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Family policy patterns in autocratic countries

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INTRODUCTION

While the literature on family policy in modern and western democracies is vast, there are few single or comparative studies of family policy in autocratic countries. This chapter therefore breaks new ground for comparative analysis. Autocracies are defined by the narrow concentration of governance and their coercive hold on power: extreme autocratic regimes are found in various geographical areas in Asia, Africa, Eastern Europe, Latin America and the Middle East. Autocratic countries include states such as Russia, China, Saudi Arabia, Cuba and Ethiopia. Until now, autocratic countries have had little attention from the family policy research community. As family policy has expanded globally, theoretical analysis has concentrated on western democracies, even though in some cases, autocracies have more generous family policy in eligibility and social expenditure than western democracies. It is surprising that autocratic countries are rarely used as country cases in family policy research or family policy regime typologies and very little is known about how policy instruments are applied or how policies have developed over time. Welfare state theories have emphasized causal factors in policy development such as politics, power and institutions: this makes the study of autocracies and their specific cases of governance and power dynamics especially relevant for investigating how politics, power and institutions affect policy. Family policy theorists have also concentrated on how policy affects gender equality and, yet, rarely is a step taken in order to analyse policy in countries with extremely unequal shares of power between men and women, social classes or ethnicities. An examination of family policy in states with widely disparate distributions of power could offer a multifaceted analysis of family policy, its development and instruments.

The close observation of autocracies and family policy is only at its initial stages, and this chapter is unique in analysing some patterns across autocracies. Our chapter asks the following questions: (1) What variations in family policy are there in autocratic countries – in particular, what patterns can be found in autocratic family leave policy? (2) How might such variations be explained? (3) How can such comparisons contribute to further family policy and gender analysis? Where feasible, we will make reference to autocratic countries in comparison to democratic ones. In particular, we examine how the characteristics of family leave policy in autocratic countries differ according to regime type in autocratic literature. We define family leave as paid or unpaid maternity, paternity and parental leave for the care of small children. The variations that we find in autocracies are distinctly grouped together and we propose that these variations should be explored with explanations of autocratic regime types and geographical locations. Culture and ideology is another factor that is worth exploring for family leave variation among autocracies. We hypothesize that with an examination of family policy from the perspective of autocracies, new issues emerge that offer a new view to old theories but also to fundamental assumptions about the function of family policy, such as family policy's role in the legitimization of a state, its strong relationship to cultural heritages, and its explicit and implicit confirmation of societal ideals and ideology.

In the next section of this chapter we provide a literature review of approaches to examining autocratic regime types, family policy variation and family leave in autocracies. We present the theories outlined above as well as social policy analysis that has until now only concentrated, for example, on institutions, industrial development, social movements or political representation in democratically run governments. In the following section we outline our method, the data and our approach. We then proceed to compare demographics in autocracies, comparing economic activity of men and women as well as fertility and growth rates, which are central control variables for potential variations in family policies across countries and will be tested in the further analysis. The next section shows patterns of family leave policy, based on eligibility, length of leaves, generosity and differences for mothers and fathers. We then summarize the diversity of family policy across a number of autocracies, discuss patterns and approaches to family policy, analyse emerging gender issues and discuss explanations for such patterns. Heterogeneity in autocratic family policy is not surprising because, with absolute power, autocrats can change policies quite easily, but we argue in our conclusion that these patterns are not arbitrary, but depend on path-dependent trajectories as well as tradition and culture.

LITERATURE REVIEW

How does the literature define and characterize autocracies and can theoretical approaches applied to western democratic family policy variation also be applied to family policy patterns in autocracies? To answer the first question, autocracies have been defined generally as political systems ‘in which the rulers are insufficiently, or not at all, subject to antecedent and enforceable rules of law – enforceable, that is, by other authorities who share in the government and who have sufficient power to compel the lawbreaking rulers to submit to the law’ (Friedrich and Brzezinski, 1965, p. 5). There are three major data sets that rank autocratic institutions on a scale based on civil society, civil rights, political participation, representation and free elections. The Bertelsmann Foundation’s Transformation Index (BTI) measures the quality of democracy and economic development in two-year cycles. The Freedom House is another measure based on global freedom and the implementation of political rights and civil liberties. The last index, and the one we use for choosing our sample, is the annual Democracy Index published by the Economist Intelligence Unit. Democracies and autocracies are measured and compared to one another on a scale of full democracies, flawed democracies, hybrid regimes and autocratic regimes; at the extreme, there were 51 cases of autocracies in 2016.

In terms of measuring and explaining variation within autocracies, the literature seems to agree on general typologies. There is some cross-over between types, but, for the most part, mainstream literature on autocracies explain variance in terms of how autocratic governments institutionalize and legitimize their power (see Geddes, 1999, 2007; Hadenius and Teorell, 2007; Kailitz, 2013). Legitimization and justification of autocratic power are important factors in autocracies, according to the literature, because they do not otherwise receive social validation through free speech and fair elections. Following Kailitz (2013), a typology of these regimes and their legitimization is as follows (see Table 22.1 for a full categorization):

- *Ideological autocracies* uphold legitimization of power through ideology, such as a (former) communist or religious ideological tradition. Examples of communist ideological autocracies are China, Cuba, Laos, North Korea and Vietnam.
- *Electoral autocracies* legitimize power through controlled elections. Examples include Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, Russia and Zimbabwe.

- *One-party autocracies* legitimize themselves as a single and major ‘people’s party’, so electoral competition of political alternatives is discouraged and opposition is illegitimate. Examples are Chad and Uzbekistan.
- *Military regimes* legitimize their power through force as they decide on regulations and norms according to their own will without procedural justification. A current example is Mauritania.
- *Monarchies* legitimize themselves by drawing on the ‘natural’ right of the monarch to govern. Examples are Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
- *Personalist autocracies* are characterized by a lack of comprehensive institutions to legitimize a powerful individual who can change the political and societal rules arbitrarily. Examples include Eritrea and Sudan.

To answer the second question, we assume in this chapter that (family) policy plays an important role in legitimizing autocratic regimes, and we test whether specific family policy instruments will correspond to this autocratic typology. Because autocracies need to legitimize their power, we surmise with our first hypothesis that certain family policy patterns will emerge connected to legitimization types. Analogous to the autocratic regime types are institutional constellations of autocratic power and our first hypothesis finds that institutionalism is a probable explanation for autocratic family policy variation. Because the availability of data on autocracies is limited and because we are examining 50 autocracies, an in-depth examination of historical institutionalism or path dependency is beyond the limits of this chapter. However, we explore family policy variation according to societal traditions and cultural settings, by testing a second hypothesis that regimes’ family policy types are based on geographical location. (For more on cultural influences on family policy, see Pfau-Effinger, 2012.) The neo-Marxist approach is another theory that focuses directly on unions and collective actors as playing a role in promoting highly developed employment-related social policy. We find relatively little evidence in autocracies for strong union clout because civil society is weak in autocracies. However, indirectly related to union organization, communist ideology seems to be found in well-developed family leave policy, which is another correlation we explore in the empirical evidence.

While early literature on families in autocracies has focused on the family’s function merely as an oasis in a repressive political environment (see, e.g., Friedrich and Brzezinski, 1965), emerging research has concentrated on the family’s role as welfare provider (see Baylouny, 2010,

e.g., or Habtom and Ruys, 2007). Literature on cross-country analysis of gender issues and family policy in autocratic countries has mainly focused on the former Eastern Bloc countries, although there are some exceptional comparisons of gender issues in the Middle East (see Charrad, 2011; Moghadam, 2006). These studies are not explicitly focused on autocratic regimes as such. In the case of Eastern Bloc countries, studies compare social policy development in autocracies with developing democracies indiscriminately. In one of these studies, Pascal and Manning (2000) follow the transition of former Soviet Bloc states' social policy and their gendered impact, finding that women struggle to cope and survive because the former support systems collapsed. While costs of balancing work and family were de-familized in Soviet times, such resources have been falling away, and especially domestic violence and heavy domestic responsibilities are proving difficult for women. Other studies echo such sentiments (e.g., see Chapter 17 by Rağ and Szikra in this volume; Dugarova, 2016; Motiejunaite and Kravchenko, 2008; Robila, 2012). The context of these studies concentrate on breadwinner model types and the lack of de-familization but they do not concentrate on autocratic political systems per se. This is unfortunate due to well-established theories of social policy development that, for example, point to the importance of politics and its role in creating and expanding policy.

From the literature, we know that comparative analysis of family policy in autocracies is rare (for an exception, see Woods and Frankenberger, 2016). Studies that look at family policy in countries that have autocratic regimes do not explicitly focus on autocratic regimes per se, or examine theories pertaining to autocracies. In the few cases that studies compare autocracies in relation to gender, they examine women's political representation, values and rights (see, e.g., the studies from Pickel, 2013 and Moghadam, 2006). An empirical comparison and grouping of autocratic family policy has not been attempted in the literature nor has family policy been an issue of empirical analysis for autocratic states. Such a gap in the literature has been the motivation for this chapter.

METHODOLOGY

One of the most difficult challenges of studying autocracies is the lack of reliable, available data and there is a scarce amount of comparative data on family policies. This chapter uses the ILO survey (2014), the World Policy Analysis Center (2016) and CIA World Factbook (2016). We have narrowed our observation of family policy specifically to family leave policies because of the

availability of the data set, the ease in which family leave policies can be compared, and because leave policies are a good case study of family policy for this study. The policy of leave schemes is closely related to women's labour force participation and gender equality, two issues that one would assume are not supported in particular autocratic regimes. These issues of equality are interesting for a variety of reasons: firstly, autocracies aim to segment societal inequality in order to preserve their elite power base. A broad and generous family leave policy seems to contradict this assumption. Secondly, this policy is emblematic of current discourse in family policy research in western democracies. A policy that is indicative of such discourse is most promising for closer observation of contributions this analysis might have for overall family policy research. Thirdly, family leave is for all purposes a straightforward policy for comparison: the instruments are similar in the sense that they all have equivalent time limitations and levels of reimbursements. This is not the case for allowances and benefits-in-kind which are subject to functional equivalents and undefined boundaries between policy instruments and monetary amounts.

We examine three types of family leave policy: maternity, paternity and parental leave (see also Chapter 10 by Thévenon for an account of leave schemes). Complying with the ILO data set, we define maternity leave as protective leaves that are available to mothers right before or following the birth of a child. Paternity leave is available to fathers only, and immediately following the birth of the child. Parental leave is defined as leave that is available for parents on a longer term basis for the care of an infant or young child after the initial period (and expiry) of maternity or paternity leave (ILO, 2014, p. 164). The factors that we consider for comparing these leaves are wage replacement rates, length of leaves and eligibility. In addition to a comparison of absolute numbers, we also calculate a standardized measure for the generosity of leave regulations: we use the measure of Full Time Equivalents (FTE), as, for example, proposed by Gornick and Meyers (2003) and Ray et al. (2010) for the comparison of generosity in 21 high-income countries. FTE units are calculated as 'the wage replacement rate multiplied by the duration of leave' (Ray et al., 2010, p. 200). Sources of leave payments (state or company insurance plans) we discard for lack of space, but we note here that most leave schemes were state-provided, and it was generally the Middle East countries that funded leave schemes through companies. Interesting for us is an inter-country observation on gender, in terms of the ratio of a country's leave policy that is available for mothers and fathers.

In order to do justice to the high numbers of autocracies and to capture their variance, we include as many as possible in this chapter: 50 of 51 full autocracies designated by *The Economist's*

Democracy Index (The Economist, 2016, p. 2). The Ivory Coast was left out due to missing demographic and leave data. There is insufficient data on family leaves for Oman and Turkmenistan, so they are left out in some calculations. The high number of cases only allows for general comparisons with less specificities of cultures, economic and political stability or policy. Also, examining the historical developments of each autocracy is beyond the scope of this chapter. The qualitative clustering of autocracies is based on the variants of family leave length and generosity of wage replacements as well as in the differing eligibility in leave policy for mothers and fathers. It is complemented by a hierarchical cluster analysis using Ward-Clustering. In order to test our hypotheses we test for statistical covariations of autocratic clustering of maternity, paternity and parental leave with autocratic regime type, geographical location, male and female employment differences. In addition, we use multiple ANOVA in order to reveal significant variances between subtypes of autocracies and regional groups. We also consider communist ideology as specifically relevant for well-developed and gender-egalitarian family leave policy.

PATTERNS OF AUTOCRACIES: DEMOGRAPHICS

There is an extreme range of demographic characteristics in autocracies, in particular male and female labour force participation, fertility rates, infant mortality and population growth rates. These indicators are useful for our analysis because they provide background information on demographic issues that these countries are facing, and we find they are illustrative of the exceptional variety in core aspects of autocratic societal reproduction. Women's employment participation rates are also more varied in autocracies than in democracies and span from very little participation to even higher rates of participation than their male counterparts. These gendered aspects of family and labour market characteristics seem to also correlate to the heterogeneous family leave policy of autocracies. The magnitude of diversity in autocracies is apparent in our analysis of fertility, infant mortality and population growth rates (Table 22.1). For example, the lowest fertility rates in autocracies were 1.6 (China, Cuba, Belarus) to an extreme high value of 7.6 in Niger and Angola. The demographics of infant mortality rates also tended to diverge widely: Angola had a high rate of 96 deaths but Cuba had a low rate of four deaths per 1000. Another demographic indicator, the population growth rate, also shows variety: There are negative percentage growth rates in autocratic countries like Belarus (-0.20), Cuba (-0.15), Syria (-0.16) and Russia (-0.04), but also quite high

growth rates in some of the Sub-Saharan African autocracies, such as Burundi (3.27) and Niger (3.25) or in the Middle East with Qatar (3.07).

Table 22.1 Demographics

	Female labour force participation rate	Male labour force participation rate (2016) ^a (age 15–64)	Gender difference in labour force participation	Total fertility rate (2014) ^b	Population growth rate (2015) ^c	Infant mortality rate (2015) ^d	Regime subtype (Kailitz, 2013)
<i>Autocracies</i>							
<i>Caribbean</i>							
Haiti	64.0%	72.4%	8.4%	3.0	1.17%	52.2	Electoral
<i>Central Asia and Eastern Europe</i>							
Azerbaijan	67.4%	72.8%	5.4%	2.0	0.96%	27.9	Electoral
Belarus	68.2%	76.6%	8.4%	1.6	−0.20%	3.4	Electoral
Kazakhstan	74.4%	82.6%	8.2%	2.7	1.14%	12.6	Electoral
Russia	68.6%	79.3%	10.7%	1.7	−0.04%	8.2	Electoral
Tajikistan	62.1%	80.4%	18.3%	3.5	1.71%	38.5	Electoral
Turkmenistan	50.2%	80.6%	30.4%	2.3	1.14%	43.7	One party
Uzbekistan	51.8%	79.7%	27.9%	2.2	0.93%	33.9	One party
<i>Latin America</i>							
Cuba	51.1%	79.1%	28.0%	1.6	−0.15%	4.0	Communist
<i>Middle East and North Africa</i>							
Afghanistan	19.9%	85.3%	65.4%	4.8	2.32%	66.3	Personalist
Algeria	18.5%	76.2%	57.7%	2.9	1.84%	21.9	Electoral
Bahrain	40.5%	86.6%	46.1%	2.1	2.41%	5.3	Monarchy
Egypt	24.9%	80.4%	55.5%	3.3	1.79%	20.3	One party
Iran	17.2%	76.4%	59.2%	1.7	1.20%	13.4	Ideocracy
Jordan	15.3%	67.8%	52.5%	3.4	0.83%	15.4	Monarchy
Kuwait	49.3%	85.6%	36.3%	2.1	1.62%	7.3	Monarchy
Libya	29.5%	81.8%	52.3%	2.5	2.23%	11.4	Personalist
Oman	31.6%	87.4%	55.8%	2.8	2.06%	9.9	Monarchy
Qatar	53.9%	94.5%	40.6%	2.0	3.07%	6.8	Monarchy
Saudi Arabia	21.1%	80.4%	59.3%	2.8	1.46%	12.5	Monarchy

Syria	13.1%	74.0%	60.9%	3.0	-0.16%	11.1	One party
United Arab Emirates	42.4%	92.0%	49.6%	1.8	2.58%	5.9	Monarchy
Yemen	27.1%	75.6%	48.5%	4.2	2.47%	33.8	Electoral
<i>South and East Asia</i>							
China	70.3%	84.3%	14.0%	1.6	0.45%	9.2	Communist
Laos	81.2%	79.3%	-1.9%	3.0	1.55%	50.7	Communist
North Korea	80.4%	89.6%	9.2%	2.0	0.53%	19.7	Communist
Vietnam	79.9%	86.9%	7.0%	2.0	0.97%	17.3	Communist
<i>Sub-Saharan Africa</i>							
Angola	61.0%	78.0%	17.0%	6.1	2.77%	96.0	Electoral
Burundi	85.7%	83.6%	-2.1%	6.0	3.27%	54.1	Electoral
Cameroon	72.1%	82.0%	9.9%	4.7	2.59%	57.1	Electoral
Central African Republic	72.1%	85.0%	12.9%	4.3	2.13%	91.5	Electoral
Chad	64.6%	79.3%	14.7%	6.2	1.89%	85.0	One party
Comoros	36.2%	79.8%	43.6%	4.5	1.77%	55.1	Electoral
Democratic Republic of the Congo	71.3%	71.9%	0.6%	6.0	2.45%	74.5	Electoral
Djibouti	38.9%	71.4%	32.5%	3.2	2.20%	54.2	Electoral
Equatorial Guinea	72.9%	93.8%	20.9%	4.8	2.51%	68.2	One party
Eritrea	80.3%	91.0%	10.7%	4.3	2.25%	34.1	Personalist
Ethiopia	79.9%	90.3%	10.4%	4.4	2.89%	41.4	Electoral
Gabon	42.5%	60.3%	17.8%	3.9	1.93%	36.1	One party
Gambia	72.8%	82.6%	9.8%	5.7	2.16%	47.9	One party
Guinea	82.3%	86.1%	3.8%	5.0	2.63%	61.0	One party
Guinea- Bissau	68.8%	79.2%	10.4%	4.8	1.91%	60.3	Electoral
Mauritania	30.2%	65.9%	35.7%	4.6	2.23%	65.1	Military
Niger	40.9%	90.6%	49.7%	7.6	3.25%	57.1	Electoral
Republic of the Congo	68.5%	73.7%	5.2%	4.9	2.00%	33.2	Electoral
Rwanda	88.4%	84.1%	-4.3%	3.9	2.56%	31.1	Electoral
Sudan	25.0%	73.2%	48.2%	4.4	1.72%	47.6	Electoral
Swaziland	42.8%	67.3%	24.5%	3.3	1.11%	44.5	Monarchy

Togo	82.7%	81.6%	-1.1%	4.6	2.69%	52.3	Electoral
Zimbabwe	78.8%	88.2%	9.4%	3.9	2.21%	46.6	Electoral

Source: Own compilation based on:

- a. ILO (2016), 'Labour force participation rate by sex and age (%)', accessed 0415 December July 2018 at http://www.ilo.org/ilostat/faces/oracle/webcenter/portalapp/pagehierarchy/Page27.jspx?subject=EAP&indicator=EAP_DWAP_SEX_AGE_RT&datasetCode=A&collectionCode=YI&_afLoop=1736015464278895&_afWindowMode=0&_afWindowId=484dos1dl_1#!%40%40%3Findicator%3DEAP_DWAP_SEX_AGE_RT%26_afWindowId%3D484dos1dl_1%26subject%3DEAP%26_afLoop%3D1736015464278895%26datasetCode%3DA%26collectionCode%3DYI%26_afWindowMode%3D0%26_adf.ctrl-state%3D484dos1dl_62
- b. World Bank (2016), <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.TFRT.IN?end=2014&start=1960> Total fertility rate represents the number of children that would be born to a woman if she were to live to the end of her childbearing years and bear children in accordance with age-specific fertility rates of the specified year.
- c. Central Intelligence Agency (2016), <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2002rank.html>
- d. World Bank (2016), <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.IMRT.IN> Infant mortality rate is the number of infants who die before reaching 1 year of age per 1000 live births in a given year.

The economic need to support the family varies, and there is also extreme variation in female and male labour force participation rates in autocracies. Some autocracies have high rates of female labour market participation but ungenerous family leave policy, for example, in regions of Africa. Higher female labour force participation rates than men's could be found in Togo, Rwanda, Burundi and Laos. The high rates might be related to data accuracy or to counting the informal economy. However, the necessity of being active in the labour force does not seem to be related to requirements of benefit receipt. Another 19 autocracies have very similar male and female labour force participation rates, with minimally higher percentages of male labour force participation: Haiti, Ethiopia, Cameroon, Belarus, Vietnam, Russia, Guinea, China, Kazakhstan, Zimbabwe, Gambia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Azerbaijan, Eritrea, Republic of the Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Central African Republic, Chad and North Korea. From a policy perspective, the need for family leave might be quite high in all of these countries, considering the high rates of female labour participation, but these rates are not related to benefits, as we will show in the next policy section. Congruent with little family leave policy are the low female participation rates in

autocracies in the Middle East and North Africa: Algeria, Jordan, Niger, Egypt, Oman, Afghanistan, United Arab Emirates, Sudan, Libya, Yemen, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Syria. In addition, some Sub-Saharan African and Central Asian autocracies represent a middle range of male labour force participation rates – about 20 to 40 per cent more than women's, like Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Comoros, Djibouti, Mauritania, Niger, Sudan, Swaziland and Equatorial Guinea, where female participation rate is 72.9 and male participation rate is 93.8. The high rates of female labour force participation rates in Qatar might be due to the inclusion of domestic work in its formal employment data.

PATTERNS OF AUTOCRACIES: FAMILY LEAVE POLICY

Just as patterns of demography are extremely diverse in autocracies, so are the family leave policies. Table 22.2 shows autocratic regime type and family leave policy. Although standard maternity leave in autocracies is less varied from one another, it is more diverse than democracies. Especially parental leave is strikingly disparate in autocracies. The length of leave, the eligibility for either mothers or fathers (or both) and the replacement rates for paid leave are our qualifier for further analysis of patterns. Leave lengths express the norms of how long the child should be cared for at home and when parents should return to the labour market. Leave eligibility for mothers and fathers illustrates both the extent of universalism and norms around gender roles. For example, if generosity in benefit is high and the leave is universal, than such a leave is more attractive for men to take up. Generosity calculated in Full Time Equivalent Units was less of a central issue for our analysis, although it corresponds with clustering of leave length and replacement rates. Generosity levels are nevertheless reported in the discussion, when autocratic regime types differ significantly. It should be noted, however, that the take-up of leaves from parents is often unknown and implementation of policies might vary widely.

Table 22.2 Family leave

	Maternity leave 2013			Paternity leave 2013		Parental leave 2013	
	Duration of maternity leave (in weeks)	Maternity leave cash benefits/wage replacement rate (% of previous earnings)	Duration of paternity leave (in national days)	Paternity leave cash benefits/wage replacement rate	Duration of parental leave (in national legislation)	Parental leave cash benefits/wage replacement rate (% of previous earnings)	
<i>Autocracies</i>							
<i>Caribbean</i>							
Haiti	12	100% for six weeks	none	–	none	–	
<i>Central Asia and Eastern Europe</i>							
Azerbaijan	18	100%	14 calendar days	unpaid	156 weeks (either parent or actual caregiver)	flat rate benefit	
Belarus	18	100%	none	–	156 weeks (either parent or actual caregiver)	80% of the minimum subsistence wage	
Kazakhstan	18	100%	5 days	unpaid	156 weeks (either parent)	unpaid	
Russia	20	100% up to a ceiling	none	–	156 weeks, 76 paid (either parent or actual caregiver)	40% up to a ceiling	
Tajikistan	20	100%	none	–	156 weeks, 78 paid (either parent or actual caregiver)	flat rate benefit	
Turkmenistan	16	100%	–	–	–	–	
Uzbekistan	18	100%	none	–	156 weeks (either parent or actual caregiver)	20% of minimum wage	
<i>Latin America</i>							
Cuba	18	100%	none	–	39 weeks (either parent)	60%	
<i>Middle East and North Africa</i>							
Afghanistan	13	100%	none	–	none	–	

Algeria	14	100%	3 days	100%	none	-
Bahrain	9	100%	45 days	none	-	26 weeks (only mothers) unpaid
Egypt	13	100%	none	-	104 weeks (only mothers)	unpaid
Iran	13	66,7% for 12 weeks	none	-	none	-
Jordan	10	100%	none	-	52 weeks (only mothers)	unpaid
Kuwait	10	100%	none	-	17 weeks (mothers only)	unpaid
Libya	14	50% (100% for self-employed)	3 days	-	none	-
Oman	7	100%	-	-	-	-
Qatar	7	100%	none	-	none	-
Saudi Arabia	10	50-100%	1 day	100%	none	-
Syria	17	100%	6 days	unpaid	52 weeks (only mothers)	unpaid
United Arab Emirates	6	100%	none	-	none	-
Yemen	9	100%	none	-	none	-
<i>South East Asia</i>						
China	14	100%	none	-	none	-
Laos	13	100%	none	-	none	-
North Korea	13	100%	3 days	unpaid	52 weeks (either parent)	40%
Vietnam	26	100%	none	-	none	-
<i>Sub-Saharan Africa</i>						
Angola	13	100%	none	-	none	-
Burundi	12	100%	15 days	50%	none	-
Cameroon	14	100%	10 days	100%	none	-
Central African Republic	14	50%	10 days	100%	none	-
Chad	14	100%	10 days	100%	up to 52 weeks (6 months renewable once, either parent)	unpaid

Comoros	14	100%	10 days	100%	none	–
Democratic Republic of the Congo	14	66,7%	2 days	100%	none	–
Djibouti	14	100%	3 days	100%	none	–
Equatorial Guinea	12	75%	none	–	none	–
Eritrea	9	paid (amount unidentified)	none	–	none	–
Ethiopia	13	100%	5 days	unpaid	none	–
Gabon	14	100%	10 days	100%	none	–
Gambia	12	100%	none	–	none	–
Guinea	14	100%	none	–	none	–
Guinea-Bissau	9	100%	none	–	none	–
Mauritania	14	100%	10 days	100%	none	–
Niger	14	100%	none	–	none	–
Republic of the Congo	15	100%	10 days	100%	none	–
Rwanda	12	100% 6 weeks	4 days	100%	none	–
Sudan	8	100%	none	–	none	–
Swaziland	12	100% 2 weeks	none	–	none	–
Togo	14	100%	10 days	100%	none	–
Zimbabwe	14	100%	none	–	none	–

Source: Own compilation based on ILO (2016).

Four groups of autocracies emerge after initial qualitative examination of their family leave policies. The first distinct group is comprised of eight electoral autocracies with a strong communist legacy. These countries have the longest maternity leaves, with an average of 18.3 weeks: Russia and Tajikistan have 20 weeks; Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Cuba and Azerbaijan have 18 weeks; and Turkmenistan has 16 weeks paid maternity leave. In terms of wage replacements, these communist ideological autocracies also tend to be the most generous with 100 per cent wage replacement for the complete maternity leave. Exceptions were Russia, which has a ceiling on wage replacements, and Kazakhstan which pays full wage levels up to only six weeks. Following

maternity leave, Belarus, Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan offer 156 weeks of consecutive parental leave (available to either of the parents) with 20–80 per cent of the last earnings for at least 52 weeks. Cuba covers 39 weeks of parental leave with 60 per cent coverage. Although Cuba is geographically far away from these former Eastern Bloc countries, it has enjoyed close ties to Russia and is mostly isolated from its geographical neighbours.

Autocracies in the Eastern Bloc do not offer specific paternity leaves separate from parental leave, except for Azerbaijan with 14 days and Kazakhstan with five days of unpaid leave. This most generous leave corresponds with the relatively high rates of labour force participation of both genders and the little difference between men's and women's labour force participation. In terms of autocratic regimes, this first group is overwhelmingly dominated by electoral government systems. Only Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have one party regimes.

A second group of four communist ideocracies, located in East and South Asia, has a slightly different type of generosity and eligibility for mothers and fathers in family leaves compared to the former Eastern Bloc communist autocracies and Cuba. This second group has relatively shorter maternity leaves and a glaringly different approach to paternity and parental leave. China, North Korea, Laos and Vietnam grant shorter maternity leave than the Central Asian countries, with no or little paternity leave. China offers 14 weeks maternity leave, Laos 13 weeks, North Korea 13 weeks, and Vietnam 26 weeks of maternity leave. Of the four countries, only North Korea offers paternity days (three unpaid) and parental leave (52 weeks at 40 per cent wage replacement for both parents). While the first group of Eastern Bloc autocracies has a generous parental leave for both mothers and fathers, this second Asian group is distinct in having hardly any parental leave. Similar to the first Eastern Bloc group, this second Asian group of countries contains some electoral autocracies and has communist heritage. On the other hand, there are Confucian cultural influences that set this second group apart from the first.

The Sub-Saharan African autocracies make up the largest group of autocracies with 23 countries, and contains mostly one party or electoral autocracies. These countries have a middle range of on average 12.8 weeks of maternity leave with little or no paternity leave and no parental leave (an exception being Chad with 52 weeks of unpaid leave for either parent). Payment during maternity leave is 100 per cent of wage replacement, with the exception of the Democratic Republic of Congo with 66.7 per cent, Guinea-Bissau with 75 per cent and the Central African Republic with 50 per cent. About half of the countries offer some paternity leave: Gabon, Comoros, Cameroon, Togo, the Republic of Congo, the Central African Republic and Chad offer ten days paternity leave

at 100 per cent wage replacement. Mauritania offers five days, Rwanda four days, Djibouti three days, the Democratic Republic of Congo two days – all paid with full wage replacement; Burundi offers 15 days with 50 per cent paid paternity leave and Ethiopia offers five days unpaid. Electoral regimes dominate in over half of the countries but there are also quite a few one party regimes. The military, personalist and monarchist regimes are also represented in this group.

The fourth group of 14 autocracies come from the Middle East and North Africa and it is the last family leave model type. Of all the autocracies, these countries have the fewest weeks of maternity leave, although most weeks are paid with full wage replacement (the exception being Bahrain with 100 per cent for just 45 days, Iran with 66.7 per cent for 12 weeks, and Libya with between 50 and 100 per cent depending on self-employment). With an average of 11.5 weeks, the lengths range from a low of six weeks in the United Arab Emirates to a high of 17 weeks in Syria and Saudi Arabia, and in some cases, Iran. With four exceptions, all countries have no paternity leave (the exceptions being six unpaid days in Syria, one paid day in Saudi Arabia, three paid days in Algeria and three unpaid days in Libya). Parental leave is only available in five countries and these are all exclusively tagged for mothers (Jordan, Kuwait, Egypt, Afghanistan and Syria). These countries represent a variety of monarchy, electoral, military and personality autocratic regimes.

This qualitative clustering along the family policy provisions is strongly supported by statistical classification analyses. Hierarchical cluster analyses using Ward-Clustering with squared euclidean distance measures and z-transformed data on leave durations and replacement rates by and large reproduce the patterns of the qualitative clustering presented above. In particular, the cluster of countries with a (post-)communist legacy is vastly reproduced. It consists of Belarus, Russia, Cuba, North Korea, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Azerbaidjan and Vietnam, whereas China and Laos are grouped into another cluster with the Gulf monarchies and other states with short maternity and overall leaves and no paternity leave at all (Niger, Zimbabwe, China, Guinea, Haiti, Swaziland, Gambia, Angola, Laos, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Syria, Egypt, Bahrain, Kuwait, Jordan, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Guinea Bissau, Yemen and Sudan). The boundaries between Sub-Saharan and Middle East/North African countries are not that clearcut in the cluster analysis as we qualitatively argue, but by and large Sub-Saharan African states also cluster statistically. A third cluster comprises Algeria, Djibouti, Rwanda, Mauritania, Togi, Cameroon, Comoros, Gabon, Republic of the Congo, Chad and Burundi. One smaller cluster comprises Iran, Libya, Equatorial Guinea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Saudi Arabia and the Central African Republic. The

four clusters for multiple ANOVA procedures reveal, as predicted by clustering, overtly significant variances of means.

EXPLAINING VARIATION

The four clusters mentioned above for multiple ANOVA procedures affirm overtly significant variances of means. We find autocratic regime type and region to be potential explanations for family leave variation in autocracies (Table 22.3), although there are some interesting relationships between family leave and demographics. Results for demographics show that difference in labour force participation between men and women is more closely related to family leave policies than other demographic characteristics: The higher the gender gap, the shorter the duration of maternity leave and paternity leave. Patterns in leave duration, generosity and availability are not closely related to employment rates. Whereas male and female employment covary significantly and negatively, female employment is neither correlated with leave availability nor replacement rates. Instead, our calculations strongly indicate that longer family leave provision and higher generosity are related to lower fertility rates, population growth and infant mortality.

Table 22.3 Descriptives

Variable	N	Min.	Max.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Female labour force participation rate	50	13.1%	88.4%	54.7%	0.225991
Male labour force participation rate	50	60.3%	94.5%	80.5%	0.074272
Gender difference in labour force participation	50	-4.3%	65.4%	25.9%	0.210336
Total fertility rate (children per woman)	50	1.6	7.6	3.594	1.4703
Population growth rate	50	-0.20%	3.27%	1.78%	0.0088603
Infant mortality rate (per 1000)	50	3.4	96.0	37.132	24.7211
Duration of maternity leave (weeks)	50	6.0	26.0	13.420	3.6983
Duration of paid maternity leave (weeks)	50	2.0	26.0	12.900	4.3530
Average maternity leave wage replacement rate (% of previous earnings)	49	50%	100%	96%	12.5086
Full Time Equivalent Units (weeks) maternity leave	49	2.0	26	12.4	4.65
Duration of paternity leave (in national legislation, weeks)	49	0.000	2.143	.41983	0.632461
Average paternity leave wage replacement rate (% of previous earnings)	49	0.0	100.0	27.551	44.5594
Full Time Equivalent Units (weeks) paternity leave	49	0.0	1.43	0.29	0.54
Duration of parental leave (in national legislation)	48	0.0	156.0	27.708	53.2521
Duration of paid parental leave (weeks)	48	0.0	156.0	14.854	40.8688
Average parental leave wage replacement rate (in %)	48	0%	60%	4%	12.9746
Full Time Equivalent Units (weeks) parental leave	48	0.0	62.4	3.74	11.17

Source: Own calculations based on data from ILO (2014, 2016), The Economist (2016) and Kailitz (2013).

Whereas the relationship between demographic and family leave variables are mostly insignificant, the differences in autocratic regime types can better account for variation. There is at least some significant differences between autocratic regime types. For example, monarchies differ significantly from other regime types, except from personalist regimes, by having the least generous regulations in maternity leave with shorter maternity leaves and shorter periods of pay, and the least FTE units (6.9). Monarchies also have significantly shorter paternity leaves than electoral autocracies. This reinforces the hypothesis that monarchies would rely on family policies that reinforce traditional family roles to legitimize themselves. Also, personalist regimes offer significantly less maternity wage replacement benefits than other regimes, thereby illustrating the short-term perspective of these regimes. As expected, communist ideocracies, have significantly higher wage replacement rates than all other subtypes, thereby reinforcing their legitimacy in line with equality-based provisions and communist ideology. Although autocracy types have different levels of paternity leave, these regimes do not significantly differ in benefits or duration. There are also no significant differences among the regimes in overall wage replacement and duration of paid parental leave.

*Table 22.4 Analysis of variance – between groups combined for region and regime type**

Independent variable	Region			Regime type		
	Eta ²	F	Sig.	Eta ²	F	Sig.
Duration of maternity leave	0.488	8.372	0.000	0.366	5.085	0.001
Duration of paid maternity leave	0.45	7.207	0.000	0.389	5.594	0.000
Maternity leave replacement rates	0.055	0.501	0.774	0.135	1.34	0.266
Full Time Equivalent Units maternity leave	0.417	7.872	0.000	0.357	6.095	0.001
Duration of paternity leave	0.17	1.765	0.141	0.205	2.218	0.07
Paternity leave replacement rates	0.245	2.796	0.028	0.183	1.931	0.109
Full Time Equivalent Units paternity leave	0.290	4.497	0.004	0.125	1.565	0.200
Duration of parental leave	0.873	57.623	0.000	0.055	0.484	0.786
Duration of paid parental leave	0.714	21.018	0.000	0.041	0.358	0.874
Parental leave replacement rates	0.662	16.484	0.000	0.198	2.073	0.088
Full Time Equivalent Units parental leave	0.473	9.653	0.000	0.074	0.858	0.497

Note: * The Student-Newman-Keuls-Procedure has been calculated. Subsamples were only partly reproduced significantly, as significance in post hoc tests depends on the number of cases in subsample cells. Because these are below 5, effects might be distorted.

Source: Own calculations based on data from ILO (2014, 2016), The Economist (2016) and Kailitz (2013).

Table 22.4 shows the main explanatory effects of regime type and region in comparison for all family leave provisions under research: There is a significance between autocratic clusters and their geographical location (Cramer's V: 0.572; p: 0.000). This suggests that cultural and traditional legacies are more important in shaping family policies than political regime types. If geographical location can be used as a proxy variable for culture and tradition, this would mean that, for example, Middle Eastern and North African traditional and paternalistic models of family and gender generate specific family policy, and women's roles, that are vastly reduced to home and child care, have a strong legacy in Middle Eastern family leave policies, granting the least generous maternity (9.6 FTE units on average) and parental (0 FTE units) leave provisions. The same seems to hold true to some extent for Sub-Saharan Africa (11 FTE units for maternity and 0 for parental leave) and Latin America/Caribbean (12 and 11): these regions are slightly more generous, but also have traditional gender role models. One might expect similar results for Central and South East Asia, but countries in these regions are far more generous, at least, in terms of maternity and parental leave FTE units. This, we argue, can partly be explained by the influence of communist ideologies and their legacy in these autocratic regimes, if this ideology is also accounted for in Eastern Bloc countries' autocratic regime types (in addition to their designation as electoral or one party systems). In general, as regime type and regions are not statistically independent with high significance of Cramer's V (0.60) and Contingency-Coefficient (0.768), there might be overlapping effects. For example, seven out of 14 regimes in the Middle East and North African region are monarchies, 15 out of 23 regimes in Sub-Saharan Africa are electoral autocracies, and 11 out of 11 regimes in Central Asia/Eastern Europe and South East Asia have a communist legacy. Further research is necessary in order to separate effects, even though the overall data problem remains. The overlapping communist and electoral or one party regime types for Eastern Bloc autocracies expose some difficulty in the autocratic regime typologies themselves. Autocratic regime types, nonetheless, have at least some explanatory power for the overall and paid duration of maternity leave and the duration of paternity leave. In all, regional belonging, however, can contribute most to explaining overall and paid duration of maternity leave, paternity leave wage replacement, parental leave duration and wage replacement.

CONCLUSION

There are some clear characteristics that emerge from a cross-comparison of autocracies, and distinct groups of autocracies can be discerned in regards to family leave policy. However, autocracies' family policy and demographics are not necessarily solely grouped by political structures (e.g., monarchies, one party systems, personalist autocracies and so on). Overall, we see a gamut of clustering from the most generous paid maternity and parental leaves for mothers and fathers in Central Asia/Eastern Europe and Cuba to minimal maternity in the Middle East/North Africa, with little or no paternity leave, and if parental leave is offered, then only for mothers. The South and East Asian autocracies cluster contiguous to Central Asian and Eastern Europe autocracies, and Sub-Saharan autocracies cluster closer to the Middle East/North Africa. These autocratic groupings are surprising as a whole because they are not necessarily linked to special patterns of legitimation we assumed to find in different types of autocratic regimes, although we found some overlaps. Instead, the autocratic groupings seem to be more related to world regions and culture. Former or current communist-influenced autocracies are highly generous with family leaves, but similarly influenced East and South Asian autocracies have distinctively less generous policy and more gender-specific policy, especially in terms of paternity and parental leave. Demographically, East and South Asian autocracies have, on average, a narrower gap in labour force participation among men and women than their Eastern Bloc neighbours. Even when autocracies have high levels of female labour force participation and high fertility rates, this does not necessarily translate into more generous leave policy, as we also see in Sub-Saharan African autocracies.

These family leave groupings seem to point to other explanations than just autocratic regimes or demographics: gender ideology and economics could be plausible alternative explanations. Family policy itself might be playing a legitimizing role, and we surmise that cultural (and regional) values and legitimacy are related. Repression and repressive capacity might serve autocrats well to remain in power for some time, but this is not a long-term means to secure it, as 'the use of force is costly and may not always be effective' (Gandhi and Przeworski, 2007, p. 1281). 'Legitimacy' can be instrumented to uphold and reinforce power, so certain types of family policy instruments can be used to legitimize specific autocracies. Scarce family leave policy in the Middle East might be a reflection of traditional family values dominant in these countries while more gender neutral family leaves in the former Eastern Bloc countries uphold the post-communist ideological heritage (i.e., in

supporting full formal employment for men and women). And yet, the economic systems of the different regions of autocracies might play a vital role, too. For example, the importance of informal economies in Asian and Sub-Saharan autocracies gives us pause to think about the waning significance of formal labour force participation, and ensuing (ir)relevance of family leave regulations for these workers. Also, many Middle East/North African countries' economies revolve around oil resources: having one economic revenue source impacts employment structures in a variety of ways, so that, for example, much of taxation is irrelevant and this could result in weak justification (and demand) for social and family policy.

Reconsidering family policy 'functions' is also intriguing for family policy analysis. So far, common analysis views the 'purpose' of family policy in terms of shaping personal decisions around family forms, directing behaviour and addressing problems of families, or mitigating family risk. More recent analysis views 'function' also in relation to work-life balance and the promotion of gender equality. And yet, with an examination of family policy from the perspective of autocracies, new issues emerge: family policy's role in the legitimization of a state, its strong relationship to cultural heritage, and confirmation of societal ideals and ideology. An examination of autocracies also highlights how the provision of family policy can be quite diverse for men and women across the globe. With autocratic countries, family policy analysis is confronted with what it means to have 'explicit' versus 'implicit' family policy. Indeed, when it comes to the 'function' of family policy, we are left to consider how structures and institutions play a role in organizing society, the ways in which family policy supports individual freedom, and how it dampens unrest, reduces government resistance and upholds elite control. Furthermore, this examination of autocracies shows the urgency of illuminating and understanding the actual use and take-up of family policy. Finally, this chapter generates further material for gender analysis and family policy development. More studies are clearly needed on the development of family policy as well as the impact of family policy on individuals and families. The striking differences but also patterns in family leave policy (and demographics) in autocracies can provide policy analysts with a more well-rounded investigation of family policy and policy development.

NOTE

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