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What kind of nationalism sets the radical right and its electorate apart from the rest? Pride in the nation's history as part of nationalist nostalgia

MARCEL LUBBERS

Department of Sociology, Radboud Universiteit NIDI, Nijmegen, Netherlands

ABSTRACT. This contribution concerns the nationalist ideology of the radical right and the kind of nationalism that prevails amongst its voters. The article addresses whether closeness to the nation, patriotism and chauvinism are relevant for people to be attracted to the radical right compared with competing parties or whether a reference to an out-group perceived to harm (economic or cultural) interests is necessary for voters to opt for the radical right. The argument here is based on the ASEN lecture at the 2018 General Conference in London and sets forth a closer interest in nationalist nostalgia.

KEYWORDS: Populist radical right, national identity, nationhood, Netherlands

Introduction

The radical right is nativist: it claims to protect the interests of an ingroup against those of out-groups, protecting the homogeneity of the nation state against threats by non-native elements. Despite its many definitions, few academics will doubt the centrality of nativism in the radical right party family so neatly described in the contributions of Mudde (2007, 2017) and Rydgren (2007, 2018). It is the *combination* of nationalism and xenophobia (Mudde 2007; Akkerman et al. 2016) that characterises the radical right. Before the introduction of the concept nativism, the nationalist and xenophobic ideological components were often discussed as two separate, relevant dimensions for understanding the party family. But Mudde (2007) and others significantly discussed what kind of (confusing concept of) nationalism appeals to the typical radical right – dismissing the idea that liberal nationalism is part of the party's core ideology. Empirical studies, like the ones that I have published, show that voters' support for radical right parties is – from the demand side perspective – foremost explained by perceived economic and in particular cultural ethnic threats and by some kind of political dissatisfaction or protest

(e.g. Lubbers et al. 2002; Lucassen and Lubbers 2012; Lubbers and Coenders 2017). Ivarsflaten (2008) and Rydgren (2008) summarised in their grievances or resentment thesis that voters support the radical right because of their resentment over immigration and its supposed harmful influence on nation states and their resentment over non-radical right politics; politics perceived to take an interest in itself only, bypassing 'the people's' interest. These non-radical right parties, then, are perceived as responsible for multicultural failure since they developed the previous immigration policies, allowing too many immigrants and demanding too little from immigrants to integrate or to adjust.

Despite agreement on the centrality of nativism in the radical right's ideology and the empirical support that the perceived threat of non-native elements to the nation state is the single most relevant explanation for voting behaviour, I feel that this explanation does not adequately discuss to what extent nationalism provides a key motivation. Indeed, the radical right defines itself regularly as nationalist (never as nativist, which is an academic concept). The Flemish Interest Party, for instance, explicitly declares its foundation as 'a Flemish-Nationalist party, an instrument for national and cultural identity politics', long since summarised in the slogan 'Flemish First' (VB 2018). A Jobbik party leader in Hungary once stated that the Left and Right were opposites in historical times but that the true, current cleavage is one of being either for or against globalisation. The Greek Golden Dawn proclaims its nationalism explicitly as well, stating on its webpages that 'nationalism is not a crime'. Thus, nationalism and national identity are often mentioned in one breath and as the core of the radical right-wing program, but how important is nationalism and national identity for the voters?

In addressing what national identity entails, parties mostly refer to cultural identity and argue that unique cultural features should be protected. The Flemish Interest Party and Alternative for Germany, for example, highlight the role of the national language in protecting national identity (VB 2018; AfD 2016). The Dutch Party for Freedom states that norms and values, as developed in the Judeo-Christian and Humanist traditions, are dominant in the Netherlands and should be the basis for and constitute the boundaries of Dutch civilisation (PVV 2006a, 2006b). The Alternative for Germany also mentions these norms and values adding the principle of Roman law on which current rule of German law is based (AfD 2016). The parties also proclaim that more pride in the nation is needed, which would contribute to national cohesion (AfD 2016; Forum voor Democratie 2018). It often remains unspecified who belongs to the national ingroup – or it should be the groups defined in general terms, *the French, the Dutch, the Danes* and the like. Groups or cultural features are mostly mentioned to define who or what does not belong to the national culture, for example, the German AfD states that Islam does not belong to Germany. Taking a longitudinal perspective on the party family, it can be noticed that which groups are defined as non-national changes over time as well as what kind of interests are claimed to be protected by the party family.

Radical right-wing parties (like any other party) adjust to changing circumstances and therefore who they target in their programs (Mudde 2007). Having followed the Dutch radical right most closely, I have seen their focus change from immigrants from the former colonies in the 1980s, to guest workers in the later 1980s, to asylum seekers in the 1990s, to second generation Turks and Moroccans in the late 1990s, to Muslims since 2001, to eastern European immigrants around 2010, and back again to asylum seekers and Muslims in more recent years. I was asked once to comment on a radio interview given by the late radical right leader Hans Janmaat in the early 1980s, in which he thought it inappropriate to have a Surinamese train driver (still a public job at the time) and a Moroccan mayor in the Netherlands. Both have long become (common) practice, and I cannot imagine that a represented radical right party in Europe would claim that immigrants as a general category cannot become public officials. This statement should be understood in the context of the 1980s, when unemployment was high and immigrants were first and foremost seen as a threat to the natives' labour market position; in contrast, I have not seen a statement like this during the most recent economic crisis. The shift in focus from immigrants to religious minorities – Muslims – was accompanied by a shift from economic motivations mostly to more cultural motivations to protect the national identity (Lucassen and Lubbers 2012). The radical right in the Netherlands more and more positions immigrants with a Muslim background as 'non-Dutch', inasmuch as they adhere to religious norms long gone in the Netherlands. Thus, immigrants with traditional gender role attitudes and with intolerant perceptions of gays are contrasted with the progressive and tolerant Dutch (society) (Spierings et al. 2017). Just as one cannot imagine today that radical right parties would claim that the Surinamese cannot become train drivers, in the early 1980s, one would not have predicted that the radical right parties in 2012 would include in their program statements such as 'we protect our gays against advancing Islam'. The radical right in the Nordic countries seems to have adopted a similar position. But most other radical right parties mirror the mainstream of their countries: in Eastern Europe, they hold firm positions against homosexuality, and most Southern European countries disapprove as well. This variance seems to reflect what is the dominant norm in a society – a more progressive cultural norm in North-Western Europe and a more traditional one in Southern and Eastern Europe. Radical right parties, then, vary in their motivation for viewing Muslims as non-native, as well as vary over time for who they target.

The role of nationalism amongst radical right voters

Given that nationalist ideology is at the core of the radical right party family, I was puzzled over why we so often investigate attitudes towards immigration (or ethnic threat) and political dissatisfaction, and so little time on the importance of national identity, patriotism or perhaps chauvinism without

necessarily explicitly referencing the negativity towards immigrants. The straightforward answer is that because the ideology of the radical right does concern nativism and hence always concerns the combination between nationalism and the perception towards non-native elements, the perceived threat to the nation that should be investigated. Often nationalistic sentiments and in particular chauvinism have been defined as just that: encompassing negativity towards defined others. Still, the focus in empirical research on negative attitudes towards defined others (mostly immigrants) does not, in the reverse, infer that people are positive about the nation. Or that nationalism plays a role for radical right voters to vote for the parties. Although radical right parties may base their program on a nationalist ideology and then claim that immigrants or Muslims (or whatever other defined out-group) harm the interest of the national ingroup (hence, being nativist), voters may step in on the latter in particular. Thus, perceived threats from immigrants or for example from the EU are not related to the nation (as is done in the program of the radical right) but rather are seen to harm self-interests, specific group interests or perhaps even overarching national interests, for example, those of Western or European culture (which by definition is not national).

I aimed to gain a better understanding of the role of nationalistic attitudes in earlier research, even before the term nativism was coined. Together with Peer Scheepers and Jaak Billiet, we related the role of nationalism to the theory of symbolic interests (Lubbers et al. 2000). We theorised that people who lack any feeling of belonging offered by other groups would be interested in nationalistic ideology since belonging to the nation offers a binding function, which is explicitly offered by radical right parties, not only because of parties' reference to 'we the nation', but also because of its strong usage of national symbols. Few datasets I employed had strong measurements of nationalism, except the Flemish data I used in the past, with good measurement of Flemish nationalism (and Dutch data from the 1990s but with no radical right voters given the lack of support at the time). We found here that Flemish nationalism was associated with *Vlaams Blok* voting almost equally as strong as the association between political dissatisfaction and voting for the party, but nothing compared with the relevance of unfavourable out-group attitudes in understanding voting behaviour. Moreover, the specific role of Flemish nationalism in this Belgian-regionalist case made it hard to generalise to other contexts. Raising the question again recently (Lubbers and Coenders 2017), we tried to answer it with by then the relatively old European Value Survey data from 2007. The measurements relating to aspects of nationalism we could use were related to radical right voting but rather limited, and again, nothing compared in size with the effect of anti-immigration attitudes on radical right voting. The radical right voters, who are the most negative about people and/or institutions that are sometimes more or less explicitly positioned by the radical right to be non-national (immigrants, Muslims, the EU), do not identify themselves more than voters from other parties as 'a national', do not perceive more often than voters

from other parties the nation as the most important for who they are and do not take the most pride in the nation. This is puzzling.

By using data from the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) from 2013, I aim to provide further insights into the relation between nationalism and voting for the radical right. I will test whether previous findings on the (limited) role of attachment to the nation, national pride and chauvinism can be replicated. I will provide more information on whether pride in specific domains in society is related to voting for the radical right. With that information, I can then disentangle whether radical right voters are prouder of the nation, but in sub-domains, for example, history or sports. Moreover, the ISSP includes an interesting measurement on whether people would like to have more pride in the nation than they currently have. With the data, I will also assess people's perception on the role of patriotism in society to see; whether people see it as a positive or negative contribution to society.

The U-curve

The U-curve hypothesis suggests that on the flanks of the political spectrum the voters are close to each other in their nationalistic sentiments. Halikiopoulou et al. (2012) found evidence for this hypothesis with political program positions on both nationalistic ideology and the EU (and their association) on the political extreme. Rooduijn et al. (2017) showed that radical left and radical right voters represent a U-curve in this respect as well. Both electorates are motivated in their voting by their Eurosceptic attitudes. When nationalism is derived from Euroscepticism, however, the definition of nationalism includes the EU as an outsider. It is difficult to unravel in such a situation whether radical right voters are negative to the EU because of nationalistic sentiments or other reasons. That said, the Halikiopoulou et al. (2012) political program analyses show the association between Euroscepticism and nationalism. Rooduijn et al. (2017) do find a U-curve with respect to the socio-economic profile as well: both radical electorates are often from lower social classes and lower income groups. A U-curve was lacking with respect to educational level, with voters for the radical left much higher educated than those amongst the radical right. A similar conclusion is drawn by Visser et al. (2014), who compare respondents' radical right-wing with radical left-wing ideological positions. Moreover, the studies from Rooduijn et al. and Visser et al. conclude that radical right – and radical left-wing supporters differ considerably in their anti-immigration attitudes and their egalitarian attitudes: no U-curve with respect to these attitudes. The studies discussed here all find evidence for a U-curve with respect to Euroscepticism. In previous research, I have found that Euroscepticism on the left is motivated by criticism on the EU's market liberalism and its scant attention to social policies (Lubbers 2008). Taken together with the international solidarity that the radical left in certain cases proclaims, I doubt whether a U-curve exists in nationalistic attitudes amongst voters.

National identification, patriotism and chauvinism

Since radical right parties speak to people belonging to a nation, I expect that as a minimum, voters for the radical right perceive themselves to belong to that national (native) group. Placing the nation in such a central position, I expect that voters for the radical right are those for whom the nation is most important; likely more important than any other social group; and more important when compared with the voters of any other electorate. I expect radical right voters not to have the most national pride though. In previous work, I formulated the expectation that radical right voters are more patriotic, but that hypothesis found little support (Meuleman and Lubbers 2013) likely because of the radical right's criticism on the current state of the nation (Betz 1994; Betz and Johnson 2004; Meuleman and Lubbers 2013). Voters may feel they belong to the nation, nevertheless, and perceive that the current situation is spoiled by other politicians, thus rejecting the state and development of current society. This situation refers to the feelings of nostalgia attributed to radical right voters, who long for a better past (Betz and Johnson 2004). Radical right-wing voters, then, are proud of how the nation used to be. Although the question then arises which past is preferred by the radical right voter – the conservative, traditional 1950s or the progressive 1970s – the bottom line is that they currently have less pride, are likely proud of something in the nation's history and aim to feel pride again in the entity they identify with.

Over the last decades, the radical right has made a shift in its program, in which explicit national superiority has been replaced by protection of differences against otherness (Rydgren 2007, 2018). The radical right does not describe the nation and national as necessarily better, but as different, and aims to preserve the difference. Although one may argue that an aim to preserve a difference equals valuing that what needs to be preserved more than that what is protected against, this is not necessarily the case. Moreover, dissatisfaction with the nation's current situation amongst radical right voters may, just as with the line of reasoning for patriotism, lower feelings of superiority. Also, chauvinism may be linked to a certain past or to an ideal type of the nation. Chauvinism may therefore have been in decline amongst radical right voters as well because radical right parties adjusted their rhetoric to the preservation of differences instead of hammering on superiority. Still, I expect that perceptions of the superiority of the nation are most prominent amongst radical right voters when compared with voters for all other electorates.

Data and analyses

In this article, I focus on the Netherlands only. What I analyse here can be easily repeated for other countries, but since I have not put forward any expectations on why the association between nationalistic attitudes and support for

the radical right would be different between countries, I refrain from a cross-national analysis.

The radical right's position has been described in detail elsewhere (e.g. Van der Veer 2006; Entzinger 2006; De Lange and Art 2011). The major change and breakthrough in the Netherlands took place with the rise of politician Pim Fortuyn in 2001. Fortuyn brought the topic of immigration and integration to the centre of the political arena and normalised the Netherlands in comparison with many other European countries in which voters had already expressed their nativist ideology in voting behaviour. This compares with what happened in Germany and Sweden in more recent years, in which a breakthrough of the radical right took place much later than in their neighbouring countries. In the 1980s and 1990s, there were Dutch radical right parties, but they were perceived as (or set aside as) too extreme and incapable. After Fortuyn's murder in 2002, Geert Wilders has been the major representative of the nativist agenda, with the foundation of the Party for Freedom (PVV). Since 2006, the party (leader) has managed to draw attention with ever more strict immigration and integration policy proposals and has become one of the largest parties in the Dutch parliament. In the 2017 national elections, the party did not become the largest, as the polls had been suggesting for a substantial period; rather, it came second with twenty seats to the right-wing liberal party VVD, which remained in power (with thirty-three seats). Moreover, the PVV received competition from the new Forum for Democracy (FvD) and its party leader Thierry Baudet (two seats). The FvD positions itself as a more intellectual nationalist party with a focus on protection of Dutch core values, amongst which are the protection of the position of gays against Islam. However, the party leader is critical of feminists and gender ideologies, although those views are not mirrored in the party program. In other radical right party programs, this opposition to gender neutrality is more explicit. The Alternative for Germany (2016) spent a full paragraph on the topic, in which they proposed to dismantle gender and diversity chairs at universities and disapproved of further gender (diversity) research.

I chose to employ Dutch data from ISSP, the module on National Identity (ISSP 2013) since this is one of the databases in which questions on national identity and nationalism are thoroughly included ($N = 1,638$). These data are from 2013 and, consequently, lack information on voting for FvD. I will describe the differences between PVV voters and socialist (SP) voters, for which electorates in the upward parts of the U-curve hypothesis are expected to hold. The lower part of the U-curve should contain the voters for the liberals (VVD), the Christian democratic/conservative electorates (CDA, CU and SGP), social liberals (D66), social-democratic voters of the labour party (PvdA) and green left-wing voters (GroenLinks). Respondents were asked which party they had voted for in the 2012 national parliamentary elections. Respondents who did not vote or provided no answer were excluded in the analyses. The radical right (ten per cent) and labour party (twenty-four per cent) performed better in the actual elections than in the data (seven per cent

and sixteen per cent, respectively). At the time of the survey in 2013, both parties were polled at a loss, possibly explaining why people refrained from mentioning that they had voted for these parties in the 2012 elections. The social liberals performed worse in the elections of 2012 than respondents report in the data. This result may mirror the increasing popularity of the party in the polls at the time or indicate an overrepresentation of higher educated respondents in the data, who often vote for social liberals. Previous research demonstrated that education is a major cleavage in current voting behaviour, with radical right voters having much lower education (Lucassen and Lubbers 2012). For that reason as well, I account for respondents' educational level in the analyses. By accounting for the differences in the level of education between the electorates, I describe the extent to which nationalistic attitudes relate to voting for a party versus voting for the radical right PVV.

I first describe how close people feel to the nation, in contrast with other geographical areas, such as town, region or Europe. These questions were asked of the respondents directly. Separately, respondents were also asked to what extent they agreed with the statement 'I feel more like a citizen of the world than of any country'. Then, I describe to what extent the voters have pride in the nation and show how this varies by domain, like sport, history, scientific or technological achievements. Respondents were asked how much pride they have in the Dutch (note, not how much pride they have in the Netherlands) and how much pride they have in ten aspects about the Netherlands. Items do not correlate over 0.45, so I did not scale the items and examined how the electorates differ on all of these aspects.

I then tried to understand whether voters perceive the role of patriotism for outcomes differently. Respondents were asked whether they think that patriotism contributes to cohesion in Dutch society and to the Dutch reputation internationally. The answers to these two questions correlate at 0.62, which is not very strong, but I took the two measures together as a mean score. The same holds for the questions that ask whether respondents think that patriotism contributes to intolerance or to unfavourable attitudes towards immigrants. These items correlate at 0.65 and were taken together as a mean score as well. I also aimed to see whether electorates differ in their opinion that they are less proud of the nation than they would like to be.

Finally, I evaluated the differences between the electorates in their support of national superiority or chauvinism, without an explicit reference to immigrants or the EU (although it may of course be interpreted as such by the respondents). Questions asked were the extent to which people agree with statements like: 'I would rather be a citizen of the Netherlands than of any other country'; 'The world would be a better place if more people from other countries were more like the Dutch'; and 'Generally speaking, the Netherlands is a better country than most other countries'. These items were mean-score scaled into a measure of chauvinism, with a Cronbach's alpha reliability of 0.67.

Perceptions of ethnic threat were measured with three items: 'Immigrants take jobs away from people born in the country'; 'Immigrants undermine

national culture'; and 'Immigrants increase crime rates'. The Cronbach's alpha for this scale was 0.78. The mean of the three items was taken to compose the scale.

Findings

Just like in previous research, the ISSP data show that the electorate of the radical right possesses relatively low education: no other Dutch political party electorate has as little education as the voters for the radical right PVV. Moreover, with the data, we can replicate the finding that radical right voters can be set apart from the rest of the electorate by their strong perception of ethnic threat or unfavourable attitudes towards immigrants (not shown). Regarding their relation to the nation, I show to what extent the radical right is set apart based on national attachment, national pride, relevance of national pride for the country, preference for stronger national pride and national superiority. For all these associations, I perform multinomial analyses and control for level of education.

Table 1 shows that PVV voters attach (strong) feelings of closeness to the nation, just as we expect, when the nationalist ideology resonates amongst the electorate: eighty-three per cent feel (very) close. Also, seventy-three per cent of the PVV voters feels (very) close to the place of living and half feels (very) close to the province one lives. About one in five radical right voter feels (very) close to Europe and feels like a world citizen rather than a Dutch citizen. These findings seem to fit the expectations. However, we need to set this result against the other electorates. On the right side of the table, each party is contrasted to the PVV to determine whether the measurements of closeness to a geographical area contribute positively (+), negatively (-) or not at all (ns) in the likelihood of voting when comparing the two parties. Strikingly, closeness to the nation does not discriminate between any other party and PVV voting. This finding implies that, controlled for education (and the other closeness attitudes), more closeness to the nation does not increase the likelihood to vote for the PVV. Neither, however, does feeling close to the province contribute to the understanding of why people vote for another party versus the PVV. Closeness to the place one lives slightly increases the likelihood to vote for Christians and socialists compared with a vote for the radical right. The effect is small but surprising. Strong effects are found regarding the role of feeling close to Europe or feeling like a world citizen. In both rows, many plus signs are noted, meaning that the likelihood to vote for the listed party family increases when compared with voting for the PVV when the voter feels closer to Europe and feels a world citizen stronger. This result overall implies that PVV voters do not express more closeness to the nation or local communities but that PVV voters, unlike all other electorates, including socialists, dissociate from feeling something overarching the nation whether it be Europe or the world.

Table 1. Closeness to the nation and other geographical areas amongst PVV voters and the role of closeness in explaining the vote for a party family compared with a vote for the radical right PVV (multinomial logistic regression analysis, with level of education as the control).

| | Versus PVV | | | | | | |
|--|-----------------|----------|------------|-----------------|------------------|--------|------------|
| | % of PVV voters | Liberals | Christians | Social liberals | Social democrats | Greens | Socialists |
| Feeling (very) close to the nation | 83 | ns | ns | ns | ns | ns | ns |
| Feeling (very) close to the place of living | 73 | ns | + | ns | ns | ns | + |
| Feeling (very) close to region (province) | 53 | ns | ns | ns | ns | ns | ns |
| Feeling (very) close to Europe | 22 | ++++ | ++++ | ++++ | +++ | +++ | ++ |
| Agree (completely) with feeling oneself as world citizen rather than Dutch citizen | 20 | +++ | ++ | ++++ | ++++ | ++++ | +++ |

+, positive effect, $p < 0.10$; ++, positive effect, $p < 0.05$; +++, positive effect, $p < 0.01$; +++++, positive effect, $p < 0.001$.

The radical right often claims that pride in the nation is at the basis of their program and of relevance to national identity. Here, I find that thirty per cent of PVV voters are proud of the Dutch, and the majority is 'somewhat proud'. Given the findings from previous research, I anticipated that radical right voters would be critical of the current state of the country and therefore less proud than other electorates. But this is not the case, even though the effects are not very strong. The minus signs imply that with increasing pride in the Dutch, the likelihood to vote for the listed parties decreases, compared with a vote for the radical right. Only in contrast to the vote for Christians does national pride not discriminate. There is no U-curve effect here; also the likelihood of voting for the socialists decreases in favour of the PVV when pride in being Dutch increases.

PVV voters have little pride in the way democracy works in the Netherlands, its political influence in the world and the country's honest and equal treatment of groups in society. This is rather different amongst other electorates, which is why pride in these aspects increases the voting for most other parties versus a vote for the radical right, but none of these aspects discriminates between the radical right and each and every party electorate. From the PVV voters, thirteen per cent show pride in Dutch arts and literature, but this is much more prevalent amongst almost all other electorates, except liberals. Increasing support for the radical right is found when voters are prouder of sports and of Dutch history. Controlling for level of education, the more pride a voter expresses in sports or Dutch history, the less likely (s)he votes for another party versus the radical right (Table 2).

For some, a patriotic ideology entails something positive; for others, it refers to something negative. The data show that radical right PVV voters are more likely to acknowledge the positive side of a patriotic ideology for society than the negative consequences. Patriotism is perceived as positive for the Dutch international reputation and internal cohesion for fifty-seven per cent of the PVV voters. Almost one in five PVV voters (eighteen per cent) sees patriotism as negative for tolerance in society and that it may contribute to negative attitudes towards immigrants. Voters for the other parties are most likely to be less positive and more negative, but again, this does not hold for all the distinguished electorates. Controlling for level of education, a positive perspective on patriotism does not reduce the vote for the Christian parties in favour of the radical right PVV. And a more negative perception on the role of patriotism for tolerance and immigrants does not increase the likelihood of voting for the liberals (VVD) or social liberals (D66) compared with the radical right PVV (Table 3).

We have seen that being proud of the Dutch, sports and history contribute to voting for the radical right. Moreover, radical right voters perceive patriotism as more positive for society and less negative for tolerance and immigrants. But we still do not know whether they long for a country in which they can have more pride than currently is the case. Table 4 shows that fifty-two per cent of radical right voters agree (strongly) with the statement that the

Table 2. *Pride in the Dutch and aspects of the Netherlands amongst PVV voters and the role of pride explaining the vote for a party family compared with a vote for the radical right PVV (multinomial logistic regression analysis, with level of education as the control).*

| | % of PVV voters | Versus PVV | | | | | | |
|---|-----------------|------------|------------|-----------------|------------------|--------|------------|--|
| | | Liberals | Christians | Social liberals | Social democrats | Greens | Socialists | |
| Proud of being Dutch | 30 | - | ns | -- | --- | -- | -- | |
| Proud of the Netherlands with respect to: | | | | | | | | |
| • The way democracy works in NL | 6 | + | ns | ++ | +++ | ns | ++ | |
| • Its political influence in the world | 1 | ++ | ++ | ++ | ++ | ns | ns | |
| • Dutch economic achievements | 14 | ns | ns | ns | ns | ns | ns | |
| • Its system of social security | 13 | ns | ns | ns | ns | ++ | ns | |
| • Its scientific and technological achievements | 38 | ns | ns | ns | ns | ns | ns | |
| • Its achievements in sports | 55 | - | --- | - | --- | --- | --- | |
| • Its achievements in arts and literature | 13 | ns | ++ | +++ | ++++ | +++ | ++++ | |
| • The Dutch army | 10 | ns | ns | ns | ns | ns | - | |
| • Its history | 33 | ns | -- | --- | --- | --- | --- | |
| • Its honest and equal treatment of all groups in society | 9 | +++ | ++ | +++ | ++ | ns | ++ | |

+, positive effect, $p < 0.10$; ++, positive effect, $p < 0.05$; +++, positive effect, $p < 0.01$; +++++, positive effect, $p < 0.001$; -, negative effect, $p < 0.10$; --, negative effect, $p < 0.05$; ---, negative effect, $p < 0.01$; ----, negative effect, $p < 0.001$. ns, not significant.

Table 3. Perceived role of patriotism amongst PVV voters and perceived role of patriotism in explaining the vote for a party family compared with a vote for the radical right PVV (multinomial logistic regression analysis, with level of education as the control).

| | % of PVV voters | | | | | | |
|---|-----------------|------------|-----------------|------------------|--------|------------|-------|
| | Liberals | Christians | Social liberals | Social democrats | Greens | Socialists | |
| | Versus PVV | | | | | | |
| | Values ≥4 | | | | | | |
| Patriotism is positive for international reputation and internal cohesion | 57 | -- | ns | ----- | ----- | ----- | ----- |
| Patriotism is negative for tolerance and attitudes to immigrants | 18 | ns | + | ns | ++++ | ++ | ++++ |

+, positive effect, $p < 0.10$; ++, positive effect, $p < 0.05$; +++, positive effect, $p < 0.01$; +++++, positive effect, $p < 0.001$. -, negative effect, $p < 0.05$; ---, negative effect, $p < 0.01$; -----, negative effect, $p < 0.001$. ns, not significant.

Table 4. *Less pride than is liked to be amongst PVV voters and the role of lack of pride for the vote for a party family compared with a vote for the radical right PVV (multinomial logistic regression analysis, with level of education as the control).*

| | % of PVV voters | Liberals | Christians | Social liberals | Social democrats | Greens | Socialists |
|--|-----------------------|----------|------------|--------------------|---------------------|--------|------------|
| | Versus PVV | | | | | | |
| (Strongly) Agree to that I am less proud of the Netherlands than I like to be | 52 | ----- | ns | - | -- | ns | ns |

-, negative effect, $p < 0.10$; --, negative effect, $p < 0.05$; ----, negative effect, $p < 0.001$. ns, not significant.

respondent is less proud of the Netherlands than (s)he likes to be; but this is not a unique position for radical right voters. While accounting for differences in level of education, I find that this attitude does not explain differences in voting for Christians, greens and socialists on the one hand and voting for the radical right on the other. And, for the contrast with the social liberals and social democrats, it is just barely significant. Only when compared with the liberal VVD voters can we find that the likelihood of voting for the radical right increases when one is less proud than one likes to be.

The final nationalistic attitude to address is chauvinism. Chauvinism characterises forty-four per cent of radical right voters. I anticipated that the more chauvinistic respondents are, the lower the likelihood to vote for the other parties when compared with the vote for the radical right (so the larger the likelihood to vote for the radical right). This turns out to be the case only when the parties on the left are compared with the radical right. The likelihood of voting for social democrats, greens and socialists decreases when respondents are more chauvinistic. Again, there is no support for the U-curve hypothesis. The radical right cannot be set apart by its chauvinism, as chauvinism does not explain differences in voting behaviour amongst liberals, Christian-conservatives and social liberals versus the radical right PVV (Table 5).

Relating all the dimensions of nationalistic attitudes to voting behaviour, while at the same time accounting for the perception of ethnic threat and level of education, I find that the perception of ethnic threat is the strongest predictor of PVV voting behaviour. The contrast between voting for the PVV and almost all other parties is predominantly explained by the perception of ethnic threat. The exception is the contrast between the liberal VVD party and radical right PVV party, in which the perception of ethnic threat plays a smaller role. For the three strongest predictors in understanding the vote for the radical

Table 5. *Chauvinism amongst PVV voters and the role of chauvinism for the vote for a party family compared with a vote for the radical right PVV (multinomial logistic regression analysis, with level of education as the control).*

| | % of PVV voters | Liberals | Christians | Social liberals | Social democrats | Greens | Socialists |
|----------------------------|-----------------------|---------------|------------|--------------------|---------------------|--------|------------|
| | Values ≥4 | Versus PVV | | | | | |
| (Strongly) Chauvinistic | 44 | ns | ns | ns | -- | - | -- |

-, negative effect, $p < 0.10$; --, negative effect, $p < 0.05$. ns, not significant.

right versus one of the other parties, we indeed find the perception of ethnic threat mostly listed as the strongest predictor (Table 6). Closeness to Europe increases the vote for all other parties compared with the radical right as well. Moreover, we see that pride in history relatively strongly diminishes the likelihood to vote for the social liberals, social democrats and socialists.

Conclusions and discussion

Radical right parties focus on national identity and the protection of the nation. However, voters for the radical right do not stand out in their feelings of closeness to the nation. Radical right voters are also not more locally oriented, at

Table 6. *The three strongest predictors (in sequence of strength) of voting for a Dutch party family compared with a vote for the radical right PVV in a model, including all the nationalistic attitudes distinguished, perceptions of ethnic threat and level of education (multinomial logistic regression analysis).*

| | Liberals | Christians | Social liberals | Social democrats | Greens | Socialists |
|---|-------------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|--------------------|-----------------------|
| | Versus PVV | | | | | |
| 1 | Close to Europe | Less ethnic threat | Less ethnic threat | Less ethnic threat | Less ethnic threat | Less ethnic threat |
| 2 | Higher education | Close to Europe | Close to Europe | Less pride in history | Close to Europe | Less pride in history |
| 3 | Proud of fair treatment | Less pride in sports | Less pride in history | Close to Europe | Higher education | Close to Europe |

least not in terms of closeness since the electorate of the radical right hardly differs from the voters for the liberals, Christians, social liberals, social democrats, greens and socialists in their feelings of closeness to their place of living or province in which they live. Radical right voters can be set apart from the rest in their lack of attachment to geographical regions overarching the nation: they dissociate from feeling European or like a world citizen.

In the Netherlands, radical right voters are amongst the electorates scoring highest with respect to pride in being Dutch, a need for more pride in the nation as well as chauvinism. But their position is not strikingly different in that there is always another electorate that scores similar to radical right voters.

This rather descriptive analysis of the situation in the Netherlands shows that although the nation is central to nationalistic ideology of radical right parties, the threat framework seems more relevant than the nationalist framework. Also, the data employed here show that ethnic threat and distancing from the EU are the main drivers for the radical right vote, not so much their closeness to the nation, their pride in the Dutch or aspects of the Netherlands, or their chauvinism. The findings repeat the results from the European Value Studies that found the (other) dimensions of nationalism to play a modest role (Lubbers and Coenders 2017).

What we need to know better, however, is what radical right-wing voters make of the nation and whether the threats that are central in radical right-wing research are indeed seen as threats to the *nation*. Are immigrants seen as threat to the nation or to personal (or specific group) interests? This question is hard to answer empirically. Whenever respondents are asked to evaluate immigrants, it matters little whether it is the economic or cultural domain or if it refers to personal, neighbourhood or national interests: if one is negative about immigrants, it mostly comes to the fore on all these domains, on all these levels. In empirical terms, these factors are highly correlated. We now know that radical right-wing voters can be set apart by their anti-immigration attitude, anti-EU attitudes and anti-establishment attitudes but we do not know what interests these anti-attitudes serve, leaving the question of how national it is?

Still, it is hard to imagine that the nation does not play a key role in understanding the radical right's electorate. The party programs are highly (self-defined) nationalistic. Both positioning the country first and rejecting a globalist ideology in favour of a patriotic agenda is key in the party programs (and explicitly mentioned by President Trump in his recent UN speech [25 September 2018] – putting the question on the research agenda of the difference between the United States and EU electorates). The results from the current study suggest that radical right-wing voters relate to the nation in a specific way. Some like to have more pride in the nation than they do now. Sceptics may see this as a general pessimism that shows up amongst radical right-wing voters, but the pride they express for the country's history shows that they long for something that the country once was. This result makes clear why acknowledgements of the dark pages of history may cause

so much controversy in society: if people do not feel pride in the current nation and attach their pride to a historical version of the nation, a reinterpretation of that history affects the (only) positive identity people derive from the nation. Falling of national heroes, heroic eras or national traditions, then, affect people with nostalgia in particular. Studies from Smeekes, Verkuyten and Martinovic (2015), for example, tried to understand what the role of history is in the construction of national identity and national identity threat. A study from Mann and Fenton (2017) investigated resentments in classes and specifically the role of the nation in a promising way. This importance of nostalgia, as introduced earlier by Betz (1994; Betz and Johnson 2004) and as highlighted by Bauman (2017), should receive more attention in future research.

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