



# Immigrants' support for social spending, self-interest and the role of the group: A comparative study of immigrants in The Netherlands

Renema J.A.J., Lubbers M. Immigrants' support for social spending, self-interest and the role of the group: A comparative study of immigrants in The Netherlands

This study examined immigrants' support for social spending. We tested the dominant self-interest hypothesis for a number of immigrant groups in the Netherlands with highly varying socio-economic positions. We additionally examined the effect of immigrants' group interest by testing the relevance of in-group immigrant benefit participation rates and their effect on support for social spending. In this article, we discuss how immigrants' sense of belonging to a group affects the association between immigrants' self- and group interests in welfare and their support for social spending. We found that self-interest has explanatory relevance, but that this is strongly correlated with level of income. Results showed weak support for the effect of group interest. Instead of the expected moderation effects of sense of belonging on the self- and group-interest explanations of support for social spending, the results showed a direct effect of sense of belonging on support for social spending.

**Jeanette A. J. Renema, Marcel Lubbers**

Radboud Universiteit Faculteit der Sociale Wetenschappen,  
Department of Sociology, Nijmegen, The Netherlands

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Jeanette A. J. Renema, Radboud Social and Cultural Research, Radboud University, Postbus 9104, 6500 HE, Nijmegen, The Netherlands  
E-mail: j.renema@maw.ru.nl

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Attitudes toward the welfare state are an important aspect of the legitimacy of a government and the consequential social order. Intrinsically, the question raised is whether citizens perceive the existing distributional programmes as just or unjust. Hence, studies frequently underline the importance of majority support for redistribution programmes (Andreß & Heien, 2001; Svallfors, 2012). Over the past several decades, European nations have become increasingly diversified with immigrants arriving from a variety of countries, some of which have minimal welfare expenditures (Castles & Miller, 2003). This could result in an increase in assorted support for the welfare state. Apart from Reeskens and Van Oorschot (2015) and Luttmmer and Singhal (2011), there has been little discussion of the extent to which immigrants support welfare redistribution in their host countries.

Findings often emphasise that immigrants have a high risk of becoming dependent on welfare due to, for example, language barriers or education obtained abroad (Blomberg, Kallio, Kangas, Kroll, & Niemelä, 2012; Reeskens & Van Oorschot, 2015). Previous research has shown that benefit recipients are more

strongly supportive of welfare redistribution than are non-recipients (Svallfors, 2012). This leads to the assumption that immigrants largely support public welfare spending (e.g., Reeskens & Van Oorschot, 2015). However, in this previous research, immigrant status was taken merely as a proxy for self-interest, whereas there is actually significant variation between and within immigrant groups in their attitudes toward and extent of reliance on welfare benefits (Statistics Netherlands, 2016). This study drew on the literature of welfare redistribution preferences and migrant integration to gain a better understanding of immigrants' support for public welfare spending.

A wide strand of research explains support for welfare spending by means of self-interest preferences, in that people tend to favour state welfare redistribution programmes if they themselves benefit from these measures (Andreß & Heien, 2001; Gelissen, 2002; Jæger, 2006; Svallfors, 2004; Van Oorschot, 2006; Van Oorschot & Roosma, 2017). Most common determinants are income, educational background and personal benefit, although few studies have tested their relevance among the migrant population. Taking the

migrant integration literature into consideration, studies have emphasised not only the socio-economic position of various societal groups, but also the sense of belonging to the immigrant group in question, which emphasises the pertinence of the group's interests instead of the exclusive focus on individual self-interests (Sears & Funk, 1990; Staerklé, Likki, & Scheidegger, 2012).

We studied group interest by examining the effect of immigrants' benefit participation rates (which are the relative national shares of benefit recipients from the country of origin) on their support for welfare spending. We assumed that the benefit participation rates among co-national immigrants are particularly relevant to immigrants with a strong sense of belonging to the people from their country of origin. We argue that immigrants with a strong sense of belonging will place less emphasis on their own welfare needs. Our research questions were: 'To what extent do self-interest determinants and the relative shares of benefit recipients from the country of origin affect immigrants' support for welfare spending? And how is this moderated by the sense of belonging to the immigrant group?'

By raising these questions, we contribute to the growing body of literature on welfare state attitudes by theorising the welfare position of immigrants. We tested whether the individual's or group's welfare position is relevant to explaining immigrants' support for welfare spending and whether these associations are affected by immigrants' sense of belonging to other immigrants from the country of origin. To examine the extent to which the immigrant group's benefit participation rates affect immigrants' support for public spending on welfare, we distinguished various immigrant groups that differ strongly in their benefit participation rates and socio-economic positions. For the purposes of this study, a new and recent survey dataset, Migrants' Welfare State Attitudes (MIFARE), was employed (Bekhuis, Fage Hedegaard, Seibel, Degen, & Renema, 2018). This dataset was designed to assess the attitudes of immigrants in the Netherlands toward the welfare state and drew on various immigrant groups from both European Union (EU) and non-EU countries, thereby allowing for differentiation. Furthermore, the Dutch state does not have selective immigration policies like those applied by countries such as Canada and Australia. This reduced immigration selection effect is based on factors such as educational level, age or language abilities (Pedersen, Pytlikova, & Smith, 2008).

This contribution focuses on support for public spending on unemployment benefit and social assistance schemes. The purpose of both welfare programmes is to provide recipients with a minimum amount of income. Yet in the Netherlands, eligibility

for these programmes varies considerably. Moreover, the immigrant groups in our sample differ not only to the extent they rely on general welfare, but also to the extent they rely on different welfare programmes (Statistics Netherlands, 2014, 2016). We anticipated that these different eligibilities for and usages of welfare would be reflected in the extent to which group interest matters to immigrants' support for welfare spending. For both types of benefits, we were able to match figures on immigrant group share of benefit recipients.

### Self-interest

A broad strand of the literature on immigration emphasises the significance of short-term self-interests (Andreß & Heien, 2001; Gelissen, 2002; Heath, Rothon, & Kilpi, 2008; Jæger, 2006; Reeskens & Van Oorschot, 2015). Along these lines, the theory predicts, and research has found, that welfare recipients are inclined to show a stronger preference for state intervention than non-recipients (Blomberg et al., 2012), in that welfare recipients already benefit from the support of social policy programmes. Studies of welfare state attitudes often emphasise that immigrants are one of the societal groups most at risk for welfare dependency because of their relatively deprived position in the labour market, which can be ascribed to language barriers, among other factors (Blomberg et al., 2012; Fridberg & Kangas, 2008; Jæger, 2006; Staerklé et al., 2012). Therefore, in the literature, immigrant status has been taken as a proxy for a strong interest in welfare usage (Blomberg et al., 2012). This, however, ignores the variance that might exist between and within immigrant groups. For example, in the Netherlands, immigrants from the United States generally have a better socio-economic position than immigrants from Turkey (Statistics Netherlands, 2014, 2016). Thus, we hypothesised that among immigrants the take-up of welfare benefits is associated with stronger support for public spending on unemployment benefits and social assistance (H1: current risk – self-interest hypothesis).

Beyond the expectations of those currently receiving welfare benefits, the self-interest approach predicts approval of extended welfare state arrangements when the risk for welfare needs in the near future is greater (Andreß & Heien, 2001; Gelissen, 2002). This would hold in particular for immigrants in lower socio-economic positions. In their study, Reeskens and Van Oorschot (2015) demonstrated a modest effect of a deprived socio-economic status on support for the welfare state while addressing immigrants' welfare state attitudes specifically. We aimed to replicate this finding. Thus, we expected that a lower

socio-economic status would be associated with stronger support for public spending on unemployment benefits and social assistance (H2: future risk – self-interest hypothesis).

### Welfare group interest

Migrant integration literature has emphasised the importance of social context for understanding the development of immigrants' individual societal preferences (Alesina, Baqir, & Easterly, 1999; Glaeser & Ward, 2006; Klor & Shayo, 2010; Maliepaard, Lubbers, & Gijsberts, 2010). Immigrants are expected to be affected by the societal positions of their immigrant group (Klor & Shayo, 2010). Therefore, we expected that immigrants who belong to a group where the majority relies on support provided by the welfare state's programmes (i.e., groups with higher benefit participation rates) would hold more benevolent attitudes toward these programmes than would immigrants from groups that rely little or not at all on state support. For instance, in his US-based study, Luttmer (2001) found a strong positive association between racial groups' benefit participation rates and individual welfare spending preferences. Subsequently, redistribution preferences should be explainable in part by means of interpersonal preferences such as the welfare interests of the group (Luttmer, 2001).

The assumption here is that not only are people who themselves rely on benefits more likely to support social spending, but also that people who belong to a specific group where many of its members rely on welfare are also greater supporters of social spending, as this would redistribute income to their group (Breznau & Eger, 2016). This could be regarded as an indirect self-interest approach, since members of a group are likely to indirectly profit from redistribution to that group (Bobo & Kluegel, 1993; Luttmer, 2001). However, since we took into account immigrants' individual socio-economic position and benefit take-up, we considered the anticipated effect of the group's benefit participation rates to be a group-interest effect. Thus, our third hypothesis was: higher benefit participation rates among immigrants from the country of origin are associated with stronger support for public spending on unemployment benefits and social assistance (H3: welfare group interest hypothesis).

### Sense of belonging

In the migration literature, most studies have emphasised that immigrants vary strongly in their sense of belonging to their country of origin group. The proposition is that when immigrants have a strong sense of belonging to their country of origin, members of that group are more likely to be affected by

characteristics of that group in the destination country. This is demonstrated in the work undertaken by Klor and Shayo (2010), whose empirical analyses showed that identification with the respective immigrant group explains a large proportion of immigrants' voting behaviour, as long as it does not exceed a certain threshold of individual economic loss. Hillman (2010) described this phenomenon as a result of *expressive behaviour*, meaning that, aside from satisfying material self-interests, people strive for utility through group norm-compliant behaviour. Thus, we proposed that the *welfare group interest hypothesis* would be relevant only for those immigrants who felt a strong sense of belonging to other immigrants from their country of origin (Poletta & Jasper, 2001; Tilly, 1978). These immigrants in particular would adjust their support for social spending to their group's needs, even if this was at odds with their own financial situation. Hence, our fourth hypothesis was: the stronger is the sense of belonging to other immigrants from the country of origin, the stronger is the association between immigrants' welfare group interest and support for public spending on unemployment benefits and social assistance (H4: sense of belonging – welfare group interest hypothesis).

Building on the same rationale, we expected that when the sense of belonging to the immigrant group was more salient, individual needs would be overshadowed. Or, as Brewer and Silver (2000, p. 160) noted: 'the meaning of "self-interest" is transformed to the group level'. Thus, immigrants who felt a stronger sense of belonging to other immigrants from their country of origin would allocate more importance to the interests of their immigrant group while showing less interest in their own personal situation (Klor & Shayo, 2010). We therefore formulated the following two conditional hypotheses: the stronger is the sense of belonging to other immigrants from the country of origin, the weaker is the association between immigrants' individual benefit take-up and support for public spending on unemployment benefits and social assistance (H5: sense of belonging – current risk hypothesis). The stronger is the sense of belonging to other immigrants from the country of origin, the weaker is the association between socio-economic status and support for public spending on unemployment benefits and social assistance (H6: sense of belonging–future risk hypothesis). Figure 1 presents the overview of our hypotheses in a conceptual model.

### The Dutch context

In this section we give a brief overview of the study's context and immigrants' institutional access




Figure 1. Conceptual framework as proposed.

to the unemployment benefit and social assistance schemes in the Netherlands. The Dutch welfare system is commonly defined as a hybrid type that features characteristics of both the Continental European welfare model and the Nordic welfare model. Continental European characteristics are comparable to employee social insurance, while the universal social coverage elements are comparable to the Nordic welfare model. In recent decades, the Dutch welfare system has also incorporated several liberal components into its welfare model. This latter development is rooted in the recent stipulation of citizens' responsibility by the government (Van Oorschot, 2006).

### Unemployment benefits

In the Netherlands, the Unemployment Act (*Wet Werkloosheid*) is a personal contribution-based employee insurance programme that protects employees from potential future unemployment. To be eligible, a person must meet certain conditions (e.g., the employee must not have resigned, but have been fired instead), and the scheme links payment to the recipient's total years of labour service. The payment's time span ranges from 3 to 28 months. During the first 2 months of payment, the recipient receives 75% of her or his last salary. Thereafter, this percentage drops to 70%. While the take-up possibility is restricted to residents of the Netherlands, this holds for both Dutch citizens and immigrants.

### Social assistance

The Dutch social assistance scheme (*Bijstand*) falls within the jurisdiction of the Participation Act and is a means-tested programme that ensures a minimum income to residents who cannot support themselves through their own means. To be eligible for social assistance, one must be ineligible for other welfare programmes. On 1 July 2015, the scheme's payment level was set at a monthly allowance of €1,570.80. However, the exact monthly allowance is decided at the municipal level and depends on the total number

of members of the household (*kostendelersnorm*). Regarding immigrants' eligibility for social assistance, those who wish to claim social assistance but have lived in the Netherlands for less than five years might find that their temporary residence permit will not be prolonged (Vreemdelingenwet 2000, 2017). Though non-extension of the temporary residence permit is not necessarily implemented in all cases (aspects such as time of residency in relation to previous economic activity may alter the decision),<sup>1</sup> it is only after five years of residency that immigrants have the same eligibility rights as Dutch citizens.

## Data and methods

### Data

To test our hypotheses, we employed the MIFARE survey dataset (Bekhuis et al., 2018). The MIFARE data are sampled from among immigrants from ten countries of origin (and net sample size) residing in the Netherlands: China (307), Great Britain (269), Japan (295), the Philippines (385), Poland (353), Romania (357), the Russian Federation<sup>2</sup> (475), Spain (341), Turkey (212) and the USA (251), a total sample size of 3,245 respondents. These immigrant groups vary greatly regarding their in-group benefit participation rates (Statistics Netherlands, 2016) and thus provides the opportunity to examine the welfare group interest hypothesis. The sampling was of immigrants between the ages of 18 and 75 years, and only those immigrants were selected who were born in one of the targeted countries and had resided in that country until at least the age of 16. Respondents had the opportunity to fill out a hard copy of the questionnaire or an online version. The questionnaire was presented both in Dutch and in the main language spoken in the country of origin, thereby reducing the non-response rate while including immigrants who did not understand the Dutch language. Additionally, an adjusted version of the survey was distributed among native Dutch citizens (427).

Response rates were the highest among native Dutch citizens (49%), closely followed by immigrants from the Russian Federation (47%). For the other immigrant groups, the response rates varied between 30% and 42%, with the exception of the Turks with a low response rate of 22%. To determine whether there was a bias in the sample regarding an immigrant group's benefit reciprocity, we compared the personal benefit reciprocity in the sample with Dutch

<sup>1</sup> For more information in English about claiming social security benefits and the effect it may have on immigrants' residence permits, see the following link: [www.expatica.com/nl/about/Dutch-social-security-system-explained\\_100578.html](http://www.expatica.com/nl/about/Dutch-social-security-system-explained_100578.html)

<sup>2</sup> Or immigrants from the former Soviet Union who were located in the current Russian Federation Territories.

registration data. Generally, response rates aligned with population figures. Nevertheless, the data showed a small overrepresentation of Turkish and Russian immigrants who are unemployment benefit recipients, and a small underrepresentation of Turkish and Chinese social assistance recipients (Statistics Netherlands, 2016).

### Dependent variables

We used two dependent variables from the following two battery questions: 'Listed below are various areas of government spending in the Netherlands. [Would you] 'like to see more or less government spending? Remember that if you say "much more", it might require a tax increase to pay for: (i) unemployment benefits, (ii) social assistance.' The two items were moderately correlated  $r(2770) = .54, p < .001$ , verifying the assumption that spending preferences with regard to work-related benefits and social assistance would differ from each other.<sup>3</sup> The answers were given on a 5-point scale (1 = spend much less, 5 = spend much more). The higher was the score, the greater was the support for welfare spending (WS) on: (i) unemployment benefits, or (ii) social assistance. This exact wording was also used for the items in the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) questionnaires. Comparably, the option 'can't choose' was given. The rate of respondents who answered 'can't choose' rose to a quarter of the respondents and were excluded from the analyses. We analysed the likelihood of picking the 'can't choose' option (see Table A1 in the appendix). It shows, for example, that additional years of residence in the Netherlands lowers respondents' chances of selecting 'can't choose', whilst increased public spending on the social protection of the labour force in the country of origin increased these chances.

### Independent variables

The variables *unemployment benefit recipient* and *social assistance benefit recipient* reflect whether a respondent is a welfare recipient. The first variable shows whether the respondent is an (1) unemployment benefit recipient (or has been within the last year) or (0) not, while the latter variable shows whether the respondent is a (1) social assistance recipient or (0) not.

Taken together, educational level and household income reflect respondents' socio-economic status. *Educational-level* measures the completed education

level or how far one has come in the current educational programme. Respondents were able to fill out the highest level obtained in the country of origin and in the Netherlands. To distinguish the various levels of education, we followed the ISSP's ISCED procedures in order to convert respondents' educational attainment to a variable measuring respondents' overall level by means of the 'International Standard Classification of Education 1997' (ISCED97) classification (OECD, European Union, UNESCO Institute for Statistics, 2015). The *household income* variable indicates the monthly net household income of the respondents and is measured through 11 categories resembling the wave 2008 of the ISSP's family income variable. For more information about the ISCED-level classification and the exact values of the household income levels, see Table A2 in the appendix.

The *welfare group interest* variables are calculated by means of registration data referring to national unemployment benefit and social assistance participation rates, per country of origin, in the Netherlands (Statistics Netherlands, 2016). We thereby anticipated that benefit reciprocity among immigrants from the country of origin would be more visible than the abstract sum of the group's income tax contribution and benefit take-up rates. Benefit participation rates were measured as the percentage of welfare recipients compared with the total number of people registered in the Netherlands per targeted immigrant group, with a reference date set on 31 December 2015. We homed in the unemployment benefit and social assistance receipt that occurred somewhere in 2015. The percentages are calculated for people who are at least 18 years of age. Regarding unemployment benefit percentages, the upper limit was set to the age of 65 years and 3 months, while there was no upper limit for social assistance take-up.<sup>4</sup>

To measure respondents' sense of belonging to other immigrants from the country of origin, we used the survey question, '[There are] 'different groups living in the Netherlands. How strong, would you say, is your sense of belonging to the people from [country of origin]?' The answers were given on a 5-point scale (1 = not at all, 5 = very close). Therefore, the higher the score on the *sense of belonging* variable, the higher the sense of belonging to the given immigrant group residing in the Netherlands.

### Control variables

We included the following control variables for the analyses: *age*, *sex*, *partner in household*, *number of household members*, *years resided in the Netherlands*,

<sup>3</sup> By means of a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) controlling for measurement errors, the results showed that the theoretical concept of labour market public expenditure preferences as one scale was not reflected by these two items (RMSEA .552; 90% C.I. .521–.584).

<sup>4</sup> The lower and upper limits were set with reference to legal entitlement to work-related benefits and social assistance. This resulted in a better representation of the welfare dependency of various immigrant groups.

and *welfare generosity in country of origin*. Age was measured in years and ranged between 18 and 75. The gender of the respondent was coded through the dummy variable *sex* with men as the reference category. Measuring household composition, the dummy variable *partner in household* captured whether the respondent had a partner living in the household. The interval variable *number of household members* was measured on a scale from 1, representing single households, up to 8. The interval variable *years resided in the Netherlands* was measured by the number of years of residence in the Netherlands, with an upper limit cut-off point of 29 years. Immigrants (1.4%) who had resided in the Netherlands for at least 29 years and at most 56 years were coded as 29.

By means of the *welfare generosity in country of origin* scale, the analyses were controlled for the respondents' country of birth. This scale refers to the country of origin's public investment in labour force-related social security programmes and social assistance. This is measured by dividing the percentage of gross domestic product spent on these social expenditures by the labour force's unemployment rate, following Saltkjel, Dahl and Van der Wel (2013), Asian Development Bank (2016), International Labour Office (2016) and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2016). In this way, we controlled for the level of need in the targeted countries and thus for the level of generosity of the social insurance expenditures (Luttmer & Singhal, 2011); see Table A3 in the appendix for the calculation procedure.

### Missing data

For the 2,383 immigrant respondents with no missing value on the dependent variables, we used a multiple imputation procedure to impute values for 14% of the respondents who had a missing value on either one of the following independent or control variables (Lall, 2016; Ruben, 1996).<sup>5</sup> The descriptive statistics are shown in Tables A4 and A5 (appendix).

### Method

First, bivariate analyses were applied indicating whether there were differences between various immigrant groups while a comparison with native Dutch citizens was made. Mean values of the targeted immigrant groups were included, exploring size differences regarding WS attitudes, sense of belonging to the

<sup>5</sup> To facilitate accuracy of the multiple imputation procedure, the following additional variables from the MIFARE dataset were included: country of origin, sense of belonging among native Dutch citizens and migrants in general living in the Netherlands, Dutch language proficiency and whether respondents were economically active in the labour market.

target group, unemployment benefit and social assistance participation rates by country of origin.

Second, we used the immigrant sample and applied ordinary least square (OLS) regression analyses with clustered standard errors (country of origin) to test our hypotheses. By clustering the standard errors, we could account for the in-group correlation to avoid incorrect retaining of our hypotheses (Cameron & Miller, 2015). In doing so, we acknowledge that immigrants were clustered into immigrant groups. We do realise that multilevel modelling (MLM) would be a more appropriate way to test the effect of group interest and the anticipated cross-level effect of sense of belonging. But because we lacked statistical power at the group level, we could not make sufficient use of MLM. However as Moulton (1990) has underlined, by specifying the standard error clustering in our OLS regression models, we were better able to measure the effect of group interest that takes the same value for all immigrants within one group than with ordinary OLS regression models.

The empirical analyses contained four models measuring whether the *self-interest*, *welfare group interest* and *sense of belonging* determinants have an effect among immigrants. The first model included the self-interest and control variables and estimated the effect of personal benefit receipt and socio-economic status on immigrants' support for public spending on unemployment benefits and social assistance, thus testing the hypotheses *current risk – self-interest hypothesis* (H1) and *future risk – self-interest hypothesis* (H2). The second model additionally estimated the effect of the group's benefit participation rates, as formulated in the *welfare group interest hypothesis* (H3). The third model was utilised to examine the interaction effect of *sense of belonging* on the self-interest and group interest determinants, testing the *sense of belonging* hypotheses (H4–H6). For the fourth and final model without clustered standard errors, we included the immigrant group-level indicators by means of country of origin dummies (instead of the in-group's benefit participation rates), and added an interaction term of sense of belonging to the country of origin group in order to capture differences between immigrant groups. We chose Turkish immigrants as the reference group because they held the relatively weakest socio-economic position in our data sample (Statistics Netherlands, 2014).

## Results

### Descriptive results

Figure 2 illustrates the mean values of immigrant groups' support for public spending on unemployment benefits and social assistance. The value scale goes from (1) spend much less to (5) spend much more. Immigrant groups are sorted in a descending manner; the right bar presents native Dutch citizen's




Figure 2. Support for social spending (1) spend much less – (5) spend much more; including error bars. Panel A: public spending on unemployment benefits; Panel B: public spending on social assistance. *Source*: MIFARE (2018).

support for spending on welfare. Generally, support for the welfare state's unemployment benefits and social assistance expenditure was moderate. Russian (2.58) immigrants preferred unemployment benefit expenditures the least, whereas Spanish (3.22) immigrants preferred extended expenditures the most. Native Dutch citizens took a position similar to Romanian and American immigrants. Japanese immigrants (2.79) preferred expenditures on social assistance the least, while Spanish (3.38) immigrants allocated more governmental spending and native Dutch citizens took a position in between Philippian and Romanian immigrants.

Figure 3 presents the percentages obtained from Statistics Netherlands (2016) registration data. These represent the relative shares of welfare recipients per immigrant group in 2015. Shares are sorted in a descending manner with native Dutch citizens' share as reference point on the right side of both panels. The figure is quite revealing, since evidence shows large differences between the various groups. There is a great contrast between the receipt of unemployment benefits

among immigrants from Poland (20%) and among immigrants from Japan (1.6%), likely due to the much more often temporary job status of Polish immigrants. However, looking at social assistance reciprocity, which is a more conservative measure of labour market positions, the numbers reveal that Turkish immigrants (17%) had the largest share whereas the smallest share was, again, among Japanese immigrants (0.8%).

Figure 4 shows the origin group's mean values of people's *sense of belonging* to the country of origin group measure. The value scale goes from (1) not at all to (5) very close. The right bar illustrates the mean value of native Dutch citizens. The figure shows that native Dutch citizens (4.00) had the strongest sense of belonging to their own group.<sup>6</sup> Notwithstanding the relatively small differences

<sup>6</sup> For the sake of robustness analyses, T-tests were applied and showed that the various immigrant groups' mean values differ significantly compared to the mean value of the native Dutch citizen sample.




Figure 3. Benefit participation rates by country of origin in the Netherlands – 2015; Panel A: unemployment benefit; Panel B: social assistance. Source: Statistics Netherlands (2016).

between various immigrant groups, the results show that Romanian (2.83) immigrants had the weakest sense of belonging to the people from Romania residing in the Netherlands, whereas Turkish (3.73) immigrants had the strongest sense of belonging to Turkish immigrants residing in the Netherlands.

Analytical results

Tables 1 and 2 present the coefficients and standard errors (with significance values) of the OLS regression models (with Models 1, 2 and 3 corrected for clustering on country of origin) employed for




Figure 4. Mean values per country of origin regarding sense of belonging to people from country of origin residing in the Netherlands, (1) not at all – (5) very close; including error bars. Source: MIFARE (2018).



Table 1. OLS regression 'support for public spending on unemployment benefits' with (country of origin) clustered standard errors (std.).

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4 (no clustered SE)	
	<i>b</i>	(SE)	<i>b</i>	(SE)	<i>b</i>	(SE)	<i>b</i>	(SE)
<b>Self-interest</b>								
Unemployment benefit recipient (ref. no recipient)	.452	(.126)**	.427	(.123)**	.427	(.124)**	.428	(0.068)***
Educational level <sup>a</sup>	-.046	(.017)*	-.035	(.015)*	-.036	(.015)*	-.016	(0.016)
Household income <sup>a</sup>	-.031	(.008)**	-.029	(.008)**	-.028	(.008)*	-.038	(0.008)***
<b>Group-interest</b>								
Unemployment benefit participation rate <sup>a</sup>			.011	(.006)	.011	(.006)		
<b>Sense of belonging</b>								
Sense of belonging to country of origin immigrants in the Netherlands <sup>a</sup>					.038	(.016)*	.126	(.066)~
<b>Sense of belonging interaction effects</b>								
Unemployment benefit recipient (ref. no recipient)					-.050	(.046)		
Educational level * sense of belonging <sup>a</sup>					-.010	(.014)		
Household income * sense of belonging <sup>a</sup>					.004	(.007)		
Unemployment benefit participation rate * sense of belonging <sup>a</sup>					.004	(.003)		
<b>Control variables</b>								
Age <sup>a</sup>	.002	(.003)	.002	(.003)	.002	(.003)	.004	(.002)
Female (ref. male)	-.057	(.043)	-.052	(.043)	-.054	(.043)	.019	(.042)
Years of residence in the Netherlands <sup>a</sup>	-.001	(.003)	-.001	(.003)	-.001	(.003)	-.001	(.003)
Partner in household (ref. no partner)	.038	(.029)	.029	(.031)	.031	(.033)	.046	(.050)
Amount of household members <sup>a</sup>	-.028	(.015)	-.026	(.016)	-.028	(.016)	-.026	(.019)
Welfare generosity in country of origin <sup>a</sup>	-.111	(.273)	-.052	(.252)	-.026	(.252)		
<b>Country of origin (ref. Turkey)</b>								
China							-.179	(.102)
Japan							-.101	(.105)
Philippines							-.307	(.097)**
Poland							.018	(.097)
Romania							-.011	(.101)
Russian Federation							-.396	(.095)***
Spain							.284	(.100)**
UK							-.127	(.106)
USA							.006	(.109)
<b>Country of origin * Sense of belonging (ref. Turkey)</b>								
China * Sense of belonging <sup>a</sup>							-.180	(.093)~
Japan * sense of belonging <sup>a</sup>							-.100	(.087)
Philippines * sense of belonging <sup>a</sup>							-.072	(.082)
Poland * sense of belonging <sup>a</sup>							-.076	(.083)
Romania * sense of belonging <sup>a</sup>							-.049	(.082)
Russian Federation * sense of belonging <sup>a</sup>							-.147	(.078)~
Spain * sense of belonging <sup>a</sup>							-.086	(.083)
UK * sense of belonging <sup>a</sup>							-.019	(.084)
USA * sense of belonging <sup>a</sup>							-.118	(.086)~
Intercept	2.836	(.076)***	2.841	(.079)***	2.842	(.080)***	2.890	(.088)***
Variance explained by the model (Adj. $R^2$ )	4.4%		4.6%		4.7%		8.1%	
$n = 2,383$								

Source: MIFARE (2018).

Note. <sup>a</sup>variable is mean-centred.

~ $p < 0.10$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ .

empirical analyses among immigrants only. We first hypothesised about the self-interest induced determinants of immigrants' support for public spending on welfare. We expected that when immigrants are themselves claimants of unemployment benefits or social assistance, they would prefer increased public spending on the welfare programme concerned. The results of Model 1 (Table 1:  $b = .452$ ,  $p < 0.01$ ) reveal that this expectation can be supported with regard to immigrants' preferences for public spending on unemployment benefits.

Additional robustness analyses, wherein we interchanged unemployment benefit reciprocity with social assistance reciprocity, showed that individual social assistance receipt (Appendices, Table A7:  $b = .296$ ,  $p < 0.05$ ) was an additional predictor of stronger support for spending on unemployment benefits. We did not find an effect of unemployment benefit reciprocity on support for spending on social assistance. Hence, the current risk – self-interest hypothesis (H1) holds for immigrants' support for spending on unemployment benefits only.

Table 2. OLS regression 'Support for public spending on social assistance' with (country of origin) clustered standard errors.

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4 (no clustered SE)	
	<i>b</i>	(SE)	<i>b</i>	(SE)	<i>b</i>	(SE)	<i>b</i>	(SE)
Self-interest								
Social assistance recipient (ref. no recipient)	.161	(.117)	.159	(.117)	.156	(.114)	.148	(.105)
Educational level <sup>a</sup>	-.034	(.019)	-.032	(.022)	-.032	(.024)	-.005	(.017)
Household income <sup>a</sup>	-.052	(.011)**	-.051	(.010)***	-.051	(.010)***	-.052	(.008)***
Group-interest								
Social assistance participation rate <sup>a</sup>			.005	(.011)	.002	(.011)		
Sense of belonging								
Sense of belonging to country of origin immigrants in the Netherlands <sup>a</sup>					.014	(.020)	.165	(.067)*
Sense of belonging interaction effects								
Unemployment benefit recipient (ref. no recipient)					-.005	(.052)		
Educational level * sense of belonging <sup>a</sup>					-.025	(.014)		
Household income * sense of belonging <sup>a</sup>					.005	(.007)		
Unemployment benefit participation rate * sense of belonging <sup>a</sup>					.005	(.006)		
Control variables								
Age <sup>a</sup>	-.001	(.002)	-.001	(.002)	-.001	(.003)	.001	(.002)
Female (ref. male)	-.067	(.040)	-.063	(.042)	-.067	(.040)	-.006	(.042)
Years of residence in the Netherlands <sup>a</sup>	-.010	(.004)~	-.010	(.004)*	-.010	(.004)*	-.011	(.004)**
Partner in household (ref. no partner)	-.043	(.051)	-.041	(.052)	-.040	(.054)	-.040	(.052)
Amount of household members <sup>a</sup>	-.016	(.016)	-.017	(.016)	-.020	(.017)	-.021	(.019)
Welfare generosity in country of origin <sup>a</sup>	.077	(.145)	.121	(.152)	.122	(.148)		
Country of origin (ref. Turkey)								
China							-.064	(.104)
Japan							-.291	(.106)**
Philippines							-.187	(.098)~
Poland							.158	(.099)
Romania							-.266	(.103)**
Russian Federation							-.131	(.097)
Spain							.261	(.102)**
UK							.008	(.106)
USA							.049	(.110)
Country of origin * sense of belonging (ref. Turkey)								
China * sense of belonging <sup>a</sup>							-.277	(.095)**
Japan * sense of belonging <sup>a</sup>							-.146	(.090)
Philippines * sense of belonging <sup>a</sup>							-.225	(.084)**
Poland * sense of belonging <sup>a</sup>							-.175	(.085)*
Romania * sense of belonging <sup>a</sup>							-.132	(.085)
Russian Federation * sense of belonging <sup>a</sup>							-.169	(.080)*
Spain * sense of belonging <sup>a</sup>							-.160	(.085)~
UK * sense of belonging <sup>a</sup>							-.086	(.086)
USA * sense of belonging <sup>a</sup>							-.171	(.089)~
Intercept	3.144	(.070)***	3.140	(.077)***	3.140	(.078)***	3.164	(.089)***
Variance explained by the model (Adj. <i>R</i> <sup>2</sup> )	4.4%		4.4%		4.5%		7.5%	
<i>n</i> = 2,383								

Source: MIFARE (2018).

Note. <sup>a</sup>Variable is mean-centred.

~*p*<0.10; \**p*<0.05; \*\**p*<0.01; \*\*\**p*<0.001.

Results additionally showed that a higher socio-economic status as measured by means of household income (Table 1: *b* = -.029, *p*<0.01; Table 2: *b* = -.051, *p*<0.001) affected immigrants' spending preferences negatively. The same association was found with regard to immigrants' educational level on spending preferences regarding unemployment benefits (Table 1: *b* = -.035, *p*<0.05). Thus, the future risk – self-interest hypothesis (H2) holds.

Subsequently, we hypothesised that alongside welfare preferences driven by self-interest, the interests of the group would affect immigrants' support for

public spending on welfare as well. At first glance, the results of Model 2 in Tables 1 and 2 did not support this proposition. Subsequently, we conducted robustness analyses to determine whether the group's benefit reciprocity was interchangeable with regard to immigrants' spending preferences on either of the benefit programmes. Results showed that the group's interest in unemployment benefit reciprocity solely affected immigrants' support for public spending on social assistance (Appendix, Table A6: *b* = .016, *p*<0.05). Thus, the welfare group-interest hypothesis (H3) should be partly retained.

For the sense of belonging hypotheses (H4–H6), we expected that the greater was the sense of belonging to immigrants from the in-group, the stronger would be the association between the relative shares of unemployment benefit or social assistance recipients within each immigrant group and immigrants' individual support for spending on welfare. We additionally hypothesised that when immigrants felt this stronger sense of belonging, the association between the self-interest determinants and immigrants' support for welfare spending would be weaker. We cannot support this proposition by means of our findings (Model 3 in Tables 1 and 2).<sup>7</sup> Instead, results show a moderate direct effect of sense of belonging on support for public spending on unemployment benefits (Table 1:  $b = .038$ ,  $p < 0.05$ ). On the basis of our findings, we have to refute the anticipated interaction effect of sense of belonging on the welfare interests of the individual and group (H4–H6).

For the final model, Model 4, we examined the effect of country of origin by means of dummy variables. We also investigated whether the direct effect of sense of belonging could be found among all immigrant groups, with Turkish immigrants as the reference group. The evidence, as shown in Table 1, showed that both Philippian ( $b = -.307$ ,  $p < 0.01$ ) and Russian ( $b = -.396$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ) immigrants showed less support for public spending on unemployment benefits than did Turkish immigrants, whereas Spanish immigrants ( $b = .284$ ,  $p < 0.01$ ) showed more support for public spending. With a 90% confidence interval, the direct effect of sense of belonging on support for spending on unemployment benefits was less strong for Chinese ( $b = -.180$ ), Russian ( $b = -.147$ ) and American ( $b = -.147$ ) than for Turkish immigrants.

The results of the fourth model in Table 2 show a slightly different picture. We see that compared with Turkish immigrants, Japanese ( $b = -.291$ ,  $p < 0.01$ ) and Romanian immigrants ( $b = -.266$ ,  $p < 0.01$ ) showed less support for public spending on social assistance, whereas Spanish immigrants ( $b = .261$ ,  $p < 0.01$ ) showed more support for spending on the programme. Results additionally showed that by controlling for groups by means of country origin instead of groups' benefit participation rates, a moderate effect of sense of belonging to the in-group ( $b = .165$ ,  $p < 0.05$ ) was found. The effect of sense of belonging toward the in-group was less strong for Chinese ( $b = -.277$ ,  $p < 0.01$ ), Philippian ( $b = -.225$ ,  $p < 0.01$ ), Polish ( $b = -.175$ ,  $p < 0.05$ ) and Russian ( $b = -.169$ ,  $p < 0.05$ ) immigrants than for Turkish immigrants. The same was found, but with a 90%

confidence interval, for Spanish ( $b = -.160$ ) and American ( $b = -.171$ ) immigrants.

We performed additional analyses (not reported), wherein we ran the self-interest preferences per immigrant group (including the control variables) to see whether the found effects of self-interest on social spending preferences would hold within each of the immigrant groups. Results showed that the level of (household) income remained a significant indicator of support for public spending within most groups, whereas other factors of self-interest often showed little relevance to immigrants' welfare spending preferences. Thus, our results showed that among immigrants, educational level (only significant among Polish and Japanese immigrants) and benefit receipt (only significant among Polish, Russian and Turkish immigrants) were less relevant to immigrants' social spending preferences than level of income.

## Conclusions and discussion

Our contribution set out to explain immigrants' support for social spending and differentiated between support for public spending on unemployment benefits and social assistance. A major contribution of this study is that we not only tested the effect of self-interest among immigrants who differ significantly to the extent they rely on welfare support, but added the element of group interest to better understand immigrants' welfare state attitudes. Subsequently, we theorised about the relevance of immigrants' identification with their own immigrant group and empirically tested whether immigrants' self-interest in welfare usage or their in-group benefit shares would be affected by the extent of immigrants' sense of belonging to their own group.

The results of this study contribute to existing knowledge on welfare state attitudes by providing a sturdy validity test for the self-interest determinants among immigrants, characterised by highly varying socio-economic positions. The results have shown that in terms of immigrants' self-interest in welfare usage, the level of household income seem to be the most informative indicator in contrast to the less relevant effects of educational level and benefit reciprocity, which were of significance within only a few groups. The relevance of immigrants' level of income relates to the idea that a potential future risk for welfare need causes immigrants to favour social spending more (Andreß & Heien, 2001; Gelissen, 2002). That education was not found to have an effect might be considered specific to the immigrant population. Literature on migrant integration suggests that immigrants with higher educational levels accept jobs below their level or face discrimination and have difficulties obtaining higher status jobs (e.g., Zorlu,

<sup>7</sup> Additional robustness analyses did not present significant effects while introducing the interaction effects one by one.

2013). Thus, the highest obtained educational level of immigrants might not represent their actual socio-economic vulnerability properly.

Initially, we did not find support for the anticipated effect of group interest. Yet, our robustness analyses showed that the immigrant group's relative unemployment benefit shares affect immigrant support for spending on social assistance, which may be interpreted as an expression of solidarity with the welfare interests of the immigrant group (Kiewiet & Lewis-Beck, 2011). On the other hand, the effect of the in-group shares of unemployment benefit reciprocity can be interpreted as an indirect self-interest effect. Although we accounted for the self-interest explanation by level of household income, obtained education and individual benefit take-up, high unemployment benefit participation rates may indicate an increased risk for possible personal job loss in the near future (Bobo & Kluegel, 1993).

The lack of clear evidence for the effect of the in-group's unemployment benefit shares on support for spending on unemployment benefits suggests that the interests of the group matter most with regard to the more contested welfare programmes. Social assistance is a means-tested programme and it is thus easier to associate this programme with stigmatisation or a loss of self-respect than a contribution-based programme, such as unemployment benefits (Blomberg et al., 2012; Van Oorschot & Schell, 1989).

A puzzle we are left with is that immigrants' sense of belonging to their own group was positively associated with support for welfare spending, but that this sense of belonging did not moderate the self- or group-interest explanations of support for social spending. At the same time, our results revealed that the direct effect of sense of belonging to the in-group mattered most among Turkish immigrants, but much less so for most of the other immigrant groups. Since in our sample Turkish immigrants were found to be the most vulnerable migrant group in socio-economic terms (Statistics Netherlands, 2014), there might be a threshold level of vulnerability (and in-group shares of benefit reliance) for immigrants to perceive it to be in their group interest to prefer more social spending.

Within this contribution, we have also taken the welfare generosity of the countries of origin into account, but it was not relevant in explaining social spending preferences. However, origin group differences remained substantial. We suggest that not only does the country of origin's actual welfare generosity play a role, but also that public opinion on the role of the state in providing welfare to its citizens in the country of origin is perhaps more relevant. We additionally found that extended period of residence decreases the chance that immigrants could not answer questions about their spending preferences

(robustness analyses). Hence, we can theorise that upon arrival a clear opinion about the state's social spending is not yet formed or, otherwise, that immigrants are less critical towards their host country's government (Maxwell, 2010). This study's combined findings raise questions for future research about the effect of state socialisation (Larsen, 2008; Svallfors, 2012) and whether immigrants' general knowledge about welfare programmes influences their social spending preferences.

In sum, the results presented in this contribution provide new insights with regard to immigrants' support for social spending. We found that, aside from the effect of level of income, immigrants' in-group shares of unemployment benefit reciprocity and immigrants' sense of belonging to their own group affect immigrants' individual support for social spending. Whether these findings are rooted in a sense of solidarity with the societal interests of the immigrant group in question or the result of an indirect self-interest deserves further scholarly attention.

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**Appendix**

Table A1. Binomial logistic regression models (ref. cat. scale positioning), b coefficients, standard errors, significance values, odds ratio – immigrants.

	'CAN'T CHOOSE' UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFIT <sup>1</sup> Unemployment benefit recipient <sup>2</sup> Unemployment benefit participation rates			'CAN'T CHOOSE' SOCIAL ASSISTANCE <sup>1</sup> Social assistance recipient <sup>2</sup> Social assistance participation rates		
	b	(SE)	Odds Ratio	b	(SE)	Odds Ratio
Benefit recipient (ref. no recipient) <sup>1</sup>	-1.054	(.339)**	.349	-.666	(.038)*	.514
Educational level	-.053	(.054)	.949	.030	(.047)	1.030
Household income	-.010	(.022)	.990	.004	(.020)	1.004
Benefit participation rate <sup>2</sup>	-.004	(.012)	.996	-.042	(.020)*	.959
Sense of belonging to country of origin immigrants in Netherlands	-.066	(.050)	.936	-.042	(.044)	.959
Age	.013	(.007)	1.013	-.015	(.006)*	.985
Female (ref. male)	.079	(.124)	1.083	-.063	(.109)	.939
Years of residence in the Netherlands	-.118	(.013)***	.888	-.073	(.011)***	.930
Partner in household (ref. no partner)	-.454	(.167)**	.635	.035	(.151)	.965
Amount of household members	.069	(.065)	1.072	-.116	(.061)***	.891
Welfare generosity in country of origin (% of GDP)	1.095	(.344)***	2.990	1.313	(.312)	3.717
Intercept	-1.117	(.451)*		-.180	(.401)	
Variance explained (Cox & Snell R <sup>2</sup> )	7.1%			8.3%		
Baseline model $\chi^2$	1888			2279		
-2LL (df)	162 (11)			190 (11)		
n	2202			2194		

Source: MIFARE (2017).

Notes: Missing values of independent variables are handled by means of multiple imputation.

\*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001.

Table A2. List of variables based on the MIFARE questionnaire.

Variables	Survey question
Support for public spending on unemployment benefits	Listed below are various areas of government spending in the Netherlands. [Would you] like to see more or less government spending. Remember that if you say 'much more', it might require a tax increase to pay for it. . . 1. Spend much less 2. Spend less 3. Spend the same as now 4. Spend more 5. Spend much more ○ Can't choose
Support for public spending on social assistance	1. Spend much less 2. Spend less 3. Spend the same as now 4. Spend more 5. Spend much more ○ Can't choose
Unemployment benefit recipient	Which of the following of Dutch benefits have you or anyone of your family members in the Netherlands received within the last year? ○ No ○ Yes, only me ○ Yes, me personally and some of my family members ○ Yes, one of my family members only
Social assistance recipient	○ No ○ Yes, only me

Table A2. *Continued*

Variables	Survey question
Educational level (ISCED-97)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Yes, me personally and someone of my family members</li> <li>○ Yes, one of my family members only</li> </ul> What is the highest level of education you attained in country of origin? What is the highest level of education you attained in the Netherlands? <i>List of educational programmes to choose from for each country of origin and receiving country, available upon request.</i> Both answers were converted into the following ISCED '97 educational levels <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>0. No formal education</li> <li>1. Primary education</li> <li>2. Lower secondary education</li> <li>3. Upper secondary education</li> <li>4. Post-secondary non-tertiary education</li> <li>5. Lower level tertiary education</li> <li>6. Upper level tertiary</li> </ol>
Household income	What is approximately your family household's total income per month, after tax and compulsory deductions, from all sources? <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. &gt; €600</li> <li>2. €600–€799</li> <li>3. €800–€999</li> <li>4. €1,000–€1,349</li> <li>5. €1,350–€1,649</li> <li>6. €1,650–€1,999</li> <li>7. €2,000–€2,499</li> <li>8. €2,500–€2,999</li> <li>9. €3,000–€3,999</li> <li>10. €4,000–€4,999</li> <li>11. &lt; €5,000</li> </ol>
Sense of belonging	We are also interested in your sense of belonging to different groups living in the Netherlands. How strong, would you say, is your sense of belonging to the people from [country of origin]?
Age	In which year were you born?
Sex	Are you a man or a woman?
Years resided in the Netherlands	In which year did you first move to the Netherlands to live here for more than 3 months?
Partner in household	Can you provide information for up to 7 family members who live with you in your household here in the Netherlands regarding what relation you have with them and how old they are? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Partner/child/parent or parent-in-law/brother or sister/another relative</li> </ul>
Amount of household members	Can you provide information for up to 7 family members who live with you in your household here in the Netherlands regarding what relation you have with them and how old they are? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Partner/child/parent or parent-in-law/brother or sister/another relative</li> </ul>

Source: Questionnaire MIFARE (2017).

Table A3. Labour market and social assistance social protection expenditure by guarantee for working-age population, divided by unemployment rate (% of GDP).

Country	Indicator year	Elements of the welfare generosity indicator formula				
		Calculated welfare generosity indicator (total social protection expenditure on) labour force/% unemployed of total labour force)	Social protection expenditure for working-age population, excluding general social assistance (% of GDP)	Social assistance expenditure (% of GDP)	Total social protection expenditure for working-age population and social assistance expenditure (% of GDP)	Unemployment rate (% of total labour force ages 15 – 64 modelled ILO estimate)
China	2009	.555	1.90	0.54	2.44	4.4
Japan	2009	.526	2.26	0.37	2.63	5.0
Netherlands	2009	.207	5.77	1.73	7.50	3.4
Philippines	2012	.039	0.27	0.01	0.28	7.0
Poland	2009	.460	3.56	0.21	3.77	8.2
Romania	2010	.371	2.48	0.23	2.71	7.3
Russian Federation	2010	.639	2.90	1.77	4.66	7.3
Spain	2009	.435	7.40	0.47	7.87	18.1
Turkey	2011	.024	0.24	0.00	0.24	9.8
UUK	2009	.736	4.07	1.67	5.74	7.8
USA	2010	.388	2.85	0.91	3.76	9.7

Sources: International Labour Office (2014) and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2016); regarding China, Philippines and Russian Federation: Asian Development Bank (2016); regarding Romania: European Commission (2014).

Table A4. Descriptive statistics after multiple imputation.

	Mean	SD	min	max
Dependent variables				
Support for public spending on unemployment benefit	2.865	0.924	1	5
Support for public spending on social assistance	3.080	0.942	1	5
Self-interest				
Unemployment benefit recipient	0.095	0.294	0	1
Social assistance recipient	0.062	0.241	0	1
Educational level (ISCED-97)	4.309	1.308	0	6
Household income	7.006	2.831	1	11
Sense of belonging				
Sense of belonging to country of origin immigrants in NLD	3.280	1.131	1	5
Welfare group-interest				
Unemployment benefit participation rate	6.272	5.241	1.6	20
Social assistance participation rate	5.020	3.880	0.8	17
Control variables				
Age	38.100	10.552	18	75
Female (ref.cat male)	0.680	0.467	0	1
Years resided in the Netherlands	8.570	6.906	0	30
Partner in household (ref.cat. no partner)	0.655	0.476	0	1
Amount of household members	2.480	1.279	1	8
Welfare generosity (% of GDP)	0.414	0.223	.02	.74

$n = 2,383$

Source: MIFARE (2017).

Note. Variables not mean-centred; statistics after multiple imputation in STATA and pooled results after Rubin's rules.



Table A5. Descriptive statistics per country of origin after multiple imputation.

Country of origin	Unemployment benefit recipient	Social assistance recipient	Educational level ISCED-97	Household income
China	5.1%	6.7%	5	6
Japan	3.2%	2.6%	5	8
Philippines	7.8%	6.2%	5	7
Poland	23.4%	6.7%	3	6
Romania	5.4%	4.7%	4	7
Russian Federation	10.7%	9.7%	5	7
Spain	10.1%	5.8%	4	8
Turkey	19.3%	13.2%	3	6
UK	5.3%	2.7%	4	8
USA	4.2%	1.2%	5	9
<i>n</i> = 2,383				

Source: MIFARE (2017).

Note. Variables not mean-centred; statistics after multiple imputation in STATA and pooled results after Rubin's rules.

Table A6. OLS regression 'support for public spending on social assistance' with (country of origin) clustered standard errors.

	Model 3	
	<i>b</i>	(SE)
Self-interest		
Unemployment benefit recipient (ref. no recipient)	0.163	(.105)
Educational level <sup>a</sup>	-.019	(.015)
Household income <sup>a</sup>	-.048	(.010)**
Group-interest		
Unemployment benefit participation rate <sup>a</sup>	.016	(.005)*
Sense of belonging		
Sense of belonging to country of origin immigrants in the Netherlands <sup>a</sup>	.018	(.023)
Sense of belonging interaction effects		
Unemployment benefit recipient (ref. no recipient)	-.053	(.049)
Educational level * sense of belonging <sup>a</sup>	-.028	(.013)
Household income * sense of belonging <sup>a</sup>	.003	(.007)
Unemployment benefit participation rate * sense of belonging <sup>a</sup>	-.000	(.003)
Control variables		
Age <sup>a</sup>	-.000	(.002)
Female (ref. male)	-.055	(.042)
Years of residence in the Netherlands <sup>a</sup>	-.010	(.004)
Partner in household (ref. no partner)	.061	(.049)
Amount of household members <sup>a</sup>	-.017	(.017)
Welfare generosity in country of origin <sup>a</sup>	.186	(.107)
Intercept	3.142	(.080)***
Variance explained by the model (Adj. R <sup>2</sup> )	5.3%	
<i>n</i> = 2,383		

Source: MIFARE (2017).

Note. <sup>a</sup>Variable is mean-centred.

\**p*<0.05; \*\**p*<0.01; \*\*\**p*<0.001.

Table A7. OLS regression 'support for public spending on unemployment benefits' with (country of origin) clustered standard errors.

	Model 3	
	<i>b</i>	(SE)
Self-interest		
Social assistance recipient (ref. no recipient)	.296	(.074)*
Educational level <sup>a</sup>	-.048	(.021)*
Household income <sup>a</sup>	-.033	(.010)*
Group-interest		
Social assistance participation rate <sup>a</sup>	.006	(.013)
Sense of belonging		
Sense of belonging to country of origin immigrants in the Netherlands <sup>a</sup>	.032	(.016)
Sense of belonging interaction effects		
Social assistance recipient (ref. no recipient)	.058	(.081)
Educational level * sense of belonging <sup>a</sup>	-.011	(.018)
Household income * sense of belonging <sup>a</sup>	.006	(.008)
Social assistance participation rate * sense of belonging <sup>a</sup>	.004	(.004)
Control variables		
Age <sup>a</sup>	-.001	(.003)
Female (ref. male)	-.084	(.035)
Years of residence in the Netherlands <sup>a</sup>	-.000	(.003)
Partner in household (ref. no partner)	.048	(.032)
Amount of household members <sup>a</sup>	-.028	(.015)
Welfare generosity in country of origin <sup>a</sup>	-.138	(.360)
Intercept	2.871	(.075)***
Variance explained by the model (Adj. R <sup>2</sup> )	3.0%	
<i>n</i> = 2,383		

Source: MIFARE (2017).

Note. <sup>a</sup>Variable is mean-centred.

\**p*<0.05; \*\**p*<0.01; \*\*\**p*<0.001.