

**AN ALTERNATIVE RECONSTRUCTION OF DIOGENES OF OINOANDA,
FR. 21 III 14 – IV 14**

In fragment 21 (= NF 40/YF 097) of his inscription, Diogenes of Oinoanda continues the argument of the so-called Theological *Physics*-Sequence (= NF 167 + NF 126 + NF 127 + fr. 20 + NF 182, henceforth: *Theol.*).¹ The two passages are in fact so closely connected that probably only one block was lost in between, perhaps containing no more than the right-hand portion of *Theol.* XVI (= NF 182 III) and the left-hand portion of fr. 21 I.² In *Theol.* XIV (= fr. 20 III + NF 182 I), Diogenes sets out to investigate whether god created everything for the sake of human beings. He proposes to deal, first, with the world and, subsequently, with human beings themselves (lines 3–8): “Let us divide the discussion into two (the world and humans themselves), and first let us speak about the world ...”.³ In the rest of *Theol.* he only speaks about various aspects of the world, and this is continued in fr. 21. Only halfway through column III, Diogenes moves on to the promised discussion of human beings (lines 9–14): “Such then are the things of the world. But the things of humans themselves – let us now see if they are compatible with divine providence. Let us begin like this: ...”.⁴

Since Diogenes’ arguments about the world (*Theol.* XIV–XVI and fr. 21 I–III) closely match Lucretius’ arguments in *DRN* V 200–221,⁵ one would expect the continuation of Diogenes’ argument – about human beings – to correspond with the sequel of Lucretius’ account as well. In fact, Lucretius, too, continues with a discussion (*DRN* V 222–234) of the human condition. Nevertheless, Diogenes’ argument about human beings is very different from Lucretius’. Whereas Lucretius points to the helplessness of the human infant as compared to young animals,⁶ Diogenes chooses – as far as can be ascertained from the transmitted text – to attack his adversaries in this passage (undoubtedly the Stoics, who are explicitly mentioned in *Theol.* IX 11 and possibly in fr. 21 IV 11–12) on a perceived contradiction in their doctrine: on the one hand they declare that human beings are privileged above all other animals because they alone partake of reason, which is a necessary condition for happiness, but on the other hand they claim that only the wise (who are extremely rare and may not even exist) are happy, whereas all other people are condemned by their foolishness to utter misery.⁷ Similar arguments, exploiting the same con-

1 For the complete text with English translation of the Theological *Physics*-sequence, see Jürgen Hammerstaedt and Martin Ferguson Smith, *The Epicurean Inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda: Ten Years of New Discoveries and Research*, Bonn 2014, 263–270.

2 Jürgen Hammerstaedt and Martin Ferguson Smith, *Diogenes of Oinoanda: The discoveries of 2010* (NF 182–190), *EA* 43 (2010) 1–29, notably pp. 11–12 and 15; reprinted in Hammerstaedt/Smith (2014) 109–137, notably pp. 119–120 and 123.

3 Translation from Hammerstaedt/Smith (2010) 10 = Hammerstaedt/Smith (2014) 118.

4 Translation (modified) from Martin Ferguson Smith, *Diogenes of Oinoanda. The Epicurean Inscription*, Naples 1993, 377.

5 See Hammerstaedt/Smith (2010) 11–12 and 15 = Hammerstaedt/Smith (2014) 119–120 and 123.

6 Compare also Aristotle’s anonymous adversaries in *PA* IV 10, 687a23–26, who point out the defenselessness of human beings as compared to other animals.

7 In his commentary on fr. 21, Smith (1993) 462–463, has little to say about the interpretation of column IV as a whole, but commenting on fr. 32 (*ibid.* p. 480), he writes about “the Stoic view that all who have not attained wisdom/virtue (and few, if any, ever have) are foolish/vicious – a view which Diogenes mentions in fr. 21 IV

tradition, are also brought against the Stoics by, for instance, Plutarch, *De Stoicorum repugnantibus* 31, 1048e–1049a (= *SVF* 3.668a), and Alexander of Aphrodisias, *De fato* 28, p.199, 7 Bruns (= *SVF* 3.658).⁸

Unfortunately, of column IV, which originally straddled two contiguous blocks, only the left-hand half has been preserved. In his latest edition of fr. 21, Martin Ferguson Smith offers a bold reconstruction of column IV, providing several, often ingenious, conjectures as to the missing portions. However, although Smith's reconstruction is generally on the right track and has been an invaluable guide for those who want to grasp the general meaning of the text, I think many of its details are open to debate. In this article I want to re-examine the text of column IV. This I will do in the form of a critical commentary on Smith's reconstruction, after which I will offer an alternative reconstruction, which – while being no less conjectural than Smith's – I hope may in some respects be more convincing. I will begin by quoting Smith's reconstruction and translation of the text.⁹

Smith's text

III 14 καλὸν μὲν, ὦ φί-
 IV 1 λοι, τὸ ζῶον [τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἄν]-
 θρωπος, λο[γιστικόν τε]
 καὶ τοῦ μέλλ[οντος προνοη]-
 τικόν, ὦ καὶ [δυνατὸν βιω]-
 IV 5 ναι μακαρί[ως, ἂν τὴν ἀρε]-
 τὴν ἑαυτ[ῆς ἕνεκα καὶ ἀγα]-
 θὰς ἔχη δ[ιαθέσεις. ἀλλὰ]
 τοῦτο τὸ ζῶ[ον οὐκ ἔχει φρό]-
 νησιν οὐδ[ὲ μὴν ἀρετὴν κα]-
 IV 10 τὰ τοὺς τὸν [λόγον ὑπολαμ]-
 βάνοντα[ς ἐκεῖνον Στω]-
 ικούς. ὦ τὸ γὰρ μέγα πάν]-
 των ἀφρα[ίνειν κωλύει αὐ]-
 IV 14 τὰς, καὶ οὐ[]

Smith's translation

Fine indeed, my friends, [is this] creature man – a creature that is [rational, gifted with prescience] of the future, and [capable of] leading a blissful [life –, if] he possesses [virtue for] its own [sake and good dispositions. But] this creature [does not possess wisdom] or [indeed

7–14.” More explicit is Francesca Masi, Virtue, pleasure, and cause. A case of multi-target polemic? Diogenes of Oenoanda, fr. 32–33 Smith, in J. Hammerstaedt, P. M. Morel and R. Güremen (eds.), *Diogenes of Oenoanda: Epicureanism and Philosophical Debates*, Leuven 2017, 111–141, notably p. 115: “In fr. 21 V [sic], in the context of an anti-teleological argument, Diogenes shows how the Stoics, while maintaining that man is a rational creature capable of foreseeing the future and leading a blessed life, believe that insanity prevents nearly all human beings from gaining wisdom and virtue.”

8 *SVF* = Hans von Arnim (ed.), *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta*. 3 volumes, Leipzig 1903–05. (In those cases where von Arnim has combined several texts under a single fragment number, I have added a letter (a, b, or c) to distinguish the individual texts.)

9 For Smith's reconstruction and translation of fr. 21, see Smith (1993) 182–184 and 377 respectively.

virtue, according to] the [Stoics who hold that view]; for the [great folly of all men prevents them.] And ... not ...

My notes

III 14 – IV 4. In these lines Diogenes presents the Stoic doctrine of man's perfection as compared to other animals in language that seems to imitate the Stoics' own diction. In his *editio princeps* of the fragment,¹⁰ Smith compared the content of these lines to Cic. *ND* 2.147, where Balbus, Cicero's Stoic spokesman, says: "Iam vero animum ipsum mentemque hominis, rationem, consilium, prudentiam qui non divina cura perfecta esse perspicit, is his ipsis rebus mihi videtur carere." However, an even closer parallel is furnished by a Stoicizing passage in Cicero's *De legibus* 1.22¹¹ (I have underlined the most notable similarities):

Huc enim pertinet, animal hoc providum, sagax, multiplex, acutum, memor, plenum rationis et consilii, quem vocamus hominem, praeclara quadam condicione generatum esse a supremo deo; solum est enim ex tot animantium generibus atque naturis particeps rationis et cogitationis, cum cetera sint omnia expertia.

For it comes down to the following: that this creature, provident, sagacious, complex, keen, remembering, full of reason and purpose, which we call human, has been created according to some excellent condition by the highest god; for this is the only one from among so many animal species and natures that partakes of reason and thought, while all the others are deprived of it.

IV 1. Smith reads [τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἄν]θρωπος. Another possible reading would be [ὃ λέγεται ἄν]-
θρωπος (with ἐστὶν implied). Compare Cic. *Leg.* 1.22 "quem vocamus hominem". As for Diogenes' general avoidance of hiatus: the juxtaposition of words ending in -αι (and esp. -εται) and words beginning with a vowel is not uncommon.¹² Apposite examples are fr. 9 III.8–9 ποροποιεῖται ἡμῶν and fr. 125 IV.1 περιγίνεται ἡμεῖν.

IV 2. Smith's reading λογιστικόν τε] – based on a suggestion made by Westman¹³ – is unlikely, since in *SVF* λογιστικόν is used only to refer to a specific part or power of the soul (see *SVF* 1.571; 2.828b; 839b; 881; 904–906; 911; 3.257; 259; 260; 441; 463; 471a), never to refer to a complete animal. The required adjective would be λογικόν (cf. *SVF* 1.110; 230b; 244; 2.61; 83; 224; etc.), which – even if we add τε – seems to be too short to fill the available space. In the critical apparatus Smith also mentions Westman's alternative suggestion λό[γου μετέχον],¹⁴ which neatly

10 Martin Ferguson Smith, More new fragments of Diogenes of Oenoanda, in Jean Bollack and André Laks (eds.), *Études sur l'Épicurisme antique* (Cahiers de philologie 1), Lille 1976, 279–318, notably p. 294.

11 On the Stoic character of Cicero's *De legibus* 1 in general, see e. g. Andrew Roy Dyck, *A Commentary on Cicero, De Legibus*, Ann Arbor 2004, 12 and 51; Elizabeth Asmis, Cicero on Natural Law and the Laws of the State, *Classical Antiquity* 27.1 (2008) 1–33, esp. p. 5; and René Brouwer, *The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates*, Cambridge 2013, 159 n. 99. On the Stoic character of *De legibus* 1.22 in particular, see Dyck (2004) 121–123.

12 See Smith (1993) 111–112; and Michael McOsker, Hiatus in Epicurean authors, *Cronache Ercolanesi* 47 (2017) 145–161, notably p. 147.

13 Rolf Westman, Zu einigen new fragments des Diogenes von Oinoanda, in *Συζήτησις. Studi sull'epicureismo greco e romano offerti a Marcello Gigante*, Naples 1983, I, 374–384, notably p. 381.

14 See Westman (1983) 382.

fits the available space. For Stoic parallels of this expression, see *SVF* 1.515a μετέχειν λόγου, 2.528 (p.169.29) λόγου μετέχειν (in a passage precisely about man’s privileged position among animals), and *Marc. Aur.* 7.9 τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγου μετεχόντων ζώων. Another parallel is found in Cicero’s *De legibus* 1.22, that was quoted above: “particeps rationis”.¹⁵

IV 3–4. Smith’s conjecture τοῦ μέλλ[οντος προνοη]τικόν is very attractive. The two alternatives which Smith mentions in the critical apparatus, τοῦ μέλλ[οντος προγνωσ]τικόν and τοῦ μέλλ[οντος προορα]τικόν, are unlikely. Both refer to *foreknowledge* or *prescience* of the future, something which nobody would ascribe to human beings in general; τοῦ μέλλ[οντος προνοη]τικόν, on the other hand, is about having *forethought* for, or *providing* for, the future, which applies (at least potentially) to all human beings. It is in this sense, ‘providing for’, that προνοητικός and its cognates προνοεῖν and πρόνοια are used in Stoic sources, although usually with God or nature as their subject. The only Stoic source that I could find where προνοητικός is predicated of a human being is in Marcus Aurelius (1.16.3), who praises his adoptive father for τὸ πόρρωθεν προνοητικόν. I have found no Stoic sources where having *forethought* is predicated of human beings in general, at least not in Greek, but *Cic. Leg.* 1.22, which I quoted above, provides a Latin parallel: Cicero’s “providum” may be seen as rendering the Greek προνοητικόν, especially if one takes into account that elsewhere, in an explicitly Stoic context, Cicero offers “providentia” as a translation of πρόνοια.¹⁶

IV 4–5. Smith’s reading [δυνατὸν], in the active sense of “capable”, cannot be excluded, although this word is used more typically in the passive sense of “possible”. Other and perhaps more likely ways to express the desired active meaning are [δυνάμενον], [οἶόν τ’ ὄν] or [οἶόν τ’ ἄν ὄν]. Moreover, depending on the remaining space, for [βιω]ναί μακαρί[ως] one could also read [εἶ]ναί μακαρί[ον]. For the Stoics’ use of μακάριος/μακαρίως with respect to the sage, see *SVF* 1.216 (p. 53.9); 1.356; 2.1183.3; 3.54a; 3.586; 3.759b; 3.764.

IV 5–6. Smith’s reconstruction [ἄν τὴν ἀρε]τὴν ἑαυτ[ῆς ἔνεκα καὶ] is clever and cannot be excluded. The conjunctive ἔχη in line 7 does, indeed, require some conjunction like ἄν, “if”. On the other hand, although, according to the Stoics, *having virtue* was certainly a necessary condition for happiness or blessedness (*SVF* 1.216, 263, 3.49–50, 54a, 56–57, 59, 61), the stipulation that it should be had *for its own sake* (see *SVF* 3.38–48) seems unnecessarily specific in the present context. Another option would be to reconstruct these lines as referring to *self-knowledge* or *the lack thereof*, which are characteristic of the sage and the fool, respectively: see *SVF* 1.216 (p. 53.7–8) “οὔτε ἀγνοεῖ (sc. ὁ σπουδαῖος) ... ἑαυτόν”; and 3.663 “πάντα φαῦλον μαίνεσθαι, ἄγνοϊαν ἔχοντα αὐτοῦ”.¹⁷ Accordingly, the lines might be reconstructed as, for instance, [ἄν μὴ ἀγνοῆ] τὴν ἑαυτ[οῦ φύσιν καὶ] “if it is not ignorant of its own nature and ...”. For this construction, cp. *Epict. Diss.* 4.8.42 οὐκ ἀγνοεῖ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν. For the juxtaposition of μὴ and ἀγνοεῖω in Diogenes’ inscription, see e. g. fr. 146 II 14.

IV 6–7. Smith reads [ἀγα]θὰς. Another option would be [ὀρ]θὰς, which is slightly shorter.

IV 7. Smith suggests ἔχη δ[ιαθέσεις. ἀλλὰ]. After the preceding hypothetical clause, a word like ἀλλὰ seems indeed to be required to mark the beginning of the contradiction. If Smith’s [ἀγα]θὰς δ[ιαθέσεις], “good dispositions”, is correct, this could perhaps be interpreted as a pe-

¹⁵ Commenting on this passage Dyck (2004) 123 explicitly links the Latin words *particeps* and *ratio* to Greek μετέχειν and λόγος, respectively.

¹⁶ *Cic. ND* 1.18 “Stoicorum πρόνοϊαν, quam Latine licet *providentiam* dicere”. See also *ND* 2.58 and 2.73.

¹⁷ On self-knowledge as a defining trait of the Stoic sage, see Brouwer (2013) 34–36. As evidence for this position Brouwer cites *Cic. Fin.* 3.73 (= *SVF* 3.282); *id. Tusc.* 5.70; *id. Leg.* 1.58–62; and *Jul. Orat.* 6.6, 185d–186a.

riphrasis of “virtues”, given that, according to the Stoics (SVF 3.104), virtues as well as vices count as dispositions, so that having good dispositions (i. e. virtues) could indeed be seen a condition for wisdom and hence blessedness. One wonders, however, whether this does not assume too much detailed knowledge of Stoic terminology on the part of Diogenes’ readers. Instead of [ἀγα]θὰς δ[ιαθέσεις] one could also think of, for instance, [ἀγα]θὰς δ[ιανοίας], “good thoughts”, which could be interpreted as corresponding to [φρό]νησιν in lines 8–9.

IV 8–9. Smith’s reading [οὐκ ἔχει φρό]νησιν is very plausible and fits the context very well: according to the Stoics the unwise lack φρόνησις (SVF 3.663); they are presented as ἄφρονες (SVF 3.664 and 668b) and οὐ φρόνιμοι (SVF 3.664), and suffering from ἀφροσύνη (SVF 3.664 and 668c). The word φρόνησις could be interpreted as referring back to the (self-)knowledge of lines 5–6 (if that conjecture is correct); for φρόνησις as the opposite of ἄγνοια, see SVF 3.663: Τὴν δ’ ἄγνοιαν εἶναι ἐναντίαν κακίαν τῇ φρονήσει. Alternatively, it could be interpreted as picking up the “good thoughts” ([ἀγα]θὰς δ[ιανοίας]) of lines 6–7 (if that conjecture is correct).

IV 9. Smith conjectures οὐδ[ὲ μὴν ἀρετήν]. However, many other reconstructions seem possible as well, e. g. οὐδ[ὲ μὴν ἀρετὰς] (in the plural to match the plural of [ἀγα]θὰς δ[ιαθέσεις], if that conjecture is correct), or οὐδ’ [ἐπιστήμην] to answer to [μὴ ἀγνοῆ] of line 5 (if that conjecture is correct). For ἐπιστήμη as the opposite of ἄγνοια, see SVF 3.657: Πᾶσα φαύλου [...] ὑπόληψις ἄγνοιά ἐστι καὶ μόνος ὁ σοφὸς ἀληθεύει καὶ ἐπιστήμην ἔχει τάληθοῦς βεβαίαν. “Every supposition of an inferior person is ignorance, and only the sage speaks the truth and has fixed knowledge of the truth.”

IV 9–12. Smith’s restoration [κα]τὰ τοὺς τὸν [λόγον ὑπολαμ]βάνοντα[ς ἐκείνον Στω]ϊκούς is ingenious and may well be correct. I cannot think of anything better.

IV 12–14. Smith restores these lines as τὸ γὰρ μέγα πάν]των ἀφρα[ίνειν κωλύει αὐ]τάς ..., which he translates as: “for the great folly of all men prevents them ...”. While the restoration of ἀφρα[ίνειν] (or some cognate form) is highly probable and would fit the context very well (cf. SVF 2.173 (p. 49.36); 3.501; and especially 3.668a (p. 167.17–18): μαίνεσθαι πάντα, ἀφραίνειν), the rest of the reconstruction is very doubtful. To judge from Smith’s translation, he interprets [πάν]των as a *subjective genitive* with ἀφρα[ίνειν]. However, infinitives, even when substantivized, typically use the *accusative* to indicate the subject, not the *genitive*. It seems more likely that -των is part of either a *partitive genitive*, e. g. τὸ γὰρ πάντα αὐ]τῶν ἀφρα[ίνειν] – “for the fact that all of them are foolish”, or a *comparative genitive*, e. g. τὸ γὰρ μάλιστα πάν]των ἀφρα[ίνειν] – “for the fact that (they) are most foolish of all”. A further problem with Smith’s suppletion [-ρ μέγα πάν]- in line 12 is that it is rather short (only 8 letters) as compared to his other additions in this column (10–13 letters): if this had really been what Diogenes wrote, there seems to be no good reason for “πάντας” being divided over two lines. Both alternatives that I proposed do better in this respect (9 and 11 letters, respectively). I am not convinced by Smith’s [κωλύει αὐ]τάς either. The pronoun αὐ]τάς in lines 13–14, being *feminine* plural, can only refer back to a *feminine* plural noun or nouns. In his commentary, Smith suggests that [αὐ]τάς “refers to wisdom and virtue,”¹⁸ i.e. to [φρό]νησιν and [ἀρετήν] of lines 8–9. However, the long distance that separates [αὐ]τάς from its presumed antecedents makes this interpretation very unlikely. Alternatively, one could conjecture that -τας is the ending of a *masculine* plural, perhaps a first or third declension noun, or an active or passive participle, which could then either refer back to the Stoics, who may have been mentioned in the previous sentence (if Smith’s conjecture there is correct), or (and this seems to me to be more likely) point forward to some other masculine plural noun,

18 Smith (1993) 463.

e. g. τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, that would have stood in the now missing continuation of the argument. By way of an example, I suggest [μεμηνό]τας “being utterly crazy”. For the Stoic view that all inferior people are crazy (μαίνεσθαι), see e. g. *SVF* 3.658, 663, 664, 668a, 668c. We cannot know what came after καὶ οὐ in line 14, but if my reconstruction is on the right track, we may assume that it was followed by another infinitive, parallel to ἀφρα[ίνειν] in line 13. Possibly, the missing portion contained another reference to self-knowledge, e. g.: “καὶ οὐ[δ’] ἑαυτοὺς γινῶ/ναι ...” – “and do not even know themselves ...”.

Alternative text

III 14	καλὸν μὲν, ὧ φί-	
IV 1	λοι, τὸ ζῶον [ὃ λέγεται ἄν]- θρωπος, λό[γου μετέχον]- καὶ τοῦ μέλλ[οντος προνοη]- τικόν, ὦ καὶ [δυνάμενον εἶ]-	
IV 5	ναι μακάρι[ον, ἂν μὴ ἀγνοῆ] τὴν ἑαυτ[οῦ φύσιν καὶ ἀγα]- θὰς ἔχη δ[ιαθέσεις. ἀλλὰ]	θὰς ἔχη δ[ιανοίας. ἀλλὰ]
	τοῦτο τὸ ζῶ[ον οὐκ ἔχει φρό]- νησιν οὐδ[ὲ μὴν ἀρετὰς κα]-	νησιν οὐδ[ὲ] [ἐπιστήμην κα]-
IV 10	τὰ τοὺς τὸν [λόγον ὑπολαμ]- βάνοντα[ς ἐκεῖνον Στω]- ικούς. ὦ τὸ γὰ[ρ μάλιστα πάν]-	ικούς. ὦ τὸ γὰ[ρ πάντας αὐ]-
	των ἀφρα[ίνειν μεμηνό]-	τῶν ἀφρα[ίνειν μεμηνό]-
IV 14	τας καὶ οὐ[δ’] ἑαυτοὺς γινῶ]- [ναι] ...	

Alternative translation

Fine indeed, my friends, (is) the creature [that is called] human, (a creature) [partaking of reason and providing] for the future, and [capable of being] blissful, [if it is not ignorant] of its own [nature and] has [good dispositions / thoughts. But] this creature [has neither prudence] nor [(indeed) virtues / knowledge, according to] the [Stoics who hold that view;] for the fact that they are [the most] foolish of [all (creatures), being utterly crazy], and do not [even know themselves],
for the fact that [all of them] are foolish, [being utterly crazy], and do not [even know themselves],

This could then have been followed by something along the following lines: “makes human beings (τοὺς ἀνθρώπους) the most wretched creatures of all!”¹⁹ Thus Diogenes would have demon-

19 Cf. Alexander of Aphrodisias, *De fato* 28, p. 199, 7 Bruns (= *SVF* 3.658) πῶς οὐκ ἂν ἀθλιώτατον ζῶον ἀπάντων ὁ ἄνθρωπος εἶη; (“how could man not be the most wretched creature of all?”), and Plutarch, *De Stoicorum repugnantis* 31, 1048e–1049a (= *SVF* 3.668a) τοὺς δ’ (sc. ἀνθρώπους) ὡς ἔνι χεῖριστα πρᾶττειν (“that human beings are in the worst possible condition”).

strated, not – as Lucretius does – by observing the human condition for himself, but by using against the Stoics one of their own arguments, that god did not take good care of us.²⁰

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Özet

Oinoandalı Diogenes'in Epikourosçu yazıtının 21. parçası (= NF 40/YF 097), sözde Teolojik Fizik Dizisi (= NF 167 + NF 126 + NF 127 + fr. 20 + NF 182, buradan itibaren: *Theol.*) argümanını sürdürür. *Theol.* XIV'te Diogenes, tanrının her şeyi insanlar için tasarlayıp tasarlamadığını araştırmaya koyulur. Tartışma iki bölüme ayrılmıştır: dünyanın tasarımı ve insanın tasarımı. Dünya ile ilgili kısım *Theol.* XIV'te başlar ve fr. 21'de devam eder. Sadece III. sütunun sonunda, tartışma IV. sütunda devam eden insanlık durumuna geçer. Ne yazık ki, bu argümanın metni sadece kısmen korunmuştur, çünkü IV. sütunun sağ yarısını içeren blok henüz bulunamamıştır. Bu sütunun Martin Ferguson Smith tarafından yapılmış tamamlaması (*Diogenes of Oinoanda. The Epicurean Inscription, Naples 1993, 182-184 ve 377*) genel argümanı anlamamızı sağlar. Diogenes, bir yandan insanların diğer tüm hayvanlardan daha ayrıcalıklı olduğunu, diğer yandan da hemen hemen tüm insanların aptallıkları yüzünden perişan olduğunu iddia eden Stoacıların tutarsızlığına dikkat çekmiş görünmektedir. Smith'in tamamlaması genel olarak doğru yolda olmasına rağmen, ayrıntılarının çoğu tartışmaya açıktır. Bu makale, mevcut sütun boşlukları daha iyi kullanan ve dilbilgisi ve deyim açısından daha düzenli bir tamamlama alternatifi sunmaktadır. Ayrıca, Diogenes'in Stoacıları eleştirirken Stoacıların sözlük seçimlerini taklit ettiği önerilmiştir.

²⁰ At the end of this article, I wish to express my gratitude to Jürgen Hammerstaedt and Albert Jooose for their useful comments and welcome advise on previous versions of the article. Naturally, all remaining errors and inaccuracies are my own.