and effectiveness they apply. Distinguishing between these types of civil servants is therefore crucial for understanding what kind of activities take place and why these activities are done the way they are. In addition, this typology of civil servants highlights some key challenges in organizing EU-related work within Dutch government. ‘The’ Dutch input in EU policymaking is formed by the combined efforts of all three types of civil servants. More often than not, their respective activities focus on related concerns and have an impact on each other. At the same time, these three types of civil servants have distinct outlooks on the EU and on the way EU-related work should be handled, making for a high potential of clashes and lack of coordination. Hence, effectively organizing EU-related activities largely consists of coordinating and accommodating these various activities so as to minimize overlap and tensions, and increase possible synergies.
With regard to the organizational context of EU-related work, the overriding differences found in our study relate to the degree of Europeanization of an organization. The more highly Europeanized an organization is, the higher the priority accorded to EU-related work, the better EU-related work is for one’s career, and the better this work is organizationally facilitated. In a sense, there seems to be a ‘virtuous circle’ of Europeanization, whereby greater degrees of Europeanization lead to better organizational facilitation which may in turn be expected to strengthen EU-related work in the organization again. This conclusion has a theoretical relevance, since it pinpoints the key determinant of the way EU-related work is organized. Moreover, it has practical implications for efforts to improve the way EU-related work is organized and facilitated. Efforts should preferably focus on organizations that are not very highly Europeanized, and they should seek ways to overcome the relative lack of importance of EU-related work in those organizations.

6.5 Improving Dutch Eurocracy: Ideas from the field

In this final section, we articulate a number of concluding observations. Each harbours lessons for the design and management of Eurocratic activities in the Dutch central government. One important caveat applies. This study was not designed as an evaluation of the Dutch performance in the EU. We have consistently avoided making normative judgments. As our main research questions reveal, our main aim was to observe, describe and understand the nature of Eurocratic work. Nevertheless, the insights gained from this study can be used to formulate some tentative policy recommendations. What follows then is not the product of a scholarly evaluation but of us observing and listening carefully to Eurocratic insiders in numerous corners of the Dutch government. It is their voices that have been doing much of the talking throughout this study, and it is ideas for improvement picked up from them that we now offer for future consideration.

The basic point of departure in discussing these issues at all must be clear: the Dutch government cannot afford to be a mere follower in a Union of 25. Therefore the first hurdle to overcome on the road to strengthening the Dutch administration’s Eurocratic capacity is the temptation of fatalism. We live in an era of integration impasse and widespread Euro scepticism. Hence the nagging question: if the people
do not care about or actively mistrust the EU, why should departments and agencies bother to invest in strengthening their capacity to act on the European stage? The answer is self-evident: because whether we like it or not, the EU will continue to exert great and probably increasing influence over large segments of public policy. Yet this answer may be a lot less obvious to those operating outside the relatively confined inner circle of EU cognoscenti than these insiders think. Credible communication and professional incentives aimed at underlining importance of effectively engaging with and in the EU will continue to be needed, targeted in particular at the great majority of national civil servants who spend precious little time at doing just that.

In an EU of 25, the Netherlands, once a ‘mid-sized’, fairly influential founding nation, now has become one of an army of small member states. When it comes to votes in council, it has little weight. Hence it must exercise its influence by other means. Throughout the research process we encountered Dutch officials who were clearly able to punch far above their country’s weight in the European arena. They managed to do so by living up to a few simple maxims.

1. Know your business
Nurture a reputation for professional competence, particularly when operating in expert committees. Hence: send only highly qualified, well-briefed people to European meetings, and – equally important - keep them in their roles longer than other states tend to do. In EU settings where participation in policymaking arenas is highly fluid, a ‘government of strangers’ emerges; in such an environment, embodying knowledge, experience and memory is a pivotal asset.

2. Be ahead of the game
Political scientists have agreed for decades that the most important source of power in any process derives from the opportunity to determine the subject and terms of the debate on the issues. This lesson needs to be transplanted more systematically towards departmental EU strategies. Hence: start ‘signalling’ (see chapter 4) Dutch perspectives into European arenas (Commission, Parliament) by producing well-considered policy frames and policy alternatives which these institutions – understaffed and overextended as they are – are more often than not likely to take seriously if not embrace wholeheartedly.
3. Place people where the action is

Although some departments are quite active in it already, there is considerable scope for stepping up the ‘frontloading’ strategy described in chapter 4. Hence: move more Dutch civil servants into pivotal positions in those policy domains where Dutch strategic interests are judged to be at stake. This does not mean: get a few Dutchmen appointed to top positions within the Commission or the Council Secretariat, although that helps. It means: get many more Dutchmen seconded to ‘help out’ the Commission in the nitty-gritty work of drafting policy proposals since it is there that the crucial issue framing and agenda-setting take place.

4. Build coalitions proactively

The final strategy identified in chapter 4, ‘coalition formation’ was presented there as the main avenue for action when Commission proposals are on the table already and are moving toward decision. However, in chapter 5 we saw that coalition-building can also be done much more proactively. It can, in fact, go hand in hand with a signalling approach, for example when operational level ‘coalitions of the willing’ seek to get Commission funding for pilot projects. This is the way to go for a small state. It is not a panacea, since there will be many instances where it will find itself in a minority coalition, or simply outflanked by the ‘big 6’ member states. But that is not the point. The point is that not engaging in timely coalition formation is a path with only one outcome: lack of influence.

5. Bridge the gap between bureaucrat diplomats and street-level entrepreneurs

In chapter 5 we noted the difference between these two outlooks and styles of doing business in Europe. We also noted that representatives of both approaches inhabit different worlds and do not necessarily regard one another as helpful. In a sense, this is merely an extension of the long-standing schism and latent tensions between policy bureaucrats and implementation agents. The former’s disdain for the allegedly pedestrian approach to Eurocratic work, is matched by the latter’s disdain of the former’s ‘pussyfooting’ and proceduralism. This is a missed opportunity. No member state can afford being caught speaking with different voices in European arenas. In the Dutch context, much has been made of this issue as far as the interdepartmental coordination of Dutch EU policies is concerned, but what has received far less attention is the policy-operational divide, which also needs to be bridged. Policy
bureaucrats and EU coordination units within departments should be more proactive about bringing and keeping the agents of implementation (executive agencies, non-profit and even for profit organizations) into the loop of EU strategy-building and policy preparation. Reversely, agents of implementation should suppress their inclination to ‘go solo’ in Brussels. Some civil servants have taken up this challenge by organizing conferences and other types of meetings that bring together different types of civil servants working in a given policy area. These initiatives could be used in a wider range of areas and on a more regular basis in order to bridge the gap between bureaucrat-diplomats and street-level entrepreneurs. The Permanent Representation in Brussels – whose expertise and assistance is generally trusted and appreciated by actors on both parts of the divide – could be another locus for consultation and integration of the two strands.

6. Know what you want to achieve or avoid

All maxims above more or less presuppose one thing: clear and cogent policy preferences. At the level of individual Eurocrats this boils down to securing that they have a clear sense of the overall direction of policy in the domain at hand, as well as cogent instructions on how to deal with particular issues under a variety of conditions (see above). This can only be achieved consistently when there is a forward-looking, purposeful system for managing EU policy within the organizations these Eurocrats are part of. At present, this is the case in a relatively small number of ‘EU bulwarks.’ This number needs to grow, with EU ‘newcomers’ being able to draw upon the lessons learnt by these bulwarks. This presupposes an active learning strategy at the level of the Dutch government as a whole that is presently lacking. We do not at present have a system in place that provides clarity to all departments and agencies as to which EU policies are considered of strategic priority to the Dutch state (e.g. which policies they should strive to achieve and which they should try to stop, slow down or modify). The reality of Dutch EU policymaking which we observed is one of improvisation-based policymaking: no strategic frameworks are in place, preferences are formed on an ad-hoc basis, often by portfolio experts rather than strategic policymakers, or emerge belatedly from tenuous interdepartmental coordination processes.

Time and again, Dutch officials mention the French and English systems as being superior to their own in this regard. Invariably, the French and the British are
described as having ‘a much more strategic approach than we do’, ‘having their act in Brussels together,’ ‘knowing what they want and working systematically to get it,’ and so on. These are highly centralized systems, which are often deemed inconceivable and undesirable in the Dutch context. Yet many Dutch officials compare the French and British performance favourably to what is generally perceived as a Dutch ‘muddling through’ approach where every department and agency charts its own course in terms of EU strategy and capacity building (which an increasing number among them is beginning to take up more purposefully). Yet EU policy coordination between them remains relatively reactive, organized as it is mainly on an issue by issue basis.

Although currently the debate on the Dutch interdepartmental coordination system for EU affairs seems to have been laid to rest, the tension remains: those working in EU settings simply see that other nations do it better, and get better results because of it. Hence: even if embracing their models wholeheartedly is out of the question, consider which elements of the French and/or British approach to managing EU policy can be borrowed and adapted to the Dutch context. To begin with, it should become standard practice in all departments for the political and organizational leadership to periodically identify a number of EU dossiers in which the department seeks to achieve particular results and for which it is willing to give active support to those tasked with achieving these results. By making a discussion of EU-related issues part of regular and recurring rounds of strategic priority setting, EU-related activities may acquire a clearer place on the organizational agenda and the vacuum in which some lower-ranking civil servants now feel they operate may be partially filled.

7. Get middle management involved and committed
Support from the political and administrative leadership of one’s own organization was often identified as key to effective participation in European arenas. Lack of such was mentioned often as a major handicap. Interestingly, the impression is that in many even as yet not very highly Europeanized departments and agencies the top management layer has begun taking more interest in and organizing itself for the European arena. For example in ‘non-bulwark’ departments such as Education, Science & Culture, and Housing, Environment & Physical Planning, the top echelon now meets regularly to discuss current and future EU portfolios.
The problems, many Eurocrats observe, are really one level down, at the level of directors and other middle management. These people are often bogged down in national arenas and outlooks, which provide the more direct and intrusive demands on their time and incentives for career development. As a result, many of them take a reactive approach to European issues, leaving the Eurocrats in their staff largely to their own devices. Whilst some Eurocrats may welcome such a long leash, many of them are acutely aware that this also means they are fighting an uphill struggle for attention, priority and support from management as and when these are really needed.

Hence: current top management interest in EU affairs should be made to spill over more poignantly towards middle management. This can be done in a number of ways. The first method is to have strategic papers and conferences about European issues, in order to raise the profile of European issues within the organization. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, EU-related internal accountability practices should be beefed up by making achievements in EU-related dossiers an integral part of the assessment of middle managers’ performance. If departmental leaders are so serious about upgrading Dutch EU policy capacity, they should make clear to the middle management layers that (in)competence and (lack of) results in European arenas will be rewarded accordingly. Third, and finally, middle managers should be encouraged to form networks with counterparts in other EU member states and the European Commission. These need not be highly intensive networks, but by meeting once in a while middle managers may both become more aware of the European dimension of their work and feel more at home in the workings of European cooperation processes.

8. Select and motivate people with the right skills for EU-positions
This study shows that formal training for EU-related work is not seen as an important factor by most Dutch Eurocrats. The importance of individual skills is not denied, on the contrary: Eurocrats are all too aware that in many EU settings one’s personal authority may be more important than the positional authority derived from nationality or otherwise. But what they experience is that the skills to acquire such authority cannot be acquired in formal training. They depend to a large extent on personal characteristics and motivation. Solutions are therefore sought in selecting and ‘incentivizing’ people with the right motivation and skill sets rather than providing elementary training to everyone in the organization. This is not to say, of
course, that training serves no purpose: it remains important for people to acquire language and negotiation skills, as well as legal/institutional knowledge about the EU. However, from our observations so far it appears that training need not be the main priority in HRM-policy. Instead, the focus should be on: identifying and selecting the right people from within the organization; building more proactive and reliable systems of job rotation for staff seconded to EU and international posts; and integrating of EU and international experience more firmly in the departmental and national HRM incentive systems. In brief, then, our main recommendation is to invest primarily in organizational and managerial support for EU-related work, as well as improved career prospects for civil servants working on European matters. This, and the greater attention for European issues that goes with it, are considered the most important asset in working on EU-related dossiers by Dutch Eurocrats themselves.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


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Appendix I: Questions on Europeanization included in the POMO survey

PART H  IMPACT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

In your work you may be affected by the European Union (EU). For instance, you may be involved in preparing the Dutch input into EU decision-making, you may participate in meetings at the EU-level or bilateral meetings with colleagues from other member states, or you may play a role in implementing European legislation and policies. In the following, some of these activities are listed.

1. Is your work affected by the European Union?

☐ Yes
☐ No, go to question XXX.

2. Can you indicate the importance of the following activities in your work?

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<tr>
<th>Totally unimportant</th>
<th>Not very important</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Fairly important</th>
<th>Very important</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. Preparation of the Dutch input into EU-level meetings</td>
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<td>2. Participation in working groups of the Council of Ministers</td>
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<td>3. Participation in meetings organized by the European Commission (e.g. expert meetings,</td>
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<td>4. Consultation with colleagues from one or more other member states outside the formal EU</td>
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<td>5. Transposition of European policies into national legal measures</td>
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<td>6. Practical application or enforcement of rules and policies that originated in the EU</td>
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<td>7. Taking into account EU policies during national policy making</td>
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<td>8. Involving local government in EU-level decision making or policy making</td>
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3. On average, how many hours per week do you spend on the EU-related activities listed above?

☐ ☐ hours per week (→ to question XXX if you spend 0 hours per week on EU-related activities).
4. The following statements concern the way in which your employer facilitates EU-related activities organizationally. This may involve training opportunities, career development, and managerial support. To what extent do you agree with the following statements?

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<th>I do not agree at all</th>
<th>I do not agree</th>
<th>neutral</th>
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<td>1. My organization offers sufficient training opportunities for</td>
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<td>EU-related activities</td>
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<td>2. When selecting candidates for EU-related activities, my</td>
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<td>employer takes sufficient account of European experience</td>
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<td>3. Experience with EU-related activities offers an advantage</td>
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<td>for my career development</td>
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<td>4. When I participate in EU-level meetings, I receive a clear</td>
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<td>negotiation mandate</td>
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<td>5. In my organization, EU-related activities have a lower</td>
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<td>priority than purely national activities</td>
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<td>6. In my policy area, there is sufficient coordination between</td>
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<td>those who negotiate at the EU-level about European policies,</td>
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<td>and those who are responsible for transposing and</td>
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Appendix II

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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>international policy co-ordinator</td>
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<tr>
<td>Boonstra, C.</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality,</td>
<td>Department of International Affairs, policy advisor</td>
<td>20 July 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dommers, H.</td>
<td>Ministry of the Interior, Local &amp; Regional Governance and</td>
<td>policy advisor</td>
<td>19 September 2005</td>
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<tr>
<td>Esveld, M.</td>
<td>National Institute for Public Health and the Environment,</td>
<td>Centre for Infectious Disease Control, co-ordinator</td>
<td>3 March 2006</td>
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<tr>
<td>Goebbels, J.</td>
<td>Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority,</td>
<td>Director Inspection</td>
<td>23 November 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jong, H. de</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality,</td>
<td>Head Foreign Agriculture Service, Deputy Director</td>
<td>26 April 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalden, Chr.</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality,</td>
<td>Secretary General</td>
<td>23 November 2005</td>
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<tr>
<td>Leeuw, P. de</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality,</td>
<td>Department of Food Quality and Veterinary Affairs,</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Chief Veterinary Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ottevanger, A.</td>
<td>Ministry Health, Welfare and Sports, Nutrition, Health</td>
<td>policy co-ordinator health protection</td>
<td>26 September 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paardekooper, J.</td>
<td>Permanent Representation EU,</td>
<td>animal health and human health affairs, animal welfare</td>
<td>6 February 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paul, H.</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality,</td>
<td>Department of Food Quality and Animal Health,</td>
<td>16 March 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siemelink, L.</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality,</td>
<td>Department of Food Quality and Animal Health,</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>policy advisor</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sprang, A. van</td>
<td>Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority,</td>
<td>directorate of Inspection, senior policy advisor</td>
<td>10 October 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valk, F. v.d.</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality,</td>
<td>Department of International Affairs, manager</td>
<td>3 October 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visscher, L.</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality,</td>
<td>Department of Food Quality and Animal Health,</td>
<td>21 November 2005</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>policy advisor</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vrolijk, B.</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality,</td>
<td>Department of International Affairs, senior policy advisor</td>
<td>28 November 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warmerhoven, K.</td>
<td>Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority,</td>
<td>directorate of Inspection, senior policy advisor</td>
<td>31 October 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weijtens, M.</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality,</td>
<td>Department of Food Quality and Animal Health,</td>
<td>30 November 2005</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>senior policy advisor</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Observations on police co-operation

Ministry of the Interior, The Hague and 1 March
Meeting Council Working Party on Police Co-operation,
Justus Lipsius Building, Brussels 26 January 2006

Preparatory Meeting Comité Article 36
Ministry of Justice, The Hague 1 February 2006
Meeting Comité Article 36, Justus Lipsius Building, Brussels 2 and 3 February 2006

Preparatory Meeting Task Force Chiefs of Police,

Epic, bureau for euregional police co-operation Heerlen 14 March 2006
Police bureau in Kerkrade (cooperation with Germany) and in
Maastricht (cooperation with Belgium) 10 May 2006

Preparatory meeting Europol Management Board

Observations on veterinary policy

Agricultural Import Forum (information meeting organised by the
Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority; Rotterdam Airport) 24 November 2005

Meeting SCoFCAH, Brochette Building Brussels 15 June 2006
and 26 June 2006
Council meeting, Chief Veterinary Officers,
Justus Lipsius Building Brussels 11 July 2006

Preparatory meeting Comité 133, Ministry of Economic Affairs 20 July 2006
Meeting Comité 133, Justus Lipsius Building Brussels 24 July 2006
Expert meetings, held at the Netherlands School of Public Administration, The Hague

1. Monday 25 September 2006 10.00 – 12.00 h.
Blok, H. Government Buildings Agency, department Projects, policy co-ordinator
Koning, E. de Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment, DG of environmental protection, policy advisor
Monfils, V. Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, department of European funding regulation on labour market
Reiff, J. Ministry of Education, Culture and Science
Rienen, G. van Ministry of the Interior, DG Safety, department of strategy, senior co-ordinator international co-operation

Eyk, H. van Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment, policy development
Groot, D. de Ministry of the Interior, Strategy and Innovation department
Janssens, M. Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment, DG of environmental protection, department of climate change and industry, policy advisor
Holl, C. Ministry of Finance, department of international financial affairs, senior policy advisor
Remmen, Y. van Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment, DG of International Affairs, policy advisor
Vijlbrief, A. Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, department of labour affairs

3. Tuesday 26 September 2006 10.00 – 12.00 h.
Arnts, L. Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality, Department of Food Quality and Animal Health, international policy co-ordinator
Billiet, S. Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, Agentschap SZW
Kootstra, J. Ministry of the Interior, department on innovation and datapolicy in public affairs, senior policy advisor
Mink, W. Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management, department of passenger transport, senior policy advisor
Ossendorp, R. Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management, department of Transport and aviation security, senior policy advisor
Stoop, J. Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment, department of international affairs, legal advisor

Dekker, B. Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management, DG Water Affairs, assistant director international affairs
Galje, S. Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment
Kohll, N. Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment, department of legal affairs, head international legal affairs
Mallekoote, M. Ministry of Defence, Dutch army affairs

5. Thursday 5 October 2006 10.00 – 12.00 h.
Akkerman, E. Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality, head European co-operation
Brussaard, A. Ministry of Justice, co-ordinator international policy affairs
Draaisma, A. Ministry of Finance, co-ordinator international policy affairs
Seriese, A. Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, co-ordinator international policy affairs
Versteeg, J. Ministry of General Affairs, co-ordinator international policy affairs
Weyenberg, S. v. Ministry of Economic Affairs, co-ordinator international policy affairs