

*Working papers Migration and Development series*  
Report No. 15

## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

### **International migration and national development in sub-Saharan Africa. Viewpoints and policy initiatives in the countries of origin**

Annelet Broekhuis  
Hein de Haas  
Joep Kusters  
David van Moppes  
Ton van Naerssen  
Marcel Rutten  
Joris Schapendonk  
Ernst Spaan  
Marleen van der Veen

Annelies Zoomers (ed.)

*In collaboration with*  
Desirée Ooft (DCO)  
Marieke van Rensen (DPV)  
Jan Verboom (SZW)  
Marjan Wind (SPL)

December 2006

Migration and Development Research Group (Department of Human Geography)  
Radboud University, Nijmegen, the Netherlands

in collaboration with

the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment (the  
Netherlands)

## **Executive summary: International migration and national development in sub-Saharan Africa. Viewpoints and policy initiatives in the countries of origin**

### **Background**

#### *Antecedents*

In May 2005, the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Radboud University started to explore avenues for collaboration on the theme of international migration which in the course of the final decade became an increasingly important policy theme, in relation to the need to deal with questions of integration (how to deal with migrants in Dutch society) and especially the incorporation of migration issues as a new element in the Dutch development cooperation policy, as well as in anticipation of participation of the Netherlands at the UN high-level dialogue on 14 and 15 September 2006.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, cognizant of the increasing growth rate of the world's migrant population, acknowledged the need to better understand the root causes of migration, and the need to contribute to policy formulation to optimise the link between (international) development and migration, in particular for the countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (also from the perspective of achieving the millennium development goals).

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Research Group Migration and Development at Radboud University streamlined efforts which resulted in the initiation of a joint project 'International Migration and National Development: Viewpoints and Policy Initiatives in the Countries of Origin' (see Zoomers and van Naerssen, report 1) under the coordination of the latter and financed by the former. In the course of the process, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment also decided to participate and co-finance activities. The project, consisting of desk research, field missions and an international experts' meeting, was carried out between May and December 2006.

#### *Purpose and project activities*

This project focuses on achieving a better understanding of the implications of international migration for national development from the perspective of the sending countries (with an emphasis on sub-Saharan Africa). More specifically, the purpose of the project is to explore (1) current perceptions - as seen from the perspective of the countries of origin - of the links between international migration and national development, and (2) current trends in policy making aimed at minimizing the negative effects, while optimizing the development impact. What are the dominant view and policy initiatives in the different countries of sub-Saharan Africa? It is concerned with the question of how a coherent international migration policy can contribute to the fight against poverty.

The project consists of desk research (policy documents, statistical analysis, interviewing diaspora organisations etc.), field missions to Rwanda, Burkina Faso, Senegal, Kenya and Nigeria, and an international experts' meeting with participants from a large number of countries in sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and Latin America. The project was carried out by an international

and multidisciplinary team of researchers (geography, anthropology, economics and demography) affiliated to various institutions (Radboud university Nijmegen, ASC, CEDLA, NIDI, Utrecht University, Oxford University and the Human Resources Development Centre in Lagos, Nigeria). This team worked in close collaboration with policy makers of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment. All the reports are available on the websites of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs ([www.minbuza.nl](http://www.minbuza.nl)) and the Radboud university ([www.ru.nl](http://www.ru.nl)). For a complete overview of the project output, see Annex 1.

## **Summary of the results**

### ***The characteristics of international labour migration***

Based on statistical sources and policy documents, we analysed the characteristics of international labour migration (see van Moppes 2006; Spaan and van Moppes 2006; Zoomers and van Naerssen 2006).

The number of international labour migrants is currently estimated at between 175 and 200 million, about 3 percent of the world population. If we try to obtain a picture of the direction of the international migration flows, we find that there is a limited number of dominant destinations, i.e. the classical immigration countries (the United States [US] and Canada), a number of countries on the Persian Gulf (such as Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Emirates) and, lastly, a number of European countries (France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Spain and Italy). Thus from the perspective of the receiving regions there appears to be a situation in which the migration flows follow a relatively fixed pattern – migrants seem to move from the poor south towards the richer northern countries. These migration flows are often matched by a reversed flow of remittances (see Zoomers and van Naerssen; report 14) .

If we look at international migration from the perspective of the sending countries, however, a different - more diverse - picture emerges. The majority of migration flows are found not to be directed towards the core receiving countries just referred to. Only a limited number of countries are characterised by South-North migration. By far the majority of emigration countries are found to be the subject of South-South migration; in other instances we encounter diasporic states (states with a large migrant population fanning out over many countries).

- ***South-North Migration***

Examples of countries with South-North migration directed at one of the above core regions include Mexico (to the US); Morocco (to France, Germany etc.); Senegal (to France or Spain); and/or Ecuador (Spain). It concerns a limited group of countries with a clearly structured flow towards specific receiving countries with, in the case of the EU, the majority of the migrants entering via Spain and Italy, and/or settling in the former mother country (colonial ties).

- ***South-South Migration***

In many countries - notably in sub-Saharan Africa – there is mainly South-South migration. These are often relatively poor (landlocked) countries. Examples include Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger (with migration to Ivory Coast, but also towards Nigeria and Senegal); Lesotho and Mozambique (with migration to South Africa and Botswana); and Liberia, Sierra Leone,

Burundi, Congo and Rwanda, where continuing conflicts have caused a large part of the population to seek refuge in the neighbouring countries (e.g. Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania). In Latin America examples include such countries as Paraguay and Bolivia, from where, until recently, large numbers emigrated to Argentina; Nicaragua (with migration to Costa Rica); and Honduras (mainly migration to Mexico). Asian examples are Indonesia (with a population of more than one million in Malaysia) and Myanmar (with one million living in Thailand). There is also considerable migration from Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam to destinations within the region.

- ***Diasporic States (countries with a huge and dispersed overseas population, with a large number of expatriates)***

The migrants originating from diasporic states are by far the most numerous. As a result of outmigration over a long time covering several generations, a substantial part of the population (including the elite) has now become dispersed over a large number of countries throughout the world. The numbers involved are impressive (in any event many times greater than the flow of south-north migration). The Asian diaspora is estimated at more than 70 million. The largest is the Chinese diaspora - over 35 million (widely dispersed over South East Asia, but also the rest of the world). The figure for India is 20 million, that for the Philippines over 7 million, and Korea has a diaspora of over 3.5 million. Other examples are Malaysia with a diaspora of 5 million, Vietnam (1 million) and Pakistan. The Latin American diaspora is estimated at over 25 million. If we ignore Mexico and the Caribbean (which are oriented mainly on the US) and Argentina and Ecuador (relatively strongly oriented on Italy and Spain), we find that the countries mainly concerned are Colombia, Brazil, Peru and Venezuela, from where a group of over 8 million has fanned out over a large number of countries: not only the US, United Kingdom, Germany, Spain, Italy, Israel and Japan, but also over the neighbouring countries. African examples of diasporic states are South Africa, Nigeria and Kenya, but also on a more modest scale smaller countries such as Ghana, Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Gambia and the Cape Verde islands.

The above classification (see Zoomers and van Naerssen 2006) makes clear that, where migration is concerned, it is no longer sufficient to divide the world into origin and destination regions and to connect the two groups with arrows to indicate the migrant and capital flows. There is a wide variety of ways in which countries are incorporated into the migration system. This has direct consequences for the possibilities of being able to profit from migration. Diasporic states and countries with directed South-North migration generally find themselves in a relatively favourable position, while the countries with south-south migration appear to be increasingly faced with fresh restrictions.

The most favourable are the circumstances of the diasporic states: thanks to migration over many generations, they can call on a considerable overseas population which they can use as development potential. They have not so much to suffer under restrictive policies; the majority of the migrants are already living in the reception region and are, more or less, successfully integrated, so that they have relatively good possibilities for investment. Countries with South-North migration enjoy the advantage that they are clearly in the picture and can relatively easily negotiate about projects, readmission or migrant quotas. They sit close to the fire compared with other countries and so are able to profit from temporary requirements for migrant labour.

This stands in contrast to the countries with mainly South-South migration, which are largely at the mercy of the policy of receiving countries in their own region (often therefore

neighbouring countries), where conflicts are relatively quickly translated into inter-state problems; where problems of discrimination or xenophobia (which also arise in the north) remain relatively invisible, because the media pay attention mainly to tensions in the northern countries (see for further details report 14).

### ***Migration routes and recent trends***

The heterogeneity of migration finds expression in a great variety of migration routes (see van Moppes 2006; Spaan and van Moppes 2006; also Zoomers and van Naerssen 2006).

If we analyse the dominant migration routes from sub-Saharan Africa to Fortress Europe (van Moppes 2006), just as the route through Mexico is the main route for most Latin American migrants on their way to the United States, there is a restricted number of gateways towards the EU. There are currently six main routes from sub-Saharan Africa, leading to three major departure areas, namely the Canary Islands (from Northern Mauritania, Western Sahara and southern Morocco); the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla and parts of the Spanish mainland (from Northern Morocco); and Italy (Lampedusa, Sicily) and/or Malta (mainly from the Tunisian east coast and western parts of the Libyan coast)(see van Moppes 2006).

The Spanish and Italian territories in and near Africa are thus the main destinations on the way to the EU. After all, arriving on one of these territories means actually landing in the European Union, which opens up a broad range of possibilities of other countries to go to. However, before migrants actually arrive in departure areas like airports, seaports and the coasts of different African countries, they have usually been on a long journey on the African continent in order actually to get there (see van Moppes 2006; also Spaan and van Moppes 2006).

Migration patterns are becoming increasingly less transparent and are rapidly changing; radical changes have recently occurred in the direction and volume of migration. In the first place a reversal of migration has occurred in many countries: former emigration countries, such as Spain or Italy, and also Botswana, now act as both immigration and transition areas. Other examples are Nigeria and Kenya, which have developed from immigration into emigration areas (often in combination with assuming a role as a transit area (de Haas 2006; Rutten 2006). An increasing number of countries are affected not only by emigration or immigration, but are also the subject of both at the same time (e.g., Morocco, Senegal [Broekhuis and Ndione 2006]). Countries such as Rwanda, Kenya and Senegal increasingly act as transit areas.

As a direct consequence of restrictive policies in the core regions (i.e., EU, US etc.) new transition zones and more specific migration hubs have arisen between the place of origin and the place of destination. Cities along the Sahara route, or places with direct boat and flight connection are attractive locations for people specializing in the migration business, and develop into migration hubs (van Moppes 2006). Migrants are confronted with rising costs and are increasingly vulnerable to exploitation (there seems to be a rapid increase in human trafficking and illegality). Moreover, restrictive policy (in the US, Europe, but also with the migrants' own region) has led to an increasing diversity of origin and destination areas. Where previously, migration preferably took place along the more or less well-known routes, travel now preferably takes place to conventional destinations in order to evade tightened border controls as far as possible (for examples, see van Moppes 2006; Spaan en van Moppes 2006; Zoomers and van Naerssen 2006). Compared with previously, people now travel less often by air; whereas labour migration and trafficking to Europe used to predominantly use air links, visa requirements and increasing immigration controls at air and seaports, seem to have led to an increasing reliance on

trans-Saharan, overland routes to the Maghreb countries (de Haas 2006; Broekhuis 2006; also Zoomers and van Naerssen 2006).

Important changes have recently also occurred in the composition of the migrant flows. Whereas migration was for a long time a matter for men, significant portions of females now migrate independently to fulfil their own economic needs. In addition to feminisation, there is also rejuvenation of migration flows (Moppes 2006; Adepoju, van Naerssen and Zoomers 2006).

Lastly, changes have occurred in the occupations and level of skill of migrants. While, formerly, many migrants were wage earners, now a considerable proportion consists of self-employed entrepreneurs. There appears to be a shift towards higher skilled migrants, and migration is increasingly transnational (i.e., there is a growing group of transnational entrepreneurs who commute intensively in an attempt to profit from the economic opportunities which present themselves in several countries at the same time).

### **Issues on the policy agenda: an overview**

The crucial objective of our research was to analyse viewpoint and policy initiatives in the countries of origin. What are the issues that are currently on the migration agenda in the different countries in sub-Saharan Africa, and how is this linked to the performance of international migration?

#### *A summary of the experts' meeting*

Discussions during the experts' meeting (Adepoju, van Naerssen and Zoomers 2006; van Moppes et al 2006) showed that migration policy in Sub-Saharan Africa appears to be a rather new policy field –the agenda is very diverse and unfolding gradually. While some countries are preoccupied with issues of human trafficking, others are exploring ways to make a more productive use of remittances, and the contributions the diaspora can and does make to home-country developments. There are important differences in the way countries deal with problems of 'brain drain or brain gain'. Some countries are actively involved in how to retain people or to bring them back, whereas others are actively trying to locate and lure their experts into strategic positions in order to generate development benefits. Despite the fact that migration is an age-old topic, and that much research has been done during the last decades, it is not a consolidated policy field (see Adepoju, van Naerssen, Zoomers 2006)

During the meeting, the following issues were raised (and presented as recommendations for the UN high - level dialogue in New York):

#### *General*

Migration needs to be tackled as a global issue. It is no longer logical to make a distinction between sending–receiving and/or transit country as most countries have to deal with these three dimensions at the same time. Its dynamics and interconnectivity can best be appreciated when migration is perceived as a system (rather than focusing only on specific flows such as South-North migration)

Current attempts to optimise the link between migration and development should not focus on South-North migration. The bulk of migration is taking place in the South. Such South-South migration is also taking place among the world's demographic giants in, and inherent in the

connectivity between, Latin America-Asia and Asia-Africa. More attention should be paid to this hidden dimension.

#### *Circular migration*

Circular migration is being flagged as a win-win situation provided that sufficient attention is given to how to prevent brain drain and stimulate brain gain. The circular migration debate is presented as a strategy for coping with the urgent labour needs in the destination countries of the North. The possibilities to use circular migration as a solution to the urgent labour needs in the South should be systematically explored. In that context, the free circulation of workers in sub-regions should be promoted.

#### *Remittances*

Remittances are private transfers to families to alleviate poverty. Governments of receiving countries should endeavour to provide the enabling environment to facilitate the productive use of remittances. To strengthen the development impact of remittances, the costs of migration (recruitment fees and documentation), the cost of remitting and the costs of loans should be reduced, while also ensuring a more facilitating investment environment.

#### *Migration of skilled professionals and ethical recruitment*

Emigration of skilled professionals hampers the attainment of Millenium Development Goals, especially in the health sectors of poor countries. The direct recruitment of professionals undertaken by the countries of destination by means of unfair competition should be discouraged. For the time being, the North decides how many workers to recruit and from where and often unilaterally selects the best workers in the international market.

The countries of destination should be promoting a shared responsibility with the countries of origin concerning local need in terms of professionals (education and training) and in the spirit of co-responsibility, help to foster local development of the countries of origin to reduce poverty and to create domestic employment.

“Compensation” for the brain drain may take the form of supporting projects involving professionals going back to their country of origin for short periods to work in public structures, special programmes and education. At any rate, there is a clear need to promote bilateral (and/or regional) agreements for the mutual recognition of titles and accreditation.

#### *Diaspora*

The countries of origin should invest more in strengthening linkages with their diaspora communities, involving and promoting the migrant associations overseas, offer cooperation and assistance to well-established NGOs managing the philanthropy arising from diaspora locally and transnationally, by reducing unnecessary taxes and bureaucratic delays. The best practices should be documented and officially recognised. They should also provide infrastructural facilities and concrete opportunities for overseas nationals to invest in their country, promote the active involvement of the local communities in order to strengthen the self-development potential develop and implement reintegration programmes for returnees to foster the possibilities of investment and entrepreneurship. The countries of destination could help to facilitate such processes.

### *Governance of Migration*

Countries of origin and destination should promote migration governance, including data, monitoring, assistance and protection of migrants. Migration policies are international by definition and should be discussed at regional, bi-regional and multilateral levels in order to establish a common standard of protection and promote policy coherence in migration management. Countries should take responsibility to ban rights violations such as trafficking and xenophobia. More attention should also be paid to the impact of images –presentation of information –and the media.

### *Field missions*

The conclusion that ‘migration is not a consolidated policy field’ and ‘that the agenda is very diverse’ (see Adepoju, van Naerssen, Zoomers 2006) was largely confirmed during the field missions to Nigeria, Senegal and Burkina Faso, Kenya and Rwanda (see de Haas 2006; Broekhuis 2006; Broekhuis and Ndione 2006; Rutten 2006 and Muhoza and Rutayisire 2006, respectively).

We analysed the present situation in different countries, beginning with the analysis of agendas in countries with predominantly south-south migration (Rwanda, Burkina Faso), then countries with predominantly South-North migration (Senegal), ending with the countries classified as diasporic states (Senegal, Nigeria and Kenya, including China, India, the Philippines etc). It is interesting to note that there is a kind of continuum in the migration agendas of the different countries (see Zoomers and van Naerssen 2006 for the complete overview). Reviewing migration as a policy issue, and summarising the types of programmes that are currently under way, we can say that they are usually a combination of the following measures. *(Some of the measures are supported by Dutch development cooperation (indicated in the listing by \*\*)).*

### *Policy priorities in the sending countries (also prioritised on the migration and development agenda of receiving countries/ donor agencies)*

- Increasing the flow of remittances/ ensuring a more productive investment of the money through forms of co-financing (co-development in West Africa/ Tres por Uno in Mexico).
- \*\*Measures aimed at encouraging brain gain and limiting brain drain; encouragement of return often linked to northern programmes (MIDA, TOKTEN; in Senegal, Ghana, and also Burkina Faso).
- \*\* Capacity strengthening/ improvement of border controls, intended to limit immigration from neighbouring countries. Investments are made within the framework of this policy and with financing from northern countries in the training of customs officials and equipment to sharpen border controls.
- \*\* Combating human trafficking (mainly of women and children, partly linked to the problem of forced labour). Many anti-trafficking policies are financed and carried out in collaboration with donors/ receiving countries (including the ILO).

*Policy priorities in the sending countries together with the diaspora (partly supported by receiving countries/ donor agencies).*

- The institution of a ministry of diaspora/ minister for diaspora (starting initiatives in Nigeria, Senegal, Mali, Rwanda, Argentina); intensifying contacts with the population overseas.
- Starting up cultural programmes etc.; spreading information; granting the franchise to the population in the diaspora. (is currently being discussed in several countries, including Kenya and Nigeria)
- Programmes aimed at improving the investment climate – aimed at attracting investment, e.g. by offering tax concessions etc. (examples: China, India and Korea; starting in Senegal).

*Policy priorities in de sending countries (not on the migration and development agenda of receiving countries/ donor agencies)*

- Protection of the rights of migrants; the ILO Convention on Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and their Family Members (not ratified by most of the northern countries)
- How to create youth employment (e.g. in Senegal, Burkina)? Part of conventional development policies, but not on the migration and development agenda.
- Encouragement of immigration and return, e.g. in Rwanda. Forms part of the refugee agenda, but usually from the perspective of the reception region.
- Exporting the labour surplus /the development of remittance corridors. In different countries active attempts are made to facilitate emigration (providing services/institutional reforms) while an attempt is made to maximise the positive effects (e.g. the Philippines, Kenya, Ecuador)
- Reducing the dependency on remittances/ promoting a greater stability (Cape Verde, Kenya); not on the migration and development agenda of donors.

*Policy priorities in the receiving countries/ donors (not so much in line with priorities in sending countries).*

- \*\*Encouragement of circular migration (is presented as a win-win situation, because it makes migration possible without the threat of an invasion).
- Anti-migration campaigns/ information to make people aware of risks and dangers. Emphasis is placed in discussions in the receiving countries, and by donors, on the need to stop the brain drain (not often referred to in the sending countries) and the need to inform people about the risks of migration (in the sense of anti-emigration policy).
- Policies for improving migration data. It is mainly from donor circles that resources are currently being provided for the provision of reliable information (migration statistics). Senegal is a pilot country in this respect (see Broekhuis and Ndione 2006).
- \*\* involvement of migrants - diaspora organisations. There has recently been a growing interest from the sending region in making contact with the diaspora. Governments in reception zones and donors are trying to involve migrants actively in the formulation and/or implementation of policy in their region of origin.

### *African diaspora organisations in the Netherlands*

During our research, while focusing on the perspective of the sending countries, we also interviewed migrant and diaspora organisations in the Netherlands (see van Naerssen et al 2006) in order to learn more about their views and perceptions, and to explore the opportunities for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to link with development-oriented MOs in the Netherlands in order to optimise the contribution of MOs to local, regional and national development in the countries of origin (see van Naerssen et al 2006; Kusters et al 2006).

The following recommendations were made to improve the performance of African MOs and their capacity to contribute to development processes (van Naerssen et al 2006; Kusters et al 2006):

\* During the past few years a dialogue has started between Dutch development agencies and MOs. Return migration and mostly small-scale projects (education and health care) are now on the agenda. The latter could be broadened by examining and encouraging social remittances, transnational entrepreneurship, private investments and tourism in countries of origin. Special and careful attention should be paid to the opportunities for MOs to engage in programmes in the field of good governance and democratisation in the countries of origin.

\* Although they possess specific assets such as knowledge of foreign cultures and language-skills, there is no reason to give MOs a privileged position in development cooperation and acquiring funding. The major criterion for funding should be the quality of the project/project implementation. The aim of development is not in the Netherlands, but in the home countries of the MOs.

\* Migrants have a relative advantage by being rooted in more than one society. This ‘transnationalism’ offers a huge potential for development cooperation. This potential should be exploited, and optimised by dialogue, information on funding opportunities, capacity building programmes etc. Special attention should be paid to the second generation of migrants (and how to keep them involved).

\* African MOs in the Netherlands are small and greatly rely on volunteer work. While acknowledging the value of the volunteer work, Dutch Development Cooperation agencies could facilitate and increase the quality of the work of MOs by organising training and exchange of experience sessions; and also by supporting MOs in the monitoring and evaluation of projects and programmes currently carried out in Africa. This should preferably be done by independent institutions (i.e. not linked to the funding agencies).

\* African MOs could learn lessons from Asian and Latin American MOs, in particular, with regard to lobbying the African national governments for migrants’ rights and facilitating social remittances. Lessons could also be learned from existing initiatives and programmes in other European countries.

\* Projects of MOs in *all* African countries should be considered for funding and other forms of support (i.e., not restricted to the partner countries).

\* The possibilities for ways of co-operation between Dutch development agencies, African MOs in the Netherlands and governments of the countries of origin should be explored and expanded. Apparent examples are the dialogues with the embassies of Ghana and Cape Verde.

### **Final reflections**

How can consistent migration policies contribute to combating poverty? At this moment, several 'sending' countries are looking at 'migration and development', but there are several reasons why international migration will not automatically result in poverty alleviation or sustainable development (see Zoomers and van Naerssen 2006).

Much will depend on the type of destination where migrants decide to go. People moving to the Gulf States will – in comparison with migrants who move to other destinations - have fewer possibilities for upward mobility than those who migrate to the US/Canada or the EU (and where conditions are better for establishment, family reunification, etc.). Within the EU there are wide differences between countries in the possibilities for integration and becoming full citizens, which will determine to a large extent whether migrants will be able to benefit from migration or not.

At the country level, the development potential of migration will greatly depend on the way countries are incorporated into the migration system. This has direct consequences for the possibility of being able to profit from migration. Diasporic states and countries with directed South-North migration generally find themselves in a relatively favourable position, while the countries with south-south migration appear to be increasingly faced with restrictions. In the case of south-south migration, migrants often travel without the required documentation, they are vulnerable to exploitation – do not receive protection; job opportunities – as well as salaries - are usually unfavourable in comparison with the northern destinations; the flow of remittances is small in comparison with the flow of money coming from the northern states, and much of the suffering remains invisible.

To the extent that receiving states/ donors are currently implementing 'migration and development' policies, these are mainly aimed at controlling dominant patterns of south-north migration. The areas of origin are treated as 'sending states' without taking into account that many of these countries also play a role as immigration and/or transition areas. EU countries and a selected group of emigration countries are currently negotiating readmission and/or migration quotas (bilateral agreements), often without taking into consideration the negative consequences for intra-regional relations (i.e., restriction of migration from neighbouring states).

In addition, there is another paradox: regional organisations (ECOWAS, AU etc.) aim at facilitating 'free movement of persons', but also acknowledge the need to control migration. Processes of regional integration seem to have given more space to human traffickers and have restricted the possibilities for states to control migration.

Restrictive policies – and more intensive border control in northern countries - have often been unable to solve the problem of illegal migration, but have – instead - resulted in a more complex situation. Migrants are forced to spend more money and time, take higher risks, and are more dependent on smugglers than before. The likelihood of international migration helping to combat poverty is less favourable than before. Migrants are increasingly attracted to criminal activities (to earn large amounts of money in a short time); the migration agenda has become mixed up with anti-terrorism; and human trafficking has intensified.

International migration might have helped groups of people to escape from poverty, but the impact tends to be limited, even in the most favourable circumstances. Where migrants do manage to send remittances to their areas of origin, these flows are usually geographically concentrated (and benefit only small numbers of people). Flows of remittances help to create 'islands of wealth', but will in many cases not contribute to 'national' development. Another problem is the variability of remittance flows and the lack of sustainability. Even if remittances are stable in the short run (first-generation migrants sending home significant amounts of money on a regular basis), this seems to decline in the course of time (second or third generations often lose interest and feel less committed). Migration streams are often not so stable in the long run: the intensity and direction of migration will very much depend on economic growth, which will vary in time.

Even though migration is nowadays described as a strategy aimed at spreading risk (common in the 'new economics of migration theory'), it often results in new vulnerabilities. There is a considerable group of migrants who – due to migration – suffered downward social mobility: they fell ill (malaria), were involved in an accident or became victims of robberies or exploitation; well-educated women working as domestic servants will often not be able to fully exploit their capabilities. Another negative dimension of migration is the intensification of land conflicts and rising land prices (use of remittances for the purchase of land). International migration – along with the liberalisation of land markets and the use of internet – has opened the door to a real estate boom. International migrants – and also tourism entrepreneurs – are increasingly appearing as a new category of absentee landowners.

Where attempts have been made by policymakers to maximise the positive impact of international migration or to restrict the negative implications, most of the sending countries in sub-Saharan Africa do not yet have well-established policies (van der Veen 2006). It is a new policy field and there is a wide variety of topics which very much depend on the particular position of countries.

There is some overlap between the 'migration and development' agendas of northern and southern countries (increasing the flow of remittances, combating human trafficking, improving border controls, stimulating brain gain etc.) but this is very much dependent on the country under consideration; within the South, there are considerable conflicts of interests between countries.

Where northern countries or donors invest in 'migration and development' programmes (MIDA/TOKTEN) – the number of beneficiaries is small in comparison with the total migration flow. From the perspective of the sending countries, it seems unrealistic to expect migrants to be willing to return as long as there are no comparable employment or educational opportunities. In many sending countries, the focus is not so much on 'return'; instead, policymakers are searching for 'long distance' types of support by migrant populations. While they accept that people should have a right to move freely, they aim to get the diaspora involved by inviting them to send money or make investments. In general terms, in donor policies there is a bias in favour of countries with south-north migration and little is done for the countries experiencing south-south migration.

### **Recommendations**

In order to improve the development impact of international migration and to make international migration more relevant to development, we formulated the following recommendations (Zoomers and van Naerssen 2006):

**Improvement of current policies (supported by donors and northern countries):**

- *Anti-trafficking* measures (programmes to stop the trafficking of women and children) should continue to receive high priority (supported by sending and receiving countries). At the same time, however, the sending countries are unhappy that victims and traffickers are treated equally as criminals. Priority should be given to stopping the criminalisation of the victims (and to focusing more on the traffickers). Legalisation of the victims is seen as an important requirement making anti-trafficking more effective.
- *Anti-migration* policies and/or intensification of *border controls* as a strategy for restricting illegal migration is not effective. Rather than investing in strengthening border controls (capacity building, technology etc.), more attention should be paid to problems of ‘overstaying’.
- Where receiving countries show an interest in facilitating *circular migration*, it is necessary to examine critically previous experiences (guest worker programmes) and the development implications of current migration towards the Gulf States. The ageing population in Europe might offer opportunities for Africans on the European labour market, but little is known about the particularities of future labour needs, and how such migration can help to promote essential productive investments and knowledge transfer. A better orientation towards the international labour market is needed if the country wishes to profit more from international migration. It is also important to anticipate better the growing competition between different migrant groups (how is it possible to guarantee that migrants from sub-Saharan Africa will be able in the long run to compete with migrants arriving from Asia and Latin America?).
- It is recommended that an analysis be made of to what extent MIDA-TOKTEN initiatives (aimed at *brain gain/ brain circulation*) form part of mainstream development policies (PRSPs and sectoral plans), and analyse to what extent these are in conflict with ‘traditional structures’. What is the capacity of local institutions to facilitate ‘reintegration’ and or the return of people, and what is the impact of ‘foreign expertise’? What kind of institutional adaptations are necessary (e.g., property rights, inheritance rights etc.). Who is responsible for the people moving in and out, and what are the social security implications for these groups? What are their rights and obligations of circular migrants and who is responsible (the government of the sending or the receiving country)?
- Where support is given to migrant and diaspora organisations, it is important to also consider supporting such organisations in the countries of origin (e.g., in Burkina Faso there are numerous migrant organisations). Northern government and donors could continue to help migrant organisations to establish contacts with the area of origin, but also diaspora organisations in other countries, thus facilitating communication and information flows. (For more specific recommendations related to MOs in the Netherlands, see van Naerssen et al 2006).

**New orientations:**

- Greater priority should be given to the problems of countries with South-South migration, and to those of transition areas/ migration hubs (how to improve the situation of transit migrants? In doing this, sufficient attention should be paid to the Asian-African (and potentially Latin American) connection.
- More emphasis should be given to supporting national governments and/or local groups (in sending countries) to establish links with their diaspora. Many sending countries are interested in intensifying relations with countries with substantial migrants group, but the financial means of their governments are limited.
- More attention could be paid to the worldwide problem of discrimination and xenophobia (including in the South). Rather than continuing data collection –and deepening the contrast between how migrant and non migrant populations get along (as is currently done by different donors), it is necessary to make a critical review of the paradigms used (aliens, 'immigrants', expats) and to assess how, in different countries, this categorisation contributes to stigmatisation, exclusion etc.
- More attention should be paid to the negative implications of the boom in bilateral agreements (readmission, migration quotas) for the intra-regional patterns of collaboration and/or interstate relations within the south.
- Given the growing interest in circular migration (see above), it would be interesting to collect more concrete information about how to monitor 'urgent labour needs' (not only in the North, but also within the South in relation to HIV-AIDS etc.). How can we match demand and supply, and make circular migration more relevant to African labour requirements?
- Priority should be given to providing more and better information to different categories of migrant groups. How can we inform migrants before their departure about the conditions in host countries; inform women and children so that they do not become victims of traffickers, AIDS and other diseases; inform people about visa requirements etc. (and the need to formalise their presence); economic investment possibilities; assessing the future labour needs; obtaining information about new laws and international treaties. etc.
- It is urgent to initiate a discussion about the new role of embassies and consulates – they are currently providing visas and passports, but what is their future role in distributing information (see above); in providing assistance in the case of emergencies and expulsions; in preparing agreements to improve social security etc?
- More attention should be paid to the problems of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and refugees, in particular the 'ecological refugees' (together with political conflicts, one of the root causes of forced migration). Early warning systems and spatial planning could help to prevent forced migration.

- It is important to mainstream 'migration and development' policies in the direction of anti-poverty strategies. The current emphasis on 'migration and development' should not result in the reallocation of money in favour of the migrants. The majority of the population (97%) is geographically stable; they are quite reluctant to leave their homes and villages or towns. More explicit attention must be paid to how to control population growth and/or improve local employment opportunities, especially for the youth.

### **Annex 1: Working papers Migration and Development series**

(Radboud University Nijmegen, Migration and development research group, Department of Human Geography). Reports 1-15.

#### Report No. 1

Zoomers, A. and T. van Naerssen (2006). Proposal and working programme: International migration and national development. Viewpoints and policy initiatives in the countries of origin. *Working papers Migration and Development series*, Nijmegen.

#### Report No. 2

Adepoju, A. van Naerssen, T and A. Zoomers (2006). Proceedings of the experts' meeting. International migration and national development: Viewpoints and policy initiatives in the countries of origin. *Working papers Migration and Development series*, Nijmegen.

#### Report No. 3

van Moppes D; J. Schapendonk; J. Kusters and M. van der Veen (2006). Summary of the discussions of the experts' meeting: International migration and national development. Viewpoints and policy initiatives in the countries of origin. 23-24 August 2006. *Working papers Migration and Development series*, Nijmegen.

#### Report No. 4

Spaan, E. and D. van Moppes. (2006). African exodus? Trends and patterns of international migration in Sub-Saharan Africa. *Working papers Migration and Development series*, Nijmegen.

#### Report No. 5

van Moppes, D. (2006). The African migration movement: Routes to Europe. *Working papers Migration and Development series*, Nijmegen.

#### Report No. 6

de Haas, H. (2006). International migration and development Nigeria. *Working papers Migration and Development series*, Nijmegen

#### Report No. 7

Broekhuis, A. (2006). International migration and development in Burkina Faso, viewpoints and policy initiatives. *Working papers Migration and Development series*. Nijmegen.

#### Report No. 8

Broekhuis, A. and Ndione B. (2006). Migration internationale et développement. Points de vue et initiatives au Sénégal. *Working papers Migration and Development series*. Nijmegen.

#### Report No. 9

Muhoza, D. and P. Rutayisire (2006). Migration Internationale et Développement National: Points de vue du Rwanda. *Working papers Migration and Development series*, Nijmegen.

## Report No. 10

Rutten, M. and K.Muli (2006). International migration and development in Kenya. *Working papers Migration and Development series*, Nijmegen.

## Report No. 11

van der Veen, M. (2006). Een inventarisatie van migratiebeleid volgens de Nederlandse Ambassades in Sub-Sahara Afrika, het belang van migratie in PRSPs, en een overzicht van belangrijke beleidsdocumenten *Working papers Migration and Development series*, Nijmegen

## Report No. 12

van Naerssen, T.; J. Kusters and J. Schapendonk (2006). Afrikaanse migrantenorganisaties in Nederland. Ontwikkelingsactiviteiten en opinies over ontwikkelingssamenwerking. *Working papers Migration and Development series*, Nijmegen.

## Report No. 13

Kusters, J; R. Plug; J. Schapendonk and T. van Naerssen (2006). Een inventarisatie van Afrikaanse migrantenorganisaties in Nederland betrokken bij ontwikkelingssamenwerking. *Working papers Migration and Development series*, Nijmegen.

## Report No. 14

Zoomers, A. and T. van Naerssen (2006) Final report: International migration and national development in sub-Saharan Africa. Viewpoints and policy initiatives in the countries of origin. *Working papers Migration and Development series*, Nijmegen.

## Report No. 15

Zoomers, A. (ed) (2006) Executive summary: International migration and national development in sub-Saharan Africa. Viewpoints and policy initiatives in the countries of origin. *Working papers Migration and Development series*, Nijmegen.