Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

Living on Other People's Land; Impacts of Farm Conversions to Game Farming on Farm Dwellers' Abilities to Access Land in the Eastern Cape, South Africa

Marja Spierenburg[a,b]

[a]Department of Anthropology and Development Studies, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands; [b]Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology, Stellenbosch University, Matieland, South Africa

ABSTRACT

This contribution analyses the impacts of conversions of commercial – mainly white-owned – farms to wildlife-based production on access to land for farm workers and dwellers in South Africa. They depended on informal arrangements with landowners for access, hence the notions of 'abilities to access' and 'bundles of power' are more appropriate concepts to analyze their access than bundles of rights. In post-apartheid South Africa, the state attempted to formalize farm dwellers' land rights, but simultaneously deregulated the agricultural sector, which stimulated land concentration and land investments, and changed social relations on commercial farms. These contradictory interventions impact negatively on farm dwellers' abilities to access to land on commercial farms. The paper furthermore demonstrates that conversions to wildlife-based production constitute one response by landowners to the changes in the agricultural sector, but also play a role in struggles about identity and belonging in post-apartheid South Africa.

Introduction

Since the early 1990s, the number of – mainly white-owned – farms shifting from "conventional" agriculture to wildlife-based production, or game farming, as it is colloquially known, has increased significantly in South Africa. Official figures are hard to obtain, as not all changes of land use and ownership are registered with government, or only with certain departments (Snijders 2015). Nevertheless, in 2006 South Africa's National Agricultural Marketing Council estimated that wildlife was produced on nearly 10,000 commercial farms, covering about 14.9 million hectares (NAMC 2006). More recent estimates cite 9000 wildlife ranches, but with an expanded area of 17.04 million hectares (Taylor, Lindsey, and Davies-Mostert 2016), amounting to more than a quarter of all land available in South Africa for grazing.

The farm conversions take place in a context characterized by both de- and re-regulation of the agricultural sector – severe reductions of state support to agriculture, combined with attempts to improve labor legislation – as well as a faltering land reform process, and increasing unemployment levels (Seekings and Nattrass 2015; Vink and Van Rooyen 2009). Game farming is presented by its proponents as a win-win strategy to foster both nature conservation and development; the latter mainly through an alleged increase of employment opportunities related to tourism development (Snowball and Antrobus 2008; Langholz and Kerley 2006). This claim, however, is quite problematic, as will be shown below. Furthermore, the impacts of the conversions should not only be analyzed in terms of employment, but also, as this contribution argues, in terms of access to land.

This contribution to the special issue on Access Revisited analyses the impacts of farm conversions on access to land by farm dwellers, one of the most marginalized social groups in South Africa. Farm dwellers are those people who, despite large-scale land alienations during colonial and apartheid times, managed to hold on to some land on farms in what was classified as 'White South Africa', albeit in a precarious way, as farm workers or labor or rent-paying tenants (McClendon 2002; Jeeves and Crush 1997; Bundy 1988). They consider the commercial farms on which they live, but do not own, their home (AFRA 2003). Providing farm workers and tenants with access to land to supplement meager incomes were an important strategy for landowners to keep labor expenses in check, and continued despite attempts by apartheid governments to ban the practice (McClendon 2002).

Farm dwellers depended – and depend - on informal arrangements with landowners for access to land; hence the notions of 'abilities to access' and 'bundles of power' – i.e. the various mechanisms of resource access – are more appropriate concepts to analyze their access than 'bundles of rights' (Ribot and Peluso 2003, 173, see also Myers, Hansen and Chhottray, this issue). In post-apartheid South Africa, the state has attempted to formalize farm dwellers' land rights through, for instance the Extended Security of Tenure Act (ESTA) of 1997. Several authors, however, have argued that the introduction of the Act, in combination with the withdrawal of financial state support to agriculture, had rather negative impacts on farm dwellers' abilities to access to land on commercial farms (Hall 2007; Wegerif, Russell, and Grundling 2005). At the same time, heightened exposure of farmers to competition in global agricultural markets, combined with new labor legislation and land reform results in anxiety among white land owners concerning their abilities to hold on to the land (Fraser 2007; see also Brandt 2013; Josefsson 2014). Conversions to wildlife-based production constitute one response by landowners to changes in the agricultural sector. The conversions are not only an economic response to these changes, but also to contestations over land and land reform, and as will be shown below, to threats experienced by white land owners in terms of their social position in post-apartheid South Africa. They thus also play a role in struggles about identity and belonging in post-apartheid South Africa (Brandt and Spierenburg 2014; Fraser 2007).

Both the Theory of Change (Ribot and Peluso 2003) as well as Sikor and Lund's (2009) analysis of the differences and overlaps between property and access appear to be suitable heuristic tools (cf. Myers and Hansen, this issue) to analyze contestations

over access and rights to land between white landowners and farm dwellers. These take place in a context of deep historic power asymmetries between the contestants. In their review of the scholarly impact of the Theory of Access, Meyers and Hansen (this issue) conclude that while Ribot and Peluso (2003) explicitly mention the analysis of power relations as an integral part of access mapping, they nevertheless fail to detail this part of the mapping. This paper aims to analyze how historic power asymmetries in South Africa influence current struggles over access to and ownership of land, and aims to contribute to the endeavor called for by Myers and Hansen (this issue) to further elaborate the analysis of power relations. The concept of 'webs of power' (Ribot and Peluso 2003, 154) is relevant here, constituted by different people and institutions holding and drawing on different bundles of power. In post-apartheid South Africa, some of the positions in these webs have changed, but there is also much continuity; some webs have been reconstituted, adding powerful actors and institutions operating at different scales. Ribot's (2014, 683) discussion of the influence of markets and globalized systems that shape broader-scale distributions, and Pedersen's (2016) call for attention to the poly-centricity of institutions controlling and influencing access to land is pertinent as well. The influence of actors operating at global scales not only relates to globalized economic systems, but also to control over the development agenda, and ideas of what constitutes development (see also Fairbairn 2013).

The paper will start with a discussion of the research methods. This will be followed by a discussion of the history of the emergence of farm dwellers as a social group. This discussion allows for a better understanding of the changes in the abilities of farm dwellers to access land, as well as current contestations between (white) landowners and the state about the rights and status of farm dwellers.

Research Methods

This contribution is based on the findings of a research project conducted in KwaZulu-Natal and the Eastern Cape, intermittently between 2007 and 2016, coordinated by the author. These two provinces were selected because both witnessed high rates of farm conversions, as well as high levels of unemployment and poverty, while both show different historical trajectories related to the position of farm dwellers. The author relies on more than sixty in-depth interviews conducted (some in the company of other team members) with owners and managers of game farms, 'conventional' farmers, farm dwellers – both on and off-farm - government officials at national, provincial and district levels, staff members of conservation and land rights organizations, and representatives of national and provincial game farming organizations. Most of these were conducted in the Eastern Cape, but the author also joined students and colleagues during site visits in KwaZulu-Natal. Policy documents and websites related to game farming, land reform and agricultural development were analyzed as well. Transcribed interviews and other texts were deductively coded (cf. Saldaña 2015) and analyzed in terms of motives for and processes of conversion, responses to conversions, labor relations, access to and conflicts over land and other resources, linkages and relations between the various actors, and on-farm/off-farm linkages. A total of four senior researchers, six PhD-students, six Master students and two Honors students participated

in the project, and their theses and publications are analyzed (and cited) for this contribution as well. Regular team meetings and joint field visits were organized to discuss findings and validate the coding of the interviews and observation reports by the team members. In addition, several multi-stakeholder meetings were organized by the project team (including the author) between 2007 and 2012 to discuss the objectives of the research and inform the different stakeholders about the findings, which also provided further insights into the power relations between the different stakeholders (Brandt, Josefsson and Spierenburg 2018), and also served to check our interpretations of the findings with our respondents and stakeholders.

A mix of snowball sampling and purposive sampling strategies were used to select respondents. The aim was to obtain a good representation of government officials from various ministries and government departments (e.g. agriculture, land affairs, environmental affairs and labor) relevant to game farming, at national, provincial and district level. The selection of game farm owners and managers interviewed was based on the mode of wildlife-based production (i.e. consumptive and non-consumptive) and the market segment operations focused on (from high-end international to local lower cost range). Enlisting the assistance of the sector's professional organizations such as the Eastern Cape Game Management Association served as a starting point in the search for respondents. In-depth ethnographic case studies were conducted by the students involved in the project on four hunting farms in the Eastern Cape and seven game farms (both for hunting and non-consumptive tourism) in Kwa-Zulu Natal, which included the mapping of conversion histories and farm dweller settlements, and studies of every-day life at the farms.

Involving farm dwellers in the study was not easy, and the difficulties experienced are indicative of the position of farm dwellers (Mkhize 2012, 2014). To speak to farm dwellers on farms in most cases required permission from the landowners, which was not always granted, or subject to close surveillance by the landowner or manager. The inaccessibility of many game farms, with high electrified fences and locked or guarded gates, restricts farm dwellers in their movements and hospitality. Over time, other ways of contacting farm dwellers – often off-farm – were developed. The author conducted interviews with former and current farm dwellers in two settlements in Kwa-Zulu Natal and three townships and an informal settlement in the Eastern Cape where they were either visiting relatives or had found alternative accommodation after losing their homes on the farms.

Engaging with a variety of stakeholders with different power positions and interests were challenging. All students involved in the project had to apply for ethical clearance from their universities. Research protocols were developed with detailed information on how to protect the rights of respondents, including obtaining informed consent and safeguarding the anonymity of respondents. Research integrity was part of the students' training. The research protocols were also adhered to by the senior researchers. Special care was taken to protect the rights and position of the most vulnerable group of respondents, the farm dwellers. The next section discusses the emergence of farm dwellers as a social group, as well as the factors influencing their increased precariousness.

From Farmers to Farm Dwellers

The conversions of farms to game farms occur in the context of apartheid legacies that resulted in a subdivision of South Africa in large, fertile areas for white people and marginal territories for black people. During apartheid townships and 'homelands' were established to both control the mobility of Africans and create a cheap labor force (Bundy 1988; Beinart and Bundy 1987; Beinart, Delius, and Trapido 1986). In 1994, when apartheid officially ended, the 'homelands' represented only 14% of the territory, or 17% of all rural land (Walker et al. 2010). Apartheid, however, built on an earlier colonial history of land dispossession, and in the Western and Eastern Cape most dispossessions took place before the implementation of the Native Land Act of 1913. Initially, that date was chosen as the cutoff point in the land restitution policy which allowed dispossessed people to reclaim ownership of land after the change to democracy in 1994 (Walker et al. 2010). In 2014, then President Zuma signed an Amendment Bill into law, which would allow claims to land taken before 1913. However, in 2016 the Constitutional Court deemed the Bill invalid (PLAAS 2016). A new Amendment Bill has been drawn up and is still open to public comments (Parliament 2018).

While many Africans were forced to move into reserves – and later 'homelands' – some managed to hold on to land for cultivation and grazing on white-owned farms, first as slaves and serfs, later as wage workers or labor tenants (Crais 1992; Bundy 1988). These arrangements were advantageous to white farmers, especially during the early phases of the development of commercial agriculture; providing farm workers with land, or employing the services of labor tenants and sharecroppers during certain times of the year, kept labor costs low. These practices laid the basis for profoundly patriarchal relations on the farms that still influence present-day relations between farmers and farm dwellers (Du Toit 1993, 2004).

Under apartheid, share cropping and labor or rent-paying tenancy became illegal, precisely because it allowed nonwhites some control over land in what was referred to as White South Africa. Between the 1960s and 1980s forced removals were intensified to clear the last of the 'black spots' in the country (Platzky and Walker 1985). In some areas, these removals coincided with technological and financial changes in agriculture, reducing the demand for labor. Nevertheless, in many parts of the country the arrangements continued to operate until well after the end of apartheid (Brooks et al. 2011; McClendon 2002).

The abilities of farm dwellers to access land differed by region. In the semi-arid part of the Eastern Cape known as the Karoo, one of the research areas, sheep and goat farming dominated the landscape. Initially, sheep farming was rather labor intensive. Sheep had to be moved along great distances as grazing was sparse, which resulted in the institution of a 'shepherd-and-kraal system'. Scattered livestock posts were established, guarded by Africans, who lived there as tenants with their own livestock as well. Over time, however, investments and technological advances changed the infrastructure of the farms. The introduction of windmills and wire fences in the late 19th century improved access to water and changed grazing patters. These technological changes facilitated the process of enclosure of private property and reduced labor demands (Archer 2002). Enclosed camps for sheep replaced shepherds and made the tenants

operating the livestock posts redundant (Archer 2002, 124–127). These developments resulted in the displacement of many people; shepherds and tenants increasingly had to seek their homes outside the fenced-off sheep farms.

In KwaZulu-Natal, labor tenancy continued much longer. As only few 'native reserves' were designated in the western part of the Colony and the coastal areas were already densely settled, many black families entered into agreements with white land-owners which allowed them to live and keep cattle on private land, in exchange for pro-viding labor (McClendon 2002). Labor tenancy in the province has persisted into the present, despite continuous attempts by the (apartheid) state to eradicate the practice. Though large-scale forced removals in the 1960s reduced the number of farm dwellers significantly (Platzky and Walker 1985), most privately owned farms in the Midlands still have Zulu-speaking households living on them (Brooks et al. 2011). From the 1930s onwards, many Midlands farmers bought land further north and east in the *thornveld*, in addition to their more productive farms in the Midlands, to establish so-called labor farms. At certain times of the year, tenants living on these 'labor farms' would be called to the associated productive farm to work. Apart from these intermittent labor demands by the farmer, farm dwellers on 'labor farms' experienced a high degree of autonomy because they lived on land that was not actually occupied by the owner. While many of them are poor, most are not willing to leave the lands that they regard as home (Brooks et al. 2011; McClendon 2002).

Further Changes in the Demand for Labor and Farm Dwellers' Abilities to Access Land

During the second half of the 20th century, economic conditions for (white) commer-cial farmers deteriorated. Despite generous subsidies provided by the apartheid state to modernize agriculture, farmers suffered from declining prices of some of the main agri-cultural products. In the 1980s, the state and some leading players in commercial agri-culture started to promote economies of scale to increase economic efficiency of the sector. This involved merging farms, eliminating less successful producers, and cutting back on state subsidies and other advantages to white farmers (O'Laughlin et al. 2013). An increasing number of farmers went bankrupt and the number of farms declined, but farm sizes increased. The demand for labor reduced significantly; between 1980 and 1985, about a million farm dwellers were moved off farms (Bernstein 1996). In the early 1990s, as the end of apartheid came in sight and farmers feared post-apartheid protec-tion of workers' and farm dwellers' rights, further lay-offs and evictions followed (Bernstein 1996). In 2004, Hall, nevertheless, estimated that between 3 and 5 million farm dwellers were still residing on commercial farms in South Africa (Hall 2004, 1). The 2011 census showed that 2.7 million people lived in farm areas, 2.07 of which on privately owned land (PLAAS 2016, 56).

Since the first democratic elections in 1994, South Africa's post-apartheid govern-ments struggle to reconcile the need to redress historical injustices with the need to stimulate economic growth, while at the same time restructuring government itself. Although the restructuring process initially was explained as a short-term 'shock ther-apy' to respond to the economic stagnation that had set in during the 1980s, many

authors conclude that the South African state appears to have embraced an enduring neo-liberal project, focusing on a reduction of the role of the state and a more important role for the market in addressing economic and social issues (Bassett 2008; Habib 2008). This has resulted in sometimes-conflicting policies – or contradictory policy outcomes.

The first post-apartheid government introduced a land reform program to change the racially skewed distribution of land, but also further deregulated the agrarian sector. The land reform program has a restitution and redistribution component, and aims to strengthen tenure security of those living on public and private land (Hall 2007). At the same time, marketing boards were closed, price controls abolished, export monopolies abandoned, and most of the remaining subsidies abolished, while boosting export production became a major policy focus. These measures further fueled land consolidation (Williams et al. 1998). Since 1993 the number of commercial farming units has decreased by about 20% to 40,000 units in 2010 (SA Parliament 2010), while the size of the units have increased, resulting in larger properties in fewer hands. Land reform has not significantly changed the racial distribution of land. By 2010, only about 7% of white-owned land has been transferred (back) to black farmers (Walker et al. 2010); more recent figures only add a few percentage points (Ramutsindela, Davis, and Sinthumule 2016; PLAAS 2016).

The consolidation of land and agricultural production contributed to a declining number of jobs on commercial farms between 1985 and 1995, followed by a small increase up until 2002, before declining again (Vink and Van Rooyen 2009). At the same time, government tried to regulate labor conditions. In the 1990s agricultural workers were finally recognized in the Labor Relations Act, yet, a minimum wage was introduced for the sector only in 2003 (Brandt 2013). This resulted in further attempts by farmers to reduce the number of farm workers, and replace permanent workers by casual labor (Aliber, Baipethi, and Jacobs 2009). This trend has continued after the increase of the minimum wage following massive farm worker protests notably in the Western Cape in 2013 (Alford and Phillips 2018).

In 1996, government passed the Labor Tenant Act (LTA) and in 1997 the Extension of Security of Tenure Act (ESTA). The objectives of these acts were to secure farm dwellers' rights of occupying and using land, prevent arbitrary evictions and regulate relations between farm dwellers and land owners (PLAAS 2016; Hall 2007). In practice, however, the new legislation had opposite effects. The fear of farm dwellers claiming land through ESTA resulted in many pro-active evictions just before the act was passed into law. Furthermore, once the act was passed, it was used by quite some landowners as a 'manual' for legal evictions (Hall 2004).

Subject to fierce global competition and feeling threatened by land reform and new labor legislation – whether this feeling is justified or not remains a moot point – white farmers developed a range of strategies to hold on to the land and justify their place in post-apartheid society. Shifting to wildlife-based production is one such a strategy (Andrew et al. 2013; Mkhize 2014; Brandt 2013), and while the first conversions took place as early as the 1950s, the number of wildlife ranches increased dramatically after 1994.

Taking Land out of Production to Keep it

The first conversions from livestock farming to game farming in the Eastern Cape started already in the 1950s. Declining wool prices resulted in some of the wealthier landowners investing in wildlife production. Game farms were a status symbol to some; others considered them lucrative investments considering the possibilities for tourism (Nell 2003). In KwaZulu-Natal game farming also appeared to be a response to increased feelings of insecurity, as the anti-apartheid struggle became more intense (Wels 2015). While complaints about cattle theft were cited by farmers as reasons to convert to wildlife management, there was also a general fear of increasing activities by anti-apartheid activists. Poaching on the conservancies was often discursively linked to these activists, and the Farm Patrol Plan initiated by the Natal Parks Board allowed farmers to protect their properties without being seen as openly supporting apartheid (Wels 2015, 100–104).

   In the 1960s a small number of farmers started to develop business models based on wildlife production (Carruthers 2008; Nell 2003). Backed by agricultural unions, they formed associations to lobby for policy changes that would promote wildlife ranching (Snijders 2014). The most prominent organization was the South African Game Ranching Organization (SAGRO), later renamed Wildlife Ranching South Africa (WRSA). Game farmers claimed that authorities were actively preventing the production and trade in wildlife, and financial institutions were hampering development by not recognizing wildlife as an economic asset (Snijders 2012, 2014). In 1989, the lobbying started to have an impact when then Prime Minister P.W. Botha instructed the Law Commission to explore whether wildlife could be accommodated by agricultural legislation such as the Stock Theft Act. This necessitated a re-definition of wildlife, which till then had been res nullius (Snijders 2014). The Game Theft Act, approved and adopted in 1991, changed this by integrating the concept of occupation, arguing that enclosing was sufficient to show one's intention to – physically - control wildlife on one's property. Adequate enclosure, attained by erecting 2.4-metre tall game fences around one's property, is needed to claim the wildlife on one's land. The Act allows land owners to exercise the right to capture and keep most species without having to apply for separate permits, and to hunt at any time of the year (Snijders 2012, 508). Legislation is strictly tied to land ownership. The fencing serves to secure and strengthen the abilities to benefit from (the resources on) the landed property (Snijders 2012, 508; cf. Ribot and Peluso 2003; Sikor and Lund 2009).

   Wildlife ranching takes on different forms – hunting (both 'biltong' and trophy) farms, 'eco'-tourism, breeding for live sales or venison – which are sometimes combined on the same property, occasionally in combination with more 'conventional' forms of agriculture. The type of wildlife production as well as the conversion process is influenced by the capital available to game farmers (Snijders 2015; Nell 2003). Some farmers gradually converted their farms, taking down internal fencing and stocking their land with wildlife. Over time, neighboring farms were bought and amalgamated to create enough space for wildlife and tourism activities. Some also formed conservancies; farmers retained ownership of their individual farms, but fencing between the properties is removed to allow wildlife to roam across vast stretches of land. Other farm owners

mobilized investors to expand their properties and invest in wildlife and tourist accommodation. Some wildlife ranches are part of big international corporations controlling multiple properties (Andrew et al. 2013).

Interviews with local farmers and managers in the wildlife industry reveal a number of common motivations for farm conversions. Most of these are related to the economic difficulties farmers are experiencing. Many argue that stock farming is no longer profitable due to global competition as well as stock theft. Some contradictions are notable in relation to labor costs. Many game farm owners and managers interviewed argue that new labor legislation is driving up production costs, and that game farming is an attractive alternative as it requires less labor. At the same time, these interviewees claim that game farming creates more employment opportunities than conventional farming, and emphasize the contribution of game farming to conservation as well as development. Surveys conducted among managers of eco-tourism lodges seem to support the employment generation claim (Langholz and Kerley 2006; Snowball and Antrobus 2008). However, while Langholz and Kerley (2006) do note that most conversions include the amalgamation of on average five properties, they fail to take into account the total number of people employed on all these farms prior to conversion and only ask the owner/manager – who often owned one of the properties included in the game farm – about the number of people employed pre-and post conversion.

Labor demands, nevertheless, vary across different modes of game farming. The high-end 'eco-tourism' lodges do generate more employment than 'conventional' farming, especially for women. However, this is a rather fickle industry; during the first years after the financial crisis, many of the high-end lodges witnessed a drastic reduction in the number of bookings, and many employees – especially in the lower ranks – lost their jobs or saw their working hours and pay significantly reduced. Most of the jobs created are seasonal and temporary, and former farm workers and dwellers often only have access to insecure jobs in the lower ranks (Andrew et al. 2013). Other forms of game farming result mainly in the shedding, casualization, and outsourcing of labor (Brandt and Spierenburg 2014). Especially hunting and breeding farms require far less labor. Only a few laborers are retained to maintain water points or as trackers, and some of the women manage to obtain jobs looking after the guests in the hunting lodges. More labor intensive tasks, such as fencing and the maintenance of fences are often outsourced (Brandt 2013).

Game farm owners and managers emphasize their love for and contribution to nature conservation. This is often phrased as undoing the damage caused by commercial farming, and 'returning the land to what it was like when our ancestors arrived here', conveniently forgetting the history of the black peasantry displaced by commercial farming. To return the land to its 'original' state, much of the farming infrastructure is removed. Farm dwellers' shelters, especially those scattered across the farms, are either destroyed or turned into tourist accommodation. The destruction of farming infrastructure results in contentions with those farmers who still invest in crop or domestic livestock production, who are angry that infrastructure built with (apartheid) state subsidies are wasted. That same infrastructure used to symbolize the technological advancement of white farmers, which justified their control over vast stretches of land – now it is 'pristine'

nature and game farmers' custodianship that is supposed to legitimize their hold on the land (see Spierenburg and Brooks 2014).

The claims by game farmers that they contribute both to economic development as well as to nature conservation serve to legitimize their claims to land in post-apartheid. As Sikor and Lund (2009, 7) remark, it is important to study the processes through which actors attempt to legitimize actions and claims, especially in times of political change. Here, the influence of markets and the poly-centricity of actors and institution influencing access to land also play a role (cf. Pedersen 2016; Ribot 2014).

Conversions to game farming are driven by a growing market for nature and wildlife tourism. Nature becomes increasingly marketed as a refuge from the modern world. This process of commodification of nature and the neo-liberalization of nature conservation are the subject of a growing body of literature (Büscher, et al. 2012; Castree 2008). Game farm owners and managers as well as local conservation authorities stress the importance of the market as the solution to both environmental and societal problems (Spierenburg and Brooks 2014; Snijders 2015). Desperate to tackle high rates of unemployment in the countryside, successive post-apartheid governments have placed high hopes on tourism and particularly nature-based tourism to boost the economy, stimulated by glowing reports from the National Agricultural Marketing Council (2006, Taylor et al. 2016) as well as proponents of pro-poor tourism (Spenceley 2012).

The marketing of game farms in South Africa not only focuses on wilderness experiences. Website texts and brochures also demonstrate a distinct colonial nostalgia. Brandt (2013: 130) cites an apt, and quite common example from a brochure (the name of the family has been changed):

> The Watson family settled on the Safari Estate in 1843 … Sundowners are enjoyed in the quaint colonial underground pub or around a campfire under the star filled African Sky. Candlelit hunting cuisine, with fine South African wines, is served in old colonial comfort, with classic China, antique silverware and crystal.

Bunn (1996) noted a similar tendency in the uniforms worn by game trackers, gun bearers, cooks and waiters on Mala Mala game farm. Ndbele offers an interesting discussion of how the presentation of the 'colonial present' (cf. Fraser 2007) results in feelings of discomfort and being out-of-place in him as a nonwhite guest (Ndebele 1997). Conversions to game farming hence are not only attempts to hold on to and benefit from land in post-apartheid South Africa (cf. Sikor and Lund 2009), but also offer possibilities for the enactment of an era gone-by when white landowners were undisputedly dominant (Josefsson 2014). At the same time, the emphasis on their contribution to nature conservation, as well as promises of development may serve as social justifications of game farmers' continued control over land in present-day South Africa.

Rendering Farm Dwellers Invisible

In the process of converting their farms to game farms, a number of the farmers interviewed had worked hard to minimize the visibility of farm dwellers on their farms. In interviews, these actions were linked to assumptions about the desires of tourists. Much has been written about conservation ideologies and the marketing of images of 'pristine' nature, which is supposed to be devoid of people – except for tourists and their

immediate hosts (Brockington, Duffy, and Igoe 2008, Beinart and Coates 2002). However, fears about land reform and the possibilities of farm dwellers claiming parts of farms through ESTA may also have played a role.

Hardly any interviewee explicitly linked the moving of farm dwellers to this fear, yet, land reform was a topic often and vehemently discussed during interviews and informal conversations. While the property clause in the constitution prevents confiscation without compensation (Ntsebeza 2007, 2011), occasional statements made by politicians in the press about the need to abolish the property clause to satisfy those constituents who are disappointed about the slow pace of land reform (see for instance Stoddard 2016), result in a growing anxiety among white land owners about the security of their title deeds (PLAAS 2016). At the same time, however, the South African government is concerned about maintaining a positive investment climate (Seekings and Nattrass 2015), and secure title deeds are very much part of that. This is especially pertinent in relation to game farming, as many game farms – especially the ones catering to a high-end clientele - are owned by domestic and international investors (Andrew et al. 2013).

Nevertheless, game farmers are keen to move as many farm dwellers either to the edges of the game farms, or over the edges. Creating 'pristine wildernesses' turns out to be suitable mechanism to undermine farm dwellers' tenure security and the official objectives of ESTA. One game farm owner in KwaZulu-Natal managed to convince the farm dwellers living on his farm to move away from their existing and quite visible dwellings, which had been scattered across the property to allow for better surveillance of the livestock (Brooks et al. 2011). They were first offered housing near the tourist accommodations. After some time, however, the owner concluded that the sight of farm dweller families living with their goats and chickens next to the lodges might not be appreciated by his clients, and he moved the families to the edge of the farm, away from the tourists (Brooks et al. 2011). Intentionally or unintentionally, such movements obstruct possibilities for farm dwellers to lodge tenant claims, as they have to prove that they and their families have been living on the same farm and plot for more than ten years. The common practice of merging several properties into one game farm also allows landowners to evict farm dwellers in accordance to the conditions laid down in ESTA. Visits to the Department of Agriculture district offices in the Eastern Cape revealed that not all of these mergers are registered, and if they are, often both the merged game farm as well as the individual properties still appear in the registers, making it easy for land owners to prove that farm dwellers have moved from one farm to another, and hence no longer qualify for a tenant claim.

Farm dwellers are hardly ever allowed to remain where they were living prior to the change to game farming, and those who still live on the farms often had to give up their livestock. A notable exception was a mixed farm in the Eastern Cape where the women working in the tourism lodge – including the lodge manager, who grew up on the farm and whose training at the Tourism College had been paid for by the farmer - proudly showed their houses:

> This is our home, this is where we have our *bomas* where we conduct our rituals. When our children go to town to school or look for work, this is where they come for Christmas. We also have our own fields, but with all the work in the lodge, we did not manage to do the weeding (interviews Eastern Cape, April 2011).

Some landowners do provide compensation for the loss of access to land by farm dwellers, and buy land elsewhere to resettle them. In a few cases the state's land redistribution program was used to compensate farm dwellers. A game farm owner in KwaZulu-Natal sold a portion of his farm, 600 hectares, to government. The twenty-five farm dweller families who were living on his farm had applied for land redistribution, and each received the (then) standard settlement grant of R15 000 per household, with which they collectively paid for the 600 hectares of land. The plot of land was located on the other side of a highway, and the sale, the game farmer said, rendered his remaining property - the game farm – more 'defendable':

> When I say defendable I mean that they know that this is their side, and this is mine. There are two fences, it is a wide area. Defendable because fire cannot get across, defendable against their animals, that they cannot cut the fence and push their animals on my piece of land because I have better grass - because they do cut the fence and push their cattle through … . (Brooks et al. 2011, 267).

In some cases, farm dwellers are evicted violently. A group of ex-farm dwellers interviewed related how they were evicted by a landowner who wanted to convert his farm to a game farm. The latter enlisted the help some of his neighbors to set the farm dwellers' houses on fire, scatter their livestock, and transport them to a township where they were dumped by the side of the road. The stories were corroborated by some of the neighbors involved in these actions, who expressed remorse during one of the workshops organized in the context of the research project (Brandt, Josefsson and Spierenburg 2018).

Some farm dwellers responded with violence as well. A group of evicted families residing on public land, squashed between game farms, lacked grazing areas for their livestock. Several times they cut the fences to drive their cattle onto the game farms. A neighboring community of farm dwellers recounted how, when a game farm manager confiscated the cattle and demanded a fine to be paid for the damage:

> They decided to teach him a lesson. Nothing serious, they shot him in the knee. Well … they did not kill him, and he stopped taking their cattle (interviews with farm dwellers KZN November 2008).

This quote illustrates the level of conflict in KwaZulu-Natal, and the normalization of violence in everyday life (Josefsson 2014). At the same time, farm dwellers also use legal ways to challenge their marginalized position. KwaZulu-Natal has a strong presence of advocacy and activist organizations and has its share of high-profile tenant claims such as the Gongolo case where claimants managed to stall the development of a private wildlife reserve (Brandt, Josefsson and Spierenburg 2018, Kamuti 2014).

In many cases, though, evictions are a gradual process, and seemingly 'voluntary'. As one landowner in the Eastern Cape explained:

> When you buy land in South Africa there are always people living there (…) I bought farms, and then I had 28 labourers, but I did not need all those labourers, now we are down to eight. I did not fire anybody, but every time someone left, I just did not replace them. If you do not give them jobs to do, they will just leave (interview March 23 2009).

Especially in the Eastern Cape, farm dwellers respond by seeking security in townships by applying for housing to the municipalities in the province, and oscillate between the townships and farms (Brandt 2013). (Ex-)farm dwellers interviewed in the Karoo especially reported a growing insecurity about their place on the farms. Brandt (2013, 161–162) quotes a female worker on a game farm:

> But it is not really my house you know. I cannot do what I think, maybe build another room. That's why I can say it is not my house, that's why I can say it is my work house…. . I like to have a house [in town]. That's why I am trying always when I am going to town to look after house (….)

Municipalities struggle to offer enough affordable housing, and informal settlements continue to grow as both public and private conservation areas expand (Connor 2005). It must be noted, however, that this growth is not only related to conversions to game farming; similar trends of land concentration and labor shedding have been noted in relation to commercial 'conventional' farming as well (Hall 2011).

Government's Ambivalent Responses and Webs of Power

Government's responses to the increase in game farming have been diverse and contradictory. To a large extent, the narrative of game farming creating jobs appear to be quite dominant among government officials, both at national and local level. Nevertheless, relations between game farmers, their organizations and the state fluctuate, and game farmers have demonstrated shifts in their allegiance to certain ministries and departments. The position of farm dwellers, however, rarely features in policy debates about game farming.

State conservation organization in South Africa such as SANParks generally support the expansion of wildlife habitat through farm conversions, and increasingly seek to cooperate with game ranchers or even devolve conservation tasks to private landowners (Crane 2006). Questions, however, have been raised about game farmers' wildlife production strategies. Criticism concerns for instance stocking practices, which focus on those species that are popular with tourists for game viewing and hunting. Legislation to limit the transport of protected species is fiercely fought by the WRSA. The intensive breeding of trophy animals raises questions about the 'wildness' of some of the wildlife on private wildlife reserves and game ranches, and concerns about contamination of wild populations by escaped animals (Snijders 2014). At the same time, conservation agencies also need to justify their operations in a context of high levels of poverty and inequality, and support the commodification of nature and the narrative of the high potential of nature-based tourism for economic growth, referring to National Parks and surrounding game farms as 'hubs of local economic development' (e.g. SANParks official presentation at the Thicket Forum, September 3 2013, interview SANParks official March 2016).

In relation to agriculture and land reform, responses are mixed. In 2007, then Rural Development and Land Reform Minister Nkwinti complained that game farms are 'elitist' and constitute a 're-colonisation of the countryside' (Haywood 2007, 195). The controversy about the record price of one billion South African Rand paid by government to the owners of Mala Mala game farm in Mpumalanga Province, to return

the land to communities that had been evicted in 1923, sparked fierce debates on the impacts of farm conversions on land reform. The associated increase in the value of land poses difficulties given that land for land reform has to be bought on a willing-seller willing-buyer basis, for current market values, and in 2016 the Land Claims Court overturned the deal (Ramutsindela, Davis, and Sinthumule 2016). In the Eastern Cape, however, local government officials demonstrated great reluctance to target game farms for land reform (Andrew et al. 2013). In KwaZulu-Natal game farms have been subjected to land claims. Some claims were settled through the allocation of alternative land, in other cases land was returned, and the land reform beneficiaries were strongly advised to continue with this new form of land use – with little success, as it requires quite a lot of running capital (Ngubane and Brooks 2013, Kamuti 2016).

The Department of Agriculture (DoA) is equally ambivalent. Department staff both at national and local level appear to endorse game farming as a profitable form of land use, and have sometimes sided with game farmers in their critique on stringent environmental legislation. Some DoA officials though, do share the fears also expressed by some commercial farmers, about negative impacts on national food production and the spreading of diseases and an increase of predator populations (Kamuti 2016, Snijders 2015).

Nonetheless, no policy has curbed game farming as of yet, and given that the new President of South Africa, Cyril Ramaphosa is a wealthy game farmer himself, who has repeatedly promoted the win-win narrative on game farming in the media claiming that 'Game farmers create jobs' (see for example Fin24 2014), this is not likely to happen anytime in the near future. The state is benefitting from increased revenues, and the Department of Environmental Affairs (DEA) has mainly facilitated the growth of the wildlife industry. An increasing number of animals can be hunted in South Africa; the Eastern Cape is the province with the most 'huntable' species, namely 56. In 2009 this resulted in an income of 66.83 million Rand from hunting permits alone (Snijders 2015). Other revenues such as transportation permits, daily fees, taxidermy exportation fees or fees for keeping wildlife on private land are not included in this figure.

WRSA has complained about the lack of coherent policies and the high number of regulations game farmers have to comply with - both from DoA and DEA. Yet, the lack of clarity also allows game farmers room to maneuver, by playing out one department against the other (Kamuti 2014). Furthermore, many (game) farmers draw on old connections within these departments, as quite a number of civil servants stayed on after the change to the new democratic dispensation in 1994. In KwaZulu-Natal game farmers have used their long-standing relationship with what used to be the Natal Parks Board, and has now become Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife, to safeguard their interests (Kamuti 2016, Wels 2015).

In 2005 the Wildlife Forum was set up as a multi-stakeholder platform to address policy and legislation contradictions regarding game farming. It does not include farm workers or dwellers' representatives. While the Expert Panel had advised government to include labor and civil society organizations in the Panel, once the DEA took over the

organization of the Forum, these were excluded (Snijders 2014). When an executive officer of WRSA was asked why this was the case, he responded:

> No, no, they are not real stakeholders. They don' t own anything; it' s [that they are] not hunters, not landowners' (cited in Snijders 2014, 178).

Conclusion and Discussion

The statement above suggests that property rights – and coveting property rights – is still important, as Sikor and Lund (2009) argue, though they agree with Ribot and Pelusso (2003) that these are not enough to secure access or benefits. Realizing that the end of apartheid was near, farmers and game farmers resorted to various strategies to strengthen their abilities to continue to access land. One strategy focused on reducing the presence of farm dwellers on their properties, whose labor had become increasingly redundant, through preemptive evictions and streamlining production (Bernstein 1996). Game farmers lobbied successfully to obtain property rights over the wildlife on their land, which was conditioned on the erection of high, electrified fences, which made their landed properties even less accessible. The negotiations about the transition to democracy and a new Constitution resulted in the firm entrenchment of the then existing property rights (Ntsebeza 2007). This entrenchment was also the result of international pressure, and a response to concerns by old and possibly new investors who feared the nationalization of assets, including land (Terreblanche 2002), suggesting that the analysis of 'webs of power' in which bundles of rights are embedded according to Ribot and Peluso (2003), indeed needs to take into account actors and institutions at different levels, ranging from the local to the global (Pedersen 2016; Ribot 2014).

Nevertheless, as Sikor and Lund (2009, 11) argue, shifts in authority do require new justifications for claims to rights. Game farmers justify their hold on the land by referring to their contribution to a global common good - the conservation of nature – and to development through the claim of employment creation. Government responses to these claims are somewhat ambiguous, resulting to shifts in allegiances by game farmers and their organizations with different departments. Many white landowners feel threatened by the land reform program and its possible impacts on their abilities to continue to access their properties. Shifting to game farming allows them to forward new justifications to their access to land, but also offers them possibilities to further shed labor and reduce the threatening presence of farm dwellers on their land. There are, however, also more emotional aspects related to the conversions; in a context where their social position has changed, the creation of enclosed game farms also allows white game farmers to enact 'the colonial present', and claim a long-standing bond with and stewardship over the land they occupy (Josefsson 2014, Fraser 2007). The shifts to game farming in turn are made possible by national and international demands for wilderness experiences, strengthening a process of the commodification of nature. The inclusion of game farmers' organizations and the exclusion of labor and farm dwellers – or their representatives – from what was supposed to be a multi-stakeholder platform to streamline game farming legislation, shows that despite some transformations of the public sector, game farmers are still better embedded in local and national institutions (Snijders

2014), and that their webs of power are still more extensive than those of the farm dwellers.

As a result of a long history of dispossession, farm dwellers could only access land 'through means that are not intended to impart property rights' (Ribot and Peluso 2003, 156), i.e. through informal arrangements with land owners (Bundy 1988, McClendon 2002). How important these arrangements were, is reflected by the apartheid regime's fear that they would undermine white control over land, and it's vigorous attempts to stamp out these practices (Platzky and Walker 1985). These attempts failed to be entirely successful, but farm dwellers' access was increasingly jeopardized by technological changes and processes of land concentration. The contradictory attempts to both regulate the agricultural sector in terms of labor legislation and deregulate the sector by allowing a greater role of the market and financial institutions (Williams et al. 1998), resulted in further land concentration and labor shedding. Attempts by the post-apartheid state to strengthen farm dwellers' land rights appeared to have had the opposite effect, further undermining the social mechanisms that allowed farm dwellers access. In addition, ESTA was used as an 'eviction manual' (Hall 2004, 2007). As was shown in this contribution, the spatial rearrangements related to conversions to game farming assisted landowners in this respect. In other words, the formalization of farm dwellers' rights to land has seriously undermined their abilities to access land in post-apartheid South Africa.

References

AFRA. 2003. *The investigation of the effects of conservation and tourism on land tenure and ownership patterns in KwaZulu-Natal*. Pietermaritzburg (South Africa): Association for Rural Advancement.

Alford, M., and N. Phillips. 2018. The political economy of state governance in global production networks: change, crisis and contestation in the South African fruit sector. *Review of International Political Economy* 25 (1):98–121. doi:10.1080/09692290.2017.1423367.

Aliber, M., M. Baipethi, and P. Jacobs. 2009. Agricultural employment scenarios. In *Another countryside? Policy options for land and agrarian reform in South Africa*, ed. R. Hall, 133–164. Cape Town: PLAAS.

Andrew, N., F. Brandt, M. Spierenburg, D. Snijders, and N. Mkhize. 2013. Land consolidation and the expansion of game farming in South Africa: Impacts on farm dwellers' livelihoods and rights to land in the Eastern Cape. In *Africa for sale? Positioning the state, Land and society in foreign Large-Scale land acquisitions in africa*, eds. S. J. T. M. Evers, C. Seagle, and F. Krijtenburg, 97–130. Leiden: Brill.

Archer, S. 2002. Technology and ecology in the Karoo: A century of windmills, wire and changing farming practice. In *South Africa's environmental history: Cases and comparisons*. eds. S. Dovers, R. Edgecombe, and B. Guest, 112–38. Ohio: David Philip.

Bassett, C. 2008. South Africa: Revisiting capital's 'formative action. *Review of African Political Economy* 35 (116):185–202. doi:10.1080/03056240802193804.1

Beinart, W., and C. Bundy. 1987. *Hidden struggles in rural South Africa*. Berkeley: University of California Press. doi:10.1086/ahr/94.4.1150.

Beinart, W., and P. Coates. 2002. *Environment and history: The taming of nature in the USA and South Africa*. London/New York: Routledge.

Beinart, W., P. Delius, and S. Trapido. 1986. *Putting a plough to the ground: Accumulation and dispossession in rural South Africa, 1850–1930*. Cape Town: Raven Press.

Bernstein, H. 1996. How white agriculture (re)positioned itself for a'New South Africa. *Critical Sociology* 22 (3):9–36. doi:10.1177/089692059602200302.

Brandt, F. 2013. *Tracking an invisible great trek: An ethnography on the re-configuration of power and belonging on trophy-hunting farms in the karoo. PhD diss*. Amsterdam: Vrije Universiteit.

Brandt, F., J. Josefsson, and M. Spierenburg. 2018. Power and politics in stakeholder engagement: farm dweller (in)visibility and conversions to game farming in South Africa. *Ecology and Society* 23 (3):32. doi:10.5751/ES-10265-230332.

Brandt, F., and M. Spierenburg. 2014. Game fences in the karoo: reconfiguring spatial and social relations. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 32 (2):220–37. doi:10.1080/02589001.2014.925300.

Brockington, D., R. Duffy, and J. Igoe. 2008. *Nature unbound: Conservation, capitalism and the future of protected areas*. London: Earthscan.

Brooks, S., M. Spierenburg, L. Van Brakel, A. Kolk, and K. B. Lukhozi. 2011. Creating a commodified wilderness: Tourism, private game farming, and 'third nature'landscapes in Kwazulunatal. *Tijdschrift Voor Economische en Sociale Geografie* 102 (3):260–74. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9663.2011.00662.x.

Bundy, C. 1988. *The rise and fall of the South African peasantry*. 2nd ed. Cape Town/London: David Philip/James Curry.

Bunn, D. 1996. Comparative Barbarism: Game reserves, sugar plantations, and the modernization of South African landscape. In *Text, theory, space: Land, literature and history in South Africa and Australia*, ed. K. Darian-Smith, L. Gunner, and S. Nuttall, 37–52. London and New York: Routledge.

Büscher, B., S. Sullivan, K. Neves, J. Igoe, and D. Brockington. 2012. Towards a synthesized critique of neoliberal biodiversity conservation. *Capitalism Nature Socialism* 23 (2):4–30. doi:10.1080/10455752.2012.674149.

Carruthers, J. 2008. Wilding the farm or farming the wild? The evolution of scientific game ranching in South Africa from the 1960s to the present. *Transactions of the Royal Society of South Africa* 63 (2):160–81. doi:doi: 10.1080/00359190809519220.

Castree, N. 2008. Neoliberalising nature: The logics of deregulation and reregulation. *Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space* 40 (1):131–52. doi:10.1068/a3999.

Connor, T. 2005. Place, belonging and population displacement: New ecological reserves in Mozambique and South Africa. *Development Southern Africa* 22 (3):365–82. doi:10.1080/03768350500253179.

Crais, C. 1992. *White supremacy and black resistance in pre-industrial South Africa: The making of the colonial order in the Eastern Cape, 1770–1865*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Crane, W. 2006. Biodiversity conservation and land rights in South Africa: Whither the farm dwellers? *Geoforum* 37 (6):1035–45. doi:10.1016/j.geoforum.2006.07.002.

Du Toit, A. 1993. The micro-politics of paternalism: The discourse of management and resistance on South African fruit and wine farms. *Journal of Southern African Studies* 19 (2): 314-336. doi:10.1080/03057079308708362.

Du Toit, A. 2004. Social exclusion' discourse and chronic poverty: A South African case study. *Development and Change* 35 (5):987–1010. doi:10.1111/j.1467-7660.2004.00389.x.

Fairbairn, M. 2013. Indirect dispossession: Domestic power imbalances and foreign access to land in Mozambique. *Development and Change* 44 (2):335–56. doi:10.1111/dech.12013.

Fin24 2014. Ramaphosa: Game farmers create jobs. Fin24 online. https://www.fin24.com/Economy/Ramaphosa-Game-farmers-create-jobs-20140908 (accessed May 15, 2018).

Fraser, A. 2007. Land reform in South Africa and the colonial present. *Social and Cultural Geography* 8 (6):835–51. doi:10.1080/14649360701712560.

Habib, A. 2008. South Africa: Conceptualising a politics of human-oriented development. *Social Dynamics* 34 (1):46–61. doi:10.1080/02533950802078921.

Hall, R. 2004. *Land and agrarian reform in South Africa: a status report, 2004*. Cape Town: Institute of Poverty, Land and Agrarian Studies.

Hall, R. 2007. Transforming rural South Africa? Taking stock of land reform. In *The land question of South Africa: The challenge of transformation and redistribution*, eds. L. Ntsebeza and R. Hall, 87–106. Cape Town: HSRC.

Hall, R. 2011. Land grabbing in Southern Africa: The many faces of the investor rush. *Review of African Political Economy* 38 (128):193–214. doi:10.1080/03056244.2011.582753.

Jeeves, A. H., and J. Crush. 1997. *White farms, black labor: the state and agrarian change in Southern africa*, 1910–1950. Oxford: James Currey.

Josefsson, J. 2014. Safe-guarding the colonial present: Game farms on the frontier in KwaZulu-Natal's 'Battlefields route. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 32 (2):258–74. doi:10.1080/02589001.2014.925302.

Kamuti, T. 2014. The fractured state in the governance of private game farming: The case of KwaZulu-Natal province, South Africa. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 32 (2): 190–206. doi:10.1080/02589001.2014.936678.

Kamuti, T. 2016. Private wildlife governance in a context of radical uncertainty: Dynamics of game farming policy and practice in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. PhD diss., Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, University of the Free State.

Langholz, J. A., and G. I. Kerley. 2006. Combining conservation and development on private lands: an assessment of ecotourism-based private game reserves in the Eastern Cape. Centre for African Conservation Ecology (formerly TERU) Report, 56, Port Elisabeth (South Africa)

McClendon, T. V. 2002. *Genders and generations apart: Labor tenants and customary law in seg-regation-era South Africa, 1920s to 1940s*. Portsmouth, New Hampshire/Oxford/Cape Town: Heinemann/James Currey/David Philip.

Mkhize, N. 2014. Game farm conversions and the land question: Unpacking present contradic-tions and historical continuities in farm dwellers' tenure insecurity in cradock. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 32 (2):207–19. doi:10.1080/02589001.2014.925303.

Mkhize, N. N. 2012. Private game farms and the tenure security of workers and dwellers in cra-dock-implications for tenure reform in South Africa. PhD diss., University of Cape Town.

Myers, R., and C. P. Hansen. In press. Revisiting a theory of access: a review. *Society and Natural Resources*

Myers, R., C. P. Hansen, and V. Chhotray. In press. Revisiting a theory of access: Introduction. *Society and Natural Resources*

NAMC. 2006. *Report on investigation to identify problems for sustainable growth and development in South African wildlife ranching*. Pretoria: National Agricultural Marketing Service.

Ndebele, N. 1997. Game lodges and leisure colonialists. In *Blank: Architecture, apartheid and after*, ed. H. Judin and I. Vladislavic, 10–14. Rotterdam: NAi Publishers.

Nell, D. 2003. The development of wildlife utilization in South Africa and Kenya, c. 1950–1990. PhD Diss., University of Oxford.

Ngubane, M., and S. Brooks. 2013. Land beneficiaries as game farmers: conservation, land reform and the invention of the 'community game farm' in KwaZulu-Natal. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 31 (3):399–420. doi:10.1080/02589001.2013.811790.1

Ntsebeza, L. 2007. Land redistribution in South Africa: the property clause revisited. In *The land question in South Africa: The challenge of transformation and redistribution*, eds. L. Ntsebeza and R. Hall, 107–131. Cape Town: HSRC.

O'Laughlin, B., H. Bernstein, B. Cousins, and P. E. Peters. 2013. Introduction: Agrarian change, rural poverty and land reform in South Africa since 1994. *Journal of Agrarian Change* 13 (1): 1–15. doi:10.1111/joac.12010.

Pedersen, R. H. 2016. Access to land reconsidered: The land grab, polycentric governance and tanzania's new wave land reform. *Geoforum* 72:104–13. doi:10.1016/j.geoforum.2015.12.010.

PLAAS 2016. *Diagnostic report on land reform in South Africa. Commissioned report for high level panel on the assessment of key legislation and the acceleration of fundamental change, an initiative of the parliament of South Africa*. Belleville (South Africa): Institute for Poverty Land and Agrarian Studies, University of the Western Cape,

Platzky, L., and C. Walker. 1985. *The surplus people: Forced removals in South Africa*. Cape Town: Ravan.

Ramutsindela, M., N. Davis, and I. Sinthumule. 2016. Diagnostic report on land reform in South Africa, Land resitution. Commissioned report for High Level Panel on the assessment of key legislation and the acceleration of fundamental change, an initiative of the Parliament of South Africa. Pretoria: Parliament of the Republic of South Africa. Accessible through: https://www.parliament.gov.za/storage/app/media/Pages/2017/october/High_Level_Panel/Commissioned_Report_land/Commissioned_Report_on_Land_Restitution_Ramutsindela_et_al.pdf

Ribot, J. 2014. Cause and response: Vulnerability and climate in the anthropocene. *Journal of Peasant Studies* 41 (5):667–705. doi:10.1080/03066150.2014.894911.

Ribot, J. C., and N. L. Peluso. 2003. A theory of access. *Rural Sociology* 68 (2):153–81. doi:10.1111/j.1549-0831.2003.tb00133.x.

Parliament, S. A. 2018. *Restitution of land rights amendment bill, 2017: Background and summaries for public hearings 18 June–4 July 2018*. Pretoria: Parliament of the Republic of South Africa.

Saldaña, J. 2015. *The coding manual for qualitative researchers*. Washington, US: Sage Publications.

Seekings, J., and N. Nattrass. 2015. *Policy, politics and poverty in South Africa*. Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave MacMillan.

Sikor, T., and C. Lund. 2009. Access and property: A question of power and authority. *Development and Change* 40 (1):1–22. doi:10.1111/j.1467-7660.2009.01503.x.

Snijders, D. 2012. Wild property and its boundaries–on wildlife policy and rural consequences in South Africa. *Journal of Peasant Studies* 39 (2):503–20. doi:10.1080/03066150.2012.667406.

Snijders, D. 2014. Wildlife policy matters: Inclusion and exclusion by means of organisational and discursive boundaries. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 32 (2):173–89. doi:10.1080/09637494.2014.937163.

Snijders, D. 2015. Shifting species in South Africa: Wildlife policy, rural consequences. PhD diss., Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam.

Snowball, J., and G. Antrobus. 2008. *Ecotourism and socio-economic development: The impact of the conservation, economic and social activities of private game reserves in the Eastern Cape*. Grahamstown (South Africa): Rhodes University.

Spenceley, A. 2012. *Responsible tourism: Critical issues for conservation and development*. New York: Earthscan and Taylor & Francis.

Spierenburg, M., and S. J. Brooks. 2014. Private game farming and its social consequences in post-apartheid South Africa: Contestations over wildlife, property and agrarian futures. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 32 (2):151–72. doi:10.1080/09637494.2014.937164.

Taylor, A., P. Lindsey, and H. Davies-Mostert. 2016. With contributions from M. Child, I. Little, G. Martindale and S. Page. An assessment of the economic, social and conservation value of the wildlife industry and its potential to support the green economy in South Africa. Research report prepared under the research funding programme 'Research and policy development to advance a green economy in South Africa'. Department of Environmental Affairs, South Africa, Greenfund, and the Development Bank of Southern Africa.

Terreblanche, S. 2002. *A history of inequality in South Africa, 1652–2002*. Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press.

Vink, N., and J. Van Rooyen. 2009. *The economic performance of agriculture in South Africa since 1994: Implications for food security*. Johannesburg, South Africa: Development Planning Division, Development Bank of Southern Africa.

Walker, C., A. Bohlin, R. Hall and T. Kepe, editors. 2010. *Land, memory, reconstruction, and justice. Perspectives on land claims in South Africa*. Athens: Ohio University Press.

Wegerif, M., B. Russell, and I. Grundling. 2005. *Still searching for security: The reality of farm dweller evictions in South Africa*. Polokwane, South Africa: Nkuzi Development Association.

Wels, H. 2015. *Securing wilderness landscapes in South Africa: Nick Steele, private wildlife conservancies and saving rhinos*. Leiden: Brill.

Williams, G., J. Ewert, J. Hamann, and N. Vink. 1998. Liberalizing markets and reforming land in South Africa. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 16 (1):65–94. doi:10.1080/02589009808729621.