

POPULAR MUSIC AND THE RISE OF POPULISM IN EUROPE

An introduction¹

Mario Dunkel and Melanie Schiller

On July 30, 2016, tens of thousands of people donned lederhosen and dirndl to celebrate Andreas Gabalier's sold-out show in Munich's Olympic Stadium. The scale of the event testified to Gabalier's increased popularity in German-speaking countries. In fact, the Austrian musician, who has repeatedly expressed sympathies for the far-right populist Freedom Party of Austria, has become one of the most successful artists with German-speaking audiences in recent years. In addition to showcasing Gabalier's enormous popularity in German-speaking regions, however, the concert in Munich was also remarkable for another reason: it took place one week after nine people were killed and thirty-six injured by an 18-year-old Iranian-German inside the Olympia shopping mall near the stadium. The teenager's motives were unknown at the time, but false rumours of Islamist terrorism were one prominent explanation.²

Whilst Gabalier was careful not to make any clear statements about the incident, he nonetheless alluded to it between songs:

It is sad enough that you even have to think about whether to still go to concerts on days like these, whether you still go out of the house, whether you still go out in public somewhere, somehow [cheers, Gabalier pauses]. That's pretty bitter, because we're actually a very, very happy and sociable culture, we Austrians just like you Germans, and, and, what do I want to say now? Everything I'm thinking, I'd just rather not say, because, because I have to watch out for you guys. But I can say one thing: I am so happy that you are here today. And I am glad that you also take a young Styrian boy from Austria as he is, who now and then also says what he thinks, because it is still nicer, despite all these worries that the country currently brings with it, here with you in Germany, and also at

home in Austria. It's a big challenge that we have to face at the moment, and [pause]. Well, that's all I'm saying.³

Gabalier used this subtle reference to an ostensible security crisis to introduce his 2015 protest song "A Meinung haben" ("Having an Opinion"), in which his persona heroically confronts political correctness as dictated by an unnamed elite and presents himself as a lone warrior for free speech. The song thereby invokes the populist trope of the silent majority, and questions whether Austria is truly democratic. More specifically, "A Meinung haben" celebrates Gabalier's famous refusal to sing the revised official lyrics of the Austrian national anthem, voted into effect by the Austrian parliament in 2012, in which not only are the nation's "great sons" revered, but its "great daughters" too. As such, "A Meinung haben" has become something of a signature song for Gabalier, who projects a self-styled rebellious persona and flaunts an opinion that runs contrary to the supposedly dominant regime of elite politics and political correctness.

By introducing "A Meinung haben" with a speech that gestured, albeit obliquely, to a recent act of alleged Islamist terrorism in Munich, Gabalier not only reinforces his persona as politically outspoken in the face of powerful elites, but also alludes to the populist notion of the silent majority – that is, "the people" – who share an opinion which cannot be expressed publicly. Accordingly, his hesitancy to say what he is really thinking is, he claims, to protect his audience ("because I have to watch out for you guys"). Note that it would not threaten Gabalier himself, the unwavering rebel, but – such is the implicit assumption – the audience might be penalised in public discourse, supposedly dominated by political correctness. Furthermore, Gabalier, who describes himself here as a simple and down-to-earth "young Styrian boy" from the countryside, connects this silent majority with the "very, very happy and sociable" culture of Austria and Germany – as opposed to the implied Other that poses a serious threat to these ostensibly natural national lifestyles.

Besides illustrating how populist politics are actively negotiated in contemporary popular music culture in German-speaking countries, this example also raises a number of questions: what does the concept of populism entail in a popular culture context? How do music and musical performance negotiate populism? To what extent is Gabalier's popular success emblematic of a larger normalisation, or mainstreaming, of populist discourses in German-speaking countries, or Europe more broadly? And how do audiences interpret performances and articulations of populism? In its attempt to answer these questions, this book argues that in some ways, Andreas Gabalier does indeed exemplify broader developments within popular music cultures in Europe. Populism and popular music culture are intricately intertwined in contemporary Europe, and it is necessary to explore the ways in which they interact.

What, then, is populism? All of the reference works that have been published on the topic in recent years agree that it is notoriously difficult to define.⁴ In addition to being a common political *Kampfbegriff*⁵ in many countries, populism

has been approached from a wide range of research traditions and perspectives. Whilst historically oriented studies tend to associate the development of the term with the US Populist Party, and therefore with a democratic social movement (Goodwyn 1976; Ionescu and Gellner 1969; Postel 2009), other definitions have described populism as an emancipatory resource (Laclau 2005), a political strategy (Weyland 2017), an economic policy (Dornbusch and Edwards 1991), a communication style (Block and Negrine 2017), or an ideology (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2017). Benjamin Moffitt has grouped these perspectives into three main categories: ideational, strategic, and discursive-performative. Ideational perspectives consider populism to be an ideology that lacks substance and is therefore “thin-centred” (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2017, 6). Strategic approaches, meanwhile, view populism as a specific “way to pursue and sustain power” (Moffitt 2020, 17; Weyland 2001), whilst discursive-performative approaches regard populism as a kind of language or communication (Moffitt 2020, 22; Venizelos and Stavrakakis 2020).

Due to the term’s polyvalence, attempts have been made to distinguish between different varieties of populism. Indeed, research that focuses on specific regions often prioritises certain concepts of populism over others. Strategic approaches are prevalent in research on South America, for instance, whilst ideational perspectives are prominent in studies of European populisms. To systematise populism, given its adaptability, scholars have differentiated between Latin American, African, Central and Eastern European, Western European, US, East Asian, Indian, and other regional varieties.⁶ Moreover, researchers have defined subcategories of populism such as inclusionary, exclusionary, right-wing, left-wing, syncretic, and others (Downes and Xu 2020; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013).

Despite these variations, a significant majority of researchers agree that populism’s primary function is to operate a conceptual division of society into two antagonistic groups: the people and the elite. Populism therefore denotes ways of discursively and performatively casting the people as a group engaged in a struggle on a vertical (bottom-up) axis of conflict with a corrupt elite. It then invests this antagonism with affective significance. As Lawrence Rosenthal, Chantal Mouffe, and others have pointed out, the failure or success of populism depends on the extent to which it is able to appeal to people’s emotional and affective faculties (Mouffe 2018; Rosenthal 2020).

Over the last decade populist politics have gained real prominence in European contexts. The rise of populism has been described as a major threat to European social order, as it is deemed to undermine the core democratic and egalitarian values on which the European Union was founded. This argument has been particularly prevalent among Western European researchers with liberal democratic commitments, such as the German populism researcher Jan-Werner Müller (Müller 2016). Assessments of the alleged danger posed by populism to democracy often revolve around the question of whether or not populism’s dualisms and dichotomies are dangerous *per se*, or whether they are a necessary aspect of political

transformations. Whilst Müller argues that populism always invites Manichean thinking and the vilification of a particular group of people, Mouffe sees the confrontations inherent in populism as a necessary means of democratic political change (Mouffe, 2018). Following Mouffe's embrace of populism, we see populism in Europe as a complex phenomenon that precludes reductive assessments and judgments. The last ten years have seen the rise of a wide array of populisms in Europe, ranging from left-wing (such as Syriza and Podemos) to syncretic (such as the Five Star Movement (M5S) and the Slovakian Ordinary People and Independent Personalities party), and far-right variants. It is therefore necessary to theoretically distinguish populism from related discourses that represent genuine, major challenges for European societies, such as far-right extremism and authoritarianism.

As Lawrence Rosenthal has argued, the 2010s saw "populism's toxic embrace of nationalism" in European and North American societies (Rosenthal 2020). This is true of most European national parliaments, where populist-nationalist and far-right parties have gained more than a foothold. Such populist-nationalist parties as the League and Brothers of Italy (FDI) in Italy, Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) in Austria, Party for Freedom (PVV) in the Netherlands, Danish People's Party (DPP) in Denmark, Finns Party (PS) in Finland, and Sweden Democrats (SD) in Sweden have already participated in and formed governments, in coalition with both established parties and other populists. The German Alternative for Germany (AfD), Estonian Conservative People's Party of Estonia (EKRE), Latvian National Alliance (NA), Dutch Forum for Democracy (FVD), and Spanish party Vox have gained large swaths of the popular vote in national elections, and in some of the Visegrád countries, such as Hungary and Slovakia, populist-nationalist politics and discourses have become hegemonic.⁷ Meanwhile, non-nationalist, left-wing, and syncretic varieties of populism have been on the wane (Moffitt 2020, 67).

The reasons behind this rise in populist far-right politics are manifold, and their salience in public discourse is itself subject to contestation. They range from economic crises such as the Great Recession of the late 2000s and the further expansion of a neoliberal financial regime, to an increase in economic and social insecurity for the large majority of people, the continuing erosion of the welfare state, changes in patterns of global migration (such as 2015's "summer of migration" and, in 2022, the influx of refugees to European countries in the context of the Russian war against Ukraine), larger technological transformations and developments in media culture (Wodak, KhosraviNik, and Mral 2013, xvii; Reckwitz 2012), progressive value change (Inglehart and Norris 2019), and the diminishing influence of an "old establishment" in various social, political, and economic sectors (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2019). Populism researchers have also pointed to the significance of crises in populist discourse (Moffitt 2016; Brubaker 2017), and the past decade and a half have provided an array of events that have been framed as such. This framing has been facilitated by a political and media culture in which crisis, as "a category of social and political practice," is "mobilized to do specific political work" (Brubaker 2017, 373). Notably, the crisis frame seems particularly

relevant for populist nationalism, which proffers the nation state as the safe haven of the people.

The frame of populism itself, however, has also become a subject of debate. In particular, it has been criticised for functioning to obscure more than it reveals. According to the German sociologist Wilhelm Heitmeyer, the term populism has served to banalise the rise of authoritarian nationalism in Europe (Heitmeyer 2018). Similarly, Mondon and Winter (2020) have argued that populism's popularity amongst academics has contributed to downplaying ongoing practices of xenophobia and racism, and the structures that enable them, in contemporary Western democracies. We agree with these assessments. Bearing these calls for caution in mind, however, we argue that the frame of populism is nonetheless crucial in any attempt to come to terms with contemporary social change. As this book demonstrates, populism, as a discursive and performative practice, is a widespread – albeit ambiguous – phenomenon that has shown itself to be remarkably successful at permeating contemporary popular culture, and that continues to be central to political and cultural change. In popular music it is often difficult to pin one political ideology to a particular genre, song, artist, or reception practice, even if they are highly relevant to political discourse by reproducing the populist dichotomy of “us” versus “them.” It is therefore important to engage with the term populism critically and in ways that are context-sensitive, as well as to closely examine how populism is articulated in popular music cultures. This will allow us to gain a clearer picture of how populism may be empirically enmeshed with discriminatory practices such as racism and sexism, as well as political discourses such as nationalism.

Whilst the political traction of populist nationalism is often examined via a focus on party politics, we argue that this approach does not sufficiently explain the rise of populism and populist nationalism in Europe. Indeed, a far more fruitful perspective from which to understand the rise of populism in Europe, and its embrace of nationalism, is a discursive-performative one. As Benjamin Moffitt argues, “[w]e need to move from seeing populism as a particular ‘thing’ or entity towards viewing it as a *political style* that is performed, embodied and enacted across a variety of political and cultural contexts” (Moffitt 2016, 3, emphasis in original). Though discursive-performative approaches vary depending on their understanding of discourse, they all agree that populism should be treated as a complex phenomenon that reaches beyond the realm of party politics. As such, populism is a cultural phenomenon. It is ingrained in everyday culture and performed in myriad ways that are often difficult to grasp.

Against this backdrop, the chapters presented here ask: What is the role of popular music cultures in the rise of populism in Europe?

Cultures of populism: Towards a culture-oriented approach

Studies on the recent rise of populism and its various articulations have analysed several reasons behind the growing support for populist parties and movements,

both nationally and internationally. Yet, these have remained largely limited to political and economic perspectives, neglecting insights from other fields such as cultural studies (Marchart 2010; Moran and Littler 2020). This volume, therefore, argues that the cultural dimension of populism must be addressed so as to gain a more complete understanding of how populism has been able to attract the widespread support that it has in Europe (and elsewhere). So far, arguments about cultural aspects of populism have tended to fall into two camps. Either they are limited to a cultural backlash thesis, which holds that the recent rise of populism can best be explained as a reaction against progressive cultural change (Norris and Inglehart 2019), or, as in the case of Juha Herkman's recent *A Cultural Approach to Populism*, hold to a view of populism as merely a "political phenomenon" (Herkman 2022, 8) tied to the empirical field of political parties or movements. Our focus, however, relies less on essentialising cultural claims that consolidate (rather than challenge) populist dichotomies, as we are more interested in how populist discourses are articulated in the realm of (popular) culture and music in particular. As such, we aim to broaden the frames through which populism is understood by discussing it as a cultural phenomenon beyond the narrow field of party politics, politicians, and political movements.

Populism's changing discursive power in society needs to be understood as part of a broader cultural struggle. As Laclau reminds us, categories such as the people and common sense are not preexisting social givens, but are in fact constructed through discourse. Following Laclau and Mouffe, discourse is not limited to words and ideas, but rather denotes all "systems of meaningful practices that form identities of subjects and objects through the construction of antagonisms and the drawing of political frontiers" (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2002, 3–4). This performative construction of the people versus the elite – mostly in nationalist and exclusionary terms (Müller 2016) in contemporary Europe – is what characterises populist projects. Populist discourses can therefore be understood as hegemonic struggles for power in their attempts to fix meanings and identities (Moffitt 2020, 21), to win the consent of other groups, and to achieve a kind of ascendancy over them in both thought and practice (Hall 2003). On the one hand, populism presents itself as counter-hegemonic by claiming to challenge the dominant culture, and the political and social status quo, playing the role of the oppositional underdog, whilst on the other hand, it simultaneously claims to be the true and rightful representative of the ("silent") majority. To achieve hegemony,⁸ it is necessary to create a basic level of consensus in which a social group can present its own interests as the general interests of society as a whole (Gramsci 1998).

This hegemonic struggle plays out in what Gramsci calls the "war of positions": an ideological struggle over definitions of the people and common sense, in which existing elements are dismantled and reconstituted into a new logic (Hall 1979). This war of positions is not only political, but also cultural, in as much as culture is a terrain of ideological struggle over meanings and the discursive construction

of (new) societal norms. As such, (popular) culture plays an important role in this conflict as it is a site

where [the] struggle for and against a culture of the powerful is engaged: it is also the stake to be won or lost in that struggle. It is the arena of consent and resistance. It is partly where hegemony arises, and where it is secured.

(Hall 1998, 453)

In fact, as Stuart Hall points out, popular culture is the primary site for constituting the people (Hall 1998, 452).⁹

Of course, these discursive struggles over cultural hegemony are not (always) articulated as explicitly political messages, but most often work indirectly and invisibly, at the level of representation, signs and myths, affect and emotions. Since (popular) culture is not only concerned with concepts and ideas, but just as much with feelings, attachments, and emotions (Hall 2003), it is particularly fertile terrain for creating a sense of collective identity, (national) community, and belonging. As Fiske reminds us, it is important to remember that audiences play a constitutive role in the attribution and creation of (alternative) meanings as political acts (Fiske 2002). As such, popular culture is never a one-sided medium of communication, for instance for the dissemination of populist messages, but always consists of both consent and resistance that must be analysed and understood in their specific contexts.

It is particularly surprising that populism scholarship has neglected popular culture, given that populist actors¹⁰ often hone in on socio-cultural issues such as cultural change resulting from immigration (Mudde 2010), claiming to represent the (national) culture of the common people whilst drawing on popular cultural means of expression. Because culture is so central to any hegemonic project, as Hall writes, populism (in his case, Thatcherism) works on the basis of existing social practices and lived ideologies (Hall 1979). As we have seen, “populism takes these cultural elements which are already constructed into place, dismantles them, reconstitutes them into a new logic and articulates [them] in a new way, polarizing [them] to the Right” (Hall 1979, 16). Besides the obvious notions of an authentic people and a corrupt elite, particularly salient concepts in European contexts that are frequently rearticulated in populist terms include the nation and national (memory) culture, the heartland or *Heimat* and a sense of belonging, rurality as opposed to urbanism, gendered identities, and taste communities, amongst others.

Since hegemony-building always involves social and cultural processes that extend beyond the political realm (Panizza and Stavrakakis 2020), populists frequently employ popular cultural forms of expression. For a better understanding of these, Pierre Ostiguy’s socio-cultural conceptualisation of populism contains some very valuable insights. Populism has, of course, long used simplified messages and affective appeals directed at the so-called people; Ostiguy’s contribution

is a discussion of populism's social connotations. With the notion of "flaunting the low," Ostiguy points to how populist actors not only construct the people, but also appeal to the public by performing seemingly improper approaches to politics, and disregarding conventionally correct modes of expression. This may involve manners, demeanour, ways of speaking and dressing, vernacular codes, and culturally popular tastes displayed in public. By behaving in this way, populist actors aim to present themselves as authentic, cultural nationalists close to those they claim to represent. As Ostiguy concludes, "populism is defined as the antagonistic, mobilizational flaunting in politics of the culturally popular and native, and of personalism as a mode of decision-making" (Ostiguy 2017, 84).

More recently, Ostiguy, Moffitt, and Panizza have recommended a "performative and discursive approach to populism," arguing that "populist actors constitute popular political identities through performative practices that range from political speeches to transgressive 'low culture' performances which resonate locally" (Ostiguy et al. 2021, 2). This post-Laclauian approach is certainly valuable for recognising the relational link between populism and culture (by connecting content to style). However, it still misses the fundamental role of (popular) culture in the construction and representation of the populist people and its dichotomous, antagonistic Other, as well as in the dissemination and normalisation of populist discourses in wider society in and through (popular) culture. By remaining focused on the way in which populist actors use strategic performances and styles to gain political support, Ostiguy et al. remain limited to a narrowly-defined political realm, overlooking broader and more fundamental shifts, such as the ongoing redistribution of the sensible order (Rancière 2004)¹¹ along populist lines in contemporary European societies. Whilst they rightly highlight the fact that "populism redefines what is *sayable*, and hence also doable, in politics" (Ostiguy et al. 2021, 8, emphasis in original), their appraisal of culture sees it only as a resource for transgressive behaviour, rather than an equally important realm in which populist discourses are negotiated. Meanwhile, in *A Cultural Approach to Populism*, Herkman is right to observe that populism combines the cultural processes of signification and affective identification with political identities by giving politicised meanings to things and creating social belonging and exclusion (Herkman 2022, 35). However, his discussion does not go beyond populism's challenge to *political* hegemony, and overlooks the importance of (everyday) cultural practices.

Considering the centrality of (popular) culture for any hegemonic project, it is therefore obvious that the recent rise of populism in Europe must be understood as a wider discursive shift in society that surpasses the realm of party politics. Andreas Reckwitz, for instance, has indicated the importance of the cultural dimension in radical right-wing populist movements. As he puts it, "Right-wing populism is [. . .] not only party politics; it pursues a policy of ideas that aims at achieving cultural hegemony."¹² Likewise, Miller-Idriss has also pointed out that the far right is not simply a political movement, but a site of (sub-)cultural engagement (Miller-Idriss 2017).

This book therefore proposes a culture-oriented approach to populism, and takes a closer look at what we call *cultures of populism* to interrogate the complex interconnections between the cultural articulations of populist actors on one hand, and the wider cultural shifts that both enable and result from these articulations on the other. By cultures of populism we mean the ways in which systems of meaning and cultural practices function to constitute, communicate, and reinforce populist attitudes on a discursive, interpretative, and performative level. Our understanding of culture thereby builds on Doris Bachmann-Medick's revision of the "culture-as-text" paradigm (Bachmann-Medick 2012). With reference to Clifford Geertz and Andreas Reckwitz, Bachmann-Medick contends that viewing cultures as mere systems of meaning risks reducing them to their semiotic shape (102). She demands instead that texts – cultural products – be understood not as carriers of immanent meaning, but rather "as the result of an attribution of meaning by [their] recipients" (Bachmann-Medick 2012, 104; see also Reckwitz 2012, 606). However, we aim to avoid notions of cultural populism that overestimate audience empowerment, whilst neglecting the political economy of popular culture (Fiske 2002). Our point, following McGuigan, is precisely that popular culture is "*both* ordinary people's everyday culture *and* its material construction by powerful forces beyond the immediate comprehension and control of ordinary people" (McGuigan 1992, 5, emphasis in original). This is what makes popular culture such a significant field for the performance, constitution, and negotiation of populist discourses.

When studying the rise of populism in Europe, then, it is essential to focus on cultural transformation as much as changes in party politics. Here, Ruth Wodak and others have already highlighted the ways in which popular culture has contributed to normalising populist far-right discourses (Rheindorf and Wodak 2019; Wodak 2018). Culture's role as a site of normalisation can be approached from a variety of perspectives. We argue that normalisation is a multi-layered process. The combination of discourses such as nationalism and populism may itself be investigated through the lens of a normalisation that results from their enmeshment. De Cleen and Stavrakakis define nationalism as

a discourse structured around the nodal point 'nation', envisaged as a limited and sovereign community that exists through time and is tied to a certain space, and that is constructed through an in/out opposition between the nation and its out-groups.

(De Cleen and Stavrakakis 2017)

By contrast, they describe populism as a vertical rather than horizontal discourse that differentiates between low (the people) and high (the elite) social groups (De Cleen and Stavrakakis 2017, 310; Moffitt 2020, 34).¹³ Consequently, populism imbues nationalism with the additional axiology of an oppressed people versus their oppressors which can serve not only to discursively construct a (national) people, but also justify that people's ostensible struggle against an illegitimate

power bloc (Mondon and Winter 2020, 20, 147–198). By justifying the struggle of a nationally defined people in this way, populism further normalises nationalism by presenting it as a righteous cause.

In addition to their resulting from the above combination of discourses, processes of normalisation are often described as movements of discursive elements from the fringes to the social centre or mainstream. Rheindorf and Wodak, for instance, illustrate this with the image of a smaller “fringe” cloud of far-right discourse which disseminates elements to the larger cloud of “mainstream discourse” (Rheindorf and Wodak 2019, 307). On their way to the larger cloud, materials from the fringe pass through a catalyst which involves processes of “recontextualization” and “resemiotization.” These may take place in various kinds of media, through the different branches of government, and via educational institutions. From this perspective, normalisation primarily involves the unidirectional movement of ideas and discourses from a smaller (radical) margin to the considerably larger centre. Accordingly, Rheindorf and Wodak consider normalisation to describe “how ideologies are incorporated into the mainstream – not only of politics but of popular culture and other fields as well – through recontextualizations and semiotic reinterpretations, usually moving from offstage to onstage, and across fields as well as genres” (Rheindorf and Wodak 2019, 307).

Whilst Rheindorf and Wodak’s model assumes the normalisation of far-right ideologies to be a one-way process, we suggest some adaptations. We argue that the investigation of popular culture shows how processes of normalisation must be regarded as multi-directional rather than unidirectional. In addition to disseminating discourses from the fringes, normalisation also relies on mobilising the potential for radicalisation that already exists in society.¹⁴ As such, normalisation often involves performing, and thus accentuating, those cultural practices that are compatible with extremist discourses. These may include the glorification of heroic masculinity in superhero aesthetics, the celebration of national pride that accompanies football matches, tacit opposition to the implications of gender equality, broadly accepted racist stereotypes, and so on. Processes of normalisation, then, involve rearticulating common cultural tropes along populist or extremist lines. Besides transferring discourses from the fringes to the mainstream, normalisation requires the reinterpretation and recontextualisation of aspects of mainstream popular culture. In turn, it also involves the articulation of populist or extremist discourses through signs and practices from popular culture. This serves to “pop-ify” (Schiller 2022) and alter fringe discourses and performances, thus blurring the boundaries between fringe and mainstream by establishing new, multidirectional connections and compatibilities. The investigation of cultural change – and changes in popular culture in particular – is therefore central to understanding processes of populist mainstreaming, by which we mean the sociocultural normalisation and increased prevalence of populist discourses, both in specific contexts and society at large.

Populism and popular music

This book therefore investigates popular music as one aspect – albeit a highly significant one – of populism as a cultural phenomenon. The profound cultural significance of music is often discussed from an economic perspective, particularly in the context of the European Union, where music constitutes one of the largest sectors within the cultural and creative industries. In fact, the European Commission posits that music boasts “the largest audience” of any of the cultural and creative sectors in the European economy (European Commission 2020; Hogan 2020). Music’s cultural and social functions, however, are more far-reaching than quantifiable data about the EU’s music sector may suggest. As research in popular music studies and ethnomusicology reveals, music and sound have become “ubiquitous” (Kassabian 2013) in our everyday lives. Whether we pay attention to it or not, music surrounds us – from the song we may select as our morning alarm to the playlist chosen by the algorithm of our streaming service (Boschi et al. 2013). The ways in which people engage with music seem endless, and range from trying to ignore the aural spaces that we inhabit to participating in shows, dancing, and producing new sounds via both technologies and our bodies (Kassabian 2013). From participation in spectacular large-scale shows to all kinds of everyday “musicing”¹⁵ practices (Small 1998), music plays a significant role in how we make sense of and engage with the world.

If, following Gramsci, we understand culture to be inherently political, music undoubtedly has real potential as a political practice. Investigations into the ways in which music is and can be political have shifted in recent decades from approaches that locate the politics of music within music itself (with an interest in explicitly political music) to theories emphasising music’s context, positionality, and situatedness (Garratt 2019, 33–35). Regarding music as discourse and performance, the chapters in this book explore the ways in which music can become political depending on individual actors as well as cultural contexts and situations. Those involved in musicing practices – from politicians to celebrities, audiences, and listeners in certain social, cultural, and situational contexts – are therefore central when it comes to understanding the politics of music at a given moment.

To account for the significance of how music is received as a process in which individual people actively create, interrogate, and negotiate meanings, affects, and politics, the chapters presented here draw on the concept of musical affordance as laid out by Tia DeNora. In *Music in Everyday Life* (DeNora 2000), DeNora compares the way in which people use music to their interactions with other material objects, arguing that

Objects ‘afford’ actors certain things; a ball, for example, affords rolling, bouncing and kicking in a way that a cube of the same size, texture and weight would not. So, too, the particular materials of the cookies afford certain marketing ploys and will not afford others.

(DeNora 2000, 39)

Music makes possible some uses and interpretations, whilst preventing others. Music's affordances, therefore, are far from arbitrary. Rather, they rely on the ways in which people make use of the expansive yet limited range of possibilities that music affords. As such, affordances may include interpretations as well as bodily engagements, movements, affects, and emotional responses. Musical affordances depend on the active and often creative work of music reception.

An awareness of music's affordances, and the accompanying impossibility of imbuing music with absolute meaning, seems particularly relevant in relation to populism. In many cultures, music has a long history of according meaningful references and practices to abstract communal concepts that are relevant to populism, such as the people or the nation. As Celia Applegate and Pamela Potter have argued, the idea of a German nation, for instance, is closely intertwined with the notion that Germans are a "people of music" (Applegate and Potter 2002, 1–3). Music also draws on a large tradition of ascribing meaning to antagonisms – as one can see in revolutionary songs, war songs, or the protest song genre, for instance. What is more, music functions not only in a semiotic, interpretative way, but is also effective at the level of affect. As Lawrence Rosenthal, Chantal Mouffe, and others have argued, the affective dimension is highly pertinent for the success of populist discourses and social movements. Mouffe even identifies their affective impact as one of the main reasons for the recent popular success of European right-wing populist parties. As she puts it, these parties "have successfully mobilized common affects in constructing a people whose voice calls for a democracy aimed at defending the interests of 'true nationals'" (Mouffe 2018). We would add that this popular success has much to do with the ways in which music has served to mobilise these common affects (Dunkel and Schiller 2022).

The ways in which music can serve populist discourses may be approached from three main directions. The first addresses the role of music within the strategies and practices of politicians, the second centres on musicians as political figures, and the third has to do with the politics of music reception as an active and creative process. Music's wide reach and enmeshment in people's everyday lives make it possible for politicians and political actors to draw on it in the service of their political goals. Although music's ability to directly support politicians' messages varies, it often has to do with tapping into the affective power of musical aesthetics as a political resource. This practice is by no means limited to contemporary politics, but rather harks back to the general use of music as a means within a broader set of strategies for political mobilisation (Patch 2016; Street 2012). Some of the first international hit recordings in the history of popular music were written as campaign songs, such as W.C. Handy's "Memphis Blues," which famously became an international smash hit after having aided Edward H. Crump's 1909 campaign to become Mayor of Memphis. According to Handy, "it was known to politicians that the best notes made the most votes" (quoted in Johnson 2014, 53).

As actors across the political spectrum continue to make use of popular music's affective power, the boundaries between politics and popular music have become

porous (Cooper 2008; Street 2012; Dunkel and Schiller 2022). Bruce Jordan, for instance, argues that Barack Obama successfully employed popular music in a populist aesthetic strategy to mobilise political support (Jordan 2013), and Oded Erez (2022) highlights how Miri Regev drew heavily on the taste cultures and aesthetic economy of talent shows during her term as Israel's Minister of Culture and Sports in Netanyahu's right-wing populist government (2015–2020). The Italian populist Beppe Grillo's use of music also exemplifies this development. In the years following the foundation of his party M5S, Grillo wrote songs, performed at rallies, and organised music festivals such as the Woodstock 5 Stelle, which not only served to mobilise support for his party but also created the impression that the party was in fact a movement. Similarly, in Sweden, the leader of the populist radical right Sweden Democrats, Jimmie Åkesson, plays in a rock band that regularly performs at party events such as the annual Summer Festival (see Schiller chapter in this volume). Since sound and music have the power to evoke an array of affects and emotions – from anxiety and anger to relaxation and happiness – they can be highly effective means of tying political messages and concrete policies to deeply felt emotional responses.

Secondly, just as populist politicians have appealed to their base by performing as musicians and using popular music in campaigns, some musicians have likewise taken up prominent roles as populist actors. In February 2021, youth demonstrations erupted across Spain following the arrest of the rapper Pablo Hásel for glorifying terrorism and disparaging the monarchy. Hásel is a controversial figure. On the one hand, his critique of glaring social inequalities is irrefutable: at the time of his arrest, youth unemployment had risen to about 40%. In many ways, Spain is an extreme case of a larger crisis, that of diminishing future perspectives for young Europeans. On the other, Hásel's lyrics promote extreme violence and terrorism, including the use of car bombs against those he deems the elite. In addition to speaking out against police brutality, Hásel is known for likening Spanish judges to Nazis and celebrating the Basque separatist and terrorist organisation ETA (Casey 2021).

Musicians in other European countries have likewise become active in populist movements. In Italy, the rise of the M5S in the early 2010s was supported by well-known musicians including the rapper Fedez and the singer-songwriter Cristiano De André (see Caiani and Padoan in this volume). In Germany, the iconic singer Xavier Naidoo, who has previously spread antisemitic conspiracy theories, has repeatedly been referred to as a leading figure in protests against government policies to contain the Covid-19 pandemic (see Dunkel and Kopanski in this volume). In Hungary, where populist nationalism and authoritarianism are hegemonic, the far-right extremist members of the band Kárpátia have composed and performed music commissioned by the Hungarian military to accompany the arrival of fifty new Leopard II tanks from Germany (see Barna and Patakfalvi-Czirják in this volume). The Hungarian example also demonstrates the extent to which musical, political, and economic developments in different European countries can be intricately interwoven. As an article in *Der Spiegel* makes clear, the silence of the

German government about the use of far-right extremist music to celebrate the arrival of German tanks is consistent with the interest of their military industry to sell weaponry to one of its best clients (Verseck 2020).

However, musicians can also become political actors in ways that are subtler than the example of Kárpátia might suggest. The politics of Andreas Gabalier, for instance, are not so easy to pin down. In public statements, he has repeatedly denied that his music is in any way political (Weber 2019, 101–102). On first inspection, many of his songs would appear to simply follow the seemingly innocuous characteristics of the rejuvenated folk-like Schlager genre, with its celebration of Austrian culture, including national foods, customs, clothing, and musical instruments (such as the Steirische Harmonika, a diatonic button accordion from Styria). Over the years, though, the singer has alluded to populist tropes such as those mentioned earlier, and has been suspected of having affinities with the far-right political spectrum. This suspicion has been fuelled by Gabalier speaking out publicly in defence of former FPÖ politician Heinz-Christian Strache (Stendel 2015), and attacking gender equality politics, which he referred to as “gender madness” (Weber 2019, 99) in a discussion about Austria’s national anthem (Dunkel et al. 2021; Weber 2019, 100–101). Overall, however, explicit self-positioning via public and musical statements in favour of far-right parties is rare in the Austrian case. Some musicians even publicly distance themselves from populist far-right politics, whilst their music may still be heard at FPÖ campaign events. In fact, this ambivalence is central to the politicisation of music in Austrian popular music cultures (see Doehring and Ginkel in this volume).

These uses of music by populist actors and musicians notwithstanding, this book, thirdly, furthers the claim that music does not necessarily need to be used by politicians or musicians-turned-political actors in order to be populist. On the contrary, we regard populism as a dimension of various cultural and musical practices that can become relevant depending on different factors, such as the combination of music with lyrics and other media, social contexts, situative circumstances, and subjective predispositions (Street 2012). If the question of whether or not music can be populist depends on the uses to which it is put by audiences, then musical populism can occur at different levels that do not necessarily involve populist politicians or political movements. Indeed, the ways in which music becomes populist may depend on the individual recipient actively imbuing it with a populist political function. This reliance on the listener does not, however, mean that musical materials and performances are irrelevant to the question of politicisation. Rather, musical performances may afford certain kinds of politicisation and preclude others. As such, a music video that humorously pits a healthy but poor younger generation against a polarised older one – such as in the case of “Wake Up” by the Italian singer Rocco Hunt – would seem likely to resonate with populist discourses, depending on whether or not listeners make this association (for a discussion of Hunt, see Caianni and Padoan in this volume). The song’s politicisation as populist, then, depends in large part on the way in which it is actively received.

Whether we are focusing on politicians, musicians, or recipients more generally, populism relies on two main conceptual ways of investing the notion of the people with meaning through music. The first draws on music to frame and solidify the people as a positively defined community. This can be achieved by celebrating that which many regard as their own: an idea of a national culture, for instance, including food, songs, sport, habits, and all sorts of cultural practices that can be framed as communal. In populist discourses, an understanding of the people is usually communicated with reference to lowbrow cultural matters with a class component, such as ostensibly bad manners and working-class tastes (Moffitt 2020; Peck 2019; Erez 2022). Since populism tends to occur in connection with other discourses such as nationalism, these aspects are often accompanied by references to a people's would-be national character, and features of their homeland.

Besides this definition of the people via positive communal characteristics, a second way in which the concept is solidified in populism is via an *ex negativo* process, by which the people are constructed as precisely non-elite. The antagonism that is therefore set up between the people and the elite then helps to co-constitute the people. Hence, the people and the elite should both be understood as epistemologically relational concepts. From a musical perspective, this often entails associations with certain musical genres and related taste worlds that correspond to social class, social groups, and social distinctions (Bourdieu 1984; Dunkel and Schiller 2022). In Poland, for instance, the PiS (Law and Justice) party actively endorses and promotes the genre disco polo, deemed lowbrow (Łuczaj 2020), harnessing this genre-specific authenticity to declare itself in line with the true Polish people (Zienkiewicz 2021). In turn, musical attacks against the elite function as an othering mechanism that both defines and emotionally charges a shared group identity, casting the people as antagonistic to the elite. Moreover, common scenarios of cultural threat may also serve as *ex negativo* reinforcements of the people's identity. The German far-right populist AfD, for instance, has used recordings of muezzin singing to stoke people's indignation about the potential approval of a mosque being constructed in their home district (Dunkel 2020; Ginkel et al. 2023).

By tying the confrontation of socially defined groups to musical experiences, populist performances have the power to reach beyond the merely cognitive. Rather, they can reach people at the level of affect and emotion. As a practice that is tied to group experience, music has the power to create "communities of feeling" (Berezin 2002, 39). This is particularly significant when it comes to a discourse such as populism, which relies on the construction and performance of meaningful group identities and on the separation between a people and its Other. Populist performances, therefore, can afford a sense of group belonging and identity on multiple levels.

Following a culture-oriented approach that is based on the above theoretical premises, the chapters in this book seek to answer the following questions: (1) How are populism and popular music culture connected in contemporary Europe? (2) How does popular music culture afford the mainstreaming and

normalisation of populism in specific European contexts? (3) What is specific about popular music in these contexts? (4) How do people relate to popular music in these contexts?

Popular music and the rise of populism in Europe: Five case studies

To address these questions whilst taking into account the wide range of populisms, diverse political and social contexts, and differences in (national) music cultures, the chapters in this book employ a multiple opportunity structure analysis to contextualise the interconnections between popular music and populism in their various cases.

The concept of a multiple opportunity structure (MOS) was developed to examine the rise of social movements by studying both the institutional structure and dominant political culture within a specific polity – generally a state, but also supranational polities such as the EU (Sperling 2015). The core tenet is that the constraints and opportunities faced by emerging social movements are determined by the “openness” of the political system under which they seek to operate (Meyer 2004). The MOS allows us to observe the multiplicity of opportunities and constraints across several dimensions: the political opportunity structure primarily illuminates the configuration of power within institutionalised politics, whilst the cultural opportunity structure takes into account how a dominant political culture influences or shuts down such opportunities. Finally, there is the discursive opportunity structure, which has been described as “determining which ideas are considered ‘sensible’, which constructions of reality are seen as ‘realistic’, and which claims are held as ‘legitimate’ within a certain polity at a specific time” (Koopmans and Statham 1999, 228). To support our study of the role of popular music in connection with populism, we add a musical opportunity structure to the above. This includes aspects such as developments in the music market (such as digitisation or the changing role of gatekeepers) or shifts in music production, consumption, tastes, and what is considered to belong to the popular mainstream or a (radical) subculture.

Whilst the use of the MOS in social movement studies is based on the assumption that activists and movement organisations face both barriers and opportunities, and will design their tactics accordingly, the concept has also proven fruitful when it comes to disentangling the political, cultural, and discursive structures that determine whether or not particular ideologies are embraced and upheld (Sperling 2015, 47–48). In this sense, the authors in this volume draw on the MOS to determine the opportunities for and obstacles to political populism in their respective countries. Although we do believe that differences at the national level matter and demand different ways of investigating the nexus between popular music and populism, we are nevertheless highly wary of inferring causal explanations for the rise of populism simply from a comparison of country cases. In a nutshell, the concept of a multiple opportunity structure allows the authors to explain why

their investigations into different national case studies take different forms. This grounded approach also allows for comparisons of specific populist phenomena between countries, thus revealing a number of transnational commonalities across the diverse range of places and populisms represented.

All of the chapters in this volume are informed by ethnographic fieldwork and participant observation at events such as party rallies, demonstrations, festivals, and concerts (both online and offline), as well as informal conversations and formal interviews with audiences and fans. This qualitative approach necessitates the researchers to engage in ongoing critical reflection regarding their positionality in relation to their research subjects. Particularly when researching such dynamic and polarised fields as contemporary populist politics and culture, self-awareness regarding personal and social backgrounds, political convictions, and worldviews *via-à-vis* the research subjects is crucial to avoid (simplistic) normative conclusions (Clifford and Marcus 1986; Zenker and Kumoll 2010). The fact that all of the researchers hold PhDs from and are employed by state-funded European universities is all the more relevant given the widespread scepticism towards cultural elites and state-funded higher education institutions within certain populist groups. Since all of the chapters in this book are concerned with the ongoing processes of normalisation and mainstreaming of populisms, much sensitivity has been required to understand the contemporary “structures of feeling” (Williams 1977) within and behind meanings that may not be fully articulated (yet), that may be invisible or only implicit in current discursive struggles over cultural hegemony and the mobilisation of emotions and affects by populist actors.

With this in mind, it is important to note that not only do the kinds of populism in the different national contexts differ, but so too do the positions of each chapter’s authors. Mario Dunkel and Reinhard Kopanski, writing about Germany, and Manuela Caiani and Enrico Padoan, writing about Italy, for instance, all grew up in their countries of enquiry and are deeply embedded in their local contexts. Meanwhile, André Doehring and Kai Ginkel, writing about Austria, Melanie Schiller, writing about Sweden, and Emília Barna and Ágnes Patakfalvi-Czirják, writing about Hungary, take on more hybrid positions: in the case of Hungary, Patakfalvi-Czirják has a Transylvanian (Romanian) minority upbringing, and Doehring and Ginkel have German backgrounds but have been living in Austria for several years. This hybridity is even more pronounced in the Swedish case: Schiller is German and currently based in the Netherlands, although she had previously lived in Sweden for long periods, she had to travel and immerse herself anew in the national contexts and language for this project. All authors benefitted from White privilege (although coming from different socio-economic backgrounds with varying degrees of precarity) during their research. In addition to being able-bodied, this made access to those cultural spaces coded as (exclusively) White not only possible but also relatively safe (albeit daunting and uncomfortable at times). On the other hand, as many of the social spaces discussed in this book are associated with masculinist discourses and their corresponding

behaviours and cultural codes, uneasy situations were – for female researchers in particular – not uncommon during fieldwork.

The chapters in this book are particularly interested in how popular music plays a role in the articulation and mobilisation of collective affects and populist meanings as ways of mainstreaming populist politics. To study this process, they draw on musicological group analyses (MGA) as a method for analysing the specific popular music case studies identified as relevant in each context. As highlighted by Doebling and Ginkel (2022), the MGA, in which researchers analyse music together in groups of two to five peers, is particularly useful for understanding “the relationship between *meanings* that listeners ascribe to a piece of music and its *sonic structures* in a specific social and cultural setting” (Doebling and Ginkel, forthcoming, emphasis in original). As the case studies are analysed in groups with a number of music experts rather than by an individual researcher, this interactive method enables a focus on patterns of collective and inter-subjective interpretation as well as (shared) embodied listening experiences. This allows the researchers to investigate potential populist affordances in their interactions with the material (such as a song’s instrumentation, or its harmonic, melodic, rhythmic, and sonic elements), the lyrics (in, for example, the rhetoric trope of a righteous people versus a corrupt elite), and audiovisual material such as music videos (images, performance style, and so on). By engaging in this form of self-reflexivity, the analysing group can achieve a deeper understanding of the song under study and its potential uses in populist contexts, as well as how its structures may evoke certain ideas and affects in the reception process (Doebling and Ginkel 2022).

This book brings together a collection of studies – both theoretical and empirical – that look at a wide range of populist articulations in and through music in contemporary Europe. Its five chapters offer detailed analyses of the nexus of popular music and populism in Hungary, Italy, Austria, Sweden, and Germany. These countries have all experienced a substantial increase in populist parties and movements over the last few years, played a major role in shaping EU immigration policy, and seen significant interactions between populism and popular music. Whilst populist authoritarianism has become hegemonic in Hungary since the change of political regime in 2010, with the election of Fidesz’ Viktor Orbán as prime minister, Italy was governed by two populist parties (the radical right populist League and the syncretic M5S) between 2018 and 2019. More recently, syncretic populist parties in Italy have lost ground to a populist far-right coalition consisting of the FDI, League, and Forza Italia (the former party of Berlusconi), which has held the political reins since 2022. In Austria, the far-right populist FPÖ was part of the national government in the 1980s, the 2000s, and then again between 2017 and 2019. After a short dent in popular support in the wake of the Ibiza corruption scandal (see Doebling and Ginkel in this volume), the party has regained momentum. In Germany and Sweden, meanwhile, far-right populists have made substantial electoral gains, and both AfD and the SD have gained an unprecedented number of seats in parliament in recent elections. However, whilst the AfD has been excluded

from government coalitions and clearly positions itself as oppositional, the SD has gained significant influence supporting a conservative minority government following 2022's national elections. In addition to this increase in popularity of genuinely populist (and often far-right) parties, it is worth noting that some established parties, such as the Austrian People's Party (ÖVP), have adopted populist and right-wing populist strategies as well.

The chapters in this book highlight different aspects of how popular music functions in the renegotiation of populist discourses and hegemony in different contexts. On one hand, populist actors draw on popular music in their attempts to performatively construct an antagonism between the people and certain Others, the elite in particular. The chapter on the nexus of popular music and populism in Hungary, for instance, looks at the interaction between increasingly hegemonic populism and wider cultural shifts by investigating how populist discourses are mobilised in popular music and engaged with by listeners. As Barna and Patakfalvi-Czirják show, populist discourse has become a central feature of popular culture in the context of the Orbán regime. Populism not only influences pro-government narratives, however, but also shapes oppositional and even anti-establishment discourses. By identifying and discussing a wide array of populist performances that range from (1) mainstream songs that support Fidesz's hegemonic populism and (2) anti-government protest songs to (3) articulations of anti-elitism in contemporary Hungarian popular music, they investigate how an important part of Fidesz's hegemony-building has been the restructuring of culture and media policy, as well as funding and sponsorship opportunities for artists. Their analysis shows that pro-government songs help to create a cultural, affective, and collective social environment in which political projects are readily accepted, and that consent is manufactured through both the aesthetics and consumption of popular music. According to Barna and Patakfalvi-Czirják, the populist discourses of the Fidesz government aim to symbolically construct and represent a middle class by performing the cultural attributes associated with it and projecting a shared, middle-brow taste as the prevailing norm. This is, in other words, what the authors describe as the "middle-classification" of radical right-wing symbolic imagery.

Italy has often been framed as something of a laboratory for populism, with the rise of Silvio Berlusconi (once a singer and writer of popular songs), following the Tangentopoli corruption scandal, during the early-to-mid 1990s. Berlusconi in particular was an early example of what we would now call a European centre-right populist. Over the last thirty years, Italy has seen a diversity of populist movements and parties achieve short-term and medium-term electoral success, including the M5S, the League, and the FDI. Caiani and Padoan's chapter on the Italian context looks at how popular music affords identification with populist identities in highly divergent political contexts (nativist, culturally conservative, anti-establishment, or participatory), but also more broadly in popular culture. As the authors argue, popular music is highly significant in Italian culture, where it serves as an arena for cultural and political discourse. To assess the ways in which popular music culture has

contributed to the mainstreaming of populism in Italy, Caiani and Padoan apply a mixed methods approach, combining musicological group analysis and interviews with an online data mining of specific significant keywords. On the one hand, they discuss how music has interacted with party politics and show how populist parties such as the M5S have cultivated what they call a “rocker” party image that seems both limiting and conducive to electoral success, as well as how individual politicians have used music to position themselves within the cultural field. On the other hand, they emphasise the ways in which mainstream popular music, regardless of its explicit appropriation by politicians, can serve as a site for political projections and negotiations as collective identities that afford populist uses – the concept of Italianness (*italianità*), for instance – are performed and interpreted.

Similarly, Doehring and Ginkel’s chapter on popular music and populism in Austria focuses on wider cultural shifts in today’s society in the context of contemporary populism, with its resurgence of nationalism, notions of traditionalism, and emphasis on rural and Alpine Austrian national identity. The authors identify stylistic musical hybrids with elements of schlager music, rock, and country that are played at populist radical right events and that make strong references to Austrian identity as specifically rural and Alpine. In contrast to urban settings, this identification is conceived as a culturally uniform realm tied to tradition, marked by gender segregation, and characterised by suspicion of the new and foreign. In particular, Doehring and Ginkel’s reading of the politically ambiguous Austropop songs “I Am from Austria” by Reinhard Fendrich (1989) and S.T.S.’s “Fürstenfeld” (1984) at populist radical right rallies held by the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) and folk festivals highlights the importance of examining the specific socio-material conditions of reception involved in the process of politicising popular music towards a populist construction of the people. The chapter stresses the performativity at the work in constructions of a nationalist homeland in the sense of a rural Alpine heartland (Taggart 2000), and highlights how populist notions of home are enacted through popular music.

Schiller’s chapter on Sweden takes the populist radical right SD party’s production and dissemination of popular songs and performances as a starting point for understanding the party’s engagement with popular culture so as to articulate populist cultural politics on the one hand, and rearticulate popular national culture in populist-nationalist terms on the other. With the leader of the SD playing in a rock band – Bedårande Barn – that performs regularly at party events and sells CDs, DVDs, and merchandise with an active online presence on social media, the connection between populist party politics and cultures of populism is obvious. By analysing three specific songs as case studies, the chapter shows how the SD mainstream their political discourses by aesthetically and discursively “popifying” radical nationalism and by performing what Schiller conceptualises as “heroic averageness”: the paradoxical articulation of hegemonic and counter-hegemonic discourses in their cultural and musical expressions. As Schiller argues, the SD’s performance of heroic averageness allows them to politicise a certain performative commonness, which they then elevate to a heroic defence of national culture and a

revolt against the left-liberal establishment's ostensible cultural hegemony in Sweden's ongoing culture wars.

Finally, the German case study looks at musicians and celebrities as potentially right-wing, populist performers. By analysing performances and practices of reception regarding two major popular music acts – Andreas Gabalier and Xavier Naidoo – Dunkel and Kopanski highlight, in particular, how live music settings such as concerts function to mainstream right-wing and far-right populism on an affective level. Based on participant observation at concerts and MGAs, the chapter argues that Gabalier and Naidoo exemplify two different ways in which right-wing and far-right populism is mainstreamed in celebrity music culture. Whilst Gabalier presents himself as a voice of the people, legitimising far-right populist frames and combining neotraditional aesthetics with a modern sound that draws on African American genres such as swing, blues, and soul, and the country music-inspired sounds of the cultural far-right in the US, Naidoo alternates between what could be described as two different personas. Naidoo's mainstream persona refrains from public political statements, and rather embodies artistry and sophistication. This persona is staged at concerts, on Naidoo's official website, and in his mainstream media appearances, for instance as a jury member of a highly popular talent show. At the same time, Naidoo's underground persona, visible on social media including Telegram, in selected interviews, and in some of Naidoo's songs, expresses extremist and far-right views and caters to far-right audiences. At times, these personas interact and merge, but, as Dunkel and Kopanski argue, Naidoo's strategy of using two different personas has largely allowed him to cultivate both mainstream and far-right audiences. Appreciated by those in the political mainstream as well as in far-right milieus, Naidoo occupies a unique cultural position in the mainstreaming of far-right populism in Germany and German-speaking countries.

Overall, the chapters presented here argue that studying the nexus of popular music and populism offers a unique illumination of significant aspects relating to both the recent rise of populism in Europe and developments in European popular music cultures. They do so by combining a range of insights into the ways in which popular music and populism interact in specific contexts, emphasising structural and historical conditions (that is, the prevailing Multiple Opportunity Structures), the use of music by politicians and political organisations, the role of (celebrity) musicians as political actors, and the politics of music reception as a creative process. Taking into account data from participant observations, individual interviews, group interviews, musicological group analyses, and online research, the chapters draw on a rich variety of sources to explore popular music as an important element of the contemporary cultures of populism. They then build on this theoretical and methodological basis to investigate how populism – and major related discourses such as (ethno-)nationalism and nativism – are normalised and mainstreamed in different European cultures and societies. In doing so, they not only contribute to a better understanding of the rise of populism in Europe as a cultural phenomenon, but also offer a fresh perspective on an important yet under-researched facet in the study of European popular music cultures.

Notes

- 1 Early drafts of this introduction were co-authored by Anna Schwenck, who had to step back during the writing process due to other commitments. We would like to thank Anna for her great work and expertise (especially regarding the “Multiple Opportunity Structure”). In addition, we would like to thank everyone who contributed to the research consortium “Popular Music and the Rise of Populism in Europe” as well as the Volkswagen Foundation for their generous support of this project.
- 2 It was only revealed later that the teenager had been following a right-wing extremist ideology. In fact, the large majority of those killed in the attack were people of colour (Bernstein, 2018).
- 3 Our translation. “Es ist traurig genug, dass man sich überhaupt Gedanken machen muss, ob man an Tagen wie diesen noch auf Konzerte geht, ob man noch außer Haus geht, ob man irgendwo, irgendwie noch in die Öffentlichkeit geht [cheers, Gabalier pauses]. Das ist ziemlich bitter, weil wir eigentlich eine sehr, sehr fröhliche und gesellige Kultur sind, wir Österreicher genauso wie ihr Deutschen, und, und, was will ich jetzt sagen? Alles, was ich mir denk’, das sag ich einfach lieber nicht, weil, weil ich auf euch aufpassen muss. Aber eines kann ich noch sagen: Es freut mich so gewaltig, dass ihr heute da seid. Und es freut mich, dass ihr auch einen jungen Steirerbuam aus Österreich so nehmt, wie er ist, der ab und zu auch mal sagt, was er sich denkt, weil es immer noch schöner ist, trotz aller dieser Sorgen, die das Land momentan mit sich bringt, hier bei euch da in Germany, und auch wir bei uns zu Hause in Österreich. Es ist eine große Herausforderung, der wir uns momentan stellen müssen, und [pause]. Na, mehr sag ich nicht” (oachkotzlschwoaf 2016).
- 4 The number of handbooks and general introductions that endeavour to chart populism has increased exponentially over the last years. The 2017 *Oxford Handbook of Populism* (Rovira Kaltwasser et al. 2017) was followed by the *Routledge Handbook of Global Populism* in 2018 (Torre 2018). The *Edward Elgar Research Handbook of Populism* (Stavrakakis and Katsambekis) is currently in preparation. Similarly, numerous general introductions to populism have recently appeared. Jan-Werner Müller’s *What Is Populism?* (Müller 2016) was followed by Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser’s *Populism: A Very Short Introduction* (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2017), Manuel Anselmi’s *Populism: An Introduction* (Anselmi 2018), Pierre Rosanvallon’s *Le siècle du populisme* (Rosanvallon 2020), and Benjamin Moffitt’s *Populism* (Moffitt 2020), to name only a handful of the most visible monographs on the topic. In addition, Brill launched the academic journal *Populism* in 2018 as a platform for a wide variety of research into populism.
- 5 Literally ‘fighting term,’ i.e. a term used primarily to attack a political opponent.
- 6 See for instance the chapter division by region in Part II of the *Oxford Handbook of Populism* (Rovira Kaltwasser et al. 2017).
- 7 As Cas Mudde points out, far-right parties increased their presence in the European Parliament again in the 2019 European elections, as they had in the elections of 2009 and 2014 (Mudde 2010).
- 8 According to Tony Bennett, hegemony involves “moral, cultural, intellectual, and, thereby, political leadership over the whole of society” (Bennett 1998, 220).
- 9 For a discussion of the relationship between popular culture and populism from a cultural studies perspective, see Dunkel and Schiller 2022.
- 10 By populist actors or populists, we refer to individuals or political institutions that actively participate in the articulation and dissemination of populist discourses in society, in the realms of both politics and media, but also in culture at large. This may include political parties, movements or associations, and politicians, as well as celebrities, artists, bands and musicians, and fans and audiences.

- 11 Jacques Rancière defines the distribution of the sensible as “the system of self-evident facts of sense perception that simultaneously discloses the existence of something in common and the delimitations that define the respective parts and positions within it” (Rancière 2004, 12). Thus, “[t]he distribution of the sensible [. . .] produces a system of self-evident facts of perception based on the set horizons and modalities of what is visible and audible as well as what can be said, thought, made, or done” (Rancière 2004, 85).
- 12 Our translation. “Der Rechtspopulismus ist damit nicht nur Parteipolitik, er betreibt eine Politik der Ideen mit dem Ziel einer kulturellen Hegemonie” (Reckwitz 2020, 413–414).
- 13 There is an ongoing debate amongst political theorists on the nature of populism and nationalism, with some arguing that they are inextricably interwoven and others advocating for their conceptual separation. Most scholars agree, however, that populism and nationalism tend to be interconnected on an empirical level. See the debate between Rogers Brubaker and De Cleen and Stavrakakis in *Nations and Nationalism* (Brubaker 2020; De Cleen and Stavrakakis 2020).
- 14 As Herschinger et al. highlight, theories of social radicalisation must also account for individual agency, taking into consideration radicalising individuals or groups, who in turn polarise society and create a climate conducive to radicalisation (Herschinger et al. 2020). As a result, “significant socio-political changes such as growth in extremist views among the middle of society” lead to “a reduction of social cohesion as polarization leads to hostile confrontations between extremist individuals, groups, milieus and social layers as well as between proponents of non-radicalized positions” (12).
- 15 We use musicking in Christopher Small’s sense here as a term that encompasses all kinds of music-related activity, including listening and moving to music (see Small 1998).

References

- Applegate, Celia and Pamela Potter. 2002. “Germans as ‘The People of Music’: Genealogy of an Identity.” In *Music and German National Identity*, edited by Celia Applegate and Pamela Potter, 1–35. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Bachmann-Medick, Doris. 2012. “Culture as Text: Reading and Interpreting Cultures.” In *Travelling Concepts for the Study of Culture*, edited by Birgit Neumann and Ansgar Nünning, 99–118. Berlin: De Gruyter.
- Berezin, Mabel. 2002. “Secure States: Towards a Political Sociology of Emotion.” *The Sociological Review* 50, no. 2: 33–52. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-954X.2002.tb03590>.
- . 2009. *Illiberal Politics in Neoliberal Times: Culture, Security and Populism in the New Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bernstein, Martin. 2018. “Das war ein rassistischer Ansatz.” *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, June 17, 2018. <https://www.sueddeutsche.de/muenchen/morde-am-oez-das-war-ein-rassistischer-ansatz-1.4019199>.
- Block, Elena and Ralph Negrine. 2017. “The Populist Communication Style: Toward a Critical Framework.” *International Journal of Communication* 11: 178–197.
- Boschi, Elena, Anahid Kassabian, Marta García Quiñones. 2013. “A Day in the Life of a Ubiquitous Musics Listener.” In *Ubiquitous Musics: The Everyday Sounds That We Don’t Always Notice*, edited by Marta García Quiñones, Anahid Kassabian, and Elena Boschi, 1–12. London: Routledge.
- Bourdieu, Pierre. 1984 [1979]. *Distinction. A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste*. Translated by Richard Nice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Brubaker, Rogers. 2017. “Why Populism?” *Theory and Society* 46: 357–385.
- . 2020. “Populism and Nationalism.” *Nations and Nationalism* 26, no. 1: 44–66. <https://doi.org/10.1111/nana.12522>.

- Caiani, Manuela and Enrico Padoan. 2020. "Setting the Scene: Filling the Gaps in Populism Studies." *Partecipazione e Conflitto* 13, no. 1: 1–28. <https://doi.org/10.1285/i20356609v13i1p01>.
- Casey, Nicholas. 2021. "Rapper's Arrest Awakens Rage in Spanish Youth Chafing in Pandemic." *The New York Times*, February 27, 2021. <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/27/world/europe/barcelona-protests-pablo-hasel.html>.
- Clifford, James and George Marcus, eds. 1986. *Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography*. Oakland: University of California Press.
- Cooper, Andrew F. 2008. *Celebrity Diplomacy*. Boulder: Paradigm Publishers.
- De Cleen, Benjamin and Yannis Stavrakakis. 2017. "Distinctions and Articulations: A Discourse Theoretical Framework for the Study of Populism and Nationalism." *Javnost - The Public* 24, no. 4: 301–319. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13183222.2017.1330083>.
- . 2020. "How Should We Analyze the Connections between Populism and Nationalism: A Response to Rogers Brubaker." *Nations and Nationalism* 26, no. 2: 314–322. <https://doi.org/10.1111/nana.12575>.
- DeNora, Tia. 2000. *Music in Everyday Life*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Doehring, André and Kai Ginkel. 2022. "Songs of Tractors and Submission: On the Assembled Polity of Popular Music and Far-Right Populism in Austria." *Popular Music* 41, no. 3: 354–369. doi:10.1017/S0261143022000459.
- . Forthcoming. "Musicological Group Analysis (MGA): Conceptual Basics and Rough Guide." Unpublished manuscript.
- Dornbusch, Rudiger and Sebastian Edwards, eds. 1991. *The Macroeconomics of Populism in Latin America*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Downes, James F. and Lin Xu. 2020. "'Syncretic' Populism in Contemporary 21st Century European Politics." *Centre for Analysis of the Radical Right*, February 19, 2020. <https://www.radicalrightanalysis.com/2020/02/19/syncretic-populism-in-contemporary-21st-century-european-politics/>.
- Dunkel, Mario. 2020. "Zusammenhänge zwischen Populismus, Jazz und afrodiasporischen Musiken als Ausgangspunkt für Demokratiebildung." In *POSITIONEN! Jazz und Politik*, edited by Wolfram Knauer, 79–100. Hofheim: Wolke-Verlag.
- Dunkel, Mario and Melanie Schiller. 2022. "The People vs. the Power Bloc? Popular Music and Populism." *Popular Music* 41, no. 3: 281–292. doi:10.1017/S026114302200054X.
- Dunkel, Mario, Melanie Schiller and Anna Schwenck. 2021. "Researching Popular Music and the Rise of Populism in Europe." In *Turns and Revolutions in Popular Music. Proceedings from the XX Biennial Conference of IASPM, Canberra, Australia, 24th – 28th June 2019*, edited by Kimi Kärki, 31–34. Turku: International Institute for Popular Culture.
- Erez, Oded. 2022. "The Regime of Style: Cover Versions, Reality TV, and the Aesthetic Principles of Populism in Israel and Beyond." *Popular Music* 41, no. 3: 293–312. doi:10.1017/S0261143022000411.
- European Commission. 2020. *Music Moves Europe*. <https://ec.europa.eu/culture/sectors/music/music-moves-europe>
- Fiske, John. 2002. *Reading the Popular*. London: Routledge.
- Garratt, James. 2019. *Music and Politics: A Critical Introduction*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Ginkel, Kai, Anna Schwenck, Melanie Schiller, André Doehring, and Mario Dunkel. 2023. "Populäre Musik als nationalistische Ressource? Vergleichende Schlaglichter auf AfD, FPÖ und die Schwedendemokraten (SD)." In „Pop the Nation!“ *Das Nationale als Ressource und Argument in Kulturen populärer Unterhaltung und Vergnügung*, edited by Marketa Spiritova and Manuel Trummer. Münster: Waxmann.
- Goodwyn, Lawrence. 1976. *Democratic Promise: The Populist Moment in America*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Gramsci, Antonio. 1998. "Hegemony, Intellectuals and the State." In *Cultural Theory and Popular Culture*, edited by John Storey, 210–216. Athens: University of Georgia Press.

- Hall, Stuart. 1979. "The Great Moving Right Show." *Marxism Today* 23, no. 1: 14–20.
- . 1998. "Notes on Deconstructing the Popular." In *Cultural Theory and Popular Culture*, edited by John Storey, 442–453. Athens: University of Georgia Press.
- . 2003. "The Work of Representation." In *Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices*, edited by Stuart Hall, 13–64. London: Sage.
- Heitmeyer, Wilhelm. 2018. *Autoritäre Versuchungen: Signaturen der Bedrohung*. Berlin: Suhrkamp.
- Herkman, Juha. 2022. *A Cultural Approach to Populism*. London: Routledge.
- Herschinger, Eva, Kemal Bozay, Magdalena von Drachenfels, Oliver Decker, and Christian Joppke. 2020. "A Threat to Open Societies? Conceptualizing the Radicalization of Society." *International Journal of Conflict and Violence (IJCV)* 14: 1–16. <https://doi.org/10.4119/ijcv-3807>.
- Hogan, Phil. 2020. "Keynote Address by Commissioner Phil Hogan at ICMP Annual General Meeting." ICMP Annual General Meeting on "Global Music & Global Trade," June 3, 2020, Cannes, France. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2019-2024/hogan/announcements/keynote-address-commissioner-phil-hogan-icmp-annual-general-meeting-global-music-global-trade_en.
- Howarth, David and Yannis Stavrakakis. 2002. "Introducing Discourse Theory and Political Analysis." In *Discourse Theory and Political Analysis: Identities, Hegemonies and Social Change*, edited by David Howarth, Aletta Norval, and Yannis Stavrakakis, 1–23. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Ionescu, Ghița and Ernest Gellner, eds. 1969. *Populism: Its Meanings and National Characteristics*. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
- Johnson, Mark A. 2014. "'The Best Notes Made the Most Votes': W. C. Handy, E. H. Crump and Black Music as Politics." *Southern Cultures* 20, no. 2: 52–68. <https://doi.org/10.1353/scu.2014.0017>.
- Jordan, Matthew F. 2013. "Obama's iPod: Popular Music and the Perils of Postpolitical Populism." *Popular Communication* 11, no. 2: 99–115. <https://doi.org/10.1080/15405702.2013.779484>.
- Kassabian, Anahid. 2013. *Ubiquitous Listening: Affect, Attention, and Distributed Subjectivity*. Oakland: University of California Press.
- Koopmans, Ruud and Paul Statham. 1999. "Ethnic and Civic Conceptions of Nationhood and the Differential Success of the Extreme Right in Germany and Italy." In *How Social Movements Matter*, edited by Marco Giugni, Doug McAdam, and Charles Tilly, 225–251. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Laclau, Ernesto. 2005. *On Populist Reason*. London: Verso.
- Levitsky, Steven and Daniel Ziblatt. 2019. *How Democracies Die*. New York City: Crown.
- Łuczaj, Kamil. 2020. "Lowbrows as Rebels: Under What Circumstances a 'Low' Musical Genre Can Change Its Cultural Value? The Case of Disco Polo and Populism in Poland." *Social Communication* 21, no. 1: 106–120. <https://doi.org/10.2478/sc-2020-0011>.
- Marchart, Oliver. 2010. "Austriifying Europe: Ultraright Populism and the New Culture of Resistance." *Cultural Studies* 16, no. 6: 809–819. <https://doi.org/10.1080/095023802200034192>.
- McGuigan, Jim. 1992. *Cultural Populism*. London: Routledge.
- Meyer, David S. 2004. "Protest and Political Opportunities." *Annual Review of Sociology* 30, no. 1: 125–145. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.30.012703.110545>.
- Miller-Idriss, Cynthia. 2017. *The Extreme Gone Mainstream: Commercialization and far Right Youth Culture in Germany*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Moffitt, Benjamin. 2016. *The Global Rise of Populism: Performance, Political Style, and Representation*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- . 2020. *Populism*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Mondon, Aurelien and Aaron Winter. 2020. *Reactionary Democracy: How Racism and the Populist Far Right Became Mainstream*. London: Verso.

- Moran, Marie and Jo Littler. 2020. "Cultural Populism in New Populist Times." *European Journal of Cultural Studies* 23, no. 6: 857–873. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1367549420960477>.
- Mouffe, Chantal. 2018. "The Affects of Democracy." *Eurozine*, November 23, 2018. <https://www.eurozine.com/the-affects-of-democracy/#>.
- Mudde, Cas. 2010. "The Populist Radical Right: A Pathological Normalcy." *West European Politics* 33, no. 6: 1167–1186. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2010.508901>.
- Mudde, Cas and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser. 2013. "Exclusionary vs. Inclusionary Populism: Comparing Contemporary Europe and Latin America." *Government and Opposition* 48, no. 2: 147–174. <https://doi.org/10.1017/gov.2012.11>.
- . 2017. *Populism: A Very Short Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Müller, Jan-Werner. 2016. *What Is Populism?* Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Norris, Pippa and Ronald Inglehart. 2019. *Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Authoritarian-Populism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- oachkotzlschwoaf. 2016. "Andreas Gabalier - A Meinung Haben - Olympiastadion München - 30.07.2016." YouTube video, 6:48. July 31, 2016. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VqOLFQsIlyk>.
- Ostiguy, Pierre. 2017. "Populism: A Socio-Cultural Approach." In *The Oxford Handbook of Populism*, edited by Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Paul Taggart, Pierre Ostiguy, and Paulina Ochoa Espejo, 73–97. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Ostiguy, Pierre, Benjamin Moffitt, and Francisco Panizza. 2021. "Introduction." In *Populism in Global Perspective: A Performative and Discursive Approach*, edited by Pierre Ostiguy, Benjamin Moffitt, and Francisco Panizza, 1–18. London: Routledge.
- Panizza, Francisco and Yannis Stavrakakis. 2020. "Populism, Hegemony, and the Political Construction of 'The People'." In *Populism in Global Perspective. A Performative and Discursive Approach*, edited by Pierre Ostiguy, Benjamin Moffitt, and Francisco Panizza, 21–46. London: Routledge.
- Patch, Justin. 2016. "Notes on Deconstructing the Populism: Music on the Campaign Trail, 2012 and 2016." *American Music* 34, no. 3: 365–401. <https://doi.org/10.5406/americanmusic.34.3.0365>.
- Peck, Reece. 2019. *Fox Populism: Branding Conservatism as Working Class*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Postel, Charles. 2009. *The Populist Vision*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Rancière, Jacques. 2004. *The Politics of Aesthetics*. Translated by Gabriel Rockhill. London: Continuum.
- Reckwitz, Andreas. 2012. *Die Transformation der Kulturtheorien: Zur Entwicklung eines Theorieprogramms*. Meckenheim: Velbrück.
- . 2020. *Die Gesellschaft der Singularitäten zum Strukturwandel der Moderne*. Berlin: Suhrkamp.
- Rheindorf, Markus and Ruth Wodak. 2019. "'Austria First' Revisited: A Diachronic Cross-Sectional Analysis of the Gender and Body Politics of the Extreme Right." *Patterns of Prejudice* 53, no. 3: 302–320. <https://doi.org/10.1080/0031322X.2019.1595392>.
- Rooduijn, Matthijs. 2019. "State of the Field: How to Study Populism and Adjacent Topics? A Plea for Both More and Less Focus." *European Journal of Political Research* 58, no. 1: 362–372. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12314>.
- Rosenthal, Lawrence. 2020. *Empire of Resentment: Populism's Toxic Embrace of Nationalism*. New York City: The New Press.
- Rovira Kaltwasser, Cristóbal, Paul Taggart, Paulina Ochoa Espejo, and Pierre Ostiguy, eds. 2017. *The Oxford Handbook of Populism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Small, Christopher G. 1998. *Musicking: The Meanings of Performing and Listening*. Lebanon: University Press of New England.
- Sperling, Valerie. 2015. *Sex, Politics, and Putin. Political Legitimacy in Russia*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Stendel, Sarah von. 2015. "Andreas Gabalier verteidigt rechten Politiker." *Stern.de*, October 7, 2010. <https://www.stern.de/lifestyle/leute/andreas-gabalier--facebook-unterstuetzung-fuer-strache-sorgt-fuer-rechte-hetze-6488006.html>.
- Street, John. 2012. *Music and Politics*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Taggart, Paul. 2000. *Populism*. Maidenhead: Open University Press.
- Venizelos, Giorgos and Yannis Stavrakakis. 2020. "Left-Populism Is Down but Not Out." *Jacobin Magazine*, March 22, 2020. <https://jacobinmag.com/2020/03/left-populism-political-strategy-class-power>.
- Verseck, Keno. 2020. "Ungarns rechter Sound zu deutschen Panzern." *Spiegel Online*, August 2, 2020. <https://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/ungarn-unter-viktor-orban-rechter-sound-zu-deutschen-panzern-a-37036ff2-a4e7-4d5e-9920-427003aac433>.
- Weber, Michael. 2019. "Überschreitungen bei Andreas Gabalier: Musikalische, kulturelle und gesellschaftliche Aspekte." In *Darüber hinaus . . . Populäre Musik und Überschreitung(en)*, edited by Stefanie Alisch, Susanne Binas-Preisendörfer, and Werner Jauk, 135–148. Oldenburg: University of Oldenburg Press.
- Weyland, Kurt. 2001. "Clarifying a Contested Concept: Populism in the Study of Latin American Politics." *Comparative Politics* 34, no. 1: 1–22. <https://doi.org/10.2307/422412>.
- . 2017. "Populism: A Political-Strategic Approach." In *The Oxford Handbook of Populism*, edited by Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Paul Taggart, Pierre Ostiguy, Paulina Ochoa Espejo, 48–73. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Williams, Raymond. 1977. *Marxism and Literature*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Wodak, Ruth. 2018. "Vom Rand in die Mitte – 'Schamlose Normalisierung'." *Politische Vierteljahresschrift* 59, no. 2: 323–335. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11615-018-0079-7>.
- Wodak, Ruth, Majid KhosraviNik, and Brigitte Mral, eds. 2013. *Right-Wing Populism in Europe: Politics and Discourse*. London: Bloomsbury.
- Zenker, Olaf and Karsten Kumoll. 2010. *Beyond Writing Culture: Current Intersections of Epistemologies and Representational Practices*. Oxford: Berghahn Books.
- Zienkiewicz, Joanna. 2021. "Cultural Rupture: Music as a Discursive Tool of Contemporary Polish Populism." MA thesis. University of Groningen.