Marcel Wissenburg

Ecological Neutrality and Liberal Survivalism
How (not) to Discuss the Compatibility of Liberalism and Ecologism*

Abstract: Perhaps the most animated debate in green political thought—the sub-discipline of political theory devoted to the relations between humanity, politics and environment—addresses the question of the compatibility of ecologism and liberal democracy, more particularly the liberal aspects of the latter. The present article affirms and further elaborates earlier suggestions that existing approaches to this matter are either flawed or, when defensible, prone to produce trivial conclusions. Incompatibility of the two theories is always to be expected, in one form or another. It is argued that a characterization of political theories as families growing and changing over time, a notion partly derived from Wittgenstein’s family concept, allows us to understand ecologism and liberalism as evolving theories, and to anticipate the development of both—which may lead to far more surprising conclusions.

0. Introduction

Green political thought is a relatively new branch on the tree of political theory. Old branches die off—few political theorists discuss the legitimacy of the rule of heathens over Christians, these days—while new ones develop in response to the needs of the times. After its radical start some forty years ago in the wake of Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring (1965) and the Club of Rome’s Limits to Growth (1974), green political thought has become established as an accepted academic sub-discipline in its own right, represented in journals, at conferences and in graduate and undergraduate courses in the Americas, Europe and Asia. Like all established fields of research, it has yielded fruitful debates and less fruitful ones. This article addresses one of the apparently most fruitful debates, that on the compatibility of liberalism and ecologism, or in other (immediately controversial) words: can a sustainable society, with all the restrictions thought necessary to ensure the survival of both humanity and a healthy ecology, safeguard the heritage of liberal democracy? I argue that the way in which this question has been addressed so far risks generating increasingly trivial conclusions, and that new approaches are worthy of attention.

* An earlier version of this article was presented at the symposium ‘Ecological Goals and Political Ideals: Harmony or Conflict?’, University of Mannheim, 13–14 October 2005. For their extensive and extremely helpful comments, I would like to thank John Barry, Andrew Dobson, Tim Hayward, Anton Leist, Andrew Light, John O’Neill and Thomas Schramme.
The one topic uniting the sub-discipline of green political thought is that of the relationship between ecologism and political reality. Virtually all research in the field can be represented as addressing questions relating to this defining trait, from “how eccentric are these greenies, anyway?” to “how can sustainability be squared with a free market?” An important strand within green political thought has addressed the compatibility of ecological thought with ‘classic’ mainstream political theories, first authoritarianism, anarchism and socialism, and later others.

Over the past 15 years or so, this debate on compatibility has focused on one item in particular: liberal democracy—asking whether ecologism is compatible with reality (reality defined as liberal democracy), whether liberal democracy is compatible with our ecological reality, and so on, depending on authors’ perspectives. The focus is often narrowed down even further to liberal democratic political theory rather than practice on the apparent assumption that humans, even politicians, are—to use a Marxist phrase—relatively autonomous, i.e., that policy and political change can to a degree be inspired by ideas rather than merely be a function of anonymous, large-scale causal processes. Zooming in even further, the debate has focused in part on liberalism itself rather than hybrid liberal democracy, since compatibility with ecological principles and needs is a problem for all versions of democracy, from democratic centralism down to Herrschaftsfreier Diskurs and reflective equilibrium (Habermas 1981; Rawls 1973) if democracy is aimed at formulating substantive consensus, or down to positive legitimacy if it is Realpolitik, aimed at the management of power (Shapiro 2002).

Even liberalism itself is not ‘the’ problem. In these fifteen years, the debate on the compatibility of ecologism and liberalism, to which I admit having contributed my share of processed tree carcasses (e.g. Wissenburg 1998; 2001; 2002; 2004), has identified areas unworthy of further investigation (e.g., the liberal freedom of religion seems irrelevant), areas hardly worth getting up for (e.g., freedom of assembly and association seems relevant only when travel is involved), and areas that seem to present real problems.

Having zoomed in to an almost microscopic level, it is difficult to separate these ‘real’ problems individually; they seem to form a cluster of public and private vices (from the ecological point of view) or virtues (from the liberal point of view). There is, for one, individualism—though not individualism as awareness of individuality, of existence as a separate identity per se (although more communitarian-minded ecologists might disagree here) but rather expressive, possessive and materialistic individualism, what I once called the freedom of life—the freedom to realize in material reality different conceptions of a meaningful life. It is this freedom that allows individuals to wear clothes other than Mao-suits, drive cars in addition to public transport, drive Hondas and Mazdas and beamers and beetles rather than Trabants only, drink juices and soda and wine rather than beer and cider only, eat snails in Britain and hamburgers in France, fly off to the South, go skiing up North, and in the process burn up everything that is left of nature. Related to the freedom of life is freedom of thought, more neutrally described as irreducible moral pluralism, without which prefer-
ences over individual lifestyles would never be generated the way they are—and neither would government policies. Another part of the cluster (adding means to opportunity and motive) is the freedom of trade, making nature available to us in all shapes desirable for all lifestyles, from ecotourism to refined dinosaur juice for cars. Finally, at the public level, there is neutrality: the obligation on liberal institutions not to (dis)advantage particular lifestyles arbitrarily or/nor (“or” and “nor” define three different strands within liberalism) the individuals exercising their rights to such lifestyles.

Rhetorically put, it seems that ecologism has a problem with freedom of thought, diversity and self-determination; or (the everyday “or”: a, b or both) that liberalism has problems appreciating the material preconditions for liberty. It is crucial to note that by zooming in on particular issues, others are lost from sight. The general compatibility debate now focuses on liberalism and, to a lesser degree, democracy, thereby ignoring that real-world politics is usually inspired by (or, if there is no relative autonomy, justified by reference to) a mixture of political and non-political theories—conservatism, Christian democracy, social democracy, communitarianism, racism, nationalism, religion, and so on. Moreover, real existing political constellations are mutations or (at best, assuming ideas can really change the world) adaptations of older systems that arose under different circumstances, and they have to operate within a social, cultural, economic, geographic and political context they only influence, not define. Governments of liberal democracies cannot choose their people or country, and liberal democratic constitutions often still contain remnants of feudalism, absolutism, religious sectarianism and so on. If political theories rather than laws of nature rule politics, it is important to remember that any real-world contradiction with ecologism may not necessarily be related to liberalism as such.

Moreover, even if the focus on liberalism were completely justified, we may well have identified only one cluster of problems where there are more. The presently popular focus on pluralism and neutrality obscures the possibility that, for instance, liberalism’s egalitarianism (and egalitarianism in general) contributes to ecological problems due to its claim that each individual and not just the deserving has an equal and not a proportional right to the benefits and burdens of social cooperation. Questioning the taboo on unequal treatment may be politically incorrect but is a necessary step towards the formulation of theories of ecological and environmental justice, which in turn is by definition the only viable alternative in a world of scarcity to theories of the good (i.e., perfect) life.

Nonetheless, liberalism is not an exclusively Betelguesian theory or practice, and the problems identified so far are problems for planet Earth. It is therefore legitimate to ask if there really is a kind of contradiction between the demands of ecologism and the cluster of liberal virtues and practices associated with political neutrality and individual moral pluralism. Given the number of publications on this question, it is also legitimate to ask if anything can still be added to that debate other than an overview and a final conclusion—has not enough been said
yet? It is this latter question, rather than the former, that I shall deal with in this article.

In the next section, after a very brief overview of the debate on the possible opposition between public ecological goals and liberal neutrality, I shall defend three theses. The first of these is that the debate has been obstructed and has suffered (though not fatally) from confusion due to imprecision as to what it is that has to be assessed: the mutual exclusion of principles or practices, their incompatibility, their impossibility, their incompossibility, and so on. Secondly, a purely analytical approach to the ecologism-liberalism controversy could highlight exactly under exactly which conditions exactly which conception of liberal neutrality may be incompatible with (or, in any other sense, contradictory to) exactly which political goal of ecologism. Thirdly however, such an analytical approach misses one important dimension of the problem: political theories evolve.

These theses lead me, in the ensuing section, to argue against an essentialist conception of liberalism and ecologism, and in favour of understanding political theories in terms of—with a reference to Wittgenstein’s family concept—horde concepts. I defend a more evolutionary approach to the compatibility question.

Interpreting political theories as evolving bodies of thought, I then move on to defend the idea that ecologism can and must develop its own concept of moral neutrality, while liberalism can and must develop a substantive view on ecological side-constraints to human emancipation. In due course, I conclude, we may find ourselves discussing whether ecological neutrality is compatible with liberal survivalism.

1. How Not to Assess Contradictions

The history of the ecologism-liberalism debate has been documented extensively both in independent contributions to the debate itself and in handbooks (e.g. Dobson 2000; Dryzek/Schlosberg 2005; also Wissenburg 2006). Suffice it to say that the neutrality and pluralism cluster has sometimes been seen as a consequence rather than an independent cause of (by the standards of ecologism) our present ecological mayhem.

As the real and underlying causes, growth-driven capitalism has been blamed, the Enlightenment in general and Cartesianism in particular (see Sagoff 1988) as well as anthropocentrism (VanDeVeer 1979; Singer 1988; Garner 2003; Eckersley 1992). Counterarguments based on for instance Spinozism and John Stuart Mill’s idea of a steady-state economy (Mill 1848/1999) show that most instances of apparent incompatibility are contingent: liberals can quit their addiction to growth, ecologists can accept all sorts of growth as long as it is not at the expense of relevant parts or aspects of nature; dichotomies are heuristic constructs not necessary conditions for being a liberal; and liberals can extend the circle of compassion (Wenz 1988) to include not only future humans but also sentient animals and even further, perhaps even so far as to accept the intrinsic value of nature itself or something equivalent (Dizerega 1996; Hailwood 2004).
Neutrality and pluralism, or more bluntly put, liberalism’s apparent aversion to political interference in the genesis of preferences (Wissenburg 1998), have been the object of both green authoritarian (Ophuls 1976) and green pro-democracy critique (Dryzek 1990; Barry 1999; Schlosberg 1999; Dobson 2003; Smith 2003). Again, the result is that no fundamentally irreconcilable differences between ecologism and neutrality exist (see Bell 2002), at least not in the sense that liberalism excludes ecologism as a theory of the good. The latter caveat indicates exactly where the problem lies: although liberalism offers room to green ideas at the level of individuals, and can if necessary even appreciate a unanimous preference for green policies among them, it can apparently not accept that one particular and very substantive theory of the good be prescribed and be made the yardstick of all political institutions. By the same token, ecologism apparently excludes as a matter of principle liberalism’s love for individual diversity and constitutional neutrality.

This brief summary may create the impression that clear conclusions can now be drawn and that the debate is over: either liberalism and ecologism are incompatible as a matter of principle, or we can move on to the technical rather than philosophical question of formulating political principles that satisfy the demands of both political theories. This impression would be incorrect. There are, as a matter of fact, good reasons to argue that so far, the debate on the greening of liberalism was not only biased (it has rarely been presented as one on liberalising ecologism) but also incomplete and oversimplified, disorganised and confused. I shall discuss three such reasons (though there may be more): the incarnation of liberalism, the versions of liberalism and ecologism, and the notion of compatibility. Each indicates that the search for an answer to the question of compatibility will have to be far more subtle and therefore complicated; I then move on to suggestions for justifiable simplification.

Two of the most important causes of—surprisingly seldom recognized—confusion lie in the choice of target: which incarnation of liberalism is to be assessed, and which version? In a very enlightening paper, Sverker Jagers (2005; see also Jagers 2002, Ch. 1) recently listed four different incarnations of liberal democracy (the distinction with liberalism sec is irrelevant here) that have been the object of research into their compatibility with the demands of ecologism. Three of these, Jagers argues, tell us little to nothing about compatibility: (1) present liberal democratic institutions and their functioning, the context within which liberal democracies are functioning, and the temporal dimension of liberal democracies can be assessed as green or non-green, deep or shallow, sustainable or unsustainable, but these assessments give us no reason to blame or praise liberal democracy (liberalism) as such. The relationship between liberalism and real-world liberal political institutions (2) is contingent: alternative institutions might be greener or less green without being any less liberal. The context within which liberal democracies operate is not of their own making and often cannot be ‘made’ either—they inherit but do not choose a culture and history containing elements of, say, Christianity, feudalism, Enlightenment and laissez-faire capitalism. The time horizon of liberal democracies (3)—which Jagers understands as a distinct incarnation of liberal democracy, while I would rather see it as a function
of certain democratic institutions—may be limited to one or two electoral hunting seasons, and the decision-making process may be arduous, time-consuming and inappropriate to environmental crises, but is again a contingent feature of liberal democracy. Quoting liberally from a long list of sources, Jager shows that much of the green critique of liberalism was (mis)directed at exactly these contingent factors.

It is only, Jagers argues, the philosophical foundations of liberal democracy that can tell us anything definitive about the incompatibility of liberal democracy and ecologism. Focusing again on liberalism per se, it would be irrelevant how or where these foundations manifest themselves in political reality—whether in nation-states or a world federation, through bureaucracies or service providers competing in a market, guided by elected parliaments, citizen juries or an enlightened despot. Up to a point, each and every one of these ‘realities’ could be replaced by another without ‘loss of liberalism’, and each is to a degree interchangeable with other political theories. What matters is what is essential to liberalism: “For example, liberalism’s denial of specific ends as legitimate to pursue, its lack of a moral concept of peoples’ appropriate relation to nature, the emphasis on autonomy, individual self-rule, liberty, private property, lack of intrinsic concern for others.” (Jagers 2005, 6)

Although I shall, for the sake of simplicity, assume that he is right, Jagers may actually be too radical in dismissing the relevance of political reality for an analysis of the compatibility of political theories. It is not unimaginable that a practice that is (1) unacceptable from a green point of view happens to be (2) a necessary consequence of the combination of (3) a liberal principle X that is in itself compatible with ecologism, and (4) an ineradicable ‘environmental’ factor. If, for instance, (some) humans are genetically programmed to fear war, pestilence, famine and death, and if liberals and ecologists would agree on the morality of a principle like “each morally relevant natural entity is to have a freedom to choose any lifestyle that does not directly or indirectly inhibit other entities’ possibilities to exercise a similar freedom”, then the result, in a world where that principle would be meticulously respected, will not be overexploitation of natural resources but still in all likelihood a dangerous kind of exploitation to the utter limits of sustainability.

It is also worth mentioning that merely because a critique of practices or institutions can at best accidentally contribute to the incompatibility debate, it still is these institutions and practices that are the direct causes of (un)sustainability and the like. From a practical perspective, an ecological critique of the philosophical foundations of liberalism could then be seen as drawing attention away from the real problems—if only ideas would not to some degree inspire policymakers and shape future policies.

With or without this amendment, Jagers’ insistence on choosing the right incarnation of liberalism, i.e. its philosophical foundations, leads to the rejection of an important part of the green critique of liberalism as at least prima facie irrelevant. In the present context, where we focus on the possible opposition of public ecological goals and liberal neutrality, it implies at least the possibility that neither moral pluralism nor liberal neutrality (i.e., foundations)
are problematic, but rather the contingent way these ideas are given shape in political practice. Thus, liberal neutrality may well be imperfectly practiced as state partiality to the strong and to broadly preferred lifestyles—in a sense, a problem that relates to liberalism operating in an environment that is hostile to green ideas: an environment of materialism and a democratic mass culture embracing prosperity and growth for all. Conversely, any green critique of the practice of impartiality sheds no light whatsoever on the morality or immorality of the liberal foundational notions of political neutrality and moral pluralism.

A second type of confusion haunting the incompatibility debate concerns the version of liberalism criticized. No two traditions within liberalism, and ultimately no two distinct authors or even one author at different stages of his or her intellectual evolution, share the exact same set of liberal principles, not even those defining the essence of liberalism. For example, one of the most fundamental cleavages in current politics, that between neo-liberalism on the one hand and on the other (among others) old-fashioned social democrats and liberals, reflects (but only up to a point) a cleavage in philosophy between the classical school of liberalism epitomized by John Locke, Adam Smith, Friedrich von Hayek and Robert Nozick (by US standards ‘libertarians’), and the social school of John Stuart Mill, John Rawls, Brian Barry and others (by US standards ‘liberals’). The first rejects social redistributive justice and embraces retributive justice, the second takes an almost perfectly reversed position. At the level of foundational ideas, both may stress the vital importance of individual property but they differ on the way the original acquisition of property is justified, as well as on the rights (of use, abuse, transfer etc.) incurred by original acquisition. A second example is the interpretation of neutrality—with each of the three interpretations dividing both social and classical liberals. On a more libertarian interpretation, individual preferences are an individual’s responsibility; thus, liberal institutions should not (dis)advantage particular lifestyles arbitrarily nor the individuals exercising their rights to such lifestyles. Perfectionists argue for neutrality towards individuals but not lifestyles, whereas consequentialists support neutrality towards lifestyles (outcomes) rather than individuals (starting positions). Finally, on a less abstract level, some liberals embrace equal obligations to future generations, others embrace discount rates, others focus on future individuals; some are communitarian, others cosmopolitan; some recognize animal rights, others do not; some see non-acquired natural resources as collective property, others as unowned; and so on.

All in all, this forces us to rephrase the original research question: no longer can we ask if there is (ecologically acceptable) life on Planet Liberalism—it now becomes a matter of assessing the quality, quantity, diversity and viability of life on each of the many planets in the galaxy called Liberalism.

At this point, it is important to note that ecologism is not a monolithic political theory either. As one of the classic introductions to green political thought (Dobson 2000) shows, not only are there environmentalists and ‘real’ ecologists, but real ecologists themselves are divided over numerous issues including the role and extent of (direct) democracy, the cultural or biological definition of borders or rejection of same in favour of cosmopolitanism, the value of collec-
tives (species) versus individuals and of life (biocentrism) versus the ecosystem (ecocentrism), etc.

In my *Green Liberalism*, I compiled a list of some 24 issues that a complete green political theory would have to address, as well as the possible positions that could be chosen on each of these issues or essentially contested concepts (Wissenburg 1998, 48–63). If each distinct combination of issues and positions defines a distinct political theory, there are 39,731,628,000 possible ecologisms—under two rather implausible assumptions: that the list of issues and positions is complete (more issues increase the number of permutations) and that a choice for one position on one issue is independent of choices on other issues (dependence reduces the number of permutations). It is not unrealistic to assume that a similar approach to liberalism would result in a far longer list of issues and positions, and a far higher number of possible permutations, i.e., liberalisms.

If we want to be not only fair and impartial but also complete in our answer to the question whether liberalism and ecologism are compatible, then avoiding the pitfalls of confusing the various incarnations and versions of liberalism as well as ecologism is possible only if we compare, one by one, each and every one of billions of liberal principles with each and every one of nearly 40 billion ecologisms. Perhaps this would be a good reason for philosophers to finally get acquainted with otherwise philosophically useless spreadsheet software, if it were not for the virtual impossibility of the exercise (not to mention the limitations of most spreadsheet programs). We are talking about a four-dimensional spreadsheet here (henceforth: the matrix): each cell of a two-dimensional NxM table of distinct liberalisms and ecologisms contains a 24xP table of ecologism’s respectively liberalism’s specific positions on distinct issues.

The compatibility debate as it actually takes place does not conform to this obviously over-rationalized analytical model. Instead, two approaches or rather shortcuts are preferred. The ecological shortcut consist of a combination of inductivism and Popperian falsificationalism (bien étonnées): one or more intuitively objectionable premises of liberalism are selected or constructed (the straw man argument is no stranger to any philosophical debate), their incompatibility with by definition ‘reasonable’ ecological demands is shown, and the obvious conclusion is drawn: the compatibility hypothesis is refuted and liberalism thereby discredited. Unfortunately, the ecological shortcut backfires: the liberal’s answer is simply to rephrase the offending liberal premises or whatever green criteria were applied, or refute the latter, thereby showing that by definition more ‘sensible’ interpretations of liberalism are not incompatible with by definition more ‘reasonable’ interpretations of ecologism. The ecologist will thereupon be tempted to use the ecological shortcut once more, and so on. Note that this strategy comes down to almost randomly testing sets of cells in our analytical matrix. Liberal neutrality offers a good illustration: where ecologists first aimed their critique at libertarian interpretations of neutrality, liberals were quick to respond with more perfectionist and consequentialist interpretations.

The liberal shortcut is equally haphazard as compared to systematically working through all the cells of our matrix. It consists in showing the compatibility of at least one version of liberalism with at least one version of ecologism. As an
illustration: I followed a minimax variety of this strategy in my *Green Liberalism*: choosing a ‘thin’ or minimal interpretation of liberalism (reflecting classical liberalism more than social liberalism), I tried to determine how green such a liberalism could become. The obvious countermove by ecologists is to argue that ecologism has not been represented adequately or that at least one of its most fundamental demands is not satisfied. In response, as Jagers (2005) suggests, and Stephens (1999) and Bell (2002) already tried, more Mill (steady state economy, harm principle, etc.) is brought on: a more social liberalism, it is hoped, will be compatible with a less shallow ecologism. The ensuing moves in the debate are predictable—ecologists can and will apply the same strategy liberals adopt in response to the ecological shortcut.

Both shortcuts are based on inductive if not intuitive reasoning, both result in random moves across the analytical matrix. Although more practical than an ideal-typical cell-by-cell analysis of an immense matrix, the result is disappointing: all we get is incomplete and inconclusive assessments of compatibility. A purely analytical approach to the ecologism-liberalism controversy on the other hand—were it humanly feasible—would highlight under exactly which conditions exactly which conception of liberal neutrality would be incompatible with (or, in any other sense, contradictory to) exactly which political goal of ecologism.

A second disadvantage of ‘intuitive’ approaches to incompatibility is that they have resulted in extremely predictable outcomes: no two principles covering one area (even if only a slice is shared) are by definition incompatible. A perhaps childish example: on the same crossing, “cars take precedence over bikes” can contradict “traffic from the left has the right of way”. Incompatibility of this sort only shows that two potentially contradictory principles have to be ranked, subsuming one to the other.

This brings us to the third and final cause of confusion in compatibility debates: the notion of compatibility or incompatibility itself—a notion that can be interpreted (as I will now show) in at least five different, and in some senses obviously incompatible, ways. Note that incompatibility is not about the necessary ethical priority of ecologism over liberalism (“is liberalism incompatible with ecologism?”, a phrasing biased in favour of ecologism), nor vice versa, but ‘impartially’ about any principle A being a necessary or sufficient condition for the exclusion of principle B.

1. **Perfect mutual exclusion**
Two theories can be completely incompatible if every commandment of the first is prohibited by the second, and every commandment of the second forbidden by the first: the set of overlapping principles is empty.

2. **Unilateral exclusion**
Two theories can be unilaterally incompatible if the one excludes the other but not vice versa. Hence (with apologies for the obvious good guy-bad guy framing; the examples are debateable), atheists can marry muslims but muslims cannot marry atheists; a freemason is allowed to be a catholic, but a catholic cannot join freemasonry; and perhaps a liberal can act in accordance with all the demands of ecologism, but an ecologist can never embrace liberal neutrality.
(3) Incompossibility
The case of the contradictory traffic rules can serve as a good illustration of incompossibility: two legitimate principles that are compatible in theory but (in the absence of a priority rule) cannot in practice be applied at the same time and place. A more appropriate example of incompossibility is the medieval nobleman’s dilemma: whose command to fight is he to follow in a conflict between two equally deserving overlords if he owns lands from, and swore allegiance to, both? Incompossibility is predictable, but can only be solved by introducing priority rules—and this shows the relevancy of the nobleman’s example to our problem: the two overlords (ecologism and liberalism) would both have to agree to one priority rule.

(4) Contingent mutual exclusion (practical and theoretical)
The incompossibility of our two traffic rules is predictable because we know in advance that the principles themselves will, in an infinite universe, have to be applied at least once at the same time and place to the same situation; in other cases we cannot predict that principles will clash, only establish the possibility. Both are cases of practical contingent exclusion. It is however also imaginable that two principles are contingently incompatible because they may require belief in mutually exclusive premises for belief in both. If two such principles lead to the same practical results (i.e., if they are compossible), we end up with what one might call an irrelevant form of incompossibility—or ‘pragmatic’ compatibility, such as for instance Brian Norton (1991) argued would be possible among various ecologist traditions, sects and schools.

(5) Reductive exclusion
Instead of making it certain, likely or imaginable that a particular principle A cannot be realized if principle B is applied, it is also possible for B to limit the degree to which A can be realized. Thus, Rawls’ First Principle (Rawls 1973) limits my liberty (an egotic principle) by demanding a similar liberty for others. Neutrality, in a similar way, limits the realization of the ecologist’s plan of life (i.e., of ecologism) by demanding that in a morally pluralistic world, other individuals or their plans of life should be treated equally.

This is still an imperfect characterisation of the many interpretations given to incompossibility: it is probably incomplete and certainly conflates several technically interesting alternative interpretations. Nevertheless, it suffices to draw two conclusions: first, that any two principles, unless they are totally identical or totally incomparable, are necessarily incompatible in one way or another (hence that incompossibility as such is unsurprising and uninteresting), and second, that incompossibility cannot be solved, only prevented by introducing a third, higher principle. Prioritization, an obvious solution strategy for the first three forms of incompossibility, leads either to contingent or reductive exclusion. The only alternative, demarcation of distinct territories for the application of incompatible principles, necessarily leads to reductive exclusion. Contingent and reductive exclusion, in turn, can only be solved by completely rejecting at least one of the two conflicting principles.

Obviously then, asking whether liberalism and ecologism are incompatible,
or more specifically whether liberal neutrality towards moral pluralism and ecology’s substantive goals are, is just a tad like kicking in an open door. Incompatibility is to be expected, no matter how the two sets of principles are formulated. There is no perfect solution, in that we can expect any solution to result in a confirmation of the classic wisdom that one cannot have one’s cake and eat it: any solution demands that at least one of the two gives way to the other, i.e., that at least one of the two sets is restricted in range or degree of realization.

The intellectually more challenging question then seems to be: in which exact territories, to what exact degree, can neutrality co-exist with specific ecological goals? In what remains of this article, I shall argue that this is a question to which an intellectually satisfactory answer is possible—and even indicate in which direction we may expect a solution to lie. Before we can move in that direction, however, one more obstacle will have to be overcome: the apparent mutual exclusion by ecologism and liberalism of any possible solution strategy. If we want to draw borders between the realms of neutrality and ecological goals, or if we want to prioritize one over the other, we need the higher principle for demarcation or priority to be acceptable to both ecologists and liberals. Ecologists are supposed to be consequentialists, however, and liberals proceduralists: the former position excludes as irrelevant arguments for a higher principle that do not refer to the certain realisation of a green society, the latter excludes all arguments that do. Unless we can refute one of these two meta-ethical premises, higher-principle-solutions require two defences: one acceptable for liberals by their own standards, the other acceptable for ecologists by theirs. That, however, might get us caught in a loop: if such a higher principle can be defended, the original problem of incompatibility could never have arisen in the first place; since it did, the higher principle must contradict a further core value or principle of liberalism respectively ecologism.

Overlooking a 15 years’ debate on the possible ‘incompatibility’ of public ecological goals and liberal neutrality, we can draw two conclusions.

First, both liberalism (broadly construed) and ecologism (broadly construed) have never been simple, monolithic ideologies but were always better described as multi-faceted sets of political theories. Both have moreover (see above under shortcuts) evolved over those fifteen or more years, partly in response to one another, only to increase the diversity. As a result, the question of the compatibility of liberal neutrality (just one variable characterising the various liberalisms) and public ecological goals (ditto) can no longer be phrased in terms of fundamental opposition, assuming it could ever sensibly have been posed like that in the first place. Rather, the question is which exact interpretation of liberal neutrality is incompatible, in which sense (practical or theoretical), under exactly which circumstances, with exactly which interpretation of which goal of which version of political ecologism. Using a simile, the question of incompatibility has to be tackled at the level of genes rather than species.

A second conclusion that can be drawn (and that will be further supported in the next section) is the following: although it has been fruitful and remains essential, and although it has generated conclusions at a far more general level than
that of the ‘genetic’, the intuitive-inductive approach to the ecologism-liberalism controversy (as much as the never practiced ideal-typical purely analytical form) misses one important dimension of the problem. The intuitive and analytical approaches analyse ideas rather than families of ideas, and ideas, as we know since Plato, are eternal and constant. Political theories, on the other hand, are not. They evolve—and over the past twenty years, liberalism and ecologism have even evolved partly in response to one another.

2. Families and Hordes

In the preceding section, an implicit distinction was made between relevant and irrelevant incompatibility. Incompatibility between any two political theories, any two sets of principles plus the arguments that support them, is to be expected; any instance of incompatibility can be ‘solved’ (but only to a degree) by ranking incompatible principles or by rejecting at least one of two, but not every such solution will fit the frameworks of the affected theory—the latter may become internally incoherent, or a higher principle may exclude a ‘solution’. Then again, it may not: if ecological ideals can be reformulated in such a way as to meet standards of liberal neutrality, or if neutrality can be redefined so as to satisfy crucial ecological goals, the original incompatibility can be characterized as—ultimately—irrelevant.

Distinguishing between relevant and irrelevant (or non-reducible and reducible, non-solvable and solvable) inconsistency seems practically impossible, however. If we follow the traditional approach of liberal or ecological shortcuts through the matrix of possible liberalisms and ecologisms, we will at best be able to identify reasons why complete schools within each tradition are irreducibly incompatible with schools within the other tradition—only to be defeated by the counterargument that whatever defines the ‘incompatible’ version of liberalism or ecologism is not really a defining mark of liberalism or ecologism per se. The alternative, systematically assessing incompatibility over all the cells of our matrix one by one, seems unfeasible within the course of a lifetime.

At this point, I would like to suggest a solution that makes the incompatibility problem both relevant and manageable. It supports and improves the intuitive approach of making shortcuts, it allows us to distinguish between defensible and indefensible solutions to perceived instances of incompatibility, and it makes room for a dynamic aspect ignored so far: the evolution of political theories in the course of history.

The fundamental flaw of the matrix approach and the redeeming quality of the intuitive approach is that the former does not, while the latter does, allow us to believe in a distinction between liberalism and non-liberalism, ecologism and non-ecologism. On the matrix approach, all issues that a political theorist addresses, all positions s/he chooses, are equally important and equally define his or her specific theoretical position. The intuitive approach assumes that some ideas and principles are more important than others, indeed that these define a kind of core set of values and principles shared by a group of theories (theorists),
a core that distinguishes, say, social liberalism per se from everything else, rather than merely one particular theorist’s liberalism at one particular moment in time, say, the Rawls of 1999, from any others—the Rawls of 1973, Mill, Smith, Marx, Mozart or Madonna.

Thanks partly to Plato and Aristotle, thanks to their notions of forms and categories, we can distinguish between (and I use this word broadly) the essence of things and their particular manifestations. We believe—possibly correctly, at least inescapably—that ‘essences’ of a kind exist that allow us to distinguish not just between phenomena, but also between phenomena as differing more or less. Thus, we assume that it is legitimate (under conditions) to say that liberalism and tulips differ more fundamentally than liberalism and sculpture, which in turn differ more fundamentally than liberalism and the principles of the Dogma school in film, which in turn differ more fundamentally than liberalism and socialism. On the basis of that same conviction, we argue that two authors or their theories are both liberal despite all further differences—an assessment that does not square well with the matrix approach.

As far as political theories are concerned, there are a number of ways in which these ‘essences’ can be represented. A classic one is the tree: at the roots, the Founding Fathers of liberalism, branching off from the stem different traditions and sub-traditions within liberalism, on the leaves different philosophers. Although useful in other contexts like introductory courses, the tree does not serve our purposes: there is little or no room in the picture of a tree to represent cross-branch influences, for instance. The London tube map can serve as a model for connecting concepts and conceptions uniting a school or tradition within liberalism, the lines connecting them representing distinct theories or theorists. This model, too, has its flaws: among others, it lacks the dimension of time. One of the most popular models is the planet model—often discernable in intuitive approaches to the compatibility question—representing a political theory as made up of a hard core of fundamental principles, a periphery of more fluid ideas, a surface divided by continents and the void beyond, where other theories and practices exist. The obvious flaw here is that if theories influence one another at all, it is across a vacuum.

The metaphor of the family concept (Wittgenstein 1953/2002, 67) has distinct advantages over any of these models. In the most literal sense, a family concept describes how we intuitively distinguish family members from others, and more remote family members from more related members. Brothers, sisters, cousins and all may have the same hair, the same eyes, the same ears, lips, hands, build, and so on, but virtually no two members of a family will be identical. The more traits they share, the closer we expect them to be related—but still, sister A may have a different nose than B and C, whereas A and B may have the same lips. In a totally different context, applied to principles rather than bodily properties, the notion of family resemblance can be used to describe the young and old Rawls as very closely related, Brian Barry and Bruce Ackermann as cousins, and Richard Rorty and John Locke as $n$-th cousins $m$ times removed.

Unfortunately, Wittgenstein devoted hardly more than ten sometimes fuzzy paragraphs to the notion of a family concept. It is open to interpretation and
amendment, and while not all interpretations are appropriate in our context, some amendments are definitely required. The result is an alternative notion more suited to the description of (at least political) theories specifically, for which I too shall use a metaphor: the (Khan’s) horde.

The Core

The notion of a core—a set of traits that horde members must share to some degree (e.g. blood thirst), as opposed to traits that they can or cannot share accidentally (e.g. scimitars)—does not seem to be part of the original Wittgenstein concept, but is essential if we are to apply it to political theories. Without a core containing some notion of what defines a political theory for instance, the distinction between ecologism and utopianism would be as accidental (and small) as that between ecologism and socialism or ecologism and Taoism.

The Soft Core

Then again, an immutable Lakatos-like hard core is too much to demand of a political theory. As I shall argue below, liberalism has for instance always contained something like a principle of toleration for moral differences, but it seems impossible to describe this principle precisely and at the same time not exclude theories that are clearly but more or less intuitively related (intuition being the first step towards formulating a horde concept). Likewise, the concept of democracy has evolved over time from what by modern standards is best described as rule by middle-class male chauvinist inbreds, i.e., a tribal oligarchy—yet we cannot help calling it democracy. We must then assume that the core of a political theory is soft rather than hard: no element of the core is necessarily shared by all members of the horde.

The Mutating Core

The examples just given illustrate (and in fact conflate) two types of diversity within a horde: conceptual diversity (ideas being eternal) and temporal diversity. The latter allows the core traits of a horde to evolve over time—some elements disappear, like the nomadic lifestyle of the horde, feminine emotional immaturity in liberalism, or Gaiaesque inescapable ultimate harmony in ecologism; others get included.

Periphery and Void

Horde members may share traits that neither define them ‘essentially’ as a horde nor belong exclusively to the horde—all humans have the genes for noses and all are organic; liberalism is as ambivalent about faith as socialism; ecologism admires landscapes as much as 19th Century romantic painters. There is a periphery of ideas that can be part of one or more individual liberalisms or ecologisms, even define their distinctiveness, without being necessary conditions for horde membership. A political theory being a language game—or with a more popular term, discourse—also contains rules excluding topics from the game as either irrelevant or dangerous: the void, relative to liberalism for instance containing topics like painting techniques and racism.

In summary, understanding political theories as hordes involves the notion of a soft, mutating core, a periphery and a surrounding void. There is a hierarchy
of ideas—some principles and values being more important than others—but it is open to amendment and development. One horde’s core can be part of another’s periphery: ecologism, it is claimed, can exist in the periphery of liberalism but essential parts of liberalism are exiled to ecologism’s void.

One other remarkable feature of the horde concept of political theories is that it still fits in nicely with Wittgenstein’s ideas about rule-following and the rules of a language game (Wittgenstein 2002, 7, 69). Wittgenstein argued that nobody knows exactly which grammatical rules he or she applies in speaking or writing, or even which grammatical rules govern a language game—as in fact rules do not govern, but are at least in part (e.g. in ‘new applications’) formulated after the fact. Likewise, a reconstruction of a horde of political theories is an after-the-fact explanation of its constitution; individuals creating new theories do not usually follow rules but (re)define them.

The horde concept allows us to support the intuitive approach to the question of incompatibility: the latter tries to focus on the more important parts of theories and the matrix in general, also allowing us to argue that some instances of incompatibility are worse than others.

There are also areas in which the horde concept is not helpful. It allows for diversity and evolution but does not explain exactly how and why hordes develop and come to vary. Those are questions for the sociology of knowledge on the one hand (explaining the how: laboratory testing, perceived needs, Zeitgeist, ‘practice’ etc.) and epistemology on the other (explaining the why: truth, validity and credibility).

Yet political theories do evolve. As a consequence, liberalism, even the specifically liberal trait of moral neutrality, cannot be considered immutable—and neither can ecologism. This leads me to a (qualified but on the whole) negative answer to the question whether ecological politics needs specific ‘biocentric’ values, or liberalism needs specific forms of neutrality, either one being incompatible with the other, making the one totalitarian or the other shallow. Neutrality may be a core value for modern liberals, the intrinsic value of unspoiled nature for ecologists, but there is no a priori reason to assume that either one is a necessary condition for being a liberal or ecologist. There may simply be good, i.e., internally valid and credible, reasons for one or the other or both to accept a mutating core.

3. Neutrality and Survival

In the previous section, I promised that an interpretation of political theories, specifically ecologism and liberalism, in terms of evolving horde concepts would help make the question of consistency both relevant and manageable. The problem cannot be ‘solved’ since no solution exists that does not in some way create a

1 Note one of many significant differences here between the family and horde concepts and the Continental notion of a discourse: while perhaps only Foucault managed to describe the latter concept in empirically verifiable terms, he does presuppose that discourses are always, necessarily, governed by rules.
new instance of incompatibility between existing liberalisms and ecologisms, but it can be managed by developing new versions of ecologism or liberalism. Such new liberal or ecological political theories would be the result of a reflection on the theories’ internal consistency rather than incompatibility with other systems of thought.

Extrapolating from recent and current debates, I shall use this section to give two illustrations of the effects that internal reflection can have, one for liberal neutrality, the other for ecologism’s substantive demands. I shall argue that ecologism can and probably ought to develop its own concept of moral neutrality, while liberalism can and probably ought to develop a substantive view on ecological side-constraints to human emancipation. I do not claim that these represent the ways in which either tradition will necessarily develop—but I do intend to lend some plausibility to the claim that it would be reasonable to expect (and further) developments as sketched here. In due course, we may find ourselves discussing whether ecological neutrality is compatible with liberal survivalism.

Ecologism is a Young Turk: it emerged as a school in political theory only during the 1970s out of protest against a collection of threats to humanity and nature. The alternatives it offered to existing society, as well as the alternative routes towards those alternatives, changed over time as a result of increasing insight and an expanding agenda. On the horde concept view, we can expect the various ecologisms to share a relatively soft core of foundational ideas, like the idea that nature itself, as such, is a legitimate object of moral and political concern. The core is surrounded by a periphery of principles, different for different versions of ecologism, principles that interpret these foundational ideas—the intrinsic value of nature being one, its non-instrumental value being another (see for a recent overview of reasons to care for nature ‘as such’ Hailwood 2004).

The fact that core values for ecologists are open to interpretation not only helps to explain the existence of diversity within ecologism, it also indicates that these core values are in a way underdetermined: they are insufficiently determinate to support one and only one interpretation as the true or even best one. This in turn may help to explain how ecologism can support diametrically opposed (read: incompatible) interpretations of its core ideas. Classic examples are the opposition between the authoritarian, anarchist and grass roots democratic versions of ecologism, but there are others. Over the past few years, windmills have become a topic of heated debate among ecologists, with some parties giving precedence to the promotion of sustainable energy production over use of depletable natural resources, while others give precedence to the protection of unspoiled landscapes over nature exploitation per se. Both represent positions that can be defended by even the darkest green ecologists. Mobile telephone networks suffer the same fate, with some parties pointing to the advantages of mobile communication for democratic deliberation and their contribution to reducing the amount of less environmentally friendly ways of communication including physical transportation, while others again defend immaculate nature against incursions. It is not unlikely that some ecologists will before long start to defend the use of nuclear energy in the Third World as the only viable short-
term alternative to the now finally really depleting fossil fuels, while others will repeat the old but still sensible objections to nuclear power. Similarly, ecologists can (although they do not yet) both defend and reject genetic modification, both for reasons consistent with the core values of ecologism.

The main reason why ecologists can have internally contradictory convictions, up to the point where critics might argue that ecologism begins to bite its own tail, is that its underdetermined core values are not just confronted with a reality to which it has to be applied, but are confronted with a reality that is more complex than expected. Ecologism may have substantive ethical values to defend, reality does not lend itself to their being practiced in necessarily one and only one way. Two more classic examples: the natural way of staying warm in the wilderness (a romantic fire) is far more taxing on the environment than many alternatives involving modern technology; and for a family of two or more (ecologically speaking a more efficient way of living than as a solitary individual) the dishwasher is ecologically far more sensible than washing dishes by hand.

One could then argue that even though ecologists may agree on what they want to achieve (let us at least assume that much), they cannot agree in advance on how to achieve it, for the simple reason that more research is needed. Laboratory experiments only get us so far; countless permutations and combinations of technologies, resources and lifestyles will have to be tested in practice, in real life and real environments, simply because the success of any solution for unsustainability is unpredictable. This is where the precautionary principle, one of the few procedural principles most ecologists appear to support, comes into play.

It would be imprudent, not to say contrary to any interpretation of the precautionary principle, to prescribe one lifestyle for all humans living under unimaginably different circumstances, i.e., to put all one’s eggs in one basket, or even to create social environments in which some lifestyles are willfully obstructed. The result could be unforeseen local or global exhaustion of resources, civilization reaching a dead end, new and greener technologies and ways of life remaining undiscovered. Prescribing an appropriate lifestyle instead, one that is ‘in tune’ (in harmony) with a particular group’s natural environment, may appear to be a more sensible solution, but it only gets us halfway there—wherever ‘there’ may be. Misanthropic as the observation may be, many of the darker ecologists have argued that humans have never ever led sustainable lives, and if they did once, all knowledge of it has disappeared. In other words, giving scientific uncertainty its due role, if we do not know what a sustainable life ought to be like for all humans, we do not know what it ought to be like for any particular subset; we could easily face the same results as when prescribing one lifestyle for all. Since laboratory settings and drawing table plans can only be of limited help, the road to sustainability may be one encouraging diversity, bold experiments challenging orthodox views (from space travel to dishwashers), and trial and error.

From here, it is only a small step towards accepting an ecological principle of neutrality with regard to lifestyles and social and natural environments (together: life environments), the Life Environment Principle: “There is to be a
maximum set of life environments compatible with a similar set for others.” (see Wissenburg 2007 for further interpretations of this principle)

Having rid ourselves of the misconception that substantive ecological goals necessarily imply one road to salvation only, or even many roads as long as they do not involve a conception of neutrality, it is now time to look more closely at the liberal conception of neutrality.

In the 17th and 18th Century, liberalism contained no such principle as “all theories of the good deserve equal respect”; there was no room for the modern liberal notion of neutrality there. Females, primitives, peasants and atheists were never part of the original liberal plan. Liberals were tolerant and promoted tolerance, but tolerance was almost exclusively limited to different religions (or even only some sects within Christendom) and the moralities to which they gave rise. Overarching ‘all’ different moralities was one final touchstone: natural law. First stretched up to legitimize libertine sexual practices and finally blown to bits by De Sade’s insistence that anything goes that natural law allows, 19th Century liberals like Mill and Green replaced natural law by a perfectionist belief in pluralism as the road to the good life. Although no explicit standards for ‘the best way of life’ were given, the assumption was clearly that some ways of life were better than others, that discovering the better way(s) of life was a matter of experimentation, and that some could even be excluded beforehand—although it has never become clear if pushpin, being an obviously less worthy activity than poetry, belonged to the latter class. It is only in parts of 20th Century liberalism that we can find supporters for the idea that governments should be scrupulously neutral with regard to real-existing and irreducible moral pluralism, i.e., liberals who have given up all hope of moral perfection. In other words, neutrality is not a core value of liberalism, though perhaps tolerance towards reasonably defensible disagreement on foundational principles is.

Although liberalism has then, apparently, given up on its belief that the laws of nature include natural laws (i.e., moral laws), it has never rejected the notion of laws of nature (i.e., physics) demarcating the realm of human possibilities. Nor has it given up belief that physical laws do and moral principles should apply equally to all: if I have a right to X by virtue of property Y, and you also have property Y, then, other things being equal, you have an equal right to X. This one natural law left over has always (although not always consistently) served as a restraint on individual acquisition, excluding first violence and murder except when in self-defence, then slavery and the subjection of women, next aspects of pornography and educational indoctrination—all reflected in John Rawls’ First Principle.

At this point, we meet a fork in the road. In one direction, we find a typically social liberal a priori argument for nature conservation. The other is more in line with classical liberalism, i.e., John Locke’s defence of the right to private property, requiring real need and sufficient remaining stock as justifications, combined with John Stuart Mill’s harm principle.

The social liberal road leads us to the notion of equal opportunity. Where Rawls (1973) criticized Napoleonic equal opportunity as unfair since it made careers open to all but did not guarantee equal education prior to entering the
career path, Rawls himself can in turn be criticized for promising equal starting positions (fair equality of opportunity) but not delivering. As conscious as social liberals have always been to educational, social and economic inequality as factors inhibiting an equal start in life, as unmindful have they remained of environmental factors with the same effect—even though one’s birth place is as undeserved as one’s talents or one’s parents’ class. While he himself kept rejecting cosmopolitan liberalism, the later Rawls (1999) did affirm that participation in a just international society is possible only for relatively affluent societies; on them rests a moral obligation (a ‘natural duty’, Rawls (1973) would say) to remove economically and environmentally challenged societies from that state. The same line of reasoning might be used to support the thesis that any society has an obligation to ensure that its members live under conditions of relative scarcity rather than absolute poverty, i.e., that they have sufficient resources to survive in the first place.

An alternative route to survival as the primary concern of liberals leads through possessive or classical liberalism. In a way, liberalism has become more and more restrictive over the centuries, excluding more and more ways of life and lifestyles as unjustifiable obstructions to equal liberty, in turn regardless of the goal served by liberty: some lifestyles are straightforward morally repugnant (raping), some are so indirectly by seizing a, by law of nature, scarce good (loot- ing). Just like no human can claim the exclusive right to rule all others any more than any other, no human can (mutatis mutandis) claim the exclusive right to a scarce resource any more than anyone else. In other words: environmental factors limit all systems of human liberty.

From here, using Locke’s provisos, it is only a small step towards acknowledging that, first, no human can claim, more than any other, the exclusive right to the use, possession or ownership of nature in any way in which it can be interpreted as a resource; and then to the principle that no part or aspect of nature may be used by any one individual unless an argument can be given that trumps all others against that individual’s using it. Given the fact that nature can always be interpreted in some way as a scarce resource, the only argument that cannot be trumped (although it can be met on equal terms) would be survival.

Both roads lead to the same conclusion: survival trumps everything. Without the necessary natural (and social) resources to survive, diversity of lifestyle, autonomy, choice and justice become fantasies; where resources are finite, no individual’s life of luxury can be justified unless ‘enough and as good’ was left for others to survive on, or unless the worst-off had their fair share in natural resources enabling them not just an equal start, but simply the ability to start.

Hence, liberalism’s appreciation of moral pluralism combined with the recognition not only in theory but also in practice that the means to realize different views of the good life are limited could become a survivalist theory, a theory in which diversity in lifestyle is permissible only when survival is guaranteed first.

The exact meaning of the crucial term “survival” is of course open to debate. From a libertarian point of view, it can be read as a Lockean proviso for those resources needed to breathe, move and procreate (food, water and air in whatever form). Social liberals will indubitably be divided on the exact border between
basic needs and further wants, with many arguing that survival equals a life worth living in a given social context, hence some degree of positive liberty: the availability of the best possible (and most expensive) health care in one place, the prohibition of SUVs elsewhere. What matters is not that survival is a controversial or essentially contested concept, what matters is that at the level of principles, survival may come to precede just distribution—in Rawls' (1973) terms, that a general conception of justice may be more often considered fitting than a special conception, and that more and more often the condition of relative scarcity, required to successfully apply the concept of justice in the first place, may not be judged to have been met at all.

4. Conclusion

Is liberal neutrality compatible with substantive ecological goals, or will one have to give way to the other? We have seen above that this question is perhaps not only often posed in the wrong way, or addressed in an incoherent way—maybe it is not even the right question to begin with. Each and every single possible version of liberalism and each and every possible version of ecologism will in one way or another be ‘incompatible’—just like any other two schools of political thought. If our interest is limited to these individual theories, the right question is not a predictable ‘whether’ any two are incompatible but why, where, how they are. If we look at schools of thought rather than individual theories, and understand these schools of thought in terms of evolving hordes with a soft, mutable core and a variable periphery, the question is, in our case, not whether ecologism and liberalism are compatible, but under which circumstances the one can evolve to include specific core elements of the other—or how both can co-evolve. In other words, we should be asking how consistent forms of ecoliberalism or liberecologism can be justified, which exact configuration of ideas can be defended as internally consistent, and how convincing is the justification.

Perhaps the incompatibility question is one we should leave behind us. Been there, done that.

Bibliography

Barry, J. (1999), _Rethinking Green Politics_, London
—/D. Schlosberg (eds.) (2005), _Debating the Earth: The Environmental Politics Reader_, Second edition, Oxford
Eckersley, R. (1992), _Environmentalism and Political Theory_, London
Garner, R. (2003), _Animals, Politics and Justice: Rawlsian Liberalism and the Plight_
of Non-humans, in: Environmental Politics 12, 3–22

Habermas, J. (1981), Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, Frankfurt

Hailwood, S. (2004), How to be a Green Liberal, Chesham


— (2005), The Debate on Sustainable Development and Liberal Democracy—Some Critical Remarks, paper presented at the 7th NESS Conference, Göteborg University, 15–17 June 2005

Mill, J.S. (1848/1999), Principles of Political Economy, Oxford


Rawls, J. (1973), A Theory of Justice, Oxford

— (1999), The Law of Peoples, Cambridge


Wenz, P. (1988), Environmental Justice, Albany


