

[catchline] *Conflict, Security & Development 15:4 September 2015* [/catchline]

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[right running head] Environmental vulnerability [/right running head]

[tagline] ISSN 1467-8802 print/ISSN 1478-1174 online/15/040000-00 © 2015 King's

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DOI: [/tagline]

[Article type] Analysis [/Article type]

[Article title] **Environmental vulnerability as a legacy of violent conflict: a case study of the 2012 waste crisis in the Palestinian gathering of Shabriha, South Lebanon** [/Article title]

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[Abstract] *In 2012, South Lebanon faced a solid waste management crisis that particularly affected Palestinian refugee communities, which were excluded from municipal service mandates. By means of a case study of the Palestinian community living in Shabriha, this article demonstrates that the vulnerability to the environmental effects of this waste crisis ultimately stems from a legacy of violent conflict. Lebanon's fragile political order and history of protracted war have crucially shaped governance arrangements in Shabriha. These arrangements excluded Shabriha from legal dumpsites and recycling facilities and thereby decisively exacerbated the environmental consequences of the waste crisis. At first sight, Shabriha's resort to indirect, informal and politicised social networks to remedy its*

marginalisation constituted an effective form of resilience. However, drawing on an entitlements approach to vulnerability, we argue that these coping mechanisms also entrenched Shabriha's institutional marginalisation because they exacerbated its dependence on informal governance structures. [/Abstract]

[A Head] Introduction: service provision to protracted refugees under hybrid governance arrangements [A Head]

In 2012, the Sur (or Tyre) area in South Lebanon faced a solid waste management crisis as a result of the closure of its main local dumpsite. Palestinian communities were especially vulnerable to this crisis and its potential environmental effects because of their institutional marginalisation in Lebanon's post-war polity. After the Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990), Palestinians in Lebanon have been deliberately disenfranchised politically as well as socio-economically not only as a punishment for their role during the war but also to prevent them from interfering in future intra-Lebanese conflict. This marginalisation here manifested itself in the Palestinians' exclusion from the service mandate of the region's municipalities (and hence their access to the new recycling factory that the Union of Municipalities in Sur eventually opened). The situation of Palestinian refugees in unofficial refugee camps that are not administered by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), so-called 'gatherings', moreover, was particularly dire. These gatherings also fell outside the mandate of UNRWA when UNRWA eventually arranged access to the recycling factory for the inhabitants of the official Palestinian camps.

By means of a case study of the Palestinian gathering of Shabriha, this article conceptualises the various layers of institutional marginalisation that Palestinians in Lebanon face in light of the dialectic between violent conflict and environmental vulnerability. As outlined in the flowchart in figure 1 below, we suggest that the environmental and

developmental consequences of the 2012 waste crisis partly stem from the particular governance arrangements in Shabriha. These local governance arrangements, in turn, have been importantly shaped by Lebanon's fragile national political order and protracted violent conflict. We demonstrate, furthermore, that Shabriha's utilisation of indirect, informal and politicised social networks and relations to address the waste crisis constitutes an effective coping mechanism. However, from an entitlements perspective, which highlights the collective and political features of vulnerability, this short-term resilience actually entrenched the gathering's institutional marginalisation. It reiterated Shabriha's dependence on informal governance structures and thereby made it more vulnerable in the long run.

[f] figure 1 here [/f]

This argument feeds into two broader debates on conflict, security and development. First, the governance context in Shabriha as outlined below is characterised by multiple state and non-state authorities and by plural political institutions ranging from de jure policies to de facto practices. As such, our discussion resonates closely with scholarly debates on hybrid political orders and negotiated statehood that are concerned with the organisation of security, welfare and representation in situations of 'political fragility' or 'softening sovereignty'.¹ We contribute to this body of knowledge by showing that hybrid governance arrangements can simultaneously contain the coping mechanisms to deal with institutional marginalisation as well as the precedents to cement such marginalisation. This implies that empirically documented instances of hybrid governance should neither be romanticised nor be seen as inevitably repressive.

This suggestion ties in with the second academic discussion with which our argument connects: that on protracted refugeeness, of which the Palestinians constitute an emblematic

example.² Protracted refugee situations are closely related to the phenomenon of political fragility, but the links between refugeeness and fragility are contested.³ Our case study documents the deep-rooted lack of formal representation and entitlements of the Palestinian refugee community in Lebanon. It thereby forcefully illustrates how protracted refugeeness in fragile settings can result in an ambiguous protection regime in which basic service responsibilities are jostled back and forth between international agencies, communal authorities and the host state.⁴ The case of Lebanon's Palestinians corroborates Loescher and Milner's finding that the presence of refugees does not generate insecurity in its own right. Rather, it 'exacerbates previously existing inter-communal tensions in the host country'.⁵ Clearly, the Lebanese state 'deliberately focuses on Lebanese national security at the expense of Palestinian human security'.⁶ This is typical of the securitisation of protracted refugee communities in fragile political settings that often results in marginalising governance arrangements such as those exemplified in our case study. It is also, however, a manifestation of 'the failure of international solidarity and burden sharing with host countries'.⁷

The article is structured as follows. We first discuss our methods and analytical strategy. Next, we introduce the case and its context. The subsequent section discusses the waste crisis and is followed by a section detailing the analysis of the case study. Conclusions and final reflections are provided in the closing section.

[A Head] *Methods and concepts: a qualitative approach to governance, conflict and vulnerability* [/A Head]

The data on which this article draws were collected in the context of a broader study of the governance interaction between Palestinian and Lebanese authorities in Shabriha in which the 2012 waste crisis was one out of five vignettes, or sub-cases, that were explored.⁸ During five months of fieldwork in the spring of 2013, 140 semi-structured in-depth interviews were

conducted with 115 communal and political leaders, state representatives, residents, staff of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and analysts. In addition, three focus groups were conducted and document and observational data were collected.⁹ Data were analysed on the basis of categories derived from an analytical framework geared towards exploring the relationship between conflict and environmental vulnerability. The literature suggests that the relation between these two concepts—conflict and environmental vulnerability—is importantly mediated by institutional and political structures.¹⁰ Therefore, we added a third sensitising concept to our framework, namely governance (which we use as interchangeable with ‘institutional forms of political authority’¹¹).

With regard to the notion of conflict, we were interested in all references to previous fighting and war (most prominently the Civil War but also the 2006 War between Israel and Hezbollah, the 2007 clashes between the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and militants in the Palestinian camp of Nahr al-Bared in North Lebanon¹² and the 2008 showdown between Hezbollah and its political adversaries in Beirut). We also included respondents’ references to possible future conflicts (for instance in relation to the spill-over of the Syrian war and the rise of Islamic State).¹³

Vulnerability was approached as the susceptibility of particular communities to specific risks and hazards,¹⁴ in our case the 2012 waste crisis and its environmental consequences. Three components are essential in analysing vulnerability. First, exposure: the extent to which a community is confronted with the hazard in question. Second, sensitivity: the likely damage the hazard will do to this particular community. And, third, resilience: the coping or response mechanisms available to the community to deal with the impacts of the hazard.¹⁵ As elaborated on in the concluding section, we specifically adopt an entitlements perspective on vulnerability because it puts a premium on the collective and political elements of the distribution of rights and resources that determine vulnerability.

As we are dealing with a man-made hazard—a management crisis rather than a natural disaster—exposure, sensitivity and resilience are to a large extent determined by the, formal as well as informal, governance arrangements in place to organise society.¹⁶ Based on Bevir, Hoffmann and Kirk and Kooiman, we focused on three aspects of governance to investigate how exposure, sensitivity and resilience manifested themselves in the case of the 2012 waste crisis in Shabriha.¹⁷ First, governance actors: those individuals and organisations acting to address the waste crisis. Second, governance levels: whether meetings and communications played out locally (at the municipal level), regionally (at the provincial and district level) or nationally (at the governmental level). Third, governance modes: the way in which actors interacted. Based on Hoffmann and Kirk, the following concerns were central here: directness (whether Lebanese and Palestinian authorities met and communicated directly or via other actors, such as NGOs or political parties); formality (the extent to which interactions were impersonal, conducted publicly and documented); regularity (the degree to which interaction was occasional, ad hoc and spontaneous or structural, planned and regular); and manner of initiation (referring to which governance actors took the initiative).¹⁸

[A Head] *Context and setting: Shabriha gathering* [/A Head]

Lebanon hosts some 400,000 Palestinians, approximately 10 per cent of the country's population before the influx of refugees from Syria.¹⁹ The Palestinians constitute Lebanon's most disenfranchised community: they cannot vote or work for state agencies, are legally discriminated against in the labour market and, since 2001, prohibited from owning real estate.²⁰

More than 60 years after the 1948 *Nakba* (catastrophe) that forcefully displaced them from Palestine, the majority of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon still live in refugee camps.²¹ These 12 camps are administered by UNRWA and located on land that UNRWA rents from

the Lebanese state. Services in these camps are provided by a patchwork of actors ranging from UNRWA to a variety of NGOs and political factions.²² The Lebanese state, however, plays no role in the provision of public goods in the Palestinian refugee camps. Although unilaterally abrogated by the Lebanese Parliament in 1987, the 1969 Cairo Agreement has set a strong precedent for self-governance in the camps and de facto prevents state agencies from entering the camps and sanctions the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) as the main authority inside them.²³

Apart from these formal camps, however, there are tens of smaller, informal refugee settlements in Lebanon. While Shabriha is often called a ‘camp’ (*mukhayem*), it is, in fact, what the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) calls a ‘gathering’ (*tajamu’a*). A gathering is a community that:

*1. Has a population of Palestinian refugees [...]. 2. Has no official UNRWA camp status or any other legal authority identified with responsibility for camp management. 3. Is expected to have clearly defined humanitarian and protection needs, or have a minimum of 25 households. 4. Has a population with a sense of being a distinct group living in a geographically identifiable area.*²⁴

Lebanon hosts some 39 of these ‘unofficial camps’, most of them in South Lebanon, which together host approximately 38 per cent of the Palestinians in Lebanon.²⁵ While residents of the gatherings go to UNRWA schools and clinics, UNRWA does not consider itself responsible for utility (water, electricity and waste management) and infrastructural services in the gatherings.²⁶ These services are provided by Popular Committees (PCs), ‘municipality-like’ bodies installed by the PLO to take care of the day-to-day governance of the refugee communities. Their responsibilities include the oversight of utility service provision in liaison with Lebanese authorities, UNRWA and NGOs.²⁷

Shabriha is located near the city of Sur in South Lebanon. It has, according to a survey done by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT) in 2013, 1850 residents, living in 382 houses.²⁸ Cadastrally, Shabriha falls under Abasiye municipality. Most of the land on which Shabriha is built is owned by the municipality of Abasiye and is occupied by the Palestinians illegally.²⁹ The Palestinian gathering of Shabriha is located next to a Lebanese village with the same name. The main authority in Lebanese Shabriha is constituted by the *mukhtar*, a village-level state authority responsible for administrative and social representation of his constituency vis-à-vis the state.

The collection and management of solid waste in Shabriha is the responsibility of the PC, which has contracted the NGO PARD (Popular Aid for Relief and Development) to provide this service. PARD operates its own garbage trucks and collects Shabriha's waste twice a week to transport it to the local dumpsite—as it does for several other Palestinian gatherings in the region. The PC collects a service fee from the residents of Shabriha (that also covers costs for drinking water) from which it subsequently pays PARD³⁰—although respondents of both the PC and PARD indicated that this was merely a 'symbolic fee' that does not come close to covering the costs PARD actually incurs concerning waste management.

[A Head] *Case study: the 2012 waste crisis* [/A Head]

[B Head] Exposure and sensitivity: emergence of and responses to the crisis [/B Head]

Around February 2012, the municipality of Deir Qanun closed the waste dump in Ras al-Ain that was used by PARD and all other waste management providers in the region.³¹ Most of our respondents were convinced that Deir Qanun closed the dump on the orders of the Union of Municipalities of Sur in order to push waste collectors to dump at a new recycling factory

that the Union had opened in Ain al-Baal under the Sustainable Environmental Practices and Policies (SEPP) programme.³² There were also accounts, however, that mentioned that the dump was closed because it contaminated a local well.³³ In any case, the new factory was ill-prepared and could not process all waste.³⁴ When the factory did get going, moreover, it was reluctant to accept waste from Palestinian communities (that do not pay taxes and do not fall under the service mandate of the municipalities). This had not been a problem with the Ras al-Ain dump, of which Barrage noted that ‘all regions of the South use it, including the Palestinian refugee camps’.³⁵ As a result, Palestinian camps and gatherings lost their dumpsite without being provided with an alternative. For Shabriha, this initiated a ‘waste crisis’ of approximately six months during which waste was hardly collected because it could not be disposed of.

Apart from the obvious discomfort caused by heaps of uncollected waste piling up in the middle of summer in a densely populated settlement, the waste crisis entailed real environmental risks. Most pertinent of these was the danger of soil and ground water pollution as a consequence of uncontrolled illegal dumping. These risks, in turn, carried health perils, predominantly food poisoning and infections.³⁶ Tassabehji notes that landfills in the region ‘are contributing to the pollution of both the air and water aquifers’.³⁷ A waste entrepreneur working in the area told us that the registered landfills, and the uncontrolled dumping sites even more so, are ‘close to buildings and orchards [...] and the polluted water goes underground and affects the soil of the orchards’.³⁸ He commented that people suffer from the smoke of burning waste and said that ‘they live in a polluted atmosphere which causes many diseases such as asthma’.³⁹ A respondent representing Shabriha’s women’s committee said:

We were suffering from this problem; the waste was accumulating next to the houses and there were mosquitoes and insects and smells. Many diseases might

*have started from this; also because it was very rainy and all the bad things from the garbage could get into the soil and affect the water as well.*⁴⁰

Shabriha's PC and PARD worked to address the crisis through three main strategies. First, they sought to ensure temporary dumping places to find relief for the immediate waste pressure that the gathering faced. The PC tried to find private waste collectors who would be willing to collect and (illegally) dump the waste as well as owners of land where occasional dumping could take place.⁴¹ The PC also contacted municipalities in the region that had all dug emergency waste pits to deal with the temporary capacity problems of the newly opened factory. An UNRWA sanitation officer remembered:

*The gatherings would go to someone else every time to plead with them and ask them to take some of their waste; one day they would get permission to take a shift here, the next day they would get permission to take a shift to another place.*⁴²

The majority of people, moreover, tried to take care of their own waste by dumping it individually somewhere outside the gathering.⁴³ Second, as we will describe in more detail below, the PC and PARD tried to get Shabriha's waste accepted by the municipality through informal means. They, for instance, attempted to convince individual municipalities and UNRWA to accept waste from the gatherings and pass it off as their own at the factory. Third, PARD and the PC addressed the Union of Municipalities directly to persuade it to accept waste from the gatherings at the new factory.

The resolution of the waste crisis emerged gradually. The capacity of the factory was expanded so all municipalities under the Union of Municipalities could once again dispose of their garbage. Later, after negotiations between UNRWA and the Union of Municipalities and pressure from donors, it was agreed that the factory would also accept waste collected by UNRWA. The Palestinians in Shabriha, however, were excluded from both phases of the

resolution. A waste entrepreneur working in the region said that the head of the Union had felt embarrassed vis-à-vis the donors and thus ‘started taking from the camps as well, but only the recognized camps; the gatherings were forgotten, no one asked about them’.⁴⁴ This was the case because the gatherings neither fell within the municipal mandate that was based on Lebanese citizenship nor under the UNRWA mandate based on camp residence. A UNDP expert noted: ‘This is the problem with the gatherings: UNRWA doesn’t see it as a camp and hides behind the reiteration that it provides services to Palestinians *within* the camps and the municipality doesn’t recognize them either’.⁴⁵

With regard to the municipal mandate, Abasiye municipality maintained that it was not responsible for ‘Palestinian waste’ because Shabriha’s residents do not pay taxes to the municipality and, Abasiye reasoned, therefore cannot expect any services. Moreover, the municipality argued that if it is not responsible for waste management in ‘normal times’—PARD and the PC had created a satisfying *modus operandi* for everyday waste management—it should not all of a sudden be looked to in times of crisis.⁴⁶ UN-HABITAT and UNDP, however, found that municipalities, despite the lack of taxes collected and regardless of the citizenship issue, are officially responsible for waste management in their entire cadastre (including the gatherings).⁴⁷ And indeed some other municipalities in the region were actively involved in solving the waste crisis, also for Palestinian gatherings in their area.⁴⁸ The annual report of the regional PC representative, for instance, documented that:

*With the cooperation of the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), Kharayeb municipality got rid of the problem of buried garbage in the municipal dump. And the PC in Maashouk [gathering] cooperated with of the municipality of Bourj el-Shemali and also solved the waste problem.*⁴⁹

Because there are no official policy guidelines on how municipalities should deal with Palestinian gatherings in their area, however, the response to the waste crisis was random and differed per municipality. The Lebanese-Palestinian Dialogue Committee (LPDC) noted in this regard that ‘in the absence of a general policy or directive, the municipality’s strategy depends on the personal initiatives of the head of the municipality’.⁵⁰ Abasiye, clearly, did not consider Shabriha its responsibility in the context of the waste crisis. Because the Ain al-Baal factory owned by the Union of Municipalities only accepted waste collected by public service providers or private providers contracted by its member municipalities, this meant that Shabriha was excluded from the factory.

Regarding the UNRWA mandate, in the context of the waste crisis, being a camp was considered an asset. A waste entrepreneur summarised:

And in the crisis, the most difficult situation was in the gatherings because there is no place for them and they belong neither to the camp nor to the municipality. [...] The gatherings were forgotten; no one asked about them. [...] At first, when the factory was still small, the camps were accepted, but the gatherings weren’t. No one from the municipalities or the EU [European Union] talked in their name.⁵¹

As a well-known and sizeable international organisation, UNRWA could eventually convince the Union of Municipalities to allow UNRWA trucks to dump at the recycling factory.

However, the waste that UNRWA collected was determined not by nationality (i.e. all Palestinians) but by place of residence (i.e. residents of the official, UNRWA-registered camps).⁵² Because the ‘deal’ UNRWA had struck with the Union was precarious anyway, moreover, UNRWA was even less inclined to incorporate the Palestinian gatherings into it. Under conditions of anonymity, an UNRWA representative said:

The factory is a municipal constellation. The whole situation is very sensitive [...]. Some agreements aren't exactly official, but rather depend on personal relations. The municipalities involved might be concerned that this arrangement gets public. We fought really hard for this deal and I don't want to endanger it. We talked a lot with the mayors and the municipalities. A lot of wasta [social capital] went into this.

Thus, the ambiguous institutional status of Shabriha as a Palestinian gathering that does not fall under the service provision mandate of either the municipality or UNRWA was defied relatively successfully with regard to 'normal', regular waste management, which the PC and PARD had organised rather satisfactorily. In times of crisis, however, the institutional gap in which Shabriha found itself concerning waste management proved significantly more problematic. First of all, because it undermined direct responses to the crisis: whereas Lebanese municipalities dug their own temporary dumping pits, the PC and PARD could not do this as they did not have any land at their disposal (the gathering is built on municipal land and very densely populated at that).⁵³ Tellingly, the head of the Union of PCs in Sur region said:

I wrote a newspaper article noting that all Lebanese found a solution in dumping their waste on a piece of municipal land but that this was impossible for the Palestinians who have no land to spare to live and build on let alone to dump waste on!⁵⁴

In addition, the PC and PARD did not have sufficient financial means to pay for temporary dumping as they had neither the tax base the municipalities have nor the donor funding that UNRWA can count on.

Ultimately, however, the institutional gap that Shabriha suffered from during the waste crisis manifested itself most crucially in the lack of a recognised representative. Had Shabriha

been a camp, UNRWA would have represented it directly vis-à-vis the Union. Had it been a village, the municipality would have approached the Union on its behalf. As it was, the PC and PARD needed others to speak for them and plead their case with the Union.⁵⁵ An UNRWA representative, for instance, confirmed that, because the gatherings are not part of the UNRWA mandate, UNRWA expects the PCs to take an active role in communicating the gatherings' needs themselves.⁵⁶

[B Head] Resilience: coping strategies [/B Head]

This lack of representation crucially informed the way in which Shabriha's authorities dealt with the waste crisis. Their main coping strategy was informal referral to brokers that had the institutional access to the Union of Municipalities—or to the entities that could pressure the Union—that the PC was lacking. The PC, without formal recognition by the Lebanese state, could not be the direct representative of Shabriha vis-à-vis the Union itself. However, neither was there a unitary alternative organisation that could or would. Rather, reflecting what Turner et al. call a 'diversification' strategy,⁵⁷ different actors—PARD, the *mukhtar*, UNRWA and private waste entrepreneurs—in different ways, at different times and for different reasons, represented the PC in the efforts to solve the waste crisis. The communications between these brokers and the Union were overwhelmingly unofficial, in the sense that they were undocumented and not publicised or publicly known.

With regard to finding immediate and temporary dumping places, apart from their own efforts to convince neighbouring municipalities and private landowners to allow one-off dumps, the PC and PARD turned to private entrepreneurs. These entrepreneurs then used their connections with municipalities, often their clients, to arrange occasional dumping.⁵⁸ Additionally, there was mention of an UNRWA-brokered deal to dispose of some truckloads at the dump in the city of Saida.⁵⁹ Regarding the finding of a more structural solution, i.e.

access to the new factory, PARD's regional sanitation officer acted as a 'go-between' for the PC and the Union, mostly after requests from the PC, and was accepted as spokesperson for the gatherings.⁶⁰ PARD's mediation, however, to a large extent depended on the back-up of the *mukhtar*.⁶¹ A communal leader elucidated: 'For some time the recycling factory stopped accepting garbage from here. And PARD can transport, but it need a place where it can transport the waste to. So the *mukhtar* used his relations to help them find a dumpsite'.⁶²

While Shabriha, as a Palestinian gathering, does not have a *mukhtar*, the Lebanese village located next to the gathering does. Although 'Lebanese Shabriha' falls in the cadastre of Abasiye municipality, its relations with the municipality are problematic. Consequently, Shabriha basically functions as an independent village—also because of the significant sociopolitical clout of the *mukhtar* who is exceptionally influential due to his connections with the Amal party and his position as head of the *mukhtar* council in the Sur area.⁶³ The Lebanese village of Shabriha and the municipality of Abasiye have reached the unspoken consensus that the village does not pay service-related taxes to the municipality, which absolves the municipality of its responsibility to collect waste in Shabriha.⁶⁴ Instead, the *mukhtar* has arranged with PARD to be included in its waste management programme. This has created the rather unique situation in which the Palestinian gathering of Shabriha and the Lebanese village of Shabriha both depend on the NGO PARD for their solid waste management. When the waste crisis commenced, therefore, they were, to some extent, in the same boat. As a result, the PC, PARD and the *mukhtar* closely co-ordinated throughout the waste crisis.⁶⁵

What eventually proved crucial for both Palestinian and Lebanese Shabriha was the fact that—due to one of the peculiarities of the Lebanese electoral system—the Lebanese citizens of Shabriha vote for the municipal council in Sur (and not in Abasiye, under whose geographical scope they fall). In fact, while they are a relatively small constituency, they hold

a strategic position in Sur's electoral politics.⁶⁶ This gave the *mukhtar* some leverage with the municipality of Sur, the biggest member of the Union of Municipalities. When asked whether Palestinian gatherings had problems accessing the waste recycling factory, the *mukhtar* answered: 'Yes, but this is not the case for Shabriha as I have partners within Sur municipality. Because of my good relations with them I can solve the problem for the whole Shabriha [Lebanese as well as Palestinian]'.⁶⁷ The mayor of Sur subsequently told us: 'We consider Shabriha as Sur, it belongs to us. [...] We were the ones who registered the PARD vehicles legally with the factory; we provide them with administrative help'.⁶⁸ It was this leverage, ultimately, that provided PARD with the influence it needed vis-à-vis the Union to get permission to dump 'Palestinian waste' at the Union's factory, as a waste entrepreneur explained:

*[Lebanese Shabriha] is included in Sur municipality so their problem was solved. PARD collects their waste to get support from the municipality. [The logic is that] 'we support Aoun [the mukhtar], so you have to support us in return by accepting the waste from the gatherings'. And the municipality of Sur agreed.*⁶⁹

Jadam observes that this is a structural phenomenon in Lebanon: 'Towns with no municipal councils typically piggy-back on the collection and disposal system of neighbouring municipalities based on mutual agreement, or illicitly'.⁷⁰ Thus, the municipality of Sur, on behalf of the *mukhtar* of Shabriha, convinced the Union of Municipalities to accept the waste of the village of Shabriha in its factory. And indeed, the SEPP project documentation mentions Shabriha as one of the beneficiary villages.⁷¹ PARD, the PC and the *mukhtar* then argued that PARD could not distinguish between the 'Palestinian' and 'Lebanese' waste it collected, as it all ended up on one pile, and that the factory thus needed to accept not just the waste from the Lebanese village of Shabriha, but all waste collected by

PARD. Shifting the focus from the *place* where the waste was collected from—Lebanese Shabriha—to the *actor* collecting the waste—PARD—widened the deal to include the Palestinian gathering of Shabriha.

In the end, it was the efforts of the *mukhtar* that were seen as most instrumental in solving the waste crisis.⁷² His solidarity—‘where we throw, they throw’⁷³—helped to span the institutional gap in which the gathering of Shabriha found itself. PARD’s Palestinian truck driver summarised: ‘When there was a solution, it was for us and for them; there was no discrimination’.⁷⁴ The *mukhtar*’s stance, however, was both inspired and compelled by PARD’s policy not to distinguish between Palestinian gatherings and Lebanese villages. PARD’s director concluded:

Regarding the garbage, there is no ‘Palestinian waste’ and ‘Lebanese waste’: we collect from Palestinians as well as Lebanese and have a good reputation. And since we replace municipalities and they’re thankful that we take this load of their shoulders, they allow us [to dump the waste collected at the gatherings at the factory].⁷⁵

The attempts of the PC and PARD to persuade the Union followed a pattern of action that is typical for the Palestinian authorities’ operating under a hybrid governance arrangement. This pattern is characterised by three main attributes. First, as described above, its mediated, or indirect, nature: the PC could not petition the Union effectively directly, but had to rely on liaisons by PARD and, especially, the *mukhtar*. Second, interactions were informal, because Palestinians from the gatherings are excluded from the formal UNRWA and municipal mandates and the PCs do not have an official status as representatives of the gatherings. Third, these informal and mediated attempts to sway the Union of Municipalities of Sur were distinctly political. The *mukhtar*’s influence on the municipality of Sur was not only constituted by the voters he represents, but also by his close relations with the national

leadership of the Amal party, one of the main parties in South Lebanon and dominant in many of the municipalities constituting the Union of Municipalities of Sur.⁷⁶ Allegedly, the leader of the Amal party and Speaker of the Parliament, Nabih Berri, consulted with the national head of UNRWA in Lebanon in an attempt to push the Union towards a more lenient stance towards the Palestinians. While this did not concern Shabriha specifically, it might have made the Union more amenable to the pleas of Shabriha's PC that were delivered via the *mukhtar*.⁷⁷

Throughout the waste crisis, a direct, formal and 'technical' arrangement between the PC, as the representative of the Palestinian community in Shabriha, and the Union of Municipalities, as the operator of the new waste recycling factory, was unachievable. This was largely the effect of the unofficial and unrecognised status of the PC. The Palestinian gathering of Shabriha fell outside the 'Lebanese-citizens-only' mandate of the municipality and the 'official-camps-only' policy of UNRWA and thus had no official representative vis-à-vis the Union of Municipalities. As a result, the PC was forced to adopt an informal, indirect and politicised approach to finding a solution to its exclusion from the waste factory. This resulted in a de facto rather than de jure form of access: while the Union is aware of the fact that the waste PARD dumps at its factory is partially collected from a Palestinian gathering, it has, as far as we were able to establish, never formally acknowledged that Shabriha has a *right* to dispose of its waste at the factory. Consequently, Shabriha relied heavily on the brokering role of the *mukhtar* and his political affiliations.

[A Head] *Analysis and discussion: from violent conflict to marginalising governance arrangements to environmental vulnerability* [/A Head]

So how does the above-described account of Shabriha's response to the waste crisis resonate with the broader nexus between conflict and environmental vulnerability? As we established

in the opening section of this article, the relation between violent conflict and environmental vulnerability is often an indirect one. The waste crisis weathered by Shabriha demonstrates this well. Shabriha's vulnerability to the environmental effects of the waste crisis resulted from the particular governance arrangements it found itself in. These arrangements, in turn, were importantly shaped by violent conflict. War did not affect the *exposure* of Shabriha to environmental risk, as the waste crisis was not caused by violent conflict, but it did crucially determine Shabriha's *sensitivity* and *resilience*, as the governance arrangements that hampered Shabriha's response to the crisis followed from a history of war.

First, the very fact that the Palestinian refugees were in Shabriha in the first place is a direct consequence of the epitome of all Middle Eastern conflicts: the 1948 *Nakba* in which the Palestinians were forcefully expelled from their land in the process of the establishment of the state of Israel. Had the Israeli-Palestinian conflict not occurred, or had UN General Assembly Resolution 194 that stipulates the Palestinian refugees' right to return to Palestine been implemented by now, the Palestinian community in Shabriha would not have been there to face the waste crisis to begin with. Indeed, 'the prolonged exile of refugees is a manifestation of failures to end conflict'.⁷⁸

Second, the legacy of the Lebanese Civil War is an important part of the explanation for the Palestinian's exclusion from the municipal service mandate for two main reasons. On the one hand, the war all but destroyed the institutional infrastructure of the Lebanese state in South Lebanon.⁷⁹ The minimal capacity of the municipality of Abasiye in terms of finances and human resources—that it presents as its main motivation to prioritise providing services to tax-paying Lebanese, rather than to 'free-riding' Palestinians—should be seen in light of the just commencing post-war reconstruction.⁸⁰ Tassabehji notes:

In Lebanon, solid waste management falls under the responsibility of cash-strapped municipalities. Lack of funds, decades of civil war, corruption, and a

*weak tax system have all led to widespread environmental problems that municipalities are no longer able to deal with. In addition, due to the never ending political instability, no comprehensive national regulation scheme has been able to be implemented.*⁸¹

On the other hand, the exclusion of Shabriha's Palestinians from the mandate of Abasiye cannot be understood without reference to the lingering animosity between the Lebanese and Palestinian communities in the region that was created by the War of the Camps (1985–1987).⁸² The War of the Camps was a particularly atrocious episode of the Civil War that pitted Lebanese affiliated with the Amal party against the Palestinians and their PLO protectors. These hostilities particularly concerned the official camps, especially those in Beirut, but also had their local manifestation in Shabriha and its surroundings.⁸³ In general, in Lebanon, there is rather little goodwill towards the Palestinians at large as a result of the (perceived) role of the PLO throughout the Civil War.⁸⁴ Lebanese often see the Palestinian community, and especially their political and military representatives, as having instigated or at least exacerbated the Civil War. Indeed, the question of whether the PLO should be allowed to launch its resistance against Israel from Lebanese soil (with all ensuing retaliations that would entail) is broadly acknowledged to have been one of the key drivers of the war.⁸⁵ This issue was particularly salient for South Lebanon as it comprised the actual front of this Palestinian resistance and Israeli counter-insurgency.⁸⁶ It was here that the PLO established its 'state-within-the-state' and had its revolutionaries grow increasingly oppressive vis-à-vis the Lebanese population and it was here that the Israeli retribution that sought to turn the Lebanese population against the Palestinian refugees became gradually more successful.⁸⁷

Third, the Lebanese government's refusal to formally recognise the PCs as representatives of the Palestinian refugee communities in their country generated a lack of

formal representation that importantly determined Shabriha's options to deal with the waste crisis. This refusal is largely informed by the logic dictated by Lebanon's sectarian political system that is determined by quotas dividing all public positions and resources on the basis of sectarian affiliation. In Karamé's words:

*[In Lebanon,] the president of the Republic is always a Maronite, the prime minister always Sunni and the president of the Parliament a Shi'a. The intention behind this 'consociational democracy' was to guarantee political representation for all the various religious sects, but the arrangement has also been grounds for inter-sectarian conflict.*⁸⁸

While sectarianism was not caused by the Civil War, the Taif Accords marking the end of the war certainly further ensconced it as the main rationale for conducting politics in Lebanon.⁸⁹ Kaufman summarises: 'As a state founded on the basis of a delicate balance between its sects, the [overwhelmingly Sunni] Palestinian refugees were perceived as a threat to Lebanon's political order'.⁹⁰ It is, in a nutshell, this sectarianism that leads to the disproportionate fear of 'permanent settlement' or 'integration' of the Palestinians in Lebanon (*tawteen*) and, in its wake, the idea that any form of formal interaction or socio-economic emancipation would be a precursor of the Palestinian nationalisation that would disrupt Lebanon's precarious political balance and reignite civil war.⁹¹ Refugees, in such a state of affairs, are first and foremost 'a potential source of domestic and regional instability'.⁹²

In short, the legacy of the *Nakba*, the Civil War and the related sectarian design of Lebanon's political order have led to a distinct securitisation of the 'Palestinian file' by the Lebanese state,⁹³ a dynamic that has only been reinforced by the Nahr al-Bared clashes.⁹⁴ In this context, as Loescher and Milner pose, 'local and national grievances are particularly heightened when refugees compete with local populations for resources, jobs and social services', such as waste management.⁹⁵ There is a 'deep-seated prejudice that many Lebanese

hold for Palestinians, which is in favour of keeping the Palestinians socially, politically and economically marginalized'.⁹⁶ Combined with the ambiguous institutional status of the gatherings—where the state can neither completely relinquish its governance authority as it does in the camps, nor fully assert it as it strives to do in Lebanese villages⁹⁷—this created a situation where 'a commitment to meaningful partnership has been absent'.⁹⁸ The Lebanese state, as far and as long as possible 'actively avoids engaging with the Palestinian refugees or their leaders' in any formal way.⁹⁹ In this light, McCormack's claim that the SEPP programme, of which the new recycling factory was part, 'has helped reduce tensions between communities' seems misleading.¹⁰⁰ Instead, the discrimination based on the categorisation of 'Lebanese', 'Palestinians from the camps' and 'Palestinians from the gatherings' is likely to have exacerbated existing tensions. It also underlines the fact that host states tend to see refugee populations as 'both an unending burden and a security concern'.¹⁰¹

Thus, violent conflict did not cause the waste crisis, but the legacy of former conflicts and the fear of future ones did shape the governance arrangements Shabriha was subject to. These arrangements became evident in the community's exclusion from official service mandates and the lack of formal recognition of their representatives. It was these arrangements that determined how severe the effects of the crisis would be for the gathering and the options it had at its disposal to deal with it—options that were limited to indirect, informal and politicised coping strategies. These observations underscore that dynamics of armed conflict matter for environmental vulnerability. However, it was not the *extent* to which Shabriha was confronted with the waste crisis (exposure) that was determined by dynamics of conflict, but the *damage* the crisis did to the community (sensitivity) and the coping and *response mechanisms* to mitigate this damage that were available to Shabriha (resilience).

Governance in post-conflict settings cannot be separated from the governance patterns that emerge and are cemented during war, often comprising the ‘institutionalization of authority beyond the state’.¹⁰² In Lebanon, governance is characterised by a multiplicity of political authorities (both state and non-state), a plurality of political institutions (de jure policies and de facto practices) and a volatility of political structures (protracted sectarianism with changeable alliances).¹⁰³ It is only in light of the institutionally devastating Civil War that these governance arrangements can be properly understood.¹⁰⁴ And it is only in light of this hybrid governance, in turn, that degrees and patterns of sensitivity and resilience can be explained.

This article’s case study has made this assertion concrete by, first, documenting the diversity of political authorities that Shabriha had to deal with in the waste crisis and the relations among them. While Shabriha’s PC and PARD petitioned state actors such as municipalities, the Union and the *mukhtar*, they also had to handle non-state actors with political influence, such as UNRWA and political parties.¹⁰⁵ Second, in terms of the governance institutions shaping the course of the waste crisis, de jure and de facto logics were caught in a deadlock: the formal exclusion from the municipality’s and UNRWA’s official mandates could ultimately not be countered without recourse to unofficial practices such as ‘lobbying’ political figures and local authorities and utilisation of political ‘weight’. Third, the dynamism of political structures was apparent in the fluidity of official mandates on the Lebanese side (residents of Lebanese Shabriha living on the territory of one municipality and voting for the council of another and the de facto independence of the village’s *mukhtar*). This presents a stark contrast with the rigidity of such mandates on the Palestinian side (the unyielding exclusion by the Union of Municipalities and UNRWA was only circumvented with, again, help from the Lebanese *mukhtar*).

[A Head] *Conclusions: the consequences of a protracted lack of entitlements*

[/A Head]

In this article, we discussed the vulnerability of the Palestinian gathering of Shabriha during a solid waste management crisis it faced in 2012. Shabriha's sensitivity towards this crisis and the resilience it could muster to deal with its environmental risks were crucially shaped by a governance context produced by the legacy of violent conflict. This corroborates Podder's assertion that the 'informalisation of decision-making' can be one of the most pertinent longer-term consequences of war.¹⁰⁶ The article demonstrated that while Shabriha's coping strategies were limited to informal, indirect and politicised modes, they were nevertheless there. This illustrates the social capital inherent in Lebanon's strong and multiple 'civil societies'.¹⁰⁷ By the grace of the *mukhtar*'s institutional and political facilitation, Shabriha's PC and PARD were able to cut an implicit deal with the Union of Municipalities of Sur that the recycling factory would accept all waste collected by PARD, from Lebanese *and* Palestinian Shabriha. While later than the Lebanese villages and the official Palestinian camps, eventually Shabriha also solved its waste crisis. As such, it could be concluded, all is well that ends well.

However, while the waste crisis demonstrates Shabriha's immediate resilience, it also forebodes a further entrenchment of its sensitivity. Shabriha is a telling example of the fact that resilience can emerge despite exclusion from formal governance structures concerning contingency planning, disaster management, emergency response and government support. Yet, in the longer run, this resilience risks reinforcing rather than overcoming existing vulnerabilities, as outlined in figure 2 below. The very fact that Shabriha's indirect, informal and politicised coping strategies were, in the end, 'successful' sets a strong precedent. The assumption of the PC of Shabriha that these are the strategies that work will be confirmed, just as the local authorities and UNRWA will be comforted by the knowledge that, when

push comes to shove, the Palestinians can indeed do without them. For both, such precedents might diminish the need to arrange inclusion of the Palestinians from the gatherings in formal service provision mandates, recognise a direct Palestinian counterpart and move towards a rights-based approach to service delivery. This is problematic because the ‘state avoidance’ heralded in such precedents is, for the disenfranchised Palestinian communities, especially those outside the camps, a symptom of deprivation rather than a form of freedom.¹⁰⁸

[f] figure 2 here [/f]

Resilience is often based on de facto precedents rather than de jure policies. This means that coping strategies rooted in indirect, informal and politicised rationales ultimately make the Palestinian gatherings even more sensitive to environmental and social risks. Resilience is not merely context specific, but (partially) path dependent as well.¹⁰⁹ The sensitivity to current crises depends on the forms of resilience that surfaced in previous ones. Respondents were quite convinced that the solution they had reached would not help them if another waste crisis was to occur—something they saw as a matter of ‘when’ rather than ‘if’. A communal leader called the agreement reached with the Union a ‘partial solution’, because: ‘Each factory opened will be saturated after a few years and the problem will start again. Just look at the mountain of waste in Saida’.¹¹⁰ PARD’s driver said: ‘There is no special contract; there is just the agreement with the Union of Municipalities’.¹¹¹ When asked what would happen if the Union changed its mind, he answered: ‘This is unknowable; it might or might not happen’.¹¹² A PARD spokesperson agreed that in the future: ‘Some municipalities will allow PARD to dump the gatherings’ waste, others won’t; in any case there is no comprehensive solution’.¹¹³

This institutionalisation of vulnerability through informal, indirect and politicised precedents resonates closely with the entitlements approach to vulnerability. The entitlement concept was developed to ground ‘vulnerability analysis in theories of social change and decision-making’.¹¹⁴ Entitlements—here seen as collective, communal, features rather than individual assets¹¹⁵—can be understood as the legal and customary rights to exercise command over ‘necessities of life’, for instance solid waste management.¹¹⁶ In their ‘architecture of entitlements’ model, Adger and Kelly position vulnerability in ‘the wider political economy’.¹¹⁷ They do so by demanding attention to, first, the distribution of entitlements at the community level, but also, second, the ‘institutional context within which entitlements are formed, contested and distributed over time and among groups’.¹¹⁸ This underlines the ways in which the consequences and anticipation of violent conflict have resulted in a situation where the Palestinian communities in the gatherings are not entitled to formal representation. This also meant they were excluded from the deals brokered for either the Lebanese villages or the Palestinian camps. The concept of entitlement shows that it is not the existence or even availability of resources that determines vulnerability, but ‘the extent to which individuals, groups or communities are “entitled” to make use of these resources’.¹¹⁹ Shabriha’s vulnerability did not follow from the fact that solutions to the waste crisis were unavailable, but from the fact that these solutions were not accessible for the particular population of Shabriha, because they were, based on the existing UNRWA and municipality mandates, not entitled to them.

Entitlement theory, furthermore, highlights the importance of incorporating ‘the system’s restructuring after the responses taken’ into our analysis.¹²⁰ It thereby sheds light on the paradox that short-term resilience might in the long run aggravate sensitivity. In the case of the waste crisis in Shabriha, a narrow focus on the crisis as such would suggest an improvement in the gathering’s situation: from no dumping place to a dumping place.

However, widening the scope of the analysis beyond the specific crisis reveals that a more negative, and more systemic, restructuring has also taken place: from formal access to the original waste dump in Ras al-Ain (where anyone who paid had access) to informal access to the new factory in Ain al-Baal (where access was only granted by ‘selling’ Shabriha’s ‘Palestinian’ waste as ‘Lebanese’).

As Adger notes, ‘vulnerable people and places are often excluded from decision-making and from access to power and resources’, which means that structural readjustments following the waste crisis discussed here are not likely to benefit Shabriha’s Palestinians.¹²¹ Indeed, ‘social units are not passive’.¹²² But ‘adaptive actions often reduce the vulnerability of those best placed to take advantage of governance institutions, rather than reduce the vulnerability of the marginalized, or the undervalued parts of the social-ecological system’.¹²³ This ties in with conceptualisations of hybrid governance. It echoes Lund’s observation that ‘plurality of institutions may open alternative avenues for some—also for poorer people—but the more affluent, the better connected, and the more knowledgeable tend to have the upper hands in such contexts’.¹²⁴ Cleaver has also noted that crises might ‘not just reproduce, but reinforce social divisions’.¹²⁵ Therefore, while it is certainly true that vulnerability is not a static attribute of a community, it might similarly be misleading to overstate its dynamism.¹²⁶

The very welcome shift—in the social and political sciences at large and in refugee studies in particular—from seeing marginalised groups predominantly as victims to regarding them as active political agents of change needs to take these dynamics into consideration.¹²⁷ In instances such as Shabriha’s waste crisis, the entitlement perspective shows how vulnerability, rooted as it is in institutional structures and governance arrangements, can often be remarkably protracted, even to the extent that short-term resilience strategies further cement long-term sensitivities. We thus agree with Adger and Kelly that while ‘short-term extreme events’ could trigger systematic adaptation, ‘social, resource and entitlement

inequalities are rarely overturned in the course of adaptation'.¹²⁸ Crises might constitute triggers for immediate change, but this change is often temporary, obscuring a more durable lack of entitlements. Public goods dilemmas such as those posed by the waste crisis are therefore ultimately about more than pragmatic service delivery. They are acutely political episodes touching on political aspirations and institutional norms.¹²⁹ As such, they necessitate 'not only humanitarian but also political solutions'.¹³⁰ In the end, 'improving Palestinian life and legitimising Palestinian governance' is a necessary, if not sufficient, condition for 'Lebanon to succeed in promoting security and stability'.¹³¹

[A Head] *Acknowledgements* [/A Head]

We are grateful to two anonymous reviewers for their helpful feedback on previous versions of this article and to the Hendrik Muller Fonds and the Lutfia Rabbani Foundation for awarding fieldwork grants. We thank Nora's research partner Asma for her invaluable commitment and friendship during fieldwork. Most of all, we are immensely thankful to all Palestinian and Lebanese people who helped throughout the research and to PARD, which has greatly aided our research. This work was supported by the Hendrik Muller Fonds under a Fieldwork Grant and the Lutfia Rabbani Foundation under a Travel Scholarship Grant.

[A Head] *Endnotes* [/A Head]

¹ Boege et al., 'Hybrid Political Orders'; Hagmann and Péclard, 'Negotiating Statehood'; Engberg-Pedersen et al., 'Fragile Situations'; Ramadan, 'The Guests' Guests'. See also Lund, 'Twilight Institutions'; Cleaver, 'Institutional Bricolage'; Podder, 'Mainstreaming the Non-State'; Bacik, *Hybrid Sovereignty*; Fregonese, 'Beyond the "Weak State"'.
² Allan, *Refugees of the Revolution*.

³ Loescher et al., 'Protracted Refugee Situations', 492; Loescher and Milner, 'Protracted Refugee Situations', 4.

⁴ Loescher et al., 'Protracted Refugee Situations'; Raffonelli, 'With Palestine'.

⁵ Loescher and Milner, 'Protracted Refugee Situations', 12–13.

⁶ Long and Hanafi, 'Human (In)security', 681.

⁷ Loescher and Milner, 'Protracted Refugee Situations', 12–13. See also Brynen, 'Building a Better Relationship'.

⁸ Stel, 'Governance between Isolation and Integration'; Stel, 'Lebanese-Palestinian Governance Interaction'.

⁹ Participants were sampled theoretically, targeting individuals representing relevant governance actors, and via 'snowballing'. Interviews were conducted with the help of a translator. While not all data directly touched upon the waste crisis, as this was just one out of five vignettes, all interviews contributed to the analysis presented in this article by enhancing contextual understanding.

¹⁰ Van der Molen and Stel, 'Conflict and Environment'; Le Billon, 'The Political Ecology'; Collier, 'The Political Economy'.

¹¹ Podder, 'Mainstreaming the Non-State', 216.

¹² The Nahr al-Bared clashes refer to the fighting between militants related to Fatah al-Islam that had installed themselves in the Palestinian camp of Nahr el-Bared in North Lebanon and the LAF and the subsequent destruction of almost the entire camp. Apart from its obvious humanitarian impact, the fighting also had important political repercussions as it indicated the end of the Lebanese state's post-Civil War non-interference policy towards the Palestinian camps (see Ramadan, 'Destroying Nahr el-Bared' for an excellent analysis of the events).

¹³ Karamé, 'Reintegration'; Atzili, 'State Weakness'.

¹⁴ Turner et al., 'A Framework for Vulnerability', 8074.

¹⁵ Adger, ‘Vulnerability’; Turner et al., ‘A Framework for Vulnerability’.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Bevir, ‘Governance as Theory’; Hoffmann and Kirk, ‘Public Authority’; Kooiman, *Governing as Governance*.

¹⁸ Hoffmann and Kirk, ‘Public Authority’. See also Stel, ‘Governance between Isolation and Integration’.

¹⁹ Khalidi and Riskedahl, ‘The Lived Reality’, 1.

²⁰ Chabaan et al., *Socio-Economic Survey*; Al-Natour, ‘The Legal Status’; Suleiman, ‘Marginalized Community’.

²¹ Hanafi, ‘Governing the Palestinian Refugee Camps’.

²² Knudsen and Hanafi, *Palestinian Refugees*.

²³ Long and Hanafi, ‘Human (In)security’, 676; Czajka, ‘Discursive Constructions’. The debate about why the Lebanese state has not retaken control over the camps after its abrogation of the Cairo Agreement is far from settled. Yet, authoritative scholars agree that an explanation for the currently ambiguous situation should be sought in the interests of the Lebanese state. As it is, the Lebanese state has the potentiality of establishing sovereignty when it deems fit while at the same time avoiding the reality of bearing responsibility for security and welfare in the camps (see Martin, ‘The “Where” of Sovereign Power’, 181–182; and Ramadan, ‘Destroying Nahr el-Bared’, 158).

²⁴ DRC, *Needs Assessment of Palestinian Refugees*, 4–5.

²⁵ PARD, ‘Annual Report’, 7; PU and NRC, ‘Needs Assessment in the Palestinian Gatherings’; Ugland, *Difficult Past, Uncertain Future*.

²⁶ DRC, *Needs Assessment of Palestinian Refugees*, 4–5; PU and NRC, ‘Needs Assessment in the Palestinian Gatherings’, 18.

²⁷ DRC, *Needs Assessment of Palestinian Refugees*, 15; PARD, ‘Annual Report’, 9.

²⁸ UNDP and UN-HABITAT, 'Towards Sustainable Solutions'.

²⁹ PARD, 'Annual Report', 14.

³⁰ UNDP and UN-HABITAT, 'Towards Sustainable Solutions'.

³¹ Bashir Barrage, 'Ras al-Ain Dump Blamed for Contaminating Drinking Water'. *The Daily Star*, 25 October 2003; Jadam, 'Solid Waste', 280; Nathanael Massey, 'Out of Sight... But Lebanon's Dumps Won't Stay Hidden Forever'. *The Daily Star*, 2 November 2009; Mohammed Zaatari, 'Waste Crisis in Sidon and Tyre Intensifies'. *The Daily Star*, 18 March 2011.

³² McCormack, 'Strengthening Local Governance'; Jadam, 'Solid Waste', 276; USAID, 'Sustainable Environmental Practices'; YMCA, 'SEPP Program'. Interview with waste entrepreneur, Sur, 6 July 2013; interview with owner waste dumpsite, Sur, 1 July 2013; interview with UNRWA sanitation officer, Sur, 25 June 2013; interview with PARD garbage truck driver, Shabriha, 28 July 2013.

³³ Barrage, 'Ras al-Ain Dump'; Zaatari, 'Waste Crisis in Sidon'.

³⁴ Kobaissi et al., 'Further Curing of Lebanese Compost', 200. Interview with the head of the Union of PCs in Sur, Bourj el-Shemali camp, Sur, 7 May 2013.

³⁵ Barrage, 'Ras al-Ain Dump'.

³⁶ Massey, 'Out of Sight'.

³⁷ Tassabehji, 'Lebanon's "Wasted" Opportunity'.

³⁸ Interview, Sur, 6 July 2013.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Interview, Shabriha, 17 May 2013.

⁴¹ Massey, 'Out of Sight'.

⁴² Interview, Sur, 25 June 2013.

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- ⁴³ Interview with a representative of a Palestinian NGO, Al Bass camp, Sur, 18 June 2013; interview with PARD garbage truck driver, Shabriha, 28 July 2013; interview with communal leader, Shabriha, 19 July 2013.
- ⁴⁴ Interview, Sur, 6 July 2013.
- ⁴⁵ Interview, Beirut, 4 June 2013.
- ⁴⁶ Interview with district governor, Sur, 29 April 2013.
- ⁴⁷ UN-HABITAT and UNDP, *Investigating Grey Areas*, 30.
- ⁴⁸ Interview with the head of the Union of PCs in Sur, Bourj el-Shemali camp, Sur, 7 May 2013; interview with director and vice director of UNRWA's camp improvement and infrastructure programme, Beirut, 29 March 2013.
- ⁴⁹ Unpublished documents in Arabic obtained from the head of the Union of PCs in Sur in Bourj el-Shemali camp, Sur on 7 May 2013 (translated by a research assistant).
- ⁵⁰ LPDC, 'Access to Basic Urban Services'.
- ⁵¹ Interview with waste entrepreneur, Sur, 6 July 2013.
- ⁵² Interview with UNRWA sanitation officer, Sur, 25 June 2013; interview with the head of the Union of PCs of Sur, Bourj el-Shemali camp, Sur, 7 May 2013; interview with PARD driver, Shabriha, 27 April 2013; interview with communal leader, Shabriha, 8 June 2013.
- ⁵³ Interview with UNRWA sanitation officer, Sur, 25 June 2013; interview with UNRWA regional co-ordinator, Sur, 15 May 2013.
- ⁵⁴ Interview, Bourj el-Shemali camp, Sur, 7 May 2013.
- ⁵⁵ Interview with waste entrepreneur, Sur, 6 July 2013.
- ⁵⁶ Interview, Sur, 25 June 2013.
- ⁵⁷ Turner et al., 'A Framework for Vulnerability', 8075.
- ⁵⁸ Interview with the owner of a waste dumpsite, Sur, 1 July 2013.
- ⁵⁹ Interview with communal leader, Shabriha, 8 June 2013.

⁶⁰ Interview with PARD garbage truck driver, Shabriha, 27 April 2013; interview with communal leader, Shabriha, 19 July 2013; interview with the PC secretary, Shabriha, 2 April 2013; interview with communal leader, Shabriha, 18 May 2013.

⁶¹ Interviews with the PC secretary, Shabriha, 2 April and 16 July 2013.

⁶² Interview, Shabriha, 5 April 2013.

⁶³ Stel, 'The Children of the State?'

⁶⁴ Interview with the mayor of Abasiye, Abasiye, 10 June 2013; interview with the vice-mayor of Abasiye, Abasiye, 1 July 2013; interview with a member of the PC from Jal al-Bahar, Sur, 1 April 2013.

⁶⁵ Interview with communal leader, Shabriha, 8 June 2013.

⁶⁶ Stel, 'The Children of the State?'

⁶⁷ Interview, Lebanese Shabriha, 3 April 2013.

⁶⁸ Interview, Sur, 25 June 2013.

⁶⁹ Interview, Sur, 6 July 2013.

⁷⁰ Jadam, 'Solid Waste', 276.

⁷¹ USAID, 'Sustainable Environmental Practices', 20.

⁷² Interview with PARD garbage truck driver, Shabriha, 27 April 2013; interview with PARD representative, Beirut, 28 May 2013; interview with communal leader, Shabriha, 8 June 2013; interview with a PC member, Shabriha, 26 July 2013.

⁷³ Interview with the *mukhtar*, Lebanese Shabriha, 23 July 2013.

⁷⁴ Interview with PARD garbage truck driver, Shabriha, 28 July 2013.

⁷⁵ Interview, Saida, 8 May 2013.

⁷⁶ Interview with the *mukhtar*, Lebanese Shabriha, 3 April 2013; interview with waste entrepreneur, Sur, 6 July 2013.

⁷⁷ Interview with UNRWA's regional co-ordinator for Sur, Sur, 15 May 2013.

⁷⁸ Loescher et al., 'Protracted Refugee Situations', 492.

⁷⁹ Leenders, *Spoils of Truce*.

⁸⁰ McCormack, 'Strengthening Local Governance', 189. See also El-Mikawi and Melim-McCloud, *Lebanon. Local Governance*.

⁸¹ Tassabehji, 'Lebanon's "Wasted" Opportunity'.

⁸² Long and Hanafi, 'Human (In)security', 686.

⁸³ Doraï, 'From Camp Dwellers', 13; Sfeir 'Palestinians in Lebanon'; interview with NGO representative, Sur, 13 May 2013; interview with resident, Shabriha, 22 May 2013; interview with the *mukhtar*, Abasiye, 25 April 2013; interview with a youth leader, Shabriha, 1 May 2013; interview with the PC secretary, Shabriha, 16 July 2013.

⁸⁴ Czajka, 'Discursive Constructions'; Haddad, 'The Origins of Popular Opposition'; Karamé, 'Reintegration'.

⁸⁵ Fisk, *Pity the Nation*; Hirst, *Beware of Small States*.

⁸⁶ Beydoun, 'The South Lebanon Border Zone'.

⁸⁷ Meier, 'The Palestinian Fadâ'i'; Beydoun, 'The South Lebanon Border Zone'. The relation between South Lebanon's Palestinian and Lebanese communities is complex (to the extent that it is beyond the scope of the current article). It knows periods of great solidarity in addition to the more antagonistic components emphasised in our analysis (see Beydoun, 'The South Lebanon Border Zone'; and Stel, 'Children of the State?').

⁸⁸ Karamé, 'Reintegration', 497–498.

⁸⁹ Maila, 'The Document of National Understanding', 159.

⁹⁰ Kaufman, 'Between Palestine and Lebanon', 695.

⁹¹ El-Khazen, 'Permanent Settlement of Palestinians'; Meier, 'Al Tawteen'.

⁹² Loescher et al., 'Protracted Refugee Situations', 494. See also Richter-Devroe, 'Like Something Sacred'.

⁹³ Knudsen, ‘Nahr al-Bared’; Raffonelli, ‘With Palestine’.

⁹⁴ Long and Hanafi, ‘Human (In)security’; Czajka, ‘Discursive Constructions’.

⁹⁵ Loescher and Milner, ‘Protracted Refugee Situations’, 12–13.

⁹⁶ Long and Hanafi, ‘Human (In)security’, 678.

⁹⁷ There is no legal reason for Lebanese authorities to avoid accessing or servicing the gatherings (they are, after all, located on Lebanese land and were never part of the stipulations put forward by the Cairo Agreement). Lebanese authorities can, and indeed do, enter the gatherings. Police and army officials have been reported to occasionally patrol in the gatherings and utility providers related to *Électricité du Liban* also work there sometimes. Yet, it would be misleading to conceive of the presence of the Lebanese state in Palestinian gatherings as similar to that in Lebanese villages. This relative absence of Lebanese state representatives in the gatherings is a matter of abandonment by the Lebanese state as much as sovereignty or autonomy on the side of the Palestinian authorities (see the discussion on this with regard to the official camps in note 24).

⁹⁸ Long and Hanafi, ‘Human (In)security’, 677.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 680.

¹⁰⁰ McCormack, ‘Strengthening Local Governance’, 188.

¹⁰¹ Loescher et al., ‘Protracted Refugee Situations’, 494.

¹⁰² Podder, ‘Mainstreaming the Non-State’, 218. See also Richards, *No Peace, No War*.

¹⁰³ Van der Molen and Stel, ‘Conflict and Environment’, 6.

¹⁰⁴ See Mac Ginty, ‘Reconstructing Post-War Lebanon’ for a relevant illustration.

¹⁰⁵ The status of Lebanon’s political parties and their connection to, or independence from, the Lebanese state is complex (Fregonese, ‘Beyond the “Weak State”’). In the case study central to this article, however, representatives of political parties acted as delegates of these individual parties (that have their own administrative, financial and institutional infrastructure

independent from the state bureaucracy) more than as spokespersons of the government, parliament or municipalities in which these parties also take part. As such, we categorise them as non-state actors in this particular case.

¹⁰⁶ Podder, 'Mainstreaming the Non-State', 235.

¹⁰⁷ Mac Ginty, 'Reconstructing Post-War Lebanon', 465.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 478. See also Stel, 'Children of the State?'

¹⁰⁹ Turner et al., 'A Framework for Vulnerability', 8076.

¹¹⁰ Interview, Shabriha, 18 May 2013.

¹¹¹ Interview with PARD waste driver, Shabriha, 27 April 2013.

¹¹² *Ibid.*

¹¹³ Interview with PARD representative, Beirut, 13 September 2012.

¹¹⁴ Adger, 'Vulnerability', 269. See also Adger and Kelly, 'Social Vulnerability'.

¹¹⁵ Adger and Kelly, 'Social Vulnerability', 258.

¹¹⁶ Turner et al., 'A Framework for Vulnerability', 8075.

¹¹⁷ Adger and Kelly, 'Social Vulnerability', 256.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*

¹²⁰ Turner et al., 'A Framework for Vulnerability', 8075.

¹²¹ Adger, 'Vulnerability', 276.

¹²² Turner et al., 'A Framework for Vulnerability', 8075.

¹²³ *Ibid.*

¹²⁴ Lund, 'Twilight Institutions', 700.

¹²⁵ Cleaver, 'Institutional Bricolage', 30. See also Adger, 'Vulnerability', 277. This is especially pertinent considering that it is often formal institutions that 'determine the nature

of adaptation through the policy-learning process' (Adger and Kelly, 'Social Vulnerability', 258).

¹²⁶ Adger and Kelly, 'Social Vulnerability', 259.

¹²⁷ Richter-Devroe, 'Like Something Sacred', 95.

¹²⁸ Ibid., 257–258.

¹²⁹ Mac Ginty, 'Reconstructing Post-War Lebanon', 479.

¹³⁰ Loescher et al., 'Protracted Refugee Situations', 7.

¹³¹ Long and Hanafi, 'Human (In)security', 690.

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