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1. Introduction

Do you regard sexuality as the mother of all feelings? Isn’t sexuality for you merely one component of the personality (albeit the most important), and isn’t the sexual complex therefore the most important and most frequent component in the clinical picture of hysteria? Are there not hysterical symptoms which, though co-determined by the sexual complex, are predominantly conditioned by a sublimation or by a non-sexual complex (profession, job, etc.)? (Letter 39J)

Jung’s cautious question to Freud in a certain sense reformulates the stake of their longstanding dialogue such as it takes shape in exemplary manner in their correspondence: how sexual is the libido? Can you sustain your (Freud’s) constantly reaffirmed commitment to the sexual character of the libido? Nevertheless, in contrast with what the passage just cited might lead one to suspect, the stake of the discussions between Freud and Jung was not the sexual aetiology of the neuroses so much as that of the psychoses. In this connection, Jung was for Freud a privileged if not dreamed-of discussion partner. Jung not only provided the clinical experience that Freud lacked in the field of the psychoses, but at the same time brought him and psychoanalysis into contact with and made them acceptable to, the official German psychiatry of the day. Jung was a close collaborator with Bleuler at the Burghölzi hospital in Zürich. With Jung’s help, Freud hoped to accomplish two things at once: on the one hand, he wanted to extend his theory of neurosis into the domain of the psychoses, and on the other he sought the recognition of the most renowned representatives of the psychiatry of the day. The psychiatric problem par excellence, the psychoses, was to be carefully reworked from out of the psychoanalytic metapsychology so that, conversely, psychoanalysis could provide a theoretical framework for the further development of psychiatry. The stake of the debate between Jung and Freud was in this sense from the beginning political as well as theoretical.

Very schematically, one could say that Freud tries to understand psychosis from out of a withdrawal of libidinal – and one should remember here that Freud is talking of a libido sexualis – investment from objects of the outside world. Whereas in neurosis the disinvestment of, for example, forbidden objects of the outside world leads to reinvestment of these objects in the world of fantasy (introversion), the psychotic seems to have severed his ties with reality entirely. According to Freud, reinvestment of outer reality happens in psychosis only in a secondary manner and must be understood as an effort at healing. Psychotic delusion is, in other words,
nothing but an attempt in extremis to reinstate investment from the outside world.

But what is the fate of the libido that is withdrawn from the outer world in the first place? Here, says Freud, it is megalomania that points the way. The libidinous energy first attached to an external object is now invested in the ego. By analogy with sexual overestimation of the object of love – the object of love is idealized and all sorts of perfections that escape a ‘neutral’ bystander are attributed to it – Freud understands the inflation of the ego in megalomania as a consequence of a libidinous investment of the ego. The ego, as it were, takes itself as exclusive libidinous object. Here, the critique of many unsympathetic commentators is in fact obvious: one can indeed accept that libidinous investment of the ego leads to a single, perhaps limitless, overestimation of oneself, but why should we necessarily refer to this investment as ‘sexual’? After all, does not Freud himself say that the investment of libido in the ‘ego’ is attended by a ‘desexualisation’? And when the libido that is directed on the ego in this manner is not ‘really’ sexual, but is still libido, should we not rather understand it according to the example of Jung, as an a-specific ‘psychical interest’?

It is precisely in order to reply to this and to similar objections that Freud introduced the concept of narcissism into his metapsychology. In accordance with his general model of pathology in which every psychical disorder implies a regression to an earlier, in itself non-pathological (infantile) stage of libido development, Freud considers the narcissism of the psychotic a regressive repetition of an infantile narcissism that he further deems responsible for the very constitution of the ego. With the exception of his “Project for a Scientific Psychology” (1895), Freud paid relatively little attention to the status of the ego until around the year 1910 – that is, until his meeting with Jung and with psychosis. From the year 1910 until around 1914 – that is, throughout the correspondence with Jung and in the texts that mark its evolution – Freud works out the idea that the ego itself must be understood as a libidinous – and thus a ‘sexual’ – construct. The ego is not given from the beginning, but must be developed. This is brought about as the different partial (sexual) drives that until then found satisfaction in auto-erotic and diffuse manner are now unified and take the body as totality for their object. The ego, Freud says, emerges as an effect of a new psychic action (“eine neue psychische Aktion”) in which the body as a whole is taken as an object of love. In this way, narcissism emerges as a stage in which the outer world has no psychical meaning for the infant. Psychosis must be understood as a regressive return to the stage in which ‘the ego was its own ideal’.

This rudimentary evocation of Freud’s theory of primary narcissism and of the theoretical-political context in which it was worked out can already make
it sufficiently clear why this theory may have enjoyed so much attention in philosophical circles. The stake of the debate is indeed considerable from a philosophical point of view: it concerns not only the essential nature of human desire, but also the origin of the ego and of subjectivity itself.

In the past twenty years, there has been much concern in philosophy over what could be called the ‘mimetic status of desire and of subjectivity’. I will not take up that discussion at any length here, but it is interesting to take note of the number of philosophers (including M. Borch-Jacobsen, Ph. Lacoue-Labarthe and J.-L. Nancy, R. Girard) and psychoanalysts (such as F. Roustang) who have entered into the discussion on the mimetic character of desire and subjectivity with explicit reference to Freud, Freud’s theory of narcissism and his correspondence with Jung. Moreover, they do so in a manner that in a certain sense seems to side with Jung against Freud. Freud reproaches Jung for remaining unreceptive to what is nonetheless a central point for psychoanalytic metapsychology – namely, the sexual character of the libido. The philosophers just mentioned turn this reproach back on itself: had you (Freud) only listened a little better to Jung, then you would have seen what you could or would not see – and what Jung was on the verge of seeing – that desire (as well as subjectivity) must be understood in terms of or as mimesis, and that it therefore can not be called intrinsically sexual.

Thus, after an interval of some seventy years, the debate between Freud and Jung is taken up anew. During the course of those years, the stake of that debate remains, at bottom, virtually unchanged. For the theoreticians of mimesis not only dispute the intrinsic sexual character of the libido but also immediately pretend – whether explicitly or not – to lay bare a psychotic core of subjectivity. If subjectivity has a mimetic character, then psychosis is among its intrinsic possibilities. This is reason enough to pursue exactly what these pretenses entail and if – against Freud and with Jung – they can be sustained. In what follows, I do not attempt to formulate a conclusive solution for this discussion, but instead will try to sketch its central lines. I will try to show that both Jung and the theoreticians of mimesis failed to see the stake of Freud’s linking up in an inextricable way sexuality and libido. We will try to reveal the fundamental misunderstandings that structure, as it were, the discussion between them. The question then is not so much who is right and who is wrong, but rather what the debate should be about. But before taking up this problem in more detail let us first say a word at the mimetic theory of desire.

2. The Mimetic Structure of Desire

The intrinsic relation between desire and mimesis was brought to light in a very powerful way by the French philosopher and anthropologist René Girard. Desire, Girard argues, in a certain sense has no object. Or, better,
desire has no object which has not been rendered desirable by some mediator – a master, books, style, culture. Consequently, there is no essential relation between desire and its object: desire for a specific object is an induced desire. It is secondary with respect to imitation – that is to say, mimesis – of the desire of the other. Desire is as it were mobilized by a model to which it conforms itself or with which it identifies. Mimesis informs desire, it awakens it and determines the path it takes.

If desire is thus intrinsically mimetic, then it is also essentially conflictual: “I want what my brother, my model wants – in and at his/her place.” The model that informs desire for structural reasons also proves to be an obstacle: since desire for the object is in its very essence desire for the mediator, it will also inevitably be confronted with the fact that this mediator also desires the object or, worse even, already possesses it. In his relation to his model the subject experiences a lacerating feeling that emerges out of the combination of two opposites: the unconditional respect (after all, s/he is my model) and unrelenting resentment. This, Girard says, is precisely what we commonly call ‘hatred’. This hatred is not only directed towards the model-obstacle, but also, if not in the first place, against oneself because of the admiration that is hidden behind it. In order not to have to admit this admiration the other is reduced to a mere obstacle. Thus the ‘disciple’ does not declare himself a faithful follower. Rather s/he will deny all mediation between him/her and his/her model by stressing the originality of his/her own desire and in doing so reversing the logical and chronological order of the desires that are involved. But perhaps even more important is the following: if desire is mimetic then by definition it has no specific – e.g., sexual – object. Desire, according to Girard, is indeed not awakened by an object, but through mimetic assimilation of or through a model. The object is as a consequence determined in function of this model. It is desired not in itself, but because it belongs first to the model – and there is nothing to guarantee that this model will be a ‘sexual’ one in whatever sense of the word.

Ultimately, the mimetic model of desire implies that desire is not primarily directed to obtaining an object – sexual or otherwise. Desire wants in the first place not to ‘have’ something, but to ‘be’ something: it wants to be ‘in and at the place of the other’. To the degree that desire must be conceived in terms of mimesis, before all else it wants to be like the other. In this sense, desire is directed to the realization of a subjective identity, and it is from this that the desire for an object is derived.

If I in the first place and ‘before all else’ – that is, even before ‘I’ have reached any definable identity – want to be in and at the place of the other, then it is not sexuality that we should attempt to recover from our phantasms, dreams and symptoms, but, for example, jealousy, rivalry or ambition. Is it not to this dimension that Jung sought to draw attention when he asked Freud
whether some symptoms might not be burdened by certain non-sexual components? Indeed, as we saw, Jung referred between quotation marks to one's profession, which in this context makes it difficult not to think of professional rivalry. And elsewhere Jung stresses that jealousy should not be understood exclusively in 'sexual' terms.\textsuperscript{14}

In any case, Jung rejects Freud's theory of an essentially sexual libido. In the second part of his "Transformations and Symbols of the Libido" (1911-1912) - in a move which sealed the break with Freud - he identifies the libido with "a concept of intentionality in general." Jung adds that: "We would be better advised, therefore, when speaking of the libido, to understand it as an energy-value which is able to communicate itself to any field of activity whatsoever, be it power, hunger, hatred, sexuality or religion, without ever being itself a specific instinct".\textsuperscript{15} In this connection, Jung cites Schopenhauer: "The Will as a thing-in-itself is quite different from its phenomenal manifestation, and entirely free from all forms of phenomenality, which it assumes only when it becomes manifest, and which therefore affect its objectivity only, and are foreign to the Will itself".\textsuperscript{16} Must we not now say the same of desire as mimesis? Must we not also - indeed, \textit{mutatis mutandis} - understand mimesis by analogy with Jung's concept of libido as an aspecific dynamic that can express itself in one or another domain without being restricted to any single one of them? And is mimetic desire not also in a certain sense, like the will according to Schopenhauer, "free of all forms of that in which it clothes itself"? Mimetic desire can have all sorts of models and objects, but these models and objects do not in any way determine the essence, the 'an sich', of desire.

However, it is not sufficient to call desire mimetic and to presume an implicit alliance between all those who defend a mimetic theory of desire and Jung. According to Borch-Jacobsen and Roustang, the problem of mimesis as it were casts a shadow over the entire correspondence between Jung and Freud.\textsuperscript{17} In particular, they point out that this correspondence itself must be read in terms of mimetic desire. Thus Freud very early proposes to Jung an "intellectual communism" in which there is no tight control over what one gives and what one has received.\textsuperscript{18} In other words, Freud proposes that Jung speculate together with him in such a way that each partner has the right, without scruple - that is to say, without concerning himself with the right to a 'certificate of origin' - to make the thoughts of the other his own. But if each of the two parties involved may - \textit{must} - make the other's thoughts his own, then that other also continually threatens to appear as a sort of 'doppelganger'. In such a relation, it can not be otherwise since each must appear to the other as a sort of usurper who has appropriated for himself 'my' ideas: from there, for example, there follow claims for one's own originality, accusations of ill will and misunderstanding that will lead
ultimately to a break between Freud and Jung.19 ‘Intellectual communism’ leads, in other words, according to an inexorable logic – the logic of the mimetic relation – to its contrary: the confirmation of one’s own identity, the consolidation of the proper and inalienable ego, the affirmation of the self. The fact that ‘I’ have my identity and ownness in the other, that ‘I’ am not myself, is as unspeakable as it is unacceptable. This is the classic scheme of mimesis: similarity leads to (affirmation of) difference, and mimesis to a claim for ownness and originality.20 Or, as Girard would say, the affirmation of ownness and originality is nothing but the centrifugal movement of an ego that is not capable of desiring by itself, that cannot bypass a fatal mediation by a model.21

This problematic of self-assertion, of the affirmation of the self – and thus of narcissism? – that follows mimesis like a shadow seems to lead directly into that of psychosis. Or at least, into the problematic of paranoia – the narcissistic disturbance par excellence which in a certain sense functions as Freud’s paradigm for psychosis in general. For does it not indeed appear that the theoreticians of mimesis – whether explicitly or not – invite us to consider paranoia, alongside Jung (and, at bottom, Bleuler), as an excessive “affirmation of an abased and disillusioned self”?22 In any case, there thus seems good reason to ask ourselves what they might have to say to us concerning this disturbance. In doing so, we will take as our guide the analysis of the correspondence between Freud and Jung which we find in the work of Borch-Jacobsen and Roustang.

3. Jung and Freud on Paranoia

3.1 General Exposition

Your views on paranoia have not lain fallow. I have been able to confirm them many times over... The detachment of the libido, its regression to autoerotic forms, is probably well explained by the self-assertion, the psychological self-preservation of the individual. Hysteria keeps to the plane of ‘preservation of the species’, paranoia (Dementia praecox) to the plane of self-preservation, i.e., autoerotism23 (Letter 722).

This fragment from a letter that Jung sent to Freud on February 20, 1908, is of interest in many respects. Jung refers, as is clear, to his own views on psychosis in general and paranoia in particular. Psychosis is an answer to vital situations of disenchantment, humiliation, the impossibility of realizing a specific aim, etc. These real conflicts are, according to Jung, overcompensated in the world of fantasy: a fantasmatic – and in Jung’s terminology this means an ‘auto-erotic’ – solution is posed for real problems. In light of this, the withdrawal of libido from objects of the outer world must be understood in terms of the ‘psychological self-preservation of the individual.’ Thus paranoia is an excessive self-affirmation in response to, for example, a situation in which the ego considers itself injured or abased.24

Still, our citation is interesting not only for the information that it conveys...
regarding Jung’s own insights on psychosis, but also for its stylistic characteristics. While referring to his own theory, Jung gives the impression – one might say that ‘he acts as if’ – that it is one with that of Freud: “Your (Freud’s) views on paranoia have not lain fallow. I have been able to confirm them many times over...” The mimetic contract exhibits its productivity: I, Jung, am hard at work confirming your (Freud’s) metapsychology, we occupy the same standpoint and the same theoretical perspective. But at the very moment that Jung confirms his identity with Freud he also brutally introduces a difference: “Hysteria keeps to the plane of ‘preservation of the species’, paranoia (Dementia praecox) to the plane of self-preservation, i.e., autoerotism.” Jung can not but have known that to Freud’s ears this statement would sound like a provocation. In Freud’s famous “Anlehntheorie” (theory of ‘leaning on’) of sexuality, auto-eroticism denotes the moment in which the sexual drive frees itself from the drive for self-preservation in order to find satisfaction autonomously in one’s own body. According to Freud the satisfaction of the sexual drive originally leans on the satisfaction of the self-preservation-drive: erotic pleasure is concomitant with the child’s feeding and in a way that makes it impossible to discern this pleasure from the pleasure that goes together with the satisfaction of bodily functions as such. This pleasure, in a second moment, is sought for its own sake (and independently from any biological need) in one’s own body, that is auto-erotically. Thus for Freud the notion of auto-eroticism clearly refers to the sexual drive. It has nothing to do with self-preservation. Once again, Borch-Jacobsen notes, the fulfillment of the mimetic contract leads to the confirmation of owness and thus to the breaking of the contract: *logique mimétique oblige*...

Things are no different for Freud. In a letter to Jung in 1907, he writes that psychosis is characterized by a withdrawal of the libido from the outer world. The libidinous energy thus free is then invested in the ego, that is to say, Freud adds, that the libido has become auto-erotic again. When this return succeeds, what results is dementia praecox (autism, schizophrenia), but when it does not succeed, then a portion of the libido is reinvested in the object which became hostile in the process. This hostility is, according to Freud, the ‘endogenous perception’ of the original disinvestment of the object.

Beginning in 1910 – in other words, from his study on ‘Senate President Schreber’ onwards – Freud introduces the distinction we have already mentioned between auto-erotism and narcissism. This distinction was still lacking from the letter we just referred to. What else can this mean, asks Borch-Jacobsen, than that Freud has come progressively to the standpoint of Jung, at least with regard to the distinction between auto-erotism and megalomania? Does not the introduction of narcissism mean that Freud realized in
the mean-time that megalomania can not be conceived in terms of autoerotism? Freud’s theory of narcissism then implies a turn in Jung’s direction toward a study and analysis of the ego which Freud, on his own admission, had neglected. But at the moment that Freud seems to turn toward Jung, he also affirms their difference: I (Freud) am in agreement with you (Jung) that a better conception of psychosis is possible only through the development of an ego-psychology, but I immediately add that this ego itself can and may be understood only as a libidinous construct. The excessive self-affirmation of the paranoiac is, according to Freud, of libidinous, that is sexual, nature.31

The respective positions of Jung (and the proponents of the theory of mimesis) and Freud in the debate which occupies us here are thus clear: self-affirmation out of self-preservation versus ‘sexual’ overestimation of the self. One nevertheless sees the problem: what do we mean when we refer to this self-overestimation as ‘sexual’, and also, what in fact are we saying when we propose that self-preservation has nothing to do with Freud’s ‘libido sexualis’? Freudians will certainly remark – not, after all, without reason – that this entire discussion has little meaning unless we first ask ourselves precisely what it is that Freud understands by sexuality. It must at least be clear that when Freud calls narcissism ‘libidinous’ and thus ‘sexual’, he is not thinking of adult genital sexuality. Still, perhaps we should ask ourselves not only in what manner Freud extends the concept of sexuality but also, and much more importantly, why he does so. Indeed, that extension is not to be considered apart from Freud’s project as a whole. What Freud tries to think – because he thinks that his clinical practice requires him to do so – is the mutual and constitutive penetration of the sexual and the psychic. This constitutive entanglement can be thematized only when sexuality is not restricted solely to genital or even infantile sexuality. In fact, we are thus dealing with a double extension: on the one hand, sexuality can no longer be equated with the domain of genital sexuality, but on the other hand, and moreover, the dispositive thus reached is not, on the grounds of the constitutive entanglement of the sexual and the psychic, to be approached as merely behavioral. For Freud, sexuality is something more and something other than the sum of the forms of behavior emerging from a specific sort of appetite. The latter underscores once again the importance of the discussion on narcissism: by thinking the ego itself as a libidinous construct, Freud emphasizes the mutual and necessary implication of the psychic and the sexual. Precisely what this means or can mean for Freud will not occupy us here, though indeed it already has the appearance of an essential aspect of Freudian psychoanalysis that neither the theoreticians of mimesis nor Jung himself could or would accept – if they have not, in fact, simply overlooked it. Perhaps further analysis of the Freud-Jung debate from the perspective of the problematic of mimesis can provide more clarity.
3.2 Senate President Schreber

In 1907, Freud connected psychosis with a withdrawal of the libido from the objects of the outer world. In his famous study of "Senate President Schreber" (1911), he specifies that it is a matter of a homosexual object. Schreber's illness, as is well-known, erupted on the occasion of his appointment as chairman of the court of appeals in Dresden. Grosso modo, it passed through two phases: in the first phase, Schreber was the victim of terrible homosexual attacks by Flechsig, his former physician, who was then quickly succeeded by God himself; in a second phase, he accepted his fate and organized his delusion into a complicated and strongly religiously inspired cosmogony in terms of which he saw himself as the female savior of the world who must give rise to a new and superior human race on earth. The analysis of this tragic case history led Freud to interpret different sorts of delusion (erotomania, delusions of persecution and jealousy, and megalomania) as different ways of denying the proposition 'I (a man) love him'. The megalomaniac reworks the entire proposition: 'I love nothing and no one, I love only myself'. In this way, says Freud, he regresses to infantile narcissism, in which the ego loved only itself and objects of the outer world played no psychical role. And infantile narcissism, he goes on, opens immediately onto a stage of homosexual object-choice in which only objects with the same sexual characteristics are chosen. Originally, the libido invests only objects similar to me. The paranoid patient would, as it were, pass through this evolution in the reverse direction. When he turns away from the homosexual object, there remains no other way out for him than to turn back to the narcissistic, that is to say an-objectal, stage. From this, megalomania and its characteristic 'Weltuntergangserlebnis' is the result. When this regressive movement fails, the libido turns back along the same (homosexual) path back to the world of objects, which gives rise to the formation of other types of delusions as so many denials of the homosexual point of departure.

The future will tell - so concludes Freud's analysis of the Schreber case -- whether our theory contains more madness than I would like or madness more truth than I can see today. That theory connects the eruption of psychosis with a homosexual impulse. Schreber himself, however, was of another conviction: he attributed the outbreak of psychosis to a plot by Flechsig to prevent him from becoming a 'nerve specialist'... like Flechsig himself. In other words, Schreber attributed his sickness to a 'non-sexual complex concerning the profession' (Jung). Or again, Schreber himself ascribes his sorry fate to a problem of professional, i.e., mimetic, rivalry.

Freud, it is true, did not deny that one can become sick from one's profession (frustrated ambition, etc.), but he immediately added that this is possible only on the basis of a more fundamental, unconscious conflict in which homosexuality regularly plays a role. Freud writes:
Paranoia is precisely a disorder in which a sexual aetiology is by no means obvious; far from this, the strikingly prominent features in the causation of paranoia, especially among males, are social humiliations and slights. But if we go into the matter a little more deeply, we shall be able to see that the really operative factor in these social injuries lies in the part played in them by the homosexual components of emotional life. So long as the individual is functioning normally and it is consequently impossible to see into the depths of his mental life, we may doubt whether his emotional relations to his neighbors in society have anything to do with sexuality, either actually or in their genesis. But delusions never fail to uncover these relations and to trace back the social feelings to their roots in a directly erotic wish.7

The paranoid delusion thus finds its origin in a field – that of social relations – of which the sexual character is not self-evident. And, further, not just any homosexuality gives rise to paranoid conflict: indeed, it concerns a conflict in the area of sublimated, “ziel-gehemmte” (thrust-inhibited) homosexuality.

We already know that the first object-choice, that is to say the original relation to the other is, according to Freud, homosexual in nature. Homosexuality is in this sense the original social drive. In this first stage of object-choice, only objects with the same sexual characteristics are chosen. The first object is in the strictest sense an alter-ego. Here the other can be an object of libidinous investment only on the ground of his similarity to me.

Nevertheless, this original social drive can also become social in the strict sense of the word by combining itself with the self-preservation-instincts or, as Freud calls them from 1910 onwards, with the ego-instincts (Ich-Triebe). This makes possible a sublimation of the homosexual drive through which sociality proper can then emerge. Homosexuality is thus the energy of sociality. For precisely this reason, says Freud, they menace social relations from the inside out, as their ‘inner exteriority’. Homosexuality is the energy of the social: it is that which transforms the ego-instinct into a social drive. At the same time, it is also a permanent threat to the social: when the homosexual impulse which provides it with its energy becomes too strong, it threatens to collapse the entire social edifice. This, according to Freud, is what happens in paranoia. Paranoid patients defend themselves against “einer solchen Sexualisierung ihrer sozialen Triebbesetzungen” (such a sexualization of their social drive-investment). Paranoia is a sickness of sublimation.88

The homosexual object-choice, we know, is the most original. The other is beloved because he is an alter-ego. This homosexual object-choice is thus essentially narcissistic. The object is chosen because of its similarity to me. For the proponents of mimesis, this seems just what they were waiting for. And this is all the more so since the transition from this archi-sociality to sociality in the strict sense seems in this case to bring little change to light: just as homosexuality is essentially narcissistic, so sociality seems to be intrinsically linked up with homosexuality. This, according to Borch-
Jacobsen, explains why the homosexual drive is so easily tied to the ego-instinct: in homosexuality the ego is already interested in itself. It is thus the similarity which creates a tie (the homo-sexuality) and not the sexual libido (homo-sexuality). Consequently, there is no essential distinction between ego-instinct and libido: desire, we are to believe, is solely mimetic.39

The implications of this mimetic reinterpretation of Freud are considerable. Freud introduces an original homo-sexual stage in the development of the libido in order to account for certain phenomena (e.g. 'mimetic rivalry') that seem to be characteristic of paranoia.40 By thus inferring normality (homosexual 'archi-sociality') from pathology, Freud would write, as it were, pathology into the heart of normality. When this original homosexual openness to the other is reinterpreted in terms of mimesis, it implies an equiprimordial openness to the annihilation by the other. Indeed, when the other is in the strictest sense an alter-ego, then he is also and for the same reason a stranger and an enemy. He deprives me of myself (my authenticity). The other acts, as it were, 'in my place' without me having any control over him. Not so much my objects as my identity and properness would be at stake – or better, they are from this perspective always already lost. As a consequence, there is a violence inherent to the appearing of the other as such. This violence belongs to the very essence of a desire that seeks or wants to be itself but can only find that ownness in the other. In this light, narcissism is nothing other than the confirmation of the ego, that is to say of the desire to cancel the original displacement in the other that I myself am. Mimetic desire is – as mimetic – immediately narcissistic: it has always already forgotten its (mimetic) origin.

Can there still be any wonder, chorus Roustang and Borch-Jacobsen, that Freud discovers madness at the heart of social relations? According to Freud, the delusion ('He hates me') supplants the proposition 'I love him' which is projected outside in reverse form. In the light of a mimetic theory of desire and of sociality, what returns from the outside in this manner is not something that is 'first' projected to the outside by and already constituted subject, but that 'same' subject showing itself to itself from the outside, in the inner dissension inevitably caused by mimetic doubling. However much the subject tries to be absolutely 'itself', it is that much more confronted with itself in the figure of an enemy doppelganger. To acknowledge that I am an other, that to and in the heart of my desire I am like an other, comes down to an acknowledgement of the unspeakable – namely, that I am not myself and that my identity lies in the other. This is, according to Borch-Jacobsen, the truth that the paranoiac 'represses' in delusion. Paranoia is indeed a narcissistic disturbance, but narcissism is nothing other than the – potentially overblown – 'affirmation of the uniqueness of the ego.' Seventy years after the facts, Jung wins out against Freud.
4. Conclusion

But does this really refute Freud? In the first place, one could (and should) ask the proponents of mimesis whether they are also able to make intelligible the other psychical disturbances – or even psychosis itself. What does seem tempting to the philosopher should also be plausible from a more clinical standpoint. For the moment at least, it is far from clear how this theory of mimesis can help to explain obsessional neurosis in all its aspects, let alone schizophrenia. And one is certainly to expect this to result from what unequivalently understands itself as a ‘general theory’. Above all, and still in the same line, one can ask oneself whether interpreting Freudian desire solely and exclusively as homo-sexual desire, and thus in terms of mimesis, does justice to the subtle distinctions that Freud introduces in the domain of identification. Mimetic identification is a ‘total identification’ in which the ego is radically transformed in conformity with the model with which it identifies itself. It is, in Freudian terms a ‘narcissistic’ identification. The question must be asked whether the theorists of mimesis by so easily reducing identification to ‘narcissistic identification’ do not bypass the multiformity and complexity of clinical reality in which very different types of identification may have to be distinguished. Furthermore, when Borch-Jacobsen, with regard to Freud’s study on Schreber, writes that the homosexual drive can easily be tied up with the ego-instinct because in homosexuality the ego is already interested in itself, one wonders whether he is not pulling a rabbit out of his hat, after having put it there himself. Indeed, the Freudian concept of an ego-instinct refers first and foremost to biological self-preservation. The ego-instinct has, according to Freud, its source in the ego and is directed towards objects that are independent of it, e.g. food. This ego-instinct has little or nothing to do with the metaphysical desire for identity Borch-Jacobsen is thinking of. This would be much more the case for the ego-libido (narcissistic libido), the concept of which Freud did not introduce for another four years.

There remains, however, the problem of whether or not the character of the libido is sexual. Or better, it can still be asked whether Freud’s theory of the libido can render an account of the psychotic break with reality. It will come as no surprise that I will not – and can not – give a definitive answer to this question. But we can ask ourselves whether Freud’s opponents have in fact met him on his own ground. Is not this entire discussion founded on a misunderstanding?

We have already noted that the Freudian extension of the concept of the libido makes it impossible to define it from a purely behavioral point of view: sexuality is for Freud something more and something other than the sum of forms of behavior anticipating a specific sort of corporal satisfaction. In a sense, Jung had little trouble with an extended concept of the libido –
that is, if one were to restrict it to the behavioral. For example, when Freud, during the early years of his correspondence with Jung, related dementia praecox to a regression to auto-erotism, Jung hastened to provide him with all sorts of clinical data on genital and pre-genital behavior testifying to that regression. But he immediately added that as far as he could see masturbation and the manipulation of excrement did not concur with anything psychical. Thus does Jung write in a letter to Freud in 1907 that sexuality in sensu stricto has altogether no effect on the psyche, that in the majority of cases it is experienced as something strange and inopportune and that it provides no occasion for repression. Elsewhere, he writes that the giving up of sexual interest can not explain the psychotic break with reality. The withdrawal of libido sexualis might yield an ascetic recluse who has banished all traces of sexuality from himself, but it does not produce schizophrenia. And Jung adds in a note: even when, in order to clarify, one adds to the withdrawal of sexual libido a regression to an infantile stage, one is still not free of problems. In any case, it can not be demonstrated that it is always sexuality that is stricken by regression: "Ich kenne Fälle von Dementia Praecox, wo alle Selbsterhaltungsrücksichten wegfallen, nicht aber die sehr lebhaften erotischen Interesse." One is again left with the impression that Jung seems to reduce sexuality to a form of behavior. In other words, what Jung from the beginning can not or will not except is the mutual and constitutive penetration of the sexual and the psychical. He can not or does not want to see that Freud is not so much talking of sexuality, but of psycho-sexuality.

The Freudian libido does indeed seem to escape the Jungian dilemma (sexual libido vs. psychical interest). According to Freud, sexuality can not be reduced to the pursuit of satisfaction which would be more or less directly related to a release of tension on the level of the various erogenous zones. From a genetic point of view, there can be no doubt that sexuality is to be brought together with such a release of tension. However, according to Freud, this scheme is greatly complicated by psychical development. Everything that can indirectly represent an erotic object can in turn become the object of libidinous investment. Or, again, anything capable, even indirectly, of representing the erotic object can mobilize the libido. The sexual drive emerges out of the perception of a multitude of metonymic and metaphoric representatives of the desired object. This is, for Freud, its essential characteristic. These re-presentatives are nonetheless sometimes quite different from erotic objects in the strict sense of the word, which can bring about a real physiological-sexual release and satisfaction. The libidinous investment of these re-presentatives can therefore find satisfaction solely in, for example, cognitive or aesthetic acts. Despite the multiformity of its fate, the sexual character of the libido can, according to Freud, be
maintained since sexuality is something else than the reality of erotic behavior and can certainly not be reduced to the relation between a drive for procreation and the mediating objects through which this aim can be accomplished. This explains why the argument pointing to the ascetic lacks any power of persuasion over Freud. Worse even, it begs the question: "Er mag sein sexuelles Interesse von den Menschen gänzlich abgewendet und kann es doch zum gesteigerten Interesse für Göttliches, Natürliches ... sublimiert haben, ohne eine Introversion seiner Libido auf seine Phantasien oder einer Rückkehr derselben zu seinem Ich verfallen zu sein."4

What bearing does this have on the proponents of mimesis? According to the adherents of that theory, desire is specified through the mimetic assimilation of a model, and there is no certainty whatsoever that it will always and by definition concern a sexual model. Consequently, they would have us believe that Freud without proper justification sexualizes desire. But it seems quite evident that 'sexual model' is here to be understood according to the strict sense of that word — that is to say, such that that model in one or another manner exhibits recognizably sexual activity. From the perspective of mimesis it is ruled out in advance that an ascetic, for example, would appear as a 'sexual model'. Once one tries to think desire exclusively from out of mimesis, one is without any further possibility of connecting non-overtly sexual behavior with sexuality. One might concede that 'infantile sexual activity' does exist, and one can then separate it from pure genitality, but one can not do otherwise than think sexuality from and as sexual behavior. At least implicitly — and mutatis mutandis — we find here again the same impossibility — or should we say unwillingness? — to think the mutual penetration of the sexual and the psychical. Just as was the case with Jung, the proponents of mimesis can not or do not want to think the Freudian problematic of psycho-sexuality. Freud could also say of the mimetic theory of desire that "it begs the question."

After an interval of 70 years, the debate between Freud and Jung thus repeats itself. After an interval of 70 years, the same misunderstanding is also repeated. The question here is not so much whether Freud and not, for example, Jung is right; for in order to answer that question one will first have to clearly define the subject of that debate. Perhaps we will then realize that the Freud-Jung debate has yet to begin.

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References
2. "Fassen Sie die Sexualität die Mutter alle Gefühl auf? Ist für Sie die Sexualität nicht bloss eine Komponente der Persönlichkeit (die wichtigste allerdings) und darum der Sexualkomplex die wichtigste und häufigste Komponente des hysterischen Krankheitsbildes? Gibt es nicht hysterische Symptome, die zwar vom Sexualkomplex mitdeterminiert,
aber Überwiegend durch eine Sublimation oder durch einen nicht sexuellen Komplex (Beruf, Stellung, etc.) bedingt sind?” S. Freud/C.G. Jung, *Briefwechsel* (Hrsg. von W. McGuire & W. Sauerländer), Fischer Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, 1974, 33.

3. The Freud/Jung Letters. *The Correspondence Between Sigmund Freud and C.G. Jung* (ed. by W. McGuire and translated by R. Manheim and R.F.C. Hull), Hogarth and Routledge Kegan Paul, London, 1974, 79. These letters are numbered in chronological order, with those from both correspondents counted in the same enumeration. Thus, Letter 39J is the thirty-ninth to pass in either direction in that correspondence, and is from Jung to Freud.


7. As far as Freud is concerned one could think here of texts such as *Psychoanalytische Bemerkungen über einen autobiographisch beschriebenen Fall von Paranoia*, *Zur Einführung des Narzissmus and Totem und Tabu*; As far as Jung is concerned one could think of his *Wandlungen und Symbole der Libido*.


19. For a penetrating and extremely lucid comment on the correspondence between Freud and


24. Jung’s view on psychosis reminds us of Bleuler’s for whom paranoia has to be understood as an affective reaction to vital situations in which the subject is humiliated or in which it is deeply disappointed. The delusion then is to be understood either as an immediate denial of this situation (megalomania), or as a mediate denial (the failure of the subject is linked up with the hostile character of its lifeworld: delusion of persecution). Cf. on this problematic P. Bercherie, *Genèse des concepts freudiens*, 263-265.


33. *Ibidem*, 188.

34. *Ibidem*, 184.


38. *Ibidem*, 186.
40. One could think here of Schreber reproaching Flechsig to prevent him from becoming a nerve-specialist like Flechsig himself.
42. *The Freud/Jung Letters. The Correspondence Between Sigmund Freud and C.G. Jung*, 44. For the problem we are dealing with here cf. the work of M. Dayan we already mentioned earlier.

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**The British Society for Phenomenology**

The Annual Meeting of The British Society for Phenomenology will take place at St. Edmund Hall, Oxford, on April 11-13th, 1997. The theme of the conference is ‘Renewing Phenomenology’. Speakers will include:
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