

**The
political
representation
of ethnic minorities
and their
vote choice**

Roos van der Zwan

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The political representation of ethnic minorities and their vote choice

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

1.1 | Introduction

Like other democracies in Europe, the Netherlands has experienced changes in the ethnic composition of its society (Schmitter, 2011). One of the challenges related to such changes is the integration of ethnic minorities as citizens of pluralistic democracies (Fukuyama, 2006). Active and engaged citizens are important because participation is essential to the functioning of democracy. The legitimacy of democracies is based on the notion that elected representatives represent the interests of the population. If certain groups in society are politically excluded or alienated, it is likely that the interests of these groups will not be represented and that the legitimacy of democracy will be under pressure. In the political context of the 2010s, where the failure of integration policies has been at the center of political debates and where anti-immigration parties have become increasingly successful throughout Europe, one of the democratic challenges that has been formulated is to encourage active citizenship from all parts of society, including ethnic minorities (Aleksynska, 2011; Phillips, 1995). Certainly, substantive representation – representing the interests of a specific social group such as an ethnic minority group – is not only reserved to Members of Parliament (MPs) belonging to that specific social group. However, when ethnic minorities are represented by MPs from a similar ethnic background – referred to as descriptive representation – they are not only objects of policy but have also become actors in the political process (Saggar & Geddes, 2000).

Even though the descriptive representation of ethnic minorities is increasing, the share of ethnic minority MPs continues to be lower than the share of ethnic minorities in the population in many European countries (Bloemraad, 2013; Ruedin, 2013b). With the current demographic development of increased ethnic diversity, the ethnic minority electorate may become essential for political parties to gain power. Political parties have begun to pay more attention to the inclusion of ethnic minorities, which partly can be understood as a strategy to win more ethnic votes (Dancygier, 2017). Despite this, existing literature provides little information about the relationship between political representation and ethnic minorities' vote choice. For this reason, the aim of this dissertation, which mostly focuses on the Netherlands, is to provide an overview of the political representation of Dutch ethnic minorities and to examine how this relates to their vote choice.

This dissertation consists of two parts. The first part gives an overview of the descriptive representation of ethnic minorities in Dutch national politics and investigates what explains minorities' descriptive representation. Up to now, there has been little quantitative analysis of the role that political parties play in the descriptive representation of ethnic minorities. To this end, I focus on the role of political parties and empirically study three aspects of the electoral process that are relevant to ethnic minority representation (Kunovich & Paxton, 2005). First, political parties have to recruit ethnic minority candidates to stand for election. Second, ethnic minority candidates have to be nominated for winnable positions. Third, ethnic minority candidates have to be elected to become MPs. For minorities' descriptive representation, parties are essential since they recruit and nominate the candidates for their candidate list. Accordingly,

the first contribution of this dissertation to the field is to study the influence of party characteristics on the nomination of ethnic minority candidates, albeit not necessarily implying electoral success. Building on existing studies, this dissertation provides a quantitative test of parties' influence on ethnic minority nomination by addressing nomination from three different angles: whether minorities are nominated as a candidate, at what position they are on the candidate list, and whether they are nominated in a safe list position. In addition to nomination, I address how many of the candidates are elected as MPs.

The second part of this dissertation concentrates on the vote choice of ethnic minorities. Even if ethnic groups are adequately represented in parties and in parliament, this does not provide us with information on whether ethnic minority voters (or others) have voted for the parties representing their interests. It is important to study the vote choice of ethnic minorities because they provide an indication of the extent to which ethnic minority citizens perceive these parties and ethnic minority candidates within these parties as actors representing their interests. For this reason, the main aim of the second part of this dissertation is to examine whether the representation of ethnic minorities influences their party and candidate choice.

To date, few empirical studies have examined the impact of representation on the vote choice of ethnic minority voters (but see Heath, Fisher, Rosenblatt, Sanders, & Sobolewska, 2013 for a study in the UK). It is therefore not clear yet what the association is between the two, even though the literature on ethnic minorities' political representation in Europe is increasing, and several studies have focused on ethnic minorities' vote choice (Bergh & Björklund, 2011; Bloemraad, 2013; Fisher, Heath, Sanders, & Sobolewska, 2015; Heath, Fisher, Sanders, & Sobolewska, 2011; Murray, 2016; Zapata-Barrero, 2017; Zingher & Farrer, 2014). Existing research shows that there are several individual-level determinants for vote choice that are similar for majority and minority voters (Heath et al., 2013). In my study, I focus on ethnic minority voters only and study the influence of minority-specific explanations on vote choice. Minority-specific explanations for ethnic minorities' vote choice have been studied before and established that factors such as discrimination and ethnic identification are determinants of party choice (Dancygier & Saunders, 2006; Heath et al., 2013; Kranendonk & Vermeulen, 2018; Sanders, Heath, Fisher, & Sobolewska, 2014). However, there is very little scientific understanding of whether the vote choice of ethnic minorities, with various levels of ethnic identification, depends on the extent to which parties emphasize ethnic minority interests. Similarly, it is unclear how the vote choice of ethnic minorities is influenced by the number of ethnic minority candidates. My second major contribution to the literature is that this thesis investigates the relationship between ethnic minorities' representation and ethnic minorities' vote choice in a systematic way.

After assessing the degree to which ethnic minority representation affects ethnic minorities' vote choice, this dissertation provides a further addition to the existing literature on this topic by studying whether ethnic candidates attract the ethnic vote. I test the so-called ethnic affinity thesis, which states that voters are likely to vote for

someone with shared characteristics (Bird, Jackson, McGregor, Moore, & Stephenson, 2016; McDermott, 1998). While there is indeed evidence for the ethnic affinity thesis, it remains unclear under which conditions ethnic affinity effects are stronger (Barreto, 2007; Bejarano & Segura, 2007; Besco, 2015; Goodyear-Grant & Tolley, 2017; McConaughy, White, Leal, & Casellas, 2010; Philpot & Walton, 2007; Stokes-Brown, 2006; Teney, Jacobs, Rea, & Delwit, 2010). Accordingly, in order to gain insight into the influence of both parties and ethnic minority candidates in ethnic minority voting, the purpose of this study is to assess the differences in the strength of ethnic affinity voting between ethnic minority candidates within parties, and whether this differs between ethnic groups. To this end, the main research question I aim to answer in this dissertation is:

‘To what extent have ethnic minorities been politically represented, how is this affected by political parties, and how does ethnic minority representation affect the vote choice of ethnic minorities?’

My research question is mainly addressed in the Dutch context. One of the chapters, however, focuses on the Canadian context. This chapter provides some first insights into the testing of the theorised relationship between ethnic minority representation and ethnic minorities vote choice in the Netherlands in another societal context. In this chapter I go from an explanatory question in the Netherlands to a testing question in Canada.

The introduction of this thesis is further structured as follows: Section 1.2 discusses the Dutch ethnic and political contexts, while section 1.3 provides an overview of the theoretical perspectives, gaps in the literature, and theoretical contributions of this dissertation. In this regard, section 1.3 begins by delineating the theoretical perspectives used in Part 1 of this dissertation, focused on ethnic minority representation before outlining the theoretical perspectives used in Part 2 relating to ethnic minorities' vote choice. In section 1.4, the data and methodological contributions are described, whereas the last section provides an outline of the empirical chapters in this dissertation.

1.2 | The Dutch context

Section 1.2 provides an overview of the societal and political contexts and their relation to ethnic minorities in the Netherlands. The section starts with a clarification and discussion of ethnic minority background before going on to present more information about ethnic minorities and their position in Dutch society. Finally, the Dutch political system and the three elections under study are briefly discussed.

1.2.1 | The conceptualisation of ethnic minority background

In most of the chapters in this thesis, the focus is on ethnic minorities in the Netherlands. In European research into integration and political representation of ethnic minorities,

the terms ethnic minorities, (im)migrants, visible minorities, and citizens of immigrant origin are sometimes used interchangeably. Predominantly, this refers to citizens of immigrant origin. It is therefore necessary here to clarify what is meant by the term ‘ethnic minorities’.

The specific conceptualisation of ethnic minority background varies in different countries, contexts, and research, and it is often based on both theoretical and practical considerations. Each of these conceptualisations has its own particular advantages and limitations (Bird, Saalfeld, & Wüst, 2011; Bloemraad, 2013; Bloemraad & Schönwälder, 2013). In some countries, a distinction is made between ethnic and/or immigrant origin and indigenous, national, and/or linguistic minorities. This is an important distinction because national or linguistic minorities, such as the Catalans in Spain, do not have an immigrant-origin background. Their political representation and vote choice may therefore be very distinct from those of ethnic minorities. In the Netherlands, there are no prominent indigenous, national or linguistic minorities.¹

Some researchers only focus on so-called visible minorities or racial minorities, in which case ethnic minority status is often identified based on physical appearances. In many European countries, visible or racial minorities cover to the ethnic groups most salient in public and political debates: usually referring to non-Western minorities (Bloemraad, 2013). This conceptualisation is especially relevant in the context of political representation where the representation of marginalised groups that experience or have experienced exclusion is addressed (Bird et al., 2011; Phillips, 1995). However, the choice to study visible or racial minorities can also be the result of practical issues. In studies on descriptive representation, it is common to identify the ethnic background of representatives by looking at a combination of names, photographs and information about country of birth (e.g. Black, 2013; Bloemraad, 2013; Mügge, 2016). This is a relatively simple approach to identifying the ethnic minority background of a large number of political candidates or MPs. Nonetheless, names and photographs can sometimes be misleading, and such a method could therefore result in incorrect identifications.

The conceptualisation of ethnic minority background can also be based on citizens’ countries of birth or the countries of birth of their (grand)parents. This is a more precise method for identifying ethnic minority background. Moreover, it has the advantage that Western minority groups can also be identified. The practical limitation of this approach is that it is a time-consuming way to identify the ethnic minority background of political candidates and/or MPs in addition to possibly leading to the incorrect identification of those with a former colony background (Bloemraad, 2013). Theoretically, neither country of birth nor a focus on visible minorities necessarily relates to ethnic identification. Candidates or MPs that are identified as ethnic minorities based on their names, photographs, or places of birth may identify more with the native population than with their ethnic origin group. Rather than identifying ethnic background based on names, photographs, or birthplace, another approach is therefore to focus on ethnic self-identification. Although self-identification is a relevant approach for identifying ethnic minority candidates, in descriptive representation research it is also relevant to

consider how these candidates are identified by others, such as political parties and voters (Zapata-Barrero, 2017). Moreover, this approach is not always possible in research on the ethnic background of representatives. Such information could be gathered by the use of interviews or by sending questionnaires to political candidates or MPs. A strategy that has the risk of high and selective non-response.

In this thesis, minorities with both non-Western and Western backgrounds are investigated, and I use the term ethnic minorities to refer to these two groups. I focus on citizens with a migration background, and I specifically concentrate on minorities with a Turkish, Moroccan, former colony, or Western background. This conceptualisation aligns with most Dutch research and policy making, and therefore fits in well with the relevant, existing literature.


1.2.2 | Ethnic minorities in the Netherlands

In research on ethnic minorities, whether relating to their economic position, cultural integration or political participation, non-Western minorities are mostly the subject of study. This is not surprising, considering the migration history of these groups. In the 1950s and 1960s, labour migrants came to countries such as The Netherlands, Belgium and Germany from Morocco and Turkey, or from Southern-European countries like Italy and Greece. Whereas most of the South-European migrants returned to their origin countries, most Moroccan and Turkish migrants did not. Instead, their families also moved to Europe, and family reunification and formation increased the immigrant-origin population (Castles, De Haas, & Miller, 2013). At present, there is a large group of Dutch citizens with an immigrant background whose parents or grandparents were born in either Morocco or Turkey; they belong to two of the largest non-Western minority groups in the Netherlands. As shown in Figure 1.1, 3.5% of citizens with Dutch nationality have their origins in Morocco or Turkey, whereas other important minority groups have their origins in Indonesia, Suriname, or the Caribbean part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Suriname and Indonesia are former colonies of the Netherlands and many Surinamese and Indonesian minorities are there because of these historical ties. The countries Aruba, Curaçao and St Maarten, in addition to the special municipalities Bonaire, St Eustatius and Saba are part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and citizens from these areas – although referred to as former colony minorities – therefore have Dutch nationality. In this sense, minorities from former colonies form another large minority group in the Netherlands. Since ethnic minority groups differ in regard to their country of origin, cultural background, language and migration history, it is not surprising that their integration processes also differ. Therefore, if possible, I will examine minorities with a Turkish, Moroccan, former colony, or another non-Western background separately. However, Western minorities also make up a considerable part of the population. To illustrate this, 1.9% of Dutch citizens have a German background, which is similar in size to the section of the population with a Moroccan or Turkish background. Moreover, Polish minorities belong to one of the largest growing Western minority groups in the Netherlands (Gijssberts & Lubbers, 2013; Kahanec & Zimmermann, 2010).

Minorities with a Western background are often thought to be more similar to Dutch citizens than those from a non-Western background. The culture, norms, values, and economic position of Western minorities are comparable to native Dutch citizens (Favell, 2008; Favell & Guiraudon, 2009; Van Tubergen, 2006). This is probably the reason why little attention has been paid to their political integration into Dutch society or in other Western countries (English, 2018). As can be seen from Figure 1.1, 4.6% of the population with Dutch citizenship has a Western background. This is a considerable proportion of the population, although their similarity with native Dutch citizens does not mean that their interests are the same. We therefore cannot assume that citizens with a Western migration background are politically well represented. This is why, if possible, I also study the political representation and vote choice among Western ethnic minorities.

Both non-Western and Western minorities are bound to the same rules and regulations regarding nationality acquisition. Dutch law regarding citizenship is based on the principle of *ius sanguinis*, meaning that children from parents with Dutch nationality automatically have Dutch citizenship and that citizenship is not determined by the place of birth. Those who do not have Dutch nationality can request naturalisation after five years of residence and three years when married to a Dutch citizen. People that pass a test on language skills and civic knowledge, and who attend the naturalisation ceremony, can obtain Dutch nationality.² All those with Dutch citizenship are allowed to vote and have the right to stand for election at the national level. At the local level, migrants have active and passive voting rights in local elections. This only applies to migrants from the age of 18 who live in that municipality, have citizenship from another European Union member state, or have legally resided in the Netherlands for five years or longer.³

FIGURE 1.1 | Share of ethnic minority groups with Dutch citizenship in the total Dutch population in 2017^a



Note: This figure is based on 2017 data, but from 2010-2016, the share of ethnic minorities with Dutch citizenship is very similar. ^aThis refers to the population eligible to vote (20 years or older; data from 18 years or older was not available).

Source: Statistics Netherlands, 2018a, 2018b (own calculations).

1.2.3 | The position of ethnic minorities in Dutch society

Scientific research has paid ample attention to the structural and socio-cultural integration of non-Western minorities (Alba & Nee, 1997; Ersanilli & Koopmans, 2010; Leszczensky, 2013; Martinovic, Van Tubergen, & Maas, 2015; Maxwell, 2010; Phinney, Horenczyk, & Vedder, 2001; Van Tubergen, 2006), but much less attention has been paid to the integration of Western minorities (but see Gijsberts & Lubbers, 2013; Lubbers, Diehl, Kuhn, & Larsen, 2018). Studies on the structural integration of non-Western minorities show that they generally have lower educational levels, incomes, and levels of employment when compared to native populations (Algan, Bisin, Manning, & Verdier, 2012; Fleischmann & Dronkers, 2010; Heath, Rothon, & Kilpi, 2008; Sanders et al., 2014; Van Tubergen, 2006), in addition to experiencing more discrimination (André & Dronkers, 2017; Maxwell, 2015; Safi, 2010). From existing research on this topic, the picture that emerges is that non-Western minorities have a particularly marginalised position in many areas of society. Nevertheless, diversity has become a salient issue in the media and attention towards anti-discrimination measures and the representation of minorities in (political) organisations has increased.⁴ In addition, second and third generations are performing better in schools and in the Dutch labour market (Wennekers, Boelhouwer, van Campen, & Bijl, 2018).

In the European context, the Netherlands has long been regarded as a tolerant country with relatively successful integration processes. Nowadays, the Netherlands is more often seen, both inside and outside of the Netherlands, as a country where integration policies have failed (Andeweg & Irwin, 2009; Joppke, 2007; Koopmans, 2010). Within the country, debates about immigration and integration have intensified since 2000 (Joppke, 2007). Several incidents have contributed to the intensification of these debates, such as 9/11, the murder of filmmaker Theo van Gogh, the murder of Islam critic Pim Fortuyn, and the rise and fall of his party LPF (Boomgaarden & Vliegthart, 2007). Since 2005, Geert Wilders, the party leader of the anti-immigrant Party for Freedom (PVV), has won a considerable amount of the votes in national elections, which has led to almost continuous political attention being paid to migration and integration issues. These are not isolated developments, in that other countries show similar developments with regard to the rising popularity of anti-immigrant parties and heated debates about migration and integration. Nevertheless, the Netherlands is described as one of the few countries that became less open to multiculturalism between 1980 and 2010 (Banting & Kymlicka, 2013). Such a constraint on multiculturalist policies could have a negative impact on ethnic minorities' descriptive representation (Bird, 2005; Ruedin, 2013b). Even though adequate cross-country research is scarce, there are indications that, in Dutch society, and in comparison to most other Western countries, the share of non-Western ethnic minority MPs mirrors the ethnic composition of the population relatively well (Bloemraad, 2013; Mügge, 2016). On the one hand, the Netherlands is considered to be a country where integration has failed. On the other hand, it has been suggested that non-Western minorities are better represented in the Netherlands than in other Western countries. This contradiction makes the Netherlands an interesting context in which to study the relationship between ethnic minority representation and ethnic minorities' vote choice.

1.2.4 | The Dutch political system

The Netherlands has a list system of proportional representation (PR), resulting in a multi-party system. On average, about ten political parties hold seats in the House of Representatives. The parties that held seats in the House of Representatives between 2010 and 2017 are shown in Table 1.1. Most of these parties can be placed into known party families, such as the Christian parties (CDA, SGP, and CU), the Social Democrats (PvdA), the Socialists (SP), the Greens (GL), the Liberal parties (D66 and VVD), and the anti-immigration party (PVV). Because there is a very low threshold for political parties, small parties can also win seats in the House of Representatives, which explains why there are so many political parties in parliament and why new and small parties have been able to win seats in parliamentary elections. Relatively new parties include the Party for the Animals (PvdD), 50Plus, DENK, and Forum for Democracy (FvD). The Party for the Animals (PvdD) is regarded as economically left and is committed to the environment and animal rights; 50Plus aims to represent the interests of the elderly; DENK was established in 2015 and focuses on equality and addressing racism and discrimination; finally, Forum for Democracy (FvD) is a right-wing party that supports direct democracy and is against the European Union. The Dutch multi-party system provides an opportunity to study how parties from all over the political spectrum deal with ethnic minority representation and the extent to which they attract the ethnic vote. This thesis will therefore advance an understanding of how differences between parties affect the political representation of ethnic minorities.

Another interesting feature of the Dutch political system is that it is regarded as one of the most proportional systems in the world (Andeweg & Irwin, 2009). Unlike voters in majoritarian systems, voters in PR systems can choose between different candidates affiliated with the same party. It has been argued that it is easier to represent both majorities and minorities in PR systems because votes are more directly translated into seats (Htun, 2004; Lijphart, 1979). The Dutch PR system has compulsory candidate voting, which means that voters receive a ballot paper with the candidate lists of all parties and, from these lists, they cast a vote for a single candidate. The sum of votes cast on all candidates of a party determines the share of votes for a political party. The distribution of the 150 seats in the House of Representatives and the candidates who have won a seat are based on this share of votes.

Most voters cast a vote for the first candidate on the list of the party of their preference, which typically expresses party support. However, a voter can also cast a preference vote by choosing a candidate ranked lower on the party list. Preference votes are often used to support a female candidate or a candidate from an ethnic minority background (Andeweg & Irwin, 2009). A candidate that receives enough preference votes can be elected and overtake the position of higher ranked candidates. Nonetheless, this is not very common and has only happened seven times since 2010. Five of these candidates were native Dutch women, while the other two were native Dutch men.

With regard to ethnic minority representation, the Labour Party (PvdA) has historically been the most important political party for ethnic minorities in the Netherlands. In 1986,

the first MP with a non-Western background was elected for the Labour Party (PvdA): John Lilipaly, a teacher of Moluccan origin (Rath, 1988; Tillie, 1998). Moreover, the Labour Party (PvdA) supports ethnic minorities both in their issue positions and within the party, such as with an ethnic minority network (Ensel, 2003). In this regard, the ties the party has established with the ethnic minority population over the years have made them a popular party among ethnic voters (Fennema & Tillie, 1999; Michon & Vermeulen, 2013; Tillie, 1998).

TABLE 1.1 | Political parties in the House of Representatives in 2010, 2012, and 2017

Party	Party name in Dutch	Abbreviation
50Plus	50Plus	-
Christian Democratic Appeal	Christen Democratisch Appél	CDA
Christian Union	ChristenUnie	CU
Democrats 66	Democraten 66	D66
DENK	DENK	-
Forum for Democracy	Forum voor Democratie	FvD
GreenLeft	GroenLinks	GL
Labour Party	Partij van de Arbeid	PvdA
Party for Freedom	Partij voor de Vrijheid	PVV
Party for the Animals	Partij voor de Dieren	PvdD
People's Party for Freedom and Democracy	Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie	VVD
Reformed Political Party	Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij	SGP
Socialist Party	Socialistische Partij	SP

1.2.5 | Time frame of the study

This thesis covers studies conducted around three parliamentary elections, held in 2010, 2012, and 2017. This section briefly discusses these three national elections and their electoral results.

The Balkenende IV cabinet collapsed in 2010 due to conflict about the military mission in Uruzgan, Afghanistan. The parliamentary elections for a new government were held on 9 June 2010. Of the seventeen parties that participated in the elections, ten won seats. The most votes were won by the Liberal Party (VVD; 21%) and the Labour Party (PvdA; 20%). A remarkable election outcome was the electoral gain of the anti-immigration Party for Freedom (PVV), which increased its political power from nine seats in 2006 to 24 in 2010 (16% of the vote). Moreover, the Christian Democrats (CDA) experienced a major loss, going from 40 seats in 2006 to 21 seats in 2010. For the first time in the Netherlands, a minority government was formed by the Liberal Party (VVD) and the Christian Democrats (CDA), supported by the anti-immigrant Party for Freedom (PVV), with Mark Rutte as prime minister. The two parties forming the government did not form a majority and were therefore dependent on the support of the Party for Freedom (PVV).

In April 2012, the Rutte I cabinet was dissolved after only two years in office because of disagreements on the budget cuts for 2013, which led to the Party for Freedom (PVV) ending its support for the minority government. This resulted in new elections, which took place on 12 September 2012. Voters could vote for candidates of 21 political parties, of which eleven were represented in the House of Representatives after the elections (Parlement & Politiek, 2016). The highest share of the votes went, again, to the People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD, 27%) and the Labour Party (PvdA, 25%). Together, these parties shaped the new government: Rutte II.

After a conflict relating to integration policies in 2014, two Labour Party MPs, with Turkish backgrounds, left the party. Subsequently, they founded their own party called DENK in 2015, aiming to represent all Dutch citizens. DENK is a Dutch word meaning 'think' in English, but it is also a Turkish word that translates as 'equal'. The party's focus is on an inclusive society and the promotion of equality and anti-discrimination measures. Sylvana Simons, of Surinamese origin, joined the party, but she left after a conflict and established her own party, Artikel 1, just a few months before the elections. The name Artikel 1 (Article 1) refers to the first article of the Dutch constitution, which states that everyone should be treated equally and that discrimination based on religion, belief, political opinion, race, sex, or any other grounds is forbidden.⁵ Similar to DENK, the main aim of Artikel 1 is to fight racism and discrimination and to promote equality. These developments took place shortly before the elections on 21 March 2017, which were held after the Rutte II cabinet had served its entire four-year term.

In the parliamentary election of 2017, a total of 28 political parties participated, of which thirteen won seats. Even though, compared to the previous election, they lost eight seats, the largest share of the vote went, once again, to the Liberal Party (VVD; 21%). The Liberal Party (VVD), the Christian Democrats (CDA), the social-liberal D66, and the Christian Union (CU) formed Rutte III. Whereas DENK was successful and won three seats in the elections, Artikel 1 did not win any seats. The party nevertheless won a substantial part of the vote share in Amsterdam and won a seat in the Amsterdam municipality elections in 2018. Additionally, the new party Forum for Democracy (FvD) added more competition to the radical right of the political spectrum as one of the parties competing with Wilders' party for votes. Other notable election outcomes were the large support for the anti-immigrant party PVV and a major loss for the Labour Party (PvdA), which went from 38 seats in 2012 to only 9 in 2017. Historically, the Labour Party (PvdA) has been the party most strongly connected to the ethnic community in the Netherlands; the emergence of Artikel 1 and DENK suggests that competition for the ethnic vote has increased.

1.3 | Theoretical framework

A number of theoretical concepts and approaches are used in this thesis, which will be discussed in this section. Section 1.3.1 examines one of the study's key concepts, which is political representation, whereas the theoretical perspectives used in the first part of this

thesis are examined in Section 1.3.2. Finally, the theoretical perspectives on ethnic voting, the focus of the second part of this thesis, are outlined in Section 1.3.3.

1.3.1 | Political representation

The key concept in this thesis is political representation, which has been defined in different ways. The general definition of representation is that it is a delegated act on behalf of someone else (Urbinati, 2011). The concept of representation applies to all citizens of democratic countries, and many political scientists have explained why proportional representation is important (Kymlicka, 1995; Mansbridge, 1999; Pitkin, 1967; Rehfeld, 2011; Urbinati, 2011). One school of thought has focused specifically on politically marginalised groups (Bird, 2005; Htun, 2004; Mansbridge, 1999; Phillips, 1995; Sapiro, 1981), which has generated the base for the representation literature of women and ethnic minorities.

An important discussion in this literature relates to the significance of descriptive and substantive representation (Mansbridge, 2003, 2009, 2011; Pitkin, 1967; Rehfeld, 2011). Descriptive representation is about *who* represents; it is the degree to which the characteristics of the electorate are resembled by its representatives (Phillips, 1995; Pitkin, 1967; Ruedin, 2013b). The similarity between representatives and those they represent may include visible characteristics, such as gender or ethnicity, but it can also be related to shared experience (Mansbridge, 1999). Substantive representation is about *what* is represented, i.e. the degree to which the interests and the policy preferences of the electorate are represented (Pitkin, 1967; Ruedin, 2013b). Some authors also discuss symbolic representation as a separate dimension, which refers to symbols such as flags or the head of state (Pitkin, 1967).

There are several reasons why the descriptive representation of social groups is important. A lack of diversity in political institutions sends a message of exclusion; when certain groups in society feel and/or are excluded from political institutions, this decreases the legitimacy of the political system (Phillips, 1995). Moreover, ethnic minorities, or other minority groups, who feel excluded from politics may experience feelings of alienation (Lijphart, 2012; Maxwell, 2015; Röder & Mühlau, 2014). These arguments for the descriptive representation of ethnic minority groups do not necessarily mean that all minority groups should be descriptively represented, such as red-headed people or those with blue eyes. Whether descriptive representation is necessary for a certain group depends, among other things, on whether a social group is politically relevant, e.g. because they have a marginalised position in society (Phillips, 1995; Sapiro, 1981). If an underrepresented group has experienced a history of exclusion, descriptive representation can counteract feelings of exclusion. Descriptive representation may be one way to decrease feelings of alienation and increase feelings of trust among marginalised groups (Banducci, Donovan, & Karp, 2004).

Advocates of substantive representation argue that, as long as the interests of a certain group are represented, it does not matter by whom these interests are represented (Bloemraad, 2013; Mansbridge, 1999). Moreover, if a person is represented by someone from

their own group, this does not imply that the group members and the representatives have the same interests. However, increased awareness relating to the political representation of women shows that this is not entirely true. Few people today would accept to be represented by men only, which was the case in many countries some decades ago (Paxton, 1997; Sapiro, 1981). This highlights the importance of the descriptive meaning of proportional representation, which relates to the identity and experiences of social groups in society (Phillips, 1995). Nevertheless, both the presence and the representation of particular issues and policy preferences of marginalised groups are important aspects of their political representation.

Following the existing literature on this topic, I define descriptive representation as the extent to which the ethnic minority electorate is represented by candidates and MPs from the same ethnic background. Although some studies specifically compare the share of ethnic minority candidates or MPs with the share of ethnic minorities eligible to vote in order to establish the level of ethnic minority representation (Sobolewska, 2013; Zapata-barrero, Dähnke, & Markard, 2017), this is not always the case or it is unclear whether their focus lies on minorities with citizenship (Bird, 2005; Black, 2013; Bloemraad, 2013; Murray, 2016; Ruedin, 2013b). However, scholars in the field rarely discuss whether ethnic minorities should be represented in national-level politics if they lack the right to vote due to the absence of citizenship in their country of residence. An exception is Bloemraad (2013), who discusses practical limitations in focusing on the ethnic minority electorate, in addition to arguing that non-voters can support ethnic minority candidates in other ways than only voting. In this thesis, the ethnic minority electorate only relates to those ethnic minorities that have Dutch citizenship and are thus allowed to vote and stand for election.

With regard to substantive representation, various interpretations and measurements exist. Some researchers focus on party manifestos and use the issue positions in these manifestos to measure substantive representation (Ruedin, 2013b), whereas others examine the political behaviour of MPs, such as the questions they ask and their voting behaviour in parliament. They argue that this behaviour exemplifies the MPs acting on behalf of the interests of ethnic minority groups (Aydemir & Vliegenthart, 2016; Saalfeld, 2011; Saalfeld & Bischof, 2013). In this thesis, substantive representation refers to the extent to which policy preferences and issue positions of certain social groups are represented.

The first part of this study examines how party characteristics, including substantive representation, are related to descriptive representation. As a result, substantive representation is a predictor, whereas descriptive representation is the outcome variable. In Part 2, the influence of both descriptive and substantive representation on the vote choice of ethnic minorities is examined, and therefore descriptive and substantive representation are both predictors.

1.3.2 | Part 1: The descriptive representation of ethnic minorities

1.3.2.1 | *Theoretical perspectives on descriptive representation*

Many studies on minority representation have been carried out in the context of the US (e.g. Bobo & Gilliam, 1990; Cameron, Epstein, & O'Halloran, 1996; Mansbridge, 1999; Wolfinger, 1965). Nonetheless, the issue of ethnic minority representation has received increasing attention in the European context (e.g. Bird et al., 2011; Bloemraad, 2013; Bloemraad & Schönwälder, 2013), in addition to the intersection of ethnic minority background and gender (Celis & Erzeel, 2017; Hughes, 2013; Krook & Nugent, 2016; Mügge, 2016; Murray, 2016). Studies have provided an overview of the share of ethnic minority MPs, in which they have mainly focused on the outcome of the electoral process. These studies highlight, over and over again, that ethnic minorities are underrepresented in the elected bodies of most of the democratic countries in Europe. This was, amongst others, found for Denmark, the UK, France, Germany, Spain, Portugal, and Ireland (Bloemraad, 2013; Murray, 2016; Sobolewska, 2013; Zapata-Barrero, 2017).

Up until now, there has been little scientific understanding of the role of one of the most essential actors in descriptive representation: political parties. Only recently, European scholars have begun paying more attention to the influence that political parties may have on ethnic minority representation (Celis & Erzeel, 2017; Sobolewska, 2013; Zapata-barrero et al., 2017). The theoretical importance of political parties in descriptive representation has been established in studies on the underrepresentation of women (Caul, 1999; Gallagher & Marsh, 1988; Kunovich & Paxton, 2005; Matland & Studlar, 1996). It is argued that the main aim of political parties is to win votes in order to gain political power. Political parties' recruitment and selection are therefore crucial because candidates are an important tool for winning votes. With a growing ethnic minority electorate, it becomes relevant for parties to include ethnic minority candidates. The selectorate – the body within a party that selects candidates – makes up the candidate list that is presented to voters and determines for whom they can vote. This line of thought argues that political parties therefore have a considerable influence on ethnic minority representation and are an essential locus of study in relation to ethnic minority representation (Gallagher & Marsh, 1988; Hazan & Rahat, 2006; Rahat, Hazan, & Katz, 2008; Scarrow, 2000).

Scholars have also sought other theoretical explanations for the degree of political integration of ethnic minorities. Although my main aim in this thesis is to test the relevance of party characteristics as an addition to existing explanations for descriptive representation, I will briefly discuss other relevant explanations. To begin with, some studies focus on the macro level and zoom in on political systems and the institutional context to argue that macro-level factors affect ethnic minorities' political integration (Bird, 2005; Bloemraad, 2006; De Wit & Koopmans, 2005; Koopmans & Statham, 2000; Ruedin, 2013b; Sobolewska, 2013; Togeby, 2008). More specifically, these researchers argue that factors such as citizenship regimes, electoral systems, and multiculturalism have an influence on the degree to which ethnic minorities are politically involved and represented.

However, comparable cross-national data about the representation of ethnic minorities is rather scarce, and systemic tests of the influence of macro level factors are limited (nonetheless, see Bird, 2005; Ruedin, 2013b). In one of the few cross-national quantitative studies on ethnic minority representation, Ruedin (2013b) found that electoral systems and other institutional factors did not affect ethnic minority representation. Apart from the lack of comparable data, it is also the diversity in and conceptualisation of ethnic minority groups that makes it difficult to determine the influence of such macro-level factors on ethnic minority representation.

Other theoretical explanations for ethnic minorities' political participation and level of descriptive representation are based on ethnic group factors, such as the size and spatial concentration of ethnic minority groups, their social capital, and the strength of ethnic communities (Barreto, 2007; Bird, 2005; Bobo & Gilliam, 1990; Fennema & Tillie, 1999; Fieldhouse & Cutts, 2008b; Maxwell, 2013; Morales, Giugni, & Solomos, 2011; Stokes-Brown, 2006). Evidence for the influence of ethnic group factors has been found for the more general political integration of ethnic minorities. For instance, Dutch research shows that Turkish minorities have the strongest ethnic communities in the largest Dutch cities, and that they are the group with the highest level of turnout and other forms of political participation (Fennema and Tillie, 1999; Tillie, 2004; van Heelsum, 2016). The influence of ethnic communities on minorities' descriptive representation has only been tested at the local level (Fennema & Tillie, 1999; Maxwell, 2013; Michon & Vermeulen, 2013; Morales et al., 2011; Tillie, 1998). Hence, although sometimes mentioned as an explanation (e.g. Bird, 2005) there is no clear evidence that the strength of ethnic communities at the local level is an explanation for descriptive representation at the national level.

1.3.2.2 | *Political parties and descriptive representation*

Several steps are required to go from candidate selection to MP, starting with the supply side. One alternative explanation for the underrepresentation of ethnic minorities is that there are not enough suitable candidates. Resources and motivation are important determinants for citizens to become politically active (Norris & Lovenduski, 1995). Although the difficulty in recruiting ethnic minority candidates may vary between parties, depending on the party ideology, it is unlikely that a lack of suitable candidates is responsible for low levels of descriptive representation in the current European context. Considering the size of the ethnic minority population, it is implausible that there are no suitable candidates either in the general European context or in the Netherlands (for a more detailed discussion of the supply side, see Dancygier, 2017). Existing literature shows that the demand side is more likely to have significant influence and that ethnic minorities experience barriers within political parties (Dancygier, 2017; Durose, Richardson, Combs, Eason, & Gains, 2012; Mügge, 2016). In this thesis, the first step I investigate is the extent to which the selection and election processes affect descriptive representation. Ethnic minorities can only be elected if they are nominated as candidates. However, it is about more than nomination only. If candidates are placed in low or unsafe

list positions, ethnic minorities may be well represented on candidate lists with little chance of electoral success. This study provides new insight into the nomination of ethnic minority candidates. The last step to be examined is the actual election of ethnic minority candidates.

The strategies and motivations for nominating ethnic minority candidates differ between parties, depending on specific party characteristics. Recent literature has identified several party characteristics that affect ethnic minorities' descriptive representation, but they have not been tested in a single framework nor studied using a quantitative approach (Celis & Erzeel, 2013; Celis, Erzeel, Mügge, & Damstra, 2014; Mügge, 2016; Sobolewska, 2013; Zapata-barrero et al., 2017), which is why I test the extent to which three party characteristics affect ethnic minority nomination.

The following party characteristics are the focus of my research: substantive representation, intra-party ethnic minority support, and candidate selection methods. The rationale for looking at substantive representation is the assumption that parties that value the inclusion of ethnic minorities are likely to emphasise this both in their party programme and in the composition of their candidate list. Studies with a more qualitative and descriptive approach have demonstrated the relevance of intra-party support for the representation of ethnic minorities (Celis & Erzeel, 2013; Celis et al., 2014; Mügge, 2016), but this has not been tested using quantitative methods. Finally, how political parties select their candidates may have an impact on descriptive representation, which is why the selection processes of candidates have been extensively studied in order to explain the underrepresentation of specific social groups (Celis & Erzeel, 2013; Celis et al., 2014; Mügge, 2016; Norris & Lovenduski, 1995; Sobolewska, 2013). Several studies have found that ethnic minority candidates are often symbolic candidates who do not have much in common with the ethnic minority electorate (Dancygier, 2017; Durose et al., 2012; Van der Zwan & Turner-Zwinkels, 2017). So far, there is little understanding of how the composition of the selectorate affects ethnic minorities' descriptive representation. I therefore theorise about the inclusiveness of the selectorate and test if it matters to the nomination of ethnic minority candidates whether the selectorate consists of party leaders only or of all party members.

To summarise, in the first part of this thesis, I investigate the extent to which ethnic minorities are represented in the Netherlands and how this is affected by party characteristics. The research question addressed in Chapter 2 is:

'To what extent do party characteristics affect the descriptive representation of Western and non-Western minority groups on national candidate lists and in the House of Representatives in the Netherlands?'

1.3.3 | Part 2: The vote choice of ethnic minorities

Knowledge of the descriptive representation of ethnic minorities and its determinants is increasing (Bird et al., 2011; Bloemraad, 2013; Ruedin, 2013b), but it is also important to look at its effects. One of the goals of the inclusion of ethnic minority MPs is that they

represent the interests of the ethnic minority population. Therefore, I examine if ethnic minority voters actually vote for parties who aim to represent their interests. In the second part of this thesis, I first study the influence of both substantive and descriptive representation on ethnic minorities' party choice. Thereafter, I examine whether ethnic minority candidates attract ethnic votes and if this differs between political parties and ethnic groups.

1.3.3.1 | *Theoretical perspectives on ethnic minorities' vote choice*

The vote choice of ethnic minorities has been the topic of many studies. Explanations of their vote choice are often based on general voting theories, which have produced a large number of explanations and schools of thoughts (Adams, Merrill, & Grofman, 2005; Andersen & Heath, 2000; Barreto, 2007; Bergh & Björklund, 2011; Downs, 1957; Miller & Shanks, 1996; Sanders et al., 2014). On the one hand, there are sociological theories suggesting that vote choice is influenced by sociodemographic factors, including class, ethnicity, and gender (Adams et al., 2005; Fennema & Tillie, 1999; Lijphart, 1979; Miller & Shanks, 1996; Tillie, 2004). According to the sociological perspective, group identities, e.g. based on ethnic background, influence people's (group) interests and attitudes and that these (group) interests and attitudes shape vote choice (Andersen & Heath, 2000). On the other hand, there is a school of thought that relies on a rational choice perspective. Downs' (1957) spatial theory of voting states that voters are rational and self-interested actors that try to maximise their utility in each election. Voters compare their own issue positions with those of parties to determine which party represents their position best and will receive their vote (Bélanger & Meguid, 2008; Downs, 1957; Van der Brug, 2004; Zingher & Farrer, 2014).

Existing literature on ethnic minorities' vote choice is largely based on these schools of thought. In line with sociological models of voting behaviour, socioeconomic position is the main explanatory factor for the vote choice of the ethnic minority population in the European context (Bergh & Björklund, 2011; Heath et al., 2013, 2011). This explanation is not surprising, considering the overwhelming evidence that ethnic minorities of non-Western origin support left-wing political parties. Evidence for their left-wing preferences is found in the UK – where the Labour Party is the most preferred party – France, Germany, and the Netherlands (Heelsum, Michon, & Tillie, 2016; Schmidtke, 2016; Tiberj & Michon, 2013; Tillie, 1998). While the socioeconomic position of ethnic minorities does partly predict their vote choice, this cannot fully explain ethnic minorities' substantial support for left-wing parties. Other explanations include discrimination, ethnic identification, parties' issue positions, and ethnic affinity voting (Bird et al., 2011), which are minority-specific explanations of vote choice. The rational choice perspective has been researched less often, but a factor such as the issue proximity between parties and ethnic voters has also been found to affect the vote choice of ethnic minorities, at least in the UK (Sanders et al., 2014; Sobolowska, 2005).

1.3.3.2 | *Substantive and descriptive representation and the vote choice of ethnic minorities*

To formulate expectations about ethnic minorities' vote choice, I combine the propositions stemming from both sociological and rational choice theories. I expect that voter characteristics as well as issue positions affect the vote choice of ethnic minorities. Following the rational choice perspective, I expect voters to be rational actors, while assuming that their rational decisions are affected by the social groups to which they belong (Andersen & Heath, 2000). Thus, voters vote according to what they consider contributes to the interests of the social groups to which they belong. This may explain why voters do not always vote for the party that best represents their individual interests. The main contribution of this thesis to the research literature on the vote choice of ethnic minorities consists of two components. First, I anticipate that parties' substantive and descriptive representation of ethnic minorities affect vote choice. Second, I expect that this relationship depends on ethnic minorities' characteristics. Hence, I combine party and individual level explanations. In particular, I take into account the substantive economic positions that parties take and their standpoints on migration and integration. In line with sociological theories, I also examine the extent to which socioeconomic position and ethnic identification affect ethnic minorities' vote choice in the Dutch context. Accordingly, I investigate whether ethnic minorities make rational choices by voting for parties with issue positions that are in line with the interests of the group to which they (feel like they) belong.

In addition to substantive matters, I test whether the presence of ethnic minority candidates on parties' candidate lists is decisive for ethnic minority voters. There are several reasons why ethnic minority voters would prefer to vote for someone similar to themselves. To start with, for ethnic minority groups, an ethnic minority candidate on a party's candidate list can be an indicator of acknowledgement (Wolfinger, 1965). Moreover, a shared language, culture, or migration experience between voters and candidates can affect co-ethnic voting (Barreto, 2007). Additionally, it is possible that ethnic minority voters believe that such parties, or the ethnic minority candidates within these parties, will do a good job representing their interests (Landa, Copeland, & Grofman, 1995). Another reason may be that ethnic minority voters are mobilised by candidates with the same ethnic background (Fisher et al., 2015; Michon & Vermeulen, 2013). I investigate the question regarding the extent to which descriptive representation plays a role in ethnic minorities' vote choice in two different ways. First, in Chapters 3 and 4, I test whether ethnic minority voters prefer parties with a higher share of ethnic minority candidates on the list. In this case, descriptive representation may be a predictor for party choice. Second, in Chapter 5, I examine whether ethnic candidates attract votes in areas with a larger share of ethnic minority inhabitants. The research question addressed in Chapter 3 is specified as follows:

'To what extent do substantive and descriptive representation play a role in explaining vote choice among ethnic minority voters in the Netherlands?'

1.3.3.3 | *The vote choice of ethnic minorities in the Netherlands and Canada*

Most of this thesis focuses on the Netherlands, but one of the chapters centres on Canada in order to provide an additional test of the influence of substantive and descriptive representation on ethnic minorities' vote choice. I test whether substantive and descriptive representation play a similar role in vote choice in another context and time period. In this regard, I examine ethnic minorities' vote choice in a comparable way in the Netherlands and Canada.⁶ First, I will explain why Canada is an interesting case for such an additional test of the influence of ethnic minority representation of ethnic minorities' vote choice.

Both Canada and the Netherlands are interesting countries for the study of ethnic minority representation since they are regarded as countries with relatively high levels of ethnic minority representation. This notion is based on a study by Bloemraad (2013), who was one of the first researchers to provide a descriptive overview of ethnic minority representation in Western countries. The variation in relevant minority groups, time points, data sources, and data collection should be considered when interpreting this index. Nevertheless, it provides an indication of how well Western countries do in terms of the political representation of minority groups.

What is interesting about this finding for Canada and the Netherlands is that, despite being regarded as countries with high levels of ethnic minority representation, they differ in many other aspects. The Netherlands is one of the most typical examples of a country experiencing a backlash against multiculturalism (Banting & Kymlicka, 2013). Integration policies have become stricter over the years, and support for anti-immigrant parties has increased since 2001 (Banting & Kymlicka, 2013; Joppke, 2007; Koopmans, 2010). During the parliamentary elections of 2017, the anti-immigration Party for Freedom (PVV) became the second largest political party. Canada, on the other hand, is known for its multiculturalism and installed its most diverse cabinet in 2015 (Black & Hicks, 2008; Marwah, Triadafilopoulos, & White, 2013). Unlike the Netherlands, Canada has a large proportion of highly skilled minorities (Bird et al., 2011). Moreover, there is no anti-immigration party, and parties have generally similar views on immigration (Ambrose & Mudde, 2015; Marwah et al., 2013). Another important difference between the Netherlands and Canada is their electoral systems. Whereas the Netherlands has a system of proportional representation, Canada has a first-past-the-post system, in which the candidate with the most votes wins. Moreover, when voters vote for a candidate, this is a vote for the party. Different from the Dutch system, voters cannot choose between different candidates from the same party (Lijphart, 2012).

Regardless of these macro-level differences, which are seen by some researchers as explanatory factors for the level of ethnic minority representation, both countries seem to do well in representing ethnic minority groups. Two aspects, however, remain unclear. First, how the representation of minorities, both substantively and descriptively, relates to the vote choice of ethnic minorities; second, it is unknown if voter and party characteristics have similar effects on minorities' vote choice in very different political contexts. Hence, this thesis adds to the ethnic voting literature with an elaborate test of the influence of

substantive and descriptive representation on ethnic minorities' party choice. Moreover, the comparison between these two countries enhances our understanding of the consequences of ethnic minority representation and the extent to which this influences party choice among the ethnic minority electorate. If I do find similar results for the Netherlands and Canada, with very different electoral systems and multiculturalism policies, this may imply that the role of ethnic minorities' representation for their party choice is robust. In Chapter 4, I therefore aim to answer the following research question:

'To what extent do substantive and descriptive representation play a role in explaining vote choice among ethnic minorities in Canada?'

1.3.3.4 | *Ethnic minorities' candidate choice*

In addition to investigating the influence of descriptive representation within parties on the vote choice of ethnic minority voters, I examine candidate choice. In Chapter 5, I concentrate on whether ethnic minority candidates attract the ethnic vote in order to investigate the extent to which it is individual candidates, rather than parties, that attract the ethnic vote. Using similar theoretical propositions to those in Chapters 3 and 4, I examine whether ethnic minority candidates attract more votes in areas with a larger ethnic minority population. This proposition is called the affinity thesis, according to which voters are likely to vote for someone with whom they share certain characteristics, such as social class, gender, or ethnic background (Barreto, 2007; Bird et al., 2016; McDermott, 1998; Sigelman & Sigelman, 1982). The affinity thesis is not limited to ethnic groups but can also be applied to other social groups. Nevertheless, there is a large body of literature that has applied affinity voting to ethnic background, i.e. investigating ethnic affinity effects (e.g. Barreto, 2007; Bird et al., 2016; Briens, 2005; Goodyear-Grant & Croskill, 2011; Philpot & Walton, 2007; Sigelman & Sigelman, 1982).

At the time of writing, the most recent Dutch national election in March 2017 offered an interesting setting in which to study such ethnic affinity effects. Most of the political parties, left- and right-wing, nominated ethnic minority candidates. This makes it possible to study ethnic affinity voting within and between parties. Moreover, I study whether ethnic affinity voting effects for the two new minority-oriented parties – DENK and Artikel 1 – differ from the more traditional political parties. With all this in mind, the research question examined in Chapter 5 is:

'Under which conditions do ethnic minority candidates receive higher vote shares in the Dutch parliamentary election of 2017?'

1.4 | Data and methodology

In addition to several theoretical contributions, this thesis also makes methodological improvements to the current literature, which the present section will outline. Section 1.4.1 is followed by an overview of the data used in this study.

1.4.1 | Methodological contributions

First, research in the field of ethnic minority representation has often been descriptive and has taken a qualitative approach (e.g. Mügge, 2016; Sobolewska, 2013; Bloemraad, 2013). This is especially the case for research on this topic in the Netherlands (Celis & Erzeel, 2013; Celis et al., 2014; Mügge, 2016). These studies have provided useful insights into descriptive representation and its explanations, and this thesis builds on such research in testing whether similar results are found when a quantitative approach is taken. In order to test the effects of party characteristics on descriptive representation in a systemic way, I collected data on the ethnic minority representation on parties' candidate lists and in the House of Representatives for three parliamentary elections, in addition to how political parties deal with minorities within the party.

Second, I use innovative methods to study and explain ethnic minorities' vote choice. In Chapters 3 and 4, I examine the influence of parties' substantive and descriptive representation, meaning that I have to include characteristics of the outcome variable, which is party choice. This is only possible using conditional logistic regression models (Long & Freese, 2006). These models estimate whether party choice depends on substantive and descriptive representation. While conditional logit models have been used in voting research (Alvarez & Nagler, 1998; Dow & Endersby, 2004; Jansen, De Graaf, & Need, 2011; McFadden, 1973; Thurner, 2000), they are applied here for the first time to examine the influence of party characteristics relevant for ethnic minority voters on their vote choice.

Third, to test ethnic affinity effects, I use fine-grained geographical data. More specifically, I examine the vote share of individual candidates at the polling station level in twenty large cities in the Netherlands. With these data, I distinguish general ethnic affinity effects from co-ethnic affinity effects and examine whether ethnic affinity voting is dependent on party affiliation and other candidate characteristics. Since most voters vote for the party leader, the distribution of vote share is heavily skewed, and using OLS regression models would therefore lead to biased estimates. For this reason, I test my hypotheses among observations with a vote share larger than zero and use beta (inflated) regression models. Regression models where the outcome variable is beta distributed (beta regression models) take into account the skewness among the observations.

Data on the political representation and vote choice of ethnic minorities are not readily available. Data limitations are one of the reasons why, for instance, cross-national research is not widespread on this topic. Hence, to be able to test my theories and hypotheses, I use a wide range of data sources and collected data myself. Table 1.2 shows an overview of the data and methodology used in each chapter.

1.4.2 | Data

This section provides a short overview of the data collected for this thesis and the secondary data sources used.

1.4.2.1 | *Descriptive Representation Data 2010-2017*

I collected Dutch Descriptive Representation data to determine the extent to which ethnic minorities were descriptively represented in the Dutch parliamentary elections of 2010, 2012, and 2017 (Van der Zwan, 2017, 2018). For all political parties that received at least one seat in the House of Representatives, I collected information about the candidates' ethnic backgrounds. In the first two chapters of this thesis, the groups of interests are Western and non-Western minority groups. For the data in these chapters, I collected information about the candidates' countries of birth and the countries of birth of their parents. I followed the definition of Statistics Netherlands for ethnic minority background: those born abroad for whom at least one parent was also born abroad were considered as an ethnic minority, and everyone who was born in the Netherlands but for whom at least one parent was born abroad. I identified the following ethnic minority backgrounds: Moroccan, Turkish, former colonies, other non-Western, and Western. With this method, it was also possible to identify Western minority candidates. In 2010 and 2012, there were 805 unique candidates, 219 of whom were nominated in both elections. In addition to ethnic origin, information was obtained about a number of background variables, including gender, age, and position on the candidate list. Data were gathered online; small online biographies about MPs⁷ were used and complemented with other online resources, such as newspaper articles, social media, and personal websites. I contacted all candidates for whom sufficient information regarding their ethnic origin could not be found. Most of these candidates responded and provided the requested details about their ethnic background; the background of the remaining candidates was coded by three independent coders. Therefore, the data include all candidates that were nominated for the elections of 2010 and 2012.

I collected data about ethnic minority candidates nominated for the national elections of 2017 for the last study in this thesis that tests ethnic affinity voting (Van der Zwan, 2018). For the twelve parties included, there were 548 unique candidates nominated for the candidate lists. To be able to test ethnic affinity effects for specific ethnic groups, I only included non-Western minorities. It was not possible to include specific Western minority groups, since Statistics Netherlands only provides information about the share of Turkish, Moroccan, and Surinamese/Antillean minorities in neighbourhoods. Such data are not available, for example, for German minorities. Therefore, the focus is on ethnic minority candidates with a Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese/Antillean/Aruban background, or other non-Western background belonging to either first, second, or occasionally third generation immigrants. Two independent coders used names and photographs to identify ethnic minority candidates. For all candidates that were identified as an ethnic minority (90), an additional search was carried out to look for more specific information about their ethnic background. This information was gathered using small online biographies about MPs and other online resources, such as newspaper articles, social media, and personal websites.

1.4.2.2 | *Ethnic minorities' party choice*

Data sets with representative numbers of ethnic minority respondents are limited; to study the party choice of ethnic minorities, I therefore combined four different Dutch survey data sets: Migrants' Welfare State Attitudes (MIFARE), The Netherlands Longitudinal Lifecourse Study (NELLS), the Survey Integratie Minderheden (SIM), and Longitudinal Internet Studies for the Social Sciences (LISS; Bekhuis, Hedegaard, Seibel, Degen, & Renema, 2018; De Graaf, Kalmijn, Kraaykamp, & Monden, 2010a; Korte & Dagevos, 2011). These particular surveys were used because they all sampled different ethnic minority groups. Based on these surveys, I can examine the party choice of Turkish, Moroccan, former colony, other non-Western, and Western minorities. Since the four surveys differ regarding the ethnic minority groups they focus on, there are also some differences in the background characteristics for each survey. More information about the survey characteristics is presented in Appendix B.

To measure party choice among ethnic minorities in Canada, I use eight waves of the Canadian Election Survey (CES) from 1993–2015 (Fournier, Cutler, Soroka, & Stolle, 2015). This is a rich data set, and pooling all these waves makes it possible to have a large enough number of ethnic minority respondents and enough variation to study ethnic minorities' vote choice.

1.4.2.3 | *Ethnic affinity voting data*

To study ethnic affinity voting effects, election results were used from the Dutch national parliamentary elections of March 2017. These data are combined with the Descriptive Representation Data for the national election of 2017 and with neighbourhood characteristics from Statistics Netherlands (Statistics Netherlands, 2018c; Van der Zwan, 2018). Data were obtained through the Dutch Electoral Council. The 20 largest cities for which data were available were included. For all of these cities, there is information about the number of votes for each candidate on the candidate list in each of the polling stations. To be able to examine the influence of neighbourhood characteristics on affinity voting, the polling stations were linked to the administratively defined neighbourhood characteristics in which they were located. In total, I had election results from 2,121 polling stations, which were located in 1,089 neighbourhoods. Since the number of votes for each of the 548 candidates in each polling station were analysed, I had $2,121 \times 548 = 1,162,308$ observations.

1.5 | Outline of the chapters

Table 1.2 provides an overview of the chapters in this thesis. The first part begins with an examination of the extent to which both Western and non-Western minorities are represented on the candidate lists of political parties in the 2012 Dutch parliamentary

elections. Moreover, it tests how political parties affect the descriptive representation of different ethnic minority groups. More specifically, I systematically analyse the role of issue positions of Dutch parties, their ethnic minority support, and candidate selection methods. As list position is related to electoral success, I study the nomination of ethnic minority candidates as well as their position on the candidate list. Accordingly, Chapter 2 addresses the descriptive representation of ethnic minorities in the Netherlands and how that is affected by party characteristics.

The second part of this thesis concentrates on ethnic minorities' vote choice. Chapters 3 and 4 expand the existing theoretical scope to the role of parties' substantive and descriptive representation in ethnic minorities' vote choice. In these chapters, I study the effects of parties' substantive viewpoints and how descriptive representation affects ethnic minorities' vote choice in the Dutch and Canadian contexts.

Chapter 5 provides a detailed test of where, and under which conditions, ethnic affinity voting takes place. It is unknown for which political parties and specific ethnic candidates, and in which geographical localities, ethnic affinity effects occur. To study how neighbourhood and candidate characteristics affect ethnic affinity voting, I look at the proportion of votes for ethnic minority candidates at the neighbourhood level in the Netherlands in 2017, when a minority-interest party entered parliament and the traditional minority-vote-catching Labour Party (PvdA) imploded.


TABLE 1.2 | Overview of the chapters

	Chapter 2	Chapter 3	Chapter 4	Chapter 5
Country	Netherlands	Netherlands	Canada	Netherlands
Ethnic groups	Western and non-Western minorities	Western and non-Western minorities	Visible minorities	Non-Western minorities
Predictors	- Party characteristics - Candidate characteristics	- Voter characteristics - Descriptive representation - Substantive representation	- Voter characteristics - Descriptive representation - Substantive representation	- Neighbourhood characteristics - Candidate characteristics
Outcome variable	Descriptive representation	Party choice	Party choice	Candidate choice
Data sources	Dutch Descriptive Representation Data 2012; Chapel Hill Expert Survey	Dutch Descriptive Representation Data 2010–2012; MIFARE; NELS; LISS; SIM ^a ; Chapel Hill Expert Survey	Canadian Election Survey; Comparative Manifesto Project 1993–2015	Dutch Descriptive Representation Data 2017; Election results Dutch parliamentary elections 2017; Statistics Netherlands
Analytical techniques	Poisson rate regression analysis, linear regression analysis, logistic regression analysis	Conditional logistic regression analysis	Conditional logistic regression analysis	Beta regression analysis

Note: ^a *Migrants' Welfare State Attitudes (MIFARE)*, *The Netherlands Longitudinal Lifecourse study (NELS)*, *Longitudinal Internet Studies for the Social Sciences (LISS)* and *Survey Integratie Minderheden (SIM)*.

Notes

- 1 One exception would be the Frisians represented by the Frisian Party. However, this party never participated in national level elections. At the national level, this distinction is therefore not very salient in the Dutch context.
- 2 More information about the specific requirements for naturalisation can be found on: <https://ind.nl/Nederlanderschap/Paginas/Naturalisatie.aspx>.
- 3 For more information, see: <https://www.kiesraad.nl/verkiezingen/gemeenteraden/stemmen/niet-nederlandse-inwoners>.
- 4 See for example the following reports and newspaper articles: Staatscommissie parlementair stelsel. (2018). *Tussenstand*. Den Haag, Nederland: Staatscommissie parlementair stelsel.; Pietersen, R. (2015, February 18). Meer discriminatie moslims. *Trouw*, p. 9.; Magendane, K. (2016, September 9). CDA een volkspartij? Met zo'n witte kieslijst? *NRC Next*, p. 30.; De Boer, M. (2016, October, 8). Denk wil koloniale straatnamen veranderen. *Trouw*, p. 10.; Bahara, H. (2017, March 30). Lelieblanke Kamer. *De Volkskrant*, p. 10.; Nekuee, S. (2017, April 8). Denk is goed voor de democratie. *NRC Handelsblad*, p.2.
- 5 Article 1 of the Dutch constitution can be found on: https://www.denederlandsegrondwet.nl/id/viaoiicz1krff/artikel_1_gelijke_behandeling_en.
- 6 In Chapter 4 the term visible minority is used rather than ethnic minority. In Canada, the term visible minorities is most commonly used and it is defined by the Employment Equity Act; it refers to any non-Aboriginal person who is non-Caucasian in race or non-White in colour (Canada, 2008). In the current chapter I use the term ethnic minorities for reasons of consistency.
- 7 Retrieved from the website *parlement.com*.



PART I

**The descriptive
representation of
ethnic minorities**

CHAPTER 2

The political representation of ethnic minorities in the Netherlands: ethnic minority candidates and the role of party characteristics*

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2.1 | Introduction

In most Western societies, the representation of ethnic minority groups remains low despite the strongly increasing diversity in ethnic composition (Bloemraad, 2013; Murray, 2016; Sobolewska, 2013; Zapata-barrero et al., 2017). In a context where migration and integration belong to the most salient political topics, it is claimed that a political voice given to ethnic minorities from within these groups is essential to stimulate social cohesion (Zapata-barrero et al., 2017). It is therefore key to understand ethnic minorities' descriptive representation. Descriptive representation concerns the resemblance of the electorate by their political representatives, and the absence of ethnic minorities in political institutions sends a message of exclusion to both majority and minority groups (Phillips, 1995). Moreover, the exclusion or underrepresentation of particular groups of citizens is perceived as problematic for democratic legitimacy. This study adds to existing explanations of the political representation of ethnic minorities (e.g. Bird, 2005; Black & Erickson, 2006; Dancygier, Lindgren, Oskarsson, & Vernby, 2015; Martin, 2016; Michon & Vermeulen, 2013) by studying the role of political parties in descriptive representation. We move beyond the focus on visible minorities and study *all* ethnic groups. More specifically, our research question is:

'To what extent do party characteristics affect the descriptive representation of Western and non-Western minority groups on national candidate lists and in the House of Representatives in the Netherlands?'

Political parties play a fundamental role in ethnic minority representation (Celis & Erzeel, 2017; Szlovak, 2017; Zapata-barrero et al., 2017), for they decide how many ethnic minorities candidates are nominated. Accordingly, parties have a substantial influence on the composition of parliament (Gallagher & Marsh, 1988; Hazan & Rahat, 2006). Moreover, political parties reflect and influence public opinions about (ethnic) diversity and they are involved in policy-making (Zapata-barrero et al., 2017). However, the strategies and motivations to incorporate ethnic minorities differ between political parties. That is why we study how party characteristics affect ethnic minority representation.

This study brings together three party characteristics. We argue that the access of ethnic minorities to the party candidate lists depends on differences in parties' policy positions on migration and integration, on ethnic minority support within parties, and on the parties' candidate selection methods. These party characteristics have been identified as relevant for ethnic minority representation, but they have not been examined in a single framework (Celis & Erzeel, 2013; Celis et al., 2014; Mügge, 2016; Sobolewska, 2013). Consequently, this study tests whether parties' issue positions, intra-party ethnic minority support, and parties' selection methods affect ethnic minority representation.

To better understand the influence of parties on ethnic minority representation, we assess ethnic minority nomination in three different ways. Since a candidate's list position is an important predictor for electoral success, studying nomination only is not sufficient.

Therefore, we hypothesise about the role of political parties for candidates' nomination, their relative position on the list, and whether they are nominated for a (relatively) safe list position. Safe list positions are positions on the list of which it is expected that these candidates will obtain a seat following the elections.

Another contribution to existing research is our focus on both Western and non-Western minorities. Definitions of minority groups vary between countries and between studies (Bird et al., 2011; Bloemraad, 2013), and in the European context the focus often is on immigrants or ethnic minorities with a non-Western background (e.g. Dancygier et al., 2015; Mügge, 2016; Murray, 2016). This approach makes sense from the perspective that especially these groups experience exclusion from mainstream society and that their representation has become salient (Bloemraad, 2013; Celis et al., 2014). However, Western minorities constitute a relevant part of the ethnic minority population in many Western countries (European Union, 2015), and we know little about the political representation of this particular group. Therefore, in this study the term ethnic minorities refers to citizens with a Western or non-Western immigration background. The immigration background is defined by the countries of birth of the candidates and their parents.

2.2 | Case selection: The Dutch electoral system and political context

The Netherlands has long been considered as a multicultural country with a successful approach to integration. Nowadays, the Netherlands is more often seen as a country where integration policies have failed (Andeweg & Irwin, 2009; Koopmans, 2010). Within the country, debates about immigration and integration have intensified since 2000 (Aydemir & Vliegenthart, 2016). These debates mainly focus on the (lack of) integration of the largest non-Western groups, which are minorities with a Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese or Antillean background. Nevertheless, with regard to political integration the Netherlands is one of the countries with the highest levels of descriptive representation of non-Western ethnic minorities (Bloemraad, 2013; Mügge, 2016). This provides an interesting political context to study ethnic minority representation.

There are several distinct features of the Dutch electoral system relevant to this study. The Netherlands, which has a list system of proportional representation (PR), is characterised by one of the most proportional systems in the world (Andeweg & Irwin, 2009). Since voters in PR systems often have a choice between different candidates of the same party, such systems, unlike majoritarian systems, are thought to make it easier to increase the descriptive representation of minority groups (Htun, 2004).

The Dutch multi-party system is another feature of the electoral system. There are, on average, about ten political parties that hold seats in the House of Representatives. The majority of these parties can be placed into known party families, such as the Christian parties (CDA, SGP, CU), the Social Democrats (PvdA), the Socialists (SP), the Greens (GL), the Liberal parties (D66 and VVD), and the anti-immigrant party (PVV). The Dutch multi-party

system provides the opportunity to study how parties from all over the political spectrum place ethnic minorities on their candidate lists.

Political parties that aim to participate in national elections are required to submit a candidate list. All candidate lists are presented to the voter, and from these lists they can cast a vote for a single candidate. The sum of votes casted on all candidates of a party determines the share of votes for a political party. How many seats a party wins, and which candidates are elected is based on this share of votes. Most voters cast a vote for the first candidate on the list of the party they prefer. However, a voter can also cast a preference vote by choosing a candidate ranked lower on the party list. Preference votes are often used to support a female candidate or a candidate with an ethnic minority background (Andeweg & Irwin, 2009). A candidate that receives enough preference votes can be elected and overtake the position of higher ranked candidates. Nonetheless, this is not very common and happened only seven times since 2002 (Parlement and Politiek, 2016). Five of these candidates were women, and one of these women also belonged to an ethnic minority group.

We gathered data on the – at the time of collection latest – Dutch national elections held on 12 September 2012. The data include 531 candidates on the candidate lists of eleven political parties and provide information about the countries of birth of the candidates and their parents. In 2012, voters could vote for candidates of 21 political parties and eleven of these parties won seats in the House of Representatives. Most of the votes went to the Liberal Party (VVD, 27%) and the Labour Party (PvdA, 25%), as shown in Table 2.1.

TABLE 2.1 | Number of candidates on the list and seats in the House of Representatives in 2012, by party

Ideology ^a	Party (abbreviations)	Candidates	Seats
Left	Socialist Party (SP)	45	15
	GreenLeft (GL)	42	4
	Party for the Animals (PvdD)	25	2
	Labour Party (PvdA)	74	38
	50Plus	34	2
	Democrats 66 (D66)	50	12
	Christian Union (CU)	50	5
	Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA)	57	13
	People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD)	75	41
	Reformed Political Party (SGP)	30	3
Right	Party for Freedom (PVV)	49	15

^a Scale based on Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Bakker et al., 2015).

2.3 | Theoretical framework

Representation can be defined as a delegated act on behalf of someone else (Urbinati, 2011). Although there are various definitions and interpretations of political representation (Mansbridge, 2003, 2011; Rehfeld, 2011), the main interest of this study is in *who* represents. In other words, we focus on descriptive representation. We argue that political parties play a crucial role in the descriptive representation of ethnic minorities. First, descriptive representation is likely to be related to parties' issue positions. Hence, we study if parties' issue positions are in accordance with their actions by examining the extent to which their restrictiveness on migration and integration issues is reflected in the nomination of ethnic minority candidates. Second, the underrepresentation of ethnic minorities may be the result of parties' internal measures to incorporate ethnic minorities (Zapata-barrera et al., 2017). Therefore, we assess whether there is some form of ethnic minority support available within each party, such as an ethnic minority network, and how this affects descriptive representation. Third, we study candidate selection processes because those deciding – the selectorate – have the power to nominate ethnic minority candidates.

2.3.1 | From candidate selection to Member of Parliament

We examine two moments in the selection and election process of candidates important for ethnic minority representation. First, candidates have to be nominated by political parties before they can stand for election. Second, candidates that are nominated for a position on the candidate list still have to be elected to become a Member of Parliament (MP; Kunovich & Paxton, 2005; Mügge & Erzeel, 2016). In a list system of proportional representation, the selectorate nominates candidates and determines the order of the candidate list (Koole & Leyenaar, 1988). This means that the selectorate decides about the list position and about who is placed in a safe or unsafe list position (Rahat & Hazan, 2001). Therefore, it is possible that ethnic minorities are placed on the list, but that they have little chance of election. That is why we look at three outcome variables. We start with an examination of the ethnic composition of the candidate lists by looking at the share of ethnic minority candidates, followed by an investigation of their positions on the list. Successively, we examine whether ethnic minorities are placed in safe or unsafe list positions. Safe list positions are positions of which it is expected that these candidates will win a seat in the elections. Studying safe list positions is relevant because it plays a role in the selectorates' decision-making (Koole & Leyenaar, 1988). Even though safe list positions do not guarantee a seat in parliament, winning a seat is highly more likely for candidates in safe than unsafe list positions (Rahat & Hazan, 2001). Once the candidate list is determined, the voters decide who gets elected. Consequently, we also examine the extent to which the representativeness of parties' candidate lists is related to the representativeness of the House of Representatives.

2.3.2 | Who gets selected?

Left-wing parties often have positive views on minority groups and support minority rights (Messina, 2006). Moreover, studies have shown that these parties are more likely to have women and ethnic minorities among their MPs (Caul, 1999; Sobolewska, 2013; Wängnerud, 2009). We examine the extent to which the issue positions of parties on migration and integration are related to descriptive representation. We study specific issue positions instead of party ideology (left-right division) because most Dutch parties are quite explicit in their views on this topic during political debates, and because they have included their positions in the party programme. Parties supportive of ethnic minorities can be expected to reveal this in their issue positions, and, additionally, by including ethnic minority candidates on their list. We argue straightforwardly that a more restrictive issue position on migration and integration is related to a smaller share of ethnic minorities on the candidate list. Furthermore, it is anticipated that parties that are more restrictive about migration and integration are less likely to place ethnic minorities in higher list positions and to nominate them for a safe list position.

What also differs between parties is whether there exists some form of support for ethnic minority party members. Examples are quotas, targets, and intra-party ethnic minority networks. Quotas are a popular method to increase the share of underrepresented minorities in political institutions (Htun, 2004; Wängnerud, 2009). We expect that quotas or targets at the party level increase the number of ethnic minorities on candidate lists, much like they have done for women. Another opportunity used by Dutch parties to support ethnic minorities is an intra-party ethnic minority network. In such networks, minority issues are discussed and members can bring possible ethnic minority candidates to the attention of the selection committee (Mügge, 2016). In parties that provide support for ethnic minority members, these members have more chances of electoral success. For that reason, we anticipate, at the party level, that parties with ethnic minority support nominate more ethnic minority candidates. Moreover, to increase chances of electoral success, parties providing ethnic minority support are more likely to both place ethnic minority candidates in higher list positions and in safe list positions than parties with no form of ethnic minority support.

Another party characteristics we theorise about is that of candidate selection methods. Candidate selection is a crucial stage in the political recruitment process. The body responsible for the selection of candidates is the so-called selectorate (Hazan & Rahat, 2006). This selectorate is the gatekeeper of a party and decides who is nominated and who is not. By doing so, they indirectly influence the composition of the House of Representatives and, consequently, policy-making (Gallagher & Marsh, 1988; Rahat et al., 2008; Scarrow, 2000). That is why candidate selection processes have been studied to explain the underrepresentation of particular groups (Norris & Lovenduski, 1995) and there has been some support that candidate selection, although time and context dependent, affects ethnic minority representation (Celis & Erzeel, 2013; Celis et al., 2014; Sobolewska, 2013). Yet, it is unknown if it matters *who* decides about the candidates.

In the Netherlands, there are no legal rules on how candidates should be selected, and the composition of the selectorate is different for each party (for more details on candidate selection processes in the Netherlands, see: Hazan & Voerman, 2006). Selectorates are most inclusive when all voters can vote for who gets selected and most exclusive when a single leader decides about the candidate selection (Rahat & Hazan, 2001). The level of inclusiveness can influence representativeness because a more exclusive selectorate (e.g., the party leader) has more influence on the candidate list than a more inclusive selectorate. Hazan and Rahat (2006) have argued that it is easier for a small and exclusive selectorate to set up a balanced and diverse candidate list. With a more inclusive selectorate, for example consisting of all party members, it is more difficult to oversee the overall composition of the list and to discuss and compromise about its composition (Rahat et al., 2008). Nevertheless, there are few studies testing this assumption. Existing studies on the influence of inclusiveness of the selectorate have mainly focused on the selection of women and the results are mixed (Luhiste, 2015; Rahat et al., 2008). Testing the effects of inclusiveness of the selectorate on ethnic minority representation for the first time, we examine whether parties with a more exclusive selectorate nominate more ethnic minority candidates and are more likely to place them in higher and safe list positions.

In summary, the following hypotheses are formulated:

The more restrictive political parties' issue positions on migration and integration, the fewer ethnic minorities are nominated for the candidate list (H1a), the lower the relative list position of ethnic minority candidates (H2a), and the less likely they are to be nominated for safe list positions (H3a).

Parties providing ethnic minority support, nominate more ethnic minorities for the candidate list (H1b), place ethnic minority candidates in higher relative list positions (H2b), and are more likely to nominate them for safe list positions (H3b).

The less inclusive the selectorate of a party, the more ethnic minorities are nominated for the candidate list (H1c), the higher the relative list position of ethnic minority candidates (H2c), and the more likely they are to be nominated for safe list positions (H3c).

2.4 | Data and measurements

2.4.1 | Data

Both self-collected data and secondary data sources we used to test our assumptions. First, we collected information on all candidates on the candidate lists of the eleven parties who won at least one seat in the House of Representatives in the Dutch parliamentary elections of 2012.¹ In addition to ethnic origin, information was obtained about a limited

number of background variables including gender, age and position on the candidate list. Data were gathered online; small online biographies about MPs (PDC, 2016) were used and complemented with other online resources, such as newspaper articles, social media and personal websites. Second, data were collected for two of the three party characteristics: ethnic minority support and inclusiveness of the selectorate. Third, secondary data sources were used to determine safe list positions (Opinion poll data; Louwerse, 2014) and to measure parties' issue positions on migration and integration (Expert surveys; Bakker et al., 2015).

2.4.2 | Ethnic background

For all 531 candidates, information about their countries of birth and that of their parents was collected. We considered a candidate to be of Dutch origin when he or she and both parents were born in the Netherlands. When the candidate was born abroad but both parents were born in the Netherlands, the candidate was also considered to be of Dutch origin. Candidates who were born abroad and of whom at least one of the parents was born abroad were considered as belonging to an ethnic minority group. Moreover, candidates who were born in the Netherlands but of whom at least one of the parents was born abroad were identified as ethnic minorities.

Information about the countries of birth was found online for 431 candidates. If no information about the countries of birth of the parents was found, and if there was no evidence that proved otherwise, such as names, we coded the parents as Dutch. We contacted 100 candidates of whom no sufficient information about their ethnic origin could be found.² In total, 61 candidates responded, and they provided the requested details about their ethnic background. For the last 39 candidates, the country of birth and that of their parents was coded by three coders. We assumed these candidates and their parents to be Dutch unless any evidence proved otherwise.³

Two variables were constructed using these data. The first variable indicated whether a candidate belonged to an ethnic minority group or not, and the second variable specified the ethnic background of the candidate. In addition to Dutch, a distinction was made between the most important non-Western minority groups in the Netherlands, which are Turkish, Moroccan and former Dutch colony minorities. Considering that they make up one third of all ethnic minorities in the Netherlands with Dutch citizenship, a category of Western minorities was also included (See Figure 2.1). The final category consisted of minorities with another non-Western background (See Table A.1 in Appendix A for a more detailed overview).

2.4.3 | Dependent variables

Three different dependent variables were constructed. The first was a dependent variable at the party level and was simply the share of ethnic minorities on the candidate list. Second, at the candidate level we obtained a variable to measure the relative position of

candidates on the list. This was calculated as $\frac{T-P}{T-1} \times 100$, where T stands for the total number of positions available on a candidate list and P for the position of a candidate on the list. This candidate level variable ranges from 0 to 100, where 0 is the lowest position on the candidate list and 100 the highest position on the list (party leader). Hence, the higher the value, the higher the relative list position of the candidate.

Our third dependent variable, which is also at the candidate level, measured whether candidates were placed in a safe or in an unsafe list position. Safe list positions have often been based on a party's current number of seats (Rahat & Hazan, 2001). We depart from this definition, and used opinion polls to determine the number of safe seats for each party. We argue that opinion polls in the months before the elections offer a better prediction of the number of seats each party may win than the party's current number of seats. Therefore, we used opinion poll data from the polling institute *NOS Peilingwijzer*, which combined three different national opinion polls to estimate the support for each political party (Louwerse, 2014). Based on these polls, the data set provided the proportion of electoral support for each party on each day. The average support in the months May, June and July of 2012 was calculated for each party.⁴ This average proportion of electoral support was converted into seats by multiplying it by 150 (the amount of seats in the House of Representatives).⁵ The average number of seats predicted by the *NOS Peilingwijzer* in this period was used to determine the number of safe seats for each party. For example, it was predicted that the Liberal party (VVD) would obtain 30 seats. For this party, candidates on position 1 to 30 were coded as having a safe list position and candidates on position 31 to 75 were coded as having an unsafe position.

2.4.4 | Individual characteristics

Considering that candidates and MPs are often middle-aged, we include age as a control variable (Norris & Lovenduski, 1995). Candidates were between 21 and 77 years old. For 28 candidates the year of birth was unknown; the mean age (44) of the 503 other candidates was assigned to them.⁶ Additionally, we control for gender because recent studies have shown the relevancy of gender in ethnic minority representation in the Netherlands (Celis et al., 2014; Mügge, 2016).

2.4.5 | Party characteristics

The Chapel Hill Expert Survey was used to measure the positions of parties on migration and integration issues (See Bakker et al., 2015 for more detailed information about these data). Dutch politics experts were asked to rate the positions of political parties on several topics; three variables from this survey were used. First, the positions of parties on immigration policy (from fully opposed to (0) to fully in favour of (10) a restrictive policy on immigration); second, the positions on the integration of immigrants and asylum seekers (from strongly favouring multiculturalism (0) to strongly favouring assimilation (10)); and last, the position towards ethnic minority rights (from strongly supporting (0) to

strongly opposing (10) more ethnic minority rights). The survey data were collected in 2010 and 2014. Because our concern was the election of 2012, we used the mean score of these two years. The only exception was for the 50Plus party, this party was established in 2011. Therefore, only the 2014 data could be used for this party. A scale was created by taking the average score on these three variables. A higher score on this scale indicates more restrictive views. The scale is reliable with a Cronbach's alpha of 0.983. For interpretation purposes, the variable was centred on the mean.

Information on ethnic minority support in 2012 was collected from the websites, statutes, internal regulations of the political parties and other party documents (See Appendix A for a detailed overview). First, no explicit references to quota were found. However, a striving for the participation of ethnic minorities (or similar terminology) in party positions was mentioned in party documents of the Labour Party (PvdA) and the Green Party (GL). Furthermore, the Christian Democrats (CDA) and the Green Party (GL) had an ethnic minority network in 2012. Therefore, the Labour Party (PvdA), the Green Party (GL), and the Christian Democrats (CDA) were considered to be supportive of ethnic minorities (1). The other parties, which had no quota, targets or ethnic minority network, obtained a score of 0.

To measure the inclusiveness of the selectorate, we used a scale as suggested by Rahat and Hazan (2001). The categories of the scale were slightly adjusted for the Dutch case: Selectorates are most exclusive when only one person decides about the candidate list, and most inclusive when all party members can decide about this list. For each party we coded who decided about the *final* version of the candidate list in 2012. The coding was based on the information in a report of Voerman, Lucardie and Marchand (2004) and was checked and complemented with information from the statutes, and internal rules and regulations of the parties (See Appendix A for a detailed overview). We note that only the formal procedures regarding the selectorate were included.⁷ Four categories were distinguished; first, only the party leadership decides about the candidate list (most exclusive), second, a party agency decides about the candidate list, third, party members present on a party congress decide about the candidate list, and last, all party members decide on the candidate list. Descriptive statistics and information about the party characteristics for each party are presented in Appendix A.

2.5 | Results

2.5.1 | Analytical strategy


To test our hypotheses, we started with an examination of the composition of the candidate lists and the MPs elected for the House of Representatives. Second, the extent to which party characteristics are related to the share of ethnic minorities on each party's candidate list was analysed. Third, multiple regression analyses were performed to test the effects of party characteristics on the relative list position of individual candidates and on

the likelihood to be placed in safe list positions. Last, the possible association between the share of ethnic minorities on the candidate list and among MPs was investigated.⁸

2.5.2 | Descriptive results

In total, 11% of the candidates and 12% of the MPs have an ethnic minority background. Figure 2.1 shows that ethnic minorities eligible to vote (aged 18 years or above and with Dutch citizenship) are underrepresented on the candidate list and in the House of Representatives. An examination of Dutch ethnic minority groups shows that there are differences in the level of representation for each group. Except for Dutch citizens with a Turkish or Moroccan background, all ethnic minority groups are underrepresented. Western ethnic minorities make up 4.7% of the population, but only 2.3% of the candidates and 2.7% of the MPs are ethnic minorities with a Western background. Furthermore, we find a substantial difference between the share of ethnic minorities that belong to the other non-Western group of the population (3.0%) and among politicians (1.3% of the candidates and 0.7% of the MPs). There is also a large difference between ethnic minorities from former colonies in the population (5.7%) and on the candidate lists and in the House of Representatives (2.4% and 2.0%, respectively).

FIGURE 2.1 | Share of ethnic minority groups with Dutch citizenship of the total Dutch population^a and the share of ethnic minorities among candidates and MPs in 2012



Note:^a This refers to the population of 18 years or older
Source: Statistics Netherlands, 2016a, 2016b; Van der Zwan, 2017; own calculations.

The representation index is often used to indicate the extent to which ethnic minorities are descriptively represented and is comparable across countries. A higher score on this index indicates better representation. Calculating the representation index for the

descriptive representation of ethnic minorities in the Netherlands in 2012, we find that the representation score is 0.73 for all ethnic minorities and 0.79 for non-Western minorities.⁹ Although this is not as high as the 1.08 score that Bloemraad (2013) found for the Netherlands in 2006, it is higher than most other countries reported in her study, where the representation index ranged from 0.00 (France, 2007) to 0.48 (Canada, 2006). In other studies, representation scores are lower as well, such as in Germany, Ireland, Portugal, Spain (Ruedin, 2013b; Zapata-Barrero, 2017).

2.5.3 | Ethnic minority candidates on parties' candidate lists

A Poisson rate regression model was used to examine the association between party characteristics and the share of ethnic minority candidates on the candidate lists. By using the share of ethnic minority candidates, the length of the candidate list is taken into account.

The results in Table 2.2 show that the restrictiveness of parties' issue positions on migration and integration is significant and is negatively related to the share of ethnic minority candidates ($b=-0.188$). As expected in Hypothesis 1a, parties with more restrictive positions on migration and integration nominate fewer ethnic minorities for the candidate list. Hence, the first hypothesis is supported. Furthermore, ethnic minority support within parties is significant and positively related to the share of ethnic minority candidates on the list ($b=0.859$). This provides support for Hypothesis 1b, arguing that parties providing ethnic minority support nominate more ethnic minorities for the candidate list. However, the effects of the inclusiveness of the selectorate are not as expected and non-significant. Hence, Hypothesis 1c that parties with less inclusive selectorates nominate more ethnic minorities for the candidate list is not supported.

TABLE 2.2 | Poisson rate regression of the share of ethnic minority candidates on the candidate list of 11 parties (N=531)

	B
Intercept	-1.611 (1.205)
Restrictiveness	-0.188* (0.099)
Ethnic minority support	0.859** (0.411)
Inclusiveness (All party members=ref.)	
- Party leader	0.092 (0.874)
- Party delegates	-0.446 (1.031)
- Party members congress	0.287 (0.936)

*Note: A control variable for the orthodox Christian parties (SGP and CU) was included (not shown), including this variable significantly increased the fit of the model. Standard errors in parentheses. ** $p<0.05$; * $p<0.10$.*

2.5.4 | Relative list position

Table 2.3 shows the effects of party characteristics on the list position of ethnic minority candidates and Table 2.4 gives the results for safe list positions. Due to the low number of ethnic minorities (e.g. the other non-Western group includes only seven ethnic minority candidates), we only distinguished between Dutch, Western, and non-Western background in the multiple regression analysis. Moreover, for parsimonious reasons, the interaction effects of the party characteristics were included in separate models.¹⁰

Only individual characteristics were included in the null model in Table 2.3. This model shows that ethnic background, gender, and age are not related to the relative list position of candidates. Similarly, these individual characteristics do not significantly affect the likelihood to be placed in a safe list position (Model 0 in Table 2.4). This means that *if* ethnic minorities are included on the lists, they, on average, are not placed in lower or unsafe list positions.

The interaction variable of the restrictiveness scale and ethnic minority background was added in Model 1 in Table 2.3. We find that when a party is more restrictive on migration and integration, native Dutch candidates have a higher position on the candidate list, and both Western and non-Western ethnic minority candidates a lower position on the list. This effect is only significant for non-Western ethnic minority candidates ($b=0.557-5.469=-4.912$). This supports Hypothesis 2a, but only for candidates with a non-Western ethnic background: the more restrictive political parties' views on migration and integration, the lower the relative list position of non-Western ethnic minority candidates.

Model 2 shows that the effects of parties' ethnic minority support by ethnic minority background are not significant. Hence, there is no support for the hypothesis that the more ethnic minorities are supported within the party, the higher the relative list position of ethnic minority candidates (H2b).

The last party characteristic is the inclusiveness of the selectorate. Model 3 shows that the results regarding inclusiveness are mixed for all ethnic groups and do not reach significance. Therefore, our hypothesis that in parties with a less inclusive selectorate, ethnic minority candidates are placed in higher list positions is not supported (H2c).

TABLE 2.3 | Linear regression of candidates' relative list position on individual and party characteristics (N=531)

	Model 0	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
	B	B	B	B
Intercept	51.763*** (5.745)	51.154*** (5.760)	51.612*** (5.873)	50.659*** (6.304)
<i>Individual characteristics</i>				
Ethnic background (Dutch=ref.)				
- Western background	0.854 (7.511)	1.375 (7.553)	3.660 (10.008)	-0.766 (15.115)
- Non-Western background	5.014 (4.753)	-1.725 (6.142)	9.362 (7.945)	13.275 (10.434)
Gender (male=ref.)				
- Female	3.085 (2.707)	3.429 (2.733)	3.241 (2.752)	3.323 (2.758)
Age	-0.074 (0.124)	-0.065 (0.124)	-0.072 (0.124)	-0.063 (0.130)
<i>Party characteristics</i>				
Restrictiveness		0.557 (0.622)	0.211 (0.629)	0.480 (0.944)
Restrictiveness × Western background		-2.461 (3.418)		
Restrictiveness × Non-Western background		-5.469* (2.901)		
Ethnic minority support			-0.076 (3.161)	
Support × Western background			-6.495 (15.234)	
Support × Non-Western background			-6.150 (9.988)	
Inclusiveness (All party members=ref.)				
- Party leader				-0.492 (5.556)
- Party delegates				1.021 (3.533)
- Party members congress				0.585 (4.741)
Party leader × Western background ^a				11.881 (26.042)
Party delegates × Western background				3.958 (18.947)
Party delegates × Non-Western background				-15.623 (12.139)
Party members congress × Western background				-9.273 (23.069)
Party members congress × Non-Western background				6.310 (14.631)
R ²	0.006	0.014	0.008	0.015

Note: ^a An interaction effect for party leader and non-Western background could not be estimated because there were no ethnic minority candidates with a non-Western background in parties where the party leader decided about the candidate list. Standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.001; **p<0.05; *p<0.1.

2.5.5 | Safe list positions

Model 1 in Table 2.4 presents the odds ratio (OR) of 1.122 for the main effect of restrictiveness. This indicates that for native Dutch candidates the chance to be placed in a safe list position versus the chance to be placed in an unsafe list position is higher when parties are more restrictive on migration and integration. The direction of the interaction effects suggests that those with a Western as well as those with a non-Western background are less likely to be placed in safe list positions when parties are more restrictive. However, the interaction effects are not significant. Therefore, Hypothesis 3a stating that when parties have more restrictive views the likelihood to be placed in safe list positions is lower, cannot be supported.¹¹

In Model 2 in Table 2.4, we see a negative and significant interaction effect for non-Western ethnic minority candidates ($b = -0.145 \pm 1.811 = -1.956$; $OR = 0.164$). In contrast to our expectation, when there is no ethnic minority support the likelihood to be placed in safe list positions is larger for candidates with a non-Western ethnic minority background. There is no significant interaction effect for candidates with a Western background. This means that we do not find the expected results for the hypothesis that when ethnic minorities are supported within the party, ethnic minority candidates would be more likely to be placed in safe list positions (H3b).

The results in Model 3 show that when party leaders, party delegates, and a party members' congress decide about the candidate list the likelihood to be placed in a safe list position is smaller than when all party members decide about the list. Our results show one exception: when party leaders decide about the list, ethnic minority candidates with a Western background have a larger likelihood to be placed in safe list position compared to when all party members decide about the candidate list. This is not in line with our expectations, and we do not find support for Hypothesis 3c that the inclusiveness of the selectorate would be related to safe list positions for ethnic minority candidates.¹²

TABLE 2.4 | Logistic regression analysis of candidates' safe list position on individual and party characteristics (N=531)

	Model 0		Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	B	OR	B	OR	B	OR	B	OR
Intercept	-0.817*	0.430	-0.875**	0.417	-0.833*	0.435	-1.098**	0.334
	(0.438)		(0.442)		(0.448)		(0.494)	
<i>Individual characteristics</i>								
Ethnic background (Dutch=ref.)								
- Western background	0.416	1.515	0.450	1.568	0.615	1.849	0.613	1.846
	(0.528)		(0.532)		(0.690)		(1.031)	
- Non-Western background	-0.291	0.750	-0.469	0.626	0.839	2.314	1.057	2.877
	(0.379)		(0.528)		(0.546)		(0.723)	
Gender (male=ref.)								
- Female	0.213	1.238	0.291	1.337	0.283	1.327	0.282	1.326
	(0.202)		(0.206)		(0.208)		(0.212)	
Age	-0.005	0.996	-0.004	0.996	-0.004	0.996	0.008	1.008
	(0.009)		(0.010)		(0.009)		(0.010)	
<i>Party characteristics</i>								
Restrictiveness			0.115**	1.122	0.087*	1.091	0.078	1.082
			(0.047)		(0.048)		(0.073)	
Restrictiveness × Western background			-0.187	0.829				
			(0.243)					
Restrictiveness × Non-Western background			-0.247	0.781				
			(0.238)					
Ethnic minority support					-0.145	0.865		
					(0.245)			
Support × Western background					-0.471	0.624		
					(1.105)			
Support × Non-Western background					-1.811**	0.164		
					(0.840)			
Inclusiveness (All party members=ref.)								
- Party leader							-0.570	0.565
							(0.415)	
- Party delegates							-0.026	0.975
							(0.255)	
- Party members congress							-1.450***	0.235
							(0.439)	
Party leader × Western background ^a							0.267	1.306
							(1.769)	
Party delegates × Western background							-0.244	0.783
							(1.296)	
Party delegates × Non-Western background							-1.988**	0.137
							(0.915)	
Party members congress × Western background ^b							-19.621	0.000
							(23194.369)	
Party members congress × Non-Western background							-0.743	0.476
							(1.326)	
Nagelkerke R ²	0.007		0.024		0.039		0.093	

Note: ^a An interaction effect for party leader and non-Western background could not be estimated because there were no ethnic minority candidates with a non-Western background in parties where the party leader decided about the candidate list. ^b This large effect and the large standard error are probably caused by the very low number of Western minority candidates in parties where the party decide about the candidate list on a party congress. Standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.001; **p<0.05; *p<0.1.

2.5.6 | Ethnic minority candidates and MPs by party

In the final part of our study, we examined whether the share and the list position of ethnic minority candidates are related to the share of ethnic minorities in the House of Representatives. Table 2.5 shows that parties with the lowest share of ethnic minority candidates have less ethnic minority candidates in safe list positions and less ethnic minority MPs (The Christian SGP and CU, and the Party for the Animals (PvdD)) and that parties with the highest share of ethnic minority candidates also have a higher share of ethnic minorities in safe list positions and ethnic minority MPs (the Democrats 66 (D66), the Green party (GL) and the Labour Party (PvdA)). Some parties stand out, such as the Elderly party (50Plus) and the Christian Democrats (CDA). Both parties have ethnic minority candidates on the list, but no ethnic minorities with a seat in the House of Representatives. For the 50Plus party their low number of seats (2) offers an explanation. The Christian Democrats (CDA) did not place ethnic minorities in safe list positions, which seems to indicate that ethnic minorities have lower list position than native Dutch candidates. A possible explanation is that the Christian Democrats (CDA) obtained the lowest number of seats ever in the 2012 elections (13 compared to 21 in the 2010 elections). Overall, not unexpected, the percentages indicate that a higher share of ethnic minority candidates is related to a higher share of ethnic minority candidates in safe list positions and ethnic minority MPs. This is supported by the strong positive and significant correlations of 0.718 between the percentage of ethnic minority candidates and the percentage of ethnic minorities in safe list positions, and of 0.736 between the percentage of ethnic minority candidates and ethnic minority MPs.

TABLE 2.5 | The number of seats, share of ethnic minority candidates and the share of ethnic minorities in safe list positions and among MPs, by party

Party	% ethnic minority candidates	% ethnic minorities in safe list positions	Seats	% ethnic minority MPs
SGP	0.0	0.0	3	0.0
CU	4.0	0.0	5	0.0
PvdD	4.0	0.0	2	0.0
PVV	4.1	5.3	15	6.7
50Plus	5.9	0.0	2	0.0
VVD	6.7	6.7	41	4.9
SP	8.9	10.0	15	20.0
CDA	14.0	0.0	13	0.0
D66	16.0	33.3	12	25.0
GL	21.4	20.0	4	25.0
PvdA	24.3	20.0	38	21.1
Pearson correlation with % ethnic minority candidates		0.718***		0.736***

Note: *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$.

2.6 | Conclusion and discussion

With a focus on the influence of political parties on the descriptive representation of ethnic minorities, this study systematically tested the role of parties' policy positions, parties' ethnic minority support, and parties' selection methods. We studied how parties affect both the nomination of ethnic minorities and their list positions. Moreover, we extended the research on ethnic minority representation to understand representation of non-Western and Western minorities. The latter is uncommon, since the representation of this group is relatively low and there are few cases to study. This contrasts the representation of Turkish and Moroccan minorities in the Netherlands, who are well represented.

Our findings show that political parties' issue positions on migration and integration affect both ethnic minority representation and minorities' list position. Parties that have more restrictive views on migration and integration not only nominate fewer ethnic minority candidates, but also place non-Western ethnic minority candidates in lower list positions. That might seem a straightforward finding, but it underlines that parties with a more positive view on migration and integration not only express this in their programme but also descriptively, sending out a direct signal of inclusion. This is an important finding we expect to be of relevance in other Western countries and different electoral systems as well.

There was no clear support for the role of the other two party characteristics under study. Although ethnic minority support at the party level was related to a higher number of ethnic minority candidates, we did not find the expected association of ethnic minority support with Western and non-Western ethnic minority candidates' position on the candidate list. As shown by previous studies, the influence of ethnic minority networks may change over time (Mügge, 2016). Ethnic minority networks were influential in the 1990s, particularly for ethnic minority women. It seems that ethnic minority networks have become less powerful in the current political context. Previous research has also shown that targets or quotas do not always work similarly for different minority groups. National level quotas have been successful for the political representation of women but were not always related to higher levels of ethnic representation (Celis et al., 2014; Ruedin, 2013b).

We did not find any evidence that more inclusive selectorates have a better balanced candidate list in terms of ethnic background. Following the conceptual framework of Hazan and Rahat (2006) we argued that parties with less inclusive selectorates are more likely to create a balanced candidate list and, consequently, will have more representative candidate lists. An explanation for our unexpected findings may be that the differences in selection methods between Dutch political parties are not substantial enough to yield an effect. Cross-national research on the representation of ethnic minorities on candidate lists could provide more clarity on this issue.

Our study showed that, in line with earlier research, non-Western minorities in the Netherlands were relatively well represented in 2012 (Bloemraad, 2013; Mügge, 2016). The ethnic groups with the highest levels of representation, Turkish and Moroccan minorities, are the groups most often the subject of (critical) debate in the Netherlands. Although

this explains the focus on these groups in earlier studies, our findings showed that not all ethnic minority groups were well represented, and there is no reason to expect different results in other countries. Hence, this study could be a starting point to examine Western minorities in more detail.

A limitation of this study is that we only examined descriptive representation and did not look into the extent to which the interests of ethnic minorities – substantive representation – are represented (Phillips, 1995; Pitkin, 1967; but see Aydemir & Vliegthart, 2016). Moreover, candidates with a non-Dutch background (both Western and non-Western) may vary in their identification with that non-Dutch background, which we were (unfortunately) unable to address. This is an interesting outlook for future research, in particular in the Dutch case where a minority-oriented party ‘DENK’ won two seats in the national elections of 2017.

This contribution has highlighted the relevance of both ethnic minority representation on national candidate lists and the role of political parties for ethnic minority representation in multi-party systems like the Netherlands. Parties’ issue positions matter, but their strategies to incorporate ethnic minorities may not always have the desired effects.

Notes

- 1 The official publication of the candidate lists for the Dutch parliamentary elections of 2012 was used to get an overview of the candidates, see: <https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/stcrt-2012-16691.html>.
- 2 We asked the candidates four questions: ‘What is your date of birth?’, ‘Which country were you born in?’, ‘In which country was your father born?’, and ‘In which country was your mother born?’.
- 3 In 95% of the cases the same country of birth of the candidate was coded. The candidates’ father’s country of birth matched in 92% of the cases and the country of birth of the mother in 90% of the cases. When the three coders did not code the same country of birth, the most mentioned country of birth was chosen.
- 4 The government collapsed on the 21 April 2012. The elections took place on the 21 September and parties could submit candidate lists for these elections to the Electoral Council (Kiesraad) until the 31 July 2012.
- 5 Because the Dutch system is very proportional, this is likely to give a good indication of the expected number of seats each party could win.
- 6 As a robustness check the analyses were also run without the candidates of whom information about the year of birth is missing, this did not change the outcome of the hypotheses tests.
- 7 When ethnic minorities are part of the party board – the most influential people within the party – this could also affect ethnic minority representation on candidate lists. Therefore, we looked into ethnic representation in party boards but found little

variation in 2012. Only in two parties (PvdA and CDA) an ethnic minority member was part of the party board.

- 8 Additional robustness checks are presented in Appendix A.
- 9 This is calculated by dividing the % of ethnic minority MPs by the % ethnic minorities with Dutch citizenship in the population (Bloemraad, 2013). For 2012, this is $12/16.5=0.73$ for the general ethnic minority population and $9.3/11.8=0.79$ for non-Western minorities.
- 10 The different party characteristics are probably related: whether a balanced candidate list is strived for is likely to depend on parties' standpoints, especially in the case of ethnic minority representation. Furthermore, ethnic minority support within parties probably goes along with more positive issue positions on migration and integration. Moreover, we anticipate that in parties with positive views on migration and integration, exclusive selectorates are better able to create a balanced candidate list. However, based on Spearman rank correlations, we decided to only include restrictiveness in all interaction models rather than to include all party characteristics in one model (we found a correlation of -0.363 between restrictiveness and ethnic minority support and -0.383 between restrictiveness and inclusiveness; the correlation between ethnic minority support and inclusiveness was -0.162).
- 11 We also examined the effect of party ideology on the relative list position of ethnic minority candidates and on the likelihood to be placed in a safe list position. There is no significant interaction effect for party ideology on the relative list position of ethnic minority candidates, nor on the likelihood to be placed in a safe list position. See Tables A.6 and A.7 in Appendix A for more details.
- 12 In addition, multilevel models were estimated as a robustness check. Some of the effects do not reach significance once multilevel methods are applied. However, the effect sizes do not change substantially. See Appendix A for more details.



PART II

The vote choice of ethnic minorities

CHAPTER 3

Political representation and the vote choice of ethnic minorities in the Netherlands*

*This chapter is currently under review at an international journal. The chapter is co-authored by Marcel Lubbers. The authors jointly developed the idea for this paper. Roos van der Zwan wrote most of the text and conducted the analysis. Marcel Lubbers contributed to the manuscript.

3.1 | Introduction

Voters of non-Western origin strongly support left-wing political parties in many Western countries. This is found over and over again in empirical research describing the vote choice of ethnic minorities; for example, in the UK (Martin, 2016), France (Tiberj & Michon, 2013), Germany (Schmidtke, 2016) and the Netherlands (Heelsum et al., 2016; Tillie, 1998). Scholars have considered several explanations for the vote choice of ethnic minorities (Barreto, 2007; Bergh & Bjørklund, 2011; Bird et al., 2011; Sanders et al., 2014; Tillie, 1998). These explanations mainly focus on the individual level in which socioeconomic position is considered one of the most relevant explanations for left-wing party support (Bergh & Bjørklund, 2011; Heath et al., 2013, 2011). Studies on individual level explanations, however, often fail to combine individual level characteristics with the influence of party characteristics, which may be important for ethnic minority voters. Therefore, this study proposes the significance of ethnic minority group-relevant party level characteristics as explanations for ethnic minorities' vote choice.

This study aims to understand whether ethnic minorities' vote choice depends on political parties' substantive and descriptive representation. Substantive representation is about *what* is represented, the degree to which the interests of a specific group are represented (Pitkin, 1967; Ruedin, 2013b). While there are a variety of interpretations, this study considers the party standpoint on ethnic minority-specific interests as substantive representation.¹ Descriptive representation is about *who* represents: the degree to which characteristics of the electorate are resembled by representatives (Bloemraad, 2013; Mansbridge, 1999; Phillips, 1995; Pitkin, 1967).

Research on the influence of substantive and descriptive representation has often been examined with voter turnout as the outcome variable rather than vote choice (e.g. Fairdosi & Rogowski, 2015; Rocha, Tolbert, Bowen, & Clark, 2010; Washington, 2016). In previous research on vote choice, descriptive and substantive representation has received some attention (Bergh & Bjørklund, 2011; Dancygier & Saunders, 2006; Dawson, 1995; Martin, 2016; Washington, 2016; Zingher & Farrer, 2014), though usually not simultaneously and not in competition with other explanations of ethnic minorities' vote choice. Our research question is:

'To what extent do substantive and descriptive representation play a role in explaining vote choice among ethnic minorities in the Netherlands?'

Scarcity of data in which ethnic minority groups are well represented often complicates the testing of explanations for the vote choice of ethnic minorities and constrains comparative research (Bergh & Bjørklund, 2011; Bloemraad, 2013; Saggar, 2000; Sobolewska, 2005). By combining four Dutch data sets, including respondents with ethnic minority backgrounds, we examine vote choice with a substantial number of ethnic minorities. Moreover, with these data we can separately test both classic and group-specific explanations for the vote choice of non-Western and Western ethnic minority groups. Like many European countries, the Netherlands has a proportional representation (PR) system. A distinct

feature is that the descriptive representation of ethnic minorities is relatively high in comparison with other Western countries (Bloemraad, 2013; Mügge, 2016; Ruedin, 2013b; Van der Zwan, Lubbers, & Eisinga, 2018). Furthermore, since levels of descriptive representation of ethnic minorities vary considerably between political parties, the Dutch context offers an interesting site to investigate the role of substantive and descriptive representation in ethnic minorities' vote choice. The vote choice of ethnic minorities has been studied quite elaborately for certain cities in the Netherlands, however, this study is one of the first to do so for national level elections (Heelsum et al., 2016; Teney et al., 2010; Tillie, 1998).

3.2 | Theoretical framework

3.2.1 | Explaining vote choice

The literature on voting behaviour has provided a wide range of explanations for vote choice. Explanations include sociodemographic factors, party identification, policy issues, evaluation of party performance and campaigning strategies (Adams et al., 2005; Downs, 1957; Evans, 2000; Jansen, Evans, & De Graaf, 2013; Miller & Shanks, 1996). Sociological models consider voting as rooted in non-policy-issues, such as class, ethnicity or other sociodemographic factors (Adams et al., 2005; Miller & Shanks, 1996). In line with these sociological models, the strength of ethnic communities, their social capital and ethnic affinity voting have also been considered as explanations for ethnic minorities' vote choice (Bird et al., 2016; Fennema & Tillie, 1999; McDermott, 1998; Michon & Vermeulen, 2013; Tillie, 1998). Spatial models in the tradition of Downs (1957), on the other hand, argue that voters are rational and self-interested actors who try to maximise their utility at each election. They focus on issue salience and/or on the distance between the policy preferences of voters and parties (Bélanger & Meguid, 2008; Downs, 1957; Van der Brug, 2004; Zingher & Farrer, 2014).

This article contributes to the existing literature on ethnic voting by combining sociological and political models of vote choice. Theorising and testing for the role of substantive and descriptive representation simultaneously, we propose that ethnic minority status and the identification with that status matter in voting behaviour and we expect that vote choice is affected by what the parties offer with respect to ethnic minority-specific interests. However, we do so in relation to the socioeconomic position of ethnic minority voters and the political parties' substantive economic position – as the economic perspective turned out to be highly relevant to understanding the voting behaviour of ethnic minorities (Bergh & Bjørklund, 2011; Heath et al., 2013).

3.2.2 | Substantive representation

We examine two issue positions for political parties that we believe to be relevant in ethnic minorities' vote choice. First, parties' positions on socioeconomic issues are considered.

Voters' socioeconomic position is a well-established explanation for vote choice and for ethnic minorities' left-wing party support in particular (Bird et al., 2011; Elff, 2009; Evans, 2000; Jansen et al., 2011), but there is an ongoing discussion about the relevance of socioeconomic predictors in vote choice for ethnic minority voters (Bergh & Bjørklund, 2011; Heath et al., 2011; Sanders et al., 2014). Indeed, social-democratic parties seem to be a sensible choice for ethnic minority voters because ethnic minorities more often have a lower socioeconomic status and those parties generally represent the interests of citizens in lower socioeconomic positions (Adams et al., 2005; Downs, 1957; Knutsen, 2013; Marcos-Marne, 2017; Messina, 2006; Saggar, 2000). Nevertheless, it remains unknown whether it is the parties' actual issue position deemed relevant for ethnic minorities that affect their vote choice. Since many social-democratic parties have been bypassed in their economic left-wing position by socialist and green parties, which do not seem to profit as strongly as social-democratic parties from the ethnic vote, it is relevant to test for the role of parties' positions. We test whether parties' issue positions are a determinant for the vote choice of ethnic minorities. Given the existing literature on ethnic voting, however, we propose to do so in relation to individual voter characteristics. Following Downs (1957), we argue that ethnic minorities vote for parties with economic positions in accordance with their own socioeconomic position. In this study, we focus on a broad range of parties that ethnic minority voters can choose from. We expect that: For ethnic minorities in a lower socioeconomic position, the more a party's programme is right-wing on economic issues, the less likely they will be to vote for that party; and for ethnic minorities in a higher socioeconomic position we anticipate the reverse outcome: The more a party is right-wing on economic issues, the higher the likelihood they will vote for that party (H1).

With our focus on substantive representation, our message is that ethnic minority voters may not only vote for parties because of their economic positions, but also because of their position on minority rights (Heath et al., 2011; Marcos-Marne, 2017; Messina, 2006; Weldon, 2006). In the Netherlands, the social-democratic Labour Party (PvdA) has been the most popular party among ethnic minorities and it is one of the first parties that supported ethnic minorities within and outside the party since the 1980s (Ensel, 2003). The first networks for ethnic minorities were established during those years and the first Member of Parliament (MP) of non-Western origin elected in 1984 was a Labour Party member. Moreover, in later years the Labour Party (PvdA) explicitly stated its support for a multicultural society (De Boer, Lucardie, Noomen, & Voerman, 1999). Recently, the Labour Party (PvdA) seems to have taken a less explicit multicultural position. It also lost its popularity among ethnic minorities and two of its Turkish origin members even left the party recently and founded a minority-oriented political party. Considering these developments, it is especially interesting to examine the influence of substantive representation on ethnic minorities' vote choice.

We expect that political parties that are more restrictive and represent ethnic minority interests to a lesser extent will be less likely to receive votes from ethnic minorities. Particularly, we expect to find this outcome among those who strongly identify with their ethnic minority group. Identification is relevant over and beyond ethnic minority

background since people do not always identify with their ethnic background and do not automatically share the same interests (Kranendonk & Vermeulen, 2018; Lee, 2008). Identification with an ethnic group is related to group consciousness and feelings of shared group interests. For those who do identify with an ethnic group, ethnic minority group interests may be more important than self-interests (Bird et al., 2011; Dancygier & Saunders, 2006; Dawson, 1995). Ethnic minorities with higher levels of ethnic identification may therefore cast a vote for the dominant party among the ethnic minority group out of group solidarity. In that case, group interests might be more important for vote choice than self-interests. We formulate the hypothesis that: The stronger the ethnic identification among ethnic minorities, the stronger the negative effect of restrictive parties' positions on migration and integration issues on the vote choice of ethnic minorities (H2).

3.2.3 | Descriptive representation

In addition to substantive matters, the presence of ethnic minority candidates may be decisive for ethnic minority voters (Barreto, 2007; Bergh & Bjørklund, 2011; Bloemraad & Schönwälder, 2013; Fisher et al., 2015; Martin, 2016; Zingher & Farrer, 2014). Descriptive representation differs in that it is concerned less with substantive ideas and more with from whom a party's ideas are delivered. In the literature on ethnic voting, it is argued that voters prefer candidates with whom they have shared characteristics such as ethnic background (Bird et al., 2016; McDermott, 2009). Hence, from this argument we derive that parties with ethnic minority candidates on their candidate list should be more popular among ethnic minority voters. There are several reasons why ethnic minority voters would prefer parties with ethnic minority candidates on the list. First, an ethnic minority candidate on a party's candidate list is recognition of the ethnic minority group (Wolfinger, 1965). Second, ethnic minority candidates share the same language and culture, and third, have a similar migration experience (Barreto, 2007). In addition, voters may expect that such parties, through their ethnic minority candidates, will better represent their interests (Landa et al., 1995). Overall, they share experiences and this may increase group consciousness (Bird et al., 2016; Bloemraad & Schönwälder, 2013). Last, ethnic minority voters may be mobilised by candidates with the same ethnic background (Fisher et al., 2015; Michon & Vermeulen, 2013). Because left-wing parties are more likely to nominate ethnic minority candidates it could be an additional explanation for the left-wing support among ethnic minority voters (Bergh & Bjørklund, 2011; Landa et al., 1995; Marcos-Marne, 2017; Sobolewska, 2005).

We expect that the more ethnic minorities placed on a candidate list, the more appealing a party becomes for ethnic minority voters. However, in PR-systems like the Netherlands, the position on the candidate list may also be important (Marcinkiewicz, 2014). An ethnic minority candidate placed at the top of the list is more appealing to voters than an ethnic minority candidate placed at the bottom of the list. Again, we expect that descriptive representation only matters when it is a salient issue for ethnic minority voters. Accordingly, this should specifically matter for those with strong levels of ethnic

identification (Kranendonk & Vermeulen, 2018; Lee, 2008). Summarising, we predict that: The stronger the ethnic identification among ethnic minorities, the stronger positive the effect of the percentage of ethnic minority candidates on a candidate list on vote choice (H3a) and the stronger positive the effect of the list position of ethnic minority candidates on a candidate list on vote choice (H3b).

3.3 | Data and measurements

To study a substantial number of ethnic minorities with different ethnic backgrounds, four data sets were used to examine their vote choice. Moreover, the data sets combined provide sufficient variation to study specific vote choice, which is more informative than left-wing and right-wing party choice alone. The four data sets are: Migrants' Welfare State Attitudes (MIFARE), the Netherlands Longitudinal Lifecourse study (NELLS), the Immigrant Panel and Survey Integratie Minderheden (SIM), and the Longitudinal Internet Studies for the Social Sciences (LISS; Bekhuis, Hedegaard, Seibel, Degen, et al., 2018; De Graaf, Kalmijn, Kraaykamp, & Monden, 2010b; Korte & Dagevos, 2011).² We chose to combine different survey data sets because data sets with representative numbers of ethnic minority respondents are limited.

Combining different data sets has limitations and advantages. In our case, the limitations are that the surveys were collected in different ways at different time points: NELLS and SIM used face-to-face interviews, MIFARE offered the choice between paper or online questionnaires and LISS Immigrant Panel collected data with monthly online questionnaires. Moreover, the survey data were collected between 2009 and 2015. To consider the time aspect and the differences for each survey a control variable for the survey was included in the analyses.

Despite these limitations, we are confident that the data sets we pooled are sufficiently similar to provide reliable outcomes. First, we focused on regularly used variables for which similar questions were used (sociodemographic variables, ethnic identification and vote choice). Second, all data sets paid specific attention to the sampling of minority groups. Table B.2 in Appendix B presents a comparison between the age and gender of ethnic minorities included in the merged data set and in Dutch register data.

The four surveys sampled different ethnic minority groups, which was one reason to use these particular surveys. The MIFARE data were collected among native Dutch and immigrants from the following ten countries: China, UK, Japan, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, Spain, Turkey and the United States. Only immigrants born in one of those countries and a resident until at least the age of 16 were sampled (aged 18 to 75; Bekhuis et al., 2018). We used the first wave of the NELLS data, which included respondents with a native Dutch, Turkish, Moroccan, Western and other non-Western background. Both first- and second-generation migrants aged 15 to 45 were sampled (De Graaf et al., 2010). The SIM data included respondents originating from Turkey, Morocco, Suriname and the Dutch Antilles aged 15 years and older (Korte & Dagevos, 2011). Last, for the LISS

Immigrant Panel, respondents aged 15 and older with a native Dutch, Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese, Antillean, Indonesian, Western or other non-Western background were sampled. By combining these surveys we could test whether our hypotheses hold for broader groups of Western and non-Western ethnic minorities. Since the four surveys differ regarding the focus of ethnic origin groups, there are also some differences in the background characteristics for each survey. More detailed information and descriptive statistics for each survey are presented in Appendix B.

3.3.1 | Ethnic background

We aim to understand the role of substantive and descriptive representation among ethnic minority members. Hence, native Dutch and those with a missing value on ethnic minority background were excluded from the data. Ethnic minorities are not a homogenous group in the Netherlands and differ not only in ethnic background, but also possibly in interests and vote choice as well. We therefore distinguished between ethnic minorities with a non-Western (reference category), Western and former colony background. We refer to Table B.4 in Appendix B for the descriptive statistics of this variable. We also provide information on Moroccan and Turkish minorities, who are part of the non-Western group in the analyses, to present more detailed differences in the descriptive statistics.

TABLE 3.1 | Measurement of vote choice by data set

Survey	Question	Parties (abbreviations) ^a
MIFARE	Regardless of whether you are allowed to vote in the Netherlands, for which party would you vote if the Dutch national elections (Tweede Kamerverkiezingen) were held next week?	Socialist Party (SP) GreenLeft (GL) Labour Party (PvdA)
NELLS	Which political party do you prefer?	Party for Freedom (PVV) Democrats 66 (D66)
SIM	(If you were allowed to vote) Which party would you vote for?	Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA)
LISS	For which party would you vote if the Dutch national elections would be held today?	People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD)

Note: ^a Parties from economically left to right; scale based on Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Bakker et al., 2015). Source: Bekhuis, Hedegaard, Seibel, & Degen, 2018; De Graaf et al., 2010a; Korte & Dagevos, 2011.

3.3.2 | Vote choice

Respondents were asked which party they would vote for to measure vote choice. The questions differed slightly for each survey (see Table 3.1). Despite the differences they all measured vote intentions rather than, for example, actual voting behaviour.³ The following parties were included (from economic left-wing to right-wing): The Socialist Party (SP), the Green party (GL), the Labour Party (PvdA), the anti-immigrant party PVV, the social-liberal D66, the Christian Democratic CDA and the liberal economic right-wing VVD. Because we were specifically interested in party choice and the role of party characteristics (regardless

of whether the respondents are allowed to vote), we excluded those with a missing value on the dependent variable (N=257) and those respondents who answered other, won't vote or don't know (N=3888).⁴

3.3.3 | Individual-specific variables

In all surveys ethnic identification was measured with a similar item. The exact wording of the questions is presented in Table B.6 in Appendix B. The items were standardised and then merged into one variable. A higher score on this variable indicates stronger identification with the ethnic minority group.


Income, employment status and educational level were used to measure socioeconomic status. First, income was measured as the monthly net household income and included six categories: less than €999, €1000-1999, €2000-2499, €2500-2999 and more than €3000 a month. To measure employment status a distinction was made between students and between employed (reference category) and unemployed respondents. Respondents' highest educational level was measured in six categories ranging from no education to university degree. Degrees attained abroad were recoded into a comparable degree in the Dutch educational system. Income and educational level were included as interval variables and were both centred on the mean.

Gender and age were included as individual-level control variables. Age was included in five-year categories in the SIM data, therefore, the age variable in the other surveys was coded in a similar manner. This resulted in twelve categories, which are included as an interval variable in the analyses.

3.3.4 | Substantive representation


This study operationalises parties' issue positions as substantive representation. To measure parties' positions on economic issues and migration and integration issues, the Chapel Hill Expert Survey was used (Bakker et al., 2015).⁵ Experts on Dutch politics were asked to rate the position of political parties on the economic left-right scale (ranging from very left (0) to very right (10)). Furthermore, they were asked to rate each party's position on immigration policy, the integration of immigrants and asylum seekers and the position towards ethnic minorities. These scales ranged from strongly positive (0) about immigration, integration or ethnic minorities to strongly negative (10). To measure the party positions on ethnic minorities' non-economic interests, we used a scale with the average score on the three variables on immigration, integration and ethnic minorities (Cronbach's alpha was 0.982). For the NELS, SIM and LISS data, experts' opinions from 2010 were used and for the MIFARE, the opinions from 2014 were used. Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show parties' issue positions.

FIGURE 3.1 | Party positions on economic issues



Source: Bakker et al., 2015.

FIGURE 3.2 | Party positions on migration and integration issues




Source: Bakker et al., 2015.

3.3.5 | Descriptive representation

To measure descriptive representation, we collected data from the Dutch parliamentary elections of 2010 and 2012 (Van der Zwan, 2017). We collected information for all candidates on each of the seven party’s candidate list, details on the data collection can be found in Appendix B. For each of these parties we have information about the number of ethnic minority candidates on their list and their list position. We followed the definition of


Statistics Netherlands for ethnic minority background: those who were born abroad and for whom at least one parent was born abroad were considered an ethnic minority; and everyone born in the Netherlands but for whom at least one parent was born abroad. For each ethnic group (Moroccan, Turkish, other non-Western, Western, former colonies) we calculated the share of minorities for the total candidate list of each party.

FIGURE 3.3 | Share of ethnic minority candidates on the list, by party



Source: Van der Zwan, 2017

FIGURE 3.4 | Mean relative list position ethnic minority candidates, by party



Source: Van der Zwan, 2017

We measured the position of ethnic minority candidates on the list as the mean relative list position of ethnic minority candidates for each party. First, the individual relative list position was calculated as $\frac{T-P}{T-1}$ where T stands for the total number of positions available on a candidate list and P for the position of a candidate on the list. Each candidate was given a value between 0 to 1 where 0 is the lowest position on the candidate list and 1 is the highest position on the list (party leader). Next, for each party the mean relative list position for ethnic minority candidates from each ethnic minority group was calculated. To get an idea of the descriptive representation, Figures 3.3 and 3.4 show the share of all ethnic minority candidates and the mean relative list positions of all ethnic minority candidates for each party.

3.3.6 | Missing values

Our merged data set included 5,557 respondents of which 1,563 had missing values. We excluded respondents with invalid values on gender and age (1%). Multiple imputation was used for the missing data on variables with higher levels of missing values, which were: income (16.1%), educational level (3.4%), employment status (3.5%) and ethnic identification (7.1%). In total, 1,508 missing values were imputed, which left a total of 5,502 respondents. Multiple imputation is known as a reliable method to manage missing data and to reduce bias to a larger extent than when respondents with missing values are simply deleted (see: Allison, 2000; Lall, 2016; Rubin, 1996). Appendix B shows descriptive statistics.

3.4 | Results

3.4.1 | Analytical strategy


This study investigates what determines party choice. More specifically, it investigates the influence of substantive and descriptive representation, which are party characteristics, on party choice of ethnic minorities. Moreover, we study whether the influence of party characteristics is dependent on voter characteristics. In order to study the influence of both voter and party characteristics, we use discrete choice models, which are an extension of multinomial logit models and also referred to as conditional logit models. With multinomial logit models, it is only possible to examine the influence of voter characteristics on party choice. However, we are particularly interested in the influence of party characteristics. Therefore, we use conditional logit regression analyses, which allows us to measure the influence of both voter characteristics and party characteristics on party choice (Alvarez & Nagler, 1998).⁶

Similar to other multinomial logit models, conditional logistic (CL) regression analysis is a model with nominal outcomes. In this study, these outcomes are party choices and we include characteristics of these party choices. These dependent variable characteristics

are referred to as alternative-specific variables and are used to predict the outcome that is chosen (Long & Freese, 2006). The data are prepared in a long format, which means that for each individual respondent in the data there is a row for each party. With seven parties of interest here, this results in $(5,502 \times 7 =) 38,514$ observations in the analyses. Due to the data structure, all voter characteristics must be estimated for each party separately. For instance, CL models estimate the effects of a voters' income on the choice for the Christian Democrats (CDA), Socialist Party (SP) and all the other parties. These so-called individual-specific effects are all relative to the reference category, which is the Labour Party (PvdA). In this contribution, CL models estimate the log-odds (and odds ratios) for the different party choices.

The CL models are run separately for non-Western and Western minorities. Although we do not have specific expectations about differences between ethnic groups, it is quite possible that the results differ for non-Western and Western minorities. Tables 3.2 and 3.3 show the results for the individual-specific variables, i.e. the voter characteristics. Tables 3.4 and 3.5 present the effects for alternative-specific variables, i.e. the party characteristics and the extent to which the influence of the alternative-specific variables depends on individual-specific variables. We start with some descriptive statistics before we continue with the multivariate analysis.

FIGURE 3.5 | Vote share by party and ethnic group



Source: Bekhuis, Hedegaard, Seibel, Degen, et al., 2018; De Graaf et al., 2010a; Korte & Dagevos, 2011.

3.4.2 | Descriptive statistics

Figure 3.5 shows which parties the respondents intend to vote for by ethnic group. In both 2010 and 2012 elections, the economically right-wing Liberal Party (VVD) and the Labour Party (PvdA) won the most seats. Clearly, among ethnic minorities in the Netherlands

the Labour Party (PvdA) is more popular than the Liberal Party (VVD). Almost half the respondents would vote for this party. The economically most left-wing parties (SP, GL) and the social-liberal D66 are also popular among ethnic minority voters. More economically right-wing parties, such as CDA and VVD, are especially popular among those with another non-Western (i.e. other than Turkish, Moroccan or former colony background) and Western ethnic background.

3.4.3 | Multivariate analyses

Tables 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5 present the logits and odds ratios (OR) estimations. The results in the null model (Tables 3.2 and 3.3) are in line with what one would expect. Most of the alternative-specific constants (ASCs) are negative and significant, indicating that ethnic minorities from non-Western and Western origin prefer the Labour Party (PvdA) over most other parties. Only for ethnic minorities of Western origin do we find no significant differences between a choice for the Labour Party (PvdA) and the Liberal Party (VVD) and the Green Party (GL). Furthermore, looking at the control variables in Table 3.2, we point here to the finding that ethnic minorities with a former colony background are generally more likely to vote for parties other than the Labour Party (PvdA) in comparison with other non-Western minorities.

Tables 3.2 and 3.3 also show that among ethnic minorities one unit increase in income significantly increases the odds to vote for the liberal and economically right-wing parties VVD or D66 in comparison with the Labour Party (PvdA). Regarding educational level, the results show for each contrast positive and significant effects except for the anti-immigrant party PVV. Moreover, there are no significant differences for the Christian Democrats (CDA) and Socialist Party (SP) in comparison with the Labour Party (PvdA) for Western minorities. This result means that for all other parties, when the educational level of ethnic minorities increases by one unit, the odds of voting for that party in comparison with the in Labour Party (PvdA) increases (holding everything else constant). Overall, we can conclude that ethnic minorities with a lower socioeconomic status (lower income and educational level) are more likely to vote for the Labour Party (PvdA) when compared with other parties, which is in line with previous research. The null model also includes the effects of ethnic identification.⁷ Among non-Western minorities, we find that the more these minorities identify with their own ethnic group, the odds to vote for a party relative to the Labour Party (PvdA) are smaller. We find this relation for all parties except the Christian Democratic Party (CDA) and the Green Party (GL). For the anti-immigrant party (PVV) and the Liberal Party (VVD) when compared with the Labour Party (PvdA), we find the strongest effects. Hence, even when considering socioeconomic status, ethnic identification seems to be an important predictor for voting for the Labour Party (PvdA) among non-Western minorities, but not among Western minorities.

TABLE 3.2 | Conditional logistic regression for vote choice among non-Western minorities; voter characteristics

	CDA			SP			VVD			PVV			GL			D66		
	B	OR		B	OR		B	OR		B	OR		B	OR		B	OR	
Alternative-specific constants (ASC: PvdA=ref.)	-2.594*** (0.221)	0.075*** (0.017)		-1.282*** (0.155)	0.277*** (0.043)		-2.138*** (0.202)	0.118*** (0.024)		-4.416*** (0.335)	0.0121*** (0.004)		-1.510*** (0.163)	0.221*** (0.036)		-1.401*** (0.173)	0.246*** (0.043)	
Income	0.063 (0.063)	1.065 (0.067)		0.015 (0.046)	1.016 (0.047)		0.295*** (0.054)	1.343*** (0.073)		0.103 (0.072)	1.109 (0.080)		0.012 (0.051)	1.012 (0.051)		0.170*** (0.047)	1.185*** (0.056)	
Student (employed=ref.)	0.233 (0.254)	1.263 (0.321)		0.069 (0.180)	1.071 (0.193)		0.171 (0.228)	1.187 (0.271)		0.277 (0.350)	1.319 (0.461)		0.139 (0.205)	1.150 (0.205)		0.347* (0.185)	1.41* (0.262)	
- Unemployed	0.104 (0.183)	1.110 (0.203)		-0.120 (0.137)	0.887 (0.122)		-0.178 (0.199)	0.837 (0.166)		0.278 (0.217)	1.321 (0.287)		-0.274* (0.145)	0.761* (0.110)		-0.140 (0.154)	0.869 (0.134)	
Educational level	0.143** (0.064)	1.154** (0.074)		0.152*** (0.046)	1.164*** (0.054)		0.303*** (0.056)	1.354*** (0.076)		0.102 (0.072)	1.107 (0.080)		0.305*** (0.047)	1.357*** (0.064)		0.438*** (0.049)	1.550*** (0.075)	
Ethnic identification	-0.079 (0.076)	0.924 (0.070)		-0.166*** (0.054)	0.847*** (0.046)		-0.312*** (0.062)	0.732*** (0.045)		-0.297*** (0.089)	0.743*** (0.066)		-0.082 (0.058)	0.921 (0.054)		-0.204*** (0.060)	0.815*** (0.049)	
Former colony background (non-Western=ref.)	1.287*** (0.205)	3.621*** (0.742)		0.775*** (0.150)	2.171*** (0.325)		1.650*** (0.187)	5.205*** (0.976)		1.767*** (0.271)	5.854*** (1.586)		0.632*** (0.142)	1.881*** (0.267)		0.592*** (0.153)	1.807*** (0.277)	
Age	0.031 (0.036)	1.032 (0.037)		0.006 (0.027)	1.006 (0.027)		-0.042 (0.034)	0.959 (0.032)		0.035 (0.041)	1.036 (0.043)		-0.040 (0.027)	0.960 (0.026)		-0.0735** (0.029)	0.929** (0.027)	
Gender (male=ref.)	0.025 (0.15)	1.025 (0.154)		-0.269** (0.105)	0.764** (0.080)		-0.359*** (0.132)	0.699*** (0.093)		0.038 (0.194)	1.039 (0.201)		0.075 (0.107)	1.078 (0.116)		-0.301*** (0.113)	0.740*** (0.084)	
MIFARE (NELLS=ref.)	1.165*** (0.262)	3.206*** (0.839)		0.903*** (0.204)	2.468*** (0.504)		2.204*** (0.219)	9.065*** (1.987)		3.564*** (0.327)	35.310*** (11.56)		0.334 (0.239)	1.396 (0.334)		1.077*** (0.211)	2.935*** (0.618)	
- SIM	-0.918*** (0.200)	0.399*** (0.080)		-0.939*** (0.137)	0.391*** (0.054)		-0.613*** (0.189)	0.542*** (0.103)		-0.122 (0.328)	0.885 (0.290)		-0.031 (0.129)	0.969 (0.125)		-0.0542 (0.141)	0.947 (0.134)	
- LISS	0.124 (0.365)	1.132 (0.413)		0.883*** (0.219)	2.418*** (0.529)		0.728** (0.293)	2.071** (0.607)		2.383*** (0.370)	10.84*** (4.014)		0.145 (0.307)	1.157 (0.355)		1.009*** (0.245)	2.742*** (0.672)	
N	31,815																	

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

TABLE 3.3 | Conditional logistic regression for vote choice among Western minorities; voter characteristics

	Model 0											
	CDA			SP			VVD			GL		
	B	OR	B	B	OR	B	B	OR	B	OR	B	OR
Alternative-specific constants (ASC; PvdA=ref.)	-1.870*** (0.552)	0.154*** (0.085)	-1.291*** (0.461)	0.275*** (0.127)	0.485 (0.218)	-0.724 (0.450)	0.285 (0.141)	0.485 (0.218)	-1.356** (0.548)	0.258** (0.141)	-0.791 (0.488)	0.453 (0.221)
Income	-0.0309 (0.111)	0.970 (0.108)	-0.058* (0.090)	0.854* (0.077)	0.200** (0.081)	0.080 (0.079)	0.083 (0.086)	1.222** (0.099)	0.091 (0.086)	0.913 (0.079)	0.080 (0.088)	1.083 (0.095)
Student (employed=ref.)	0.361 (0.616)	1.435 (0.884)	0.508 (0.512)	1.662 (0.851)	0.947 (0.480)	-0.0540 (0.507)	0.759 (0.410)	0.947 (0.480)	-0.276 (0.540)	0.759 (0.410)	0.131 (0.513)	1.140 (0.585)
- Unemployed	-0.511 (0.455)	0.600 (0.273)	-0.263 (0.324)	0.769 (0.249)	-0.118 (0.282)	0.507 (0.282)	1.119 (0.343)	0.889 (0.251)	0.113 (0.306)	1.119 (0.343)	-0.443 (0.340)	0.642 (0.218)
Educational level	0.140 (0.130)	1.150 (0.149)	0.152 (0.108)	1.164 (0.126)	0.362*** (0.106)	0.282 (0.106)	0.908 (0.088)	1.437*** (0.153)	-0.096 (0.097)	0.908 (0.088)	0.368*** (0.120)	1.445*** (0.174)
Ethnic identification	0.086 (0.145)	1.089 (0.158)	-0.126 (0.116)	0.881 (0.102)	-0.121 (0.107)	0.886 (0.095)	0.840 (0.096)	0.886 (0.095)	-0.175 (0.114)	0.840 (0.096)	-0.006 (0.115)	0.994 (0.115)
Age	0.136* (0.074)	1.146* (0.085)	0.107* (0.059)	1.113* (0.066)	-0.0605 (0.0541)	-0.0605 (0.0541)	0.911 (0.052)	0.941 (0.051)	-0.093 (0.057)	0.911 (0.052)	-0.075 (0.061)	0.928 (0.057)
Gender (male=ref.)	0.767** (0.336)	2.152** (0.724)	0.138 (0.263)	1.148 (0.302)	-0.0729 (0.234)	0.930 (0.218)	1.084 (0.277)	0.930 (0.218)	0.081 (0.256)	1.084 (0.277)	-0.095 (0.255)	0.909 (0.232)
MIFARE (NELLS=ref.)	-0.572 (0.434)	0.565 (0.245)	-0.035 (0.388)	0.965 (0.375)	0.574 (0.375)	1.776 (0.666)	5.726*** (2.873)	1.776 (0.666)	1.745*** (0.502)	5.726*** (2.873)	0.660 (0.405)	1.935 (0.784)
- LISS	-0.0361 (0.568)	0.965 (0.548)	0.639 (0.494)	1.895 (0.936)	1.223** (0.481)	2.637*** (0.576)	13.970*** (8.049)	3.399** (1.634)	2.637*** (0.576)	13.970*** (8.049)	0.593 (0.562)	1.810 (1.017)
N	6,699											

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table 3.4 presents the effects of substantive and descriptive representation on the vote choice of non-Western minorities. Regarding parties' economic issue positions, the main effect is negative and significant ($b = -0.262$), indicating that the more economically rightist views a party has, the less likely non-Western minorities vote for such parties (effect not shown, presented in Table B.7 in Appendix B). In order to test if ethnic minority voters vote for parties with an economic issue position that aligns with their own socioeconomic position, we include interactions between party and voter characteristics. Model 1 shows the interaction effect between parties' positions on economic issues and voters' income. The results in Model 1 show that the extent to which the influence of parties' economic issue positions depends on non-Western minorities' income and is positive and significant ($b = 0.096$). At the highest level of income, the predicted effect is $(-0.262 + 2.232 * 0.096) = -0.047$ and at the lowest income level the effect is $(-0.262 + -1.768 * 0.096) = -0.432$. Thus, the effect of right-wing party economics issue positions on vote choice is more strongly negative for those with the lowest incomes. Even though we do not clearly find among minorities with the highest income that the likelihood increases to vote for a party with a more economic right-wing issue positions (the effect was predicted to be positive for those with the highest socioeconomic position), the results are in line with Hypothesis 1.

In addition to income, we expected that the influence of parties' economic issue positions would depend on voters' employment status and educational level. Even though the main effect of economic standpoints remains significant, the effects of economic standpoints and employment status and educational level are not significant. These effects are therefore not included in Table 3.4, but they can be found in Table B.8 in Appendix B.

For Western minorities, the results in Table 3.5 do not show a significant effect of parties' economic issue positions on vote choice, neither do we find significant interaction effects between economic standpoints and income, employment status or educational level. The effects of parties' economic positions and employment status and educational level can be found in Table B.9 in Appendix B. Overall, we find support for Hypothesis 1 on the role of parties' economic standpoints in vote choice conditioned by socioeconomic position only for non-Western minorities' income.

TABLE 3.4 | Conditional logistic regression for vote choice among non-Western minorities; substantive and descriptive representation

Alternative-specific variables	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
	B	OR	B	OR	B	OR	B	OR
Economic issue positions (L-R) ^a	-0.262*** (0.029)	0.770*** (0.022)						
Economic pos. x Income	0.096** (0.048)	1.101** (0.053)						
Migration issue positions (P-R) ^b			-0.280*** (0.029)	0.755*** (0.022)				
Migration pos. x Ethnic identification (EI)			-0.166 (0.137)	0.847 (0.116)				
% Ethnic minority candidates by group					0.049*** (0.008)	1.051*** (0.008)		
% Ethnic minority candidates by group x EI					0.008 (0.008)	1.008 (0.008)		
List position ethnic minority candidates by group							0.610*** (0.111)	1.840*** (0.204)
List position ethnic minority candidates by group x EI							0.034 (0.087)	1.035 (0.090)
<i>Individual-specific variables</i>								
Income_CDA	0.067 (0.061)	1.069 (0.065)						
Income_SP	0.029 (0.045)	1.029 (0.047)						
Income_VVD	0.298*** (0.055)	1.348*** (0.074)						
Income_PVV	0.115* (0.064)	1.122* (0.072)						
Income_GL	0.023 (0.049)	1.024 (0.050)						
Income_D66	0.172*** (0.047)	1.188*** (0.056)						
Ethnic identification_CDA			0.224 (0.266)	1.251 (0.333)	-0.043 (0.078)	0.958 (0.075)	-0.072 (0.072)	0.931 (0.067)
Ethnic identification_SP			-0.069 (0.104)	0.933 (0.097)	-0.144** (0.059)	0.866** (0.051)	-0.158*** (0.054)	0.854*** (0.046)
Ethnic identification_VVD			0.166 (0.404)	1.181 (0.477)	-0.256*** (0.074)	0.774*** (0.057)	-0.284*** (0.067)	0.753*** (0.050)
Ethnic identification_PVV			0.593 (0.722)	1.809 (1.307)	-0.203** (0.084)	0.816** (0.069)	-0.228*** (0.079)	0.796*** (0.063)
Ethnic identification_GL			-0.501 (0.346)	0.606 (0.210)	-0.079 (0.058)	0.924 (0.054)	-0.072 (0.059)	0.930 (0.057)
Ethnic identification_D66			-0.506** (0.241)	0.603** (0.145)	-0.182*** (0.065)	0.833*** (0.054)	-0.208*** (0.063)	0.813*** (0.052)
N	31,815							

Note: In all models, socioeconomic position, ethnic identification, ethnic background, age, gender, and survey are included, for clarity, only the variables included in the interaction terms are presented. Full models can be found in Table B.8 in Appendix B. ^a Left-Right ^b Permissive – Restrictive. Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

TABLE 3.5 | Conditional logistic regression for vote choice of Western minorities; substantive and descriptive representation

<i>Alternative-specific variables</i>	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
	B	OR	B	OR	B	OR	B	OR
Economic issue positions (L-R) ^a	-0.032 (0.064)	0.968 (0.062)						
Economic pos. x Income	-0.002 (0.065)	0.998 (0.064)						
Migration issue positions (P-R) ^b			-0.087 (0.061)	0.917 (0.056)				
Migration pos. x Ethnic identification (EI)			0.264 (0.187)	1.302 (0.244)				
% Ethnic minority candidates by group					0.299*** (0.088)	1.349*** (0.118)		
% Ethnic minority candidates by group x EI					0.064* (0.034)	1.066* (0.036)		
List position ethnic minority candidates by group							1.149** (0.495)	3.156** (1.563)
List position ethnic minority candidates by group x EI							0.118 (0.176)	1.126 (0.198)
<i>Individual-specific variables</i>								
Income_CDA	-0.034 (0.215)	0.966 (0.208)						
Income_SP	-0.162 (0.185)	0.851 (0.157)						
Income_VVD	0.207 (0.317)	1.230 (0.390)						
Income_PVV	-0.091 (0.113)	0.913 (0.103)						
Income_GL	0.076 (0.107)	1.079 (0.115)						
Income_D66	0.309* (0.182)	1.363* (0.249)						
Ethnic identification_CDA			-0.420 (0.397)	0.657 (0.261)	0.121 (0.144)	1.129 (0.162)	0.148 (0.170)	1.160 (0.197)
Ethnic identification_SP			-0.228 (0.144)	0.796 (0.115)	-0.0564 (0.123)	0.945 (0.117)	-0.080 (0.134)	0.924 (0.124)
Ethnic identification_VVD			-0.827 (0.524)	0.437 (0.229)	-0.199* (0.117)	0.819* (0.096)	-0.070 (0.136)	0.932 (0.127)
Ethnic identification_PVV			-1.586 (1.020)	0.205 (0.209)	-0.145 (0.116)	0.865 (0.100)	-0.106 (0.148)	0.899 (0.133)
Ethnic identification_GL			0.710 (0.511)	2.033 (1.039)	-0.0156 (0.117)	0.984 (0.115)	0.048 (0.138)	1.049 (0.145)
Ethnic identification_D66			0.535 (0.363)	1.708 (0.621)	0.0178 (0.112)	1.018 (0.114)	0.039 (0.112)	1.039 (0.116)
N				6,699				

Note: In all models, socioeconomic position, ethnic identification, ethnic background, age, gender, and survey are included, for clarity, only the variables included in the interaction terms are presented. Full models can be found in Table B.9 in Appendix B. ^a Left-Right ^b Permissive – Restrictive. Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

The second hypothesis on substantive representation focused on parties' positions on migration and integration. The main effect of parties' positions on these issues for non-Western minorities is negative and significant ($b = -0.281$; see Table B.7 in Appendix B), implying that a party's more restrictive immigration position declines the likelihood that ethnic minorities vote for such a party. Hypothesis 2 states that for ethnic minorities with higher levels of ethnic identification, the effect of parties' restrictive standpoints on migration and integration on vote choice is more strongly negative than for those with lower levels of ethnic identification. In Model 2 in Table 3.4, the interaction between parties' migration and integration standpoints and the level of ethnic identification among non-Western minorities are included. However, the main effect does not interact significantly with ethnic identification.⁸

For Western minorities, the main effect of parties' positions on migration and integration is not significant. Neither do we find significant interaction effects between parties' standpoints on these issues and ethnic identification among Western minorities in Table 3.5. For this group, parties' substantive issues on migration and integration do not seem to affect their vote choice. Our third hypothesis is refuted. For non-Western minorities, this result is mainly caused by the Labour Party (PvdA) taking a centre-position on the migration and integration issues.

The last hypotheses predicted that descriptive representation affects the vote choice of ethnic minorities. For non-Western minorities, the main effect shows that the higher the percentage of ethnic minority candidates of the ethnic group on a parties' candidate list, the higher the likelihood to vote for that party ($b = 0.051$; Table B.7 in Appendix B). In Model 4 in Table 3.4, the interaction between parties' share of ethnic minority candidates with voters' level of ethnic identification is not significant. For Western minorities, the main effect of descriptive representation on vote choice is positive and significant as well ($b = 0.291$; Table B.7 in Appendix B). Moreover, Model 3 in Table 3.5 shows that for this group the interaction between descriptive representation and ethnic identification is positive and significant ($b = 0.064$). This finding means that a higher percentage of ethnic minority candidates of an ethnic group on the list increases the likelihood to vote for that party. For those with higher levels of ethnic identification, this effect on vote choice is more strongly positive than for those with lower levels of ethnic identification, which is in line with our expectation. Hence, we find support for Hypothesis 3a for Western but not for non-Western minorities.

Last, we tested the influence of the list position of ethnic minority candidates on vote choice. The main effect of list position is positive and significant for non-Western minorities ($b = 0.611$; Table B.7 in Appendix B). This effect suggests that the higher the relative list position of ethnic minority candidates, the more likely ethnic minorities would vote for that party. Moreover, we expected that this effect would be more strongly positive for those with high levels of ethnic identification. In Model 4, we do not find a significant interaction effect with ethnic identification for non-Western minorities. For Western minorities, the main effect is also positive and significant ($b = 1.139$; Table B.7 in Appendix B). However, Model 4 in Table 3.5 shows that the interaction with ethnic identification is not significant for Western minorities. Hence, we do not find support for Hypothesis 3b.

3.4.4 | Robustness checks

As a robustness check, we repeated all analyses for each data set separately (except for the LISS because the number of respondents was too low). We ran separate analyses for non-Western minorities, since only for non-Western minorities there was enough variation to do so. The effects for the individual-specific variables (Model 0; see Table B.11 in Appendix B) do not differ substantially. Regarding the alternative-specific interactions, we find that the effects in the NELLS and SIM models are similar to the effects in the general model (see Tables B.12–B.14 in Appendix B). An interesting finding is that for the NELLS models, unemployed voters are significantly less likely to vote for parties with issue positions that are economically more right-wing. For both the NELLS and the SIM models lower educated voters are significantly less likely to vote for parties with issue positions that are economically more right-wing. This finding for the NELLS and SIM models, which includes mainly Moroccan, Turkish and former colony minorities, is consistent with our first hypothesis.

Whereas the findings on parties' migration standpoints and its interaction with voters' level of ethnic identification are robust across the data sets, the findings on descriptive representation slightly differ. The NELLS model on descriptive representation shows support for Hypothesis 3a that the stronger the ethnic identification among ethnic minorities, the stronger positive the effect of the percentage of ethnic minority candidates on a candidate list on vote choice. In the MIFARE model the interaction effect is not significant whereas it is negative and significant in the SIM model. The differences may be explained by the differences between the ethnic origin groups included in the data sets. This robustness check suggests that Hypothesis 3a holds in particular among Turkish and Moroccan minorities. Overall, the effects in the MIFARE models are somewhat different and reach significance less often. This makes sense since the MIFARE data includes non-Western groups hardly studied before. A closer look at the political behaviour of these groups (e.g. Japanese, Chinese and Filipinos) shows that different mechanisms may be at work here and that lumping together ethnic minorities irrespective of their background is problematic.

3.5 | Conclusion and discussion

This study examined the extent to which substantive and descriptive representation play a role in explaining the vote choice of ethnic minorities. Contributing to the literature on ethnic voting, we were the first to test the influence of parties' substantive and descriptive representation in relation to voters' socioeconomic position and their ethnic identification.

In line with earlier findings, we find strong support for the Labour Party (PvdA) among ethnic minorities. Nevertheless, we also want to stress that the large support for left-wing parties was not found among *all* ethnic groups. There is variation among Western

minorities some of whom lean towards the Labour Party (PvdA) whereas others are supportive of (centre-)right parties.

The main aim of this study was to explain vote choice and we have shown that both substantive and descriptive representation are determinants of ethnic minorities' vote choice. Moreover, how these party characteristics influence vote choice differs between non-Western and Western minorities. First, political parties more right-wing on economic issues and more restrictive on minority rights are less popular among non-Western minorities whereas parties with a higher share of ethnic minority candidates and parties with ethnic minority candidates with higher positions on the candidate list are more popular among this group. Furthermore, non-Western minorities with higher incomes are more likely to vote for parties more right-wing on economics, which is in line with rational choice theories of voting. However, we do not find more evidence that the influence of either substantive or descriptive representation depends on non-Western voters' ethnic identification.

Second, for Western minorities, substantive representation does not seem to play a one-directional role in their vote choice, but descriptive representation is relevant among this group. Parties' share of Western origin candidates increases the likelihood of receiving a vote from minorities with a Western background. We also found evidence that the representation of ethnic minority members matters more for Western minorities who identify stronger with their ethnic group. The importance of ethnic identification for vote choice, also in relation to descriptive representation, is in line with Lee's (2008) idea that only an ethnic background is not enough for shared political interests.

An overarching finding is that even though the Labour Party (PvdA) is not the most left-wing party on economics nor the most permissive party on migration and integration issues most ethnic minorities prefer this party. A possible explanation is that it is not so much substantive representation that affects the vote choice of ethnic minorities, but that the norm among ethnic minority groups to vote for a certain party or the historical connections with that party are important.

In the past, the Labour Party (PvdA) explicitly stated support for the multicultural society and it has supported ethnic minorities, those of non-Western origin in particular, since the 1980s (Ensel, 2003). Although difficult to prove, historical ties between ethnic communities and specific parties may be the missing piece of the puzzle in explaining the vote choice of ethnic minorities. Since ethnic communities have proven to be important in ethnic minorities' political participation at the local level in the Netherlands, it would be interesting to study their influence on vote choice at the national level. At the same time, the Labour Party's possible shift to a more centrist position on the substantive representation scale, may have opened opportunities for ethnic minority-specific interest parties. That the association we found between substantive representation and vote choice was not moderated by ethnic identification is a possible indicator of ethnic minorities becoming dissatisfied with their representation by the Labour Party (PvdA) and contributing to the rise of parties like DENK in the Netherlands.

The relevance of substantive and descriptive representation in the vote choice of ethnic minorities has been found in the Dutch PR-system. Many other Western countries have a

PR-system, and we may expect to find similar results in these countries. Nevertheless, the results may be less easy to generalise to countries with a majoritarian system. Particularly, the influence of descriptive representation might be different in systems with a first-past-the-post system. Rather than the share of ethnic minority candidates at the party level, the ethnic background of candidates in the districts in which ethnic minorities live, might play a larger role. Future studies on the current topic are therefore recommended.

Many unanswered questions remain about the vote choice of ethnic minorities, partly due to a scarcity of data. Because of this scarcity, we combined different data sources. Although we empirically controlled for the survey and therefore for all differences between these data sets, we acknowledge that pooling of different data sets is not the ideal method. Nevertheless, our approach provided the opportunity to include more and strongly differing ethnic minority groups and this study highlights why ethnic minorities cannot be considered as a homogenous group: Not all ethnic minorities support left-wing parties. Moreover, our analyses show that the effects of substantive and descriptive representation on vote choice varies between Western and non-Western minorities. This study also illustrates that a further study on a broad range of ethnic minorities is needed to better test the political model and to move beyond socioeconomic disadvantaged ethnic minorities. Larger scale data should address the more detailed country of origin dependency of these explanations.

This study contributed to the field by testing for the role of substantive and descriptive representation together with and in relation to socioeconomic position and ethnic identification in ethnic minorities' vote choice. The findings of this study suggest that parties that want to attract ethnic minority voters would do well to pay attention to ethnic minorities' substantive interests as well as to nominate candidates with varying ethnic origins.

Notes

- 1 We do not claim that parties' issue positions exactly match with what parties do once in government. It is nevertheless a good indication of voters' perceptions of parties' issue positions. Moreover, it is an indication of the extent to which parties are concerned with the interests of the ethnic minority electorate (Chaney, 2015; Heath et al., 2013).
- 2 In this paper we make use of data of the Longitudinal Internet Studies for the Social Sciences (LISS) panel administered by CentERdata (Tilburg University, The Netherlands). More information about the LISS panel can be found at: www.lissdata.nl.
- 3 Minorities with a Turkish background were included in all four surveys. We examined whether the party choice of Turkish minorities differed between the surveys. Although party choice is not completely similar between the surveys, the order of the preferred parties is comparable (see Figure B.1 in Appendix B).
- 4 In each survey, approximately 30% of the respondent answered other, won't vote or don't know except for the MIFARE data in which almost 59% of the respondents

are in this category. Most of the MIFARE respondents stated they don't know what they would vote for. An explanation for this large proportion may be that only first-generation migrants were interviewed. For all surveys, first generation migrants were more likely to report other, won't vote or don't know than the second generation.

- 5 We also considered the Manifesto Project Dataset. However, the placement of the parties on several economic left-right scales and a migration and integration scale did not correspond to existing insights on Dutch political parties. For instance, on one of the left-right economics scales, the PVV was the most right-wing party while it is generally known to be a more leftist economic-oriented party.
- 6 The assumption of the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA-assumption) has to be met in order to use CL models. The Hausman test showed that the IIA-assumption was violated. Nevertheless, we choose to use CL models because in studies on voter choice the IIA assumption is not notably relevant nor restrictive (Dow & Endersby, 2004). Moreover, several studies have shown that the results of CL models are very comparable to models that relax the IIA assumption (Cushing & Cushing, 2007; Dahlberg & Eklöf, 2003; Train, 2003).
- 7 Although ethnic identification may function as a mediator, estimations showed that the inclusion of ethnic identification did not significantly alter the other estimates. Therefore, we decided to present the model including ethnic identification.
- 8 Bivariate associations show a slightly negative association between parties' positions on migration and integration and vote share. Ad hoc, we therefore included a quadratic term of migration and integration standpoints. This robustness check, presented in Table B.10 in Appendix B, shows that the interaction term between the quadratic term of parties' positions on migration and integration issues and ethnic identification is significant. This implies that the influence of parties' migration and integration issue positions is more strongly negative for non-Western minorities with higher levels of ethnic identification.

CHAPTER 4

Political representation and the vote choice of visible minorities in Canada*

*This chapter is currently under review at an international journal. The chapter is co-authored by Karen Bird. Roos van der Zwan developed the idea, wrote most of the text and conducted the analysis. The manuscript benefits from the theoretical insights of Karen Bird and her knowledge about the Canadian Political context.

4.1 | Introduction

Canada is known as a multicultural society that warmly embraces immigration and ethnic diversity (Banting & Kymlicka, 2010) and where the inclusion of newcomers into citizenship and political representation has been successful (Bloemraad, 2013; Howe, 2007). Indeed, Canada is one of the few Western countries in which parliament fully reflects the diverse ethnic identities of its population (Adams, 2008; Adams & Griffith, 2017). While no federal party takes the support of ethnocultural minorities for granted, it is nevertheless clear that the centrist Liberal Party has consistently been the party of choice among visible minority voters in Canada (White, 2017). This is a distinctive dynamic, as minorities in other Western countries tend to support left-wing political parties (Heelsun et al., 2016; Martin, 2016; Schmidtke, 2016; Tiberj & Michon, 2013). This raises questions about the determinants of visible minorities' vote choice in Canada and the extent to which this can be explained by minority group-specific explanations. In this article, we specifically study the influence of parties' substantive and descriptive representation on visible minorities' vote choice. We use the term 'visible minorities' here since this is the term is most commonly used in Canadian scientific and public contexts, referring to non-Aboriginal people who are non-Caucasian in race or non-White in colour.¹

There are several differences between Canada and other Western countries that make Canada an interesting case to study visible minorities' vote choice. First, immigration and integration are not especially controversial topics in national political debates in Canada (Black & Hicks, 2008; Marwah et al., 2013). Whereas many countries have anti-immigration parties as well as parties with more permissive views on immigration, Canadian parties do not differ considerably in their views on immigration (Ambrose & Mudde, 2015; Marwah et al., 2013). Previous studies suggest that specific interests on immigration and integration cannot explain the strong support for the Liberal Party (Bilodeau & Kanji, 2010; Blais, 2005; White, 2017). Nonetheless, other substantive issues in the party platform may affect vote choice, such as economic and social issues (Heath et al., 2011; Messina, 2006). Therefore, we test the role of a broader range of parties' issue positions on visible minorities' vote choice.

Second, Canada is known for its relatively high level of visible minority representation in parliament (Bloemraad, 2013). It seems that the first-past-the-post system in Canada, combined with the specific regions where visible minorities settle, make the minority vote influential. Additionally, it is relatively easy for newcomers to gain citizenship and thus to gain voting rights (Bird, 2005). These factors ensure that political parties cannot neglect visible minority voters (Marwah et al., 2013), which could explain the high level of visible minority representation; however, what role descriptive representation actually plays in visible minorities' vote choice is unknown. For this reason, we study how the number of minority candidates in each party affects the likelihood to vote for that party.

This study contributes to the literature by testing the effects of both substantive and descriptive representation simultaneously on visible minorities' vote choice. Pitkin (1967) famously distinguishes between substantive 'acting for' representation, which means acting on behalf of and looking after the specific interests of the groups one represents,

and descriptive ‘standing for’ representation, which considers whether an assembly of representatives resembles, in microcosm, the demographic characteristics of the society it aims to represent. Importantly, we also argue that the effect of substantive and descriptive representation on minority vote choice may differ between visible minorities, depending on their own positions on these issues. Our research question is:

‘To what extent do substantive and descriptive representation play a role in explaining vote choice among visible minorities in Canada?’

4.2 | Canada’s political system and political parties

Before outlining our theoretical framework, study design, and findings, a brief discussion of the context of the Canadian federal electoral and party system is in order. Canada uses the first-past-the-post, single member plurality (SMP) electoral system for national elections. This means that all parties can nominate one candidate in each electoral district (or ‘riding’), with the candidate with the most votes in a riding winning a seat in the House of Commons. In each of the eight federal elections held between 1993 and 2015, between 295 to 338 ridings were contested.²

Yet in defiance of Duverger’s Law, which predicts that SMP systems will tend to produce two and only two parties, Canada has had a multi-party system since at least the 1930s, with various incarnations over that time (Carty et al., 2000; Johnston 2018). The point of departure of our study, the 1993 election, marked the introduction of Canada’s fourth party system. In that election, the prevailing ‘two-plus’ party system, comprised of the historically dominant Liberals, the Progressive Conservatives (PC), and the New Democratic Party (NDP), collapsed. Two newer regional parties, Reform and the Bloc Québécois, each won over 50 seats. While the Liberal Party formed the government, the PC Party lost more than half its vote share from 1988 and all but two of its 156 seats, with the sovereignist Bloc forming the official opposition. The period following the 1993 election saw the Canadian Alliance Party succeed Reform (in 2000) and later merge with the remnants of the PC Party (in 2003) to form the new Conservative Party of Canada (CPC). This system remained relatively stable through the 2015 federal elections, with four national parties (the Liberals, the CPC, the NDP, and the Green Party of Canada) running candidates in all electoral districts, with the Bloc only contesting seats in Quebec. In this study, we focus on the largest parties: the Liberals, the Conservatives, and the NDP.

4.3 | Theoretical framework

4.3.1 | Explaining vote choice

Existing literature on the vote choice of visible minorities often uses similar models as those used to explain the vote choice of the general population (Barreto, 2007; Bergh &

Bjørklund, 2011; Sanders et al., 2014). Some explanations are based on sociological models, which focus on explanations such as socio-demographic factors, party identification, policy issues, and campaigning strategies (Adams et al., 2005; Downs, 1957; Evans, 2000; Miller & Shanks, 1996), while others are based on rational choice models, which consider voters as rational and self-interested actors (Downs, 1957). We combine propositions from both sociological and rational choice models and argue that voters are rational actors but that their vote choice depends on the representation of the interests of the social group(s) to which they belong (Andersen & Heath, 2000). People often belong to different social groups, and this may explain why voters vote for a certain party, even when this party does not represent their self-interests.

4.3.2 | Substantive representation

Given the complexity of the visible minority population in Canada, we are sensitive to the diversity of opinion among that community – whether on ‘mainstream’ economic issues such as taxation and social spending, on social issues concerning women’s and gay rights, or on more immigrant- or minority-specific issues. Our study therefore examines the extent to which these issue positions matter for visible minorities’ vote choice and how important issue alignment between party and voter is for predicting their party choice.

The first aspect of substantive representation under study is the influence of parties’ positions on economic issues. Despite ongoing discussion about the waning influence of social class (Knutsen, 2013), socioeconomic characteristics remain a relevant predictor of vote choice (Elff, 2009; Evans, 2000). The interests of citizens in lower socioeconomic positions are generally represented by left-wing parties (Knutsen, 2013; Marcos-Marne, 2017), which is why the relatively low socioeconomic position of the visible minority population in many Western countries is often seen as an explanation for their left-wing party support. However, Canada seems an exceptional case, insofar as its emphasis on attracting highly-skilled immigrants tends to produce relatively stronger educational outcomes and earnings among that population group (Bird et al., 2011). In fact, visible minorities in Canada vary widely in socioeconomic standing (Picot & Sweetman, 2012; Reitz & Banerjee, 2007), yet few studies have explicitly tested how socioeconomic issue positions affect their individual vote choice. We do so here, with the expectation that the effect of parties’ economic positions on vote choice depends on minorities’ own positions on economic issues. For visible minorities who take more right-leaning positions on economic issues, economically right-wing parties are likely to be a more attractive choice, while economically left-wing parties are more attractive for minorities with more leftist views. Our hypothesis is that, in the case of economically right-wing parties, visible minorities with more economically leftist views will be less likely to vote for that party, while those with economically more rightist views will have a higher likelihood of voting for that party (H1).

Second, we examine whether parties’ positions on social issues play a role in visible minorities’ vote choice. On issues such as same-sex marriage, abortion, and the role of

women in society, visible minorities tend to hold more socially conservative positions (Blais, 2005; Harell, 2013; Hyder, 2005; Marwah et al., 2013). Based on these issue positions, we would expect visible minorities to be more likely to vote for socially conservative parties. Presupposing such a natural constituency, the Conservative Party of Canada has strategically used its positions on social issues to attract visible minority voters, especially in more recent years. Nevertheless, Blais (2005) has shown that minorities' opinions on social issues have a limited effect on the choice of the Liberal Party. However, he did not examine the effect of the Liberals' and other parties' substantive positions on such issues. We expect that, for more socially conservative visible minorities, the more socially conservative a party is, the more likely they will be to vote for that party (H2).

Beyond economic and social issues, visible minority voters may prefer a party that supports visible minority rights (Heath et al. 2011; Marcos-Marne 2017; Messina 2006). In Canada, the political parties are all relatively supportive of minorities (White, 2017). Nevertheless, we expect that issue alignment between party and voters affects vote choice. Hence, we argue that political parties that are more permissive of minority issues should be more popular among visible minorities, but specifically so among those visible minority voters who are themselves supportive of minority rights. We formulate the hypothesis that the more supportive visible minority voters are on minority issues, the stronger the positive effect of parties' permissive positions is on minority issues on vote choice (H3).

4.3.3 | Descriptive representation

In the literature on ethnic voting, it is argued that voters may prefer to be represented by those with shared characteristics, such as a visible minority background. However, while there is some evidence in experimental studies and in low-information non-partisan elections that 'ethnic affinity' effects may be at work in evaluating and selecting visible minority candidates (Besco, 2012; Bird et al., 2016; McGregor, Moore, Jackson, Bird, & Stephenson, 2017), no such effects have been found to operate in actual Canadian elections at the federal level (Murakami, 2014). There may be two reasons for this: first, the effects of candidate characteristics appear to be washed away by much stronger party effects on vote choice; second, it becomes harder to detect such effects if parties run competing visible minority candidates in the same riding, as is frequently the case in Canada.

Still, the effects of descriptive representation on voter choice at the party level have not been examined. That is, even if we cannot find affinity effects in vote choice at the constituency level, visible minorities may still prefer parties with a higher level of descriptive representation. We would therefore expect that the more visible minorities a party nominates, the more appealing a party becomes for visible minority voters. However, similar to our previous hypotheses, we anticipate that this effect will be strongest among those visible minority voters who have positive views of minorities. In summary, we predict that the more supportive visible minority voters are on minority issues, the stronger the positive effect of the percentage of visible minority candidates is on vote choice (H4).

4.4 | Data and measurements

Several data sources were used to test our hypotheses. First, eight waves of the Canadian Election Survey (CES) were used to measure minorities' voting preferences: 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2011, and 2015 (Fournier et al., 2015). This is a rich data set, and pooling all these waves gave us the opportunity to study visible minorities' vote choice. Unfortunately, the number of visible minority respondents is too low to examine changes in visible minorities' vote choice over time. Such analyses would not provide reliable estimates. To take into account changes over time, we therefore control for election year.

The CES data includes a campaign survey conducted during the campaign period immediately prior to the elections and a post-election survey. The goal of these surveys was to obtain a representative sample of the adult population of Canadian citizens aged 18 years or older, across the ten Canadian provinces. In this study, we only focus on visible minorities (whether born in Canada or abroad), and therefore only the 1,548 respondents who identified as non-white and non-Aboriginal are included. In Appendix C, more information can be found on the ethnic identification and country of birth of the respondents.

4.4.1 | Vote choice

We combined two variables to measure vote choice. In the post-election survey, respondents were asked which party they voted for during the last federal elections. We combined this variable with the question: 'Which party do you think you will vote for?' For respondents who had a missing value on the question referring to the party they voted for during the elections, we used their answer on the question referring to the party they thought they would vote for. Considering our specific focus on vote choice and our link to party positions, we excluded remaining respondents with missing values on this variable ($N=416$, 26.9%; including non-voters). Furthermore, respondents that preferred Bloc Québécois or the Green Party of Canada were excluded because there were very few of them ($N=38$, 2.5%). Hence, we only focused on the three largest parties: the Liberal Party, the New Democratic Party (NDP), and the various iterations of the Conservatives.³ After this selection, there were 1,132 visible minority respondents left. Appendix C provides more detailed information about the respondents with missing values on vote choice.

4.4.2 | Individual-specific variables

Recall that we hypothesise that minorities' viewpoints on economic (H_1), social (H_2), and minority issues (H_3) will impact on vote choice. For economic issues, we used two variables, the first of which was: 'How much should be done to reduce the gap between the rich and the poor in Canada?' The second economic item related to government welfare spending. A higher score on these variables indicates economically more rightist views.

Second, we used two variables to measure respondents' views on social issues. The first variable measured their opinion about gender roles; respondents were asked

whether society would be better off if fewer women worked outside the home. A higher score indicates that respondents think society is better off if fewer women work outside the home. The second variable measured opinions on gay rights, with the three answer categories being: in favour of gay rights (reference category), oppose gay rights, and don't know.

Third, to measure views on minority issues, two questions were asked: 'Do you think Canada should admit more, about the same, or fewer immigrants as now?' and how much respondents think should be done for racial minorities. Respondents with a higher score on these variables are seen as being less supportive of minority rights. This measurement may not be the best to test our hypothesis on descriptive representation, since we do not have the ideal attitudinal measures – for example, 'there should be more minorities in parliament' – across all years of the CES. Nevertheless, we consider our measure to be a proxy for such attitudinal measures and argue that they can be used in this first exploration of the effects of descriptive representation and issue position on vote choice. The precise wording of the questions to measure visible minorities' viewpoints are presented in Table C.4 in Appendix C.

Finally, we included several control variables. In this sense, educational level, income, and employment status were used to measure individual socioeconomic status. First, respondent's household income in the prior year was used to measure income and included eight categories ranging from less than \$20,000 (0) to more than \$80,000 (8). A second indicator of socioeconomic status was employment status, distinguishing between students, the employed (reference category), the unemployed, and the non-employed. This last category included retired and disabled people, as well as those caring for a family. The respondent's highest educational level was included as a continuous variable. We also controlled for gender and age.

4.4.3 | Substantive representation

Our second data source was the Comparative Manifesto Project Dataset (CMP; Volkens et al., 2017a), which is one of the most extensive and frequently used data sets on political parties' issue positions, including the results of coding election programmes in more than 50 countries since 1945 (Lowe, Benoit, Slava, & Laver, 2011; Volkens et al., 2017b). For our analysis, we used the data for all Canadian elections since 1993.

We are specifically interested in the issue positions of political parties regarding economic, social, and minority issues. Therefore, we constructed an economic and a social dimensional scale with items from the CMP that were as close as possible to the items from the CES. Logit scales were used to estimate the issue positions, which take the manifesto size into account and thus convert data into a ratio scale. The following formula was used: $\log \frac{R+0.5}{L+0.5}$ (Lowe et al., 2011). The scores for the Conservatives in 1993, 1997, and 2000 were based on the mean scores for the Reform Party of Canada and Progressive Conservative party of Canada. Appendix C presents detailed information about the CMP and the coding of the variables.

Since the existing literature does not provide many suggestions on how to measure parties' positions on minority issues with CMP data (Ruedin & Morales, 2013), we measured parties' minority viewpoints and estimated parties' issue positions on minority issues using Wordscores, which can automatically identify and count words, an especially useful feature when studying party positions over time. Previous studies have shown that Wordscores provides relatively reliable estimates (Benoit & Laver, 2006; Lowe et al., 2011; Ruedin & Morales, 2013).

Wordscores treats the words in party programmes as data containing information about parties' relative issue positions. To be able to estimate these issue positions, we need a set of texts for which issue positions on a certain dimension are known ('reference texts'). The Wordscores programme extracts data from the reference texts by counting words and uses this information to estimate parties' issue positions for another set of texts ('virgin texts'). Our reference text was derived from an expert survey conducted from 2002 to 2003 (Benoit & Laver, 2006). In this survey, 104 Canadian political experts were asked to place federal Canadian parties on a scale running from 1 to 20, from positions supporting full integration of immigrants and asylum seekers to returning immigrants to their countries of origin. The scores of the NDP, the Liberal Party, the Canadian Alliance, and the Progressive Conservative Party from this survey were used to estimate the parties' issue positions in other years. This results in a variable with scores ranging between 1 and 15, with a higher score indicating more permissive issue positions on immigration and integration. More information about Wordscores is provided in Appendix C.

4.4.4 | Descriptive representation

In addition to parties' substantive representation, we also tested how descriptive representation affects voters' party preferences. Several researchers have collected data on the share of visible minority candidates in each party between 1993 and 2015 (Black, 2013; Griffith, 2016; Tossutti & Najem, 2002). Although different researchers collected these data, they built on each other's work, and their methods have been rather similar. The researchers followed the definition of visible minorities used by Statistics Canada. To determine who is a visible minority, a last name analysis was used by means of surname dictionaries. Additionally, biographies were used for photographs and other relevant references (for more information on the data collection, see Black, 2013; Griffith, 2016; Tossutti & Najem, 2002).

4.4.5 | Missing values

First, from the 1,132 respondents with valid values on vote choice we excluded those with invalid values on educational level, employment status, denomination, and age (N=75). Among the 1,057 remaining visible minority respondents, there were several variables with many respondents that had missing values, for which we used multiple imputation techniques. Multiple imputation is a reliable method for handling missing data that


reduces bias to a higher degree than the application of list wise deletion (see Allison, 2000; Lall, 2016; Rubin, 1996). Data were imputed for income (9.7%) and for respondents' opinions on social, economic, and migration issues, which included how much should be done to reduce the gap between the rich and the poor (30.5%); welfare spending (19.0%); gender role attitudes (18.4%); gay rights (22.0%); the admission of immigrants (24.6%); and how much should be done for minorities (21.7%). In total, 1,057 visible minorities were analysed. Tables C.6 and C.7 in Appendix C present the descriptive statistics.

4.5 | Results


4.5.1 | Analytical strategy

The outcome variable under study is visible minorities' vote choice, meaning that we have a multi-category dependent variable. We therefore use a Multinomial Logit (ML) model to estimate our results. However, we are specifically interested in the influence of substantive and descriptive representation – which are party characteristics – on vote choice and in the extent to which alignment between voters' and parties' issue positions affect vote choice. To be able to estimate the effects of such party characteristics on vote choice, an extension of the ML model is used, commonly referred to as a conditional logit model but also known as a discrete choice model (Long & Freese, 2006). Whereas multinomial logit models can only estimate the influence of voter characteristics on party choice, conditional logit regression models enable us to measure the influence of both voter characteristics and party characteristics on party choice (Alvarez & Nagler, 1998). Characteristics of the dependent variable are referred to as alternative-specific variables, and voter characteristics are referred to as individual-specific variables.⁴ The data are prepared in a long format, which means that, for each individual respondent in the data, there is a row for each party. We study three parties, which results in $(1,057 \times 3 =) 3,171$ observations in the analyses. Due to the data structure, all individual-specific variables must be estimated for each party separately. For instance, CL models estimate the effects of a voters' economic issue position on a choice for the Conservatives and the NDP. These individual-specific effects are all relative to the reference category, which is the Liberal Party.


In this contribution, CL models estimate the log-odds and odds ratios for party choice. Moreover, CL models estimate whether party choice is conditional on characteristics of the party (parties' issue positions and the percentage of visible minority candidates). Table 4.1 presents the results for the individual-specific variables, which indicates the influence of vote characteristics on vote choice, while Table 4.2 outlines the alternative-specific variables, which demonstrates the influence of substantive and descriptive representation on vote choice. Additionally, the interaction effects show whether parties' and voters' issue alignment affect vote choice. We begin by examining some descriptive statistics before continuing with the multivariate analysis.

FIGURE 4.1 | Descriptive results^a**a** Vote share by party (%)


Source: Fournier et al., 2015.

b Economic issue positions, by party

Source: Volkens et al., 2017b.

c Social issue positions, by party

Source: Volkens et al., 2017b.

d Minority issue positions, by party

Source: Party manifestoes, 1993–2015.

^aThe figures present averages from the period 1993–2015.


4.5.2 | Descriptive results

Figure 4.1a shows, in accordance with previous studies, that the Liberal Party is, by far, the most popular among visible minorities, with about 60% supporting the party. After the Liberals, about 23% support the Conservatives and about 18% support the NDP. In Figures 4.1b–d, we present parties' positions on economic, social, and minority issues, as drawn from their manifestoes. On economic issues, the NDP is the most left wing, followed by the Liberals and the Conservatives. Figure 4.1c shows that the Conservative Party is the most socially conservative, which would make it the most attractive party on this domain. Finally, the NDP has the most permissive position on immigration, whereas the Conservatives are the most restrictive on this issue.

Figure 4.2 presents the level of descriptive representation within the three parties, based on the share of visible minority candidates in each party. On average, the Liberal

Party has the highest share of visible minority candidates on its list (9.5%), followed by the NDP (8.2%) and the Conservatives (6.3%). These descriptive figures provide a first indication of the substantive and descriptive representation in each party. The Liberals' positions on economic issues and levels of descriptive representation may have gained them support among visible minorities. Nevertheless, on socially conservative issues, the Conservative party may be the preferred choice. The conditional logit analyses can offer more insight into the effects of substantive and descriptive representation when voter socio-demographics are also considered.

FIGURE 4.2 | Descriptive representation by party, 1993 – 2015^a



Note: ^a This figure presents averages over 1993–2015.
Source: Black, 2013; Griffith, 2016; Tossutti & Najem, 2002.

4.5.3 | Multivariate analyses

Model 0 in Table 4.1 shows that the Liberal Party is the most popular among visible minorities, which is in line with Figure 4.1a. The alternative-specific constants for both the Conservatives and the NDP are negative and significant, indicating that the odds of voting for the Conservatives or the NDP, when compared to the Liberal Party, are smaller. The results in Model 0 also show visible minorities' positions on economic, social, and minority issues and reveal that visible minorities who have more economically rightist views, more socially conservative issue positions, and more restrictive views on minority issues are more likely to vote for the Conservatives in comparison with the Liberals. No significant differences are found between the NDP and the Liberal Party. Furthermore, we find that socioeconomic characteristics have no significant influence on vote choice. Similar results of socioeconomic characteristics are found in a model without voters' issue positions (Table C.10 in Appendix C presents this model). Although this corresponds with previous research in Canada, this is a highly interesting finding in the broader ethnic voting literature.

TABLE 4.1 | Conditional logistic regression for vote choice; voter characteristics

	Model o			
	Conservatives		NDP	
	B	OR	B	OR
Alternative-specific constants (ASC; Liberal=ref.)	-1.258*** (0.312)	0.284*** (0.089)	-2.235*** (0.400)	0.107*** (0.043)
Economic issues positions (L-R) ^a				
Less government spending to reduce gap between rich and poor	0.176* (0.098)	1.192* (0.117)	-0.189 (0.121)	0.827 (0.101)
Less government welfare spending	0.212** (0.083)	1.237** (0.102)	-0.119 (0.104)	0.888 (0.093)
Social issue positions (P-C) ^b				
Traditional gender role attitudes	0.019 (0.091)	1.019 (0.093)	-0.112 (0.097)	0.894 (0.087)
Gay rights (in favour=ref.)				
- Oppose	0.708*** (0.251)	2.030*** (0.509)	-0.099 (0.252)	0.906 (0.228)
- Don't know	0.127 (0.237)	1.135 (0.269)	-0.052 (0.243)	0.949 (0.230)
Minority issue positions (P-R) ^c				
Admit fewer immigrants	0.266* (0.150)	1.305* (0.196)	-0.167 (0.170)	0.846 (0.144)
Less should be done for racial minorities	0.205* (0.105)	1.228* (0.129)	0.011 (0.11)	1.011 (0.115)
<i>Control variables</i>				
Income	0.029 (0.039)	1.029 (0.040)	-0.003 (0.041)	0.996 (0.041)
Student (employed=ref.)	-0.581* (0.323)	0.559* (0.180)	-0.213 (0.319)	0.808 (0.257)
- Unemployed	0.053 (0.348)	1.054 (0.367)	0.298 (0.369)	1.347 (0.496)
- Non-employed	0.017 (0.287)	1.017 (0.291)	-0.117 (0.324)	0.890 (0.288)
Educational level	0.018 (0.043)	1.018 (0.044)	0.053 (0.047)	1.055 (0.050)
Age	-0.007 (0.007)	0.993 (0.007)	-0.009 (0.008)	0.991 (0.008)
Gender (male=ref.)	0.066 (0.166)	1.069 (0.178)	-0.0171 (0.179)	0.983 (0.176)
Survey year (1993=ref.)				
- 1997	-0.250 (0.305)	0.779 (0.238)	0.070 (0.468)	1.072 (0.502)
- 2000	-1.330*** (0.448)	0.264*** (0.118)	-1.741 (1.068)	0.175 (0.187)
- 2004	-0.172 (0.334)	0.842 (0.281)	1.296*** (0.412)	3.656*** (1.506)
- 2006	-0.131 (0.327)	0.877 (0.287)	1.176*** (0.417)	3.240*** (1.350)
- 2008	0.006 (0.337)	1.006 (0.339)	1.356*** (0.430)	3.879*** (1.669)
- 2011	0.723** (0.316)	2.061** (0.650)	2.023*** (0.408)	7.562*** (3.085)
- 2015	0.256 (0.337)	1.291 (0.435)	1.255*** (0.431)	3.509*** (1.512)
N	3,717			

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ^a Left-Right; ^b Progressive-Conservative; ^c Permissive-Restrictive. Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table 4.2 presents the effects of substantive and descriptive representation on vote choice. We find that the main effect of parties' economic issues position on vote choice is positive and significant ($b=0.082$; not shown, see Table C.8 in Appendix C). This effect indicates that the more economically rightist views a party has, the more likely it is that visible minorities' will vote for that party. Model 1 in Table 4.2 shows interactions between parties' and voters' economic issue positions. The interaction effects are not significant. Hence, we find that economic issue positions have an influence on the vote choice of visible minorities; however, there is no evidence for Hypothesis 1: visible minorities who are economically more right-leaning are not more likely to vote for economically right-wing parties, nor are those who are economically more left-leaning more likely to vote for economically left-wing parties.⁵ This remarkable finding can be interpreted by the popularity of the Liberal Party, both among visible minorities with economically right- and left-wing views, whereas the Liberal Party holds a centrist position on the economic domain. The main effect of parties' positions on social issues shows that visible minorities are more likely to vote for more socially conservative parties ($b=0.121$; Table C.8 in Appendix C). Hypothesis 2 predicts that the influence of parties' social issue positions is dependent on voters' social issue positions. The interaction effects in Model 2 in Table 4.2 highlight that visible minorities that oppose gay rights are significantly more likely to vote for socially conservative parties. The results partly support Hypothesis 2, that visible minorities who are more socially conservative are more likely to vote for a party that is more socially conservative. This is found for gay rights but not for traditional gender role attitudes.

The last aspect of substantive representation to be tested are parties' positions on minority issues. Again, the main effect is significant ($b=0.254$; Table C.8 in Appendix C), indicating that parties that are *more* restrictive on minority issues are *more* popular among visible minority voters. However, Model 3 in Table 4.2 does not show any significant interaction effects. There is no evidence that if visible minorities are more supportive on minority issues, they will be more likely to vote for parties with permissive positions on minority issues. Neither do we find that visible minorities' own positions on minority issues influence the effect of parties' issue positions on visible minorities' vote choice (H3).

The fourth hypothesis relates to descriptive representation. There is no significant effect of the share of visible minority candidates on a parties' list on visible minorities' vote choice (Table C.8 in Appendix C). Moreover, Model 4 in Table 4.2 demonstrates that none of the interaction effects between parties' levels of descriptive representation and visible minorities' positions on minority issues are significant. Thus, Hypothesis 4 that the more supportive visible minority voters are on minority issues, the stronger the positive effect of visible minority candidates is on vote choice, is not supported.

TABLE 4.2 | Conditional logistic regression for vote choice; substantive and descriptive representation

<i>Alternative-specific variables</i>	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
	B	OR	B	OR	B	OR	B	OR
Economic issue positions (L-R) ^a	0.082*** (0.018)	1.085*** (0.019)						
Economic pos. x Less government spending to reduce gap between rich and poor	-0.003 (0.016)	0.997 (0.016)						
Economic pos. x Less government welfare spending	0.016 (0.015)	1.016 (0.016)						
Social issue positions (P-C) ^b			0.097* (0.054)	1.102* (0.060)				
Social pos. x Traditional gender role attitudes			-0.011 (0.032)	0.989 (0.032)				
Gay rights (in favour=ref.)								
Social pos. x Oppose			0.164** (0.0792)	1.178** (0.093)				
Social pos. x Don't know			0.0698 (0.0806)	1.072 (0.086)				
Minority issue positions (P-R) ^c					0.258*** (0.041)	1.295*** (0.053)		
Minority pos. x Admit fewer immigrants					0.007 (0.025)	1.007 (0.025)		
Minority pos. x Less should be done for racial minorities					0.009 (0.017)	1.009 (0.017)		
% Visible minority candidates							0.073 (0.056)	1.076 (0.060)
% Visible minority candidates x Admit fewer immigrants							0.031 (0.038)	1.032 (0.039)
% Visible minority candidates x Less should be done for racial minorities							-0.007 (0.022)	0.993 (0.021)
<i>Individual-specific variables</i>								
Economic issues positions (L-R)								
Less government spending to reduce gap between rich and poor_CON	0.304*** (0.115)	1.356*** (0.156)						
Less government spending to reduce gap between rich and poor_NDP	-0.146 (0.133)	0.864 (0.115)						
Less government welfare spending_CON	0.120 (0.114)	1.127 (0.129)						
Less government welfare spending_NDP	-0.061 (0.117)	0.941 (0.110)						
Social issue positions (P-C)								
Traditional gender role attitudes_CON			0.112 (0.131)	1.118 (0.146)				
Traditional gender role attitudes_NDP			-0.095 (0.106)	0.909 (0.097)				
Gay rights (in favour=ref.)								
- Oppose_CON			-0.373 (0.279)	0.689 (0.192)				
- Oppose_NDP			-0.274 (0.273)	0.760 (0.207)				

- Don't know_CON	-0.411 (0.323)	0.663 (0.214)				
- Don't know_NDP	-0.240 (0.258)	0.787 (0.203)				
Minority issue positions (P-R)						
Admit fewer immigrants_CON			0.319** (0.155)	1.375** (0.214)	0.297* (0.171)	1.345* (0.230)
Admit fewer immigrants_NDP			-0.149 (0.203)	0.862 (0.175)	-0.223 (0.153)	0.800 (0.123)
Less should be done for racial minorities_CON			0.233** (0.112)	1.263** (0.142)	0.290** (0.117)	1.337** (0.157)
Less should be done for racial minorities_NDP			0.0248 (0.114)	1.025 (0.117)	0.146 (0.093)	1.157 (0.107)
N			3,171			

Note: In all models, socioeconomic position, age, gender, and survey year are included, for clarity, only the variables included in the interaction terms are presented. Full models are presented in Table C.9 in Appendix C. ^a Left-Right;

^b Progressive-Conservative ^c Permissive-Restrictive. Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

4.6 | Conclusion and discussion

This study has questioned the extent to which substantive and descriptive representation can account for visible minorities' vote choice in Canada. Canada is an interesting case to study visible minorities' vote choice because the minority population is highly diverse in terms of ethnic background and socioeconomic outcomes; immigration and multicultural integration are not considered as problematic either by the general population or by politicians; and descriptive representation in the House of Commons is relatively high. With this study, we have contributed to the existing literature on ethnic voting in Western countries and tested whether, despite the unique Canadian context, determinants of minorities' vote choice in Canada are similar to findings in other Western countries.

The Liberal Party is the most popular party among visible minorities in Canada. Furthermore, it is a remarkable finding that individual socioeconomic factors have little influence on vote choice. These results are in line with those of previous studies in Canada (White, 2017) but are contrary to findings in other Western countries (Bergh & Bjørklund, 2011; Heath et al., 2013, 2011).

One of the main findings of this study is that substantive representation has an influence on visible minorities' vote choice in the Canadian context, but that this influence was not found for descriptive representation. Generally, economically right-wing and socially conservative parties are more popular among visible minority voters. Since the NDP is both the most economically left wing, the most progressive on social issues, and the least popular among visible minorities, this is not a surprising finding. However, another interesting outcome is that, overall, we did not find strong evidence that the effect of parties' issue positions on vote choice differs between minorities depending on their own issue positions. We only found evidence for parties' social positions effect on vote choice to be conditional on minorities' own issue positions on gay rights. This may indicate that gay rights are a salient issue that plays a role in visible minorities' vote choice.

An unanticipated finding was that visible minorities are relatively likely to vote for parties that have more restrictive positions on immigration. This finding can also be interpreted by the lack of support for the party with the least restrictive position on immigration: the NDP. The puzzle for Canada is thus: why is the most economically left-wing party, which claims to be the most permissive to immigration, not the most popular among visible minorities? Possible explanations may be that immigration policy is not so relevant for visible minorities, many of whom belong to second or older generations, or that, for the Canadian visible minority population with higher levels of education and higher status, self-interests prevail over presumed visible minority group interests. Previous research has already shown that minorities do not necessarily hold positive attitudes towards other minority groups (Van der Zwan, Bles, & Lubbers, 2017). However, we did not find that the influence of parties' economic issues positions is conditional on minorities' own economic views, a finding that would have been in line with the idea that self-interests are important in voting. Rather than self-interests or group interests, the historical ties of the Liberal Party with the visible minority population and socialisation within visible minority communities, may have resulted in a group norm to vote for the Liberal Party.

In Canada, the Liberal Party descriptively outnumbers the party that is substantively considered to represent the immigrant interests best. Yet, descriptive representation does not seem to be an important predictor of visible minorities' vote choice. Considering that descriptive representation was found to affect the vote choice of minorities in the Dutch PR system, the Canadian electoral system may be a possible explanation for this finding. In each riding, parties can nominate one candidate. Hence, voters can vote for the candidate nominated by the party of their choice. Even though voters may be aware of the visible minority background of candidates in their riding, they may not know how many visible minority candidates each party nominated across the country. Another reason may be that the influence of descriptive representation on vote choice differs between groups. If the influence of descriptive representation on vote choice was measured for specific visible minority groups rather than for visible minority groups in general – similar to Chapter 3 – we may have found an effect.

Studying minority groups often comes with data limitations. Because of the limited number of visible minorities in the CES data, we could not distinguish between different visible minority groups and we could not examine variation in vote choice over time. It would be interesting to examine the extent to which vote choice differs between, for example, South Asian and Black minorities. Moreover, it is possible that vote choice and predictors for vote choice have changed between 1993 and 2015. Nevertheless, the popularity of the Liberal Party is rather robust, since it was the most popular of the three parties under study in each wave of the CES. Third, the measurement of parties' standpoints on immigration is not ideal and must be interpreted with caution. Data scarcity makes it difficult to cross-check the findings on parties' minority standpoints. More data about both different minority groups and parties' issue positions is therefore needed to test the relationship between issue positions and vote choice among visible minorities more specifically.

The outcomes of this study contribute to existing research on the ethnic vote in Western countries. First, testing a minority-specific explanation for vote choice among minorities has shown that it is relevant to consider parties' issue positions. Nevertheless, the generalisability may be limited for descriptive representation. The influence of descriptive representation on visible minorities' vote choice may differ depending on the electoral system. Further work needs to be carried out to fully understand how descriptive representation affects vote choice for different minority groups and in different political systems. Second, this study contributes to Canadian research on visible minorities' vote choice. Like previous studies, we found that socioeconomic position is not an important predictor of visible minorities' vote choice (Blais, 2005; Thomas, 2012; White, 2017). It is still not clear why this is different in Canada when compared to other Western countries. However, economically rightist and socially conservative party standpoints appeal to minority voters. This deserves more attention in future studies. It will also be important to delve deeper into the effect of party leaders' descriptive representation on vote choice in future Canadian federal elections, given that the NDP's leader since 2017, Jagmeet Singh, is a visible minority.

Notes

- 1 In Canada, the term 'visible minority' as defined by the Employment Equity Act refers to any non-Aboriginal person who is non-Caucasian in race or non-White in colour (Statistics Canada, 2008).
- 2 The federal electoral order is reviewed every 10 years to reflect changes in the Canadian population. The last redistribution of the ridings took place in 2013, resulting in an increase from 308 to 338 ridings.
- 3 Because they were active at different elections, it is not possible to include each of these parties separately in the analyses. That is why the 'Conservatives' refer to the different Conservative parties: the Reform Party, the Canadian Alliance, the Progressive Conservative Party and the Conservative Party of Canada.
- 4 To use CL models the assumption of the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA-assumption) has to be met. The Hausman test shows that the IIA-assumption was violated. Since the IIA assumption is not notably relevant nor restrictive in vote choice research, we nevertheless choose to use CL models (Dow & Endersby, 2004). Moreover, previous research has shown that CL models estimate comparable outcomes as models that relax the IIA assumption (Cushing & Cushing, 2007; Dahlberg & Eklöf, 2003; Train, 2003).
- 5 For a better comparison between Chapters 3 and 4, we ran an additional analysis. We tested whether the influence of parties' economic issue positions depends on voters' socioeconomic position rather than on their economic views. As shown in Table C.11 Appendix C there is no evidence that the effect of parties' economic issue positions depends on voters' socioeconomic position.

CHAPTER 5

Under which conditions do ethnic minority candidates attract the ethnic vote?

How neighbourhood and candidate characteristics affected ethnic affinity voting in the Dutch 2017 parliamentary elections*

*This chapter is currently under review at an international journal. The chapter is co-authored by Jochem Tolsma and Marcel Lubbers. Roos van der Zwan and Marcel Lubbers jointly developed the idea for this paper. Roos van der Zwan wrote most of the text and conducted the analysis. Jochem Tolsma assisted with the analysis. The feedback of Jochem Tolsma and Marcel Lubbers further improved the manuscript.

5.1 | Introduction

Ethnic affinity voting indicates that political party candidates with an ethnic minority background receive larger vote shares in areas with a larger ethnic minority population (Bird et al., 2016; Matson, Fine, & Florida, 2006; McDermott, 1998). With an increasing ethnic minority electorate, the inclusion of ethnic minority candidates has gained importance for political parties in Western countries. The expectation that these candidates win votes among the ethnic minority population has been advanced as one of the main possible motivations (Dancygier, 2017). To date, however, the conditions under which ethnic affinity effects are particularly strong are unknown: They may depend on the political party the candidate represents or candidate characteristics other than their ethnic background, such as gender. Our aim is therefore to assess the conditions under which ethnic minority candidates receive larger vote shares in the Dutch parliamentary election of 2017. We use the proportion of votes each individual candidate on each party's candidate list received within polling stations to investigate ethnic affinity effects.

Affinity effects have been found in majoritarian systems, second-order elections, such as local elections (Barreto, 2007; Bejarano & Segura, 2007; Teney et al., 2010) and experimental studies with fictionalised majority and minority candidates (Besco, 2015; Goodyear-Grant & Tolley, 2017; McConaughy et al., 2010; Philpot & Walton, 2007; Stokes-Brown, 2006). In the European context, however, it remains unclear whether ethnic affinity voting exists in political contexts in which voters can choose between multiple candidates on parties' candidate lists in national level elections. Moreover, evidence for the ethnic affinity thesis is difficult to demonstrate. In existing studies, it often remains implicit whether people vote for a candidate or for the party to which the candidate is affiliated (Bird et al., 2016; Matson et al., 2006; McDermott, 1998). We study if evidence for the ethnic affinity thesis can still be found when we disentangle candidate and party choice, and we will assess whether ethnic affinity effects differ across political parties.

This study is innovative for three reasons. First, we examine differences in ethnic affinity voting between twelve political parties in the Netherlands. Previous research demonstrated that especially left-wing parties are successful in attracting the ethnic vote (Martin, 2016; Sobolewska, 2013; Tiberj & Michon, 2013; Van der Zwan, Lubbers & Eisinga, 2018). It is therefore likely that especially ethnic minority candidates of left-wing parties are popular in areas with many eligible voters with an ethnic minority background. Second, we will examine the extent of ethnic affinity voting within parties between candidates of different ethnic origins. Since political integration varies between ethnic origin groups, we will study both general ethnic affinity voting and specific co-ethnic affinity voting (Fennema & Tillie, 1999; Tillie, 2004). Our emphasis lies on the largest non-Western minority groups in the Netherlands, Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese and Antillean minorities, which will be discussed in further detail below. Hence, we test whether ethnic minority candidates attract more votes when minority group sizes are larger and whether candidates with a specific ethnic background attract more votes when this particular ethnic group is larger. Third, in some Western countries, including the Netherlands, ethnic minority women have

been well represented on candidate lists. Nominating ethnic minority women is a party strategy to try to maximise the representativeness of the candidate list (Bird, 2005; Celis & Erzeel, 2017; Mügge, 2016). This does not necessarily mean, however, that female ethnic minority candidates receive higher vote shares in areas with more co-ethnic minorities. We study if candidate gender influences ethnic affinity voting.

Ethnic affinity voting is examined in the Dutch political context. The Dutch national election of 2017 provides a particular interesting context for our study. The Netherlands is known as one of the few countries in which the share of the non-Western ethnic minority electorate is similar to the share of non-Western minority Members of Parliament (MPs; Bloemraad, 2013; Mügge, 2016; Van der Zwan et al., 2018). Moreover, most of the Dutch parties – from the left-wing as well as the right-wing – have ethnic minority candidates on their candidate list. What is specific about the election of 2017 is the electoral success of several new parties – e.g. DENK, which specifically targets ethnic minority voters – and the implosion of the Labour Party (PvdA), which traditionally attracted many votes among the ethnic minority electorate. The downfall of the social-democrats is not unique for the Netherlands; other European countries such as France and Austria experienced similar downfalls. There is, nonetheless, no other European country (yet) in which a party that aimed at voters with an ethnic minority background has won seats in national elections. Differences in ethnic affinity voting between left-wing parties and minority-oriented parties observed in the Netherlands may become reality in other European countries as well.

This study tests for affinity voting by assessing the relationship between the proportions of votes each specific candidate received within a polling station and ethnic group size of the neighbourhood in which the polling station is situated. Using this type of aggregated data and looking at these macro-macro relations can result in ecological fallacies (Robinson, 1950; Shaw, 1997). In contrast to earlier studies, however, our unit of analysis is very detailed (Abrajano & Alvarez, 2005; Barreto, 2007; Bejarano & Segura, 2007; Landa et al., 1995; Teney et al., 2010). We used information from 2,121 different polling stations, located in 1,089 different neighbourhoods within 20 of the larger cities in the Netherlands (including Amsterdam and Rotterdam). In the Dutch parliamentary election of 2017, the twelve political parties included in this study nominated 548 individual candidates. In each polling station, voters could give their vote to one of these 548 candidates. We are the first to use such fine-grained geographical data and to distinguish general affinity effects from co-ethnic affinity effects. Our approach makes ecological fallacies less likely. We will demonstrate below that we can enhance our understanding of ethnic affinity voting in the European context.

5.2 | The Dutch political context

The Netherlands has a preferential-list proportional representation (PR) system with compulsory candidate voting. Therefore, voters are presented with the candidate lists of all parties and from these lists they cast one vote for a single candidate. Most voters

vote for the first candidate on the list, which typically expresses general support for the party; votes for other candidates are assumed to be preference votes and are often used to support a female or an ethnic minority candidate (Andeweg & Irwin, 2009; Van Holsteyn & Andeweg, 2012). It is uncommon for candidates with a low list position to receive enough preference votes to be elected. However, most parties have ethnic minorities on their list, including in high list positions. In the parliamentary elections of 2012, for example, 11% of the candidates had an ethnic minority background (Van der Zwan et al., 2018).

The Dutch parliamentary elections of March 2017 were characterised by the emergence of several new political parties and the major loss of the Labour Party (PvdA). The Labour Party (PvdA) reached its historic low: 38 seats in 2012 to only 9 in 2017. DENK and Artikel 1 were two new parties that focused on racism and discrimination and were competitors to left-wing parties. Two former Labour Party (PvdA) MPs with Turkish origins founded DENK in 2015. Sylvana Simons, who has Surinamese origins, then joined the party. After an internal conflict, however, she left and established the party Artikel 1 just a few months before the elections. Whereas DENK was successful and won three seats during the elections Artikel 1 did not win any. The party nevertheless won a substantial part of the vote share in Amsterdam and won a seat in the Amsterdam municipality elections of 2018. In addition, Forum for Democracy (FvD) entered the elections for the first time and added more competition on the radical right side of the political spectrum, competing with Wilders' anti-immigrant party (PVV) for votes. Yet, Wilders' anti-immigrant party was the second largest party, after Prime Minister Rutte's Liberal Party (VVD).

Another relevant aspect of the Dutch context is the conceptualisation of ethnic minority background. The literature contains different views on this concept, based on both theoretical and practical concerns (for a more elaborate discussion see Bloemraad, 2013). The main focus lies on the largest non-Western ethnic minority groups, referred to by some as visible minorities (Bloemraad, 2013). Hence, we concentrate on candidates with a Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese or Antillean background. All candidates have Dutch citizenship and belong to the first, second or third generation. These are the largest non-Western ethnic minority groups in the Dutch context and are relevant considering their on average vulnerable position in society. The term 'ethnic minorities' thus refers to non-Western ethnic minorities in this research.

5.3 | Theoretical framework

5.3.1 | General ethnic affinity voting

The assumption that voters have the tendency to vote for candidates who are similar to themselves, i.e. someone who belongs to the same social group, is referred to as the affinity thesis (Bird et al., 2016; McDermott, 1998). The affinity thesis concerns various social groups, but has primarily been researched for gender and ethnic background (Barreto, 2007; Bird et al., 2016; Brians, 2005; Goodyear-Grant & Tolley, 2017; Philpot & Walton,

2007; Sigelman & Sigelman, 1982). A shared language, culture or migration experience, for instance a shared identity, are reasons to vote for someone from one's own social group (Barreto, 2007; Bird et al., 2016). Moreover, voters might expect that candidates similar to themselves have the same interests and will therefore be a good representative (Landa et al., 1995). In that sense, affinity voting is closely related to descriptive representation (Mansbridge, 1999; Phillips, 1995; Pitkin, 1967). Descriptive representation refers to the proportional representation of marginalised groups in society. The emphasis lies on the similarity between the characteristics of marginalised groups and their representatives.

Marginalised groups often have similar experiences, for example with discrimination. This experience is called linked fate and could be a reason for ethnic minorities to vote for ethnic minority candidates (Abrajano & Alvarez, 2005; Barreto, 2007; Besco, 2015; Bird et al., 2016; Bloemraad & Schönwälder, 2013; Dawson, 1995). Ethnic affinity voting can thus be used to strengthen the position of ethnic minorities in society. As has been suggested in earlier research, ethnic voting most likely refers to candidates who are easily identifiable as an ethnic minority group member, e.g. for non-Western ethnic minorities (Bird et al., 2016). Formulating a general ethnic affinity hypothesis, we expect that the larger the ethnic minority population in a neighbourhood, the larger the proportion of votes an ethnic minority candidate receives (H1).¹

The extent to which general ethnic affinity voting effects exist may differ between neighbourhoods. Even though individuals' socioeconomic and demographic characteristics are important predictors for political preferences (Adams et al., 2005; Downs, 1957; Evans, 2000), the place where one lives also shapes these preferences (David & Van Hamme, 2011; Johnston et al., 2000, 2004; Miller, 1978). There is a long history of electoral geography research on how the neighbourhood affects political preferences (Cho, Gimpel, & Dyck, 2006; Fieldhouse & Cutts, 2008a; Johnston et al., 2000, 2004). The main thesis in the electoral geography literature is that the larger the proportion of a certain social or ethnic group in a neighbourhood, the greater the impact of this groups' political preferences on the political preferences of co-residents. Ethnic communities are more likely to be organised and active in neighbourhoods with a large ethnic minority population. In such neighbourhoods, political preferences may be influenced by mobilisation through social connectedness and ethnic networks (Fennema & Tillie, 1999; Fieldhouse & Cutts, 2008a; Jacobs & Tillie, 2004). This process is referred to as the mobilisation hypothesis and would imply that affinity effects are more likely to be observed in neighbourhoods with sizeable ethnic groups and in which the relationship between minority group size in the neighbourhood and vote share among minority candidates is non-linear. Our second hypothesis is: General ethnic affinity effects increase when the ethnic minority population in a neighbourhood becomes larger (H2).

5.3.2 | Party-dependent ethnic affinity voting

Our third expectation is that ethnic affinity voting differs between parties. Parties have different strategies for the inclusion of ethnic minority candidates and this may affect

ethnic affinity voting. Dancygier (2017) states that parties may opt for a strategy of exclusion, symbolic inclusion or vote-based inclusion. Which strategy they choose depends on the size of the ethnic minority electorate. When the ethnic minority electorate is small, parties lack incentives to nominate ethnic minority candidates. For countries in which the ethnic minority electorate is larger, symbolic inclusion is a strategy for parties to express their inclusive image. Vote-based inclusion means that parties include ethnic minority candidates not only for symbolic reasons, but also to nominate those candidates who can attract the ethnic minority vote, for instance, because of their ties to the ethnic community. Political parties may choose a vote-based inclusion strategy when the ethnic minority electorate is large enough to affect electoral outcomes (Dancygier, 2017). Left-wing parties have traditionally been more supportive of minority rights, nominated larger numbers of ethnic minority candidates and enjoyed more success in attracting the ethnic vote than right-wing parties (Martin, 2016; Messina, 2006; Sanders et al., 2014). Even so, right-wing parties nominate ethnic minority candidates as well, which may be a strategy for parties to express inclusivity. We expect these candidates to be less successful in attracting the votes from the ethnic minority electorate. If right-wing parties attract ethnic votes, they may attract votes from ethnic minority voters who are more assimilated and who do not necessarily vote for the ethnic minority candidates affiliated with that party. Moreover, these ethnic minorities may have left neighbourhoods with larger concentrations of co-ethnics. We therefore expect to find stronger ethnic affinity effects for candidates from left-wing parties than right-wing parties. However, the competition for the ethnic vote has increased since the emergence of minority-oriented parties in the Netherlands. We expect that candidates of minority-oriented parties (DENK and Artikel 1) have stronger ties to the ethnic community and will be more successful in attracting the ethnic vote than left-wing parties. We predict that general ethnic affinity effects are stronger for minority-oriented parties than for left-wing parties, which in turn are stronger than for right-wing parties (H3).

5.3.3 | Co-ethnic affinity voting

Considering the differences between ethnic minority groups in the Netherlands, we expect that ethnic affinity voting takes place especially within ethnic minority groups. Moreover, since the level of integration varies between ethnic minority groups, the strength of ethnic affinity effects are similarly likely to vary (Fisher et al., 2015; Leighley, 2001). Research on the political participation of ethnic minorities in the Netherlands shows that minorities with a Turkish background are politically the most active, followed by those of Moroccan, Surinamese and Antillean origins (Fennema & Tillie, 1999; Tillie, 2004). This level of participation can partly be explained by the strength of the ethnic community and ethnic identification (Leighley, 2001; Tillie, 2004). Ethnic minorities are mobilised through their ethnic community, which results in, among others, higher levels of turnout (Fennema & Tillie, 1999). We expect that ethnic group mobilisation also affects ethnic affinity voting and that for ethnic minorities with the most cohesive ethnic community, the candidate's ethnic background is more important than for minorities with a less cohesive ethnic

community. In addition to the general ethnic affinity hypothesis, we formulate a co-ethnic affinity hypothesis: The larger the co-ethnic population in a neighbourhood, the larger the proportion of votes a co-ethnic candidate receives (H4a), and co-ethnic affinity effects are stronger for candidates with a Turkish background than for candidates with a Moroccan background, which in turn are stronger for candidates with a Surinamese or Antillean background (H4b).

5.3.4 | Gender-dependent ethnic affinity voting

Existing research on voting for women or ethnic minority women show mixed results on whether (ethnic minority) women receive higher or lower vote shares than (ethnic minority) men (Bird et al., 2016; Celis & Erzeel, 2017; Philpot & Walton, 2007). A preference for either male or female candidates could be based on existing stereotypes about men and women in relation to ideas about a politician's appropriate qualities (Bird et al., 2016; Black & Erickson, 2006; Sanbonmatsu, 2016). We anticipate that voting for female candidates differs between ethnic groups based on differences in prevalent gender role attitudes in these groups. We cannot test voters' gender role attitudes directly, but previous research has shown that some ethnic groups are more conservative and have more traditional views on gender roles than others (Arends-Tóth & van de Vijver, 2009). We anticipate that minorities from more conservative ethnic groups are more likely to vote for male candidates, assuming that they see women as less qualified politicians. Minorities with a Turkish or Moroccan background, who are often Muslim, hold more conservative gender role attitudes (Arends-Tóth & van de Vijver, 2009; Dancygier, 2017; Röder & Mühlau, 2011). Minorities with a Surinamese or Antillean background generally hold more progressive gender role attitudes; their gender role attitudes are more progressive than the gender role attitudes of Turkish and Moroccan minorities, but also of native Dutch (Arends-Tóth & van de Vijver, 2009). We thus expect that the larger the population holding more conservative gender role attitudes in neighbourhoods, the larger the share of votes for male ethnic minority candidates whereas this holds to a lesser extent for female ethnic minority candidates. In neighbourhoods with a larger population holding more progressive gender role attitudes, there may be no difference in ethnic affinity voting between male and female candidates, or it might be even stronger for female ethnic candidates than for male ethnic candidates. We hypothesise that: Ethnic affinity effects among candidates with a Turkish or Moroccan background are stronger for men than for women (H5a); and ethnic affinity effects among candidates with a Surinamese/Antillean background are equal for women and men, or stronger for women than for men (H5b).

5.4 | Data and measurements

To test our hypotheses, we combined three data sources. First, election results from polling stations were used from the Dutch national parliamentary elections of March

2017. Second, we collected information about the background characteristics of political candidates on parties' candidate lists (Van der Zwan, 2018). Last, we used neighbourhood characteristics from Statistics Netherlands (Statistics Netherlands, 2018c).

Since most ethnic minorities in the Netherlands live in cities, we expect the most variation in terms of the ethnic composition of neighbourhoods in urban areas. We selected the largest cities for which information was available at the polling station level.² Data were obtained through the Dutch Electoral Council (Kiesraad, 2017). We have information about the number of votes for each candidate on the candidate list in each polling station for twenty cities.³

In the Netherlands, all eligible voters receive an invitation by mail to vote, including their voting pass and the address of the nearest polling station.⁴ Although people are not obliged to vote there, we nevertheless assume that most voters will vote in their appointed polling station, or at least in their own neighbourhood. Polling stations of which we know this is not the case were excluded (121), for instance polling stations at train stations, universities or hospitals.

5.4.1 | Proportion of votes for candidates

The proportion of votes for individual candidates was calculated as the number of votes for each candidate in a polling station divided by the sum of votes for all candidates in that specific polling station. This variable ranged from 0 to 0.68, where 0 indicates that the candidate received no votes and where a higher number indicates a larger proportion of the votes for the candidates within that polling station. Hence, there was a maximum of 68% of the votes for a single candidate in a polling station, which was the case for Geert Wilders from the anti-immigrant party PVV in a polling station in Dordrecht. Most voters vote for the first candidate on the list, which typically expresses general support for the party (Van Holsteyn & Andeweg, 2012). Moreover, since not all candidates receive votes in all polling stations, there are many zeros in the data. The data are therefore highly skewed; in the analytical strategy, we discuss how we deal with the skewness of the data.

5.4.2 | Candidate characteristics

In addition to the proportion of votes for each candidate, we are interested in other candidate characteristics. First, we selected the political parties. There were thirteen parties that won at least one seat in the House of Representatives. We excluded the two parties that did not nominate any ethnic minority candidate, the Reformed Political Party (SGP) and the Party for the Animals (PvdD). The party Artikel 1 did not win any seats but was nevertheless included because of its minority-oriented character. In total, we analyse twelve parties of which most can be placed into known party families. The economic left-wing parties include the Socialist Party (SP), the Green party (GL), the Labour Party (PvdA), the Elderly party (50Plus), Artikel 1 and DENK. The social-liberal Democrats 66 (D66) and the economic right-wing VVD are regarded as liberal parties. There are two Christian parties, the Christian Union

(CU) and the more economic and culturally centre-right Christian Democratic (CDA). Last, we include the anti-immigrant party PVV and the economically and culturally right-wing Forum for Democracy (FvD). All parties must compose a candidate list, which is published by the Dutch government.⁵ Some candidates' characteristics can be found on these candidate lists. The candidate lists for the 2017 Dutch parliamentary elections provides information about gender and the list position of the candidate. For the twelve parties included, there were 548 unique candidates nominated for the candidate lists.

The most important characteristic was the candidate's ethnic background. Since this was not available on the official candidate list, we gathered the information about ethnic background: Two independent coders used names and photographs to identify non-Western ethnic minority candidates. For all candidates identified as an ethnic minority (90), an additional search was conducted for more specific information about their ethnic background. This information was gathered online using small online biographies about MPs, and other online resources, such as newspaper articles, social media and personal websites. We focused on candidates with a Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese/Antillean background or other non-Western background belonging to either the first, second or third generation immigrants.⁶ This is a rather common strategy to identify the ethnic background of candidates (Bloemraad, 2013). Candidate characteristics can be found in Appendix D.

5.4.3 | Neighbourhood characteristics

To examine the influence of neighbourhood characteristics on affinity voting, the polling stations were linked to the administratively defined neighbourhood characteristics in which they were located. In total, we analyse election results from 2,121 polling stations, located in 1,089 neighbourhoods.⁷ Our unit-of-analysis is the share of votes each individual candidate received in each polling station. Our original sample thus includes $(2,121 \times 548 = 1,162,308)$ observations.

Statistics Netherlands provided information about the share of ethnic groups. The total share of non-Western ethnic minorities within neighbourhoods ranged between 0% and 86%. We also included the share of each specific ethnic group in the neighbourhood in 2017: minorities with a Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese/Antillean and other non-Western background.⁸ Appendix D presents a detailed summary of the data.

5.4.4 | Other determinants of ethnic affinity voting

There are several determinants of ethnic affinity voting that we did not theorise, but we consider important to include in our analyses. First, votes for the party leader are often considered to be votes for the party, at least in the Dutch electoral system (Andeweg & Irwin, 2009; Van Holsteyn & Andeweg, 2012). To disentangle party and candidate effects, we control for the party leader. Moreover, ethnic affinity effects on the candidate level may be simply the result of certain parties being more popular in certain polling stations; we therefore include both the main effect of party as well as an interaction term between

party and the share of ethnic minorities in the neighbourhood into our explanatory model.

Additionally, we control for candidate characteristics known to increase vote shares. First, candidates who were also nominated during the previous elections in 2012 may receive higher vote shares in 2017 (Aarts, Blais, & Schmitt, 2011; Andeweg & Irwin, 2009; Gallagher & Marsh, 1988; Redmond & Regan, 2015). We also expect the first ethnic minority on the list to receive higher vote shares. The first ethnic minority on the list was linked to the specific ethnic groups. Thus, for each party, the first candidate with a Turkish background was coded as the first ethnic minority but so too the first Moroccan, Surinamese/Antillean and other non-Western candidates. This does not include party leaders with an ethnic minority background, which is the case for Artikel 1, DENK and the Green Party (GL).

Other neighbourhood characteristics other than the share of ethnic groups may also influence the popularity of parties and candidates with specific characteristics (David & Van Hamme, 2011). Since non-Western ethnic minorities are more likely to live in neighbourhoods with a lower socioeconomic status, we control for the socioeconomic status of the neighbourhood (Cho et al., 2006; Fieldhouse & Cutts, 2008a; Johnston et al., 2000, 2004). As an indication of the neighbourhoods' socioeconomic status, we included the average housing value in 2017 (Statistics Netherlands, 2018c).

Another neighbourhood characteristic we expect to influence affinity voting is the presence of a mosque in the neighbourhood, which is a possible fertile place for Muslim candidates' campaigns (Dancygier, 2017). An overview of the mosques in our cities of interest was derived from the website *moskeewijzer.nl*. Based on these data, we determined if a mosque was present in the neighbourhood. Table 5.1 presents descriptive statistics of the neighbourhood characteristics.

TABLE 5.1 | Descriptive statistics neighbourhood characteristics (N=1,089)

	%	Range	Mean	S.D.
% Ethnic minorities		0 – 86	22.9	17.6
% Turkish minorities		0 – 37	4.1	5.3
% Moroccan minorities		0 – 42	4.5	6.3
% Surinamese/Antillean minorities		0 – 48	6.0	6.4
% Other non-Western minorities		0 – 47	8.2	5.1
Socioeconomic status (x 1000)		53 – 1608	215.0	106.3
Mosques		0 – 1		
- No	89.3			
- Yes	10.7			


Source: *moskeewijzer.nl*; Statistics Netherlands, 2018c.

5.5 | Results

5.5.1 | Analytical strategy

In our data, 69% of the votes were cast for a first candidate on the parties' lists. Even though all candidates received at least one vote in at least one polling station, most candidates did not receive votes in every polling station. In total, 83.4% of the observations in our data are zeros. As shown in Figure 5.1, the distribution of vote share among non-zero observations is heavily skewed. In principle, the original distribution – including zero observations – could be fitted by a zero-inflated beta regression model. In these models, the probability that an observation is zero is estimated and, simultaneously, the mean value is estimated for observations that are non-zero, considering the skewness among these observations. This is very similar to running a separate logistic regression (among all observations) predicting a zero-vote share and running a beta regression among the sample of observations with a vote share larger than zero that predicts the mean value among these observations.⁹ We decided to test our hypotheses among observations with a vote share larger than zero. We therefore deleted observations with a vote share of zero, leaving us with a working sample of 193,393 observations in which all 548 candidates are represented. We present the results from beta regression models. Within this sample the candidate vote share ranged from 0.01 to 0.68.¹⁰ For reasons of parsimony, we decided to only present and discuss the results pertaining to the beta regression models in our main text. Results for the zero-inflated beta regression models are available upon request.¹¹

FIGURE 5.1 | Observed distribution of the proportion of votes among non-zero observations



Note: For reasons of clarity only the proportion of votes up to 0.20 are shown.

After a presentation of descriptive results, we first test the general ethnic affinity hypothesis by including in the model to predict candidate's vote share an interaction term between candidates' ethnic background and the share of ethnic minorities in the neighbourhood (Model 1 in Table 5.3). In Model 2, we test whether affinity effects are stronger in neighbourhoods in which the ethnic minority population is relatively larger by including an additional interaction with the quadratic term of minority group size in the neighbourhood. The results of Models 1 and 2 are graphically summarised in Figure 5.3. Thereafter, we examine whether ethnic affinity effects differ between parties by including interactions between party, the ethnic background of candidates and the share of the ethnic minority population in the neighbourhood. The results of this model are summarised in Figure 5.4. In Figure 5.5, we summarise specific co-ethnic affinity effects based on the model in which we included interaction effects between candidates' specific ethnic background and the share of co-ethnics in the neighbourhood and party. Last, Figure 5.6 summarises the effect of candidates' gender on ethnic affinity voting.

In all models, we control for party leader effects, first ethnic minority on the list, re-nominated candidates, party effects and (varying) party popularity across neighbourhoods with different minority populations. In Model 3, in which we examine party-dependent ethnic affinity effects, we also control for the socioeconomic status of the neighbourhood and the influence of a mosque on ethnic affinity voting by including main effects for these variables and interactions with the party variable. The additional analysis shows only minor changes in the ethnic affinity effects, which can be found in Table D.4 in Appendix D. These controls do not change the evaluation of the hypothesis and are therefore not included in the other models.

5.5.2 | Descriptive results


Table 5.2 presents the number of candidates by ethnic group and for each party. Artikel 1, DENK, the Christian Union (CU) and the Labour Party (PvdA) have the highest shares of ethnic minority candidates. Table 5.2 also shows that not all ethnic groups are represented on the candidate list of all parties. For instance, Artikel 1 has no Turkish minority candidate and 50Plus only has other non-Western ethnic minority candidates (i.e. no candidates with a Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese/Antillean background). We cannot estimate specific co-ethnic affinity effects for those ethnic groups not represented on a party's candidate list.

Table 5.2 shows that 13% (71) of candidates had an ethnic minority background in 2017. In total, 59.7% of the ethnic minority candidates were men. Table D.3 in Appendix D presents an overview of the gender of the candidates by party. Even though most candidates are men, the Socialist Party (SP) only has one female Moroccan minority; DENK and the Part for Freedom (PVV) only have female Surinamese/Antillean minority candidates; and the Labour Party (PvdA) and 50Plus only have female other non-Western minority candidates.

TABLE 5.2 | Ethnic minority candidates on parties' candidate lists (N=548)

	Dutch		Turkish		Moroccan		Surinamese/ Antillean		Other non-Western		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Art. 1	12	60.0	0	0.0	1	5.0	5	25.0	2	10.0	20	100
CDA	43	96.0	1	2.2	1	2.2	0	0.0	0	0.0	45	100
CU	44	88.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	2	4.0	4	8.0	50	100
DENK	2	11.1	9	50.0	3	16.7	2	11.1	2	11.1	18	100
D66	42	84.0	1	2.0	5	10.0	1	2.0	1	2.0	50	100
FvD	29	96.7	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	3.3	0	0.0	30	100
GL	45	90.0	3	6.0	1	2.0	0	0.0	1	2.0	50	100
PvdA	59	78.7	4	5.3	7	9.3	3	4.0	2	2.7	75	100
PVV	49	98.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	2.0	0	0.0	50	100
SP	40	90.9	3	6.8	1	2.3	0	0.0	0	0.0	44	100
VVD	77	96.3	1	1.3	2	2.5	0	0.0	0	0.0	80	100
50Plus	35	97.2	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	2.8	36	100
Total	477	87.0	22	4.0	21	3.8	15	2.7	13	2.4	548	100

FIGURE 5.2 | Share of ethnic minority groups with Dutch citizenship in the total Dutch population^a and the share of ethnic minorities among candidates and MPs in 2017



Note: The share of ethnic minority candidates is slightly different if we would only include parties that won at least one seat in the parliamentary elections: 10.4% in total, 3.3% for Moroccan minorities, 3.6% for Turkish minorities, 1.6% for former colony minorities, and 1.8 for other non-Western minorities.^aThis refers to the population eligible to vote (20 years or older; data from 18 years or older were not available). Source: Netherlands, 2018a, 2018b; Van der Zwan, 2018 (own calculations).

Figure 5.2 shows the share of non-Western ethnic minorities with Dutch citizenship in the total population with Dutch citizenship. The share of candidates with a non-Western ethnic background is 12.6%. This figure shows that, generally, non-Western ethnic minorities were overrepresented on candidate lists, but underrepresented in the House of Representatives in 2017. Both Turkish and Moroccan minority groups are overrepresented whereas former colony and other non-Western minorities are underrepresented on candidate lists and not represented in the House of Representatives.

5.5.3 | Multivariate analysis

Our first step is to examine whether we find general ethnic affinity effects. We aim to know whether the share of ethnic minorities increases the share of votes for candidates with an ethnic minority background. The general ethnic affinity effect is represented by the interaction effect of candidate's ethnic background with the share of ethnic minorities in the neighbourhood. The positive and significant interaction effect ($b=0.006$, Model 1, Table 5.3) shows that when the share of ethnic minorities in the neighbourhood increases, the likelihood for ethnic minority candidates to receive a larger share of the votes increases when compared with the share of votes candidates receive with a native Dutch background. This result supports Hypothesis 1. To ease interpretation, we graphically summarised the results of Model 1 (and Model 2) in Figure 5.3. For Figure 5.3, we calculated the predicted probabilities for ethnic minority candidates in neighbourhoods with varying shares of the ethnic minority population, ranging from 0% to 80%. The predicted probabilities presented are based on ethnic minority candidates not the party leader, the first ethnic minority on the list nor re-nominated candidates (though it can be easily calculated from the model for these groups as well). The ethnic affinity effects for the candidates are controlled for (varying) popularity of political parties. The main effect of being an ethnic minority candidate is negative, showing that ethnic minority candidates have a lower vote share than native Dutch candidates.

As an example for the calculation of the probabilities presented in Figure 5.3, we will discuss the effects for candidates from DENK. The effects in Model 1 were used to calculate the logit for ethnic minority candidates from DENK in neighbourhoods with no ethnic minority population: $-0.392 + -6.99 + (0.006 * 0) + (0.028 * 0) = -7.386$. Using this logit, we calculated the predicted probability for ethnic minority candidates in these neighbourhoods: $1 / (1 + \exp(-7.386)) = 0.001$. The logit for ethnic minority candidates from DENK in neighbourhoods with the highest share of ethnic minorities (80%) is: $-0.392 + -6.99 + (0.006 * 80) + (0.028 * 80) = -4.674$. The predicted probability for ethnic minority candidates in neighbourhoods in which 80% of the population has an ethnic minority background is: $1 / (1 + \exp(-4.674)) = 0.009$. These predicted probabilities seem quite small, but this is not very surprising because we do not focus on party leaders and when one considers the large number of candidates at 548, the vote shares of all 548 candidates add up to 100% in each polling station.


TABLE 5.3 | Beta Regression models on candidates' vote share: general ethnic affinity effects

	Model 1	Model 2
	B	B
Ethnic Minority candidate (Dutch=ref.)	-0.392*** (0.008)	-0.529*** (0.011)
Party		
- Art 1	-7.706*** (0.027)	-7.760*** (0.028)
- CDA	-5.609*** (0.010)	-5.611*** (0.010)
- CU	-6.397*** (0.013)	-6.400*** (0.013)
- DENK	-6.994*** (0.017)	-7.061*** (0.018)
- D66	-5.260*** (0.007)	-5.262*** (0.007)
- FvD	-6.525*** (0.015)	-6.528*** (0.015)
- GL	-5.273*** (0.007)	-5.273*** (0.008)
- PvdA	-5.727*** (0.008)	-5.733*** (0.008)
- PVV	-5.479*** (0.009)	-5.481*** (0.009)
- SP	-5.741*** (0.009)	-5.746*** (0.009)
- VVD	-5.109*** (0.007)	-5.11*** (0.007)
- 50Plus	-6.527*** (0.013)	-6.532*** (0.013)
Ethnic Minority candidate x % ethnic minorities in neighbourhood	0.006*** (0.000)	0.019*** (0.001)
Ethnic Minority candidate x % ethnic minorities in neighbourhood ²		-0.0002*** (0.000)
<i>Control variables</i>		
<i>% ethnic minority population in neighbourhood for:</i>		
- Art 1	0.025*** (0.001)	0.026*** (0.001)
- CDA	-0.012*** (0.000)	-0.012*** (0.000)
- CU	-0.005*** (0.000)	-0.006*** (0.000)
- DENK	0.028*** (0.000)	0.030*** (0.000)
- D66	-0.004*** (0.000)	-0.004*** (0.000)
- FvD	-0.006*** (0.001)	-0.006*** (0.001)
- GL	-0.002*** (0.000)	-0.002*** (0.000)
- PvdA	0.000 (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)
- PVV	0.004*** (0.000)	0.004*** (0.000)
- SP	0.002*** (0.000)	0.002*** (0.000)
- VVD	-0.008*** (0.000)	-0.008*** (0.000)

- 50Plus	0.003*** (0.000)	0.003*** (0.000)
Party leader	2.773*** (0.005)	2.776*** (0.005)
First ethnic minority on the list	0.708*** (0.005)	0.708*** (0.005)
Re-nominated candidate 2012	0.217*** (0.004)	0.218*** (0.004)
N	193,393	193,393
Global Deviance	-1600333	-1600751
AIC	-1600273	-1600689

Note: Standard errors in parentheses *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.05$ * $p < 0.10$.

FIGURE 5.3 | Predicted probabilities for general ethnic affinity voting



Note: EMCs refers to ethnic minority candidates. Figure 5.3 shows the predicted probabilities based on Models 1 (dashed line) and 2 (solid line) for ethnic minority candidates who are not the party leader, first ethnic minority on the list nor re-nominated candidates. We also controlled for party and for party popularity in the neighbourhood.


Hence, as shown in Figure 5.3 (dashed line), the predicted probability for ethnic minority candidates from DENK is 0.001 in neighbourhoods with no ethnic minority population and increases to 0.009 in neighbourhoods with a large ethnic minority population. The predicted probability increases more strongly for the first ethnic minority candidate from DENK – not the party leader – for whom it increases from 0.001 in neighbourhoods with no ethnic minorities to 0.019 in neighbourhoods in which 80% of the population has an ethnic minority background. Model 1 and Figure 5.3 show that ethnic minority candidates – irrespective of party – indeed receive higher vote shares in neighbourhoods with a larger ethnic minority population, supporting Hypothesis 1.

To test the second hypothesis, we included an interaction between candidate's ethnic minority background and the quadratic term of the share of ethnic minorities in the neighbourhood. The interaction term denoting the ethnic affinity effect from Model 1 is stronger in Model 2 ($b=0.019$). The interaction with the quadratic term is negative though, suggesting a parabola instead of a hyperbola. However, to get a relevant interpretation from these logistic regression terms, we calculated the predicted probabilities based on the estimates of Model 2 and summarised them in Figure 5.3 (solid line). In line with the mobilisation hypothesis, Figure 5.3 shows that in the model with the quadratic term (Model 2), ethnic affinity effects are stronger than in Model 1. Ethnic affinity effects appear to be stronger for almost every party in neighbourhoods with a substantial ethnic minority population, specifically in neighbourhoods in which the share of the population with an ethnic minority background is 40% or higher. Once again, the predicted probabilities are stronger for the first ethnic minority on the list. Moreover, a likelihood ratio test confirms that Model 2 has a significant better fit than Model 1. Hence, these results indeed suggest that general ethnic affinity effects are stronger when the ethnic minority population becomes larger (H2).

In the first model, we estimated the overall ethnic affinity effect, assuming it to have the same gradient for each party (i.e. the logit referring to the ethnic affinity effect is constant across parties). To more rigorously test for party-dependent ethnic affinity effects, we included a three-way interaction between candidates with an ethnic minority background, the share of the ethnic minority population in a neighbourhood and party. Figure 5.4 shows the parties for which we found ethnic affinity effects; the full model can be found in Table D.4 in Appendix D. We find significant effects for all parties. But for some parties these effects are negative, which is not in line with the ethnic affinity thesis. First, we find ethnic affinity effects for ethnic minority candidates affiliated with Artikel 1, DENK, the Labour Party (PvdA), the Green Party (GL), the Socialist Party (SP), the Cristian Union (CU), Forum for Democracy (FvD) and the Elderly Party (50Plus). These candidates receive a higher proportion of the votes in neighbourhoods with a larger ethnic minority population. Only for the (centre)right-wing parties (CDA, VVD, D66, PVV) did we find that when the ethnic minority population is larger, the proportion of votes for ethnic minority candidates significantly decreases. General ethnic affinity effects are strongest for the minority-oriented party DENK, but much weaker for Artikel 1. Hence, we find significant ethnic affinity effects for candidates from the left-wing parties and no ethnic affinity effects for

ethnic minority candidates from right-wing parties. Based on these results we can only partly support Hypothesis 3 that general ethnic affinity effects are strongest for candidates affiliated with minority-oriented parties, followed by left-wing and right-wing parties.¹²

FIGURE 5.4 | Predicted probabilities for party-dependent ethnic affinity voting




Note: EMCs refers to ethnic minority candidates. Figure 5.4 shows the predicted probabilities based on Model 3a (see Table D.4 in Appendix D) for ethnic minority candidates who are not the party leader, first ethnic minority on the list nor re-nominated candidates. We also controlled for party and for party popularity in the neighbourhood. The effects for ethnic minority candidates all significantly differ from those of native Dutch candidates.

Co-ethnic affinity effects are summarised in Figure 5.5 (see Table D.5 in Appendix D for model estimates).¹³ Since general ethnic affinity effects were only found for DENK and left-wing parties, we test co-ethnic affinity effects for these parties only.

Figure 5.5 shows that in neighbourhoods with a larger Turkish minority population, the proportion of votes for candidates of Turkish origin is significantly larger for all parties. For candidates with a Moroccan background, we find significant ethnic affinity effects for candidates from DENK and the Labour Party (PvdA). However, the proportion of votes for candidates of Moroccan origin from the Socialist Party (SP) significantly decreases in neighbourhoods with a larger Moroccan minority population. For candidates with a Surinamese or Antillean background we find ethnic affinity effects for Artikel 1, the Christian Union (CU) and the Labour Party (PvdA) but not for DENK. With two exceptions – Moroccan origin candidates from the SP and Surinamese/Antillean from DENK – our findings support Hypothesis 4a that in a neighbourhood with a larger number of co-ethnics, co-ethnic candidates receive higher vote shares. As becomes clear from Figure 5.5, we do not see a clear order of affinity voting effects between the ethnic groups. Based on these results, we cannot support Hypothesis 4b that ethnic affinity effects are strongest for those with a Turkish background, followed by Moroccan, Surinamese and Antillean backgrounds.


FIGURE 5.5 | Predicted probabilities for co-ethnic affinity voting by party



Note: EMCs refers to ethnic minority candidates. Figure 5.5 shows the predicted probabilities based on Model 4 (see Table D.5 in Appendix D) for ethnic minority candidates who are not the party leader, first ethnic minority on the list nor re-nominated candidates.¹³ We also controlled for party, and for party popularity in the neighbourhood. The effects for Surinamese/Antillean origin candidates from DENK do not significantly differ from those of native Dutch candidates.

The results by which we test Hypothesis 5 are graphically summarised in Figure 5.6 (see Table D.6 in Appendix D for model estimates). Figure 5.6 shows that, as expected, for Turkish and Moroccan origin candidates from the Socialist Party (SP) and the Labour Party (PvdA) there are stronger ethnic affinity effects for men than for women. However, these effects do not significantly differ for Turkish origin candidates from the Labour Party (PvdA) and for DENK there are strong ethnic affinity effects for the male party leader, but not for other male Turkish origin candidates from DENK. Moreover, we find stronger ethnic affinity effects for female than for male Turkish origin candidates from the Green Party (GL). Thus, we do not find full support for Hypothesis 5a that ethnic affinity effects among candidates with a Turkish or Moroccan background are stronger for men than for women.

Figure 5.6 also shows that ethnic affinity effects are stronger for Surinamese/Antillean female candidates than for male candidates from Artikel 1 and the Labour Party (PvdA), which is in line with Hypothesis 5b. However, among Surinamese/Antillean female candidates from the Christian Union ethnic affinity effects are stronger for men than for women. Therefore, we do not find support for Hypothesis 5b.

FIGURE 5.6 | Predicted probabilities for gender-dependent co-ethnic affinity voting by party

Note: EMCs refers to ethnic minority candidates. Figure 5.6 shows the predicted probabilities based on Model 5 (see Table D.6 in Appendix D) for ethnic minority candidates who are not the party leader, first ethnic minority on the list nor re-nominated candidates. We also controlled for party and for party popularity in the neighbourhood. The effects for male candidates from DENK and GL do not significantly differ from the effect for male native Dutch candidates from DENK and GL. The effect for female Turkish origin candidates from the PvdA does not significantly differ from the effect for male Turkish origin candidates from the PvdA.

5.6 | Conclusion and discussion

The aim of this study was to test conditions under which ethnic affinity effects are stronger. The Dutch PR system with ethnic minority candidates on almost every parties' candidate list and compulsory candidate voting gave us the opportunity for a detailed study, with 193,393 observations, of ethnic affinity voting. Moreover, the Dutch parliamentary elections of 2017 with two minority-oriented parties provided a unique context to do so.

The current study finds evidence for the ethnic affinity thesis, but the extent to which

ethnic affinity effects are found varies depending on candidates' party affiliation, ethnic background and gender. In line with the general ethnic affinity hypothesis, we found that in neighbourhoods with larger ethnic minority populations, ethnic minority candidates receive a larger proportion of the votes. These affinity voting effects are stronger in neighbourhoods with larger ethnic minority populations, which is consistent with the mobilisation hypothesis. Differentiating between parties, we found that ethnic affinity effects are most prominent for candidates affiliated with the minority-oriented DENK and left-wing parties and weak or absent for (centre)right-wing parties. Evidence from this study for the preference for co-ethnic candidates within left-wing parties provides further support for the importance of ethnic background in the vote choice of ethnic minorities. It may be that minority-oriented and left-wing parties use a vote-based inclusion strategy and are therefore more successful in attracting the ethnic vote whereas right-wing parties mainly use a symbolic inclusion strategy (Dancygier, 2017). Right-wing parties might nominate candidates with an ethnic background on their lists who are not strongly tied to their ethnic community.

In addition to party-dependent ethnic affinity voting, we examined co-ethnic affinity voting. Our research found evidence for ethnic affinity effects for all ethnic groups, but again, they are party-dependent. A notable finding is that co-ethnic affinity effects are particularly strong for candidates of Turkish or Moroccan origin affiliated with DENK. We found that ethnic minority candidates predominantly receive support in neighbourhoods with a larger concentration of their own ethnic group, even *within* minority-oriented parties. Another interesting finding is the relatively small ethnic affinity effects among Turkish and Moroccan origin candidates affiliated with the Labour Party (PvdA). Our results suggest that the Labour Party's electoral loss may indeed be partly due to the loss of ethnic minority voters to DENK in neighbourhoods with a larger share of Turkish or Moroccan origin population. Ethnic affinity effects for minority-interest party Artikel 1 are not as strong as expected among candidates with a Surinamese or Antillean background.

Last, our study shows that a candidate's gender influences ethnic affinity voting. Some results, however, contrast with our expectations. For Turkish and Moroccan origin candidates, co-ethnic affinity effects are stronger for male than for female candidates. There is one interesting exception: for the Green Party (GL), we find that co-ethnic affinity effects are stronger for Turkish origin female candidates are stronger than for Turkish origin male candidates. One possible explanation might be that voters for the Green Party (GL) are, in line with what the party stands for, relatively progressive and therefore prefer a female candidate from their own ethnic group over a male candidate. Moreover, co-ethnic effects are stronger for female candidates than for male candidates from Surinamese/Antillean origin, except for those affiliated with the Christian Union (CU). Voters for the Christian Party might hold more conservative gender role norms, which may explain why we find stronger ethnic affinity effects for male than for female candidates affiliated with this party.

The generalisability of these results is subject to certain limitations. First, it is important to bear in mind that aggregated data do not reflect individual voting behaviour. Nonetheless, our level of analysis is so low that the ethnic affinity effects we found are also

likely to exist among individual voters. Moreover, the neighbourhood data about the share of ethnic minorities do not provide us with information about the citizenship of these ethnic minorities. It is very likely that not all ethnic minorities have Dutch nationality and are eligible to vote. That the share of eligible ethnic minority voters is possibly lower indicates, however, that our result might even underestimate ethnic affinity effects.

Further research should be undertaken to investigate if ethnic affinity effects in national elections are present in other Western European countries – including those with a PR-system – and under which conditions. This study has shown the relevance of examining whether ethnic affinity voting varies between parties and ethnic groups. Survey data with information about voters' candidate preferences could provide more definitive evidence about the mechanisms behind ethnic affinity voting. For instance, such data could explore the reasons why ethnic minorities vote for a co-ethnic candidate and the role ethnic identification and ethnic communities play in that choice. However, since ethnic minorities are often underrepresented in surveys, especially those less well integrated, the value of aggregated election data should not be underestimated.

Our research has given strong evidence of co-ethnic ethnic affinity voting. With the rise of the minority-oriented party DENK, we find that party-dependent ethnic affinity voting is particularly strong. For the Labour Party (PvdA), which traditionally attracted the ethnic minority vote, ethnic affinity effects are considerably smaller. With the collapse of many social-democratic parties, we can expect that ethnic minority candidates from new minority-oriented parties will become successful in other European countries as well.

Notes

- 1 Our main focus is on ethnic affinity effects for ethnic minority candidates. Nevertheless, this hypothesis implies that in neighbourhoods with a larger native Dutch population, native Dutch candidates receive larger vote shares as well.
- 2 For some cities, information at the polling level station was not available on the website of the Dutch Electoral Council, for these cities data were obtained via the municipalities.
- 3 The cities included are: 's-Hertogenbosch, Almere, Alphen aan den Rijn, Amersfoort, Amsterdam, Apeldoorn, Arnhem, Dordrecht Eindhoven, Enschede, Groningen, Haarlem, Leiden, Maastricht, Nijmegen, Rotterdam, Utrecht, Zaanstad, Zoetermeer and Zwolle.
- 4 In Dordrecht, voters are not assigned to a specific polling station.
- 5 The Netherlands has twenty voting districts, which exist mainly for administrative reasons. PvdA, 50Plus, SP and CDA have candidate lists that slightly differ between districts. We did not include these regional candidates.
- 6 The Surinamese/Antillean group includes minorities from Aruba. Although native Dutch and other non-Western candidates are included in our data, these are not the groups of interest in this study and therefore not discussed in the results section.

- 7 Municipalities are responsible for the polling stations, but there are no formal rules for the number and location of polling stations. It is therefore possible that multiple polling stations are located in the same neighbourhood.
- 8 For the polling stations for which such information was available, we calculated the voter turnout for a polling station by dividing the number of cast votes by the number of voters appointed to that polling station. A Pearson correlation shows that the correlation between turnout and the share of Turkish minorities in a neighbourhood is -0.20: -0.22 for the share of Moroccan minorities and -0.28 for the share of Surinamese/Antillean minorities. The correlation between turnout and the share of native Dutch in a neighbourhood is 0.31. This shows that even though turnout is lower in neighbourhoods with larger ethnic minority populations, there are no large differences between ethnic minority groups.
- 9 Fitting an OLS predicting the mean among this sample would lead to biased estimates due to the highly skewed nature of this dependent variable (see Figure 5.1).
- 10 The beta regression models are estimated in R with package `gamlss.dist`. We used the logit link function. Model 3 was rerun using a beta zero-inflated beta regression model on the sample including zero observations to check the robustness of our results, which can be found in Table D.7 in Appendix D.
- 11 We recognise that an alternative – or complementary – way to test our hypotheses would be to predict whether candidates received at least some votes in each polling station (by running a logistic regression on our original sample with a dichotomised dependent variable vote share, or by running the zero-inflated beta regression model on our original sample).
- 12 Model 4 gives us insights in affinity voting among native Dutch. The interactions between the % of co-ethnics and party show the effects for Dutch candidates (see Table D.5 in Appendix D). We learn that native Dutch candidates affiliated with CDA, D66, FvD and the VVD receive higher vote shares in neighbourhoods with a larger native Dutch population.
- 13 Since Artikel 1, DENK and the Green Party (GL) have party leaders with an ethnic minority background, we also included an additional interaction effect for these party leaders. By so doing, we disentangle ethnic affinity effects for the party leader and other candidates with the same ethnic background within those three parties. For Artikel 1 and DENK, these effects clearly show that the party leaders receive higher vote proportions than other candidates with the same background. We cannot compare the effect for the party leader of the Green Party (GL), who has Moroccan origins, since there are no other candidates of Moroccan origin nominated by this party.

CHAPTER 6

Conclusion

6.1 | Introduction

Whereas the Netherlands was once famous for its multiculturalism, integration and migration have become the topics of hotly contested public and political debates over the past decades. The period under investigation in this thesis, in combination with the Dutch societal and political contexts, makes it highly interesting for studying the political integration of ethnic minorities. Even though parties from across the political spectrum nominated candidates from an ethnic minority background in 2010 and 2012, the Labour Party (PvdA) was known as the party for ethnic minorities. In 2014, however, the minority-oriented party DENK was founded and managed to win three seats in the 2017 parliamentary elections. Within a period of seven years, the political landscape developed in a way quite unique for Europe. Simultaneously, diversity and inclusion have become increasingly salient in current debates. Not only have parties like DENK and Artikel 1 increased the share of ethnic minority candidates that voters can choose from, but there have also been initiatives for debates on racist stereotypes and policy measures to reduce incidences of discrimination and to increase minority groups in top positions. In this context, this thesis investigated ethnic diversity within political parties and the House for Representatives. Moreover, it studied whether increased ethnic diversity within parties, more specifically on candidate lists, is related to the vote choice of ethnic minority voters.

This thesis has made several contributions to the literature. First, emphasising the importance of party characteristics in descriptive representation, it tested new hypotheses on the effects of party characteristics on the nomination of ethnic minority candidates. Additionally, looking further than only nomination, it studied the influence of party characteristics on ethnic minority candidates' list position and whether they are placed in winnable, i.e. safe, or unwinnable list positions. Second, this thesis has contributed to the ethnic voting literature in several ways. I combined theoretical insights from the representation literature and the ethnic voting literature to examine how both substantive and descriptive representation affect the vote choice of ethnic minorities. By means of this, I have expanded upon existing explanations for ethnic minorities' vote choice. Third, this thesis provided a comprehensive assessment of ethnic affinity voting. I studied the conditions under which ethnic minority candidates receive larger vote shares. In this regard, this is one of the first European studies to have such a detailed analysis of ethnic affinity voting at national level elections. Fourth, the collected data, in combination with other data sources, provided new possibilities for studying ethnic minority representation and ethnic voting. The innovative analytical methods used in this study may be applied in future studies of both ethnic minority representation and ethnic minority voting.

The study's main findings and implication are presented in Section 6.2, while, in Section 6.3, the study's limitations and directions for future research are discussed. Section 6.4 describes the implications for the broader context, and the final section in this chapter provides a general conclusion for this thesis.

6.2 | Research questions and main findings

6.2.1 | Part 1: The descriptive representation of ethnic minorities

In this section, I begin with a discussion of the main findings of Part 1 and provide an answer to the research question. In Section 6.2.2, I outline the most relevant results and answer the questions presented in Part 2 of this thesis.

The first question of this thesis sought to determine the extent to which Western and non-Western minority groups were represented on national candidate lists and in the House of Representatives in the Netherlands and how this was affected by party characteristics. In this regard, the research question in Chapter 2 was:

‘To what extent do party characteristics affect the descriptive representation of Western and non-Western minority groups on national candidate lists and in the House of Representatives in the Netherlands?’

To summarise, whereas Turkish and Moroccan minorities are quite well represented on the national candidate lists of Dutch political parties and in the House of Representatives, minorities with a Western, former colony, or other non-Western background were underrepresented in 2012. In Chapter 5, a similar picture emerged for the 2017 national elections. It has mostly been the left-wing political parties and the social-liberal D66 that have nominated ethnic minority candidates. This study has shown that the extent to which ethnic minority groups are descriptively represented differs between ethnic groups and between political parties. The share of candidates and MPs with a Western, former colony, or other non-Western background is lower than the share of these groups in society. This contrasts with Turkish and Moroccan minorities, who were well represented on candidate lists and in the House of Representatives, both in 2012 and 2017. The results of Chapter 2 also indicate that higher shares of ethnic minority candidates on candidate lists are related to higher shares of ethnic minority candidates in safe list positions and to a higher share of ethnic minority Members of Parliament (MPs). The parties with the highest shares of ethnic minority candidates on their lists and in the House of Representatives are the social-liberal D66, the Green Party (GL), and the Labour Party (PvdA).

A second objective of this chapter was to examine if party characteristics have an influence on the nomination of ethnic minority candidates. The results of my study showed that the nomination of ethnic minorities is indeed related to party characteristics. The most important finding was that parties with permissive views on migration and integration, which are usually in the interest of ethnic minority citizens, also express this descriptively. Regarding list position, I found that non-Western minority candidates in particular are nominated for lower list positions than native Dutch candidates in parties that are more restrictive towards migration and integration. Moreover, the nomination of ethnic minority candidates seems to benefit from ethnic minority support within parties. Political parties with some form of support for ethnic minorities within the party nominate more candidates from an ethnic minority background. Whereas ethnic minority support

seems to increase the chances for nomination, it does not affect the position in which ethnic minority candidates are placed; neither does it affect placement in either a safe or unsafe list position. The last party characteristic under study was the inclusiveness of the selectorate. Contrary to my expectations, I found that the make-up of the selectorate – the body responsible for the selection of candidates for the candidate list – is not related to the nomination of ethnic minority candidates.

6.2.2 | Theoretical implications of the findings on the descriptive representation of ethnic minorities

The finding that ethnic minorities are politically underrepresented is consistent with the existing literature on other Western countries (Bloemraad, 2013; Fieldhouse & Sobolewska, 2013; Murray, 2016; Sobolewska, 2013; Zapata-Barrero, 2017). Despite the evidence found for the underrepresentation of ethnic minorities, this study also concurs with earlier observations that, in comparison to other Western countries, levels of descriptive representation are relatively high in the Netherlands (Bloemraad, 2013; Ruedin, 2013b). Moreover, this study supports evidence from previous observations that the level of descriptive representation varies between ethnic groups (Mügge, 2016). The ethnic groups with the highest levels of representation, i.e. Turkish and Moroccan minorities, are most often the subject of current (critical) debates in the Netherlands. Moreover, the share of candidates and MPs from former colonies did not mirror the share in the population in 2012 and 2017. A striking finding is that no MPs with a former colony background, as one of the largest minority groups in the Netherlands, were elected in 2017. Additionally, it provides the first assessment of the descriptive representation of Western minorities in the Netherlands, showing that Western minorities were clearly underrepresented in 2012.

This thesis found an association between the substantive representation of ethnic minorities' interests within parties and their level of descriptive representation. While some studies found evidence for this link before, this is one of the first studies to find support for this association in the European context (Sobolowska, McKee & Campbell, 2018; Minta, 2009; Bratton & Haynie, 1999). One note of caution is due here, since causality cannot be established. It is very likely that it is not one sort of representation leading to the other but that both are established simultaneously. The found relationship between substantive and descriptive representation is nevertheless an important finding, since it shows that most political parties do more than just include – possibly symbolic – ethnic minority candidates.

For the other two party characteristics under study, I found less evidence in line with my expectations. First, even though ethnic minority support within parties was found to be related to a higher share of ethnic minority candidates, it did not affect placement in certain list positions. This inconsistency with the previous literature may be due to changes in the political context. Whereas ethnic minority networks within political parties were quite influential in the Netherlands in the 1990s, they are considered to be less influential nowadays (Mügge, 2016). Attention within parties has shifted to a broader concept of diversity. The idea that support for minority groups within political parties could affect

the level of descriptive representation comes from the literature on the representation of women (Caul, 1999; Gallagher & Marsh, 1988; Kunovich & Paxton, 2005; Matland & Studlar, 1996). It is possible that targets or quotas are not as beneficial for ethnic minorities as they have been for women (Celis et al., 2014; Ruedin, 2013a). Hence, ethnic minority support may have been beneficial for ethnic minority representation in the past, but changes in the political discourse, for example by setting up more general diversity networks, may have reduced this influence.

Second, contributing to the literature by studying the composition of selectorates rather than the selection methods themselves, I did not find evidence that this affected ethnic minorities' descriptive representation. An explanation for my unexpected findings may be that the differences in selection methods between Dutch political parties are not substantial enough to yield an effect.

In summary, the theoretical framework I proposed in the first empirical study of this thesis proved partly useful in explaining descriptive representation. Based on my findings, I strongly recommend expanding upon my theoretical framework by including other party characteristics and propose a deeper investigation of the role that the selectorate plays in descriptive representation. I did not find an effect of the inclusiveness of the selectorate on descriptive representation, a possible explanation for which is that only formal rules were measured. Parties' selection methods are highly complex and difficult to study. Although I provided an overview of the formal selection rules of Dutch political parties, there are most likely many informal rules and traditions. A study into the influence of the composition of the selectorate that takes into account both formal and informal selection rules may shed more light on this issue.

Additionally, I looked at the composition of the selectorate that had the final say on the candidate list. Future research should also examine the influence of the selectorate that has the first say about the candidate list. In these studies, it would be interesting to derive propositions from theoretical approaches used in labour market research on the discrimination of ethnic minorities. More specifically, a test of taste-based theories and statistical discrimination theories could produce interesting findings regarding the selection process of ethnic minorities (Arrow, 1971; Phelps, 1972; Zschrinst & Didier, 2016). As argued by some scholars in the field, it is possible that selectorates nominate symbolic candidates who have an ethnic minority background but are very similar to traditional candidates in other aspects (Dancygier, 2017; Durose et al., 2012; van der Zwan & Turner-Zwinkels, 2017). Further research on these questions would be a useful way to shed light onto whether the party strategies that political parties use to deal with the inclusion of ethnic minorities are a result of a conscious policy or of unconscious processes based on stereotypes (Dancygier, 2017).

6.2.3 | Part 2: The vote choice of ethnic minorities

The purpose of the second part of this thesis was to examine the vote choice of ethnic minority voters. After establishing the extent to which ethnic minorities were descriptively

represented in the Netherlands, my aim was to determine the extent to which both substantive and descriptive representation affect the party and candidate choice of ethnic minority voters. Chapters 3 and 4 addressed the vote choice of ethnic minorities in the Netherlands and Canada,¹ while Chapter 5 set out to study the extent to which ethnic minority candidates attracted the ethnic vote.

The main goal of Chapters 3 and 4 was to test the influence of substantive and descriptive representation on ethnic minorities' vote choice. Moreover, I tested their influence in relation to ethnic minorities' individual characteristics. The question I aimed to answer was:

'To what extent do substantive and descriptive representation play a role in explaining vote choice among ethnic minorities in the Netherlands and Canada?'

I tested the same theoretical propositions in two countries with different political systems and approaches to multiculturalism. In both countries, I found evidence that parties' issue positions affects vote choice. However, I did not find that descriptive representation affected the vote choice of ethnic minorities in Canada. Moreover, the relationship between substantive and descriptive representation and vote choice was not always dependent on voters' characteristics, as was theoretically anticipated.

The findings in Chapter 3 showed that, especially among ethnic minorities with a Turkish and Moroccan background but also among minorities with a former colony background, the Labour Party (PvdA) was popular. I found that ethnic minorities with a lower socioeconomic status and with a stronger ethnic identity are more likely to vote for the Labour Party (PvdA). I nevertheless want to emphasise that not all ethnic minority groups support the Labour Party (PvdA) or other left-wing parties. There is more variation in vote choice for minorities with a Western or other non-Western background (i.e. not a Turkish, Moroccan, or former colony background). For instance, the vote share for the Liberal Party (VVD) and the anti-immigrant party (PVV) among the other non-Western minorities and Western minorities is also noteworthy.

One of the significant findings to emerge from Chapter 3 is that both substantive and descriptive representation are relevant among ethnic minorities for party choice. The results suggest that the influence of parties' positions on economic issues and on migration and integration issues affect the vote choice of non-Western minorities, but that this is not dependent on their individual characteristics. More specifically, parties with higher shares of ethnic minority candidates are more likely to receive votes from ethnic minority voters. The findings reveal the relevance of co-ethnic background: the share of candidates with a specific ethnic background, e.g. a Turkish background, affects the vote choice of minorities with a co-ethnic background, e.g. Turkish minority voters. Moreover, the influence of descriptive representation on vote choice is stronger for Western ethnic minority voters who identify stronger with their ethnic groups. It is remarkable that this was not found among non-Western minorities.

In Chapter 4, the objective of the study was to determine how the party choice of ethnic minorities is related to parties' substantive and descriptive representation in the

Canadian context. The results of this study show that the centrist Liberal Party was the most popular among ethnic minorities in Canada. Almost 60% of minorities stated that they would vote for this party. In total, 18% of voters would vote for the left-wing NDP and 22% for the Conservatives. Although this finding corresponds with the outcomes of other studies on the ethnic vote in Canada, it contrasts with research in other Western countries where ethnic minorities largely support left-wing parties.

With regard to representation, the results of Chapter 4 did not show the expected effects of substantive and descriptive representation on the vote choice of ethnic minorities. Parties that are economically more right-wing, socially more conservative, and – in contrast to my expectations – more restrictive on immigration issues are more popular among ethnic minority voters in Canada. Moreover, the effects of parties' issue positions on party choice does not differ between minorities depending on their own issue positions. These results show that representation does not always affect vote choice as expected.

6.2.4 | Possible explanations for the findings in The Netherlands and Canada

In Chapters 3 and 4, I tested the significance of parties' substantive and descriptive representation as additional explanations for the party choice of ethnic minorities. The results suggest that, among non-Western minorities in particular, substantive representation indeed seems to be a relevant explanation for minorities' vote choice in the Netherlands. My findings suggest that the preference for certain parties among ethnic minorities can partly be explained by their position on economic, social, and minority issues. Minorities tend to prefer parties with economically leftist views and permissive standpoints on minority issues in the Netherlands, whereas minorities prefer parties with more economically rightist views and socially conservative issue positions in Canada.

In the studies on these two countries, the most popular party among ethnic minorities is not always the party theoretically predicted to best represent their interests. This discrepancy may explain why I did not find persuasive evidence – in the Netherlands or in Canada – for my expectation that the influence of substantive representation would be dependent on the characteristics of ethnic minority voters. Many Western countries, the Netherlands and Canada included, have one political party that has been particularly supportive of migration and integration issues and has been a pioneer in the descriptive representation of the ethnic minority electorate. It is therefore likely that the historical connections of both the Dutch Labour Party (PvdA) and the Canadian Liberal Party with the ethnic community have resulted in a norm among ethnic minority voters to vote for these parties, which may be due to socialisation within this community. Although difficult to prove, historical ties between ethnic minority groups and specific parties could be an important explanation for the vote choice of ethnic minorities.

My findings may be an indication that a group norm is more important than self-interests or even group interests in voting. If self-interest had been relevant, I would have expected the influence of substantive representation to be dependent on voters'

characteristics, especially with regard to economic issues. If group interest had prevailed, I would have expected ethnic minorities in the Netherlands to have voted for the Socialist Party (SP), the Green Party (GL), or even the social-liberal party (D66) considering their issues positions on economic issues and migration and integration issues. However, both of these expectations were unfounded. One exception on issue alignment between parties and voters is my finding regarding social issue positions in Canada. The results show that minorities who oppose gay rights are significantly more likely to vote for socially conservative parties. That this was not found for gender role attitudes may be explained by issue salience. In this regard, it is possible that gay rights are a particular salient issue among ethnic minority voters in Canada.

Another possible explanation for the result that the effects of parties' issue positions are not conditional on voters' characteristics is that none of the parties fully succeeded in representing ethnic minorities' substantive interests, e.g. by combining minority-specific interests and social-conservative issue positions. This may have been one of the reasons why DENK was able to win seats in the 2017 Dutch national elections. Whether similar developments are possible in other Western countries depends on the electoral system, the ethnic composition, and the strength of the ethnic community.

Whereas descriptive representation has an influence on ethnic minorities' vote choice in the Netherlands, it does not in Canada. The difference between the Netherlands and Canada may be influenced by the political system. In the Dutch PR system, where voters can choose between multiple candidates on a parties' candidate list, descriptive representation may be more visible than in Canada. In the Canadian first-past-the-post system, party effects may override candidate effects. Moreover, the ethnic minority status of a candidate may be less relevant in ridings where more than one party nominated an ethnic minority candidate, which is rather common.

To conclude, I did not find substantial evidence that the influence of parties' substantive and descriptive representation is conditional on voters' characteristics. If this outcome holds in other contexts than the Netherlands and Canada, and if socialisation is indeed important in ethnic minorities' vote choice, this is consistent with sociological theories of voting that emphasise the importance of socialisation and the role that ethnic communities play in political integration.

6.2.5 | Ethnic affinity voting

The final research question in this thesis was:

'Under which conditions did ethnic minority candidates receive higher vote shares in the Dutch parliamentary election of 2017?'

Building on Chapters 3 and 4, this study further examined the influence of ethnic minority candidates on vote choice. It has, as one of the first studies in this context, found evidence for the ethnic affinity thesis at national-level elections in a country with a PR-system. Ethnic minority candidates receive higher vote shares in neighbourhoods

with a larger ethnic minority population. This study therefore supports the thesis that ethnic affinity voting exists in the Netherlands. Ethnic affinity effects are even stronger in neighbourhoods with a more substantial ethnic minority population. This finding supports the mobilisation hypothesis, which predicts that mobilisation in strong ethnic communities affects the vote choice of ethnic minority voters. However, ethnic affinity effects vary depending on the parties that candidates are affiliated with, their ethnic background, and their gender. One interesting finding was that ethnic affinity effects were most prominent for candidates from the minority-oriented party DENK and for left-wing parties. For (centre)right-wing parties, ethnic affinity effects were weak or absent. Ethnic minority candidates mainly attract votes from their own ethnic groups, and ethnic affinity effects are generally stronger for male than for female candidates.

6.2.6 | Theoretical implications of the findings on ethnic affinity voting

This study found support for the ethnic affinity thesis and has shown that ethnic affinity effects are not only present in majoritarian systems but also in PR systems. This contributes to the European literature on ethnic affinity voting, which has largely concentrated on either majoritarian systems, experiments, or local elections (Barreto, 2007; Bejarano & Segura, 2007; Teney et al., 2010; Besco, 2015; Goodyear-Grant & Tolley, 2017; McConaughy et al., 2010; Philpot & Walton, 2007; Stokes-Brown, 2006). Moreover, the results of this study emphasise the importance of taking variations in ethnic affinity effects between parties, ethnic groups, and gender into account. In line with the findings from Chapter 2 that ethnic minority voters mainly support left-wing parties, I found evidence for the preference for co-ethnic candidates within left-wing parties. Moreover, the findings from Chapter 5 provide further support for the relevance of ethnic background in the vote choice of ethnic minorities. Further, the results imply that minority-oriented and left-wing parties used a vote-based inclusion strategy and were therefore more successful in attracting the ethnic vote, whereas right-wing parties mainly used a symbolic inclusion strategy (Dancygier, 2017). Right-wing parties may have nominated candidates with an ethnic background on their lists that are not strongly tied to their ethnic community. Another possible explanation for this finding is that right-wing ethnic minority voters in neighbourhoods with a larger ethnic minority population do not have a strong ethnic identity and/or are less integrated in their ethnic communities and are therefore less likely to vote for an ethnic minority candidate. My research also finds evidence for co-ethnic affinity voting; ethnic minority candidates mainly seem to attract votes from ethnic minority voters from the same ethnic background. Even within parties with the specific aim of representing ethnic minority interests, ethnic minority candidates predominantly attract votes from co-ethnics. This suggests that, at least for Turkish and Moroccan minorities, ties to their own ethnic groups are still very relevant.

Finally, this study has found that ethnic affinity effects are generally stronger for male than for female candidates. The findings on the influence of gender on ethnic affinity effects shows that, in neighbourhoods with a larger share of Turkish or Moroccan

inhabitants, male ethnic minority candidates are often preferred over female ethnic minority candidates. Although we cannot directly test the effects of gender role attitudes on candidate choice, these results suggest that gender role norms affect candidate choice.

6.3 | Limitations and directions for future research

In this section, I will provide directions for future research, partly based on some of the limitations of my thesis. First, this study has drawn attention to the testing of hypotheses for non-Western and Western minorities. Moreover, I was able to disentangle representation and ethnic affinity vote effects between ethnic minorities of varying origins. Notwithstanding this innovation, I was limited by the lack of information on ethnic groups. In Chapters 2 and 3, I was able to test the differences between specific ethnic groups, including those of Western origin, but I was prevented by data availability from doing the same in Chapters 4 and 5. However, grouping together Western minorities does not do justice to the variation among Western minorities nor to other non-Western minorities. It is unfortunate that current data restricted the examination of group-specific mechanisms in more detail. One of the reasons for this limitation is that much survey research up to now has focused on traditional non-Western groups, whereas the difficulty of sampling ethnic minority respondents is another restraint. With the focus on ten minority groups from different origins, the MIFARE data used in Chapter 3 made an important contribution to including a variety of ethnic minority groups. However, social groups that people belong to can be defined by more than just ethnic background. For instance, socioeconomic position, religion, gender, and the extent to which people identify with their ethnic backgrounds may influence their political behaviour. It was not always possible to address these factors.

In particular, I did not examine the impact of religion on vote choice. While many Turkish, Moroccan, and possibly other non-Western minorities are Muslim, Western minorities are more likely to be Christian. Among ethnic minority voters, religion and ethnic background strongly overlap, which makes it difficult to disentangle these effects. However, ethnic minorities that are often Muslim, i.e. those with a Turkish and Moroccan background, are more likely to vote for co-ethnic candidates. My results therefore imply that co-ethnic voting is not only more prevalent than ethnic block voting, but also than religious block voting. Nevertheless, the degree of religiosity – e.g. religious attitudes or the strength of religious identification – could be another relevant aspect to include in future research on the vote choice of ethnic minorities, as it provides an opportunity to better test for the role of the progressive-conservative dimension next to economic and minority issue positions.

An issue that was not addressed in this study was the ethnic self-identification of candidates and MPs from an ethnic minority background. For all the candidates and MPs in 2010, 2012, and 2017, I identified their ethnic background. Nonetheless, this does not necessarily mean that those candidates and MPs feel related to their ethnic groups.

Ethnic minority candidates and MPs who do not have ties with citizens with the same ethnic origin may differ in their political behaviours from those who do identify with their ethnic group. For instance, in the extent to which they wish to represent the interests of the ethnic minority electorate or in their appeal to ethnic voters. Even though I do not have information about ethnic affinity voting among Western minorities, the findings in Chapter 5 suggest that non-Western candidates from right-wing parties were less appealing to non-Western minority voters than non-Western candidates affiliated with left-wing parties. Further work will have to be conducted in order to determine if this finding can be explained by the ethnic identification of ethnic minority candidates. My hypothesis is that ethnic minority candidates and MPs with stronger levels of ethnic identification have stronger ties to the ethnic community they identify with, attract more votes among the ethnic minority electorate, and act more often in the interests of ethnic minorities. Based on the findings of my thesis, I predict that this occurs especially among co-ethnics.

I tested for the role of the size of ethnic communities in the neighbourhood in Chapter 5 on ethnic affinity voting, but I was unable to do so in the other chapters. The existing literature on ethnic voting has extensively investigated the role of ethnic communities and ethnic networks on vote choice at the local level in the Netherlands, and studies have found that ethnic communities are important in the political participation of ethnic minorities (Fennema & Tillie, 1999; Tillie, 2004; van Heelsum, 2016). One of the aims of this thesis was to theorise about and test new explanations for minorities' vote choice. Although my findings proved the relevance of these new explanations, the results also suggested that ethnic communities may have influenced minorities' vote choice. The findings in Chapter 3 suggested that socialisation and groups norms are important factors in the vote choice of ethnic minorities. While Chapter 5 did not specifically test the influence of socialisation or group interest, it did examine the influence of living in neighbourhoods with a substantial share of ethnic minority inhabitants on vote choice. Evidence for the mobilisation hypothesis, i.e. in neighbourhoods with a larger non-Western ethnic minority population ethnic minority candidates receive higher vote shares, offers valuable insights into the relevance of ethnic communities in vote choice. Further work is needed to understand how ethnic communities, socialisation in these communities, group norms, and vote choice relate to each other at national-level elections. Given my finding that parties with higher levels of descriptive representation are more popular among Western minorities with higher levels of ethnic identification, future research should also focus on the influence of ethnic communities on the vote choice of non-traditional minority groups.

The paucity of data resources for studying the political representation and vote choice of ethnic minorities has also limited this research. Because of this scarcity of data, I combined different data sources in Chapter 3 and different waves of the same survey in Chapter 4. Pooling different data sets or waves may not be the best approach to investigate determinants of vote choice. Moreover, there was some dissimilarity in the data and measurements in the study on the influence of substantive and descriptive representation

on ethnic minorities' vote choice in the Netherlands and Canada. Nevertheless, this approach provided the opportunity to expand the scope beyond traditional research on ethnic minority groups. My findings have raised several questions in need of further investigation, e.g. the question as to what extent the influence of substantive and descriptive representation works differently depending on the origin groups, in particular because of the different voting patterns between ethnic minority groups. This thesis also highlights that further work on a broad range of ethnic minority groups is needed to better test the political model and not to remain fixed on the socioeconomic position of ethnic minorities. Larger scale survey research should be carried out to establish the more detailed country of origin dependency of these explanations.

Another data issue is that this study measured substantive representation by looking at parties' issue positions. The measurement of parties' issue positions that I used may not have been specific enough for the ethnic groups under study. Another possibility for measuring substantive representation would be to look at the more individual behaviour of ethnic minority MPs in the House of Representatives, for example the questions they bring up in debates or their voting behaviour on legislation related to ethnic minority-relevant issues (Aydemir & Vliegenthart, 2016; Bratton & Haynie, 1999; Minta, 2009; Saalfeld & Bischof, 2013). However, my main interest was the influence of party characteristics, which includes their issue positions, on the vote choice of ethnic minorities. Furthermore, although party standpoints do not exactly match with the behaviour of MPs in parliament, it is a good indication of voters' perceptions of parties' issue positions (Heath et al., 2013). Nonetheless, the question remains as to how well informed (ethnic minority) voters are about party manifestos, the questions asked by MPs during debates, and other expressions of substantive representation. This would be a fruitful area for further work.

6.4 | Implications for the broader context

This thesis mainly focused on the Netherlands, with the exception of a study on Canada in Chapter 4. As previous research in the field has established, there are many aspects that may affect descriptive representation, substantive representation, and vote choice among the ethnic minority population; moreover, the extent to which minority groups are politically represented and how they vote is time and context dependent. Nevertheless, similar results with regard to the political representation and vote choice of ethnic minorities may be found in traditional immigration countries in Europe, who share a similar history with regard to ethnic minorities and their immigration backgrounds and integration into society. What is more, while recent political developments in the Netherlands are unique, it is not unlikely that similar developments will also take place in other European countries. There are already several European countries where social-democratic parties have experienced similar downturns as the Labour Party (PvdA) in the Netherlands. If ethnic minorities in these countries do not feel represented anymore by the parties they traditionally voted for, nor by other established parties, this may create

opportunities for minority-oriented parties such as DENK in the Netherlands. Of course, the chances of electoral success of such a party are also subject to factors such as the openness of the political system to new parties and the strength of the ethnic community.

There are several similarities between the Netherlands and other European countries on the basis of which I expect that my findings can be understood in a broader European context, e.g. a diverse ethnic composition of the population, popular anti-immigrant party and anti-immigrant sentiment in society, and a PR system with multiple parties. Despite differences between European countries, I expect that party characteristics are an important explanation for descriptive representation. Notwithstanding these similarities, the generalisability of my findings on ethnic minorities' vote choice may be limited for new European democracies, such as Poland and Hungary, and for traditional immigration countries with different political systems. Moreover, based on my findings in Chapter 4, I expect that the influence of descriptive representation may not be the same in majoritarian systems. The mechanisms behind ethnic affinity voting may be different in systems where voters cannot choose between different candidates from the same political party. I suspect that party preferences trump candidate preferences in countries with majoritarian systems. In order to further validate the conclusions of this thesis, my studies should therefore be repeated in other Western countries.

6.5 | General conclusion

This thesis has provided a deep insight into the political representation of ethnic minorities and its influence on the vote choice of ethnic minorities in the Netherlands. The main research question posed in this thesis was as follows:

'To what extent have ethnic minorities been politically represented, how is this affected by political parties, and how does ethnic minority representation affect the vote choice of ethnic minorities?'

To begin with descriptive representation, I found that the share of some minority groups in parliament mirrors the share of ethnic minority citizens in the Dutch population quite well, whereas other minority groups are clearly underrepresented. Moreover, political parties with supportive positions on integration and migration issues have higher shares of ethnic minority candidates on their candidate lists. Even though almost all political parties have ethnic minority candidates on their lists in the Netherlands, this is most common for left-wing parties.

Not only are left-wing political parties more likely to nominate ethnic minority candidates, they are also more likely to attract the ethnic vote. By combining several large-scale surveys, this study found evidence for the popularity of the Labour Party (PvdA) among ethnic minority voters in national level elections, while also highlighting that there is variation in party choice between ethnic groups. In particular, non-Western minority voters and those with low socioeconomic status are likely to vote for the Labour

Party (PvdA), which has long been the traditional minority party. Moreover, by theorising about additional minority-group-specific explanations, the findings reported here show that not only do individual characteristics affect vote choice, but substantive and descriptive representation can also play a role in ethnic minorities' vote choice. The importance of descriptive representation in vote choice is further demonstrated by the finding that ethnic minority candidates attract a larger share of votes in neighbourhoods with a larger ethnic minority population. This supports the ethnic affinity thesis, although the strength of ethnic affinity voting depends on ethnic group, party, and gender. Once again, candidates from left-wing parties are more successful in attracting the ethnic vote than those from right-wing parties. These insights contribute to our understanding of the consequences of descriptive and substantive representation.

This thesis has shown that the Labour Party (PvdA) has a relatively high share of ethnic minority candidates on their candidate lists. However, this party is not the most progressive when it comes to economic and integration and migration issues. This suggests that, even though this party represents ethnic minorities quite well in descriptive terms, considering their issue positions, other parties may be a better choice. This may partly explain the popularity of the new minority-oriented party DENK in the most recent 2017 parliamentary elections. It seems that this party has found the right composition of the candidate list in combination with a party programme including issues salient to ethnic minority voters.

There are several lessons that can be learned from this study's findings. First, this thesis has confirmed the significance of differentiation between ethnic groups when studying their voting behaviour. Ethnic minority groups are not all represented in the same manner; they vote for different parties, and the determinants of their vote choice also vary. It is therefore important to pay attention to the representation of the different ethnic groups present in the Netherlands. Minorities from a former colony were underrepresented on the candidate lists and in the House of Representatives in 2010, 2012, and 2017. What is more, no candidates from a former colony background were elected in the 2017 parliamentary elections. The representation of specific, marginalised groups is particularly important since there is no evidence for ethnic bloc voting and since descriptive representation and affinity voting proved especially relevant among co-ethnics.

Furthermore, political parties should think carefully about the way in which they want to represent ethnic minority citizens. In particular, social-democratic parties such as the Labour Party (PvdA) may face dilemmas. On the one hand, the Labour Party's position on minority issues has shifted from a supportive to a more centrist position. With the increasing salience of immigration and integration, this may have been a strategy to hold onto traditional Labour voters. This shifted position, as well as the progressive norms and values of these parties on issues such as gender and LGBT equality may conflict with the attitudes of non-Western minorities, Muslims in particular (Dancygier, 2017). It is therefore important to carefully select ethnic minority candidates. Simply selecting a candidate with an ethnic minority background may not result in attracting the ethnic vote. Selecting someone with a minority background who does not identify with this background or has

little in common with potential voters is unlikely to appeal to ethnic voters. On the other hand, ethnic minority candidates with strong ties to the ethnic community may perhaps not always have the same views as the party the candidate is affiliated with. This was one of the reasons why two Labour Party members left the party to found DENK.

In conclusion, the Netherlands seems to do quite well in terms of political representation, at least for some ethnic groups. Moreover, the presence of ethnic minority candidates and parties' representation of minority-specific interests attract ethnic votes. This study has shown the importance of both descriptive and substantive representation for the vote choice of ethnic minority citizens. Accordingly, diversity and inclusion should remain an issue on the party agenda. This is not only beneficial for parties with regard to gaining political power, but it is also important for the legitimacy of democracy in ethnically diverse societies.

Notes

- 1 In Chapter 4 the term visible minority is used rather than the term ethnic minority. In the current chapter I use the term ethnic minorities for reasons of consistency.

Appendices

Appendix A

TABLE A.1 | Distribution of ethnic groups

Ethnic background	N	%
Dutch	472	88.9
Western		
- Australia	1	0.2
- Belgium	3	0.6
- Croatia	1	0.2
- Germany	2	0.4
- Greece	2	0.4
- Hungary	1	0.2
- Italy	1	0.2
- Serbia	1	0.2
Turkish	14	2.6
Moroccan	13	2.4
Former colonies		
- Aruba	2	0.4
- Curaçao	1	0.2
- Indonesia	4	0.8
- Suriname	6	1.1
Other non-Western		
- Afghanistan	1	0.2
- Ghana	1	0.2
- Iran, Islamic Republic of	1	0.2
- Iraq	1	0.2
- Liberia	1	0.2
- Palestine, State of	1	0.2
- Tunisia	1	0.2
Total	531	100.0

TABLE A.2 | Descriptive statistics

	N	%	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	SD
<i>Individual characteristics</i>						
Ethnic minority background						
- No	472	88.9				
- Yes	59	11.1				
Relative list position	531		0.00	100.00	50.00	29.50
Safe list position						
- Unsafe	383	72.1				
- Safe	148	27.9				
Gender						
- Male	349	65.7				
- Female	182	34.3				
Age	531		22.00	77.00	43.74	10.47
Elected in 2012						
- No	381	71.8				
- Yes	150	28.2				
<i>Party characteristics</i>						
Restrictiveness migration & integration ^a	11		1.96	9.87	5.57	2.20
Ethnic minority support						
- No	8	72.7				
- Yes	3	27.3				
Inclusiveness selectorate						
- Party leader	2	18.2				
- Party agency	4	36.4				
- Party members on a congress	3	27.3				
- All party members	2	18.2				

Note: ^a This variable is not centred on the mean in this table.

TABLE A.3 | Party characteristics

Party	% ethnic minority candidates	Restrictiveness	Ethnic minority support	Inclusiveness selectorate			
				Party leadership (Most exclusive)	Party delegates	Party members on a party congress	All party members (Most inclusive)
SGP	0.0	8.23	0	1			
CU	4.0	5.22	0		2		
PvdD	4.0	3.54	0			3	
PVV	4.1	9.87	0	1			
50Plus	5.9	5.33	0			3	
VVD	6.7	7.34	0				4
SP	8.9	5.04	0		2		
CDA	14.0	6.52	1		2		
D66	16.0	2.71	0				4
GL	21.4	1.96	1			3	
PvdA	24.3	4.47	1		2		

Coding ethnic minority support and the inclusiveness of the selectorate

To find out the extent to which parties supported ethnic minority party members we reviewed four sources (if available): the websites of the political parties, their statutes and internal regulations and 2012 annual reports. There was no reference to official quotas for any of the parties. For the Labour Party (PvdA) and the Green Party (GL) we did find statements in their party documents that they were striving for ethnic minorities/diversity in party positions (See Table A.4). The Christian Democrats (CDA) and the Green Party (GL) had an ethnic minority network in 2012 and the Labour Party (PvdA) had a diversity network (which does not only focus on ethnic minorities, but on diversity in general). We coded the Christian Democrats (CDA), the Green Party (GL) and the Labour Party (PvdA) as having some form of ethnic minority support.

For inclusiveness, we reviewed the same four sources: the websites of the political parties, their statutes and internal regulations and 2012 annual reports were examined. A report by Lucardie, Voerman and Marchand (2004) was used as a starting point for the collection of these data. Based on all information available, we coded for each party who decided about the final version of the candidate list. Specific references to the party documents are presented in Table A.5

TABLE A.4 | Sources ethnic minority support

Party	Documents / sources ethnic minority support
CDA	<p><i>Ethnic minority network:</i> Source: Jaarverslag 2012. CDA en gelieerde Organen en Organisaties. 2.4. CDA Kleurrijk, 2012, p. 17.</p> <p>Reference to ethnic minority network in annual report 2012 CDA: “Netwerk. CDA Kleurrijk streeft naar een zo groot mogelijk netwerk binnen de partij. Het gaat hier vooral om een digitaal netwerk. In 2012 is dit gegroeid naar circa 500 personen. Belangrijkste communicatiewijze is de nieuwsbrief die met een frequentie van vier keer per jaar aan de achterban verstuurd wordt en waarin aandacht is voor actualiteiten, aankondigingen, activiteiten en waarin telkens een woord van voorzitter Koçak en een column van één van de andere kerngroep-leden wordt opgenomen. CDA Kleurrijk is in 2012 steeds actiever gebruik gaan maken van de eigen website en van sociale media (facebook en twitter), om aandacht voor thema’s van diversiteit te vragen.”</p>
PvdA	<p><i>Ethnic minority network:</i> Website PvdA, reference to ‘Netwerk Diversiteit’ Source: https://www.pvda.nl/partij/netwerken/netwerk-diversiteit/</p> <p><i>Striving for ethnic minorities/diversity in party positions:</i> Source: Statuten en huishoudelijk reglementen PvdA, Hoofdstuk 1.7 Overige bepalingen, 2012.</p> <p>Article 1.32 in statutes 2012, reference to strive for diversity in party positions: “Artikel 1.32. Evenwichtige vertegenwoordiging 1. Overal waar in de partij besturen, afvaardigingen en dergelijke worden gekozen of kandidatenlijsten voor vertegenwoordigende lichamen worden vastgesteld, wordt gestreefd naar een gelijke vertegenwoordiging qua sekse en naar een evenwichtige spreiding qua leeftijd, regio en diversiteit.”</p>
GL	<p><i>Ethnic minority network:</i> Website GroenLinks, reference to Kleurrijk Platform: Source: https://kleurrijkplatform.groenlinks.nl/</p> <p><i>Striving for ethnic minorities/diversity in party positions:</i> Source: Statuten & Huishoudelijke Reglement GroenLinks, 2012, p. 2.</p> <p>Article 5.2 and 5.3 in statutes and internal regulations 2012, reference to strive for representation of migrants in party positions: “Artikel 5. 2. Uitgangspunt is het bevorderen van deelname aan alle functies die in en namens de partij worden vervuld, voor al haar leden ongeacht sekse, seksuele voorkeur, huidskleur, nationaliteit, culturele achtergrond, leeftijd of validiteit. 3. Uitgangspunt is tevens een gelijke deelneming van vrouwen en mannen aan alle functies en vertegenwoordigingen van de Vereniging. Uitgangspunt is ook deelneming van migranten aan alle functies en vertegenwoordigingen van de Vereniging.”</p>

TABLE A.5 | Sources inclusiveness selectorate

Party	Documents / sources inclusiveness
SGP	<p>Party board determines final candidate list.</p> <p><i>Source:</i> Algemeen reglement van de Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij (SGP), 2008. (General regulations)</p>
CU	<p>Union congress (local departments, youth department, board association) determine final candidate list.</p> <p><i>Source:</i> ChristenUnie. Jaarverslag ChristenUnie 2012. (Annual report)</p>
PvdD	<p>Candidates are nominated on a congress (open to all party members).</p> <p><i>Source:</i> Statuten Partij voor de Dieren, 2012. (Statutes)</p>
PVV	<p>The PVV is an association without members. The party leader decides on the candidate list. No information can be found on the process.</p>
50Plus	<p>General assembly (open to all party members) determines final candidate list.</p> <p><i>Source:</i> Huishoudelijke Reglement 50Plus, 2014. (Internal regulations; did not exist before 2014).</p>
VVD	<p>Party members decide about final candidate list.</p> <p><i>Source:</i> VVD. Jaarverslag 2012. (Annual report)</p>
SP	<p>Special congress (delegates local departments and party board members) determine final candidate list.</p> <p><i>Sources:</i> Lucardie, P., Voerman, G., and Marchand, A. (2004) Portaal tot het Parlement. Kandidaatstelling binnen Politieke Partijen in acht Westerse landen. Den Haag/Groningen: Documentatiecentrum Nederlandse Politieke Partijen. Huishoudelijk reglement van de SP, 2009. (Internal regulations)</p>
CDA	<p>Delegates at the party conference formally confirm the candidate list. An advisory list is composed by the party board. Annual report 2012, CDA</p> <p><i>Source:</i> Jaarverslag 2012. CDA en gelieerde Organen en Organisaties, 2012. (Annual report)</p>
D66	<p>Party members determine final candidate list. Gerrit & Voerman, 2004; Statutes and internal regulations 2012, D66.</p> <p><i>Source:</i> D66 Statuten en Huishoudelijke Reglement, 2012. (Statutes and internal regulations)</p>

GL	Party congress (open for all party members) determine final order candidate list. Statutes and internal regulations 2012, GroenLinks
	Source: Statuten & Huishoudelijke Reglement GroenLinks, 2012. (Statutes and internal regulations)
PvdA	Conference (delegates of the local departments and the members of the party board) determine final order candidate list.
	Source: Lucardie, P., Voerman, G., and Marchand, A. (2004) Portaal tot het Parlement. Kandidaatstelling binnen Politieke Partijen in acht Westerse landen. Den Haag/Groningen: Documentatiecentrum Nederlandse Politieke Partijen. Statuten en huishoudelijk reglementen PvdA, 2012 (Statutes and internal regulations)

Robustness checks

Some additional analyses were performed. First, we examined the effect of party ideology on the relative list position of ethnic minority candidates and on the likelihood to be placed in a safe list position. In other studies, it is often argued that a more leftist party ideology is beneficial for minority candidates (women in particular) because these parties are more likely to be in favour of minority rights (Caul, 1999; Wängnerud, 2009). In this study a restrictiveness scale is included because this specifically measures the views of parties on ethnic minority groups. However, since party ideology is also included in the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Bakker et al., 2015) we tested this variable as well. In contrast to the findings in Model 1 in Table 2.3, we do not find a significant interaction effect for party ideology on the relative list position of ethnic minority candidates with either a Western or non-Western background (see Table A.6). In Table A.7 we do not find significant interaction effects either.

TABLE A.6 | Effect of ideology (left-right) on relative list position (N=531)

	B
Intercept	51.820*** (5.774)
Ethnic background (Dutch=ref.)	
- Western background	1.388 (7.548)
- Non-Western background	3.349 (5.755)
Gender (male=ref.)	
- Female	3.357 (2.745)
Age	-0.079 (0.125)
Ideology ^a	0.393 (0.598)
Ideology x Western background	-3.062 (3.285)
Ideology x non-Western background	-1.790 (2.823)
R ²	0.009

Note: ^aThis variable is centred on the mean. Standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.001; **p<0.05; *p<0.1.

TABLE A.7 | Effect of ideology (left-right) on safe list positions (N=531)

	B	OR
Intercept	-0.797 (0.437)	0.451
Ethnic background (Dutch=ref.)		
- Western background	0.433 (0.533)	1.542
- Non-Western background	-0.300 (0.463)	0.740
Gender (male=ref.)		
- Female	0.201 (0.205)	1.223
Age	-0.005 (0.009)	0.995
Ideology ^a	-0.021 (0.045)	0.980
Ideology x Western background	-0.123 (0.234)	0.884
Ideology x non-Western background	0.014 (0.225)	1.014
Nagelkerke R ²	0.009	

Note: ^aThis variable is centred on the mean. Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$.

In addition, multilevel analyses were estimated as a robustness check. Multilevel analyses were estimated for both relative list position as well as safe list positions. The results of the multilevel models on relative list positions are very similar to the results of the linear models presented in the main article (Table 2.3). The multilevel models on safe list positions shows small differences compared to the models presented in Table 2.4, however, only the changes in effects of the party characteristics variables are discussed. In the multilevel model the main effect of restrictiveness is not significant whereas it had a significant effect in Model 1 in Table 2.4. In Model 2 in the multilevel analysis the main effects of ethnic background and restrictiveness are not significant anymore. Moreover, the main effect of ethnic minority support is negative in the original model but positive in the multilevel model. Nevertheless, the interaction effect remains negative and significant in both models. Overall, some of the effects do not gain significant once multilevel methods are applied. Nevertheless, the effect sizes and the direction of the effects do not change substantively. And although multilevel modelling would be appropriate with these data since candidates are nested within parties, it is not certain to what extent these multilevel models are reliable as the number of parties (11) is too low to be able to estimate parameters reliably.

The final robustness check focused on safe list positions. In this robustness check we want to examine whether more conservative measures of safe list positions would change the results. Additionally, to the measure of safe list positions used in the analyses,

safe list positions are now defined as the lowest number of seats of each party as predicted by the opinion polls in the period of May, June and July. However, the analyses based on this more conservative definition of safe list positions do not change the outcomes of the hypothesis's tests.

Appendix B

TABLE B.1 | Differences and similarities between survey data sets

Survey characteristics	MIFARE	NELLS	SIM	LISS
Year of collection	2015/2016	2009/2010	2010/2011	2010-2014
Ethnic groups	Native Dutch, China, UK, Japan, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, Spain, Turkey and the US.	Native Dutch, Turkish, Moroccan, West and other non-West background.	Native Dutch, Turkey, Morocco, Suriname and the Dutch Antilles.	Native Dutch, Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese, Antillean, Indonesian, Western or other non-Western background.
Generation	First	First and second	First and second	First and second
Age	18-75	15-45	15>	15>
Sampling method	Stratified sample, one stratum for native Dutch and one for each of the migrant groups. From each stratum a simple random sample was drawn.	Two-stage stratified sampling.	Two-stage stratified sampling, separate for each group.	The panel is based on a true probability sample of households drawn from the population register.
Mode of delivery	Choice of paper questionnaire or online survey.	Face-to-face interview and a self-completion questionnaire (on paper or online).	Face-to-face interview.	Monthly online questionnaires.
Language questionnaire	Dutch, respondents' mother tongue.	Dutch.	Dutch, Turkish, Moroccan Arabic.	Dutch.

Source: Bekhuis, Hedegaard, Seibel, Degen, et al., 2018; De Graaf et al., 2010a; Korte & Dagevos, 2011.

TABLE B.2 | Comparison between background characteristics register and survey data, by ethnic group

	Register data 2013		Merged data set		Register data 2013		Merged data set	
	Moroccan background				Turkish background			
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Age								
- 15-24	61,836	24.1	400	26.6	71,593	23.5	300	21.4
- 25-34	61,572	23.9	437	29.1	70,701	23.2	352	25.1
- 35-44	58,945	22.9	457	30.4	72,246	23.7	512	36.4
- 45-54	37,689	14.7	116	7.7	50,633	16.6	149	10.6
- 55-64	18,440	7.2	45	3.0	20,260	6.6	46	3.3
- 65>	18,611	7.2	49	3.3	19,383	6.4	46	3.3
Total	257,093	100.0	1,504	100.0	304,816	100.0	1,405	100.0
Gender								
- Male	189,366	51.3	743	49.4	204,133	51.6	706	50.2
- Female	179,472	48.7	761	50.6	191,169	48.4	699	49.8
Total	368,838	100.0	1,504	100.0	395,302	100.0	1,405	100.0
	Former colony background				Other non-Western background			
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Age								
- 15-24	106,940	14.3	198	17.9	119,026	22.5	55	10.3
- 25-34	129,632	17.3	217	19.7	143,218	27.1	139	26.1
- 35-44	139,900	18.7	262	23.7	112,157	21.2	192	36.1
- 45-54	159,463	21.3	201	18.2	88,511	16.7	110	20.7
- 55-64	129,188	17.2	132	12.0	45,793	8.7	24	4.5
- 65>	84,562	11.3	94	8.5	19,820	3.8	12	2.3
Total	749,685	100.0	1,104	100.0	528,525	100.0	532	100.0
Gender								
- Male	419,655	48.3	567	51.4	357,765	50.1	158	29.7
- Female	448,322	51.7	537	48.6	357,041	49.9	374	70.3
Total	867,977	100.0	1,104	100.0	714,806	100.0	532	100.0
	Western background							
	N	%	N	%				
Age								
- 15-24	150,872	15.3	69	7.2				
- 25-34	190,283	19.3	263	27.5				
- 35-44	174,893	17.7	269	28.1				
- 45-54	150,758	15.3	184	19.2				
- 55-64	131,269	13.3	91	9.5				
- 65>	188,699	19.1	81	8.5				
Total	986,774	100.0	957	100.0				
Gender								
- Male	569,270	47.6	367	38.3				
- Female	626,888	52.4	590	61.7				
Total	1196,158	100.0	957	100.0				


Source: Bekhuis, Hedegaard, Seibel, Degen, et al., 2018; De Graaf et al., 2010a; Korte & Dagevos, 2011; Statistics Netherlands, 2018a.

TABLE B.3 | Descriptive statistics by survey

	MIFARE					NELLS					SIM					LISS				
	N	%	Range	Mean	S.D.	N	%	Range	Mean	S.D.	N	%	Range	Mean	S.D.	N	%	Range	Mean	S.D.
Vote choice																				
- CDA	73	6.6				107	5.6				82	3.9				24	6.0			
- PvdA	204	18.3				1057	55.5				1252	60.1				85	21.4			
- SP	129	11.6				257	13.5				151	7.2				73	18.3			
- VVD	230	20.6				104	5.5				130	6.2				52	13.1			
- PVV	151	13.5				24	1.3				50	2.4				63	15.8			
- GL	138	12.4				190	10.0				231	11.1				25	6.3			
- D66	190	17.0				165	8.7				189	9.1				76	19.1			
Income (imputed) ^a	1115		-1.77 – 2.23	0.65	1.50	1904		-1.77 – 2.23	-0.38	1.37	2085		-1.77 – 2.23	-0.38	1.30	398		-1.77 – 2.23	-0.53	1.50
Employment status (imputed)																				
- Student	60	5.4				423	22.2				401	19.2				32	8.0			
- Employed	720	64.6				1018	53.5				996	47.8				207	52.0			
- Unemployed	335	30.1				463	24.3				688	33.0				159	40.0			
Educational level (imputed) ^a	1115		-2.70 – 2.30	1.57	1.23	1904		-2.70 – 2.30	-0.37	1.18	2085		-2.70 – 2.30	-0.62	1.27	398		-2.70 – 2.30	0.38	1.29
Ethnic identification (imputed)	1115		-3.59 – 1.58	0.00	1.00	1904		-3.59 – 1.60	0.00	1.00	2085		-2.74 – 1.58	0.00	1.00	398		-3.59 – 1.60	0.00	1.00
Gender																				
- Male	341	30.6				920	48.3				1075	51.6				205	51.5			
- Female	774	69.4				984	51.7				1010	48.4				193	48.5			
Age	1115		1.00 – 12.00	5.66	2.12	1904		1.00 – 7.00	3.84	1.80	2085		1.00 – 12.00	5.45	3.10	398		1.00 – 12.00	7.15	3.13
Ethnic background																				
- Moroccan	0	0.0				846	44.4				635	30.5				23	5.8			
- Turkish	96	8.6				752	39.5				525	25.2				32	8.0			
- Non-Western	348	31.2				97	5.1				0	0.0				87	21.9			
- Western	671	60.2				109	5.7				0	0.0				177	44.5			
- Former colony	0	0.0				100	5.3				925	44.4				79	19.9			

Note: ^aThis variable was centred on the mean (before applying multiple imputation).
Source: Bekhuis, Hedegaard, Seibel, Degen, et al., 2018; De Graaf et al., 2010a; Korte & Dagevos, 2011.

FIGURE B.1 | Vote choice of Turkish minorities, by survey



Source: Bekhuis, Hedegaard, Seibel, Degen, et al., 2018; De Graaf et al., 2010a; Korte & Dagevos, 2011.

TABLE B.4 | Descriptive statistics

	All ethnic groups					Non-Western minorities					Western minorities				
	N	%	Range	Mean	S.D.	N	%	Range	Mean	S.D.	N	%	Range	Mean	S.D.
Data set															
- MIFARE	1115	20.3				444	9.8				671	70.1			
- NELLE	1904	34.6				1795	39.5				109	11.4			
- SIM	2085	37.9				2085	45.9								
- LISS	398	7.2				221	4.9				177	18.5			
Individual-specific variables															
Vote															
- CDA	286	5.2				220	4.8				66	6.9			
- PvdA	2598	47.2				2438	53.6				160	16.7			
- SP	610	11.1				497	10.9				113	11.8			
- VVD	516	9.3				337	7.4				179	17.7			
- PVV	288	5.2				155	3.4				133	13.9			
- GL	584	10.6				457	10.1				127	13.3			
- D66	620	11.3				441	9.7				179	18.7			
Income (imputed) ^a	5502		-1.77 – 2.23	-0.11	1.45			-1.77 – 2.23	-0.28	1.38			-1.77 – 2.23	0.68	1.53
Employment status (imputed)															
- Student	912	16.6				839	18.5				73	7.6			
- Employed	2942	53.5				2342	51.5				600	62.7			
- Unemployed	1648	29.9				1364	30.0				284	29.7			
Educational level (imputed) ^a	5502		-2.70 – 2.31	-0.02	1.49			-2.70 – 2.30	-0.30	1.37			-2.70 – 2.30	1.34	1.28
Ethnic identification (imputed)	5502		-3.59 – 1.60	0.00	1.00			-3.59 – 1.60	0.04	0.98			-3.59 – 1.60	-0.17	1.05
Gender															
- Male	2541	46.2				2174	47.8				367	38.4			
- Female	2961	53.8				2371	52.2				590	61.7			
Age	5502		1.00 – 12.00	5.06	2.71			1.00 – 12.00	4.87	2.68			1.00 – 12.00	5.94	2.68
Ethnic background															
- Non-Western	3441	62.5				3441	75.7								
- Western	957	17.4									957	100.0			
- Former colony	1104	20.1				1104	24.3								

Note: ^a This variable was centred on the mean (before applying multiple imputation).

Source: Bekhuis, Hedegaard, Seibel, Degen, et al., 2018; De Graaf et al., 2010a; Korte & Dagevos, 2011.

TABLE B.5 | Descriptive statistics alternative-specific variables

	N	Range	Mean	S.D.
Economic issue positions	14	1.00 – 8.33	4.78	2.18
Immigration and integration issue positions	14	1.55 – 9.90	5.60	2.50
% ethnic minority candidates (EMCs)	14	0.00 – 13.30	2.72	2.80
Relative list position EMCs	14	0.00 – 0.97	0.43	0.30

Source: Bakker et al., 2015; Van der Zwan, 2017.

TABLE B.6 | Measurement of ethnic identification, by data set

Survey	Question	Answer categories
MIFARE	How strong, would you say, is your sense of belonging to the people from (country of origin)?	Not at all, weak, moderate, close, very close
NELLS	I feel really connected to my ethnic group	Agree entirely, agree, neutral, disagree, disagree entirely
SIM	To what extent do you feel (ethnic group)?	Very strong, strong, a little, I don't, not at all
LISS	I feel connected to (ethnic group)	Disagree entirely, disagree, neutral, agree, agree entirely

Source: Bekhuis, Hedegaard, Seibel, Degen, et al., 2018; De Graaf et al., 2010a; Korte & Dagevos, 2011.

For all candidates, information about their country of birth and the country of birth of their parents was collected. In addition to ethnic origin, information was obtained about a limited number of background variables including gender, age and position on the candidate list. Data were gathered online; small online biographies about MPs (PDC, 2016) were used and complemented with other online resources, such as newspaper articles, social media and personal websites. If no information about the country of birth of the parents was found and if there was no evidence that proved otherwise, such as names, we coded the parents as Dutch. We contacted all candidates for whom we could not find sufficient information about their ethnic origin. Most of these candidates responded and provided the requested details about their ethnic background. For the 46 candidates that did not respond the country of birth and that of their parents was coded independently by three coders. The coders assumed these candidates and their parents to be Dutch unless any evidence proved otherwise. In case the three coders did not all code the same country of birth, the most mentioned country of birth was chosen.

TABLE B.7 | Conditional logistic regression for vote choice; main effects substantive and descriptive representation - analysis by group

	Non-Western						Western					
	Model 1a	Model 2a	Model 3a	Model 4a	Model 1a	Model 2a	Model 1a	Model 2a	Model 3a	Model 4a	Model 1a	Model 2a
	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B
<i>Alternative-specific variables</i>												
Economic issue positions (L-R) ^a	-0.262*** (0.0291)				-0.0320 (0.0641)							
Migration issue positions (P-R) ^b		-0.281*** (0.0293)						-0.0837 (0.0614)				
% Ethnic minority candidates by group			0.0507*** (0.00791)						0.291*** (0.0870)			
List position ethnic minority candidates by group				0.611*** (0.111)						1.139** (0.495)		
<i>Individual-specific variables</i>												
Income_CDA	0.0685 (0.0605)	0.0721 (0.0601)	0.0785 (0.0593)	0.0781 (0.0589)	-0.0385 (0.107)	-0.0381 (0.107)	-0.0385 (0.107)	-0.0381 (0.107)	-0.0346 (0.111)	-0.0371 (0.109)	-0.0346 (0.111)	-0.0371 (0.109)
Income_SP	0.0307 (0.0451)	0.0216 (0.0464)	0.0215 (0.0464)	0.0197 (0.0465)	-0.158* (0.0886)	-0.158* (0.0888)	-0.158* (0.0886)	-0.158* (0.0888)	-0.161* (0.0907)	-0.160* (0.0897)	-0.161* (0.0907)	-0.160* (0.0897)
Income_VVD	0.300*** (0.0547)	0.297*** (0.0544)	0.296*** (0.0536)	0.299*** (0.0535)	0.200** (0.0814)	0.201** (0.0816)	0.200** (0.0814)	0.201** (0.0816)	0.200** (0.0815)	0.200** (0.0814)	0.200** (0.0815)	0.200** (0.0814)
Income_PVV	0.118* (0.0641)	0.108 (0.0668)	0.123* (0.0641)	0.121* (0.0644)	-0.0927 (0.0860)	-0.0932 (0.0863)	-0.0927 (0.0860)	-0.0932 (0.0863)	-0.0916 (0.0864)	-0.0922 (0.0863)	-0.0916 (0.0864)	-0.0922 (0.0863)
Income_GL	0.0256 (0.0491)	0.0375 (0.0485)	0.0348 (0.0503)	0.0270 (0.0503)	0.0772 (0.0879)	0.0774 (0.0877)	0.0772 (0.0879)	0.0774 (0.0877)	0.0786 (0.0881)	0.0783 (0.0873)	0.0786 (0.0881)	0.0783 (0.0873)
Income_D66	0.174*** (0.0474)	0.178*** (0.0459)	0.176*** (0.0469)	0.177*** (0.0466)	0.305*** (0.0855)	0.303*** (0.0852)	0.305*** (0.0855)	0.303*** (0.0852)	0.301*** (0.0851)	0.304*** (0.0856)	0.301*** (0.0851)	0.304*** (0.0856)
Employment status (employed=ref.)												
Student_CDA	-0.879*** (0.217)	-1.014*** (0.214)	-1.236*** (0.210)	-1.335*** (0.209)	-0.533 (0.557)	-0.499 (0.552)	-0.533 (0.557)	-0.499 (0.552)	0.0508 (0.584)	-0.302 (0.562)	0.0508 (0.584)	-0.302 (0.562)
Student_SP	-1.047*** (0.155)	-0.572*** (0.153)	-0.660*** (0.152)	-0.642*** (0.152)	-0.163 (0.457)	-0.0953 (0.452)	-0.163 (0.457)	-0.0953 (0.452)	0.484 (0.493)	0.143 (0.467)	0.484 (0.493)	0.143 (0.467)
Student_VVD	-0.378* (0.215)	-0.594*** (0.206)	-0.984*** (0.199)	-1.042*** (0.198)	-0.373 (0.475)	-0.337 (0.470)	-0.373 (0.475)	-0.337 (0.470)	-0.205 (0.471)	-0.350 (0.465)	-0.205 (0.471)	-0.350 (0.465)

Student_PVW	-1.849*** (0.295)	-1.302*** (0.313)	-1.978*** (0.295)	-1.915*** (0.297)	-0.830* (0.499)	-0.703 (0.512)	-0.571 (0.506)	-0.764 (0.499)
Student_GL	-0.831*** (0.149)	-1.122*** (0.154)	-0.841*** (0.151)	-0.685*** (0.150)	-0.261 (0.464)	-0.323 (0.464)	-0.100 (0.466)	-0.430 (0.466)
Student_D66	-0.189 (0.157)	-0.763*** (0.155)	-0.414*** (0.154)	-0.594*** (0.154)	-0.299 (0.457)	-0.365 (0.454)	-0.239 (0.452)	-0.300 (0.454)
Unemployed_CDA	0.0784 (0.175)	0.0683 (0.174)	0.0530 (0.172)	0.0465 (0.172)	-0.401 (0.443)	-0.408 (0.442)	-0.475 (0.449)	-0.433 (0.447)
Unemployed_SP	-0.133 (0.134)	-0.119 (0.137)	-0.116 (0.136)	-0.114 (0.136)	-0.191 (0.325)	-0.201 (0.324)	-0.270 (0.328)	-0.231 (0.327)
Unemployed_VVD	-0.180 (0.199)	-0.179 (0.197)	-0.197 (0.192)	-0.205 (0.192)	-0.0918 (0.287)	-0.0942 (0.287)	-0.104 (0.284)	-0.0930 (0.286)
Unemployed_PVV	0.172 (0.193)	0.229 (0.200)	0.167 (0.192)	0.174 (0.193)	0.158 (0.309)	0.147 (0.309)	0.135 (0.307)	0.150 (0.308)
Unemployed_GL	-0.283** (0.142)	-0.308** (0.142)	-0.286** (0.144)	-0.274* (0.144)	-0.412 (0.344)	-0.406 (0.342)	-0.422 (0.340)	-0.397 (0.340)
Unemployed_D66	-0.142 (0.154)	-0.179 (0.152)	-0.150 (0.153)	-0.160 (0.153)	-0.492 (0.313)	-0.479 (0.312)	-0.481 (0.309)	-0.486 (0.311)
Educational level_CDA	0.174*** (0.0619)	0.182*** (0.0618)	0.182*** (0.0610)	0.202*** (0.0607)	0.0740 (0.124)	0.0774 (0.125)	0.119 (0.128)	0.0939 (0.126)
Educational level_SP	0.187*** (0.0466)	0.176*** (0.0470)	0.166*** (0.0471)	0.163*** (0.0472)	0.106 (0.107)	0.112 (0.107)	0.154 (0.110)	0.130 (0.109)
Educational level_VVD	0.325*** (0.0563)	0.332*** (0.0560)	0.325*** (0.0550)	0.336*** (0.0548)	0.357*** (0.108)	0.363*** (0.108)	0.359*** (0.105)	0.356*** (0.107)
Educational level_PVV	0.160** (0.0670)	0.148** (0.0687)	0.154** (0.0672)	0.164** (0.0672)	-0.122 (0.0978)	-0.119 (0.0984)	-0.109 (0.0968)	-0.119 (0.0977)
Educational level_GL	0.322*** (0.0466)	0.333*** (0.0463)	0.320*** (0.0470)	0.318*** (0.0471)	0.347*** (0.120)	0.334*** (0.119)	0.349*** (0.117)	0.312*** (0.117)
Educational level_D66	0.458*** (0.0492)	0.465*** (0.0481)	0.455*** (0.0489)	0.467*** (0.0485)	0.230** (0.104)	0.219** (0.103)	0.219** (0.101)	0.226** (0.104)
Ethnic identification_CDA	-0.0683 (0.0739)	-0.0682 (0.0733)	-0.0673 (0.0726)	-0.0713 (0.0720)	0.0879 (0.141)	0.0886 (0.141)	0.0876 (0.144)	0.0884 (0.143)

Ethnic identification_SP	-0.151*** (0.0532)	-0.162*** (0.0545)	-0.160*** (0.0544)	-0.158*** (0.0543)	-0.114 (0.116)	-0.115 (0.116)	-0.129 (0.118)	-0.122 (0.117)
Ethnic identification_VVD	-0.308*** (0.0626)	-0.303*** (0.0623)	-0.291*** (0.0615)	-0.293*** (0.0619)	-0.121 (0.110)	-0.123 (0.110)	-0.121 (0.108)	-0.121 (0.109)
Ethnic identification_PVV	-0.230*** (0.0782)	-0.251*** (0.0813)	-0.228*** (0.0781)	-0.232*** (0.0783)	-0.164 (0.115)	-0.169 (0.116)	-0.168 (0.114)	-0.165 (0.115)
Ethnic identification_GL	-0.0769 (0.0569)	-0.0762 (0.0561)	-0.0746 (0.0585)	-0.0744 (0.0582)	-0.00246 (0.117)	-0.00107 (0.116)	-0.00249 (0.116)	0.0016 (0.116)
Ethnic identification_D66	-0.203*** (0.0611)	-0.193*** (0.0596)	-0.198*** (0.0609)	-0.201*** (0.0603)	0.0327 (0.112)	0.0334 (0.111)	0.0328 (0.110)	0.0330 (0.112)
<i>Control variables</i>								
Ethnic background (non-Western=ref.)	1.408*** (0.203)	1.422*** (0.202)	1.498*** (0.201)	1.474*** (0.201)				
Former colony_CDA	0.938*** (0.151)	0.891*** (0.152)	1.085*** (0.155)	0.704*** (0.157)				
Former colony_VVD	1.797*** (0.193)	1.811*** (0.190)	2.010*** (0.188)	1.994*** (0.188)				
Former colony_PVV	1.827*** (0.238)	1.848*** (0.249)	1.799*** (0.239)	1.312*** (0.261)				
Former colony_GL	0.795*** (0.143)	0.829*** (0.143)	1.171*** (0.157)	0.681*** (0.146)				
Former colony_D66	0.713*** (0.156)	0.804*** (0.154)	0.789*** (0.156)	0.951*** (0.158)				
Age_CDA	-0.201*** (0.0267)	-0.232*** (0.0252)	-0.285*** (0.0241)	-0.315*** (0.0237)	-0.0125 (0.0584)	-0.00655 (0.0571)	0.0856 (0.0649)	0.0270 (0.0602)
Age_SP	-0.243*** (0.0195)	-0.131*** (0.0176)	-0.150*** (0.0173)	-0.146*** (0.0175)	0.00251 (0.0487)	0.0129 (0.0477)	0.101* (0.0556)	0.0490 (0.0512)
Age_VVD	-0.162*** (0.0292)	-0.207*** (0.0264)	-0.291*** (0.0236)	-0.307*** (0.0233)	-0.111** (0.0492)	-0.105** (0.0472)	-0.0849* (0.0466)	-0.107** (0.0463)
Age_PVV	-0.384*** (0.0302)	-0.263*** (0.0350)	-0.412*** (0.0299)	-0.400*** (0.0307)	-0.174*** (0.0506)	-0.159*** (0.0521)	-0.135*** (0.0514)	-0.164*** (0.0504)

Age_GL	-0.255*** (0.0185)	-0.331*** (0.0213)	-0.252*** (0.0190)	-0.215*** (0.0187)	-0.137*** (0.0508)	-0.149*** (0.0515)	-0.113** (0.0505)	-0.170*** (0.0526)
Age_D66	-0.189*** (0.0211)	-0.325*** (0.0208)	-0.238*** (0.0199)	-0.285*** (0.0203)	-0.0821* (0.0467)	-0.0940*** (0.0460)	-0.0750* (0.0448)	-0.0826* (0.0457)
Women_CDA	-0.479*** (0.135)	-0.538*** (0.133)	-0.637*** (0.131)	-0.676*** (0.131)	0.312 (0.294)	0.328 (0.292)	0.612** (0.312)	0.432 (0.301)
Women_SP	-0.748*** (0.0981)	-0.560*** (0.0986)	-0.601*** (0.0984)	-0.590*** (0.0987)	-0.154 (0.247)	-0.126 (0.246)	0.121 (0.261)	-0.0271 (0.253)
Women_VVD	-0.624*** (0.130)	-0.711*** (0.127)	-0.878*** (0.123)	-0.897*** (0.123)	-0.222 (0.233)	-0.207 (0.230)	-0.142 (0.227)	-0.208 (0.228)
Women_PVV	-0.919*** (0.160)	-0.687*** (0.169)	-0.988*** (0.160)	-0.959*** (0.161)	-0.154 (0.246)	-0.107 (0.250)	-0.0394 (0.245)	-0.123 (0.245)
Women_GL	-0.371*** (0.0971)	-0.498*** (0.0980)	-0.389*** (0.0980)	-0.311*** (0.0979)	-0.271 (0.248)	-0.292 (0.247)	-0.194 (0.245)	-0.325 (0.245)
Women_D66	-0.552*** (0.107)	-0.776*** (0.106)	-0.647*** (0.106)	-0.717*** (0.106)	-0.189 (0.229)	-0.213 (0.227)	-0.150 (0.223)	-0.185 (0.227)
Survey (NELLS=ref.)								
Mifare_CDA	1.225*** (0.258)	1.183*** (0.258)	1.115*** (0.256)	1.287*** (0.256)	-0.981** (0.409)	-0.957*** (0.406)	-2.595*** (0.633)	-0.830*** (0.419)
Mifare_SP	0.865*** (0.206)	0.780*** (0.208)	0.837*** (0.209)	0.863*** (0.208)	-0.476 (0.364)	-0.465 (0.364)	-1.525*** (0.495)	-0.492 (0.374)
Mifare_VVD	2.352*** (0.224)	2.086*** (0.220)	2.106*** (0.218)	2.262*** (0.219)	0.428 (0.388)	0.435 (0.360)	-0.712 (0.467)	0.913** (0.427)
Mifare_PVV	2.642*** (0.256)	3.062*** (0.269)	2.734*** (0.257)	2.665*** (0.258)	1.119*** (0.361)	1.429*** (0.441)	0.565 (0.390)	1.815*** (0.476)
Mifare_GL	0.307 (0.239)	0.214 (0.240)	0.424* (0.243)	-0.00203 (0.248)	0.387 (0.373)	0.287 (0.376)	-0.0957 (0.392)	1.508*** (0.608)
Mifare_D66	1.468*** (0.217)	1.004*** (0.212)	1.042*** (0.214)	1.206*** (0.214)	0.313 (0.375)	0.159 (0.347)	-0.0294 (0.340)	0.341 (0.346)
SIM_CDA	-1.050*** (0.189)	-1.064*** (0.187)	-1.102*** (0.185)	-1.113*** (0.183)				
SIM_SP	-1.081*** (0.133)	-1.018*** (0.137)	-1.027*** (0.136)	-1.023*** (0.137)				

SIM_VVD	-0.701*** (0.191)	-0.764*** (0.186)	-0.891*** (0.180)	-0.908*** (0.178)				
SIM_PVW	-1.063*** (0.238)	-0.806*** (0.257)	-1.106*** (0.239)	-1.074*** (0.240)				
SIM_GL	-0.251*** (0.123)	-0.314*** (0.122)	-0.268** (0.124)	-0.196 (0.125)				
SIM_D66	-0.149 (0.139)	-0.328** (0.135)	-0.210 (0.138)	-0.273** (0.136)				
LISS_CDA	0.140 (0.362)	0.138 (0.360)	0.128 (0.360)	0.216 (0.361)	-0.220 (0.555)	-0.216 (0.555)	-0.113 (0.565)	-0.195 (0.561)
LISS_SP	0.942*** (0.223)	0.883*** (0.223)	0.857*** (0.224)	0.729*** (0.226)	0.375 (0.489)	0.399 (0.490)	0.655 (0.507)	0.495 (0.500)
LISS_VVD	0.737** (0.300)	0.710** (0.296)	0.628** (0.292)	0.674** (0.293)	1.182** (0.495)	1.226** (0.487)	1.215*** (0.468)	1.183** (0.477)
LISS_PVW	1.768*** (0.302)	1.873*** (0.316)	1.699*** (0.302)	1.704*** (0.303)	2.181*** (0.492)	2.405*** (0.531)	2.353*** (0.486)	2.243*** (0.490)
LISS_GL	0.125 (0.309)	0.0906 (0.309)	0.160 (0.311)	-0.0420 (0.312)	0.445 (0.555)	0.370 (0.553)	0.485 (0.544)	0.265 (0.546)
LISS_D66	1.040*** (0.251)	0.970*** (0.249)	0.958*** (0.251)	1.082*** (0.251)	1.380*** (0.465)	1.287*** (0.461)	1.299*** (0.447)	1.350*** (0.459)
N		31,815				6,699		

Note: ^a Left-Right ^b Permissive – Restrictive. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

TABLE B.8 | Conditional logistic regression for vote choice among non-Western minorities; substantive and descriptive representation – full model

	Model 1	Model 1b	Model 1c	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
	B	B	B	B	B	B
<i>Alternative-specific variables</i>						
Economic issue positions (I-R) ^a	-0.262*** (0.0292)	-0.263*** (0.0291)	-0.262*** (0.0291)			
Economic pos. x Income	0.0962** (0.0479)					
Economic pos. x Student		-0.306 (0.367)				
Economic pos. x Unemployed		-0.0930 (0.228)				
Economic pos. x Educational level			0.0885 (0.0632)			
Migration issue positions (P-R) ^b				-0.280*** (0.0293)		
Migration pos. x Ethnic identification (EI)				-0.166 (0.137)		
% Ethnic minority candidates by group					0.0494*** (0.00801)	
% Ethnic minority candidates x EI					0.00793 (0.00805)	0.610*** (0.111)
List position ethnic minority candidates by group						0.0340 (0.0865)
List position x EI						
<i>Individual-specific variables</i>						
Income_CDA	-0.189 (0.145)	0.0669 (0.0605)	0.0669 (0.0605)	0.0707 (0.0601)	0.0783 (0.0593)	0.0781 (0.0589)
Income_SP	0.261** (0.120)	0.0284 (0.0451)	0.0286 (0.0453)	0.0204 (0.0467)	0.0208 (0.0465)	0.0198 (0.0466)

Income_VVD	-0.131 (0.233)	0.297*** (0.0550)	0.298*** (0.0547)	0.296*** (0.0545)	0.295*** (0.0536)	0.299*** (0.0536)
Income_PVV	0.00480 (0.0895)	0.115* (0.0642)	0.115* (0.0643)	0.106 (0.0668)	0.123* (0.0641)	0.121* (0.0644)
Income_GL	0.110* (0.0574)	0.0236 (0.0491)	0.0238 (0.0491)	0.0363 (0.0482)	0.0342 (0.0502)	0.0271 (0.0503)
Income_D66	-0.00575 (0.102)	0.173*** (0.0474)	0.172*** (0.0474)	0.177*** (0.0460)	0.176*** (0.0470)	0.177*** (0.0466)
Employment status (employed=ref.)						
Student_CDA	-0.845*** (0.218)	0.00823 (1.094)	-0.879*** (0.217)	-1.018*** (0.213)	-1.240*** (0.210)	-1.335*** (0.209)
Student_SP	-1.001*** (0.155)	-1.696** (0.783)	-1.041*** (0.155)	-0.574*** (0.152)	-0.664*** (0.152)	-0.642*** (0.152)
Student_VVD	-0.344 (0.215)	1.052 (1.725)	-0.378* (0.215)	-0.597*** (0.206)	-0.988*** (0.199)	-1.041*** (0.198)
Student_PVV	-1.787*** (0.296)	-1.374** (0.653)	-1.834*** (0.296)	-1.312*** (0.311)	-1.984*** (0.294)	-1.916*** (0.297)
Student_GL	-0.788*** (0.147)	-1.016*** (0.272)	-0.827*** (0.149)	-1.123*** (0.153)	-0.841*** (0.151)	-0.685*** (0.150)
Student_D66	-0.177 (0.157)	0.409 (0.727)	-0.193 (0.157)	-0.763*** (0.155)	-0.417*** (0.154)	-0.594*** (0.154)
Unemployed_CDA	0.0984 (0.174)	0.342 (0.678)	0.0810 (0.175)	0.0663 (0.174)	0.0523 (0.172)	0.0469 (0.172)
Unemployed_SP	-0.109 (0.132)	-0.343 (0.510)	-0.130 (0.133)	-0.121 (0.136)	-0.117 (0.136)	-0.114 (0.136)
Unemployed_VVD	-0.161 (0.195)	0.249 (1.116)	-0.177 (0.198)	-0.180 (0.198)	-0.199 (0.192)	-0.205 (0.192)
Unemployed_PVV	0.204 (0.194)	0.294 (0.378)	0.178 (0.194)	0.228 (0.200)	0.166 (0.192)	0.174 (0.193)
Unemployed_GL	-0.261* (0.142)	-0.349* (0.192)	-0.280** (0.142)	-0.308** (0.142)	-0.288** (0.144)	-0.274* (0.144)
Unemployed_D66	-0.133 (0.154)	0.0478 (0.519)	-0.141 (0.154)	-0.181 (0.152)	-0.151 (0.153)	-0.160 (0.153)

Educational level_CDA	0.167*** (0.0622)	0.174*** (0.0619)	-0.0816 (0.196)	0.181*** (0.0618)	0.182*** (0.0610)	0.202*** (0.0607)
Educational level_SP	0.180*** (0.0468)	0.186*** (0.0465)	0.383*** (0.148)	0.176*** (0.0468)	0.165*** (0.0471)	0.162*** (0.0472)
Educational level_VVD	0.319*** (0.0566)	0.326*** (0.0563)	-0.0907 (0.306)	0.331*** (0.0560)	0.325*** (0.0550)	0.336*** (0.0548)
Educational level_PVV	0.153** (0.0668)	0.159** (0.0669)	0.0382 (0.108)	0.147** (0.0688)	0.153** (0.0672)	0.164** (0.0672)
Educational level_GL	0.314*** (0.0467)	0.321*** (0.0466)	0.381*** (0.0636)	0.332*** (0.0463)	0.320*** (0.0470)	0.318*** (0.0471)
Educational level_D66	0.455*** (0.0493)	0.460*** (0.0492)	0.284** (0.132)	0.464*** (0.0480)	0.454*** (0.0489)	0.467*** (0.0485)
Ethnic identification_CDA	-0.0670 (0.0739)	-0.0683 (0.0739)	-0.0681 (0.0781)	0.224 (0.266)	-0.0425 (0.0781)	-0.0715 (0.0721)
Ethnic identification_SP	-0.150*** (0.0530)	-0.151*** (0.0532)	-0.151*** (0.0533)	-0.0692 (0.104)	-0.144** (0.0585)	-0.158*** (0.0542)
Ethnic identification_VVD	-0.307*** (0.0628)	-0.309*** (0.0628)	-0.308*** (0.0627)	0.166 (0.404)	-0.256*** (0.0737)	-0.284*** (0.0665)
Ethnic identification_PVV	-0.228*** (0.0782)	-0.231*** (0.0783)	-0.229*** (0.0784)	0.593 (0.722)	-0.203** (0.0840)	-0.228*** (0.0785)
Ethnic identification_GL	-0.0753 (0.0568)	-0.0773 (0.0569)	-0.0763 (0.0569)	-0.501 (0.346)	-0.0794 (0.0584)	-0.0721 (0.0586)
Ethnic identification_D66	-0.202*** (0.0613)	-0.205*** (0.0609)	-0.204*** (0.0613)	-0.506** (0.241)	-0.182*** (0.0652)	-0.208*** (0.0634)
<i>Control variables</i>						
Ethnic background (non-Western=ref.)	1.406*** (0.202)	1.409*** (0.203)	1.406*** (0.202)	1.408*** (0.201)	1.493*** (0.201)	1.474*** (0.201)
Former colony_CDA	0.932*** (0.151)	0.938*** (0.151)	0.932*** (0.151)	0.872*** (0.153)	1.074*** (0.155)	0.706*** (0.157)
Former colony_SP	1.794*** (0.193)	1.795*** (0.193)	1.797*** (0.193)	1.789*** (0.191)	1.997*** (0.188)	1.990*** (0.188)
Former colony_VVD	1.817*** (0.238)	1.826*** (0.238)	1.816*** (0.238)	1.848*** (0.248)	1.806*** (0.239)	1.321*** (0.262)

Former colony_GL	0.790*** (0.143)	0.795*** (0.143)	0.792*** (0.143)	0.813*** (0.144)	1.153*** (0.158)	0.680*** (0.146)
Former colony_D66	0.714*** (0.156)	0.713*** (0.155)	0.715*** (0.156)	0.784*** (0.153)	0.786*** (0.155)	0.948*** (0.159)
Age_CDA	-0.202*** (0.0267)	-0.200*** (0.0267)	-0.200*** (0.0267)	-0.232*** (0.0252)	-0.285*** (0.0242)	-0.315*** (0.0237)
Age_SP	-0.244*** (0.0195)	-0.243*** (0.0194)	-0.243*** (0.0195)	-0.130*** (0.0176)	-0.150*** (0.0173)	-0.146*** (0.0175)
Age_VVD	-0.163*** (0.0291)	-0.161*** (0.0291)	-0.161*** (0.0292)	-0.206*** (0.0265)	-0.292*** (0.0237)	-0.307*** (0.0233)
Age_PVV	-0.386*** (0.0302)	-0.382*** (0.0302)	-0.383*** (0.0302)	-0.264*** (0.0350)	-0.414*** (0.0299)	-0.400*** (0.0307)
Age_GL	-0.256*** (0.0185)	-0.254*** (0.0185)	-0.254*** (0.0185)	-0.330*** (0.0213)	-0.251*** (0.0190)	-0.215*** (0.0187)
Age_D66	-0.189*** (0.0211)	-0.190*** (0.0212)	-0.188*** (0.0211)	-0.324*** (0.0208)	-0.239*** (0.0199)	-0.285*** (0.0203)
Women_CDA	-0.482*** (0.135)	-0.476*** (0.135)	-0.479*** (0.135)	-0.536*** (0.133)	-0.639*** (0.131)	-0.676*** (0.131)
Women_SP	-0.750*** (0.0981)	-0.744*** (0.0981)	-0.748*** (0.0980)	-0.560*** (0.0987)	-0.601*** (0.0984)	-0.590*** (0.0987)
Women_VVD	-0.630*** (0.130)	-0.621*** (0.130)	-0.626*** (0.130)	-0.713*** (0.127)	-0.879*** (0.124)	-0.897*** (0.123)
Women_PVV	-0.922*** (0.160)	-0.914*** (0.160)	-0.918*** (0.160)	-0.683*** (0.169)	-0.989*** (0.160)	-0.960*** (0.161)
Women_GL	-0.372*** (0.0970)	-0.367*** (0.0971)	-0.371*** (0.0971)	-0.498*** (0.0980)	-0.389*** (0.0980)	-0.311*** (0.0979)
Women_D66	-0.556*** (0.107)	-0.553*** (0.107)	-0.553*** (0.107)	-0.775*** (0.106)	-0.648*** (0.106)	-0.717*** (0.106)
Survey (NELLS=ref.)	1.218***	1.247***	1.176***	1.211***	1.118***	1.290***
Mifare_CDA	(0.258)	(0.261)	(0.261)	(0.259)	(0.256)	(0.256)
Mifare_SP	0.872*** (0.206)	0.862*** (0.206)	0.869*** (0.205)	0.770*** (0.209)	0.836*** (0.209)	0.865*** (0.209)

Mifare_VVD	2.341*** (0.224)	2.371*** (0.227)	2.302*** (0.227)	2.083*** (0.220)	2.104*** (0.218)	2.262*** (0.219)
Mifare_PVV	2.653*** (0.255)	2.633*** (0.257)	2.645*** (0.254)	3.088*** (0.269)	2.741*** (0.257)	2.670*** (0.259)
Mifare_GL	0.312 (0.240)	0.310 (0.239)	0.298 (0.239)	0.209 (0.240)	0.433* (0.243)	-0.00701 (0.248)
Mifare_D66	1.384*** (0.223)	1.534*** (0.243)	1.254*** (0.273)	1.007*** (0.212)	1.044*** (0.214)	1.206*** (0.214)
SIM_CDA	-1.050*** (0.189)	-1.048*** (0.189)	-1.050*** (0.189)	-1.059*** (0.187)	-1.101*** (0.185)	-1.114*** (0.183)
SIM_SP	-1.080*** (0.133)	-1.079*** (0.133)	-1.078*** (0.133)	-1.014*** (0.137)	-1.030*** (0.136)	-1.020*** (0.137)
SIM_VVD	-0.699*** (0.191)	-0.697*** (0.191)	-0.703*** (0.191)	-0.767*** (0.187)	-0.895*** (0.180)	-0.910*** (0.178)
SIM_PVV	-1.059*** (0.238)	-1.060*** (0.238)	-1.057*** (0.238)	-0.804*** (0.257)	-1.103*** (0.239)	-1.068*** (0.241)
SIM_GL	-0.250*** (0.123)	-0.250*** (0.123)	-0.251*** (0.123)	-0.309*** (0.122)	-0.272*** (0.124)	-0.194 (0.125)
SIM_D66	-0.149 (0.139)	-0.148 (0.139)	-0.153 (0.139)	-0.323*** (0.134)	-0.208 (0.137)	-0.275*** (0.136)
LISS_CDA	0.136 (0.362)	0.142 (0.362)	0.138 (0.362)	0.145 (0.361)	0.130 (0.360)	0.215 (0.361)
LISS_SP	0.933*** (0.223)	0.944*** (0.223)	0.935*** (0.223)	0.888*** (0.223)	0.858*** (0.224)	0.729*** (0.226)
LISS_VVD	0.733*** (0.300)	0.743*** (0.300)	0.734*** (0.300)	0.726*** (0.296)	0.633*** (0.292)	0.673*** (0.293)
LISS_PVV	1.755*** (0.302)	1.772*** (0.302)	1.756*** (0.302)	1.891*** (0.315)	1.705*** (0.302)	1.706*** (0.303)
LISS_GL	0.118 (0.309)	0.127 (0.309)	0.117 (0.309)	0.0952 (0.310)	0.163 (0.311)	-0.0413 (0.312)
LISS_D66	1.041*** (0.251)	1.044*** (0.251)	1.038*** (0.250)	0.977*** (0.249)	0.962*** (0.251)	1.080*** (0.251)
N	31,815					

Note: ^a Left-Right ^b Permissive – Restrictive. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

TABLE B.9 | Conditional logistic regression for vote choice among Western minorities; substantive and descriptive representation – full model

	Model 1	Model 1b	Model 1c	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
	B	B	B	B	B	B
<i>Alternative-specific variables</i>						
Economic issue positions (L-R) ^a	-0.0322 (0.0642)	-0.0348 (0.0645)	-0.0408 (0.0649)			
Economic pos. x Income	-0.00152 (0.0645)					
Economic pos. x Student		-0.381 (0.450)				
Economic pos. x Unemployed		0.142 (0.244)				
Economic pos. x Educational level			-0.142 (0.101)			
Migration issue positions (P-R) ^b				-0.0865 (0.0614)		
Migration pos. x Ethnic identification (EI)				0.264 (0.187)		
% Ethnic minority candidates by group				0.299*** (0.0876)		1.149** (0.495)
% Ethnic minority candidates by group x EI				0.0640* (0.0340)		0.118 (0.176)
List position ethnic minority candidates by group						
List position ethnic minority candidates x EI						
<i>Individual-specific variables</i>						
Income_CDA	-0.0342 (0.215)	-0.0360 (0.107)	-0.0364 (0.107)	-0.0384 (0.107)	-0.0411 (0.111)	-0.0373 (0.109)
Income_SP	-0.162 (0.185)	-0.158* (0.0884)	-0.158* (0.0886)	-0.156* (0.0893)	-0.165* (0.0910)	-0.160* (0.0896)
Income_VVD	0.207 (0.317)	0.202** (0.0818)	0.201** (0.0816)	0.202** (0.0816)	0.196** (0.0816)	0.200** (0.0814)
Income_PVV	-0.0909 (0.113)	-0.0903 (0.0860)	-0.0920 (0.0861)	-0.0932 (0.0860)	-0.0936 (0.0866)	-0.0919 (0.0862)

Income_GL	0.0760 (0.107)	0.0789 (0.0877)	0.0776 (0.0880)	0.0781 (0.0876)	0.0768 (0.0883)	0.0793 (0.0872)
Income_D66	0.309* (0.182)	0.306*** (0.0852)	0.307*** (0.0855)	0.303*** (0.0847)	0.301*** (0.0853)	0.304*** (0.0857)
Employment status (employed=ref.)						
Student_CDA	-0.533 (0.557)	0.616 (1.515)	-0.513 (0.562)	-0.501 (0.551)	0.0317 (0.584)	-0.298 (0.562)
Student_SP	-0.164 (0.457)	-1.008 (1.053)	-0.172 (0.457)	-0.0783 (0.455)	0.461 (0.495)	0.140 (0.467)
Student_VVD	-0.373 (0.473)	1.476 (2.289)	-0.358 (0.478)	-0.320 (0.470)	-0.233 (0.473)	-0.343 (0.464)
Student_PVV	-0.830* (0.499)	-0.285 (0.834)	-0.834* (0.500)	-0.734 (0.511)	-0.577 (0.506)	-0.753 (0.499)
Student_GL	-0.262 (0.462)	-0.529 (0.525)	-0.256 (0.466)	-0.319 (0.463)	-0.103 (0.467)	-0.417 (0.466)
Student_D66	-0.300 (0.457)	0.668 (1.236)	-0.285 (0.459)	-0.364 (0.453)	-0.228 (0.452)	-0.301 (0.454)
Unemployed_CDA	-0.402 (0.441)	-0.809 (0.914)	-0.401 (0.445)	-0.405 (0.438)	-0.491 (0.450)	-0.435 (0.447)
Unemployed_SP	-0.192 (0.325)	0.155 (0.625)	-0.192 (0.324)	-0.195 (0.325)	-0.280 (0.329)	-0.233 (0.327)
Unemployed_VVD	-0.0923 (0.287)	-0.757 (1.215)	-0.0911 (0.288)	-0.0881 (0.286)	-0.112 (0.284)	-0.0927 (0.286)
Unemployed_PVV	0.157 (0.310)	-0.00406 (0.455)	0.153 (0.310)	0.149 (0.307)	0.129 (0.306)	0.151 (0.308)
Unemployed_GL	-0.412 (0.343)	-0.286 (0.378)	-0.411 (0.344)	-0.401 (0.340)	-0.427 (0.340)	-0.394 (0.341)
Unemployed_D66	-0.493 (0.313)	-0.853 (0.762)	-0.475 (0.315)	-0.474 (0.309)	-0.485 (0.308)	-0.487 (0.312)
Educational level_CDA	0.0738 (0.125)	0.0785 (0.124)	0.519 (0.342)	0.0765 (0.125)	0.126 (0.128)	0.0944 (0.126)
Educational level_SP	0.106 (0.108)	0.109 (0.107)	-0.202 (0.240)	0.110 (0.107)	0.160 (0.110)	0.131 (0.109)

Educational level_VVD

Educational level_PVV

Educational level_GL

Educational level_D66

Ethnic identification_CDA

Ethnic identification_SP

Ethnic identification_VVD

Ethnic identification_PVV

Ethnic identification_GL

Ethnic identification_D66

Control variables

Age_CDA

Age_SP

Age_VVD

Age_PVV

Age_GL

Age_D66

Women_CDA

0.357*** (0.109)	0.361*** (0.109)	1.058** (0.512)	0.362*** (0.108)	0.362*** (0.105)	0.356*** (0.107)
-0.122	-0.119	0.0741	-0.118	-0.107	-0.119
(0.0983)	(0.0980)	(0.173)	(0.0981)	(0.0968)	(0.0978)
0.346*** (0.120)	0.350*** (0.120)	0.261** (0.133)	0.335*** (0.118)	0.352*** (0.117)	0.312*** (0.117)
0.230** (0.104)	0.234** (0.105)	0.609** (0.294)	0.218** (0.103)	0.218** (0.101)	0.227** (0.104)
0.0874 (0.141)	0.0898 (0.141)	0.0879 (0.141)	-0.420 (0.397)	0.121 (0.144)	0.148 (0.170)
-0.114 (0.116)	-0.114 (0.116)	-0.113 (0.116)	-0.228 (0.144)	-0.0564 (0.123)	-0.0795 (0.134)
-0.122 (0.109)	-0.120 (0.109)	-0.121 (0.110)	-0.827 (0.524)	-0.199* (0.117)	-0.0704 (0.136)
-0.164 (0.115)	-0.165 (0.115)	-0.163 (0.115)	-1.586 (1.020)	-0.145 (0.116)	-0.106 (0.148)
-0.00296 (0.117)	-0.00131 (0.117)	-0.00204 (0.117)	0.710 (0.511)	-0.0156 (0.117)	0.0476 (0.138)
0.0320 (0.112)	0.0384 (0.112)	0.0317 (0.112)	0.535 (0.363)	0.0178 (0.112)	0.0385 (0.112)
-0.0124 (0.0584)	-0.0155 (0.0582)	-0.0120 (0.0586)	-0.00558 (0.0570)	0.0883 (0.0650)	0.0275 (0.0602)
0.00251 (0.0488)	-0.00149 (0.0488)	0.00114 (0.0488)	0.0154 (0.0476)	0.103* (0.0556)	0.0489 (0.0512)
-0.111** (0.0492)	-0.114** (0.0491)	-0.110** (0.0493)	-0.103** (0.0472)	-0.0854* (0.0466)	-0.107** (0.0463)
-0.174*** (0.0506)	-0.179*** (0.0507)	-0.175*** (0.0508)	-0.159*** (0.0521)	-0.134*** (0.0514)	-0.163*** (0.0504)
-0.137*** (0.0508)	-0.141*** (0.0508)	-0.137*** (0.0509)	-0.148*** (0.0514)	-0.113*** (0.0506)	-0.170*** (0.0527)
-0.0820* (0.0467)	-0.0840* (0.0467)	-0.0867* (0.0469)	-0.0932** (0.0459)	-0.0743* (0.0449)	-0.0827* (0.0457)
0.311 (0.294)	0.307 (0.294)	0.325 (0.295)	0.329 (0.292)	0.623** (0.313)	0.434 (0.301)

Women_SP	-0.154 (0.247)	-0.156 (0.247)	-0.155 (0.247)	-0.128 (0.246)	0.122 (0.261)	-0.0263 (0.253)
Women_VVD	-0.222 (0.233)	-0.228 (0.232)	-0.213 (0.233)	-0.208 (0.231)	-0.142 (0.228)	-0.207 (0.228)
Women_PVV	-0.155 (0.246)	-0.154 (0.246)	-0.152 (0.246)	-0.109 (0.250)	-0.0371 (0.245)	-0.122 (0.245)
Women_GL	-0.272 (0.248)	-0.275 (0.247)	-0.266 (0.248)	-0.296 (0.247)	-0.193 (0.245)	-0.327 (0.245)
Women_D66	-0.190 (0.229)	-0.207 (0.229)	-0.182 (0.229)	-0.217 (0.227)	-0.150 (0.223)	-0.184 (0.227)
Survey (NELLS=ref.)						
Mifare_CDA	-0.981** (0.409)	-0.973** (0.411)	-0.922** (0.411)	-0.948** (0.407)	-2.619*** (0.636)	-0.831** (0.419)
Mifare_SP	-0.476 (0.364)	-0.474 (0.364)	-0.499 (0.368)	-0.485 (0.363)	-1.512*** (0.495)	-0.485 (0.373)
Mifare_VVD	0.429 (0.389)	0.443 (0.390)	0.502 (0.394)	0.428 (0.360)	-0.707 (0.467)	0.911** (0.427)
Mifare_PVV	1.120*** (0.361)	1.139*** (0.362)	1.136*** (0.365)	1.470*** (0.441)	0.567 (0.390)	1.811*** (0.476)
Mifare_GL	0.387 (0.374)	0.392 (0.373)	0.385 (0.377)	0.274 (0.375)	-0.0982 (0.393)	1.511** (0.608)
Mifare_D66	0.315 (0.380)	0.328 (0.380)	0.527 (0.398)	0.154 (0.346)	-0.0271 (0.341)	0.339 (0.346)
LISS_CDA	-0.221 (0.555)	-0.191 (0.556)	-0.214 (0.556)	-0.218 (0.556)	-0.0828 (0.567)	-0.194 (0.561)
LISS_SP	0.375 (0.489)	0.378 (0.491)	0.376 (0.490)	0.376 (0.490)	0.679 (0.509)	0.498 (0.500)
LISS_VVD	1.181** (0.494)	1.216** (0.496)	1.204** (0.497)	1.202** (0.487)	1.245*** (0.469)	1.182** (0.477)
LISS_PVV	2.181*** (0.492)	2.193*** (0.494)	2.209*** (0.494)	2.400*** (0.531)	2.374*** (0.487)	2.242*** (0.490)
LISS_GL	0.445 (0.555)	0.465 (0.557)	0.461 (0.557)	0.342 (0.554)	0.493 (0.544)	0.252 (0.547)
LISS_D66	1.378*** (0.466)	1.422*** (0.468)	1.343*** (0.465)	1.272*** (0.461)	1.294*** (0.447)	1.353*** (0.459)
N	6.699					

Note: ^a Left-Right ^b Permissive – Restrictive. Standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.

TABLE B.10 | Conditional logistic regression for vote choice; substantive representation with and without quadratic term

	Non-Western				Western			
	Model 3a	Model 3b	Model 3c	Model 3d	Model 3a	Model 3b	Model 3c	Model 3d
Alternative-specific variables	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B
Migration issue positions (p-R) ^a	-0.281*** (0.0293)	-0.334*** (0.0345)	-0.280*** (0.0293)	-0.338*** (0.0345)	-0.0837 (0.0614)	-0.0756 (0.0640)	-0.0865 (0.0614)	-0.0809 (0.0645)
Migration issue positions (p-R) ²		-0.181*** (0.0133)		-0.181*** (0.0133)		-0.0159 (0.0264)		-0.0175 (0.0265)
Migration pos. x Ethnic identification (EI)			-0.166 (0.137)	-0.196 (0.136)			0.264 (0.187)	0.247 (0.187)
Migration pos. ² x EI				-0.0582*** (0.0217)				-0.0214 (0.0246)
Individual-specific variables								
Income_CDA	0.0721 (0.0601)	0.0729 (0.0589)	0.0707 (0.0601)	0.0720 (0.0589)	-0.0381 (0.107)	-0.0379 (0.107)	-0.0384 (0.107)	-0.0388 (0.107)
Income_SP	0.0216 (0.0464)	0.0255 (0.0450)	0.0204 (0.0467)	0.0246 (0.0452)	-0.158* (0.0888)	-0.158* (0.0887)	-0.156* (0.0893)	-0.155* (0.0891)
Income_VVD	0.297*** (0.0544)	0.299*** (0.0546)	0.296*** (0.0545)	0.299*** (0.0546)	0.201*** (0.0816)	0.201*** (0.0816)	0.202*** (0.0816)	0.201*** (0.0815)
Income_PVV	0.108 (0.0668)	0.107 (0.0740)	0.106 (0.0668)	0.106 (0.0739)	-0.0932 (0.0863)	-0.0932 (0.0863)	-0.0932 (0.0860)	-0.0933 (0.0860)
Income_GL	0.0375 (0.0485)	0.0147 (0.0504)	0.0363 (0.0482)	0.0133 (0.0501)	0.0774 (0.0877)	0.0777 (0.0878)	0.0781 (0.0876)	0.0792 (0.0877)
Income_D66	0.178*** (0.0459)	0.172*** (0.0462)	0.177*** (0.0460)	0.170*** (0.0463)	0.303*** (0.0852)	0.303*** (0.0851)	0.303*** (0.0847)	0.305*** (0.0846)
Employment status (employed=ref.)								
Student_CDA	-1.014*** (0.214)	-0.908*** (0.213)	-1.018*** (0.213)	-0.905*** (0.213)	-0.499 (0.552)	-0.509 (0.552)	-0.501 (0.551)	-0.512 (0.550)
Student_SP	-0.572*** (0.153)	-0.637*** (0.150)	-0.574*** (0.152)	-0.637*** (0.150)	-0.0953 (0.452)	-0.108 (0.452)	-0.0783 (0.455)	-0.0917 (0.454)

Student_VVD	-0.594*** (0.206)	-0.0464 (0.213)	-0.597*** (0.206)	-0.0323 (0.213)	-0.337 (0.470)	-0.311 (0.473)	-0.320 (0.470)	-0.310 (0.474)
Student_PVW	-1.302*** (0.313)	0.360 (0.353)	-1.312*** (0.311)	0.359 (0.351)	-0.703 (0.512)	-0.619 (0.532)	-0.734 (0.511)	-0.646 (0.531)
Student_GL	-1.122*** (0.154)	-0.182 (0.170)	-1.123*** (0.153)	-0.191 (0.169)	-0.323 (0.464)	-0.251 (0.482)	-0.319 (0.463)	-0.235 (0.481)
Student_D66	-0.763*** (0.155)	-0.199 (0.160)	-0.763*** (0.155)	-0.208 (0.160)	-0.365 (0.454)	-0.318 (0.461)	-0.364 (0.453)	-0.303 (0.461)
Unemployed_CDA	0.0683 (0.174)	0.0558 (0.172)	0.0663 (0.174)	0.0545 (0.172)	-0.408 (0.442)	-0.405 (0.441)	-0.405 (0.438)	-0.404 (0.436)
Unemployed_SP	-0.119 (0.137)	-0.124 (0.134)	-0.121 (0.136)	-0.126 (0.133)	-0.201 (0.324)	-0.198 (0.323)	-0.195 (0.325)	-0.192 (0.324)
Unemployed_VVD	-0.179 (0.197)	-0.173 (0.200)	-0.180 (0.198)	-0.172 (0.200)	-0.0942 (0.287)	-0.0965 (0.287)	-0.0881 (0.286)	-0.0928 (0.285)
Unemployed_PVW	0.229 (0.200)	0.284 (0.225)	0.228 (0.200)	0.282 (0.225)	0.147 (0.309)	0.142 (0.310)	0.149 (0.307)	0.142 (0.307)
Unemployed_GL	-0.308** (0.142)	-0.269* (0.145)	-0.308** (0.142)	-0.271* (0.145)	-0.406 (0.342)	-0.412 (0.343)	-0.401 (0.340)	-0.406 (0.341)
Unemployed_D66	-0.179 (0.152)	-0.153 (0.153)	-0.181 (0.152)	-0.158 (0.152)	-0.479 (0.312)	-0.484 (0.312)	-0.474 (0.309)	-0.480 (0.309)
Educational level_CDA	0.182*** (0.0618)	0.170*** (0.0608)	0.181*** (0.0618)	0.169*** (0.0609)	0.0774 (0.125)	0.0752 (0.124)	0.0765 (0.125)	0.0746 (0.124)
Educational level_SP	0.176*** (0.0470)	0.171*** (0.0462)	0.176*** (0.0468)	0.171*** (0.0460)	0.112 (0.107)	0.109 (0.107)	0.110 (0.107)	0.108 (0.107)
Educational level_VVD	0.332*** (0.0560)	0.312*** (0.0564)	0.331*** (0.0560)	0.310*** (0.0563)	0.363*** (0.108)	0.363*** (0.108)	0.362*** (0.108)	0.363*** (0.108)
Educational level_PVW	0.148** (0.0687)	0.0942 (0.0739)	0.147** (0.0688)	0.0938 (0.0739)	-0.119 (0.0984)	-0.116 (0.0985)	-0.118 (0.0981)	-0.115 (0.0984)
Educational level_GL	0.333*** (0.0463)	0.312*** (0.0472)	0.332*** (0.0463)	0.312*** (0.0472)	0.334*** (0.119)	0.343*** (0.120)	0.335*** (0.118)	0.344*** (0.120)
Educational level_D66	0.465*** (0.0481)	0.445*** (0.0481)	0.464*** (0.0480)	0.445*** (0.0480)	0.219** (0.103)	0.222** (0.104)	0.218** (0.103)	0.220** (0.103)

Ethnic identification_CDA	-0.0682 (0.0733)	-0.0663 (0.0719)	0.224 (0.266)	0.304 (0.265)	0.0886 (0.141)	0.0883 (0.141)	-0.420 (0.397)	-0.397 (0.394)
Ethnic identification_SP	-0.162***	-0.152***	-0.0692	-0.0727	-0.115	-0.114	-0.228	-0.236
Ethnic identification_VVD	(0.0545)	(0.0528)	(0.104)	(0.105)	(0.116)	(0.116)	(0.144)	(0.144)
Ethnic identification_PVV	-0.303***	-0.313***	0.166	0.453	-0.123	-0.123	-0.827	-0.762
Ethnic identification_GL	(0.0623)	(0.0623)	(0.404)	(0.413)	(0.110)	(0.109)	(0.524)	(0.526)
Ethnic identification_D66	-0.251***	-0.308***	0.593	1.713**	-0.169	-0.171	-1.586	-1.145
	(0.0813)	(0.0924)	(0.722)	(0.830)	(0.116)	(0.116)	(1.020)	(1.134)
	-0.0762	-0.0797	-0.501	0.0126	-0.00107	-0.00215	0.710	0.955
	(0.0561)	(0.0583)	(0.346)	(0.403)	(0.116)	(0.117)	(0.511)	(0.586)
	-0.193***	-0.196***	-0.506**	-0.201	0.0334	0.0328	0.535	0.670*
	(0.0596)	(0.0593)	(0.241)	(0.269)	(0.111)	(0.111)	(0.363)	(0.395)
Control variables								
Ethnic background (non-Western=ref.)								
Former colony_CDA	1.422*** (0.202)	1.327*** (0.198)	1.408*** (0.201)	1.311*** (0.197)				
Former colony_SP	0.891*** (0.152)	0.849*** (0.149)	0.872*** (0.153)	0.833*** (0.150)				
Former colony_VVD	1.811*** (0.190)	1.710*** (0.190)	1.789*** (0.191)	1.662*** (0.193)				
Former colony_PVV	1.848*** (0.249)	1.823*** (0.286)	1.848*** (0.248)	1.819*** (0.286)				
Former colony_GL	0.829*** (0.143)	0.680*** (0.143)	0.813*** (0.144)	0.679*** (0.143)				
Former colony_D66	0.804*** (0.154)	0.677*** (0.153)	0.784*** (0.153)	0.676*** (0.152)				
Age_CDA	-0.232*** (0.0252)	-0.213*** (0.0255)	-0.232*** (0.0252)	-0.212*** (0.0255)	-0.00655 (0.0571)	-0.00877 (0.0570)	-0.00558 (0.0570)	-0.00739 (0.0570)
Age_SP	-0.131*** (0.0176)	-0.150*** (0.0174)	-0.130*** (0.0176)	-0.149*** (0.0174)	0.0129 (0.0477)	0.0110 (0.0476)	0.0154 (0.0476)	0.0136 (0.0474)
Age_VVD	-0.207*** (0.0264)	-0.0907*** (0.0287)	-0.206*** (0.0265)	-0.0876*** (0.0288)	-0.105** (0.0472)	-0.102** (0.0476)	-0.103** (0.0472)	-0.0997** (0.0475)

Age_PVW	-0.263*** (0.0350)	0.0290 (0.0409)	-0.264*** (0.0350)	0.0299 (0.0410)	-0.159*** (0.0521)	-0.149*** (0.0549)	-0.159*** (0.0521)	-0.147*** (0.0548)
Age_GL	-0.331*** (0.0213)	-0.108*** (0.0250)	-0.330*** (0.0213)	-0.109*** (0.0250)	-0.149*** (0.0515)	-0.137*** (0.0552)	-0.148*** (0.0514)	-0.135*** (0.0552)
Age_D66	-0.325*** (0.0208)	-0.194*** (0.0224)	-0.324*** (0.0208)	-0.194*** (0.0224)	-0.0940*** (0.0460)	-0.0868* (0.0475)	-0.0932** (0.0459)	-0.0853* (0.0474)
Women_CDA	-0.538*** (0.133)	-0.480*** (0.132)	-0.536*** (0.133)	-0.478*** (0.132)	0.328 (0.292)	0.321 (0.291)	0.329 (0.292)	0.323 (0.291)
Women_SP	-0.560*** (0.0986)	-0.568*** (0.0968)	-0.560*** (0.0987)	-0.567*** (0.0969)	-0.126 (0.246)	-0.130 (0.246)	-0.128 (0.246)	-0.133 (0.245)
Women_VVD	-0.711*** (0.127)	-0.465*** (0.129)	-0.713*** (0.127)	-0.474*** (0.129)	-0.207 (0.230)	-0.196 (0.231)	-0.208 (0.231)	-0.196 (0.231)
Women_PVW	-0.687*** (0.169)	0.0944 (0.200)	-0.683*** (0.169)	0.100 (0.200)	-0.107 (0.250)	-0.0749 (0.256)	-0.109 (0.250)	-0.0732 (0.256)
Women_GL	-0.498*** (0.0980)	-0.0741 (0.104)	-0.498*** (0.0980)	-0.0746 (0.104)	-0.292 (0.247)	-0.265 (0.251)	-0.296 (0.247)	-0.268 (0.251)
Women_D66	-0.776*** (0.106)	-0.532*** (0.107)	-0.775*** (0.106)	-0.529*** (0.106)	-0.213 (0.227)	-0.194 (0.229)	-0.217 (0.227)	-0.197 (0.229)
Survey (NELLS=ref.)								
Mifare_CDA	1.183*** (0.258)	0.822*** (0.255)	1.211*** (0.259)	0.810*** (0.257)	-0.957** (0.406)	-0.976** (0.404)	-0.948** (0.407)	-0.965** (0.405)
Mifare_SP	0.780*** (0.208)	0.688*** (0.204)	0.770*** (0.209)	0.661*** (0.206)	-0.465 (0.364)	-0.465 (0.361)	-0.485 (0.363)	-0.486 (0.360)
Mifare_VVD	2.086*** (0.220)	1.248*** (0.227)	2.083*** (0.220)	1.169*** (0.230)	0.435 (0.360)	0.375 (0.371)	0.428 (0.360)	0.385 (0.372)
Mifare_PVW	3.062*** (0.269)	3.904*** (0.358)	3.088*** (0.269)	3.918*** (0.359)	1.429*** (0.441)	1.549*** (0.495)	1.470*** (0.441)	1.622*** (0.498)
Mifare_GL	0.214 (0.240)	1.065*** (0.249)	0.209 (0.240)	1.133*** (0.249)	0.287 (0.376)	0.432 (0.447)	0.274 (0.375)	0.428 (0.448)
Mifare_D66	1.004*** (0.212)	1.489*** (0.213)	1.007*** (0.212)	1.516*** (0.213)	0.159 (0.347)	0.245 (0.376)	0.154 (0.346)	0.244 (0.375)
SIM_CDA	-1.064*** (0.187)	-1.034*** (0.183)	-1.059*** (0.187)	-1.028*** (0.183)				

SIM_SP	-1.018*** (0.137)	-1.017*** (0.133)	-1.014*** (0.137)	-1.013*** (0.133)
SIM_VVD	-0.764*** (0.186)	-0.640*** (0.190)	-0.767*** (0.187)	-0.647*** (0.191)
SIM_PVV	-0.806*** (0.257)	0.321 (0.368)	-0.804*** (0.257)	0.336 (0.370)
SIM_GL	-0.314*** (0.122)	-0.0945 (0.127)	-0.309** (0.122)	-0.0933 (0.127)
SIM_D66	-0.328** (0.135)	-0.194 (0.136)	-0.323** (0.134)	-0.192 (0.135)
LISS_CDA	0.138 (0.360)	0.139 (0.356)	0.145 (0.361)	0.144 (0.357)
LISS_SP	0.883*** (0.223)	0.888*** (0.219)	0.888*** (0.223)	0.891*** (0.219)
LISS_VVD	0.710** (0.296)	0.728** (0.296)	0.726** (0.296)	0.744** (0.296)
LISS_PVV	1.873*** (0.316)	2.824*** (0.408)	1.891*** (0.315)	2.852*** (0.409)
LISS_GL	0.0906 (0.309)	0.123 (0.308)	0.0952 (0.310)	0.124 (0.308)
LISS_D66	0.970*** (0.249)	0.968*** (0.246)	0.977*** (0.249)	0.971*** (0.246)
N	31,815		6,699	

Note: ° Permissive – Restrictive. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

TABLE B.11 | Conditional logistic regression for vote choice; voter characteristics – by data set

	Model o ^a	Model o NELLs	Model o MIFARE	Model o SIM
	B	B	B	B
<i>Alternative-specific constants (ASC; Pvdta=ref)</i>				
ASC_CDA	-2.594*** (0.221)	-2.221*** (0.430)	-5.148*** (0.966)	-2.560*** (0.378)
ASC_SP	-1.282*** (0.155)	-0.804*** (0.284)	-2.336*** (0.712)	-1.209*** (0.273)
ASC_VVD	-2.138*** (0.202)	-1.656*** (0.452)	-1.050 (0.669)	-2.273*** (0.351)
ASC_PVV	-4.416*** (0.335)		-3.738*** (0.905)	
ASC_GL	-1.510*** (0.163)	-1.269*** (0.323)	-0.758 (0.882)	-0.829*** (0.231)
ASC_D66	-1.401*** (0.173)	-1.141*** (0.354)	-1.039 (0.745)	-0.378 (0.246)
<i>Individual-specific variables</i>				
Income_CDA	0.0628 (0.0633)	0.0757 (0.103)	0.0099 (0.160)	-0.0398 (0.122)
Income_SP	0.0154 (0.0462)	0.0451 (0.0683)	-0.108 (0.127)	0.0985 (0.0894)
Income_VVD	0.295*** (0.0542)	0.207** (0.100)	0.292** (0.121)	0.344*** (0.0888)
Income_PVV	0.103 (0.0718)		0.109 (0.127)	
Income_GL	0.0118 (0.0506)	-0.0464 (0.0768)	0.249 (0.154)	0.0237 (0.0773)
Income_D66	0.170*** (0.0469)	0.180** (0.0829)	0.289** (0.125)	0.0651 (0.0856)
Employment status (employed=ref.)				
Student_CDA	0.233 (0.254)	0.162 (0.409)	1.521 (1.022)	-0.0781 (0.402)

Student_SP	0.0686 (0.180)	0.187 (0.270)	-0.339 (1.191)	0.0813 (0.310)
Student_VVD	0.171 (0.228)	0.272 (0.429)	0.321 (0.818)	0.337 (0.362)
Student_PVV	0.277 (0.350)		0.582 (0.878)	
Student_GL	0.139 (0.178)	0.0794 (0.294)	0.262 (0.992)	0.262 (0.248)
Student_D66	0.347* (0.185)	0.756** (0.325)	0.487 (0.788)	-0.133 (0.283)
Unemployed_CDA	0.104 (0.183)	0.109 (0.285)	0.874* (0.470)	-0.116 (0.316)
Unemployed_SP	-0.120 (0.137)	-0.109 (0.195)	0.559 (0.402)	-0.164 (0.250)
Unemployed_VVD	-0.178 (0.199)	-0.230 (0.426)	0.177 (0.389)	-0.454 (0.316)
Unemployed_PVV	0.278 (0.217)		0.151 (0.393)	
Unemployed_GL	-0.274* (0.145)	-0.349 (0.226)	0.774 (0.528)	-0.327 (0.211)
Unemployed_D66	-0.140 (0.154)	0.0542 (0.273)	-0.296 (0.406)	-0.319 (0.238)
Educational level_CDA	0.143** (0.0641)	0.0221 (0.106)	0.626*** (0.191)	0.0666 (0.115)
Educational level_SP	0.152*** (0.0464)	0.0873 (0.0718)	0.253** (0.118)	0.194** (0.0829)
Educational level_VVD	0.303*** (0.0558)	0.409*** (0.102)	0.342*** (0.116)	0.210** (0.0897)
Educational level_PVV	0.102 (0.0723)		0.403*** (0.136)	
Educational level_GL	0.305*** (0.0471)	0.268*** (0.0742)	0.261* (0.158)	0.287*** (0.0698)

Educational level_D66	0.438*** (0.0485)	0.467*** (0.0781)	0.386*** (0.139)	0.380*** (0.0742)
Ethnic identification_CDA	-0.0791 (0.0760)	-0.102 (0.114)	-0.237 (0.242)	-0.0491 (0.126)
Ethnic identification_SP	-0.166*** (0.0538)	-0.129* (0.0739)	-0.180 (0.209)	-0.197** (0.0947)
Ethnic identification_VVD	-0.312*** (0.0618)	-0.204* (0.109)	-0.276 (0.194)	-0.498*** (0.0938)
Ethnic identification_PVV	-0.297*** (0.0887)		-0.306 (0.209)	
Ethnic identification_GL	-0.0824 (0.0584)	-0.0523 (0.0929)	-0.553** (0.248)	-0.0666 (0.0842)
Ethnic identification_D66	-0.204*** (0.0600)	-0.0416 (0.0961)	-0.503** (0.208)	-0.389*** (0.0864)
<i>Control variables</i>				
Ethnic background (other non-Western=ref.)				
Former colony_CDA	1.287*** (0.205)	1.556*** (0.389)		1.522*** (0.273)
Former colony_SP	0.775*** (0.150)	0.822** (0.338)		0.828*** (0.202)
Former colony_VVD	1.650*** (0.187)	1.926*** (0.346)		1.510*** (0.271)
Former colony_PVV	1.767*** (0.271)			
Former colony_GL	0.632*** (0.142)	0.587 (0.388)		0.658*** (0.166)
Former colony_D66	0.592*** (0.153)	1.026*** (0.352)		0.304 (0.189)
Age_CDA	0.0311 (0.0362)	0.107 (0.0828)	0.430*** (0.116)	-0.0373 (0.0498)
Age_SP	0.00599 (0.0269)	0.0402 (0.0563)	0.261*** (0.0970)	-0.0380 (0.0399)

Age_VVD	-0.0421 (0.0335)	0.0252 (0.0908)	0.0263 (0.0960)	-0.00633 (0.0469)
Age_PVV	0.0350 (0.0411)		0.170 (0.103)	
Age_GL	-0.0408 (0.0274)	0.0551 (0.0633)	-0.100 (0.134)	-0.0486 (0.0344)
Age_D66	-0.0735** (0.0294)	0.00474 (0.0716)	-0.0462 (0.108)	-0.0904** (0.0389)
Women_CDA	0.0250 (0.150)	-0.0503 (0.225)	0.490 (0.561)	0.0869 (0.235)
Women_SP	-0.269** (0.105)	-0.185 (0.149)	-0.0277 (0.405)	-0.422** (0.182)
Women_VVD	-0.359*** (0.132)	-0.577** (0.240)	0.478 (0.372)	-0.282 (0.203)
Women_PVV	0.0380 (0.194)		2.164*** (0.653)	
Women_GL	0.0751 (0.107)	0.235 (0.170)	-0.452 (0.482)	0.0590 (0.149)
Women_D66	-0.301*** (0.113)	-0.371** (0.184)	0.662 (0.409)	-0.428** (0.168)
N	31,815	12,439	3,108	14,245

Note: ^aThis is the same model as presented in Table 3.2. This model includes a control for survey, but these effects not shown in this table for reasons of clarity. Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

TABLE B.12 | Conditional logistic regression for vote choice; economic substantive representation – by data set

	Model 1a ^a		Model 1a		Model 1a		Model 1a		Model 1b ^a		Model 1b		Model 1b		Model 1c ^b		Model 1c	
	B		NELLS	MIFARE	SIM	B		NELLS	MIFARE	SIM	B		NELLS	MIFARE	B		NELLS	MIFARE
<i>Alternative-specific variables</i>																		
Economic issue positions (L-R) ^b	-0.262*** (0.0291)	-1.105*** (0.0444)	-0.0426 (0.0840)	-1.075*** (0.0395)	-0.262*** (0.0292)	-1.061*** (0.0451)	-0.0412 (0.0840)	-0.810*** (0.0421)	-0.263*** (0.0291)	-0.838*** (0.0490)	-0.104 (0.0766)	-0.709*** (0.0422)	-0.262*** (0.0291)	-1.027*** (0.0457)	-0.0521 (0.0756)	-0.927*** (0.0414)		
Economic pos. x Income					0.0962** (0.0479)	0.200*** (0.0410)	0.175 (0.182)	0.334*** (0.0434)										
Economic pos. x Student									-0.306 (0.367)	-1.736*** (0.331)	0.108 (0.620)	-10.24 (353.2)						
Economic pos. x Unemployed									-0.0930 (0.228)	-1.272*** (0.185)	-0.0185 (0.257)	-11.13 (497.2)						
Economic pos. x Educational level													0.0885 (0.0632)	0.318*** (0.0492)	0.0784 (0.354)	0.424*** (0.0420)		
<i>Individual-specific variables</i>																		
Income_CDA	0.0685 (0.0605)	0.0813 (0.108)	0.0366 (0.147)	-0.0429 (0.125)	-0.189 (0.145)	-0.418*** (0.151)	-0.492 (0.601)	-0.887*** (0.167)	0.0669 (0.0605)	0.0572 (0.106)	-0.0158 (0.136)	-0.0476 (0.120)	0.0669 (0.0605)	0.0758 (0.107)		-0.0412 (0.123)		
Income_SP	0.0307 (0.0451)	0.147** (0.0683)	-0.0844 (0.127)	0.104 (0.0837)	0.261** (0.120)	0.639*** (0.128)	0.358 (0.450)	0.962*** (0.134)	0.0284 (0.0451)	0.108 (0.0661)	-0.132 (0.115)	0.0934 (0.0821)	0.0286 (0.0453)	0.134*** (0.0672)	-0.0894 (0.126)	0.103 (0.0826)		
Income_VVD	0.300*** (0.0547)	0.163 (0.109)	0.315** (0.126)	0.404*** (0.0980)	-0.131 (0.233)	-0.693*** (0.207)	-0.523 (0.920)	-1.067*** (0.214)	0.297*** (0.0550)	0.140 (0.107)	0.264** (0.110)	0.367*** (0.0930)	0.298*** (0.0547)	0.158 (0.108)	0.304** (0.123)	0.393*** (0.0961)		
Income_PVV	0.118* (0.0641)		0.138 (0.124)		0.00480 (0.0895)		-0.0414 (0.243)		0.115* (0.0642)				0.115* (0.0643)		0.137 (0.122)			
Income_GL	0.0256 (0.0491)	0.0155 (0.0741)	0.265* (0.160)	0.0186 (0.0729)	0.110* (0.0574)	0.212** (0.0856)	0.417** (0.198)	0.372*** (0.0861)	0.0236 (0.0491)	-0.0110 (0.0738)	0.212 (0.150)	0.0195 (0.0735)	0.0238 (0.0491)	0.00602 (0.0739)	0.260 (0.158)	0.0242 (0.0730)		
Income_D66	0.174*** (0.0474)	0.193** (0.0865)	0.309** (0.129)	0.0878 (0.0991)	-0.00575 (0.102)	-0.107 (0.106)	-0.219 (0.587)	-0.414*** (0.121)	0.173*** (0.0474)	0.158* (0.0882)	0.255** (0.115)	0.0760 (0.0943)	0.172*** (0.0474)	0.183** (0.0856)	0.271** (0.122)	0.0878 (0.0971)		

Employment status (employed=ref.)

Student_CDA	-0.879*** (0.217)	0.473 (0.344)	-0.211 (0.942)	-0.111 (0.358)	-0.845*** (0.218)	0.470 (0.344)	-0.166 (0.956)	-0.381 (0.352)	0.00823 (1.094)	4.793*** (1.011)	-0.294 (1.863)	29.09 (1.035)	-0.879*** (0.217)	0.378 (0.344)	-0.288 (0.353)
Student_SP	-1.047*** (0.155)	-1.894*** (0.212)	-1.164 (1.167)	-2.411*** (0.248)	-1.001*** (0.155)	-1.772*** (0.213)	-1.123 (1.176)	-1.862*** (0.254)	-1.696** (0.783)	-5.423*** (0.706)	-0.785 (2.092)	-23.34 (731.2)	-1.041*** (0.155)	-1.757*** (0.214)	-2.157*** (0.250)
Student_VVD	-0.378* (0.215)	1.847*** (0.371)	0.109 (0.818)	1.228*** (0.370)	-0.344 (0.215)	1.811*** (0.370)	0.148 (0.823)	0.890** (0.349)	1.052 (1.725)	9.039*** (1.547)	-0.126 (2.884)	48.60 (1.667)	-0.378* (0.215)	1.685*** (0.369)	1.010*** (0.357)
Student_PVV	-1.849*** (0.295)		-0.443 (0.848)		-1.787*** (0.296)		-0.401 (0.860)		-1.374** (0.653)				-1.834*** (0.296)		-0.398 (0.835)
Student_GL	-0.831*** (0.149)	-1.283*** (0.229)	0.0773 (0.950)	-0.992*** (0.195)	-0.788*** (0.147)	-1.196*** (0.229)	0.114 (0.954)	-0.696*** (0.200)	-1.016*** (0.272)	-2.442*** (0.315)	0.318 (1.163)	-6.896 (201.3)	-0.827*** (0.149)	-1.212*** (0.228)	-0.872*** (0.196)
Student_D66	-0.189 (0.157)	1.063*** (0.260)	0.223 (0.770)	0.612** (0.256)	-0.177 (0.157)	1.086*** (0.259)	0.253 (0.771)	0.468* (0.252)	0.409 (0.727)	3.795*** (0.624)	0.139 (1.794)	19.71 (681.8)	-0.193 (0.157)	1.007*** (0.258)	0.494* (0.253)
Unemployed_CDA	0.0784 (0.175)	0.137 (0.291)	0.676 (0.449)	-0.101 (0.322)	0.0984 (0.174)	0.160 (0.292)	0.696 (0.441)	-0.0355 (0.310)	0.342 (0.678)	3.452*** (0.590)	0.717 (0.800)	32.21 (1.457)	0.0810 (0.175)	0.146 (0.290)	-0.0933 (0.316)
Unemployed_SP	-0.133 (0.134)	-0.317 (0.198)	0.474 (0.403)	-0.437* (0.233)	-0.109 (0.132)	-0.279 (0.198)	0.493 (0.394)	-0.259 (0.232)	-0.343 (0.510)	-3.244*** (0.468)	0.395 (0.797)	-23.63 (1.029)	-0.130 (0.133)	-0.285 (0.196)	-0.362 (0.231)
Unemployed_VVD	-0.180 (0.199)	-0.0893 (0.453)	0.169 (0.402)	-0.540 (0.349)	-0.161 (0.195)	-0.0704 (0.449)	0.185 (0.396)	-0.394 (0.337)	0.249 (1.116)	5.441*** (0.943)	0.244 (1.233)	51.79 (2.347)	-0.177 (0.198)	-0.0831 (0.449)	-0.501 (0.342)
Unemployed_PVV	0.172 (0.193)		0.0312 (0.392)		0.204 (0.194)		0.0467 (0.385)		0.294 (0.378)				0.178 (0.194)		-0.0367 (0.387)
Unemployed_GL	-0.283** (0.142)	-0.444*** (0.222)	0.817 (0.535)	-0.395*** (0.200)	-0.261* (0.142)	-0.415* (0.222)	0.824 (0.540)	-0.293 (0.202)	-0.349* (0.192)	-1.505*** (0.262)	0.761 (0.540)	-6.983 (283.4)	-0.280*** (0.142)	-0.426* (0.223)	-0.362* (0.200)
Unemployed_D66	-0.142 (0.154)	0.109 (0.276)	-0.306 (0.413)	-0.327 (0.261)	-0.133 (0.154)	0.134 (0.276)	-0.296 (0.411)	-0.232 (0.256)	0.0478 (0.519)	2.147*** (0.408)	-0.273 (0.795)	20.90 (959.7)	-0.141 (0.154)	0.119 (0.275)	-0.307 (0.258)
Educational level_CDA	0.174*** (0.0619)	0.0238 (0.108)	0.302** (0.142)	0.0559 (0.118)	0.167*** (0.0622)	0.0184 (0.108)	0.292** (0.143)	0.0561 (0.113)	0.174*** (0.0619)	0.0270 (0.108)	0.220 (0.135)	0.0926 (0.112)	-0.0816 (0.196)	-0.775*** (0.168)	-1.047*** (0.159)
Educational level_SP	0.187*** (0.0466)	0.157** (0.0742)	0.141 (0.111)	0.263*** (0.0767)	0.180*** (0.0468)	0.150** (0.0735)	0.132 (0.111)	0.223*** (0.0770)	0.186*** (0.0465)	0.141* (0.0728)	0.0460 (0.102)	0.253*** (0.0766)	0.383*** (0.148)	0.940*** (0.146)	1.269*** (0.129)
Educational level_VVD	0.325*** (0.0563)	0.470*** (0.111)	0.336*** (0.119)	0.149 (0.0987)	0.319*** (0.0566)	0.463*** (0.110)	0.326*** (0.120)	0.155 (0.0958)	0.326*** (0.0563)	0.456*** (0.109)	0.257** (0.110)	0.194** (0.0939)	-0.0907 (0.306)	-0.902*** (0.246)	-1.693*** (0.204)

Educational level_PV	0.160** (0.0670)	0.246** (0.121)	0.153** (0.0668)	0.239* (0.123)	0.159** (0.0669)	0.295*** (0.0733)	0.157 (0.149)	0.308*** (0.0680)	0.0382 (0.108)	0.111 (0.477)
Educational level_GL	0.322*** (0.0466)	0.298*** (0.0734)	0.261* (0.157)	0.308*** (0.0677)	0.314*** (0.0467)	0.293*** (0.0738)	0.295*** (0.0733)	0.613*** (0.0923)	0.267 (0.264)	0.682*** (0.0794)
Educational level_D66	0.458*** (0.0492)	0.482*** (0.0800)	0.385*** (0.138)	0.388*** (0.0804)	0.455*** (0.0493)	0.478*** (0.0800)	0.481*** (0.0813)	0.393*** (0.0784)	0.284** (0.132)	0.000753 (1.174)
Ethnic identification_CDA	-0.0683 (0.0739)	-0.106 (0.118)	-0.438* (0.227)	-0.0662 (0.129)	-0.0670 (0.0739)	-0.106 (0.118)	-0.104 (0.118)	-0.0705 (0.124)	-0.0681 (0.0739)	-0.0682 (0.127)
Ethnic identification_SP	-0.151*** (0.0532)	-0.145*** (0.0738)	-0.280 (0.204)	-0.233** (0.0919)	-0.150*** (0.0530)	-0.144* (0.0735)	-0.143* (0.0740)	-0.230*** (0.0912)	-0.151*** (0.0533)	-0.231** (0.0913)
Ethnic identification_VVD	-0.308*** (0.0626)	-0.237** (0.117)	-0.312 (0.198)	-0.577*** (0.0998)	-0.307*** (0.0628)	-0.235** (0.115)	-0.231** (0.117)	-0.542*** (0.0968)	-0.231** (0.116)	-0.563*** (0.0986)
Ethnic identification_PVV	-0.230*** (0.0782)	-0.440** (0.206)	-0.430** (0.207)	-0.228*** (0.0782)	-0.231*** (0.0783)	-0.430** (0.207)	-0.231*** (0.0783)	-0.229*** (0.0784)	-0.473** (0.214)	
Ethnic identification_GL	-0.0769 (0.0569)	-0.0709 (0.0899)	-0.605** (0.252)	-0.104 (0.0824)	-0.0753 (0.0568)	-0.0710 (0.0898)	-0.0729 (0.0888)	-0.102 (0.0826)	-0.0763 (0.0569)	-0.103 (0.0824)
Ethnic identification_D66	-0.203*** (0.0611)	-0.0439 (0.100)	-0.552*** (0.211)	-0.424*** (0.0910)	-0.202*** (0.0613)	-0.0435 (0.1000)	-0.0471 (0.102)	-0.415*** (0.0897)	-0.204*** (0.0613)	-0.596*** (0.215)
Control variables										
Ethnic background (other non-Western=ref)										
Former colony_ny_CDA	1.408*** (0.203)	1.574*** (0.391)	1.595*** (0.267)	1.406*** (0.202)	1.224*** (0.256)	1.565*** (0.391)	1.557*** (0.390)	1.362*** (0.250)	1.406*** (0.202)	1.485*** (0.260)
Former colony_SP	0.938*** (0.151)	0.633* (0.352)	0.118 (0.185)	0.932*** (0.151)	0.0183 (0.185)	0.640* (0.351)	0.686** (0.348)	0.299 (0.185)	0.932*** (0.151)	0.181 (0.185)
Former colony_ny_VVD	1.797*** (0.193)	1.952*** (0.362)	2.590*** (0.351)	1.794*** (0.193)	1.837*** (0.313)	1.935*** (0.361)	1.913*** (0.361)	1.893*** (0.292)	1.797*** (0.193)	2.274*** (0.327)
Former colony_ny_PVV	1.827*** (0.238)			1.817*** (0.238)	-16.42 (350.1)				1.816*** (0.238)	
Former colony_GL	0.795*** (0.143)	0.474 (0.391)	0.378** (0.159)	0.790*** (0.143)	0.197 (0.161)	0.477 (0.391)	0.489 (0.392)	0.443*** (0.160)	0.792*** (0.143)	0.394** (0.159)

Former color_D66	0.713*** (0.156)	1.009*** (0.354)	0.456** (0.201)	0.714*** (0.156)	1.003*** (0.354)	0.187 (0.201)	0.713*** (0.155)	1.012*** (0.358)	0.401** (0.197)	0.715*** (0.156)	0.988*** (0.353)	0.418** (0.200)
Age_CDA	-0.201*** (0.0267)	0.185*** (0.0420)	-0.106 (0.0680)	-0.202*** (0.0267)	0.165*** (0.0420)	-0.107 (0.0680)	-0.200*** (0.0267)	0.0701 (0.0429)	-0.127*** (0.0378)	-0.200*** (0.0267)	0.158*** (0.0420)	-0.0673* (0.0387)
Age_SP	-0.243*** (0.0195)	-0.658*** (0.0334)	-0.0261 (0.0531)	-0.244*** (0.0195)	-0.636*** (0.0335)	-0.0258 (0.0531)	-0.243*** (0.0194)	-0.523*** (0.0346)	-0.430*** (0.0310)	-0.243*** (0.0195)	-0.611*** (0.0342)	-0.504*** (0.0316)
Age_VVD	-0.162*** (0.0292)	0.539*** (0.0520)	-0.0867 (0.0709)	-0.163*** (0.0291)	0.507*** (0.0515)	-0.0870 (0.0708)	-0.161*** (0.0291)	0.349*** (0.0547)	0.054 (0.0615)	-0.161*** (0.0292)	0.489*** (0.0520)	-0.1067 (0.0429)
Age_PVV	-0.384*** (0.0302)	-0.190*** (0.0648)	-0.190*** (0.0648)	-0.386*** (0.0302)	-0.192*** (0.0647)	-0.192*** (0.0647)	-0.382*** (0.0302)	-0.342*** (0.0290)	0.0404 (0.0615)	-0.383*** (0.0302)	-0.126** (0.0595)	
Age_GL	-0.255*** (0.0185)	-0.391*** (0.0285)	-0.190*** (0.0701)	-0.256*** (0.0185)	-0.384*** (0.0286)	-0.191*** (0.0702)	-0.254*** (0.0185)	-0.342*** (0.0290)	-0.242*** (0.0233)	-0.254*** (0.0185)	-0.370*** (0.0289)	-0.260*** (0.0234)
Age_D66	-0.189*** (0.0211)	0.0882*** (0.0336)	-0.164** (0.0703)	-0.189*** (0.0211)	0.0749** (0.0337)	-0.166** (0.0703)	-0.190*** (0.0212)	0.0166 (0.0337)	-0.0202 (0.0268)	-0.188*** (0.0211)	0.0732** (0.0334)	0.0271 (0.0270)
Women_CDA	-0.479*** (0.135)	0.0142 (0.220)	-0.630 (0.440)	-0.482*** (0.135)	-0.00202 (0.219)	-0.644 (0.438)	-0.476*** (0.135)	-0.0580 (0.216)	-0.130 (0.217)	-0.479*** (0.135)	-0.0205 (0.219)	-6.268 (974.7)
Women_SP	-0.748*** (0.0981)	-0.906*** (0.139)	-0.608 (0.374)	-0.750*** (0.0981)	-0.881*** (0.139)	-0.623* (0.373)	-0.744*** (0.0981)	-0.739*** (0.139)	-1.098*** (0.170)	-0.748*** (0.0980)	-0.870*** (0.138)	-1.199*** (0.170)
Women_VVD	-0.624*** (0.130)	-0.170 (0.252)	0.269 (0.382)	-0.630*** (0.130)	-0.190 (0.251)	0.252 (0.382)	-0.621*** (0.130)	-0.263 (0.246)	-0.247 (0.204)	-0.626*** (0.130)	-0.216 (0.250)	-0.121 (0.210)
Women_PVV	-0.919*** (0.160)		0.815** (0.414)	-0.922*** (0.160)		0.815** (0.414)	-0.914*** (0.160)			-0.918*** (0.160)	0.531 (0.409)	
Women_GL	-0.371*** (0.0971)	-0.275* (0.150)	-0.733 (0.491)	-0.372*** (0.0970)	-0.262* (0.150)	-0.734 (0.491)	-0.367*** (0.0971)	-0.193 (0.152)	-0.341** (0.136)	-0.371*** (0.0971)	-0.262* (0.151)	-0.378*** (0.136)
Women_D66	-0.552*** (0.107)	-0.330* (0.181)	0.425 (0.405)	-0.556*** (0.107)	-0.337* (0.181)	0.427 (0.406)	-0.288* (0.164)	-0.362** (0.181)	-0.323** (0.163)	-0.553*** (0.107)	-0.354* (0.181)	-0.235 (0.165)
N	31,815	12,439	3,108	31,815	12,439	3,108	31,815	12,439	14,245	31,815	12,439	2,870

Note: ^a These models are the same as those presented in Tables B4.2 and B4.3. These models include a control for survey, but these effects not shown in this table for reasons of clarity.
^b Left-Right. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

TABLE B.13 | Conditional logistic regression for vote choice; migration and integration substantive representation – by data set

	Model 2a ^a		Model 2a		Model 2a		Model 2a		Model 2	
	B		NELLS	MIFARE	B		SIM		NELLS	MIFARE
Alternative-specific variables										
Migration issue positions (P-R) ^b	-0.281*** (0.0293)	-0.705*** (0.0348)	-0.350*** (0.0961)	-0.702*** (0.0303)	-0.280*** (0.0293)	-0.705*** (0.0350)	-0.350*** (0.0961)	-0.697*** (0.0304)	-0.705*** (0.0350)	-0.350*** (0.0961)
Migration pos. x Ethnic identification					-0.166 (0.137)	-0.0341 (0.0386)		-0.0557 (0.0372)		
Alternative-specific variables										
Income_CDA	0.0721 (0.0601)	0.110 (0.101)	0.0308 (0.148)	-0.0517 (0.116)	0.0707 (0.0601)	0.110 (0.101)	0.0309 (0.148)	-0.0516 (0.116)		
Income_SP	0.0216 (0.0464)	0.0679 (0.0685)	-0.0873 (0.127)	0.0865 (0.0888)	0.0204 (0.0467)	0.0677 (0.0685)	-0.0871 (0.127)	0.0865 (0.0887)		
Income_VVD	0.297*** (0.0544)	0.215** (0.103)	0.314** (0.126)	0.340*** (0.0900)	0.296*** (0.0545)	0.215** (0.103)	0.315** (0.125)	0.339*** (0.0899)		
Income_PVV	0.108 (0.0668)		0.128 (0.127)		0.106 (0.0668)		0.126 (0.127)			
Income_GL	0.0375 (0.0485)	0.0729 (0.0725)	0.258* (0.156)	0.0311 (0.0737)	0.0363 (0.0482)	0.0728 (0.0725)	0.259* (0.155)	0.0310 (0.0737)		
Income_D66	0.178*** (0.0459)	0.252*** (0.0804)	0.302** (0.127)	0.0585 (0.0822)	0.177*** (0.0460)	0.252*** (0.0804)	0.301** (0.127)	0.0585 (0.0822)		
Employment status (employed=ref.)										
Student_CDA	-1.014*** (0.214)	-0.700** (0.329)	0.0148 (0.937)	-1.231*** (0.336)	-1.018*** (0.213)	-0.700** (0.329)	0.0282 (0.939)	-1.235*** (0.336)		
Student_SP	-0.572*** (0.153)	-0.325 (0.209)	-1.096 (1.160)	-0.795*** (0.256)	-0.574*** (0.152)	-0.325 (0.209)	-1.068 (1.166)	-0.797*** (0.256)		
Student_VVD	-0.594*** (0.206)	0.178 (0.350)	0.341 (0.808)	-0.258 (0.320)	-0.597*** (0.206)	0.179 (0.351)	0.369 (0.823)	-0.264 (0.320)		
Student_PVV	-1.302*** (0.313)		0.0989 (0.867)		-1.312*** (0.311)		0.113 (0.861)			
Student_GL	-1.122*** (0.154)	-1.852*** (0.232)	-0.312 (0.948)	-1.724*** (0.201)	-1.123*** (0.153)	-1.852*** (0.232)	-0.291 (0.954)	-1.716*** (0.201)		
Student_D66	-0.763*** (0.155)	-0.932*** (0.246)	-0.0467 (0.760)	-1.575*** (0.233)	-0.763*** (0.155)	-0.933*** (0.246)	-0.0162 (0.775)	-1.569*** (0.233)		

Unemployed_CDA	0.0683 (0.174)	0.0566 (0.279)	0.707 (0.452)	-0.153 (0.296)	0.0663 (0.174)	0.0564 (0.279)	0.699 (0.456)	-0.154 (0.296)
Unemployed_SP	-0.119 (0.137)	-0.136 (0.195)	0.483 (0.404)	-0.162 (0.243)	-0.121 (0.136)	-0.136 (0.195)	0.477 (0.407)	-0.162 (0.243)
Unemployed_VVD	-0.179 (0.197)	-0.216 (0.430)	0.199 (0.407)	-0.414 (0.315)	-0.180 (0.198)	-0.215 (0.430)	0.191 (0.412)	-0.414 (0.315)
Unemployed_PVV	0.229 (0.200)		0.0881 (0.399)		0.228 (0.200)		0.0749 (0.404)	
Unemployed_GL	-0.308** (0.142)	-0.511** (0.223)	0.714 (0.525)	-0.478** (0.201)	-0.308** (0.142)	-0.511** (0.223)	0.709 (0.524)	-0.477** (0.201)
Unemployed_D66	-0.179 (0.152)	-0.148 (0.268)	-0.353 (0.412)	-0.407* (0.231)	-0.181 (0.152)	-0.149 (0.268)	-0.363 (0.414)	-0.406* (0.231)
Educational level_CDA	0.182*** (0.0618)	0.0540 (0.104)	0.336** (0.144)	0.134 (0.109)	0.181*** (0.0618)	0.0536 (0.104)	0.338** (0.144)	0.134 (0.109)
Educational level_SP	0.176*** (0.0470)	0.111 (0.0730)	0.149 (0.109)	0.240*** (0.0828)	0.176*** (0.0468)	0.111 (0.0729)	0.149 (0.109)	0.240*** (0.0827)
Educational level_VVD	0.332*** (0.0560)	0.443*** (0.105)	0.376*** (0.120)	0.237*** (0.0912)	0.331*** (0.0560)	0.442*** (0.105)	0.375*** (0.120)	0.237*** (0.0912)
Educational level_PVV	0.148** (0.0687)		0.329** (0.131)		0.147** (0.0688)		0.331** (0.131)	
Educational level_GL	0.333*** (0.0463)	0.354*** (0.0732)	0.192 (0.150)	0.353*** (0.0685)	0.332*** (0.0463)	0.354*** (0.0731)	0.193 (0.150)	0.353*** (0.0685)
Educational level_D66	0.465*** (0.0481)	0.525*** (0.0775)	0.309** (0.130)	0.440*** (0.0743)	0.464*** (0.0480)	0.524*** (0.0775)	0.310** (0.130)	0.439*** (0.0743)
Ethnic identification_CDA	-0.0682 (0.0733)	-0.107 (0.113)	-0.411* (0.226)	-0.0988 (0.123)	0.224 (0.266)	-0.0532 (0.131)	-0.0612 (0.1391)	-0.00177 (0.138)
Ethnic identification_SP	-0.162*** (0.0545)	-0.134* (0.0742)	-0.271 (0.204)	-0.238** (0.0956)	-0.0692 (0.104)	-0.118 (0.0773)	-0.233 (0.300)	-0.205** (0.0979)
Ethnic identification_VVD	-0.303*** (0.0623)	-0.216* (0.111)	-0.279 (0.197)	-0.542*** (0.0959)	0.166 (0.404)	-0.123 (0.159)	0.155 (0.723)	-0.381*** (0.143)
Ethnic identification_PVV	-0.251*** (0.0813)		-0.367* (0.208)		0.593 (0.722)		0.578 (3.639)	

Ethnic identification_GL	-0.0762 (0.0561)	-0.0845 (0.0869)	-0.636** (0.248)	-0.156* (0.0829)	-0.501 (0.346)	-0.177 (0.134)	-1.126 (1.723)	-0.298** (0.127)
Ethnic identification_D66	-0.193*** (0.0596)	-0.0609 (0.0907)	-0.579*** (0.207)	-0.437*** (0.0879)	-0.506** (0.241)	-0.130 (0.115)	-0.930 (1.214)	-0.541*** (0.113)
<i>Control variables</i>								
Ethnic background (other non-Western=ref.)								
Former colony_CDA	1.422*** (0.202)	1.540*** (0.390)	1.207*** (0.243)	1.207*** (0.243)	1.408*** (0.201)	1.540*** (0.389)		1.205*** (0.243)
Former colony_SP	0.891*** (0.152)	0.817** (0.340)	0.695*** (0.198)	0.695*** (0.198)	0.872*** (0.153)	0.818** (0.340)		0.694*** (0.198)
Former colony_VVD	1.811*** (0.190)	1.928*** (0.350)	1.554*** (0.263)	1.554*** (0.263)	1.789*** (0.191)	1.929*** (0.350)		1.549*** (0.263)
Former colony_PVV	1.848*** (0.249)				1.848*** (0.248)			
Former colony_GL	0.829*** (0.143)	0.513 (0.398)	0.267* (0.161)	0.267* (0.161)	0.813*** (0.144)	0.514 (0.398)		0.269* (0.161)
Former colony_D66	0.804*** (0.154)	1.029*** (0.359)	0.0729 (0.186)	0.0729 (0.186)	0.784*** (0.153)	1.029*** (0.359)		0.0745 (0.186)
Age_CDA	-0.232*** (0.0252)	-0.162*** (0.0377)	-0.0343 (0.0642)	-0.226*** (0.0361)	-0.232*** (0.0252)	-0.161*** (0.0377)	-0.0330 (0.0644)	-0.227*** (0.0361)
Age_SP	-0.131*** (0.0176)	-0.121*** (0.0243)	-0.000979 (0.0477)	-0.184*** (0.0268)	-0.130*** (0.0176)	-0.121*** (0.0243)	0.000942 (0.0478)	-0.184*** (0.0268)
Age_VVD	-0.207*** (0.0264)	-3.71e-05 (0.0430)	-0.0105 (0.0611)	-0.105*** (0.0364)	-0.206*** (0.0265)	0.000153 (0.0430)	-0.00846 (0.0612)	-0.106*** (0.0363)
Age_PVV	-0.263*** (0.0350)		-0.0223 (0.0807)		-0.264*** (0.0350)		-0.0213 (0.0805)	
Age_GL	-0.331*** (0.0213)	-0.623*** (0.0337)	-0.311*** (0.0775)	-0.439*** (0.0259)	-0.330*** (0.0213)	-0.623*** (0.0338)	-0.309*** (0.0775)	-0.437*** (0.0259)
Age_D66	-0.325*** (0.0208)	-0.564*** (0.0343)	-0.249*** (0.0644)	-0.367*** (0.0263)	-0.324*** (0.0208)	-0.564*** (0.0343)	-0.247*** (0.0646)	-0.366*** (0.0263)
Women_CDA	-0.538*** (0.133)	-0.345* (0.207)	-0.493 (0.441)	-0.362* (0.212)	-0.536*** (0.133)	-0.344* (0.207)	-0.481 (0.442)	-0.364* (0.212)

Women_SP	-0.560*** (0.0986)	-0.364*** (0.141)	-0.544 (0.369)	-0.747*** (0.172)	-0.560*** (0.0987)	-0.363** (0.141)	-0.532 (0.372)	-0.747*** (0.172)
Women_VVD	-0.711*** (0.127)	-0.643*** (0.235)	0.456 (0.375)	-0.517*** (0.198)	-0.713*** (0.127)	-0.643*** (0.235)	0.468 (0.375)	-0.519*** (0.197)
Women_PVV	-0.687*** (0.169)		1.621*** (0.533)		-0.683*** (0.169)		1.644*** (0.535)	
Women_GL	-0.498*** (0.0980)	-0.542*** (0.150)	-0.836* (0.471)	-0.689*** (0.138)	-0.498*** (0.0980)	-0.541*** (0.150)	-0.828* (0.469)	-0.686*** (0.138)
Women_D66	-0.776*** (0.106)	-0.934*** (0.171)	0.252 (0.381)	-0.956*** (0.159)	-0.775*** (0.106)	-0.933*** (0.171)	0.263 (0.382)	-0.954*** (0.159)
N	31,815	12,439	3,108	14,245	31,815	12,439	3,108	14,245

Note: ^a These models are the same as those presented in Tables B4.2 and B4.3. These models include a control for survey, but these effects not shown in this table for reasons of clarity.

^b Permissive – Restrictive. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Student_SP	-0.660*** (0.152)	-0.261 (0.207)	-1.055 (1.178)	-0.668*** (0.255)	-0.664*** (0.152)	-0.261 (0.207)	-1.046 (1.176)	-0.651*** (0.256)	-0.642*** (0.152)	-0.357* (0.212)	-1.100 (1.167)	-0.681*** (0.256)	-0.642*** (0.152)	-0.359* (0.212)	-1.092 (1.166)	-0.693*** (0.256)
Student_VVD	-0.984*** (0.199)	-0.397 (0.341)	0.309 (0.806)	-0.641** (0.303)	-0.988*** (0.199)	-0.395 (0.342)	0.326 (0.802)	-0.618*** (0.303)	-1.042*** (0.198)	-0.840** (0.342)	0.0782 (0.803)	-1.172*** (0.293)	-1.041*** (0.198)	-0.833** (0.341)	0.0959 (0.804)	-1.250*** (0.295)
Student_PVV	-1.978*** (0.295)		-0.147 (0.842)		-1.984*** (0.294)		-0.122 (0.841)		-1.915*** (0.297)		-0.418 (0.852)		-1.916*** (0.297)		-0.400 (0.851)	
Student_GL	-0.841*** (0.151)	-1.520*** (0.249)	0.153 (0.961)	-1.619*** (0.215)	-0.841*** (0.151)	-1.515*** (0.249)	0.155 (0.961)	-1.623*** (0.215)	-0.685*** (0.150)	-0.749*** (0.234)	0.0548 (0.954)	-0.311 (0.201)	-0.685*** (0.150)	-0.749*** (0.234)	0.0267 (0.954)	-0.336* (0.201)
Student_D66	-0.414*** (0.154)	0.225 (0.246)	0.345 (0.763)	-0.173 (0.241)	-0.417*** (0.154)	0.224 (0.246)	0.358 (0.758)	-0.160 (0.242)	-0.594*** (0.154)	-0.625** (0.245)	0.163 (0.764)	-0.989*** (0.235)	-0.594*** (0.154)	-0.624** (0.245)	0.150 (0.763)	-1.014*** (0.237)
Unemployed_CDA	0.0530 (0.172)	0.0218 (0.276)	0.772* (0.446)	-0.167 (0.292)	0.0523 (0.172)	0.0223 (0.276)	0.779* (0.446)	-0.166 (0.292)	0.0465 (0.172)	0.0141 (0.275)	0.655 (0.449)	-0.246 (0.282)	0.0469 (0.172)	0.0159 (0.275)	0.623 (0.448)	-0.252 (0.283)
Unemployed_SP	-0.116 (0.136)	-0.132 (0.194)	0.667 (0.409)	-0.159 (0.242)	-0.117 (0.136)	-0.132 (0.194)	0.689* (0.410)	-0.157 (0.242)	-0.114 (0.136)	-0.144 (0.198)	0.497 (0.403)	-0.167 (0.242)	-0.114 (0.136)	-0.142 (0.198)	0.514 (0.402)	-0.171 (0.242)
Unemployed_VVD	-0.197 (0.192)	-0.321 (0.420)	0.344 (0.407)	-0.428 (0.303)	-0.199 (0.192)	-0.322 (0.420)	0.361 (0.407)	-0.425 (0.303)	-0.205 (0.192)	-0.335 (0.428)	0.170 (0.401)	-0.469 (0.295)	-0.205 (0.192)	-0.344 (0.428)	0.175 (0.400)	-0.478 (0.296)
Unemployed_PVV	0.167 (0.192)		0.205 (0.396)		0.166 (0.192)		0.222 (0.396)		0.174 (0.193)		0.0371 (0.392)		0.174 (0.193)		0.0411 (0.391)	
Unemployed_GL	-0.286*** (0.144)	-0.516*** (0.236)	1.002* (0.531)	-0.495*** (0.211)	-0.288*** (0.144)	-0.530*** (0.236)	1.031* (0.530)	-0.495*** (0.211)	-0.274* (0.144)	-0.464** (0.229)	0.820 (0.534)	-0.307 (0.209)	-0.274* (0.144)	-0.467** (0.229)	0.828 (0.534)	-0.310 (0.209)
Unemployed_D66	-0.150 (0.153)	-0.0159 (0.269)	-0.186 (0.413)	-0.300 (0.245)	-0.151 (0.153)	-0.0170 (0.270)	-0.173 (0.412)	-0.298 (0.246)	-0.160 (0.153)	-0.0770 (0.267)	-0.316 (0.412)	-0.345 (0.233)	-0.160 (0.153)	-0.0777 (0.267)	-0.323 (0.412)	-0.349 (0.234)
Educational level_CDA	0.182*** (0.0610)	0.0537 (0.103)	0.221 (0.142)	0.143 (0.107)	0.182*** (0.0610)	0.0531 (0.103)	0.229 (0.142)	0.141 (0.107)	0.202*** (0.0607)	0.0912 (0.102)	0.309** (0.142)	0.169 (0.103)	0.202*** (0.0607)	0.0916 (0.102)	0.314** (0.144)	0.170* (0.103)

Educational level_SP	0.166*** (0.0471)	0.0941 (0.0727)	-0.0208 (0.116)	0.229*** (0.0823)	0.165*** (0.0471)	0.0942 (0.0728)	-0.0148 (0.116)	0.228*** (0.0823)	0.163*** (0.0472)	0.0444 (0.0737)	0.132 (0.113)	0.227*** (0.0825)	0.162*** (0.0472)	0.0444 (0.0737)	0.141 (0.113)	0.225*** (0.0827)
Educational level_VVD	0.325*** (0.0550)	0.416*** (0.102)	0.197 (0.122)	0.266*** (0.0874)	0.325*** (0.0550)	0.417*** (0.102)	0.206* (0.122)	0.264*** (0.0875)	0.335*** (0.0548)	0.457*** (0.107)	0.325*** (0.116)	0.277*** (0.0846)	0.336*** (0.0548)	0.459*** (0.107)	0.333*** (0.117)	0.288*** (0.0849)
Educational level_PVV	0.154** (0.0672)		0.127 (0.126)		0.153** (0.0672)		0.136 (0.127)		0.164** (0.0672)		0.246** (0.122)		0.164** (0.0672)		0.252** (0.122)	
Educational level_GL	0.320*** (0.0470)	0.381*** (0.0789)	0.0919 (0.161)	0.347*** (0.0707)	0.320*** (0.0470)	0.382*** (0.0787)	0.0966 (0.161)	0.343*** (0.0708)	0.318*** (0.0471)	0.261*** (0.0752)	0.251 (0.159)	0.313*** (0.0700)	0.318*** (0.0471)	0.261*** (0.0751)	0.252 (0.158)	0.319*** (0.0700)
Educational level_D66	0.455*** (0.0489)	0.473*** (0.0785)	0.266* (0.139)	0.412*** (0.0774)	0.454*** (0.0489)	0.471*** (0.0785)	0.273** (0.139)	0.411*** (0.0774)	0.467*** (0.0485)	0.519*** (0.0778)	0.372*** (0.137)	0.414*** (0.0745)	0.467*** (0.0485)	0.520*** (0.0778)	0.370*** (0.136)	0.418*** (0.0752)
Ethnic identification_CDA	-0.0673 (0.0726)	-0.108 (0.111)	-0.376* (0.225)	-0.0754 (0.120)	-0.0425 (0.0781)	-0.0493 (0.113)	-0.477* (0.258)	-0.138 (0.125)	-0.0713 (0.0720)	-0.115 (0.110)	-0.444** (0.226)	-0.133 (0.116)	-0.0715 (0.0721)	-0.150 (0.114)	-0.586** (0.254)	-0.0498 (0.117)
Ethnic identification_SP	-0.160*** (0.0544)	-0.130* (0.0741)	-0.204 (0.207)	-0.220** (0.0939)	-0.144** (0.0585)	-0.119 (0.0743)	-0.229 (0.211)	-0.285*** (0.100)	-0.158*** (0.0543)	-0.120 (0.0754)	-0.267 (0.205)	-0.239** (0.0940)	-0.158*** (0.0542)	-0.123* (0.0750)	-0.336 (0.213)	-0.241** (0.0954)
Ethnic identification_VVD	-0.291*** (0.0615)	-0.207* (0.108)	-0.253 (0.197)	-0.494*** (0.0937)	-0.256*** (0.0737)	-0.128 (0.109)	-0.343 (0.228)	-0.609*** (0.113)	-0.293*** (0.0619)	-0.224** (0.111)	-0.317 (0.196)	-0.507*** (0.0933)	-0.284*** (0.0665)	-0.227** (0.111)	-0.522** (0.264)	-0.0281 (0.110)
Ethnic identification_PVV	-0.228*** (0.0781)		-0.366* (0.207)		-0.203** (0.0840)		-0.485* (0.257)		-0.232*** (0.0783)		-0.437** (0.206)		-0.228*** (0.0785)		-0.663** (0.285)	
Ethnic identification_GL	-0.0746 (0.0585)	-0.117 (0.105)	-0.559** (0.251)	-0.0627 (0.0864)	-0.0794 (0.0584)	-0.349** (0.137)	-0.571** (0.253)	-0.0548 (0.0867)	-0.0744 (0.0582)	-0.0561 (0.0938)	-0.609** (0.252)	-0.0794 (0.0855)	-0.0721 (0.0586)	-0.0626 (0.0939)	-0.415 (0.307)	0.0794 (0.0883)
Ethnic identification_D66	-0.198*** (0.0609)	-0.0443 (0.0962)	-0.493** (0.208)	-0.403*** (0.0889)	-0.182*** (0.0652)	-0.0126 (0.0966)	-0.553** (0.224)	-0.443*** (0.0916)	-0.201*** (0.0603)	-0.0669 (0.0914)	-0.559*** (0.210)	-0.428*** (0.0871)	-0.208*** (0.0634)	-0.137 (0.106)	-0.488** (0.220)	-0.468*** (0.0910)

Control variables

Ethnic background (other non-Western=ref.)

Former color-ny_CDA	1.498*** (0.201)	1.850*** (0.389)		1.484*** (0.239)	1.493*** (0.201)	1.863*** (0.389)		1.496*** (0.240)	1.474*** (0.201)	2.959*** (0.397)		1.769*** (0.233)	1.474*** (0.201)	2.953*** (0.398)		1.729*** (0.239)
Former color-ny_SP	1.085*** (0.155)	1.735*** (0.341)		1.720*** (0.202)	1.074*** (0.155)	1.735*** (0.342)		1.739*** (0.202)	0.704*** (0.157)	1.103*** (0.340)		0.754*** (0.197)	0.706*** (0.157)	1.111*** (0.340)		0.764*** (0.193)

Former color_VVD	2.010*** (0.188)	2.808*** (0.351)	2.177*** (0.242)	1.997*** (0.188)	2.808*** (0.353)	2.197*** (0.243)	1.994*** (0.188)	4.024*** (0.369)	2.309*** (0.238)	1.990*** (0.188)	3.996*** (0.371)	2.151*** (0.246)
	1.799*** (0.239)			1.806*** (0.239)			1.312*** (0.261)			1.321*** (0.262)		
Former color_PV												
Former color_GL	1.171*** (0.157)	2.790*** (0.419)	3.154*** (0.207)	1.153*** (0.158)	2.712*** (0.424)	3.213*** (0.209)	0.681*** (0.146)	1.422*** (0.393)	1.043*** (0.168)	0.680*** (0.146)	1.421*** (0.393)	0.996*** (0.168)
	0.789*** (0.156)	1.248*** (0.353)	0.536*** (0.196)	0.786*** (0.155)	1.252*** (0.353)	0.530*** (0.197)	0.951*** (0.158)	3.012*** (0.366)	1.442*** (0.200)	0.948*** (0.159)	3.003*** (0.367)	1.261*** (0.213)
Age_CDA	-0.285*** (0.0241)	-0.205*** (0.0365)	-0.0414 (0.0621)	-0.240*** (0.0355)	-0.285*** (0.0242)	-0.0357 (0.0623)	-0.238*** (0.0356)	-0.315*** (0.0237)	-0.118** (0.0599)	-0.359*** (0.0350)	-0.426*** (0.0237)	-0.117* (0.0596)
	-0.150*** (0.0173)	-0.1000*** (0.0241)	0.0370 (0.0503)	-0.166*** (0.0267)	-0.150*** (0.0241)	0.0399 (0.0503)	-0.163*** (0.0267)	-0.114*** (0.0246)	-0.00728 (0.0494)	-0.169*** (0.0266)	-0.114*** (0.0246)	-0.00561 (0.0494)
Age_VVD	-0.291*** (0.0236)	-0.172*** (0.0394)	-0.193 (0.0586)	-0.172*** (0.0335)	-0.172*** (0.0237)	-0.0146 (0.0588)	-0.169*** (0.0336)	-0.344*** (0.0398)	-0.0978* (0.0575)	-0.276*** (0.0324)	-0.344*** (0.0233)	-0.0931 (0.0577)
	-0.412*** (0.0299)	-0.0996 (0.0682)	-0.0996 (0.0682)	-0.414*** (0.0299)	-0.0935 (0.0686)	-0.0935 (0.0686)	-0.400*** (0.0307)	-0.184*** (0.0665)	-0.179*** (0.0667)	-0.400*** (0.0307)	-0.179*** (0.0667)	-0.179*** (0.0667)
Age_GL	-0.252*** (0.0190)	-0.484*** (0.0367)	-0.141** (0.0709)	-0.410*** (0.0290)	-0.486*** (0.0369)	-0.139* (0.0712)	-0.412*** (0.0291)	-0.176*** (0.0283)	-0.143*** (0.0231)	-0.215*** (0.0187)	-0.176*** (0.0283)	-0.147*** (0.0231)
	-0.238*** (0.0199)	-0.150*** (0.0310)	-0.117* (0.0646)	-0.0874*** (0.0256)	-0.149*** (0.0310)	-0.113* (0.0648)	-0.0853*** (0.0257)	-0.473*** (0.0331)	-0.249*** (0.0259)	-0.285*** (0.0203)	-0.473*** (0.0331)	-0.250*** (0.0263)
Women_CDA	-0.637*** (0.131)	-0.401** (0.204)	-0.698 (0.431)	-0.381* (0.210)	-0.402** (0.204)	-0.700 (0.430)	-0.377* (0.210)	-0.604*** (0.201)	-0.599*** (0.206)	-0.676*** (0.131)	-0.604*** (0.201)	-0.614*** (0.206)
	-0.601*** (0.0984)	-0.331** (0.140)	-0.875** (0.382)	-0.693*** (0.172)	-0.330** (0.140)	-0.902** (0.383)	-0.689*** (0.172)	-0.311** (0.143)	-0.702*** (0.172)	-0.590*** (0.0987)	-0.309** (0.143)	-0.712*** (0.172)
Women_VVD	-0.878*** (0.123)	-0.810*** (0.228)	0.0621 (0.370)	-0.623*** (0.191)	-0.810*** (0.228)	0.0508 (0.370)	-0.616*** (0.191)	-0.997*** (0.123)	0.231 (0.365)	-0.897*** (0.187)	-0.995*** (0.227)	-0.808*** (0.189)

Women_PVW	-0.988*** (0.160)	0.786* (0.425)	-0.989*** (0.160)	0.781* (0.425)	-0.959*** (0.161)	0.835** (0.420)	-0.960*** (0.161)	0.852** (0.421)
Women_GL	-0.389*** (0.0980)	-0.442*** (0.161)	-0.663*** (0.144)	-0.441*** (0.161)	-0.674*** (0.144)	-0.0762 (0.157)	-0.311*** (0.0979)	-0.0752 (0.157)
Women_D66	-0.647*** (0.106)	-0.551*** (0.175)	-0.462*** (0.162)	-0.549*** (0.176)	-0.457*** (0.162)	-0.843*** (0.171)	-0.717*** (0.106)	-0.843*** (0.171)
N	31,815	12,439	14,245	12,439	14,245	12,439	31,815	14,245

Note: ^a These models are the same as those presented in Tables B4.2 and B4.3. These models include a control for survey, but these effects not shown in this table for reasons of clarity. Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Appendix C

Background information individual-specific variables

In this study, visible minority status was defined by a self-identification question. Respondents who identified themselves as non-white and non-Aboriginal were selected. By doing so, we follow existing Canadian literature on visible minorities. However, it is possible that some respondents born abroad identify themselves as Canadian and are therefore not included in our sample. Table C.1 gives an overview of the overlap between ethnic identification and country of birth. It shows that of those born in Canada, almost 78% identified as Canadian. It is possible that some of these respondents belong to the second generation, but it is not possible to track this down. Among those born in a Western country, about 40% identifies as a non-visible minority. Respondents born in a non-Western country generally identify as a visible minority, almost 69%. This table shows that country of birth and ethnic identification not always overlap, but that the majority of the respondents in our sample are born in a non-Western country.

TABLE C.1 | Country of birth by ethnic identification (%; N=37,466)^a

Country of birth	Ethnic identification				Total
	Canadian	Non-visible minority	Visible minority	Missing values	
Canada	77.9	14.4	1.2	6.5	100.0
Western country	48.7	42.7	1.3	7.3	100.0
Non-Western	12.8	8.6	68.7	9.8	100.0
Missing values	6.6	4.0	6.0	83.5	100.0
Total	69.3	15.9	4.3	10.5	100.0

Note: ^a This table is on the data before selecting visible minorities, deleting missing values on educational level, employment status, age, and before applying multiple imputation.

Source: Fournier et al., 2015.

Table C.2 shows that almost 27% of the respondents have a missing value on the dependent variable. Table C.3 shows the extent to which the background characteristics of these respondents differ from the other respondents. We see that respondents with a missing value on vote choice have, on average, a slightly lower educational level and income. Moreover, they are more often students or unemployed. Among the respondents with a valid value on vote choice, men are slightly overrepresented (55.6%), whereas they are underrepresented among the respondents with a missing value (46.4).

TABLE C.2 | Missing values on vote choice^a

	N	%
Liberal/Conservative/NDP	1132	73.1
Missing values	416	26.9
Total	1548	100.0

Note: ^aThese descriptive statistics are based on the data before deleting missing values on educational level, age, employment status, and before applying multiple imputation.

Source: Fournier et al., 2015.

TABLE C.3 | Comparison of background characteristics between visible minorities with and without missing values on vote choice

	Liberal/Conservative/NDP ^a					Missing				
	N	%	Range	Mean	S.D.	N	%	Range	Mean	S.D.
Income	1019		1 – 8	5.05	2.52	345		1 – 8	4.45	2.57
Employment status										
- Student	135	11.9				51	12.3			
- Employed	769	67.9				271	65.1			
- Unemployed	70	6.2				35	8.4			
- Other	152	13.4				54	13.0			
Missing	6	0.5				5	1.2			
Educational level	1125		1 – 11	7.72	2.05	408		1 – 11	7.33	2.03
Gender										
- Male	629	55.6				193	46.4			
- Female	503	44.4				223	53.6			
Age	1110		18 – 90	42.73	15.46	394		18 – 89	40.55	15.10

Note: ^aThese descriptive statistics are based on the data before deleting missing values on educational level, employment status, age, and before applying multiple imputation.

Source: Fournier et al., 2015.

In Table C.4 the questions on economic, social, and minority issues in each wave are presented. For most of the questions the answer categories were slightly different. If this was the case, we standardised the variables and merged them into a single variable.

TABLE C.4 | Questions on economic, social, and minority issues

Economic issues	
Reduce gap	Welfare spending
1993-1997: The government must do more to reduce the income gap between rich and poor Canadians: - Strongly Agree - Agree - Disagree - Strongly Disagree	1993-1997: If you had to make cuts, would you cut spending in the following areas a lot, some, or not at all: Welfare: - Not at all - Some - A lot
2000-2015: How much should be done to reduce the gap between the rich and the poor in Canada? - Much more - Somewhat more - About the same as now - Somewhat less - Much less	2000-2015: And now government spending. Should the Federal government spend more, less or about the same as now on: Welfare: - Spend more - About the same - Spend less
Social issues	
Gender role attitudes	Gay rights
1993-2008: Society would be better off if more women stayed home with their children - Strongly agree - Somewhat agree - Somewhat disagree - Strongly disagree	1993-1997: Homosexual couples should be allowed to get legally married: - Strongly agree -> Favour - Somewhat agree -> Favour - Somewhat disagree -> Oppose - Strongly disagree -> Oppose - Don't know -> Don't know
2011-2015: Society would be better off if fewer women worked outside the home. Do you: - Strongly agree - Somewhat agree - Somewhat disagree - Strongly disagree	2000: Gays and lesbians should be allowed to get married. - Strongly agree -> Favour - Somewhat agree -> Favour - Somewhat disagree -> Oppose - Strongly disagree -> Oppose - Don't know -> Don't know
	2004-2015: Do you favour or oppose same-sex marriage, or do you have no opinion on this? - Favour same-sex marriage - Oppose same-sex marriage - Don't know/no opinion

Minority issues	
Immigration	Done for minorities
1993: Do you think Canada should admit: more immigrants, fewer immigrants or about the same as now? - More immigrants - Depends/stay the same - Fewer immigrants	1997: How much do you think should be done for racial minorities? - More - About the same - Less
1997-2015: Do you think Canada should admit: more immigrants, fewer immigrants or about the same as now? - More immigrants - About the same as now - Fewer immigrants	1993, 2000-2015: How much do you think should be done for racial minorities: much more, somewhat more, about the same as now, somewhat less or much less? - Much more - Somewhat more - About the same as now - Somewhat less - Much less

Source: Fournier et al., 2015.

Background information Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP)

The issue positions of legislators, political parties in particular, are of interest to many scholars examining party competition. Several data sources have been used to estimate these issue positions, including expert surveys, mass surveys and political text (Laver, 2014; Lowe et al., 2011). All these types of data have their advantages and limitations (Bakker & Hobolt, 2013; Laver, 2014). In this study we used political text as coded by the CMP. Since our study focused on a period from 1993 to 2015, an important advantage of the CMP is that they provide time-series data. Furthermore, the focus lies on party manifestos, the party issue positions are based on official statements of parties rather than on the opinions of experts and/or voters (Dinas & Gemenis, 2010).

The coding of the manifestos is based on quasi-sentences. The party manifestos are divided in quasi-sentences and each quasi-sentence is assigned to one of the 56 categories (i.e. topics, such as traditional values). The 56 categories indicate the share of quasi-sentences on a certain topic calculated as the fraction of the overall number of allocated codes per document. This calculation refers to the salience of each category in the party programme (Prosser, 2014). The categories are subject to seven domains: external relations (e.g. favourable mentions of external security and defence), freedom and democracy (e.g. mentions of personal freedom and civil rights), the political system, economy, welfare and quality of life, fabric of society (e.g. favourable mentions of traditional values), and social groups.

Combinations of the 56 categories are used to construct to create scales, which give an indication of the issue positions of parties. The CMP data are often used for its right-left scale (Lowe et al., 2011). Based on aggregating counts of text categories, this scale indicates the left-right issue positions of political parties. This scale is constructed by subtracting the sum of thirteen left-associated categories from the sum of thirteen right-associated

categories (Volkens et al., 2017b). Nevertheless, there have been several criticisms on the CMP data (Bakker & Hobolt, 2013; Laver, 2014) and specifically on the left-right policy scale and the scaling methods (Bakker & Hobolt, 2013; Benoit, Laver, & Mikhaylov, 2009; Dinas & Gemenis, 2010; Franzmann & Kaiser, 2006; Gabel & Huber, 2000; Lowe et al., 2011). We propose two scales to measure economic left-right issue positions and social issue positions, Table C.5 shows the specific categories it includes. We choose items from the CMP that were as close as possible to the items from the CES (for more information on the items, see the codebook (Volkens et al., 2017a). Figure C.1 and C.2 show the position of the Liberal Party, the NDP and the Conservatives.

TABLE C.5 | Items economic and social issue position scales CMP

Economic issue position scale	
Left	Right
403 Market Regulation: Positive	401 Free Enterprise: Positive
409 Keynesian Demand Management	402 Incentives: positive
412 Controlled economy	407 Protectionism: Negative
504 Welfare State Expansion: Positive	414 Economic Orthodoxy: Positive
701 Labour Groups: Positive	505 Welfare State Limitation: Positive
	702 Labour Groups: Negative
Social issue position scale	
Progressive	Conservative
503 Equality: positive	603 Traditional morality: positive
604 Traditional morality: negative	

Source: Volkens et al., 2017a.

FIGURE C.1 | Economic issue positions (left-right), by year





FIGURE C.2 | Social issue positions (progressive – conservative), by year



Background information Wordscores

Wordscores can estimate political parties' issue positions on a policy domain of interest. This method treats the words in party programs as data containing information about parties' positions (Laver, Benoit, & Garry, 2003). To be able to estimate these parties' positions, a set of 'reference texts' has to be determined a priori. The Wordscores program extracts data from these reference texts by counting words and uses this information to estimate parties' issue positions for the other texts ('virgin texts'). That is why to use Wordscores, a first and essential step is to find and select reference texts. Reference party manifestos from one election are used to estimate the position of virgin party manifestos in other elections in the same country. Therefore, we need a set of reference text which issue positions on minority issues are known and reliable.

This information on issue positions was derived from an expert survey conducted in 2002 and 2003 (Benoit & Laver, 2006). In this survey, 104 experts were asked to place federal Canadian parties on a scale running from 1 to 20 that contrasted from support for full integration of immigrants and asylum-seekers with support for returning immigrants to their countries of origin. The exact wording used in the expert survey was:

Immigration:

- Favours policies designed to help asylum seekers and immigrants integrate into Canadian society (1)
- Favours policies designed to help asylum seekers and immigrants return to their country of origin (20)

Based on the expert survey the NDP gets a score of 4.5, the Liberal Party a score of 5.0, the Progressive Conservative Party a score of 9.3, and the Canadian Alliance a score of 13.6

(Benoit & Laver, 2006). These parties participated in the 2000 federal election; therefore, we used the party programs for 2000 as our reference texts and the party programs for all other years are our virgin texts. It is important that the reference texts and the virgin texts are similar. Following Laver et al. (2003) we assume that party manifestos on Canada at the 2000 federal election are valid points of reference for the analysis of party manifestos at other federal elections in the same country.

In addition to the similarity of the reference and virgin texts, there are several guidelines for reference texts. Meeting the guidelines provides more reliable estimates. The first guideline is that the reference texts use the same lexicon, in the same context, as the virgin text under investigation. Second, that the issue positions of the reference texts cover the dimensions of interest. It is recommended to have a selection of reference texts that includes extreme positions as well as centre positions. Third, the set of reference texts should contain as many different words as possible (Laver et al., 2003). Of these guidelines, the second one may be problematic. The scores on immigration policy of the NDP and the Liberal Party are relatively close to each other. Although a set of reference texts with both centre and extreme positions would be ideal, it is not a prerequisite. Moreover, this expert survey is, to our knowledge, the most reliable source of information on positions on minority/immigration issues that is available for Canada.


Laver and Benoit developed a program in Stata to estimate policy positions with Wordscores. This program requires all party manifestos prepared as txt files. We removed all figures and photos from the manifestos and we did a spelling check on all files.

Once the files are imported to the Stata program, word frequencies from all the manifestos are calculated. The next step is to assign scores to the reference texts. From the wordscores in each reference text, text scores in the virgin texts are computed. Each virgin text gets a score according to the relative frequency of its appearance in the reference texts. In a last step the virgin texts scores are transformed to their original metric to be able to locate the positions on immigration of each party at each election. Laver, Benoit and Garry (2003) describe this as follows:

“We use the relative frequencies we observe for each of the different words in each of the reference texts to calculate the probability that we are reading a particular reference text, given that we are reading a particular word. For a particular a priori policy dimension, this allows us to generate a numerical “score” for each word. This score is the expected policy position of any text, given only that we are reading the single word in question. Scoring words in this way replaces the predefined deterministic coding dictionary of traditional computer-coding techniques. It gives words policy scores, not having determined or even considered their meanings in advance but, instead, by treating words purely as data associated with a set of reference texts whose policy positions can be confidently estimated or assumed. In this sense the set of real-world reference texts replaces the “artificial” coding dictionary used by traditional computer-coding techniques.” (Laver, Benoit & Garry, 2003, p. 313)

Figure C.3 shows the parties' positions on immigration policy based on the transformed word scores as estimated by the wordscores program. The scores of the Conservatives in 1993 and 1997 are an average of the estimated word scores for the Reform Party and the PCP. For the year 2000, we used the average score for the PCP and the Canadian Alliance.

FIGURE C.3 Minority issue positions (permissive– restrictive), by year



Source: Wordscore estimates

TABLE C.6 | Descriptive statistics

	N	%	Range	Mean	S.D.
Vote choice					
- Liberal	630	59.60			
- Conservative	237	22.42			
- NDP	190	17.98			
Gap between rich and poor (imputed)	1057		-1.20 – 3.56	-0.10	1.00
Government welfare spending (imputed)	1057		-1.39 – 1.65	0.05	1.02
Gender role attitudes (imputed)	1057		-1.20 – 2.52	0.04	1.03
Gay rights (imputed)					
- Favour	315	29.83			
- Oppose	294	27.81			
- Don't know	448	42.35			
Admission immigrants (imputed)	1057		-0.82 – 1.17	0.01	0.68
Done for racial minorities (imputed)	1057		-1.96 – 2.67	-0.56	0.94
Income (imputed) ^a	1057		-4.05 – 2.95	-0.05	2.52
Employment status					
- Student	128	12.11			
- Employed	722	68.31			
- Unemployed	68	6.43			
- Other	139	13.15			
Educational level	1057		1.00 – 11.00	7.70	2.06
Gender					
- Male	587	55.53			
- Female	470	44.47			
Age			18.00 – 90.00	42.60	15.26
Survey year					
- 1993	131	12.39			
- 1997	145	13.72			
- 2000	71	6.72			
- 2004	133	12.58			
- 2006	142	13.43			
- 2008	124	11.73			
- 2011	159	15.04			
- 2015	152	14.38			

Note: ^aThis variable was centred on the mean (before applying multiple imputation).

Source: Fournier et al., 2015.

TABLE C.7 | Descriptive statistics alternative-specific variables

Alternative-specific variables	N	Range	Mean	S.D.
Economic issue positions	24	-4.5 – 3.04	-3.33	5.49
Social issue positions	24	-11.3 – 7.51	-1.22	2.41
Immigration issue positions	24	1.13 – 14.63	6.74	3.63
% visible minority candidates	24	1.80 – 16.90	8.74	3.49

Source: Black, 2013; Griffith, 2016; Tossutti & Najem, 2002; Volkens et al., 2017b; Wordscore estimates.

TABLE C.8 | Conditional logistic regression for vote choice; main effects substantive and descriptive representation

	Model 1a	Model 2a	Model 3a	Model 4a
<i>Alternative-specific variables</i>	B	B	B	B
Economic issues positions (L-R) ^a	0.0821*** (0.0174)			
Social issue positions (P-C) ^b		0.121** (0.0529)		
Minority issue positions (P-R) ^c			0.254*** (0.0404)	
% Visible minority candidates				0.0835 (0.0560)
<i>Individual-specific variables</i>				
Economic issues positions (L-R)				
Less government spending to reduce gap between rich and poor_CON	0.290*** (0.0980)			
Less government spending to reduce gap between rich and poor_NDP	-0.130 (0.106)			
Less government welfare spending_CON	0.205** (0.0804)			
Less government welfare spending_NDP	-0.147 (0.0988)			
Social issue positions (P-C)				
Traditional gender role attitudes_CON		0.0896 (0.0822)		
Traditional gender role attitudes_NDP		-0.0657 (0.0940)		
Gay rights (in favour=ref.)				
Oppose_CON		0.0529 (0.187)		
Oppose_NDP		-0.593*** (0.224)		
Don't know_CON		-0.230 (0.206)		
Don't know_NDP		-0.384* (0.227)		
Minority issue positions (P-R)				
Admit fewer immigrants_CON			0.308** (0.149)	0.252* (0.149)
Admit fewer immigrants_NDP			-0.182 (0.158)	-0.229 (0.150)
Less should be done for racial minorities_CON			0.227** (0.106)	0.299*** (0.108)
Less should be done for racial minorities_NDP			-0.00321 (0.0972)	0.146 (0.0922)
<i>Control variables</i>				
Income_CON	0.0219 (0.0371)	0.0473 (0.0366)	0.0365 (0.0375)	0.0331 (0.0374)
Income_NDP	0.00210 (0.0392)	-0.0211 (0.0394)	-0.00962 (0.0389)	-0.0134 (0.0383)
Employment status (employed=ref.)				
Student_CON	-0.771** (0.317)	-0.844*** (0.314)	-0.621* (0.320)	-0.665** (0.319)

Student_NDP	-0.270 (0.311)	-0.306 (0.311)	-0.193 (0.309)	-0.295 (0.306)
Unemployed_CON	-0.244 (0.340)	-0.288 (0.337)	0.106 (0.339)	-0.0661 (0.341)
Unemployed_NDP	0.0327 (0.355)	0.0547 (0.355)	0.181 (0.353)	-0.139 (0.349)
Non-employed_CON	-0.116 (0.278)	-0.0586 (0.274)	0.131 (0.278)	-0.0101 (0.280)
Non-employed_NDP	-0.271 (0.316)	-0.285 (0.321)	-0.209 (0.317)	-0.465 (0.313)
Educational level_CON	0.0325 (0.0413)	0.0235 (0.0405)	0.0200 (0.0423)	0.0293 (0.0421)
Educational level_NDP	0.0589 (0.0452)	0.0634 (0.0453)	0.0516 (0.0448)	0.0599 (0.0435)
Age_CON	0.00153 (0.00697)	-0.00297 (0.00699)	-0.00760 (0.00706)	-0.00424 (0.00708)
Age_NDP	-0.00643 (0.00767)	-0.00157 (0.00773)	-0.00681 (0.00763)	-0.000915 (0.00745)
Gender (male=ref.)				
Gender_CON	-0.170 (0.157)	-0.131 (0.156)	0.0990 (0.162)	-0.0315 (0.163)
Gender_NDP	-0.142 (0.173)	-0.216 (0.173)	-0.0690 (0.172)	-0.274* (0.165)
Survey year (1993=ref.)				
1997_CON	-1.435*** (0.235)	-1.293*** (0.271)	0.344 (0.286)	-0.600** (0.262)
1997_NDP	-1.271*** (0.362)	-1.654*** (0.349)	0.181 (0.472)	-1.745*** (0.351)
2000_CON	-2.080*** (0.391)	-2.091*** (0.398)	-0.379 (0.451)	-1.578*** (0.420)
2000_NDP	-3.589*** (1.014)	-3.486*** (1.016)	-2.272** (1.041)	-3.568*** (1.024)
2004_CON	-0.903*** (0.254)	-1.275*** (0.282)	0.114 (0.299)	-1.129*** (0.311)
2004_NDP	-0.342 (0.249)	-0.313 (0.261)	2.200*** (0.512)	-0.728*** (0.245)
2006_CON	-1.517*** (0.264)	-1.591*** (0.348)	-0.431* (0.254)	-0.638** (0.274)
2006_NDP	-0.889*** (0.238)	-0.649** (0.282)	-0.0716 (0.271)	-0.525* (0.299)
2008_CON	-0.917*** (0.246)	-0.637** (0.286)	-2.781*** (0.412)	-0.775*** (0.250)
2008_NDP	-0.261 (0.271)	-0.0811 (0.295)	-1.098*** (0.255)	-0.807*** (0.253)
2011_CON	-0.481** (0.229)	-0.469* (0.268)	-0.732*** (0.257)	-0.142 (0.252)
2011_NDP	0.252 (0.230)	0.485* (0.254)	-0.593** (0.249)	-0.0495 (0.239)
2015_CON	-1.955*** (0.343)	-1.600*** (0.433)	-1.571*** (0.284)	-0.401 (0.293)
2015_NDP	-0.874*** (0.247)	-0.550** (0.268)	-0.790*** (0.250)	-0.407 (0.329)
N	3,171			

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ^a Left-Right; ^b Progressive-Conservative ^c Permissive-Restrictive. Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

TABLE C.9 | Conditional logistic regression for vote choice; substantive and descriptive representation – full model

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
	B	B	B	B
<i>Alternative-specific variables</i>				
Economic issues positions (L-R) ^a	0.0820*** (0.0177)			
Economic pos. x Less government spending to reduce gap between rich and poor	-0.00295 (0.0157)			
Economic pos. x Less government welfare spending	0.0163 (0.0154)			
Social issue positions (P-C) ^b		0.0974* (0.0542)		
Social pos. x Traditional gender role attitudes		-0.0108 (0.0323)		
Gay rights (in favour=ref.)				
Social pos. x Oppose		0.164** (0.0792)		
Social pos. x Don't know		0.0698 (0.0806)		
Minority issue positions (P-R) ^c			0.258*** (0.0409)	
Minority pos. x Admit fewer immigrants			0.00741 (0.0245)	
Minority pos. x Less should be done for racial minorities			0.00891 (0.0172)	
% Visible minority candidates				0.0731 (0.0560)
% Visible minority candidates x Admit fewer immigrants				0.0311 (0.0376)
% Visible minority candidates x Less should be done for racial minorities				-0.00662 (0.0216)
<i>Individual-specific variables</i>				
Economic issues positions (L-R)				
Less government spending to reduce gap between rich and poor _CON	0.304*** (0.115)			
Less government spending to reduce gap between rich and poor _NDP	-0.146 (0.133)			
Less government welfare spending_CON	0.120 (0.114)			
Less government welfare spending_NDP	-0.0611 (0.117)			
Social issue positions (P-C)				
Traditional gender role attitudes_CON		0.112 (0.131)		
Traditional gender role attitudes_NDP		-0.0951 (0.106)		
Gay rights (in favour=ref.)				
Oppose_CON		-0.373 (0.279)		
Oppose_NDP		-0.274 (0.273)		

Don't know_CON		-0.411		
		(0.323)		
Don't know_NDP		-0.240		
		(0.258)		
Minority issue positions (P-R)				
Admit fewer immigrants_CON		0.319**	0.297*	
		(0.155)	(0.171)	
Admit fewer immigrants_NDP		-0.149	-0.223	
		(0.203)	(0.153)	
Less should be done for racial minorities_CON		0.233**	0.290**	
		(0.112)	(0.117)	
Less should be done for racial minorities_NDP		0.0248	0.146	
		(0.114)	(0.0928)	
<i>Control variables</i>				
Income_CON	0.0200	0.0490	0.0371	0.0336
	(0.0376)	(0.0367)	(0.0377)	(0.0374)
Income_NDP	0.00151	-0.0198	-0.00937	-0.0132
	(0.0392)	(0.0392)	(0.0390)	(0.0383)
Employments status (employed=ref.)				
Student_CON	-0.773**	-0.839***	-0.633**	-0.680**
	(0.318)	(0.314)	(0.320)	(0.320)
Student_NDP	-0.282	-0.298	-0.200	-0.297
	(0.311)	(0.312)	(0.309)	(0.306)
Unemployed_CON	-0.243	-0.260	0.0959	-0.0582
	(0.341)	(0.336)	(0.339)	(0.341)
Unemployed_NDP	0.0158	0.0736	0.173	-0.126
	(0.355)	(0.356)	(0.353)	(0.349)
Non-employed_CON	-0.114	-0.0484	0.141	-0.0205
	(0.279)	(0.276)	(0.280)	(0.280)
Non-employed_NDP	-0.270	-0.274	-0.201	-0.469
	(0.316)	(0.321)	(0.318)	(0.314)
Educational level_CON	0.0329	0.0182	0.0201	0.0270
	(0.0415)	(0.0407)	(0.0424)	(0.0424)
Educational level_NDP	0.0582	0.0601	0.0513	0.0582
	(0.0452)	(0.0454)	(0.0448)	(0.0435)
Age_CON	0.00146	-0.00400	-0.00790	-0.00407
	(0.00699)	(0.00702)	(0.00708)	(0.00709)
Age_NDP	-0.00651	-0.00264	-0.00700	-0.000713
	(0.00767)	(0.00775)	(0.00764)	(0.00748)
Gender (male=ref.)				
Gender_CON	-0.169	-0.101	0.0969	-0.0305
	(0.157)	(0.157)	(0.162)	(0.163)
Gender_NDP	-0.136	-0.190	-0.0698	-0.274*
	(0.173)	(0.174)	(0.172)	(0.166)
Survey year (1993=ref.)				
1997_CON	-1.444***	-1.314***	0.356	-0.617**
	(0.237)	(0.272)	(0.286)	(0.262)
1997_NDP	-1.253***	-1.803***	0.188	-1.762***
	(0.364)	(0.361)	(0.472)	(0.350)
2000_CON	-2.053***	-1.984***	-0.363	-1.593***
	(0.391)	(0.400)	(0.452)	(0.419)
2000_NDP	-3.591***	-3.576***	-2.261**	-3.595***
	(1.014)	(1.018)	(1.041)	(1.024)

2004_CON	-0.912*** (0.256)	-1.221*** (0.282)	0.114 (0.299)	-1.122*** (0.313)
2004_NDP	-0.345 (0.251)	-0.434 (0.271)	2.188*** (0.513)	-0.719*** (0.246)
2006_CON	-1.514*** (0.265)	-1.741*** (0.359)	-0.427* (0.255)	-0.660** (0.275)
2006_NDP	-0.872*** (0.238)	-0.885*** (0.313)	-0.0597 (0.272)	-0.554* (0.298)
2008_CON	-0.915*** (0.247)	-0.355 (0.330)	-2.798*** (0.414)	-0.780*** (0.251)
2008_NDP	-0.266 (0.273)	-0.0831 (0.302)	-1.085*** (0.257)	-0.797*** (0.253)
2011_CON	-0.476** (0.229)	-0.441 (0.268)	-0.719*** (0.261)	-0.141 (0.254)
2011_NDP	0.252 (0.230)	0.418 (0.259)	-0.564** (0.255)	-0.0412 (0.241)
2015_CON	-1.973*** (0.346)	-1.742*** (0.453)	-1.568*** (0.285)	-0.435 (0.296)
2015_NDP	-0.868*** (0.248)	-0.688** (0.280)	-0.770*** (0.252)	-0.443 (0.327)
N	3,171			

Note: ^a Left-Right ^b Progressive – Conservative ^c Permissive – Restrictive. Standard errors in parentheses.
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

TABLE C.10 | Conditional logistic regression for vote choice; voter characteristics

	Model without voters' issue positions		Model with voters' issue positions	
	Conservatives	NDP	Conservatives	NDP
	B	B	B	B
Alternative-specific constants (ASC; Liberal =ref.)	-0.843*** (0.221)	-2.199*** (0.351)	-1.258*** (0.312)	-2.235*** (0.400)
Economic issues positions (L-R) ^a				
Less government spending to reduce gap between rich and poor			0.176* (0.0983)	-0.189 (0.121)
Less government welfare spending			0.212** (0.0826)	-0.119 (0.104)
Social issue positions (P-C) ^b				
Traditional gender role attitudes			0.0185 (0.0910)	-0.112 (0.0974)
Gay rights (in favour=ref.)				
- Oppose			0.708*** (0.251)	-0.0990 (0.252)
- Don't know			0.127 (0.237)	-0.0523 (0.243)
Minority issue positions (P-R) ^c				
Admit fewer immigrants			0.266* (0.150)	-0.167 (0.170)
Less should be done for racial minorities			0.205* (0.105)	0.0109 (0.114)
<i>Control variables</i>				
Income	0.0454 (0.0361)	-0.0128 (0.0395)	0.0288 (0.0393)	-0.00370 (0.0410)
Student (employed = ref.)	-0.722** (0.312)	-0.153 (0.313)	-0.581* (0.323)	-0.213 (0.319)
- Unemployed	0.00973 (0.332)	0.287 (0.359)	0.0530 (0.348)	0.298 (0.369)
- Non-employed	0.142 (0.274)	-0.138 (0.319)	0.0170 (0.287)	-0.117 (0.324)
Educational level	0.0149 (0.0407)	0.0524 (0.0459)	0.0176 (0.0433)	0.0533 (0.0470)
Age	-0.00652 (0.00695)	-0.00868 (0.00771)	-0.00720 (0.00730)	-0.00884 (0.00803)
Gender (male=ref)	0.0608 (0.159)	-0.0113 (0.176)	0.0664 (0.166)	-0.0171 (0.179)
Survey year (1993=ref.)				
- 1997	-0.185 (0.285)	-0.0307 (0.463)	-0.250 (0.305)	0.0699 (0.468)
- 2000	-1.154*** (0.428)	-1.918* (1.063)	-1.330*** (0.448)	-1.741 (1.068)
- 2004	-0.320 (0.313)	1.275*** (0.400)	-0.172 (0.334)	1.296*** (0.412)
- 2006	-0.272 (0.309)	1.147*** (0.406)	-0.131 (0.327)	1.176*** (0.417)
- 2008	-0.0671 (0.312)	1.288*** (0.414)	0.00593 (0.337)	1.356*** (0.430)
- 2011	0.549* (0.292)	1.970*** (0.395)	0.723** (0.316)	2.023*** (0.408)
- 2015	-0.0582 (0.306)	1.278*** (0.412)	0.256 (0.337)	1.255*** (0.431)
N	3,171			

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

TABLE C.11 | Conditional logistic regression for vote choice; voters' socioeconomic position and substantive representation

	Model 2a	Model 2	Model 2b	Model 2c
<i>Alternative-specific variables</i>	B	B	B	B
Economic issues positions (L-R) ^a	0.0748*** (0.0166)	0.0766*** (0.0168)	0.0745*** (0.0169)	0.0751*** (0.0167)
Economic pos. x Income		0.00445 (0.00616)		
Economic pos. x Student			0.00731 (0.0491)	
Economic pos. x Non-employed			-0.00965 (0.0421)	
Economic pos. x Education				0.00133 (0.00692)
<i>Control variables</i>				
Income_CON	0.0441 (0.0359)	0.0207 (0.0488)	0.0442 (0.0360)	0.0443 (0.0360)
Income_NDP	-0.0112 (0.0388)	0.0121 (0.0496)	-0.0113 (0.0388)	-0.0111 (0.0388)
Employment status (employed=ref.)				
Student_CON	-0.850*** (0.313)	-0.848*** (0.313)	-0.890** (0.409)	-0.850*** (0.313)
Student_NDP	-0.235 (0.308)	-0.235 (0.308)	-0.193 (0.417)	-0.234 (0.308)
Unemployed_CON	-0.325 (0.335)	-0.329 (0.335)	-0.324 (0.335)	-0.325 (0.335)
Unemployed_NDP	0.0484 (0.351)	0.0472 (0.352)	0.0487 (0.351)	0.0490 (0.351)
Non-employed_CON	-0.0772 (0.273)	-0.0787 (0.273)	-0.0239 (0.356)	-0.0782 (0.273)
Non-employed_NDP	-0.294 (0.316)	-0.289 (0.316)	-0.338 (0.370)	-0.296 (0.316)
Educational level_CON	0.0299 (0.0402)	0.0315 (0.0403)	0.0304 (0.0403)	0.0230 (0.0541)
Educational level_NDP	0.0602 (0.0450)	0.0610 (0.0451)	0.0608 (0.0451)	0.0674 (0.0585)
Gender (male=ref.)				
Gender_CON	-0.164 (0.154)	-0.165 (0.154)	-0.163 (0.155)	-0.166 (0.154)
Gender_NDP	-0.160 (0.172)	-0.162 (0.172)	-0.160 (0.172)	-0.160 (0.172)
Age_CON	-0.000929 (0.00686)	-0.000903 (0.00687)	-0.000973 (0.00686)	-0.000947 (0.00686)
Age_NDP	-0.00495 (0.00759)	-0.00489 (0.00759)	-0.00487 (0.00760)	-0.00494 (0.00760)
Survey year (1993=ref.)				
1997_CON	-1.288*** (0.227)	-1.298*** (0.227)	-1.287*** (0.227)	-1.289*** (0.227)
1997_NDP	-1.364*** (0.358)	-1.357*** (0.358)	-1.365*** (0.358)	-1.362*** (0.358)
2000_CON	-1.889*** (0.383)	-1.896*** (0.383)	-1.892*** (0.384)	-1.891*** (0.383)

2000_NDP	-3.665*** (1.013)	-3.654*** (1.013)	-3.667*** (1.013)	-3.663*** (1.013)
2004_CON	-0.884*** (0.250)	-0.895*** (0.250)	-0.893*** (0.254)	-0.882*** (0.250)
2004_NDP	-0.333 (0.246)	-0.324 (0.246)	-0.337 (0.247)	-0.331 (0.246)
2006_CON	-1.457*** (0.257)	-1.469*** (0.257)	-1.456*** (0.257)	-1.459*** (0.257)
2006_NDP	-0.836*** (0.235)	-0.832*** (0.235)	-0.837*** (0.239)	-0.836*** (0.235)
2008_CON	-0.851*** (0.240)	-0.834*** (0.241)	-0.854*** (0.242)	-0.849*** (0.240)
2008_NDP	-0.283 (0.267)	-0.263 (0.269)	-0.287 (0.268)	-0.280 (0.268)
2011_CON	-0.440* (0.224)	-0.445** (0.225)	-0.441* (0.225)	-0.440* (0.224)
2011_NDP	0.254 (0.228)	0.264 (0.228)	0.251 (0.229)	0.256 (0.228)
2015_CON	-1.849*** (0.328)	-1.928*** (0.348)	-1.835*** (0.332)	-1.861*** (0.335)
2015_NDP	-0.806*** (0.244)	-0.828*** (0.246)	-0.804*** (0.249)	-0.810*** (0.245)
N	3,171			

Note: ^a Left-Right. Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Appendix D

TABLE D.1 | Candidate characteristics (N=548)

	N	%
Ethnic background		
- Turkish	22	4.0
- Moroccan	21	3.8
- Surinamese/Antillean	15	2.7
- Other non-Western	13	2.4
- Dutch	477	87.0
Gender		
- Male	340	62.0
- Female	208	38.0
Party leader		
- No	536	97.8
- Yes	12	2.2
First ethnic minority on the list		
- No	508	92.7
- Yes	40	7.3
Re-nominated candidate 2012		
- No	388	70.8
- Yes	160	29.2

TABLE D.2 | Summary of the data

Cities	No. of neighbourhoods	No. of polling stations		No. of candidates		Total No. of cases
's Hertogenbosch	52	84	x	548	=	46,032
Almere	35	86	x	548	=	47,128
Alphen aan den Rijn	42	58	x	548	=	31,784
Amersfoort	53	79	x	548	=	43,292
Amsterdam	228	431	x	548	=	236,188
Apeldoorn	48	86	x	548	=	47,128
Arnhem	47	64	x	548	=	35,072
Dordrecht	44	58	x	548	=	31,784
Eindhoven	51	68	x	548	=	37,264
Enschede	42	75	x	548	=	41,100
Groningen	49	112	x	548	=	61,376
Haarlem	62	72	x	548	=	39,456
Leiden	32	40	x	548	=	21,920
Maastricht	34	54	x	548	=	29,592
Nijmegen	34	78	x	548	=	42,744
Rotterdam	69	344	x	548	=	188,512
Utrecht	85	147	x	548	=	80,556
Zaanstad	30	67	x	548	=	36,716
Zoetermeer	15	57	x	548	=	31,236
Zwolle	37	61	x	548	=	33,428
Total	1,089	2,121	x	548	=	1,162,308

TABLE D.3 | Gender of candidates, by party and ethnic background

Party	Ethnic background	Male		Female		Total	
		N	%	N	%	N	%
Artikel 1	Moroccan	1	100.0	0	0.0	1	100.0
	Surinamese/Antillean	2	40.0	3	60.0	5	100.0
	Other non-Western	1	50.0	1	50.0	2	100.0
	Dutch	5	41.7	7	58.3	12	100.0
CDA	Turkish	1	100.0	0	0.0	1	100.0
	Moroccan	1	100.0	0	0.0	1	100.0
	Dutch	27	62.8	16	37.2	43	100.0
CU	Surinamese/Antillean	1	50.0	1	50.0	2	100.0
	Other non-Western	4	100.0	0	0.0	4	100.0
	Dutch	26	59.1	18	40.9	44	100.0
DENK	Turkish	6	66.7	3	33.3	9	100.0
	Moroccan	3	100.0	0	0.0	3	100.0
	Surinamese/Antillean	0	0.0	2	100.0	2	100.0
	Other non-Western	2	100.0	0	0.0	2	100.0
	Dutch	0	0.0	2	100.0	2	100.0
D66	Turkish	0	0.0	1	100.0	1	100.0
	Moroccan	3	60.0	2	40.0	5	100.0
	Surinamese/Antillean	1	100.0	0	0.0	1	100.0
	Other non-Western	1	100.0	0	0.0	1	100.0
	Dutch	25	59.5	17	40.5	42	100.0
FvD	Surinamese/Antillean	1	100.0	0	0.0	1	100.0
	Dutch	23	79.3	6	20.7	29	100.0
GL	Turkish	1	33.3	2	66.7	3	100.0
	Moroccan	1	100.0	0	0.0	1	100.0
	Other non-Western	1	100.0	0	0.0	1	100.0
	Dutch	25	55.6	20	44.4	45	100.0
PvdA	Turkish	1	25.0	3	75.0	4	100.0
	Moroccan	5	71.4	2	28.6	7	100.0
	Surinamese/Antillean	1	33.3	2	66.7	3	100.0
	Other non-Western	0	0.0	2	100.0	2	100.0
	Dutch	31	52.5	28	47.5	59	100.0
PVV	Surinamese/Antillean	0	0.0	1	100.0	1	100.0
	Dutch	37	75.5	12	24.5	49	100.0
SP	Turkish	2	66.7	1	33.3	3	100.0
	Moroccan	0	0.0	1	100.0	1	100.0
	Dutch	24	60.0	16	40.0	40	100.0
VVD	Turkish	0	0.0	1	100.0	1	100.0
	Moroccan	2	100.0	0	0.0	2	100.0
	Dutch	50	64.9	27	35.1	77	100.0
50Plus	Other non-Western	0	0.0	1	100.0	1	100.0
	Dutch	25	71.4	10	28.6	35	100.0

TABLE D.4 | Beta Regression models on candidates' vote share; general ethnic affinity and party effects

	Model 3a	Model 3b
	B	B
Ethnic Minority candidate (Dutch=ref.)	-0.3761*** (0.0084)	-0.4002*** (0.0082)
<i>% ethnic minority population in neighbourhood x ethnic minority candidate for:</i>		
- Art 1	-0.0051*** (0.0011)	-0.0040*** (0.0011)
- CDA	-0.0034* (0.0018)	-0.0032* (0.0018)
- CU	0.0303*** (0.0006)	0.0316*** (0.0006)
- DENK	0.0159*** (0.0017)	0.0174*** (0.0017)
- D66	-0.0017*** (0.0005)	-0.0010** (0.0004)
- FvD	0.0196*** (0.0024)	0.0208*** (0.0024)
- GL	0.0111*** (0.0003)	0.0109*** (0.0003)
- PvdA	0.0081*** (0.0004)	0.0088*** (0.0004)
- PVV	-0.0163*** (0.0030)	-0.0185*** (0.0030)
- SP	0.0027*** (0.0005)	0.0030*** (0.0005)
- VVD	-0.0179*** (0.0009)	-0.0182*** (0.0009)
- 50Plus	0.0088*** (0.0027)	0.0090*** (0.0027)
<i>Control variables</i>		
Party leader	2.7754*** (0.0046)	2.8510*** (0.0045)
First ethnic minority on the list	0.7400*** (0.0054)	0.7720*** (0.0053)
Re-nominated candidate 2012	0.2069*** (0.0040)	0.2167*** (0.0040)
<i>Party</i>		
- Art 1	-7.7229*** (0.0269)	-8.1460*** (0.0362)
- CDA	-5.6101*** (0.0094)	-5.3370*** (0.0164)
- CU	-6.3690*** (0.0126)	-5.9240*** (0.0234)
- DENK	-7.0129*** (0.0167)	-6.9580*** (0.0279)
- D66	-5.2710*** (0.0068)	-5.5060*** (0.0096)

- FvD	-6.5350*** (0.0151)	-6.4670*** (0.0258)
- GL	-5.2706*** (0.0075)	-5.4310*** (0.0105)
- PvdA	-5.7351*** (0.0085)	-5.8850*** (0.0131)
- PVV	-5.4782*** (0.0090)	-4.6380*** (0.0177)
- SP	-5.7485*** (0.0092)	-5.1960*** (0.0170)
- VVD	-5.1080*** (0.0068)	-5.2620*** (0.0096)
- 50Plus	-6.5293*** (0.0132)	-5.9820*** (0.0256)

% ethnic minority population in neighbourhood for:

- Art 1	0.0353*** (0.0011)	0.0399*** (0.0011)
- CDA	-0.0117*** (0.0003)	-0.0143*** (0.0004)
- CU	-0.0092*** (0.0005)	-0.0133*** (0.0005)
- DENK	0.0181*** (0.0018)	0.0134*** (0.0018)
- D66	-0.0024*** (0.0002)	-0.0015*** (0.0002)
- FvD	-0.0062*** (0.0005)	-0.0070*** (0.0006)
- GL	-0.0044*** (0.0003)	-0.0037*** (0.0003)
- PvdA	-0.0003 (0.0003)	0.0007** (0.0003)
- PVV	0.0038*** (0.0003)	-0.0017*** (0.0003)
- SP	0.0027*** (0.0003)	-0.0016*** (0.0003)
- VVD	-0.0067*** (0.0002)	-0.0057*** (0.0003)
- 50Plus	0.0028*** (0.0004)	-0.0009* (0.0005)

Socioeconomic status neighbourhood for:

- Art 1		0.0011*** (0.0001)
- CDA		-0.0013*** (0.0001)
- CU		-0.0021*** (0.0001)
- DENK		-0.0006*** (0.0001)
- D66		0.0007*** (0.0000)

- FvD	-0.0006*** (0.0001)
- GL	0.0004*** (0.0000)
- PvdA	0.0003*** (0.0000)
- PVV	-0.0036*** (0.0001)
- SP	-0.0024*** (0.0001)
- VVD	0.0004*** (0.0000)
- 50Plus	-0.0025*** (0.0001)
<i>Mosque in neighbourhood for:</i>	
- Art 1	-0.3056*** (0.0360)
- CDA	-0.0766*** (0.0174)
- CU	-0.0496** (0.0219)
- DENK	0.4150*** (0.0169)
- D66	0.0368*** (0.0113)
- FvD	-0.0768*** (0.0287)
- GL	0.0373*** (0.0112)
- PvdA	-0.0505*** (0.0141)
- PVV	-0.1479*** (0.0147)
- SP	-0.0610*** (0.0144)
- VVD	-0.0565*** (0.0123)
- 50Plus	-0.1531*** (0.0233)
N	193,393
Global Deviance	-1603698
AIC	-1603616

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.05$ * $p < 0.1$.

TABLE D.5 | Beta Regression models on candidates' vote share; co-ethnic affinity effects

	Model 4
	B
Ethnic background (Dutch=ref.)	
- Turkish	-0.494*** (0.0149)
- Moroccan	-0.1095*** (0.0143)
- Surinamese/Antillean	-0.4358*** (0.0266)
- Other non-Western	-0.5503*** (0.0316)
% co-ethnics in neighbourhood x Turkish background candidate for:	
- CDA	0.0322*** (0.0082)
- DENK	0.0445*** (0.0019)
- D66	-0.0203*** (0.0052)
- GL	0.0111*** (0.0021)
- PvdA	0.0132*** (0.0028)
- SP	0.0271*** (0.0021)
- VVD	-0.0028 (0.0043)
% co-ethnics in neighbourhood x Moroccan background candidate for:	
- Art 1	-0.0332*** (0.0120)
- CDA	0.0046 (0.0073)
- DENK	0.0768*** (0.0013)
- D66	0.0114*** (0.0014)
- PvdA	0.0121*** (0.0016)
- SP	-0.0458*** (0.0054)
- VVD	-0.0242*** (0.0039)
% co-ethnics in neighbourhood x Surinamese/Antillean background candidate for:	
- Art 1	0.0201*** (0.0029)
- CU	0.0436*** (0.0040)
- DENK	-0.0055 (0.0039)
- D66	-0.0160*** (0.0037)

- FvD	0.0621*** (0.0066)
- PvdA	0.0231*** (0.0019)
- PVV	-0.0675*** (0.0107)
<i>% co-ethnics in neighbourhood x Other non-Western background candidate for</i>	
- Art 1	0.0118** (0.0047)
- CU	0.0870*** (0.0019)
- DENK	0.0128*** (0.0038)
- D66	-0.0264*** (0.0066)
- GL	-0.0375*** (0.0045)
- PvdA	-0.0010 (0.0047)
- 50Plus	0.0249*** (0.0094)
<i>Control variables</i>	
Party leader	2.8479*** (0.0047)
Art 1 x Party leader	-2.1707*** (0.0548)
DENK x Party leader	-1.3238*** (0.0227)
GL x Party leader	0.1487*** (0.0209)
Art 1 x % co-ethnics in neighbourhood x Surinamese x Party leader	0.0759*** (0.0034)
DENK x % co-ethnics in neighbourhood x Turkish x Party leader	0.0943*** (0.0020)
GL x % co-ethnics in neighbourhood x Moroccan x Party leader	0.0110*** (0.0008)
First ethnic minority on the list	0.8518*** (0.0056)
Re-nominated candidate 2012	0.1455*** (0.0043)
Party	
- Art 1	-5.5925*** (0.0526)
- CDA	-6.7929*** (0.0266)
- CU	-6.6430*** (0.0273)
- DENK	-5.6766*** (0.0181)
- D66	-5.7253*** (0.0146)
- FvD	-7.1690*** (0.0396)

- GL	-5.4053*** (0.0167)
- PvdA	-5.7141*** (0.0151)
- PVV	-5.1519*** (0.0201)
- SP	-5.6986*** (0.0170)
- VVD	-5.9676*** (0.0165)
- 50Plus	-6.2799*** (0.0314)
% co-ethnics in neighbourhood for:	
- Art 1	-0.0078*** (0.0009)
- CDA	0.0116*** (0.0003)
- CU	0.0005 (0.0003)
- DENK	-0.0069*** (0.0010)
- D66	0.0050*** (0.0002)
- FvD	0.0051*** (0.0005)
- GL	-0.0003 (0.0002)
- PvdA	-0.0013*** (0.0002)
- PVV	-0.0033*** (0.0002)
- SP	-0.0002 (0.0002)
- VVD	0.0092*** (0.0002)
- 50Plus	-0.003*** (0.0004)
N	193,393
Global Deviance	-1619439
AIC	-1619307

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.05$ * $p < 0.1$.

TABLE D.6 | Beta Regression models on candidates' vote share; gender-dependent ethnic affinity effects

	Model 5
	B
Female (Male=ref.)	0.0056 (0.0924)
Ethnic background (Dutch=ref.)	
- Turkish	-0.3283*** (0.0157)
- Moroccan	0.0759*** (0.0153)
- Surinamese/Antillean	-0.3237*** (0.0276)
- Other non-Western	-0.3390*** (0.0328)
<i>% co-ethnics in neighbourhood x Turkish background candidate for:</i>	
- CDA	0.0405*** (0.0079)
- DENK	-0.0039 (0.0108)
- GL	0.0016 (0.0036)
- PvdA	0.0348*** (0.0060)
- SP	0.0386*** (0.0026)
- VVD	0.0193* (0.0116)
- DENK x female	0.0535*** (0.0110)
- D66 x female	0.0249** (0.0117)
- GL x female	0.0543*** (0.0114)
- PvdA x female	0.0156 (0.0124)
- SP x female	0.0324*** (0.0112)
<i>% co-ethnics in neighbourhood x Moroccan background candidate for:</i>	
- Art 1	-0.0448*** (0.0125)
- CDA	0.0124* (0.0068)
- DENK	0.0389*** (0.0106)
- D66	0.0148*** (0.0024)
- PvdA	0.0168*** (0.0025)

- VVD	-0.0256*** (0.0039)
- D66 x female	0.0374*** (0.0109)
- PvdA x female	0.0321*** (0.0109)
- SP x female	0.0141 (0.0117)
<i>% co-ethnics in neighbourhood x Surinamese/Antillean background candidate for:</i>	
- Art 1	0.0072* (0.0043)
- CU	0.0746*** (0.0046)
- D66	-0.0183*** (0.0038)
- FvD	0.0695*** (0.0063)
- PvdA	0.0125*** (0.0029)
- Art 1 x female	0.0587*** (0.0099)
- DENK x female	-0.0222*** (0.0047)
- CU x female	-0.0362*** (0.0138)
- PvdA x female	0.0710*** (0.0110)
- PVV x female	0.0279** (0.0139)
<i>% co-ethnics in neighbourhood x Other non-Western background candidate for:</i>	
- Art 1	0.0315*** (0.0084)
- CU	0.0902*** (0.0019)
- DENK	-0.0287*** (0.0111)
- D66	-0.0400*** (0.0069)
- GL	-0.0091** (0.0042)
- PvdA x female	0.0315*** (0.0117)
- 50Plus x female	-0.0020 (0.0163)

% co-ethnics in neighbourhood x Dutch background candidate for:

- Art 1 x female	0.0359*** (0.0101)
- CDA x female	0.0354*** (0.0105)
- CU x female	0.0483*** (0.0105)
- DENK x female	0.0341*** (0.0105)
- D66 x % female	0.0460*** (0.0105)
- FvD x female	0.0352*** (0.0106)
- GL x female	0.0369*** (0.0105)
- PvdA x female	0.0487*** (0.0105)
- PVV x female	0.0474*** (0.0105)
- SP x female	0.0549*** (0.0105)
- VVD x female	0.0350*** (0.0105)
- 50 x female	0.0458*** (0.0105)

Control variables

Party leader	3.0681*** (0.0052)
Art 1 x Party leader	-2.3224*** (0.0703)
DENK x Party leader	-1.4602*** (0.0241)
GL x Party leader	0.3671*** (0.0300)
Art 1 x % co-ethnics x Party leader	0.0659*** (0.0043)
DENK x % co-ethnics x Party leader	0.1024*** (0.0025)
GL x % co-ethnics x Party leader	0.0069*** (0.0009)
First ethnic minority on the list	0.8917*** (0.0063)
Re-nominated candidate 2012	0.1719*** (0.0048)
Party	
- Art 1	-5.8169*** (0.0660)
- CDA	-7.2670*** (0.0311)

- CU	-6.9380*** (0.0308)
- DENK	-5.9701*** (0.0200)
- D66	-5.8963*** (0.0190)
- FvD	-7.5561*** (0.0428)
- GL	-6.0590*** (0.0273)
- PvdA	-5.9650*** (0.0204)
- PVV	-5.1621*** (0.0206)
- SP	-5.6150*** (0.0215)
- VVD	-6.3027*** (0.0195)
- 50Plus	-6.7055*** (0.0376)
% co-ethnics in neighbourhood for:	
Art 1 = ref.	
- CDA	0.0134*** (0.0004)
- CU	-0.0023*** (0.0004)
- D66	0.0048*** (0.0002)
- FvD	0.0055*** (0.0005)
- GL	0.0038*** (0.0004)
- PvdA	-0.0021*** (0.0003)
- PVV	-0.0045*** (0.0003)
- SP	-0.0053*** (0.0003)
- VVD	0.0131*** (0.0002)
- 50Plus	-0.0033*** (0.0005)
Gender x % co-ethnics in the neighbourhood	
	-0.0426*** (0.0105)
Female for:	
Art 1 = ref.	
- CDA	1.0867*** (0.1085)
- CU	0.6401*** (0.1117)

- DENK	0.3109*** (0.0996)
- D66	-0.1204 (0.0956)
- FvD	2.0158*** (0.1443)
- GL	0.8057*** (0.0973)
- PvdA	0.0259 (0.0955)
- PVV	-0.7686*** (0.1064)
- SP	-0.5211*** (0.0971)
- VVD	0.2411** (0.0978)
- 50Plus	0.8619*** (0.1130)
N	193.393
Global Deviance	-1640777
AIC	-1640581

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.05$ * $p < 0.1$.

Robustness checks

We run several additional analyses to check the robustness of our results. First, we run a beta zero-inflated regression model to show that the results referring to proportion of vote share among candidates who received at least some votes are identical to a beta regression model in which the zeros are deleted. Table D.7 shows that the results are indeed the same. In the beta regression model, we found ethnic affinity effects for the Christian Union, DENK, Forum for Democracy (FvD), the Green Party (GL), the Labour Party (PvdA), the Socialist Party (SP), and the Elderly Party (50Plus). For candidates from DENK and most of the (centre)left-wing parties, the outcomes of the logistic model are consistent with those of the beta regression model. For these parties we find that ethnic minority candidates are more likely to receive votes in neighbourhoods with a larger ethnic minority population (Nu model). For two (centre)right-wing parties we find consistent evidence against ethnic affinity effects. Ethnic minority candidates affiliated with the Christian-Democrats (CDA) and the Party for Freedom (PVV) are less likely to receive votes in neighbourhoods with a larger ethnic minority population (Nu model), and if they receive votes, the vote shares are lower in neighbourhoods with a larger ethnic minority population (Mu model). For some parties the outcome of the logistic model is not consistent with the beta regression model. For Artikel 1, the social-liberals (D66), and the Liberal Party (VVD) ethnic minority candidates are more likely to receive votes in neighbourhoods with a larger ethnic minority population (Nu model); but if they receive votes, the vote share is lower when the ethnic minority population is larger (Mu model). For Forum for Democracy (FvD) and

50Plus we find the opposite: ethnic minority candidates are more likely to receive no votes in neighbourhoods with a larger ethnic minority population (Nu model); but if they do receive votes, the vote share is higher in neighbourhoods with a larger ethnic minority population (Mu model).

TABLE D.7 | Zero-inflated beta regression model on candidates' vote share

	Mu model	Nu model
	B	B
Ethnic minority background (Dutch=ref.)	-0.3761*** (0.0083)	1.1520*** (0.0176)
<i>% ethnic minority population in neighbourhood x ethnic minority candidate for:</i>		
- Art 1	-0.0051*** (0.0012)	-0.0324*** (0.0017)
- CDA	-0.0034** (0.0016)	0.0757*** (0.0031)
- CU	0.0303*** (0.0007)	-0.0302*** (0.0011)
- DENK	0.0159*** (0.0019)	-0.1149*** (0.0035)
- D66	-0.0017*** (0.0004)	-0.0140*** (0.0008)
- FvD	0.0196*** (0.0026)	0.0405*** (0.0040)
- GL	0.0111*** (0.0003)	-0.0531*** (0.0011)
- PvdA	0.0081*** (0.0004)	-0.0323*** (0.0007)
- PVV	-0.0163*** (0.0028)	0.0369*** (0.0041)
- SP	0.0027*** (0.0005)	-0.0431*** (0.0011)
- VVD	-0.0179*** (0.0008)	-0.0128*** (0.0012)
- 50Plus	0.0088*** (0.0029)	0.0592*** (0.0049)
<i>Control variables</i>		
Party leader	2.7754*** (0.0040)	-6.3697*** (0.0457)
First ethnic minority on the list	0.7400*** (0.0050)	-2.3985*** (0.0116)
Re-nominated candidate 2012	0.2069*** (0.0041)	-0.7628*** (0.0062)
<i>Party</i>		
- Art 1	-7.7229*** (0.0269)	4.8504*** (0.0507)

- CDA	-5.6101*** (0.0089)	1.8561*** (0.0158)
- CU	-6.3690*** (0.0117)	2.6750*** (0.0191)
- DENK	-7.0129*** (0.0167)	2.9978*** (0.0331)
- D66	-5.2710*** (0.0066)	1.1425*** (0.0124)
- FvD	-6.5350*** (0.0148)	2.6129*** (0.0254)
- GL	-5.2706*** (0.0075)	1.1535*** (0.0121)
- PvdA	-5.7351*** (0.0080)	2.1943*** (0.0136)
- PVV	-5.4782*** (0.0090)	2.9988*** (0.0201)
- SP	-5.7485*** (0.0086)	2.2424*** (0.0162)
- VVD	-5.1080*** (0.0068)	2.0499*** (0.0123)
- 50Plus	-6.5293*** (0.0126)	2.6204*** (0.0220)
% ethnic minority population in neighbourhood for:		
- Art 1	0.0353*** (0.0013)	-0.0149*** (0.0018)
- CDA	-0.0117*** (0.0003)	0.0127*** (0.0006)
- CU	-0.0092*** (0.0004)	0.0098*** (0.0007)
- DENK	0.0181*** (0.0019)	0.0595*** (0.0036)
- D66	-0.0024*** (0.0002)	0.0085*** (0.0005)
- FvD	-0.0062*** (0.0005)	0.0038*** (0.0009)
- GL	-0.0044*** (0.0003)	0.0060*** (0.0004)
- PvdA	-0.0003 (0.0003)	0.0048*** (0.0005)
- PVV	0.0038*** (0.0003)	-0.0005 (0.0007)
- SP	0.0027*** (0.0003)	-0.0002 (0.0006)
- VVD	-0.0067*** (0.0002)	0.0108*** (0.0005)
- 50Plus	0.0028*** (0.0004)	0.0003 (0.0008)
N	1,162,308	
Global Deviance	-7772323	
AIC	-777071	

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.001; **p < 0.05 * p < 0.1.

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Samenvatting *(Summary in Dutch)*

Achtergrond en doelstelling

De samenstelling van de Nederlandse bevolking is de afgelopen decennia etnisch steeds diverser geworden. Etnische minderheden hebben op veel gebieden een zwakkere positie in Nederland en dit brengt verschillende uitdagingen met zich mee voor onze samenleving. Een van die uitdagingen is de integratie van etnische minderheden als burgers van onze democratie. Om een democratie te kunnen laten functioneren zijn actieve en betrokken burgers belangrijk, politieke participatie is namelijk een essentieel onderdeel van democratieën. Dat geldt natuurlijk voor alle burgers van een samenleving. De legitimiteit van democratie is gebaseerd op het idee dat gekozen vertegenwoordigers de belangen van de bevolking behartigen. Als bepaalde groepen in de samenleving nauwelijks deelnemen aan de politiek, is het waarschijnlijk dat de belangen van deze groepen niet worden behartigd en dat de legitimiteit van de democratie onder druk staat. In dit proefschrift onderzoek ik daarom de politieke vertegenwoordiging van etnische minderheden en kijk ik naar hun stemgedrag.

Hoewel de politieke vertegenwoordiging van etnische minderheden in Nederland toeneemt, is er nog steeds sprake van ondervertegenwoordiging. Het aandeel Tweede Kamerleden met een migratieachtergrond is bijvoorbeeld lager dan het aandeel Nederlanders met een migratieachtergrond in de samenleving. Dit geldt overigens niet alleen voor Nederland, maar ook voor veel andere Westerse samenlevingen. Met de huidige demografische ontwikkelingen, wordt onze samenleving etnisch steeds diverser, en daarmee ook het electoraat. Alleen al door hun aantallen zullen etnische minderheden daardoor steeds belangrijker worden voor politieke partijen om zetels te winnen. Politieke partijen zijn dan ook meer aandacht gaan besteden aan de inclusie van Nederlanders met een migratieachtergrond. Het is echter nog onduidelijk of, en zo ja welke, relatie er bestaat tussen de politieke vertegenwoordiging van etnische minderheden en het stemgedrag van etnische minderheden. Daar is in de literatuur nog niet veel aandacht aan besteed.

Het doel van dit proefschrift is om een overzicht te geven van de politieke vertegenwoordiging van etnische minderheden en om na te gaan in hoeverre die politieke vertegenwoordiging samenhangt met hun stemvoorkeuren. Het onderzoek is grotendeels gericht op Nederland en heeft betrekking op de periode van 2010 tot en met 2017. Dit proefschrift bestaat uit twee delen. Deel 1 geeft een overzicht van het aandeel Nederlanders met een migratieachtergrond in de Tweede Kamer. Tevens onderzoek ik welke factoren de mate van vertegenwoordiging kunnen verklaren. Omdat er tot nu toe weinig kwantitatief onderzoek is gedaan naar de rol van politieke partijen in de politieke vertegenwoordiging van etnische minderheden, bestudeer ik drie relevante aspecten van het electorale proces. De drie aspecten zijn: of Nederlanders met een migratieachtergrond worden genomineerd als kandidaat, op welke lijstpositie zij worden geplaatst en of ze op een veilige lijstpositie worden geplaatst. Een veilige lijstpositie betekent een plek op

de lijst waar het mogelijk is een zetel te winnen. Voor de laatste kandidaat op de lijst is dit bijvoorbeeld haast onmogelijk. Tot slot onderzoek ik hoeveel kandidaten met een migratieachtergrond uiteindelijk worden verkozen tot Tweede Kamerlid.

Deel 2 van dit proefschrift richt zich op de stemvoorkeuren van etnische minderheden. Zelfs als etnische groepen voldoende vertegenwoordigd zijn in politieke partijen en in de Tweede Kamer, zegt dit nog niets over de stemvoorkeuren van kiezers met (en zonder) migratieachtergrond. We weten niet of zij stemmen op partijen die hun belangen behartigen of niet. Ik onderzoek daarom of de voorkeur van etnische minderheden voor een bepaalde partij afhangt van de mate waarin partijen de belangen van deze groep behartigen. Daarnaast bekijk ik in hoeverre de partijvoorkeur van etnische minderheden wordt beïnvloed door het aantal kandidaten met een migratieachtergrond. Vervolgens ga ik na of kandidaten met een migratieachtergrond stemmen trekken onder mensen met een migratieachtergrond. Ik toets de zogeheten etnische affiniteitsthese ('ethnic affinity thesis') en in welke omstandigheden etnische affiniteitseffecten sterker zijn. Het gaat er in Deel 2 van dit proefschrift dan ook om helderheid te verkrijgen over of en hoe de politieke vertegenwoordiging van etnische minderheden invloed heeft op hun voorkeuren voor bepaalde partijen en kandidaten. De onderzoeksvraag die ik in dit proefschrift wil beantwoorden is daarom als volgt:

'In hoeverre zijn etnische minderheden politiek vertegenwoordigd, hoe wordt dit beïnvloed door politieke partijen, en in hoeverre worden de stemvoorkeuren van etnische minderheden beïnvloed door de politieke vertegenwoordiging van etnische minderheden?'

Politieke vertegenwoordiging

Politieke partijen kunnen op verschillende manieren sociale groepen in de samenleving vertegenwoordigen. Er bestaat een belangrijk onderscheid tussen substantieve en descriptieve vertegenwoordiging. Zij vormen dan ook twee belangrijke begrippen in dit proefschrift. Substantieve vertegenwoordiging gaat over het behartigen van de belangen en de beleidsvoorkeuren van bepaalde sociale groepen. Zo worden mensen met een lagere sociaaleconomische positie over het algemeen vertegenwoordigd door linkse partijen, terwijl de economische belangen van mensen met een hoger inkomen wellicht beter worden behartigd door economisch rechtser partijen. Dit kan ook betrekking hebben op andere belangen, zoals culturele of religieuze belangen. Substantieve vertegenwoordiging gaat dus over wat er vertegenwoordigd wordt.

Een ander aspect van politieke vertegenwoordiging is descriptieve vertegenwoordiging. Descriptieve vertegenwoordiging gaat over wie vertegenwoordigt. Het gaat over de mate waarin vertegenwoordigers een afspiegeling zijn van het electoraat wat betreft allerlei kenmerken zoals leeftijd, geslacht, migratieachtergrond en opleidingsniveau. Als Nederlanders met een migratieachtergrond worden vertegenwoordigd door Kamerleden met een vergelijkbare achtergrond heeft dat een belangrijke symbolische waarde.

Een argument tegen descriptieve vertegenwoordiging is dat het niet uitmaakt wie vertegenwoordigt, zolang de belangen van die groep maar behartigd worden. Bovendien hoeft een vertegenwoordiger van een bepaalde sociale groep helemaal niet dezelfde belangen te hebben als die groep. Desalniettemin is descriptieve vertegenwoordiging belangrijk, het gaat namelijk over identiteit en gedeelde ervaringen. Bovendien zijn etnische minderheden – of andere sociale groepen – dan niet alleen onderwerp van debat of beleid, maar ook actieve deelnemers aan het politieke proces. Dit kan, bijvoorbeeld door persoonlijke ervaringen, zorgen voor een andere perspectief op beleid. Kortom, zowel descriptieve als substantieve vertegenwoordiging zijn van belang voor etnische minderheden en beide komen in dit proefschrift aan bod.

De Nederlandse context

Hoewel Nederland ooit bekend stond als het land van de multiculturaliteit, zijn juist integratie en migratie de afgelopen jaren het onderwerp geweest van hevige debatten. De maatschappelijke en politieke context van Nederland, juist in de periode waarop dit onderzoek zich richt, maken Nederland een interessante casus voor een studie over de politieke vertegenwoordiging van etnische minderheden. In Nederland stond de PvdA lange tijd bekend als de partij voor Nederlanders met een migratieachtergrond. Desalniettemin heeft bijna elke politieke partij tegenwoordig Nederlanders met een migratieachtergrond op de kandidatenlijst staan. Diversiteit is een belangrijk onderwerp geworden. Dit blijkt ook wel uit de opkomst van nieuwe partijen DENK en Artikel 1 die in respectievelijk 2014 en 2017 zijn opgericht.

De onderzoeksperiode van dit proefschrift beslaat drie Tweede Kamerverkiezingen, die van 2010, 2012 en 2017. Waar de coalitie na de verkiezingen van 2010 gekenmerkt werd door de gedoogsteun van de PVV, regeerden de VVD en PvdA van 2012 tot 2017. In 2017 deden verschillende nieuwe partijen mee aan de verkiezingen. Twee partijen presenteerden zich nadrukkelijk als vertegenwoordigers van Nederlanders met een migratieachtergrond. Ondanks de aandacht voor diversiteit, won alleen DENK zetels. Met drie zetels zijn ze een opvallende nieuwkomer in de Nederlandse politieke arena. Ook opvallend was het grote verlies van de PvdA, die van 38 naar negen zetels zakte. De afgelopen zeven jaar heeft het politieke landschap in Nederland zich op een unieke manier ontwikkeld en lijkt verder te zijn versplinterd. Bovendien heeft geen ander Europees land een partij gericht op mensen met een migratieachtergrond die daadwerkelijk zetels heeft gewonnen tijdens nationale verkiezingen.

Mijn onderzoek richt zich grotendeels op Nederland. Ik wil echter de verwachtingen over de mogelijke relatie tussen de politieke vertegenwoordiging van etnische minderheden en hun stemvoorkeuren toetsen in een andere politieke context. Vandaar dat een van de hoofdstukken in dit proefschrift over Canada gaat. In dat hoofdstuk ga ik van een verklarende vraag over Nederland naar een toetsende vraag over Canada.

In hoofdstuk 2, 3, 4 en 5 van dit proefschrift komen vier empirische studies aan bod. In de rest van deze samenvatting bespreek ik deze vier empirische studies, daarna sluit ik af met de conclusie.

Deel 1: de descriptieve vertegenwoordiging van etnische minderheden

Hoofdstuk 2

In het eerste empirische hoofdstuk van dit proefschrift onderzoek ik in hoeverre politieke partijen een rol spelen in de descriptieve vertegenwoordiging van etnische minderheden. Partijen hebben grote invloed op de politieke vertegenwoordiging van etnische minderheden omdat zij de samenstelling van de lijst bepalen. Daarom kijk ik naar het aantal kandidaten met een migratieachtergrond dat partijen selecteren, op welke lijstpositie zij terecht komen en of ze uiteindelijk verkozen worden. Dit kan verschillen tussen partijen, afhankelijk van verschillende partijkennmerken. Ik kijk naar drie van deze kenmerken.

Het eerste kenmerk dat ik onderzoek zijn partijstandpunten – substantieve vertegenwoordiging – op het gebied van migratie- en integratievraagstukken. Vervolgens richt ik me op de invloed van steun voor Nederlanders met een migratieachtergrond binnen partijen, zoals een diversiteitsnetwerk. Tot slot onderzoek ik of selectiemethoden van kandidaten invloed hebben op descriptieve vertegenwoordiging. Wat betreft dit laatste kenmerk richt ik me op de inclusiviteit van het selectoraat, oftewel wie er binnen de partij mee mag beslissen over de kandidatenlijst.

Om te bepalen in hoeverre Nederlanders met een migratieachtergrond vertegenwoordigd waren op kandidatenlijsten en in de Tweede Kamer, heb ik achtergrondgegevens verzameld van alle kandidaten die op de kandidatenlijst stonden bij de Tweede Kamerverkiezingen van 2012. Dit heb ik gedaan voor alle politieke partijen die tijdens deze verkiezingen ten minste één zetel wonnen. Hierbij maakte ik onderscheid tussen de vijf groepen: Nederlanders met een Marokkaanse, Turkse, postkoloniale en andere niet-westerse en westerse achtergrond. Ook verzamelde ik informatie over de drie partijkennmerken waar ik me in dit hoofdstuk op richt.

Uit de resultaten van dit eerste deel van mijn proefschrift blijkt dat Nederlanders met een Turkse en Marokkaanse achtergrond ruim vertegenwoordigd waren op de kandidatenlijsten van Nederlandse politieke partijen en in de Tweede Kamer in 2012. Het aandeel kandidaten en Tweede Kamerleden met een Turkse en Marokkaanse achtergrond was zelfs groter dan het aandeel van deze groepen in de samenleving. Daarentegen waren Nederlanders met een westerse, postkoloniale of andere niet-westerse achtergrond ondervertegenwoordigd. Het aandeel kandidaten en Kamerleden met deze migratieachtergronden was kleiner dan het aandeel van deze groepen in de samenleving. Een vergelijkbare uitkomst vind ik in hoofdstuk 5 voor de Tweede Kamerverkiezing van 2017. D66, GroenLinks en de PvdA zijn de partijen met de hoogste percentages kandidaten

en Kamerleden met een migratieachtergrond. De mate waarin Nederlanders met een migratieachtergrond vertegenwoordigd zijn op kandidatenlijsten en in de Tweede Kamer verschilt dus per etnische groep en per partij. Een andere bevinding uit hoofdstuk 2 is dat een hoger aandeel kandidaten met een migratieachtergrond is gerelateerd aan een groter aandeel kandidaten met een migratieachtergrond op veilige lijstposities en aan een hoger aandeel Tweede Kamerleden met een migratieachtergrond.

In hoofdstuk 2 onderzocht ik ook of partijenmerken een rol spelen in de nominatie van kandidaten met een migratieachtergrond. Partijen met progressievere partijstandpunten over migratie en integratie nomineren vaker kandidaten met een migratieachtergrond. Wat betreft de lijstpositie constateerde ik dat kandidaten met een niet-westerse achtergrond op lagere lijstposities terechtkomen dan kandidaten zonder migratieachtergrond bij partijen die restrictievere standpunten hebben over migratie en integratie. Bovendien nomineren partijen die een of andere vorm van steun voor Nederlanders met een migratieachtergrond hebben binnen de partij, meer kandidaten met een migratieachtergrond. Ik vond geen bewijs voor mijn verwachting dat steun binnen de partij gerelateerd zou zijn aan hogere lijstposities of een veilige lijstpositie. Ook de samenstelling van het selectoraat lijkt geen invloed te hebben op het nomineren van kandidaten met een migratieachtergrond.

Deze studie heeft laten zien dat de descriptieve vertegenwoordiging van etnische groepen verschilt tussen groepen en tussen politieke partijen. Dit benadrukt bovendien het belang om etnische groepen niet als homogeen te zien en om in toekomstig onderzoek meer aandacht te besteden aan westerse minderheden. De relatie tussen substantieve en descriptieve vertegenwoordiging die ik vond in deze studie laat zien dat de meeste partijen meer doen dan alleen etnische kandidaten op de lijst zetten. Ze zetten zich in voor etnische minderheden in zowel hun partijprogramma als binnen de partij zelf. Ik vond niet voor alle partijenmerken bewijs dat zij invloed hadden op de descriptieve vertegenwoordiging binnen partijen. Een verklaring is wellicht dat ik alleen keek naar formele regels rondom steun voor etnische minderheden en de werving en selectie van kandidaten. Het selectieproces is ingewikkeld omdat er ook veel achter de schermen gebeurt, wat niet altijd gemakkelijk te onderzoeken is.

Deel 2: de stemvoorkeuren van etnische minderheden

Een van de doelen van etnische diversiteit in de politiek is om de belangen van verschillende etnische groepen te behartigen. Ik onderzoek daarom of etnische minderheden ook daadwerkelijk stemmen op partijen wiens doel het is om de belangen van deze groepen te behartigen. Ik doe dat door de invloed van zowel substantieve als descriptieve vertegenwoordiging op de partijvoorkeuren van etnische minderheden in Nederland en in Canada te analyseren. Vervolgens bestudeer ik of kandidaten met een migratieachtergrond stemmen trekken onder Nederlanders met eenzelfde migratieachtergrond en in hoeverre dit verschilt tussen politieke partijen en etnische groepen.

Hoofdstuk 3

In de tweede empirische studie van dit proefschrift onderzoek ik de partijvoorkeuren van etnische minderheden in Nederland. Vervolgens ga ik na of substantieve en descriptieve vertegenwoordiging invloed hebben op deze partijvoorkeuren. Ook onderzoek ik of individuele achtergrondkenmerken hier een rol in spelen. Er bestaan verschillende theoretische benaderingen om stemgedrag te verklaren. Zo stellen sociologische theorieën dat stemgedrag wordt beïnvloed door sociaal-demografische kenmerken zoals groepsidentiteit, klasse, geslacht of etnische achtergrond. Er bestaan ook theorieën die stellen dat kiezers rationeel zijn. Volgens deze theorieën vergelijken kiezers hun eigen positie op allerlei standpunten met die van partijen en stemmen ze op die partij die het beste hun belangen behartigt. In dit proefschrift formuleer ik verwachtingen over de stemvoorkeuren van etnische minderheden op grond van beide theoretische benaderingen.

Ik verwacht dat individuele kenmerken van etnische minderheden invloed hebben op hun partijvoorkeur, maar ook dat hun standpunten over verschillende onderwerpen een rol spelen. Kiezers zijn rationeel, maar die rationaliteit is gebaseerd op de sociale groep waar ze toe behoren. Mijn verwachting is daarom dat etnische minderheden een voorkeur hebben voor partijen van wie zij verwachten dat die de belangen van hun etnische groep zullen behartigen (groepsbelang). Dit zou verklaren waarom etnische minderheden niet altijd kiezen voor partijen die het beste hun individuele belangen behartigen (eigenbelang). Bovendien verwacht ik dat deze relatie tussen politieke vertegenwoordiging en partijvoorkeuren wordt beïnvloed door de individuele kenmerken. Bijvoorbeeld dat voor etnische minderheden die zich sterker identificeren met hun etnische groep, partijstandpunten over migratie en integratie een grotere rol spelen in hun keuze voor een politieke partij. Hiermee combineer ik individuele- en partijenkenmerken als verklaringen voor partijvoorkeuren.

Wat betreft substantieve vertegenwoordiging kijk ik naar partijstandpunten over migratie en integratie. Ook toets ik of de aanwezigheid van kandidaten met een andere etnische achtergrond een rol speelt in de partijvoorkeuren etnische minderheden. Dat de aanwezigheid van kandidaten met een andere etnische achtergrond kiezers trekt, kan verschillende redenen hebben. Het is een teken van erkenning van de groep, maar ook een gedeelde taal, cultuur of migratie-ervaring tussen kiezers en kandidaten kan van invloed zijn. Tot slot kunnen kiezers denken dat juist deze kandidaten hun belangen goed zullen behartigen en is het mogelijk dat deze kandidaten mobiliserend werken.

Voor dit hoofdstuk verzamelde ik achtergrondgegevens van alle kandidaten die op de kandidatenlijst stonden bij de Tweede Kamerverkiezingen van 2010. Deze informatie heb ik samengevoegd met de informatie over de kandidaten voor de verkiezingen van 2012 die ik voor hoofdstuk 2 verzamelde. Wederom richtte ik me op Nederlanders met een Turkse, Marokkaanse, postkoloniale, overige niet-westerse en westerse achtergrond. Kortom, voor dit hoofdstuk gebruik ik achtergrondgegevens van de kandidaten die bij de Tweede Kamerverkiezingen van 2010 en 2012 kandidaat stonden. Voor het bestuderen van

partijkeuzes heb ik gebruik gemaakt van enquêtegegevens, verzameld tussen 2010 en 2015. Hiervoor combineerde ik de volgende enquêtes: de Migrants' Welfare State Attitudes (MIFARE), The Netherlands Longitudinal Lifecourse Study (NELLS), the Survey Integratie Minderheden (SIM) en Longitudinal Internet Studies for the Social Sciences (LISS).

De resultaten uit hoofdstuk 3 laten zien dat name met voor Nederlanders met een Turkse en Marokkaanse achtergrond, maar ook die met een postkoloniale achtergrond, de PvdA de meest populaire partij was. Bovendien was deze partij populair onder diegenen met een lagere sociaaleconomische status en met een sterkere etnische identificatie. Maar niet alle Nederlanders met een migratieachtergrond stemmen op de PvdA of andere linkse partijen. Bij Nederlanders met een westerse of andere niet-westerse achtergrond (oftewel, niet de Nederlanders met een Turkse, Marokkaanse of postkoloniale achtergrond) is er meer variatie in partijvoorkeur, een deel van deze groep stemt bijvoorbeeld op de VVD of de PVV.

Economische partijstandpunten en partijstandpunten over migratie en integratie beïnvloeden de partijkeuzes van Nederlanders met een migratieachtergrond, maar deze relatie is niet afhankelijk van individuele kenmerken zoals sociaaleconomische status. Dat laatste was wel mijn verwachting. Met betrekking tot descriptieve vertegenwoordiging blijkt uit de resultaten dat partijen met een hoger aandeel kandidaten met een migratieachtergrond een grotere kans hebben om stemmen te krijgen van kiezers met een migratieachtergrond. Hierbij wordt ook het belang van co-etnisch stemmen benadrukt: hoe groter het aandeel kandidaten met een specifieke migratieachtergrond, bijvoorbeeld een Turkse achtergrond, hoe groter de invloed op kiezers met dezelfde achtergrond. Kiezers met een Turkse migratieachtergrond zijn dus meer geneigd te stemmen op partijen met een groter aandeel kandidaten met een Turkse achtergrond. Daarnaast vind ik dat de invloed van descriptieve vertegenwoordig op partijkeuze sterker is voor Nederlanders met een westerse migratieachtergrond die zich sterker identificeren met hun etnische achtergrond. Dit heb ik niet gevonden voor Nederlanders met een niet-westerse migratieachtergrond.

Hoofdstuk 4

Het grootste gedeelte van dit proefschrift gaat over Nederland, maar hoofdstuk 4 richt zich op Canada. Dit hoofdstuk is een extra test voor de invloed van substantieve en descriptieve vertegenwoordiging op de partijvoorkeuren van etnische minderheden. Hier toets ik of ik vergelijkbare effecten vind in een andere context en periode dan de Nederlandse. Ik bespreek eerst kort waarom Canada een interessant land is om dit te onderzoeken.

Zowel Canada als Nederland staan bekend als landen met een relatief goede politieke vertegenwoordiging van etnische minderheden. In dat opzicht lijken de landen misschien op elkaar, in vele andere opzichten niet. Waar Canada bekend staat als een land dat het multiculturalisme heeft omarmd, is het beleid rondom integratie in Nederland de afgelopen jaren steeds strikter geworden. Bovendien is de PVV een grote partij en heerst er een bepaald anti-immigratie sentiment in de samenleving. In Canada werd in 2015

juist het meest diverse kabinet tot nu toe geïnstalleerd. Er is geen anti-immigratiepartij van betekenis en de meeste partijen zitten redelijk op één lijn wat betreft immigratie- en integratievraagstukken. De drie grote partijen in Canada waar ik me in dit onderzoek op richt zijn de linkse New Democratic Party (NDP), de centrumpartij Liberal Party of Canada en de conservatievere Conservative Party of Canada.

Een ander belangrijk verschil tussen de twee landen is het electorale systeem. Nederland heeft een systeem van evenredige vertegenwoordiging, het kiessysteem in Canada wordt ook wel first-past-the-post of single member plurality systeem genoemd. In Canada is het land opgedeeld in kiesdistricten. Elke partij nomineert één kandidaat per district en die kandidaat vertegenwoordigt de partij in dat district. Inwoners kunnen alleen stemmen op de kandidaten in hun eigen district. Bijvoorbeeld: in district 1 nomineert de NDP kandidaat A, de Liberalen nomineren kandidaat B en de Conservatieven kandidaat C. In district 2 nomineren zij respectievelijk kandidaat D, E en F. Dan zullen inwoners uit district 1 die op de NDP willen stemmen, hun stem moeten uitbrengen op kandidaat A. Daarmee is een stem op een kandidaat gelijk aan een stem voor de partij. De kandidaat met de meeste stemmen in een district, wordt afgevaardigde in het parlement. In Nederland kunnen kiezers kiezen uit meerdere kandidaten van dezelfde partij.

Ondanks deze verschillen tussen Nederland en Canada, lijken ze het dus beiden redelijk goed te doen op het gebied van de politieke vertegenwoordiging van etnische minderheden. Toch is het nog onduidelijk hoe politieke vertegenwoordiging samenhangt met stemvoorkeuren en of de mechanismen hierachter hetzelfde werken in landen met een verschillende politieke context. Om dit te toetsen gebruikte ik de Canadian Election Survey, van 1993-2015.

De beschrijvende resultaten uit hoofdstuk 4 laten zien dat de Liberal Party in Canada het meest populair is bij Canadezen met een migratieachtergrond. Bijna 60% van de respondenten stelde voor deze centrumpartij te stemmen, dit percentage ligt een stuk lager voor de twee andere partijen. In totaal had 22% van de kiezers een voorkeur voor de Conservatieve partij en 18% voor de linksere NDP. Dit is een opvallende bevinding in vergelijking met andere Westerse landen. In de meeste landen steunen etnische minderheden vooral linkse partijen, in Canada is juist de centrumpartij het meest populair. Wat betreft de invloed van substantieve en descriptieve vertegenwoordiging op partijkeuze, vond ik niet de verwachte resultaten. Politieke partijen die economisch rechtser zijn, sociaal conservatiever en strikter in hun opvattingen over immigratie en integratie, zijn populairder bij etnische minderheden. Ook in de Canadese context hadden individuele kenmerken van kiezers geen invloed op de relatie tussen substantieve en descriptieve vertegenwoordiging en partijvoorkeur.

Verklaringen voor de bevindingen in Nederland en in Canada

De resultaten van beide studies laten zien dat de meest populaire partij onder etnische minderheden niet altijd de partij is die het beste hun belangen behartigt. Dit kan wellicht verklaren waarom ik geen duidelijk bewijs vond voor mijn verwachting dat de relatie

tussen substantieve vertegenwoordiging en partijkeuze zou afhangen van individuele kenmerken. Veel Westerse landen, waaronder Nederland en Canada, hebben een politieke partij die zich al lange tijd inzet voor de belangen van etnische minderheden. Zij zijn vaak ook de voortrekkers op het gebied van descriptieve vertegenwoordiging. Het is goed mogelijk dat de historische binding tussen dit soort partijen en etnische gemeenschappen ervoor zorgen dat mensen met een migratieachtergrond op deze partijen stemmen. Het is dan een soort norm geworden die voortkomt uit socialisatie in de gemeenschap. Dit zou een belangrijke verklaring kunnen zijn voor de partijvoorkeuren van etnische minderheden hoewel dit moeilijk te toetsen is.

Mijn bevindingen kunnen dus een indicatie zijn dat een groepsnorm onder etnische minderheden belangrijker is dan eigenbelang. Een andere mogelijke verklaring voor mijn bevindingen is dat geen enkele partij er goed in slaagde om de substantieve belangen van mensen etnische minderheden te behartigen. Dit zou bijvoorbeeld kunnen door groep-specifieke belangen op het gebied van integratie te combineren met sociaal-conservatieve partij standpunten. Het behartigen van dergelijke specifieke belangen van etnische minderheden lijkt een niche te zijn die – ten tijde van dit onderzoek – nog niet was opgevuld. Ondertussen zou dit in Nederland wel eens veranderd kunnen zijn door de komst van DENK. Of dergelijke ontwikkelingen ook mogelijk zijn in andere Westerse landen hangt af van het electorale systeem, de etnische samenstelling van de bevolking en de etnische gemeenschap.

Uit de resultaten blijkt dat descriptieve vertegenwoordiging wel invloed heeft op partijkeuze in Nederland maar niet in Canada. Dit verschil is wellicht te verklaren door het verschillende politieke systeem. In het Nederlandse systeem kunnen kiezers kiezen tussen verschillende kandidaten op de kandidatenlijst van partijen. Hiermee is descriptieve vertegenwoordiging per partij misschien zichtbaarder dan in Canada. Het zou goed kunnen dat in Canada partijen veel zwaarder wegen dan kandidaten in stemvoorkeuren. Daarnaast komt het vaak voor dat in een district met veel inwoners met een migratieachtergrond, meerdere partijen een kandidaat met een migratieachtergrond nomineren. De migratiestatus van de kandidaat speelt dan een kleinere rol.

Hoofdstuk 5

In het laatste empirische hoofdstuk richt ik me op het stemmen voor kandidaten met een migratieachtergrond. Ik onderzoek in hoeverre kandidaten met een migratieachtergrond stemmen trekken in buurten met veel Nederlanders met eenzelfde migratieachtergrond. Dit wordt bekeken per partij en voor verschillende etnische groepen. Dergelijke voorkeuren voor kandidaten zijn voor etnische minderheden nog niet eerder onderzocht op nationaal niveau in landen met een systeem van evenredige vertegenwoordiging, zoals Nederland. In dit hoofdstuk gebruik ik vergelijkbare theoretische proposities als in hoofdstuk 3 en 4. De verwachting dat kandidaten met een migratieachtergrond meer stemmen trekken in buurten met meer mensen met dezelfde achtergrond wordt ook wel de affinititeitstheze genoemd. Deze these stelt dat kiezers aangetrokken worden door kandidaten met wie

zij bepaalde kenmerken delen. Deze kenmerken zijn bijvoorbeeld sociale klasse, gender of etnische achtergrond. De op dit moment meest recente Tweede Kamerverkiezing van maart 2017 biedt een interessante context om de affiniteitsthese te toetsen. Het grootste gedeelte van de politieke partijen had kandidaten met een migratieachtergrond op de lijst, zowel linkse als rechtse partijen. Daarnaast deden er twee nieuwe partijen mee aan deze verkiezingen die zich richten op Nederlanders met een migratieachtergrond. Ik kon daarom bestuderen of er sprake is van affiniteitsstemmen binnen en tussen partijen.

Voor de verkiezingen van 2017 verzamelde ik wederom achtergrondgegevens over kandidaten. In dit hoofdstuk richt ik me echter alleen op Turkse, Marokkaanse en Surinaamse/Antilliaanse Nederlanders. Naast gegevens over kandidaten heb ik verkiezingsuitslagen gebruikt. Met behulp van verkiezingsuitslagen van gemeentes heb ik gekeken naar het aantal stemmen dat individuele kandidaten kregen in elk stembureau in twintig grote steden in Nederland. Ik had beschikking over de verkiezingsuitslagen van 2.121 stembureaus over het aantal stemmen voor 548 kandidaten.

In hoofdstuk 5 van dit proefschrift vind ik bewijs voor de affiniteitsthese. Kandidaten met een migratieachtergrond trekken meer stemmen in buurten met een groter aandeel mensen met een migratieachtergrond. Deze effecten zijn sterker in buurten met een substantieel grotere groep mensen met een migratieachtergrond. Deze bevinding is in lijn met de mobiliteitshypothese die stelt dat mobilisatie in hechte etnische gemeenschappen de stemvoorkeur van deze gemeenschappen kan beïnvloeden. De resultaten laten eveneens zien dat etnische affiniteitseffecten verschillen tussen partijen, migratieachtergrond en tussen mannen en vrouwen. De effecten zijn het sterkst voor kandidaten van DENK en voor linkse partijen. Bovendien trekken kandidaten met een migratieachtergrond vooral stemmen in buurten met veel inwoners met dezelfde etnische achtergrond en zijn de effecten doorgaans sterker voor mannen dan voor vrouwen.

De resultaten bevestigen dat etnische affiniteitsstemmen ook op nationaal niveau in landen met een systeem van evenredige vertegenwoordiging voorkomt. Het bewijst wederom dat het belangrijk is rekening te houden met verschillen tussen etnische groepen, voor sommige groepen vond ik sterker bewijs voor de affiniteitsthese dan voor andere etnische groepen, bovendien zijn de effecten het sterkst binnen de eigen etnische groep.

Conclusie

Dit proefschrift geeft inzicht in de politieke vertegenwoordiging van etnische minderheden en de invloed hiervan op stemvoorkeuren van deze groep. De onderzoeksvraag die centraal stond is als volgt:

‘In hoeverre zijn etnische minderheden politiek vertegenwoordigd, hoe wordt dit beïnvloed door politieke partijen, en in hoeverre worden de stemvoorkeuren van etnische minderheden beïnvloed door de politieke vertegenwoordiging van etnische minderheden?’

Wat betreft descriptieve vertegenwoordiging, ontdekte ik dat het aandeel Nederlanders met een Turkse of Marokkaanse achtergrond op kandidatenlijsten en in de Tweede Kamer groter is dan het aandeel van deze groepen in de samenleving. Dit terwijl andere etnische groepen ondervertegenwoordigd zijn. Bovendien hebben politieke partijen met progressieve standpunten over integratie- en migratievraagstukken een groter aandeel van kandidaten met een migratieachtergrond op hun kandidatenlijsten. Hoewel bijna alle politieke partijen kandidaten met een migratieachtergrond op hun lijsten in Nederland hebben, komt dit het meest voor bij linkse partijen. Niet alleen is er een grotere kans dat linkse politieke partijen kandidaten uit etnische minderheidsgroepen nomineren, ze trekken ook vaker de etnische stem. Door verschillende grootschalige enquêtes te combineren, vond ik in deze studie bewijs – zoals verwacht – voor de populariteit van de PvdA bij etnische minderheden bij nationale verkiezingen. Ik vond echter ook dat er verschillen zijn in de partijkeuze tussen etnische groepen. Vooral kiezers met een niet-westerse achtergrond en mensen met een lage sociaaleconomische status stemmen vaker voor de PvdA.

De bevindingen uit dit proefschrift laten eveneens zien dat niet alleen individuele kenmerken van invloed zijn op stemvoorkeuren, maar dat substantieve en descriptieve vertegenwoordiging ook een rol spelen bij de stemvoorkeuren van etnische minderheden. Het belang van descriptieve vertegenwoordiging bij stemkeuze wordt verder aangetoond door de bevinding dat kandidaten met een migratieachtergrond een groter deel van de stemmen aantrekken in buurten met een grotere etnische minderheidsgroep. Dit ondersteunt de etnische affiniteitsthese, hoewel de mate van etnische affiniteitsstemmen afhankelijk is van etnische groep, partij en gender. Ook als ik kijk naar voorkeuren voor kandidaten, blijkt dat kandidaten met een migratieachtergrond van linkse partijen meer etnische stemmen trekken dan die van rechtse partijen. Deze inzichten dragen bij aan ons begrip van de effecten van descriptieve en substantieve vertegenwoordiging op stemvoorkeuren. Dit proefschrift heeft aangetoond dat de PvdA een relatief groot aandeel kandidaten met een migratieachtergrond op haar kandidatenlijst heeft. Dit is echter niet de partij die etnische minderheden het beste vertegenwoordigt als het gaat om economische, integratie- en migratievraagstukken. Dit suggereert dat, ondanks de descriptieve vertegenwoordiging van etnische minderheden door deze partij, andere partijen wellicht een betere keuze zijn wat betreft substantieve vertegenwoordiging. Dit kan voor een deel de populariteit van partij DENK in de meest recente Tweede Kamerverkiezingen van 2017 verklaren. Het lijkt erop dat deze partij de juiste samenstelling van de kandidatenlijst heeft gevonden in combinatie met een partijprogramma met onderwerpen die belangrijk zijn voor bepaalde etnische groepen in Nederland.

Er zijn verschillende lessen te leren op basis van de bevindingen van dit onderzoek. Ten eerste heeft dit proefschrift het belang van differentiatie tussen etnische groepen bij het bestuderen van hun stemgedrag wederom bevestigd. Etnische minderheden zijn geen homogene groep: ze verschillen in hun voorkeur voor partijen en de verklaringen voor hun partijvoorkeuren variëren eveneens. Het is daarom belangrijk om aandacht te besteden aan de vertegenwoordiging van de verschillende etnische groepen in Nederland.

Minderheden met een postkoloniale achtergrond waren ondervertegenwoordigd op de kandidaatslijsten en in de Tweede Kamer in 2010, 2012 en 2017. Bovendien is er bij de Tweede Kamerverkiezing van 2017 geen enkele kandidaat met een postkoloniale achtergrond gekozen. De vertegenwoordiging van specifieke, gemarginaliseerde groepen is bijzonder belangrijk omdat er geen bewijs voor is dat etnische minderheden als één groep stemmen. De resultaten laten juist zien dat descriptieve vertegenwoordiging en etnisch affiniteitsstemmen vooral relevant zijn voor de eigen etnische groep. Het aandeel kandidaten van een specifieke etnische groep op de kandidatenlijst van partijen zorgde voor een grotere voorkeur voor die partij bij die specifieke groep en ook kregen kandidaten met een specifieke migratieachtergrond meer stemmen in buurten met veel inwoners met eenzelfde migratieachtergrond.

Ten tweede is het voor politieke partijen aan te raden goed na te denken over de manier waarop zij burgers met verschillende etnische achtergronden willen vertegenwoordigen. Vooral sociaaldemocratische partijen zoals de PvdA kunnen met dilemma's worden geconfronteerd. Aan de ene kant is de positie van de PvdA met betrekking tot integratie- en migratievraagstukken verschoven van een progressieve positie naar het midden. Met de toenemende aandacht voor immigratie en integratie, was dit wellicht een strategie om traditionele PvdA-kiezers vast te houden. Deze verschoven positie, evenals de progressieve normen en waarden van deze partijen over kwesties zoals gender en lhbt-gelijkheid, kunnen in conflict komen met de normen en waarden van sommige groepen Nederlanders met een migratieachtergrond, bijvoorbeeld moslims. Het is daarom belangrijk om zorgvuldig kandidaten voor etnische minderheden te selecteren. Het eenvoudigweg nomineren van een kandidaat met een migratieachtergrond staat niet gelijk aan het trekken van de etnische stem. Een kandidaat met een migratieachtergrond die zich niet identificeert met deze achtergrond of weinig gemeen heeft met potentiële kiezers zal waarschijnlijk niet zo veel stemmen trekken onder Nederlanders met een migratieachtergrond. Daar staat tegenover dat kandidaten met een migratieachtergrond met sterke banden met hun etnische gemeenschap misschien niet altijd dezelfde opvattingen hebben als de partij waarmee de kandidaat is verbonden. Dit was het geval bij de PvdA, waar twee leden de partij verlieten om DENK op te richten. Uiteraard is dit wederom afhankelijk van de kandidaat, de etnische achtergrond en de partij.

Concluderend lijkt Nederland het goed te doen wat betreft de politieke vertegenwoordiging van Turkse en Marokkaanse Nederlanders maar zijn andere etnische groepen een stuk minder goed vertegenwoordigd. Bovendien maakt de aanwezigheid van kandidaten met een migratieachtergrond en de substantieve vertegenwoordiging partijen aantrekkelijker voor Nederlanders met een migratieachtergrond. Deze studie heeft het belang aangetoond van zowel descriptieve als substantieve vertegenwoordiging voor de stemvoorkeuren van etnische minderheden. Daarom moeten diversiteit en inclusie een belangrijk punt blijven op de partijagenda. Dit is niet alleen gunstig voor partijen met betrekking tot het verkrijgen van politieke macht, maar het is ook belangrijk voor de legitimiteit van democratie in etnisch diverse samenlevingen zoals de onze.

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*Roos van der Zwan,
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About the author

Roos van der Zwan was born in Tilburg, the Netherlands, on March 21, 1990. In 2012, she obtained her Bachelor of Science degree in Sociology (cum laude) at the Radboud University in Nijmegen. In 2013, she obtained her pre-master's certificate in Political Science at the Radboud University. As part of the Radboud Honours programme 'Beyond the Frontiers', she visited the WZB Social Science Center in Berlin in 2015. As a research intern she studied anti-immigration attitudes among minority and majority groups in Germany. Roos obtained her Master of Science degree in Social and Cultural Science: Comparative Research on Societies at the Radboud University in Nijmegen in 2015. In September 2015, she started working as a PhD candidate at the Department of Sociology of the Radboud University in Nijmegen and the Interuniversity Center of Social Science Theory and Methodology (ICS). She wrote her dissertation under the supervision of Prof. dr. Marcel Lubbers and Prof. dr. Rob Eisinga. From August to October 2017, she visited the Political Science Department of McMaster University in Hamilton, Canada, hosted by Prof. dr. Karen Bird. From 2017-2018, she was a board member of the Halkes Women Faculty Network, the women's network of the Radboud University. As of December 2018, she works as a postdoctoral researcher at the research institute AIAS-HSI at the University of Amsterdam. Her research interests include ethnic minorities' integration processes, political behaviour, migration research, and inclusion and diversity issues.

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The Netherlands has experienced changes in the ethnic composition of its society. One of the challenges related to these changes is the integration of ethnic minorities as citizens of our democracy. This book investigates the political representation of ethnic minorities and its influence on their vote choice. This thesis shows that the share of Turkish and Moroccan minorities on parties' candidate lists and in the House of Representatives is larger than their share in society. Other ethnic minority groups are, however, underrepresented. Furthermore, left-wing political parties are more likely to nominate ethnic minority candidates and more likely to attract the ethnic vote than right-wing parties. Parties with higher shares of ethnic minority candidates are more popular among ethnic minority voters. The importance of ethnic minority candidates is further demonstrated by the finding that ethnic minority candidates attract a larger share of votes among ethnic minority voters. This study has shown the relevance of political representation for the vote choice of ethnic minority citizens.

Roos van der Zwan (1990) wrote her thesis at the Sociology department at the Radboud University in Nijmegen and the Interuniversity Center of Social Science Theory and Methodology (ICS) about the political representation of ethnic minorities and their vote choice. She currently works as a postdoc at AIAS-HSI at the University of Amsterdam.