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Applicability of the social identity model of collective action in predicting support for interreligious violence in Indonesia

Tery Setiawan,^{1,2}  Peer Scheepers,¹ and Carl Sterkens³

¹Department of Sociology, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands, ²Faculty of Psychology, Maranatha Christian University, Bandung, Indonesia, and ³Faculty of Philosophy, Theology and Religious Studies, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands

To what extent does religious identification promote collective efficacy and perceived injustice that contribute to explain support for interreligious violence in Indonesia? This overarching research question is inspired by theoretical insights starting from social identity theory, and noticeably enriched by collective action theories. We use high-quality data of 1,995 randomly selected individuals (Muslims and Christians) from across the Indonesian archipelago to investigate the mediating effects of perceived injustice and collective efficacy on the relationship between religiosity and support for interreligious violence. We also improve upon previous research with an elaborate measure of religiosity (beliefs, practice, and salience). Our structural equation modelling analysis reveals that collective efficacy significantly mediates the relationship between the religiosity dimensions and support for interreligious violence. Moreover, on average, the Muslim community has a higher level of collective efficacy, as compared to the Christian community, which positively affects the relationship between most religiosity dimensions and support for interreligious violence. An interesting finding is that in the Christian community, salience is overall negatively related to collective efficacy, which then negatively affects support for interreligious violence. These results provide novel empirical insights on the role of religious identity in interreligious conflicts in the South Asian context, especially Indonesia.

Keywords: collective efficacy, interreligious violence, perceived injustice, religiosity, religious identity, social identity model of collective action.

In recent years, Indonesia has been stepping into a new era of democracy, with reports referring to the increase of conservative Islamic morality as a factor in societal life and politicized use of religion (Hadiz, 2017; Tomsa, 2019). This creates religious cleavages and induces religious group interests, which usually end up in interreligious violence mostly between Muslims and Christians (see Braithwaite, Braithwaite, Cookson, & Dunn, 2010). Although interreligious violence is not merely among Muslims and Christians, cases where Muslims are the victims of both state and nonstate Christian actors' exclusionary measures or otherwise are relatively notable and consistently high in number, 20.81% of 197 cases in 2015 (see Halili, 2016, especially the Appendix for a full account of violations on freedom of religion in Indonesia); for example, Christians' assault on Muslims during their Eid-al-Fitr worship in Tolikara, Papua or the church-burning by the Muslim congregation in Aceh

Singkil. This number does not include cases where the victim is either individual or an organization. To theorize on the relation between religion and intergroup violence in Indonesia, we apply the social identity model of collective action (SIMCA). SIMCA proposes individuals' *social identity* as the key factor to explain individuals' group-based perceptions (*perceived injustice*) and group-based beliefs concerning their group ability to ameliorate group experiences (*collective efficacy*) (Van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008).

Although the SIMCA has mostly been studied in Western countries, a successful investigation in Asian contexts has recently been conducted (Li, Xu, Yang, & Guo, 2019). This led to the insight that some level of culture-based contexts shapes the core motivations for collective action (Van Zomeren, 2019). Based on this insight, there are valid reasons for application of the SIMCA in the Indonesian context. First, there is enduring importance of religious identification in Indonesian society, which can be illustrated with the demand to imprison Jakarta governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (popularly known as "Ahok") for blasphemy in massive demonstrations with up to 1 million participants (Bruinessen, 2018). Second, perceived injustice has often been a crucial reason to protest against religious outgroups. Some members of the Muslim majority may perceive that traditional values and

Correspondence: Tery Setiawan, Department of Sociology, Radboud University, P.O. Box 9104, 6500 HE Nijmegen, The Netherlands. E-mail: t.setiawan@ru.nl

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roles are threatened by modernization and alleged Western domination, resulting in resistance that becomes clear in, for instance, support for Sharia law (Bruinessen, 2018). Third, violence against the religious outgroup sometimes brings the desired results, creating a sense of collective efficacy in particular religious groups. One of the most notable examples is how violent protests against Christian churches by a relatively small part of local Muslims in Singkil, Aceh in October 2015 resulted in a decree to demolish the targeted churches (Halili, 2016). This study will test theoretical notions of the SIMCA in the following ways.

First, we focus on support for violent protest (a latent measure of interreligious violence) to investigate theoretical propositions of the SIMCA among the general population of Muslims and Christians in six conflict regions in Indonesia—a relevant, yet understudied, context. While previous studies have mostly studied the phenomenon on university students (Kanas, Scheepers, & Sterkens, 2015; Study 1 in Wibisono, Louis, & Jetten, 2019, its prevalence among ordinary citizens is lacking in the current literature. Hence, we fill a major lacuna in the interreligious-conflict literature by providing an empirical perspective from the general population of the Muslim majority versus the Christian minority, with strong population validity. Second, we measure (religious) identification in more elaborate, valid ways than has previous research (see Van Zomeren et al., 2008). We elaborate different aspects (i.e., beliefs, practices, and salience) of religious identification that have been found to be related to interreligious violence. Third, we improve the understanding of differential effects of aspects of religious identification on perceived injustice and collective efficacy, which mediate and increase support for interreligious violence by presenting and testing a more comprehensive theoretical model. Here, we acknowledge that theories on religiosity (Stark & Glock, 1968) and social or religious identification (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) come from two different avenues, but have been previously and commonly combined to answer questions on the relationships of religiosity, manifested in religious identification, with adherents' attitudes toward the religious outgroup (Kanas et al., 2015). Altogether, we are interested in answering the following question: To what extent can the relationship between religiosity dimensions and support for interreligious violence be explained by perceived injustice and collective efficacy among the general population in conflict regions in Indonesia?

Theoretical Perspectives and Expectations: The SIMCA and Group Position Theory

To give a clear argument on our theoretical expectations, we start by providing theoretical notions of the SIMCA,

in which social identity theory serves as a base to explain other relevant concepts. Subsequently, we put the SIMCA into the perspective of the Indonesian context using group position theory.

The SIMCA. This model proclaims that two mediators explain a large part about why social identification may induce collective action: perceived injustice and collective efficacy (Van Zomeren et al., 2008). Conceptually speaking, social (here, religious) identification serves as the basis to individuals' group-based perceptions (i.e., perceived injustice) and their beliefs regarding their group capacity to ameliorate their group experiences (i.e., collective efficacy), which in turn affects individuals' likelihood to engage in collective action (i.e., support for interreligious violence). In line with this, we elaborate the SIMCA by first explaining social identity that is operationalized as religious identity in this study, followed by an explanation of the mediators of perceived injustice and collective efficacy.

Social identity. Essentially, social identity theory proclaims that individuals by nature identify themselves with meaningful social categorizations (social groups) and compare their social groups, preferably positively, with relevant outgroups (Tajfel, 1974). Through social identification, individuals embrace collective beliefs and values that define their social identity.

Social identification is envisaged as a multidimensional concept. Relevant within the SIMCA framework, we opted to use Cameron's (2004) three dimensions of social identity (i.e., ingroup affect, ingroup ties, and centrality). Therefore, in religious identification, individuals evaluate their religious identity and ascribe emotional significance to it (ingroup affect), form a bond to other religious ingroup members (ingroup ties), and support the importance of it (centrality). These dimensions eventually affect individuals' ingroup as well as outgroup attitudes. Under interreligious conflicts, religious identification is expected to intensify; as a result, individuals may behave more hostile toward outgroup members (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Given the unique case of religious identity, however, people who identify strongly with religious values (e.g., benevolent traits) may also be less inclined to outgroup hostility (Roof & Perkins, 1975).

Although there are different notions of religiosity, there are also some dimensions that are generally agreed upon. Religiosity is a multidimensional concept which consists of some level of activity in religious services, support for religious beliefs, and the everyday consequences of religiosity (see Jong, Faulkner & Warland, 1976). Here, Cameron's (2004) three dimensions of social identity are conceptually reflected in religiosity

dimensions: beliefs (ingroup affect), practices (ingroup ties), and salience (centrality) (see Ginges, Hansen, & Norenzayan, 2009; Scheepers, Gijssberts, & Hello, 2002). We set out to explain more specifically the relations between religiosity and religious identification as related to support for interreligious violence.

Religious beliefs. As the “heart of faith,” religious beliefs are religious doctrines that are expected to be taken in absolute terms (Stark & Glock, 1968). These beliefs are the main component of religion and provide positive distinctions as compared to nonbelievers or dissenters. By embracing their religious identity, individuals are assumed to positively evaluate their beliefs. Therefore, individuals’ religious identification, particularly in terms of ingroup affect, is largely reflected in their religious beliefs. As Cameron (2004) stated, ingroup affect can be determined by looking at individuals’ subjective evaluation of their social identity.

Thus, we proposed two subjective views on religious beliefs that may predispose individuals to support interreligious conflict. First, individuals tend to be particularistic in their religious beliefs; their beliefs are the exclusive religious truth (e.g., achieving salvation only through their own religion) or at least more truthful than are the beliefs of dissenters (Stark & Glock, 1968). Second, individuals tend to adopt religiocentrism; that is, the combination of positive ingroup attitudes and negative outgroup attitudes (Sterkens & Anthony, 2008). This view is similar to ethnocentrism, but focuses on religious divisions instead of ethnic cleavages. From the perspective of social identity theory, particularism and religiocentrism are inherent in religious identity, as these two views provide positive feelings toward religious identity, which are necessary feelings to maintain positive identification with one’s own religion (Tajfel, 1974). According to Tajfel and Turner (1979), these views are sufficient to create ingroup favouritism (to maintain positive psychological distinctiveness from the religious outgroup) and outgroup derogation or even interreligious hostility (arising from the religious group interest of maintaining ingroup favouritism). Hence, we propose that religious beliefs may induce support for interreligious violence.

Religious practices. Religious practices are defined as the extent to which religious adherents regularly perform rites and liturgical acts. Anthony, Hermans, and Sterkens (2015) distinguished them in two modes: the institutional mode of formal practices (i.e., attendance at religious services) and a personal mode of devotional practices (i.e., praying privately and reading sacred writings). According to Cameron (2004), ingroup ties refer to the extent to which ingroup members feel that they belong to their social identity.

While attending religious services and performing other religious practices, religious adherents are exposed to relatively similar (positive) views toward the religious ingroup as well as relatively similar (negative) views toward the religious outgroup. In line with this, Ginges *et al.* (2009) found that religious practices serve to provide prototypical cooperative behaviours and signal shared beliefs regarding ingroup commitment which may be related to intense interreligious conflicts. In addition, Whitehouse and Lanman (2014) proclaimed that participation in certain religious rituals (e.g., weddings and funerals) may even be stronger than regular religious services in developing ingroup ties. Through the experience of participating in such rituals, individuals reflect on their significance and assume that they share the same thoughts and feelings with others. By this, individuals are assumed to consider their religious group experiences more than personal experiences, making them even more likely to support interreligious violence. Although this theoretical claim is derived from the notion of identity fusion, this mechanism is similar to the mechanism of coalitional commitment, based on social identification, proposed by Ginges *et al.* (2009).

Scheepers *et al.* (2002) demonstrated that the more frequently people attend church, the stronger their outgroup intolerance. Similarly, Beller and Kröger (2017) showed a positive relation between regular mosque attendance and support for extremist violence. Recently, a study by Abanes, Kanas, and Scheepers (2015) showed that participation in rites of passage (i.e., weddings and funerals) was positively related to intergroup hostility in the Philippines. Altogether, religious practices are expected to be related to outgroup hostility; that is, support for interreligious violence.

Religious salience. Religious salience is a reflection of centrality, or the situational subjective importance of one’s religious identity (Cameron, 2004; Stryker & Serpe, 1994). As an undisputed belief system, religion encompasses attitudes and behavioural tendencies in individuals’ daily life, which gives religious identity a more personal significance (Ysseldyk, Matheson, & Anisman, 2010). Religious salience emphasizes individuals’ attachment to benevolent religious values (e.g., mercy, honesty) rather than religious group norms (e.g., dominance over people and resources) and is not focused on specific content of religious beliefs (Glas, Spierings, & Scheepers, 2018). In other words, the core of religiosity is to have good consequences of it; that is, benevolent traits (Stark & Glock, 1968). Therefore, those who highly identify with their central religious values rather than with ordinary social group norms are expected to be less inclined to support interreligious violence. On the contrary, these people would be more likely to support interreligious dialogue and cooperation.

To some extent, religious salience may substitute moral conviction's role in explaining collective action in the modified SIMCA (see Van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2012). Both are similar in their strong and absolute stances to daily life principles (e.g., mercy, honesty). Van Zomeren (2019) implied that moral conviction can possibly be substituted with other overlapping theoretical notions such as religious fundamentalism (cf. Wibisono et al., 2019) as a substitute for moral conviction in explaining collective action.

Roof and Perkins (1975) argued that religious salience deflates individuals' tendency toward negative outgroup attitudes. In support of this proposition, empirical evidence has shown that there is a negative relationship between religious salience and outgroup prejudice among respondents from 15 European countries (Scheepers et al., 2002). Hence, those with high religious salience or attachment to benevolent religious values are less likely to support interreligious violence.

Perceived injustice. Perceived injustice goes back to the theoretical notions of relative deprivation by Runciman (1966). Based on social identification, individuals make comparisons to specific others (i.e., individual relative deprivation) and relevant outgroups (i.e., group relative deprivation). When such comparisons have unfavourable outcomes, they activate cognitive and affective components; that is, perceptions of injustice and feelings of anger or resentment, especially at a group level (Smith & Ortiz, 2002). Perceptions of injustice can motivate individuals to engage in collective action only when they are angered or frustrated by the situation (Kawakami & Dion, 1995). In sum, religious identification enables ingroup members to experience fraternal relative deprivation; that is, perceptions of injustice which may drive people to take ameliorative actions to change their religious group conditions against the religious outgroup (i.e., support for interreligious violence).

Collective efficacy. Collective efficacy is defined as members' shared belief of being able to achieve desired results through collective efforts (Bandura, 2002). Operating in a similar vein as Bandura's (1999) self-efficacy, collective efficacy increases ingroup members' commitment to group missions, makes them more resilient to adversity, and most important, enhances their performance. Moreover, collective efficacy is perceived to develop over time: It changes as group members become familiar with each other, receive feedback from their past performances, and evaluate their group ability (Baker, 2007). Previous studies have demonstrated that collective efficacy is related to actual group behaviour and performance (Mummendey, Kessler, Klink, & Mielke, 1999; Stajkovic, Lee, & Nyberg, 2009). Thus,

the relationship between collective efficacy and support for interreligious violence is straightforward: Those with a high level of collective efficacy are expected to show more support for interreligious violence.

Given the present sociopolitical situations in Indonesia, some Muslims may feel denied on their wish for more influence of Islam in public life (Otto, 2010). Some Christians, on the other hand, feel that abuses against their religious group have often been supported by government officials and the police (Halili, 2016). Based on past interreligious conflicts involving Muslims and Christians (e.g., in Poso and in Ambon), both religious groups may share a similar belief concerning their collective efforts to ameliorate their group conditions (see Braithwaite et al., 2010). Therefore, *we* hypothesize that perceived injustice and collective efficacy mediate the relationship between religiosity dimensions and support for interreligious violence (H1).

Religious affiliation as group position

To provide the whole story of interreligious conflicts in Indonesia, we put the SIMCA framework under the perspective of group position theory by Blumer (1958). This classic theory posits that racial prejudice and other forms of outgroup hostility are a function of individuals' group position in relation to other groups. Here, group position is defined as the sense of individuals' social position of the religious ingroup in relation to the religious outgroup; that is, a religious majority versus a minority group, which also implies status differences of dominant versus subordinate groups (Olzak, 2013). The core proposition is that when a religious minority group is perceived to be challenging the proprietary claims (i.e., economic resources, political power, and sociocultural dominance) of the majority, the religious majority group is expected to take defensive acts exemplified by hostility toward the minority.

In relation to the SIMCA, some members of the Muslim community claim that they have been treated unjustly as a religious majority group. Apart from feeling denied more influence of Islam in public life, the implementation of Sharia law is limited to regions which are known as hard-line Muslim communities such as Aceh (Muluk, Sumaktoyo, & Ruth, 2013; Otto, 2010). Some Muslims would think that Indonesia has become too secular and too Western (Wibisono et al., 2019). These injustice claims have been a reason, among others, to mobilize fellow Muslims to take a stronger stance against those perceived as the "adversaries of Islam." There are regular grievances of religious minorities, ranging from closing down houses of worship, either lawfully or violently, to many other kinds of violations (Halili, 2016). On the other hand, given the extent of

injustice experiences that the Christian community has, it is interesting to see that there are only occasional protests carried out by the Christian community (Halili, 2016). The Christian community may either have accepted the status differences (along with the privilege claims) or internalized their disadvantage (Van Zomeren *et al.*, 2008). Of course, this may also be due to their history of rather unsuccessful collective actions (e.g., Batuplat incident in Kupang). In summary, due to their religious majority position, we observe that the Muslim community in general may perceive injustice experiences as well, maybe even more than do Christians, and based on their history of collective actions, Muslims may have higher collective efficacy than may have Christians.

As a consequence, members of the Muslim community are, on average, expected to be more supportive of interreligious violence than are Christians. There are two reasons for this. First, perceived injustice encourages individuals to strengthen ties with ingroup members (Smith & Ortiz, 2002). Especially when group members are angered or frustrated by perceived injustice, they are more likely to be motivated to participate in collective action; that is, supporting interreligious violence (Kawakami & Dion, 1995; for a relation between perceived injustice and sacred violence among radical Muslims, see Muluk *et al.*, 2013). Second, collective efficacy channels ingroup members' belief of ameliorating group conditions into collective efforts. It determines the amount of group effort and the designated level of group success (Bandura, 1999; Stajkovic *et al.*, 2009). Moreover, there is evidence that formal institutions often help the Muslim community in their protests against religious outgroups. In places where religious intolerance is high, such as Bogor, Kuningan, and Tasikmalaya, radical groups gain support from or may feel supported by the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI: *Majelis Ulama Indonesia*), the Religious Harmony Forum (FKUB: *Forum Keukunan Umat Beragama*), and the Ministry of Religious Affairs through its legislations (Ahnaf, Maarif, Asyhari-Afwan, & Afdillah, 2015).

Apart from the effect of religiosity dimensions on support for interreligious conflict by mediation of perceived injustice and collective efficacy, we hypothesized that religious affiliation (i.e., being Muslim vs. Christian) moderates the relationship between perceived injustice and collective efficacy on one hand, and support for interreligious violence on the other hand. Taken together, we propose that religious affiliation moderates the effects of perceived injustice and collective efficacy on support for interreligious violence (H 2).

Method

The process of data collection (including respondents and sampling procedures) regarding this research has

been extensively documented in Data Archiving and Networked Services (DANS) (Setiawan *et al.*, 2018). Both the data documentation and the data are publicly available. Therefore, we will only provide a brief explanation of sampling procedures, followed by the measures.

Respondents and sampling procedures

We performed our data collection from May 2017 until August 2017 in Indonesia. We aimed at collecting a random sample of adults aged 17 to 65 years, living for at least 5 years in locations where religious hostilities have been prevalent: Aceh Singkil, South Lampung, Bekasi, Poso, Kupang, and Sampang regions, covering a vast area of the whole Indonesian archipelago.

Two random sampling procedures were employed in our data collection: the first based on the available regional population registry and the second based on a random walk when the population registry was not available. These consistent, random selection procedures were employed to avoid or at least to reduce biases on the part of researchers, and we propose that our samples constitute the best approximation of a representation of the full adult populations (17- to 65-year-olds) in these areas (Babbie, 1989). However, considering the inaccuracy in the Indonesian population registry that we observed during the random selection of respondents, we unfortunately cannot calculate to what extent our samples of respondents in different locations are actually representative of the full population. A total of 1,995 respondents (1,432 Muslims, 563 Christians) were included in this study, with a rather comparable number of males (1,019) and females (976). To give a better context of religious composition, Table 1 provides percentages of Muslims and Christians in each region sampled.

Measures

To validate our set of measures, we conducted confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) along with tests on Cronbach's α as well as composite reliability. We also assessed discriminant validity by using the square root of average variance extracted, in which its value for every factor (latent construct) should be larger than any correlation between any pair of factors (Bertea & Zait, 2011). The following paragraphs explicate each scale.

Dependent variable. Our dependent variable is support for violent protest against the religious outgroup, adopted from Subagya's (2015) study on support for violence in Indonesia. The scale consists of six items and asks to what extent respondents support the damaging of the religious outgroup's property or harming the religious outgroup members (e.g., "I would support harm to

Table 1
Proportion of Muslims and Christians in Regions Sampled

Region	District	Muslim (%)	Christians (%)	Difference (%)
Singkil Aceh	Simpang Kanan	72.31	27.62	44.64
	Gunung Meriah	93.83	6.17	87.66
	Danau Paris	59.29	38.28	21.01
	Suro	72.92	22.81	50.11
South Lampung	Kalianda	96.31	1.30	95.01
	Sidomulyo	94.88	2.30	92.58
	Way Panji	71.77	3.56	68.21
	Palas	95.79	1.46	94.33
	Ketapang	87.35	1.36	85.99
Bekasi	Pondok Gede	90.24	8.79	81.45
	Bekasi Timur	86.60	9.79	76.80
	Bekasi Utara	88.48	9.77	78.71
Sampang Madura	Sampang	95.72	0.16	95.56
	Ketapang	98.63	0.07	98.56
	Omben	97.42	0.01	97.41
Poso	Poso Kota	96.05	1.73	94.33
	Poso Kota Utara	88.18	11.47	76.71
	Poso Pesisir	78.47	19.89	58.58
	Lage	26.32	72.61	-46.29
	Pamona Utara	1.54	96.84	-95.30
Kupang	Oebobo	12.23	86.61	-74.38
	Maulafa	6.76	92.59	-85.83
	Alak	20.93	78.11	-57.18
	Kelapa Lima	17.78	80.80	-63.02

Note. Based on the 2010 national census (Statistics Indonesia). Other religions are omitted.

persons to enforce the political influence of my religious group” and “I would support the damaging of property to enforce free access to education for my religious group”). The answer is then rated on a 5-point Likert scale of 1 (*totally disagree*) to 5 (*totally agree*), with higher scores indicating stronger support for violent protest against the religious outgroup.

The CFA demonstrates a good fit model, $\chi^2(14, N = 1,995) = 99.41$, $p < .000$, the comparative fit index (CFI) = .98, and the standardized root mean square residual (SRMR) = .02. The obtained fit measures are all well within acceptable threshold levels (Hooper, Coughlan, & Mullen, 2008). The standardized factor loadings range from .68 to .91 among both religious groups, which indicates a medium to high representation of the factor under study. Further, the six-item scale also shows relatively high reliability among Muslims ($\alpha = .91$; $n = 1,423$) and Christians ($\alpha = .92$; $n = 563$).

Mediator variables. Perceived injustice is operationalized as perceptions and feelings of unfair treatment or outcomes experienced by one’s own group (Van Zomeren et al., 2008). Therefore, we measured two types of perceived injustice: *nonaffective* (e.g., “I think my religious group experiences many unfair treatments”)

and *affective* injustice (e.g., “I feel dissatisfied by how my religious group is treated differently from other religious groups”). The three-item scale is rated on a 5-point Likert scale of 1 (*totally disagree*) to 5 (*totally agree*). The CFA demonstrates a good fit model, $\chi^2(6, N = 1,995) = 45.02$, $p < .000$, CFI = .98, and SRMR = .05. The factor loadings are within the medium to high range across religious groups, varying from .72 to .91. The scale is also shown to be reliable both for Muslims ($\alpha = .84$) and Christians ($\alpha = .93$).

Next, collective efficacy is operationalized as respondents’ belief about their own group’s capacity to ameliorate group conditions (Van Zomeren et al., 2008; for the collective efficacy scale for an organizational setting, see Riggs & Knight, 1994). The four-item scale measures respondents’ agreement to statements such as “My religious group has the ability to fight back any political power that threatens us” and is rated on a 5-point Likert scale of 1 (*totally disagree*) to 5 (*totally agree*). Similarly, the CFA displays a good fit model, $\chi^2(4, N = 1,995) = 43.32$, $p < .000$, CFI = .98, and SRMR = .02. All items demonstrate acceptability and are in the medium range of factor loadings, varying from .58 to .81. The scale also has been shown to be reliable both for Muslims ($\alpha = .77$) and Christians ($\alpha = .76$).

Independent variables. We elaborated Cameron's (2004) three-factor social identification model to measure religious identification or religiosity. First, we set to measure respondents' views on their religious beliefs. Particularly, we measured the extent to which respondents view their religious doctrines as the exclusive religious truth (*particularism*) and the extent to which they view their religious ingroup favourably as well as the religious outgroup unfavourably (*religiocentrism*). For particularism, respondents rate statements on a scale of 1 (*totally disagree*) to 5 (*totally agree*) on items such as "The truth about God is found only in my religion." For religiocentrism, on the same 5-point Likert scale, respondents are asked to evaluate statements such as "Thanks to our religion, most of us are good people" (ingroup positivism) and "Other religions are often the cause of religious conflict" (outgroup negativism). Based on a total of eight items (three particularism, five religiocentrism), we expected a two-factor model to represent respondents' views on religious beliefs. The model fit the data, $\chi^2(34, N = 1,995) = 326.43, p < .000, CFI = .93, \text{ and } SRMR = .05$. All items show acceptability and are in the medium to high range of factor loadings, varying from .55 to .88 for particularism and .35 to .69 for religiocentrism among both religious groups. In terms of reliability, for both particularism ($\alpha = .72$ for Muslims, $\alpha = .84$ for Christians) and religiocentrism ($\alpha = .66$ for Muslims, $\alpha = .75$ for Christians), scales are shown to be in the medium to high range.

Second, we set to measure respondents' religious practices. We asked respondents' frequency of attending religious service with a straightforward item and rated it on a 7-point scale of 1 (*never*) to 7 (*several times a day*). Subsequently, we asked respondents to identify whether they participate in religious *rites of passage* for religious reasons; that is, weddings and funerals (0 = *nonparticipate or participate but not for religious reasons*, 1 = *participate for religious reasons*).

Third, we adapted a religious salience scale from Eisinga, Felling, and Peters (1991) to measure the extent to which respondents agree on religion's role on their daily life. Specifically, respondents rated themselves on a 5-point Likert scale of 1 (*totally disagree*) to 5 (*totally agree*) on statements such as "My religious beliefs have a great deal of influence on how I make important decisions." The CFA displays a good fit model, $\chi^2(2, N = 1,995) = 36.21, p < .000, CFI = .98, \text{ and } SRMR = .04$. The standardized factor loadings are within a medium to high range, varying from .72 to .88 across religious groups. Additionally, the scale is shown to be highly reliable ($\alpha = .84$ for Muslims, $\alpha = .85$ for Christians).

Individual characteristics. We used straightforward questions to measure age and gender. To measure respondents' level of education, we asked them to

identify their completed highest level of education. The answer categories ranged from 1 (*Did not go to school*) to 6 (*Master's degree or higher*). Finally, we measured monthly gross household income in Indonesian Rupiah (IDR), ranging from 1 (Lower than 500,000 IDR) to 8 (6,000,000 IDR, and over).

Measurement invariance

To test the extent to which the meaning of the constructs and items are identical to Muslim and Christian religious groups, we ran tests for measurement invariance, specifically metric invariance (MI). We do this by first creating a baseline model in which the loadings of the items are allowed to differ across groups, then by creating a restricted model (MI) where we constrain the loadings to be equal across groups (Vandenberg & Lance, 2000). The change of CFI (ΔCFI) should be $< .01$ to assume that the factor loadings are equal for both groups (Cheung & Rensvold, 2002).

We began MI with our scales for the dependent variables. The configural or baseline model for both religious groups produced no negative variance and a good fit model, $\chi^2(14, N = 1,995) = 99.41, p < .000, CFI = .98$. Next, we tested MI by constraining factor loadings to be invariant across religious groups. The ΔCFI between the two models was below the cutoff point of .01, which is .003 (Cheung & Rensvold, 2002). Thus, the assumption of measurement invariance is met.

Subsequently, we conducted MI on perceived injustice, configural model: $\chi^2(6, N = 1,995) = 45.02, p < .000, CFI = .98$, and the collective efficacy scales, configural model: $\chi^2(4, N = 1,995) = 43.32, p < .000, CFI = .98$. The ΔCFI between the configural and MI models on the perceived injustice scale is .001 whereas the difference on the collective efficacy scale is .002.

Finally, we conducted MI on religious beliefs, represented by latent variables of particularism and religiocentrism, configural model: $\chi^2(34, N = 1,995) = 326.43, p < .000, CFI = .93$, and religious salience, configural model: $\chi^2(2, N = 1,995) = 36.21, p < .000, CFI = .98$. The ΔCFI between the configural and MI models is .002 for religious beliefs and .001 for religious salience. Based on all invariance results, we assume that Muslims and Christians are similar in responding to all items (Milfont & Fischer, 2010).

We also acknowledge the imbalance of our group sample sizes (ratio of Muslim group size to Christian group size = ~ 2.5) in concluding the MI. Based on the simulation study using a subsampling approach to detect invariance in imbalanced group sizes by Yoon and Lai (2018), we can confidently claim that the ratio of our imbalanced sample sizes would not significantly hamper our conclusion of MI.

Strategy for analysis

We opted to use structural equation modelling (SEM) to test the relations between our set of predictors and the dependent variable via multiple mediators (mediation model). We also used SEM for multigroup comparison to avoid the complexity of adding many interaction terms in the equation and the risk of invalid statistical inferences when the assumption of equal variances across groups is violated (Ryu & Cheong, 2017). We performed SEM analyses in R environment using lavaan package version 0.6–2, which was mainly developed by Yves Rosseel and the package is published <http://CRAN.R-project.org/package=lavaan> and supported by the website <http://lavaan.org/>.

We started with preliminary tests on normality, linearity, and multicollinearity among all variables using SPSS Version 22 (IBM Corp., Armonk, NY). First, all scales have values of skewness and kurtosis less than 2, indicating no violation of normality (Kim, 2013). Second, most scales are found to be linearly related to our dependent variables. Finally, all predictors have variance inflation factor values ranging from 1.02 to 1.50, with tolerance statistics all above 0.2, which indicate no problems of multicollinearity (Field, 2009). Table 1 confirms no overly high correlation among variables of interest. Thus, we used maximum likelihood in our SEM estimation.

Results

Bivariate results

We start by looking at the relations between religiosity dimensions and support for violent protest (Table 2). There, we see that participation in rites of passage, $r = .07$, particularism, $r = .07$, and religiocentrism, $r = .26$, are all positively correlated with support for violent protest among Muslims. Among Christians, on the contrary, religiocentrism, $r = .16$, is the only indicator of religiosity dimensions that is positively correlated with support for violent protest. Interestingly, salience is negatively correlated with support for violent protest both among Muslims, $r = -.06$, and Christians, $r = -.16$. Among all indicators, religiocentrism seems to have the strongest correlation with support for violent protest, which is also consistently found in both religious groups.

Next, Table 3 displays the descriptive statistics by religious groups. Compared to the Christian community ($M = 1.86$), on average, members of the Muslim community ($M = 2.28$) are more supportive of violent protests. Their means differ by 0.5 SD and is thus worth consideration, violent protest: $d = .56$. Furthermore, there are significant differences between Muslims and Christians in all religiosity dimensions, with particularism, $d = .79$, and

religiocentrism, $d = .59$, being the two largest differences. Next, on average, Muslims ($M = 3.27$) have higher scores on collective efficacy, as compared to Christians ($M = 2.68$). The difference is substantial, with group means differing almost 1 SD , $d = .76$, which indicates a potential large differential effect of collective efficacy among Muslims and Christians. Contrastingly, perceived injustice is not significantly different between Muslims ($M = 2.39$) and Christians ($M = 2.46$).

Multivariate results

Subsequently, we ran a single-group SEM (full population model) to test our mediation hypotheses (H1). Figure 1 displays the direct effects of religiosity dimensions on the mediators and their indirect effects through perceived injustice and collective efficacy on support for interreligious violence for the full population. Our theoretical expectations were that individuals' views on their religious beliefs (i.e., particularism and religiocentrism) as well as their religious practices (i.e., religious attendance and participation in rites of passage) would be positively related to support for violent protest through both mediators. However, we expected religious salience to be negatively related to support for violent protest through both mediators.

First, we found that religious attendance shows no important relation with both perceived injustice and collective efficacy. Only participation in rites of passage and religiocentrism have significant relations with both perceived injustice, $b = .10$ and $b = .30$, respectively, and collective efficacy, $b = .22$ and $b = .34$, respectively. Particularism, $b = .20$, was only positively related to collective efficacy whereas salience, $b = -.05$, is only negatively related to collective efficacy. As expected, perceived injustice, $b = .11$, and collective efficacy, $b = .28$, were significantly related to support for violent protest, with collective efficacy being the strongest mediator in support for violent protest.

Next, Table 4 displays the estimated indirect effects of the religiosity dimensions via perceived injustice and collective efficacy on support for violent protest. There is evidence of indirect effects of participation in rites of passage, $b = .01$, and religiocentrism, $b = .03$, on support for violent protest through perceived injustice. There is also evidence that participation in rites of passage, $b = .06$, particularism, $b = .06$, and religiocentrism, $b = .09$, are positively related to support for violent protest through collective efficacy. Additionally, as expected, salience, $b = -.01$, is indirectly related to support for violent protest only via collective efficacy. In sum, these results provide full evidence for our first hypothesis that perceived injustice is shown to have a weak mediating effect in the relationship between religiosity dimensions and support

Table 2
Bivariate Correlations by Religious Group

Measure	M	M								
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	
1 Violent	C	.79	.01	.07**	.07**	.26***	-.06*		.27***	.34***
2 Religious attendance		-.05	–	.05*	.03	.06*	.08**		.03	.02
3 Rites of passage		.01	-.06	–	.14***	.12***	.08**		.08**	.18***
4 Particularism		.01	.02	-.00	.68	.44***	.25***		.12***	.33***
5 Religiocentrism		.16***	-.05	.02	.48***	.49	.15***	.21***		.40***
6 Salience		-.16***	.20***	.17***	.15***	.03	.80		.08**	.10***
7 Perceived injustice		.02	-.02	.08	.14**	.33***	-.05		.80	.19***
8 Collective efficacy		.23***	-.03	.03	.21***	.24***	-.10*		.05	.68
CR: Muslims		.81	–	–	.80	.61	.81		.90	.67
CR: Christians		.91	–	–	.61	.74	.84		.84	.77
		.91			.74	.84	.86		.93	.76

Note. $N = 1,995$; Muslims: $n = 1,432$, Christians: $n = 563$; males: $n = 1,019$, females: $n = 976$; M = Muslims; C = Christians; CR = composite reliability. Bolded diagonal numbers are square root of average variance extracted for Muslims, and bolded horizontal numbers are square root of average variance extracted for Christians.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$.

Table 3
Descriptive Statistics by Religious Group and Mean Differences

	Range	Muslims		Christians		t test	Cohen's d
		M	SD	M	SD		
1 Violent	1–5	2.28	0.84	1.86	0.64	11.85***	.56
2 Religious attendance	1–7	3.57	1.61	4.03	1.00	-7.69***	.34
3 Rites of passage	0–2	0.49	0.43	0.37	0.45	5.50***	.27
4 Particularism	1–5	3.99	0.71	3.28	1.05	14.91***	.79
5 Religiocentrism	1–5	3.18	0.66	2.76	0.76	11.48***	.59
6 Salience	1–5	4.00	0.86	4.18	0.83	-4.14***	.21
7 Perceived injustice	1–5	2.39	0.84	2.46	1.05	-1.25	.07
8 Collective efficacy	1–5	3.27	0.81	2.68	0.74	15.50***	.76
Individual characteristics							
9 Age	17–65	32.47	12.03	32.71	12.07	-.40	.02
10 Male	0/1	0.51	0.50	0.52	0.50		
11 Education	1–6	3.47	1.08	3.95	0.97	-9.67***	.47
12 Income	1–8	3.51	2.03	4.11	1.97	-6.01***	.30

Note. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$ (one-tailed).

for violent protest whereas collective efficacy is shown to have a stronger mediating effect in the same relationship.

We continued our analyses with multigroup SEM for both separate religious groups, testing the moderation of the effect of the mediators perceived injustice and collective efficacy on support for interreligious violence based on religious affiliation (i.e., being Muslim vs. Christian). Figure 2 shows similar relationships between the religiosity dimensions and support for violent protest via perceived injustice and collective efficacy among

Muslims and Christians. However, the striking difference is that both perceived injustice and collective efficacy were found to be significantly stronger among Muslims, $b = .20$ and $b = .28$, respectively, than among Christians, $b = -.00$ and $b = .15$, respectively.

In terms of indirect effects by religious group, the index of moderated mediation in Table 5 shows that there are significant differences between Muslims and Christians. First, on average, the effect of religiocentrism was stronger among Muslims in terms of increasing




Figure 1 Estimated effects of religious identification on support for interreligious violence through perceived injustice and collective efficacy. Bold indicates significance at 95% confidence interval.

support for violent protest through both perceived injustice, index = .05, and collective efficacy, index = .07. Although the effect of religiocentrism on perceived injustice was found to be stronger among Christians (as shown in Figure 2), the effect of perceived injustice on support for violent protest was found to be in the opposite direction and nonsignificant. Moreover, we found evidence that the indirect effects of rites of passage, index = .05, and particularism, index = .04, on support

for violent protest via collective efficacy were significantly stronger among Muslims than among Christians. However, there also was evidence that the indirect effect of saliency, index = .02, on support for violent protest through collective efficacy was significantly stronger among Christians than among Muslims: Among Christians, saliency seems to reduce support for violence via collective efficacy, however, but not among Muslims. All this suggests that on average, members of the Muslim community who participate in rites of passage for religious reasons, who view their religion as the only absolute truth (particularism), and who favour religiocentrism are more likely to have high collective efficacy, which increases their support for violent protest. In addition, on average, members of the Christian community who are high in religious saliency are more likely to have lower collective efficacy, which in turn makes them less likely to support violent protest. In sum, these results lend full evidence to H2—that members of the Muslim community, on average, experience more injustice and have higher collective efficacy than do members of the Christian community, which increases their support for violent protest.

Table 4
Estimated Indirect Effects in a Single-Group Mediation Model

	Relationship	M1: Perceived injustice (b1) Violent	M2: Collective efficacy (b2) Violent
Religious attendance (a1)	a1*bj	.00	-.00
Rites of passage (a2)	a2*bj	.01	.06
Particularism (a3)	a3*bj	-.00	.06
Religiocentrism (a4)	a4*bj	.03	.09
Saliency (a5)	a5*bj	.00	-.01

Note. Based on 1,000 bootstrap samples. Bold indicates significance at 95% confidence interval.

Regarding individual characteristics, there are no spurious relationships brought about by individual characteristics in the relation between religiosity dimensions and support for violent protest, both via perceived injustice and collective efficacy.¹




Figure 2 Estimated multigroup mediation model by religious affiliation. Bold indicates significance at 95% confidence interval.

Discussion and conclusion

In this study, we employed the SIMCA theoretical framework to provide psychological perspectives on the relations between individuals' religiosity (based on religious identification) and support for violent protest via perceived injustice and collective efficacy. In addition, we applied group position theory to add sociological

perspectives to this explanation. We tested this comprehensive theoretical model among the population of ordinary citizens in conflict regions in Indonesia. The findings are presented next.

First and foremost, using elaborate measures of religiosity, we found support for the proposed SIMCA framework. In particular, collective efficacy was found to be a stronger mediator than was perceived injustice in

Table 5
 Estimated Indirect Effects and Index of Moderated Mediation of Multigroup Structural Equation Modelling

	Path	Muslims		Christians		Index of moderated mediation	
		M1: Perceived injustice (b1) Violent	M2: Collective efficacy (b2) Violent	M1: Perceived injustice (b1) Violent	M2: Collective efficacy (b2) Violent	M1: Perceived injustice (b1) Violent	M2: Collective efficacy (b2) Violent
Religious attendance (a1)	$a1*bj$.00	-.00	-.00	.00	.00	-.00
Rites of passage (a2)	$a2*bj$.02	.06	-.00	.01	.02	.05
Particularism (a3)	$a3*bj$.00	.06	.00	.02	.00	.04
Religiocentrism (a4)	$a4*bj$.05	.10	-.00	.03	.05	.07
Salience (a5)	$a5*bj$.01	.00	.00	-.02	.01	.02

Note. Based on 1,000 bootstrap samples. Bold indicates significance at 95% confidence interval.

the relationship between religiosity dimensions and support for interreligious violence. This holds true both for the full research population of Muslim and Christian Indonesian adults and for the Muslims and Christian groups separately. There are at least three reasons for this. First, departing from Runciman's (1966) distinctions between personal and group deprivation, Foster and Matheson (1999) have concluded that individuals who experience personal deprivation do not necessarily link it to group deprivation or vice versa. Therefore, perceived injustice can strongly mediate the relationship between religiosity dimensions and support for interreligious violence, but only when personal deprivation closely relates to group deprivation or when individuals experience both personal and group deprivation. Second, the average scores of perceived injustice across religious groups in this study were relatively low and are not significantly different. This finding echoes the three dimensions of relative deprivation by Stack (1984); one may perceive the need to desire a certain material condition (magnitude), but there is only a small percentage of ingroup members who share the same need (frequency), and thus, one's level of deprivation is low (degree). Third, collective efficacy simply outperforms the effect of perceived injustice due to the abundance of contextual evidence that violent protests are successful means to ameliorate religious group conditions: This history of successful violent protests elevates collective efficacy (Baker, 2007). Conceptually speaking, collective efficacy is crucial for group action whereas personal goals and aspirations are complimentary incentives (Bandura, 2002).

Second, our findings on the multigroup analyses demonstrate that Muslims and Christians greatly differ in their relations between perceived injustice and collective efficacy on one hand and support for violent protest on the other. Regarding perceived injustice, its effect on support for violent protest is found only among

Muslims. This shows that some members of the Muslim community who perceive injustice are more likely (than are Christians) to engage in collective action by supporting violent protest against the religious outgroup. Moreover, we find that Muslims who view their religious ingroup favourably and the religious outgroup unfavourably are more likely to perceive more unjust experiences of their religious group. This, in turn, encourages them to support violent protest. In this case, we confirm Klandermans' (2002) study that showed people's identification with a group, in this case through religiocentrism, increases the likelihood to engage in collective action if they feel their group is treated unfairly. Interestingly, our finding on Christians also supports previous studies showing that group identification does not always increase the likelihood of engaging in collective action, even when the group experiences injustice (Hornsey et al., 2006). Individuals can agree with other ingroup members on their group deprivation; however, when such group deprivation is unrelated to their personal life, they would be less supportive of collective action (Foster & Matheson, 1999).

Regarding collective efficacy, its effect on support for violent protest was also found to be stronger among Muslims than among Christians. On average, some members of the Muslim community who believe that their group is able to carry out actions intended to improve their conditions are more likely to support violent protest. The low collective efficacy among the Christians is somewhat influenced by their history of collective action, which has been barely successful even when they are a regional majority.² As a result, most members of the Christian community are less likely to support interreligious violence. Further, we find that Muslims who participate in rites of passage for religious reasons, view their religious truth more exclusively, and view their religious ingroup favourably while viewing the religious outgroup

unfavourably are more likely to have higher collective efficacy. In turn, they are more likely to support violent protest against the religious outgroup.

In contrast, we found that Christians who highly value the importance of religious beliefs in their daily life (e.g., putting forward the golden rule or other benevolent traits) show lower levels of collective efficacy, which makes them less likely to support violent protest. However, this relation is also partly due to their unsuccessful history of collective action.

Limitations

In presenting our findings, we acknowledge some limitations. First, this work is based on the SIMCA framework, which provides strong theoretical arguments against the possibility of other mechanisms. However, given the nature of collective efficacy that largely involves socialization (Lindsay, Brass, & Thomas, 1995), other scholars may propose collective action as a factor that increases group identification over time, as described in the encapsulation model of social identity in collective action (see Thomas, Mavor, & McGarty, 2011). Thus, future research should consider examining possible reverse causation on collective action, particularly considering panel data, which are not yet available to our knowledge.

Second, support for interreligious violence was measured using only structural disadvantages (sociohistorically rooted group deprivation based on group membership) as a context whereas incidental disadvantages (e.g., sudden changes based on group membership) were unattended. Structural disadvantages are considered to instantly spark individuals' sense of shared group identity, but may not be efficient in bringing out group-based anger because historically rooted disadvantages may have been already accepted or even internalized (Van Zomeren *et al.*, 2008). Incidental disadvantages, however, need some time to stimulate shared identity, but are efficient in producing group anger because of their novelty. Efforts to introduce Sharia law in some regions may be considered to be incidental disadvantages for Christians and moderate Muslims. These laws, for example, prohibit mixed marriages or prescribe female students (regardless of their religion) to wear a hijab in public schools (Otto, 2010). But the rise of Pentecostalism in Indonesia has also brought incidental disadvantages for Muslims and mainline Christians. Diaconal initiatives of Pentecostal groups (e.g., *Mahanaim* foundation) are accused of buying converts through the distribution of food and other forms of support (Gudorf, 2012). Given the potential differences of different types of disadvantages in producing collective action, future studies could further refine hypotheses on the relative strength of religious identity, perceived

injustice, and collective efficacy in relationship to support for interreligious violence.

Conclusion

The SIMCA framework is useful in explaining support for interreligious violence in Indonesia. Religious identification has been shown to play a strong role in driving people to support collective action both via perceived injustice and collective efficacy, due to the fact that religious identity is still one of the most important identities in the Indonesian context (see Hadiz, 2017). Based on the combined notions of social identity, relative deprivation, and collective efficacy, individuals attached to their religious identity are more likely to experience group-based feelings, treatments, and beliefs, which might be heightened in times of interreligious conflicts. This means that religious identity has a high chance of being politicized to reach a larger segment of religious ingroup members to be mobilized when necessary (see Foster & Matheson, 1999 and Klandermans, 2002).

Whether the conflicting religious groups will take violent measures depends on the level of injustice and collective efficacy perceived. Above all, this finding indicates that the SIMCA framework is applicable to any social identity as long as it is perceived as important to individuals and to different types of collective action (i.e., violence).

Acknowledgement

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End notes

- ¹ In multigroup SEM, we found that being older is associated with less support for violent protests, $b = -.01$, only among Muslims whereas having higher income is related to support for violent protest only among Christians, $b = -.06$. However, these relations do not change the existing relations between religiosity dimensions and support for violent protest, both via perceived injustice and collective efficacy.
- ² Protests from the local Christians against the construction of a mosque in Batuplat, Kupang that started in May 2003 were finally resolved in June 2013 (Ahnaf *et al.*, 2015). Meanwhile, protests from the local Muslims in Singkil, Aceh against a number of Christian churches in October 2015, which ended up in violence, quickly resulted in a decree to demolish the targeted churches (Halili, 2016).

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