



Linking Stam's Bounds with Generalized Truncation

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Abstract. One of the most prominent PRP-to-PRF designs is truncation, a method that found renewed interest with the GCM-SIV authenticated encryption scheme. A long line of research (from 1998 to 2018) shows that truncating an n -bit random permutation to m bits achieves tight $n - m/2$ security. However, it appeared that the result was a direct consequence of a statistical result of Stam from 1978. In this work, we aim to gain better understanding in the possibilities and impossibilities of truncation. We take a closer look at the ancient result, observe that it is much more general, and link it with a generalized truncation function that uses an arbitrary post-processing function after the evaluation of the permutation. The main conclusion is that generalized truncation with any balanced post-processing achieves the same security bound as plain truncation. For unbalanced post-processing, security degrades gradually with the amount of unbalancedness. The results in particular exhibit a use of the Kullback-Leibler divergence for cryptographic indistinguishability proofs, without resorting to the recently popularized chi-squared method.

Keywords: Truncation · Generalization · PRF · Stam's bounds

1 Introduction

The dominant building block for symmetric cryptographic modes is a pseudorandom permutation (PRP), such as AES [22]. However, for many such modes, most notably stream-based (authenticated) ciphers [24, 28, 39] and message authentication codes [5, 11, 16, 49], security is determined by the level at which the underlying primitive behaves like a *random function* rather than a *random permutation*. Stated differently, these modes benefit from being instantiated with a pseudorandom function (PRF) instead of a PRP. Yet, with an extreme abundance in PRP candidates [1–4, 13, 14, 22] (to name a few), and only very few dedicated PRFs [10, 41], people have resorted to generic methods of transforming a PRP into a PRF.

The well-known PRP-PRF switch [7, 9, 17, 30, 31] shows that an n -bit PRP behaves as a PRF up to approximately $2^{n/2}$ evaluations. This “birthday bound” could be inadequate for lightweight block ciphers, and various “beyond birthday bound” modes, schemes that achieve security beyond $2^{n/2}$ evaluations,

have appeared. These include the xor of permutations [6, 8, 18, 23, 38, 42, 44–46], EDM [19, 23, 40], EDMD [40], and truncation [6, 12, 25–27, 30, 47]. We refer to Mennink and Neves [40, 41] for an extensive discussion of the four variants. In this work, we focus on truncation.

1.1 History of Truncation

Let $n, m \in \mathbb{N}$ be such that $m \leq n$, and let p be an n -bit PRP. Truncation is defined as simply returning the m leftmost bits of p :

$$\text{Trunc}^p(x) = \text{left}_m(p(x)). \quad (1)$$

Hall et al. [30], introduced the truncation construction, and demonstrated security up to around $2^{n-m/2}$ evaluations, but not for the entire parameter spectrum. Bellare and Impagliazzo [6] gave an improved analysis that demonstrates security for a broader selection of n and m . Gilboa and Gueron [25] resolved the remaining gaps by proving security up to $2^{n-m/2}$ evaluations for any choice of n and m . It turned out, however, that the problem was already solved in 1978 by Stam [47], and that Stam’s bound is stronger than the bounds of [6, 25, 30] altogether. Bhattacharya and Nandi [12] transformed Stam’s analysis to the chi-squared method [23], deriving an identical bound. We elaborate on this upper bound in Sect. 4.1. Gilboa et al. [27] presented a detailed comparison of the bounds of Hall et al. [30], Bellare and Impagliazzo [6], Gilboa and Gueron [25], and Stam [47].

With respect to insecurity, Hall et al. [30] also argued tightness of their bound by sketching a distinguisher. Gilboa and Gueron [26] presented a formal derivation of a lower bound, for various choices of n, m , and the number of evaluations. They showed that the best distinguisher’s success probability is close to 1 for around $2^{n-m/2}$ evaluations. See Sect. 4.1 for the lower bound.

The truncated permutation construction found application as key derivation function in GCM-SIV [28, 29, 37], although its use is disputed [15, 32].

1.2 Stam’s Bounds

Stam’s 1978 bound [47] is more general than suggested in Sect. 1.1. Intuitively (a formal treatment of Stam’s bounds is given in Sect. 3), it covers the idea of 2^n possible outcomes being grouped into 2^m colors (the number of occurrences per color not necessarily equal) and measures the distance between sampling with or without replacement, where the observer learns the color of every sample. In a later publication in 1986, Stam [48] generalized this result to the case where the number of colors and the grouping of the outcomes into the colors differs per sample.

The analysis of Stam is based on the Kullback-Leibler divergence $KL(X; Y)$ [36] (see Sect. 2.1 for the details), and Pinsker’s inequality [21, 34, 35] stating that

$$\Delta(X, Y) \leq \left(\frac{1}{2} KL(X; Y) \right)^{1/2}, \quad (2)$$

where $\Delta(X, Y)$ denotes the statistical distance between X and Y . The exact same statistical tools were used in the chi-squared method of Dai et al. [23]. However, Dai et al. make an additional step, namely that the Kullback-Leibler divergence $KL(X; Y)$ is at most the chi-squared divergence $\chi^2(X; Y)$ (see, again, Sect. 2.1 for the details). In this work, we rely on Stam's results and perform analysis at the level of the Kullback-Leibler divergence.

1.3 Generalized Truncation

The goal of this work is to fully understand the implication of Stam's bounds to truncation. To do so, we describe a generalized truncation function GTrunc in Sect. 4. The function generalizes simple truncation by the evaluation of a post-processing function $\text{post} : \{0, 1\}^n \times \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^m$ after permutation:

$$\text{GTrunc}^p(x) = \text{post}(x, p(x)). \quad (3)$$

The function is depicted in Fig. 1. It covers plain truncation of (1) by taking the post-processing function that ignores its first input and evaluates left_m on its second input.

However, GTrunc is much more general than Trunc . Most importantly, it feed-forwards its input x to the post-processing function post . This, on the one hand, gives an adversary more power, but on the other hand, frustrates statistical analysis as the output function is not purely a post-processing function on the output of the permutation p . We consider the security of GTrunc for various types of post-processing functions. In Sect. 4.2 we consider a simplified variant where post is balanced and no feed-forward is involved, and show security-wise equivalence of the resulting construction with Trunc . In Sect. 4.3 we consider the general GTrunc construction with balanced post-processing and link it with the bounds of Stam [47, 48]. The result shows that, in fact, GTrunc achieves the same level of security as Trunc , regardless of the choice of post-processing function post (as long as it is balanced). Finally, we extend the result to arbitrary (possibly unbalanced) post , and derive a security bound that is slightly worse, depending on the unbalancedness of post . The derivation is based on Stam's bounds, with in addition an analysis of the statistical distance between unbalanced and balanced random samplings with replacement using the Kullback-Leibler divergence.

We comment on the affect of including a pre-processing function pre in Sect. 5.

2 Security Model

Consider two natural numbers $n, m \in \mathbb{N}$. We denote by $\{0, 1\}^n$ the set of n -bit strings. The set $\text{func}(n, m)$ denotes the set of all n -to- m -bit functions, and $\text{perm}(n)$ the set of all n -bit permutations. If $m \leq n$, the function $\text{left}_m : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^m$ returns the left m bits of its input. We denote by $(m)_n$ the falling factorial $m(m-1) \cdots (m-n+1) = m!/(m-n)!$. For a finite set \mathcal{X} , $x \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{X}$ denotes the uniform random drawing of x from \mathcal{X} .

2.1 Statistical Tools

For two distributions X, Y over a finite space Ω , the statistical distance between X and Y is defined as

$$\Delta(X, Y) = \frac{1}{2} \sum_{\omega \in \Omega} |\Pr(X = \omega) - \Pr(Y = \omega)| \quad (4)$$

$$= \max_{\Omega^* \subseteq \Omega} \left\{ \sum_{\omega \in \Omega^*} \Pr(X = \omega) - \Pr(Y = \omega) \right\}. \quad (5)$$

The Kullback-Leibler divergence [36] between X and Y is defined as

$$KL(X; Y) = \sum_{\omega \in \Omega} \Pr(X = \omega) \log \left(\frac{\Pr(X = \omega)}{\Pr(Y = \omega)} \right), \quad (6)$$

with the condition that $\Pr(Y = \omega) > 0$ for all $\omega \in \Omega$ and the convention that $0 \log(0) = 0$. Pinsker's inequality [21, 34, 35] gives

$$\Delta(X, Y) \leq \left(\frac{1}{2} KL(X; Y) \right)^{1/2}. \quad (7)$$

Remark 1. Dai et al. [23] recently introduced the chi-squared method to cryptography. The chi-squared method also relies on Pinsker's inequality (7), but *in addition* uses that

$$KL(X; Y) \leq \chi^2(X; Y), \quad (8)$$

where

$$\chi^2(X; Y) = \sum_{\omega \in \Omega} \frac{(\Pr(X = \omega) - \Pr(Y = \omega))^2}{\Pr(Y = \omega)} \quad (9)$$

is the chi-squared divergence [20, 43]. What then remains in order to bound $\Delta(X, Y)$ is an analysis of the chi-squared divergence between X and Y . In our work, we do not go that far, but instead, stop at the Kullback-Leibler divergence. (This is no critique on the chi-squared method; in many applications, bounding $\chi^2(X; Y)$ may be easier to do than bounding $KL(X; Y)$).

2.2 Pseudorandom Functions

A distinguisher \mathcal{D} is an algorithm that is given access to an oracle \mathcal{O} ; it can make a certain amount of queries to this oracle, and afterwards it outputs $b \in \{0, 1\}$. We focus on computationally unbounded distinguishers, whose complexities are measured by the number of oracle queries only. As usual, a scheme is secure if it withstands the strongest possible distinguisher, and we can without loss of generality restrict our focus to deterministic distinguishers. The reason for this is

that for any probabilistic distinguisher there exists a deterministic distinguisher with the same success probability.

Let $n, m \in \mathbb{N}$ such that $m \leq n$. Let $p \in \text{perm}(n)$, and consider a function $F^p \in \text{func}(n, m)$. We define the pseudorandom function (PRF) security of F^p as a random function against a distinguisher \mathcal{D} by

$$\text{Adv}_F^{\text{prf}}(\mathcal{D}) = \left| \Pr(\mathcal{D}^{F^p} = 1) - \Pr(\mathcal{D}^f = 1) \right|, \quad (10)$$

where the first probability is taken over the random drawing of $p \xleftarrow{\$} \text{perm}(n)$ and the second probability over $f \xleftarrow{\$} \text{func}(n, m)$. (Recall that \mathcal{D} is a deterministic distinguisher).

The definition of PRF security relates to the statistical distance of (4–5) in the following manner. Let $q \in \mathbb{N}$, and consider a deterministic distinguisher \mathcal{D} making q queries. Let X denote the probability distribution of interactions with F^p and Y the probability distribution of interactions with f . Let Ω_1 denote the set of query-response tuples for which distinguisher \mathcal{D} outputs 1. Then,

$$\text{Adv}_F^{\text{prf}}(\mathcal{D}) = \left| \sum_{\omega \in \Omega_1} \Pr(X = \omega) - \Pr(Y = \omega) \right| \leq \Delta(X, Y). \quad (11)$$

Equality is achieved for distinguisher \mathcal{D} that returns 1 for any query-response tuple in Ω^* , where Ω^* is the set for which (5) achieves its maximum [12].

Remark 2. The above security model considers F^p to be “keyed” with a random permutation $p \xleftarrow{\$} \text{perm}(n)$. A standard hybrid argument allows us to transform all results in this work to a complexity-theoretic setting where p is, instead, a block cipher E with secret key K , and the distinguisher’s capabilities are also bounded by a time parameter t .

3 Stam's Bounds

Consider a finite set of N elements, of M types/colors. Denote the partition of the N elements into the M colors by $A_1 \cup \dots \cup A_M$. For color j , write $a_j = |A_j| > 0$, such that

$$a_1 + \dots + a_M = N. \quad (12)$$

Let $q \in \mathbb{N}$. Denote by X the probability distribution of the obtained colors when sampling q elements *without* replacement, and by Y the probability distribution of the obtained colors when sampling *with* replacement. Both X and Y have range $\{1, \dots, M\}^q$. Stam [47] measures the distance between X and Y , and proves the following bound¹.

¹ Note that our definition of distance has a factor $\frac{1}{2}$ compared to that of Stam.

Theorem 1 (Stam’s bound [47, Theorems 2.2 and 2.3]). *Let $q, N, M \in \mathbb{N}$ such that $M \leq N$, and consider the configuration of M colors of color sizes (a_1, \dots, a_M) as in (12). Consider the two distributions X and Y over range $\{1, \dots, M\}^q$. We have,*

$$\Delta(X, Y) \leq \frac{1}{2} \left(\frac{(M-1)q(q-1)}{(N-1)(N-q+1)} \right)^{1/2}. \tag{13}$$

Proof. We include Stam’s proof (in our terminology) for completeness.

Write $X = (X_1, \dots, X_q)$ and $Y = (Y_1, \dots, Y_q)$. Denote, for brevity, $\mathbf{X}_i = (X_1, \dots, X_i)$ and $\mathbf{Y}_i = (Y_1, \dots, Y_i)$ for $i = 1, \dots, q$. The Kullback-Leibler divergence (6) can be rewritten as

$$KL(X; Y) \leq KL(X_1; Y_1) + \sum_{i=1}^{q-1} KL(X_{i+1}; Y_{i+1} \mid \mathbf{X}_i, \mathbf{Y}_i), \tag{14}$$

where

$$KL(X_{i+1}; Y_{i+1} \mid \mathbf{X}_i, \mathbf{Y}_i) = \sum_{\mathbf{j}_i \in \{1, \dots, M\}^i} \Pr(\mathbf{X}_i = \mathbf{j}_i) \cdot \sum_{j=1}^M \Pr(X_{i+1} = j \mid \mathbf{X}_i = \mathbf{j}_i) \log \left(\frac{\Pr(X_{i+1} = j \mid \mathbf{X}_i = \mathbf{j}_i)}{\Pr(Y_{i+1} = j \mid \mathbf{Y}_i = \mathbf{j}_i)} \right). \tag{15}$$

We have

$$\Pr(X_{i+1} = j \mid \mathbf{X}_i = \mathbf{j}_i) = \frac{a_j - h}{N - i}, \tag{16}$$

$$\Pr(Y_{i+1} = j \mid \mathbf{Y}_i = \mathbf{j}_i) = \frac{a_j}{N}, \tag{17}$$

where h denotes the number of occurrences of j in sample \mathbf{j}_i . Thus,

$$KL(X_{i+1}; Y_{i+1} \mid \mathbf{X}_i, \mathbf{Y}_i) \tag{18}$$

$$= \sum_{j=1}^M \sum_{\mathbf{j}_i \in \{1, \dots, M\}^i} \Pr(\mathbf{X}_i = \mathbf{j}_i) \cdot \frac{a_j - h}{N - i} \cdot \log \left(\frac{\frac{a_j - h}{N - i}}{\frac{a_j}{N}} \right) \tag{19}$$

$$= \sum_{j=1}^M \sum_{h=0}^{\min\{i, a_j - 1\}} \Pr(HG_{a_j}^N(i) = h) \cdot \frac{a_j - h}{N - i} \cdot \log \left(\frac{\frac{a_j - h}{N - i}}{\frac{a_j}{N}} \right), \tag{20}$$

where $HG_{a_j}^N(i)$ is a random variable of i hypergeometrically distributed draws from N elements with a_j success elements. We have

$$\Pr(HG_{a_j}^N(i) = h) \cdot \frac{a_j - h}{N - i} = \binom{i}{h} \frac{(a_j)_h (N - a_j)_{i-h}}{(N)_i} \cdot \frac{a_j - h}{N - i} \tag{21}$$

$$= \binom{i}{h} \frac{(a_j - 1)_h (N - a_j)_{i-h}}{(N - 1)_i} \cdot \frac{a_j}{N} \tag{22}$$

$$= \Pr(HG_{a_j - 1}^{N-1}(i) = h) \cdot \frac{a_j}{N}. \tag{23}$$

Note furthermore that

$$\sum_{h=0}^{\min\{i, a_j-1\}} h \cdot \Pr\left(HG_{a_j-1}^{N-1}(i) = h\right) = \mathbf{Ex}\left(HG_{a_j-1}^{N-1}(i)\right) = \frac{i(a_j-1)}{N-1}. \tag{24}$$

We subsequently derive the following for (20), where in the first bounding we use Jensen's inequality (log is concave) and in the second bounding we use that $\log(\alpha) \leq \alpha - 1$ (for any $\alpha > 0$):

$$KL(X_{i+1}; Y_{i+1} \mid \mathbf{X}_i, \mathbf{Y}_i) \tag{25}$$

$$= \sum_{j=1}^M \frac{a_j}{N} \cdot \sum_{h=0}^{\min\{i, a_j-1\}} \Pr\left(HG_{a_j-1}^{N-1}(i) = h\right) \cdot \log\left(\frac{\frac{a_j-h}{N-i}}{\frac{a_j}{N}}\right) \tag{26}$$

$$\leq \sum_{j=1}^M \frac{a_j}{N} \cdot \log\left(\sum_{h=0}^{\min\{i, a_j-1\}} \Pr\left(HG_{a_j-1}^{N-1}(i) = h\right) \cdot \frac{\frac{a_j-h}{N-i}}{\frac{a_j}{N}}\right) \tag{27}$$

$$= \sum_{j=1}^M \frac{a_j}{N} \cdot \log\left(\frac{N}{a_j(N-i)} \left(a_j - \mathbf{Ex}\left(HG_{a_j-1}^{N-1}(i)\right)\right)\right) \tag{28}$$

$$= \sum_{j=1}^M \frac{a_j}{N} \cdot \log\left(\frac{N}{a_j(N-i)} \left(a_j - \frac{i(a_j-1)}{N-1}\right)\right) \tag{29}$$

$$= \sum_{j=1}^M \frac{a_j}{N} \cdot \log\left(1 + \frac{(N-a_j)i}{a_j(N-1)(N-i)}\right) \tag{30}$$

$$\leq \sum_{j=1}^M \left(1 - \frac{a_j}{N}\right) \cdot \frac{i}{(N-1)(N-i)} \tag{31}$$

$$= \frac{(M-1)i}{(N-1)(N-i)}. \tag{32}$$

The theorem is concluded by combining (7), (14), and (32). □

It is interesting to note that the bound depends on q , N , and M , *but not on the a_i 's*. This is caused by the observation that the outcomes are hypergeometrically distributed and that the a_j 's drop out due to concavity of the function log.

This fact allowed Stam to generalize his result to partitions varying with $i = 1, \dots, q$ at little effort [48]. More formally, consider a finite set of N elements, this time with q partitions into M_i types/colors $A_{i,1} \cup \dots \cup A_{i,M_i}$ for $i = 1, \dots, q$. For color j in sample i , write $a_{i,j} = |A_{i,j}| > 0$, such that for all $i = 1, \dots, q$,

$$a_{i,1} + \dots + a_{i,M_i} = N. \tag{33}$$

Let $q \in \mathbb{N}$. Denote by X the probability distribution of the obtained colors when sampling q elements *without* replacement, and by Y the probability distribution

of the obtained colors when sampling *with* replacement. Both X and Y have range

$$\{1, \dots, M_1\} \times \dots \times \{1, \dots, M_q\}. \tag{34}$$

Stam [48] proves the following bound for the distance between X and Y .

Theorem 2 (Stam’s bound [48, Theorem 1]). *Let $q, N, M_1, \dots, M_q \in \mathbb{N}$ such that $M_1, \dots, M_q \leq N$, and consider the configuration of M_i colors of color sizes $\{(a_{i,1}, \dots, a_{i,M_i})\}$ for $i = 1, \dots, q$ as in (33). Consider the two distributions X and Y over range $\{1, \dots, M_1\} \times \dots \times \{1, \dots, M_q\}$. We have,*

$$\Delta(X, Y) \leq \frac{1}{2} \left(\sum_{i=1}^{q-1} \frac{2(M_{i+1} - 1)i}{(N - 1)(N - q + 1)} \right)^{1/2}. \tag{35}$$

Proof. The proof is a straightforward extension of that of Theorem 1: the only differences are that the indices in the summations and summands of (15) are updated to the new range $\{1, \dots, M_1\} \times \dots \times \{1, \dots, M_q\}$ and color sizes $a_{i+1,j}$. In particular, for fixed $i \in \{1, \dots, q\}$, (31–32) is superseded by

$$KL(X_{i+1}; Y_{i+1} \mid \mathbf{X}_i, \mathbf{Y}_i) \leq \sum_{j=1}^{M_{i+1}} \left(1 - \frac{a_{i+1,j}}{N} \right) \frac{i}{(N - 1)(N - i)} \tag{36}$$

$$= \frac{(M_{i+1} - 1)i}{(N - 1)(N - i)}. \tag{37}$$

The result then immediately follows. □

If $M_1 = \dots = M_q = M$ (but not necessarily with identical color sizes $\{(a_{i,1}, \dots, a_{i,M})\}$ for every sampling), the bound of Theorem 2 obviously simplifies to that of Theorem 1.

4 Generalized Truncation

We consider a generalization of Trunc of (1) to arbitrary post-processing function. As before, let $n, m \in \mathbb{N}$ such that $m \leq n$, and $p \in \text{perm}(n)$. Let $\text{post} : \{0, 1\}^n \times \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^m$ be an arbitrary post-processing function. Generalized truncation is defined as

$$\text{GTrunc}^p(x) = \text{post}(x, p(x)). \tag{38}$$

Generalized truncation is depicted in Fig. 1. For fixed $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$ and $y \in \{0, 1\}^m$, we define

$$\text{post}[x]^{-1}(y) = \{z \in \{0, 1\}^n \mid \text{post}(x, z) = y\}. \tag{39}$$

The differences between GTrunc and Trunc are subtle but quite significant, depending on the choice of post.




Fig. 1. GTrunc of (38) based on n -bit permutation $p \in \text{perm}(n)$. post is any function.

- The generalized description covers Trunc of (1) by setting $\text{post}(x, z) = \text{left}_m(z)$. In Sect. 4.1, we revisit the state of the art on Trunc and re-derive the best security bound;
- In Sect. 4.2, we consider GTrunc with *balanced and x -independent post-processing*, i.e., where the feed-forward of x is discarded, and demonstrate that its security is equivalent to the security of Trunc;
- In Sect. 4.3, we consider GTrunc with *balanced post-processing* (not necessarily discarding the feed-forward). In this case a direct reduction to Trunc seems impossible but we resort to Stam's generalized bound of Theorem 2;
- In Sect. 4.4, we consider GTrunc with *arbitrary post-processing*. Also in this case, we resort to Theorem 2, but additional analysis is needed to make the result carry over.

We elaborate on using a pre-processing function in Sect. 5.

4.1 Plain Truncation

We consider the case of plain truncation: Trunc of (1), or equivalently GTrunc of (38) with $\text{post}(x, z) = \text{left}_m(z)$.

Truncation first appeared in Hall et al. [30]. It is known to be secure up to approximately $2^{n-m/2}$ queries [6, 12, 25, 30, 47]. We describe the bound as a direct implication of Stam's bound of Theorem 1. For educational interest, Bhattacharya and Nandi [12] gave a self-contained proof of this result in the chi-squared method: they derived the exact same bound, which should not come as surprise in light of Remark 1 in Sect. 2.1.

Theorem 3 (Security of Trunc). *Let $q, n, m \in \mathbb{N}$ such that $m \leq n$. Consider GTrunc of (38) with $\text{post}(x, z) = \text{left}_m(z)$. For any distinguisher \mathcal{D} making at most q queries,*

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{Trunc}}^{\text{prf}}(\mathcal{D}) \leq \frac{1}{2} \left(\frac{(2^m - 1)q(q - 1)}{(2^n - 1)(2^n - q + 1)} \right)^{1/2}. \quad (40)$$

Proof. Fix a deterministic distinguisher \mathcal{D} that makes q queries. Let X^{Trunc^p} denote the probability distribution of interactions with Trunc^p for $p \xleftarrow{\$} \text{perm}(n)$, and Y^f the probability distribution of interaction with $f \xleftarrow{\$} \text{func}(n, m)$. By (11),

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{Trunc}}^{\text{prf}}(\mathcal{D}) \leq \Delta(X^{\text{Trunc}^p}, Y^f). \quad (41)$$

Put $N = 2^n$, $M = 2^m$, and define the M colors by the first m bits of the sampling, i.e., two elements $z, z' \in \{0, 1\}^n$ have the same color if $\text{left}_m(z) = \text{left}_m(z')$. Consider the samplings X and Y of Sect. 3. Clearly, $\Delta(X, X^{\text{Trunc}^p}) = 0$: in X^{Trunc^p} one samples without replacement and only reveals the first m bits of the drawing, which is equivalent to revealing the color. As all color sets are of equal size $a_1 = \dots = a_{2^m} = 2^{n-m}$, we also have $\Delta(Y^f, Y) = 0$. Thus, by the triangle inequality,

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{Trunc}}^{\text{prf}}(\mathcal{D}) \leq \Delta(X^{\text{Trunc}^p}, Y^f) = \Delta(X, Y). \tag{42}$$

The result now immediately follows from Theorem 1. □

A simple simplification simplifies the bound of Theorem 3 to $\left(\frac{q}{2}\right)/2^{2n-m}^{1/2}$. The bound is known to be tight: Hall et al. [30] already presented a distinguisher \mathcal{D} meeting this bound up to a constant, but their distinguisher did not come with an exact analysis. Gilboa and Gueron presented a more detailed attack [26], and we repeat a simplification of their bound.

Theorem 4 (Insecurity of Trunc [26, Proposition 2, simplified]). *Let $n, m \in \mathbb{N}$ such that $m \leq n$. Consider GTrunc of (38) with $\text{post}(x, z) = \text{left}_m(z)$. There exists a distinguisher \mathcal{D} making $q = 2^{n-m/2-3}$ queries, such that*

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{Trunc}}^{\text{prf}}(\mathcal{D}) \geq \frac{1}{400} \left(1 - e^{-1/306}\right). \tag{43}$$

4.2 Balanced and x -Independent Post-processing

We consider security of GTrunc in a limited setting where post is independent of its first input x ($\text{post}(\cdot, z)$ is constant for all z) and where it is balanced (the set $\text{post}[x]^{-1}(y)$ is of the same size for all x, y). Already in the original introduction, Hall et al. [30] remarked that the analysis of Trunc carries over to balanced post-processing functions, and it also follows immediately from Theorem 1 (with different color sets, but still all of equal size 2^{n-m} as the function is balanced). As a bonus, we present an analysis of this case that reduces the security of GTrunc with balanced and x -independent post to Trunc .

Theorem 5 (Security of GTrunc with balanced and x -independent post). *Let $q, n, m \in \mathbb{N}$ such that $m \leq n$. Consider GTrunc of (38) with balanced and x -independent post . For any distinguisher \mathcal{D} ,*

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{GTrunc}}^{\text{prf}}(\mathcal{D}) = \text{Adv}_{\text{Trunc}}^{\text{prf}}(\mathcal{D}). \tag{44}$$

Proof. Without loss of generality, consider $\text{post} : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^m$ and write GTrunc^p as

$$\text{GTrunc}^p(x) = \text{post} \circ p(x). \tag{45}$$

As post is balanced, there exists a balanced function $\text{post}' : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ such that

$$\text{post} = \text{left}_m \circ \text{post}'. \quad (46)$$

Let $p \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{perm}(n)$, and consider any distinguisher \mathcal{D} whose goal it is to distinguish GTrunc^p from $f \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{func}(n, m)$. Defining $p' = \text{post}' \circ p$, we obtain that

$$\text{GTrunc}^p = \text{post} \circ p = \text{left}_m \circ \text{post}' \circ p = \text{left}_m \circ p' = \text{Trunc}^{p'}, \quad (47)$$

and thus that

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{GTrunc}}^{\text{prf}}(\mathcal{D}) = \text{Adv}_{\text{Trunc}}^{\text{prf}}(\mathcal{D}), \quad (48)$$

as $p' \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{perm}(n)$ iff $p \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{perm}(n)$ (because post' is n -to- n and balanced). \square

4.3 Balanced Post-processing

We consider security of GTrunc in a more general setting: post is any *balanced* function. We consider this to be the most interesting configuration, as for unbalanced post-processing, security decreases (see Sect. 4.4).

Theorem 6 (Security of GTrunc with balanced post). *Let $q, n, m \in \mathbb{N}$ such that $m \leq n$. Consider GTrunc of (38) with balanced post . For any distinguisher \mathcal{D} making at most q queries,*

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{Trunc}}^{\text{prf}}(\mathcal{D}) \leq \frac{1}{2} \left(\frac{(2^m - 1)q(q - 1)}{(2^n - 1)(2^n - q + 1)} \right)^{1/2}. \quad (49)$$

Proof. Fix a deterministic distinguisher \mathcal{D} that makes q queries. Let X^{GTrunc^p} denote the probability distribution of interactions with GTrunc^p for $p \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{perm}(n)$, and Y^f the probability distribution of interaction with $f \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{func}(n, m)$. By (11),

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{GTrunc}}^{\text{prf}}(\mathcal{D}) \leq \Delta(X^{\text{GTrunc}^p}, Y^f). \quad (50)$$

Put $N = 2^n$, $M = 2^m$. For ease of reasoning, assume (for now) that the distinguisher makes queries x_1, \dots, x_q . For each query x_i ($i = 1, \dots, q$), define the M colors by the sets $A_{i,j} := \text{post}^{-1}[x_i](j)$ for $j \in \{0, 1\}^m$. The q queries thus define q partitions of the N elements into M colors $A_{i,1} \cup \dots \cup A_{i,M}$ for $i = 1, \dots, q$. Consider the samplings X and Y of Sect. 3. Clearly, $\Delta(X, X^{\text{GTrunc}^p}) = 0$ as in the proof of Theorem 3. As post is balanced, all color sets are of equal size $a_{i,1} = \dots = a_{i,M} = 2^{n-m}$ for $i = 1, \dots, q$. We therefore also have $\Delta(Y^f, Y) = 0$. Thus, by the triangle inequality,

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{GTrunc}}^{\text{prf}}(\mathcal{D}) \leq \Delta(X, Y). \quad (51)$$

We obtain our bound on the remaining distance from Theorem 2. As this bound holds for any possible distinguisher, and any possible selection of

inputs x_1, \dots, x_q , we can maximize over all possible deterministic distinguishers. (Formally, the analysis of Theorem 2 consists of a *per-query* analysis of $KL(X_{i+1}; Y_{i+1} \mid \mathbf{X}_i, \mathbf{Y}_i)$, where the derived bound in (37) is independent of the $a_{i+1,j}$'s and thus of the input x_{i+1} .) This completes the proof. \square

It is not straightforward to analyze tightness for the general GTrunc construction, i.e., to derive a lower bound. As demonstrated by Gilboa and Gueron [26], the analysis for plain truncation is already highly involved: including a feed-forward of the input only frustrates the analysis, and influences the per-query probability of a response to occur (unlike the case of plain Trunc of Sect. 4.1 and GTrunc without feed-forward of Sect. 4.2). However, it is possible to argue tightness for a reasonable simplification of GTrunc. In detail, if $\text{post} : \{0, 1\}^n \times \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^m$ is linear in x , i.e.,

$$\text{post}(x, y) = \mathbf{A} \cdot x \oplus \text{post}'(y) \tag{52}$$

for some matrix $\mathbf{A} \in \{0, 1\}^{m \times n}$ and arbitrary $\text{post}' : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^m$, an adversary can “undo the feed-forward” by deciding to attack

$$(\text{GTrunc}')^p(x) = \text{GTrunc}^p(x) \oplus \mathbf{A} \cdot x \tag{53}$$

$$= \text{post}'(p(x)). \tag{54}$$

In this way, it returns to the simpler case of Theorem 5. More involved post-processing functions, where x is used to transform y (e.g., by rotation or multiplication) do not fall victim to this technique.

4.4 Arbitrary Post-processing

We finally consider GTrunc with arbitrary post-processing, where we only assume that any value $y \in \{0, 1\}^m$ occurs with positive probability. Let $\gamma \in \mathbb{N} \cup \{0\}$ be such that $|\text{post}^{-1}[x](y) - 2^{n-m}| \leq \gamma$ for any $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$ and $y \in \{0, 1\}^m$. This value γ measures the unbalancedness of post : for γ close to 0, post is close to a balanced function.

Theorem 7 (Security of GTrunc with arbitrary post). *Let $q, n, m \in \mathbb{N}$ such that $m \leq n$. Consider GTrunc of (38) with arbitrary post . For any distinguisher \mathcal{D} making at most q queries,*

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{Trunc}}^{\text{prf}}(\mathcal{D}) \leq \frac{1}{2} \left(\frac{(2^m - 1)q(q - 1)}{(2^n - 1)(2^n - q + 1)} \right)^{1/2} + \left(\frac{1}{2} q \left(\frac{\gamma}{2^{n-m}} \right)^2 \right)^{1/2}. \tag{55}$$

Proof. The proof is identical to that of Theorem 6, with one important exception: post does not need to be balanced, and hence $\Delta(Y^f, Y) \geq 0$. We will use Pinsker’s inequality (7) on the chi-squared divergence (9) to bound this term. For any $i = 1, \dots, q$, $\mathbf{j}_{i-1} \in \{1, \dots, 2^m\}^{i-1}$, and $j \in \{1, \dots, 2^m\}$,

$$\Pr((Y^f)_i = j \mid (\mathbf{Y}^f)_{i-1} = \mathbf{j}_{i-1}) = \Pr((Y^f)_i = j) = \frac{1}{2^m}, \tag{56}$$

$$\Pr(Y_i = j \mid \mathbf{Y}_{i-1} = \mathbf{j}_{i-1}) = \Pr(Y_i = j) = \frac{a_{i,j}}{2^n}. \tag{57}$$

In particular, for both Y^f and Y the drawing of the i -th element is independent of the first $i - 1$ samples. From the chi-squared divergence (9), for which we translate its inductive formula [23] to our setting, we obtain

$$\chi^2(Y; Y^f) \leq \sum_{i=1}^q \sum_{j=1}^{2^m} \frac{(\Pr(Y_i = j) - \Pr((Y^f)_i = j))^2}{\Pr((Y^f)_i = j)} \quad (58)$$

$$= \sum_{i=1}^q \sum_{j=1}^{2^m} \frac{1}{2^{2n-m}} (a_{i,j} - 2^{n-m})^2. \quad (59)$$

Using that $|a_{i,j} - 2^{n-m}| \leq \gamma$, we can proceed:

$$\chi^2(Y; Y^f) \leq \sum_{i=1}^q \sum_{j=1}^{2^m} \frac{\gamma^2}{2^{2n-m}} \quad (60)$$

$$= q \left(\frac{\gamma}{2^{n-m}} \right)^2. \quad (61)$$

The proof is completed using Pinsker's inequality (7). \square

The first part of the bound of Theorem 7 is identical to that of Theorem 6, and the comments on tightness carry over. The second part of the bound comes from the bounding of $\Delta(Y^f, Y)$, and in this bounding we use the estimation $|a_{i,j} - 2^{n-m}| \leq \gamma$, which is non-tight for most of the choices for (i, j) . We see no way of attacking the scheme with query complexity around $(2^{n-m}/\gamma)^2$, but it is reasonable to assume that the security degrades with the bias in the balancedness of post.

It is interesting to note that, had we used the Kullback-Leibler divergence (6) instead of the chi-squared divergence (9), we would have derived

$$KL(Y; Y^f) \leq q \left(1 + \frac{\gamma}{2^{n-m}} \right) \log \left(1 + \frac{\gamma}{2^{n-m}} \right), \quad (62)$$

which is in turn at most

$$q \left(1 + \frac{\gamma}{2^{n-m}} \right) \left(\frac{\gamma}{2^{n-m}} \right) \quad (63)$$

as $\log(\alpha) \leq \alpha - 1$ (for any $\alpha > 0$). In other words, the non-tightness of $|a_{i,j} - 2^{n-m}| \leq \gamma$ would have amplified into a slightly worse overall bound. We remark that this does not contradict (8).

5 Note on Including Pre-processing Function

One might consider generalizing GTrunc of (38) even further to include an arbitrary pre-processing function $\text{pre} : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ as well:

$$(\text{GTrunc}')^p(x) = \text{post}(x, p(\text{pre}(x))). \quad (64)$$

However, we see no justification for doing so. If pre is balanced, it is necessarily invertible and one can “absorb” it into p as done in the analysis of Sect. 4.2. If it is unbalanced, this means that there exist distinct x, x' such that $\text{pre}(x) = \text{pre}(x')$, and consequently, the evaluations $(\text{GTrunc}')^p(x)$ and $(\text{GTrunc}')^p(x')$ use the same source of randomness:

$$p(\text{pre}(x)) = p(\text{pre}(x')). \quad (65)$$

This does not immediately lead to an attack, most importantly as post only outputs $m \leq n$ bits. If, in particular, $m \ll n$, a distinguisher may not note that the same randomness is employed. Nevertheless, unbalanced pre 's seem to set the stage for a weaker generalized truncation.

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