Politieke communicatie en communicatiepolitiek in Indonésië: een studie over media, verantwoordelijkheid en verantwoording

Een wetenschappelijke proeve op het gebied van de Sociale Wetenschappen

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Communication of Politics and Politics of Communication in Indonesia: A Study on Media Performance, Responsibility and Accountability

A scientific essay in social sciences

Doctoral Thesis

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by

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# Table of Contents

Table of Contents .............................................. i  
List of Tables ................................................. iv  
List of Figures ................................................. v  
List of Publications .......................................... vi  

## Introduction

1. Background and Theoretical Framework ........................................ 1  
2. Political Communication as a Field of Study .................................. 2  
3. Indonesian History and Contexts for Political Communication .......... 4  
4. Media Performance, Pressures and Interplay .................................. 5  
5. Relations among Media Performance, Media (Social) Responsibility and Accountability .................................. 7  
6. Media Accountability Practices and Struggles ................................ 10  
7. Community Level and Community Media ...................................... 12  
8. Recapitulation of Research Line  
   a. Research Questions ............................................ 15  
   b. Goals ......................................................... 16  
   c. Limitations of the Study ...................................... 17  
   d. Added Value .................................................. 17  

## First Chapter

Political Communication in Indonesia:  
Revisiting the Media Performance in Three Eras ................................ 19  
1. Introduction .................................................. 19  
2. Indonesia under the Soeharto Regime ........................................ 21  
3. The Shape of the Media Industry During the Soeharto Era ............... 22  
4. Press Freedom .................................................. 24  
5. Research Interests During the Soeharto Era ................................ 25  
6. The May 1998 Revolution ........................................ 32  
7. Indonesia During the Reform Era .......................................... 36  
8. Research Interests During the Reform Era ................................ 38  
9. The 2004 Election ............................................. 43  
10. Concluding Remarks ........................................... 48  

## Second Chapter

In Search of Quality Measures for News Programming on Indonesian Television .......................................... 51  
1. Introduction .................................................. 51  
2. Historical Background ......................................... 51  
   2.1. Geographical Context ....................................... 51  
   2.2. The Social/Cultural Context: Unity in Diversity ................. 52  
   2.3. The Political Context: Applied “Pancasila Democracy” ........ 53  
   2.4. Governmental Media Control .................................. 53  
   2.5. The Indonesian Broadcasting Act of 1997 ...................... 55
## Concluding Remarks

1. The Model of Political Communication Field 111
2. The Media Performance Model 115
3. Media Responsibility & Accountability 115
   3.a. During the Soeharto Era 116
   3.b. The May 1998 Revolution 119
   3.c. The Reform Era 120
4. Community Media 123
5. Closing Paragraph 125

## Endnotes

References 128
Samenvatting 141
Summary 145
Curriculum Vitae 149
Appendices 151
List of Tables

Table 1   Elaboration of Media Responsibility and Accountability   8
Table 2   Political Communication Research in Indonesia   27
Table 3   Indonesian Population by Educational Level   52
Table 4   Profile of Indonesian TV Viewers (based on sex and age, in millions)   55
Table 5   News and Information Programs on All Indonesian Television Stations (Broadcasting Hours and Minutes)   55
Table 6   News Content on the Basis of Origin   56
Table 7   Categories of News Items (%)   56
Table 8   Total Program Output per Channel (%)   58
Table 9   Market Shares of Commercial TV Stations, 1997   66
Table 10  Audience Segmentation by Age, Sex, Education Level   67
List of Figures

Figure 1   Media Performance Model 20
Figure 2   Media Performance Model: Visualising Tendencies in the Power Relations in Three Eras 31
Figure 3   Interactions of Elements in Social Transition 99
Figure 4   Media Organizational Performance Model 100
Figure 5   Media Organizational Performance Model Adapted to the Indonesian Case and Applied to Public and Community Broadcasting 108
Figure 6   Model of the Political Communication Field 113
List of Publications


3. The third article/chapter “The Suharto regime and its fall through the eyes of the local media”, was published in Gazette, the International Journal for Communication Studies [64], 2, (2002), 121–140

Introduction:

Communication of Politics
and Politics of Communication in Indonesia:
A Study on Media Performance, Responsibility and Accountability

Abstract

Political communication scholars have long explored the communication of politics, what could be called “the first face of the coin.” It is interesting, however, to observe that in Indonesian history, the second face of political communication, i.e., the politics of communication, has been the predominant force driving the country’s politics. Against this background, the present research attempts to address the theoretical shortage in the development of the political communication field in Indonesia by providing a comprehensive Model of the Political Communication Field embracing the two faces of political communication. The breeding ground for this model was found in a simpler model that is still capable of representing the larger map of the political communication field in its essence. The Media Performance Model describes a continuous interplay among four power entities, also called factors, i.e. Government, Market, Civil Society and the Media. The result of the internal interplay within each factor will inevitably impact the external interplay among these four factors. Therefore, the outcomes (at a given period in time) are visualized in what the media do, referred to by the so-called “media performance.” In turn, the impact of the external interplay is further brought into the internal media environment as input for the internal interplay of each factor in the media organization, and so forth.

The present research illustrates the necessity to connect media performance to the concepts of Media Responsibility and Accountability. Media Responsibility (assigned, contracted, self-designed and denied responsibility) will show the directions the media are taking in meeting the public’s expectations, while Media Accountability (political, market, public, and professional accountability) will show the directions citizens can take to actively compel the media to meet their expectations, so as to render politics of communication beneficial to all elements in society.

Equipped with a comprehensive map of political communication, the present research examines concrete operationalizations of Media Performance, Responsibility and Accountability taking place during the past twenty years of political communication in Indonesia in general (Chapter 1), in the television sector (Chapter 2), in the local newspapers and radio stations (Chapter 3) and in the negotiations between the public and the community media (Chapter 4). The performance of the media was examined during the three subsequent eras that have colored Indonesia during the past twenty years – the Soeharto Era (better known as the New Order Era), the May 1998 Revolution, and the Reform Era (after the downfall of Soeharto on May 21, 1998).
1. Background and Theoretical Framework

If Indonesian democracy—restored in 1998 after the fall of Soeharto—were a website, visitors would only read this line on it:
This site is still under construction!
(Basorie, 2001).

This dissertation is located at the heart of a "website of democracies under construction" (please imagine that you encounter such a website that gives no hint of why it occurred and when it would be accomplished). As a researcher, I deliberately chose to revisit the political communication aspects of that large and endless project, for at least three reasons. First, I assume that the failure so far to build democracy in Indonesia has something to do with political communication. Second, only very few people or parties have paid attention to political communication in Indonesia. To put it in other words, I assume that the governmental practices, political interactions and processes among interest groups, as well as interactions in the newsrooms, have never been analyzed appropriately in terms of political communication science, or worse, are not yet a matter of public concern. Third, Indonesians in general, and government officials and politicians in particular, have kept confusing the notion of simple analyses on communication-related aspects of political practices with analyses on political communication as an academic exercises. Certainly, these reasons taken together have exacerbated the problem.

2. Political Communication as a Field of Study

Regarding the first assumption, we should begin with stating that political communication must include two aspects. First, the communication of politics. This could be traced back to Laswell’s suggestion that an act of communication can be analyzed in terms of “who says what in which channel to whom with what effect” (Laswell, 1948, p. 37). Second, the politics of communication. To the best of my knowledge, even though numerous activists and scholars have been working in this area, this was not explicitly seen as a serious future concern in the field of political communication until recently. Chaffee (2001) gave it importance by surmising that Laswell might phrase it [to make a new aphorism in line with Laswell’s previous aphorism] as follows: Who gets to say what to whom? (p. 243)

The history of political communication has given the first aspect strong support. As a matter of fact, this field dates back to the very earliest research on mass communication (Chaffee & Hochheimer, 1985). According to Ryfe (2001, p. 408), it is in the theoretical and methodological commitments of this early research that the field’s place in history was established. These commitments, in turn, were shaped primarily by three disciplines: social psychology, mass communication
research, and political science. Of the three, perhaps social psychology exercised the most profound influence. It was from this discipline that the field inherited its interest in attitudes, opinions, and beliefs. Social psychology emerged as a field of study in the early 1900s, but by the 1920s its basic perspective was employed by a host of communication scholars (Delia, 1987, p. 39). The “four great men” of early communication research (according to Berelson, 1959) were all trained in the social psychology tradition. Not surprisingly, the earliest studies of political communication – from Laswell’s (1927) analysis of political propaganda to Hadley Cantril & Gordon Allport’s (1935) study of persuasion, and Walter Lippman’s theory of public opinion (1922) – were heavily influenced by social psychology. And since social psychology’s substantive interest in individual attitudes was combined with a deep methodological concern for precise measurement and experimentation, survey and experimental studies have become the two most common instruments of data collection in political communication.

The twentieth-century political scientists began to see politics in terms of group competition for scarce resources. The notion was first introduced by Arthur Bentley (1908/1967). Through careful observation of Chicago politics, Bentley concluded that the essence of politics was the action of groups. Bentley defined groups by their interests. Thus Bentley conceived of politics as a process of interaction among interest groups; and this view became pervasive in postwar political science (Ryfe, 2001: 409), especially in the pluralist model advanced by political scientists such as David Truman (1951/1962) and Robert Dahl (1956). In addition to these developments, another important parameter of political communication research was the “proposition that communication in election campaigns constitutes the field’s paradigm case” (Swanson & Nimmo, 1990, p. 8; see also Denton & Woodward, 1998; Stuckey, 1996).

Finally, the political communication field has inherited from mass communication research a language of “effects” and “influences.” When analysts of political communication investigate the role of mass media in politics, they typically ask research questions that seek to measure the “effects” of mass media (for a summary of theories in this vein, see McQuail, 1994). This orientation is in perfect keeping with the behaviorist mood of the field and with its interest in examining influences on, and changes in, attitudes, beliefs, and opinions (Ryfe, 2001, p. 410). The important and long-standing theories of political communication – from two-step flow to agenda setting to framing and priming – have their roots in the language of effects.

Certainly, there were other scholars using approaches derived from a variety of critical and cultural theories which have challenged the statement that the focus of political communication is communication in election campaigns (cf. Fiske, 1996; Gitlin, 1980; Hartley, 1992; Miller, 1998). Likewise, much of the contemporary literature responds to the trends by examining the “effect” and “influences” and seeks to extend these theories (cf. Hart & Shaw, 2001).

In short, Ryfe believes that early social psychology, political science, and mass communication research provided a series of terms that continue to mark the boundaries of the field: opinions, attitudes and beliefs, politics as a process, and
media effects. These terms conjure research agendas that seek to measure the effect of mass media on attitudes, beliefs and opinions expressed within the political process. But Ryfe acknowledges that they are more flexible than absolute boundaries.

3. Indonesian History and Contexts for Political Communication

One consequence of the “core” conception of political communication and its lines of research is the ignorance of, or the delay in paying serious attention to, the second aspect of political communication, i.e. the politics of communication, which is exactly the problem haunting a country like Indonesia. Since the Dutch colonial period, conflict and suppression have been the constants in the relationship between the authorities and the media. According to media educator and writer Atmakusumah Astraatmadja (1998), from the time the first newspaper in Indonesia was published in the mid-18th century to the present, “there has not been one period of considerable length without government pressure and suppression of the press” (quoted in Basorie, 2001).

Perhaps the period between 1950 and 1957 was an exception. At the time, postwar independent Indonesia had governments (led by a prime minister) that lasted only two years or so, or merely months. Yet, most members of the press were then unapologetical partisans, mouthpieces of the political parties. Of course, at the same time, there were also a handful of non-party newspapers. *Indonesia Raya* (Greater Indonesia), in particular, was fond of exposing the corruption and misdeeds of whichever government was in power.

By 1957, the Republic’s first president, Soekarno, found himself trying to quell several separatist rebellions, notably in West Sumatra and North Sulawesi. Thus, he declared martial law. Within that year alone, the government carried out as many as 125 acts of suppression against the press, including interrogations of journalists, warnings, detentions and closures of newspapers (Smith, 1983). *Indonesia Raya*, meanwhile, was finally banned in 1958.

Two years later, Soekarno presented newspaper and magazine publishers with a nineteen-point statement of support for his program, which he asked them to sign; the alternative was the cessation of their publications. The statement amounted to a loyalty pledge. Point 1, for example, compelled the signatory to obey all guidelines issued by the government concerning publications. Point 8 required the publication to be a supporter and defender of “guided democracy” (Surjomihardjo, 1980).

In October 1965, the so-called “coup by the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI)” took place, and it opened the way for the military to come marching into the Presidential Palace. In the next year, Soekarno ceded power to General Soeharto. One of the Soekarno’s last acts as president was to sign into law the Republic’s first Press Act.
According to Article 8 of the 1966 Act, the print media were not required to secure a license before operating. In practice, however, newspapers and magazines had to seek a permit called the “printing license” (Surat Izin Terbit or SIT) from the Department of Information. It might be associated with another article in that law calling for the issuance of licenses, since Indonesia was supposedly in a state of transition. Those articles contradicted one another.

Following the Dutch colonial Period, with its long-standing politics of communication, came the three subsequent eras of Indonesian history, namely:

• The Soeharto Era (better known as the New Order Era);
• The May 1998 Revolution;
• The Reform Era (after the downfall of Soeharto on May 21, 1998).

How the politics of communication worked in those three eras could best be examined through the performance of the media during each period. This examination is necessary since not only the media performance reflects what happens in the newsroom, in the forms of interests, demands, and pressures among the owners, management staff, editors, and journalists, but also the assessment of those interests, demands, and pressures coming from external individuals and institutions (what happens in society) helps to understand the mechanisms behind media performance and thus the politics of communication.

4. Media Performance, Pressures and Interplay

According to Denis McQuail (1992a, p. 81), media performance is “what the media do,” that is often shaped by others, especially by powerful institutions and irreplaceable “sources.” A strong awareness of, and sensitivity to, external pressures and demands, is reported in many accounts of the media at work. They could date back to Cantor (1971), Tunstall (1971), Elliot (1972; 1977), Sigal (1973), Johnstone et al. (1976), Burns (1977), Engwall (1978), Schlesinger (1978), Tuchman (1978), Gans (1979), Weaver & Wilhoit (1986), and Carrol (1987). This literature emphasizes the extent to which people working in media organizations develop defenses against various pressures in order to protect their autonomy.

McQuail (1992a, p. 82) tries to further describe the field of social forces in which media typically have to operate, under conditions of considerable pressure and constraint. Eight stakeholders surrounding a media organization comprise owners, advertisers, sources, audience, investors, government, social/political institutions, and pressure groups.

The influences of these elements on the media organization range from distant and general (such as requirements of international regulation or the traditions of past performance) to immediate and particular (such as pressures of competition from rivals or those from local political and business interests; cf. Dimmick & Coit, 1982). But in general, McQuail tries to place the agencies with most immediate power and leverage, i.e. owners, advertisers, sources, and audience, closer to the
media organization than other elements in his model, namely investors, social institutions, suppliers, government and its branches, or pressure groups. Certainly, the disposition of forces displayed will vary according to industry type. For instance, the public broadcasting, which is supposed to be a highly regulated industry, may find government much closer than other elements in that model. TVRI (Television of the Republic of Indonesia), as the state-owned television station since its establishment in 1962 and as the public broadcasting station since 2002, has proven to be closer to the government than the first five commercial stations. While the latter have always been closer to owners and advertisers than to investors, social institutions, government and its branches, or pressure groups.

In a situation like this, any media organization should fulfill two duties simultaneously: on the one hand, developing work routines which simplify the tasks and decision-making (Engwall, 1978; Tuchman, 1978) and, on the other hand, referring to a set of occupational or operating norms, which often connect with wider norms of conduct for public life. There are some potential conflicts arising between these two duties. But not only do external relations of the media give rise to conflicts with normative dimensions; also such conflicts occur within organizations because of mixed and, in some cases, barely compatible goals (McQuail, 1992a, p. 83). Varying tasks or functions in a media organization are very likely to cause the existence of variations in the normative outlook. For instance, the marketing staff at a commercial TV station may not have similar standards to those of the editors in the newsroom. The editors may think that a news item is very important and relevant for the public, while the marketing staff may consider the same news item to be less important or relevant, because they expect it to receive lower ratings. These phenomena have also been widely reported (e.g. Burns, 1977; Weaver & Wilhoit, 1986; Meyer, 1987). However, the most economical account of internal conflicts regarding the goals of a media organization is probably to be found in Engwall (1978), who made a three-fold division of work cultures:

1. Management;
2. Editorial, creative or writing people;
3. Technical, design and production staff.

Each of the three groups is likely to have different goals, different normative priorities and different kinds of relationship with the various “agencies” in the media environment as a whole.

Realizing that a number of factors, goals and processes, both in the internal and external environments of media organizations, could put the media performance under certain pressures, and at the same time could provide media practitioners with chances to deal with or to overcome those pressures, it will be of significant benefit to design a (relatively simple) model to describe those complex issues. This dissertation will – among other goals – aim at developing such a model. The model should be a comprehensive overview of the political communication field. Or in short, the model should cover the two faces of political communication, i.e. the communication of politics and the politics of communication.
In developing that model, we need to take into consideration an assumption, suggested by Golding & Murdock (1991) and Cottle (2003), that within any institution there is a constant interplay between structure and agency, which constrains as well as facilitates, imposes limits on as well as offers opportunities to each other. In reviewing the relevant literature on “structure” and “agency,” a researcher might face different definitions and approaches; for some, the term “structure” may primarily be seen as including resources and regulations (Giddens, 1984). The term “agency” in general refers to social actions carried out by social actors, either as individuals or as a group. It can also refer to social actions of human agents in a broader sense, not only of individuals, but also implying organized groups, organizations, and the state (Burns, 1986). The results of interplay within each factor will inevitably have an impact upon the interplay or power relations among four elements, as described below, and vice versa.

A review of the aforementioned literature highlights at least four power entities, also called (f)actors, that should be included in the planned model, i.e. Government, Market, Civil Society and the Media themselves. The results of the internal interplay within each (f)actor will inevitably be brought into the external interplay among these four (f)actors. Therefore, the final results (at a certain time or period) are seen in what the media do, called “the media performance” by McQuail (1992a), so that the model is named “the Media Performance Model”. In turn, the impact of the external interplay is further brought into the internal media environment as input for the internal interplay of each factor in the media organization, and so forth. We expect that the “new” model will complement the efforts that have long been made by scholars, as exemplified in the works by McQuail, 1992; Hidayat & Sendjaja, 2002; and Bardoel & d’Haenens, 2004.

5. Relations among Media Performance, Media (Social) Responsibility and Accountability

The Media Performance Model (which will be developed and implemented in the first chapter) is based on the principle that media is both a commercial entity and a public trustee. On the one hand, the Media (in that model) occupy an equal position, so that they can act and react equally to other (f)actors in the model. On the other hand, other (f)actors, especially public or Civil Society elements, must be assured of an equal position as well, so that they can act and react equally to the media as well. These conditions may be seen as directions for Media Responsibility and Accountability.

Regarding the so-called “social responsibility of the press,” we go back as far as 1947 when the Hutchins Commission in the United States stated:

“An overall social responsibility for the quality of press service to the citizen can not be escaped; the community can not wholly delegate to any other agency the ultimate responsibility for a function in which its own existence as a free society may be at stake” (p. 126).
According to Jo Bardoel and Leen d’Haenens (2004), in the 1940s the Hutchins Commission’s Statement was a quite daring vision, since the traditional combination of the freedom of press and freedom of market had always been the firm basis for non-interference in the press sector. Nevertheless, the commission’s conclusions were to strike a chord of sympathy in the United States and Europe in the decades to come, since they formed a counterbalance against the commerce and partisanship that had been allowed to develop.

What is implied in all expectations about the social responsibility of the media is the assumption that the Media should be freed from any pressure from the State, the Market and other potentially excessive powers. This clearly explains the context conditions for Media Performance and Media Responsibility, i.e. only if the Media are freed from any pressure that can damage the Media Performance (especially the journalistic performance), can they meet what society expects from them as a “public trustee.” Otherwise, under any kind of pressure, the Media will be forced to meet the expectations of the oppressor, and will largely neglect the public interests.

The following table describes some elaborations of the concepts of Media Responsibility and Media Accountability in literature. In addition to showing how many kinds of Media Responsibility and Media Accountability might be included in each concept (both the more theoretical and more practical), the table also presents the relations between Media Responsibility and Media Accountability including the distinctions between them.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Scholars</th>
<th>Notes</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Hodges (1986)</td>
<td>He makes an important distinction between “responsibility” and “accountability.” Accountability offers an answer to the question: “How might society call on media and journalists to account for their fulfillment of the responsibility given to them?” Thus it has to do with compelling proper conduct.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Responsibility</td>
<td>“What social needs should we expect media and journalists to respond to?” Thus it has to do with defining proper conduct.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>McQuail (2000)</td>
<td>He favors a practical description of the concept of media responsibility, and defines it as the “obligations and expectations” that society faces regarding the media. He distinguishes between four types of responsibility:</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1. <em>Assigned</em> responsibilities are obligations established by law, which the media must meet. In democratic societies, this regulation, in pursuance of the tradition of freedom of expression, is kept to a minimum.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2. <em>Contracted</em> responsibilities arise from self-regulated agreements between the press or broadcasters on the one hand, and society or politicians on the other hand, regarding the desired conduct of the media (for example showing violent images on television).</td>
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<tr>
<td>No</td>
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<td>3.</td>
<td>Self-assigned responsibilities indicate voluntary professional commitments to maintaining ethical standards and public goals.</td>
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<td>4.</td>
<td>Denied responsibilities refer to the effort to refute accusations of irresponsibility that are thought to be undeserved or inapplicable.</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>Pritchard (2000)</td>
<td>He defines media accountability as “the process by which media organizations may be expected or obliged to render an account of their activities to their constituents”. He thus stresses that media accountability is a “process” that basically consists of “naming, blaming and claiming.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>McQuail (2000)</td>
<td>He defines four accountability frames: law and regulation, the market, public, and professional responsibility.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Bardoel (2000, 2001)</td>
<td>Along McQuail’s lines, he slightly “remolds” that typology into four media accountability mechanisms:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Political accountability, which refers to formal regulations stipulating how broadcasting companies and newspapers shall be structured and how they shall function.</td>
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<td>2.</td>
<td>Market accountability or the system of supply and demand, in which the free choices of the public are given free reign and considerations of efficiency also play a role.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Public accountability, which is linked to the media’s assignment of maintaining more direct relationships with citizens, in addition to their relationship with the market and the state.</td>
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<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Professional accountability, which is linked to ethical codes and performance standards used within the media that should help counterbalancing every excessive dependence upon politics and the market.</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>McQuail (2003)</td>
<td>Indicates that the term “social responsibility” not only has different meanings but also implies “differences of location of a given responsibility within the whole institutional complex.” Media Responsibility can thus be located on different levels; the media institution as a whole, the ownership, the organization and its management, the professional employee and the individual author or performer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>McQuail (2003)</td>
<td>He suggests two models of accountability:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The liability model of accountability mainly invoked in cases where the media are believed to be capable of causing real harm to individuals, certain categories of people or the society as a whole.</td>
<td>The answerability model of accountability implies responsiveness to the views of all who have a legitimate interest in what is published, whether as individuals affected or on behalf of the society. It includes a willingness to explain, defend and justify actions (and general tendencies) of publication or omission.</td>
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The elaborations in the above table allow one to see that the concept of Media Accountability is tightly related to the second face of the political communication field, i.e. the politics of communication, specifically in terms of the rights and duties of the citizens as active information gatherers and processors (see Mutz, 2001, p. 232-233) to compel the fulfillment of Media Responsibility. It is also in line with Bruck and Raboy’s suggestion (1989, p. 14) that what we need now is to work out and develop a new and all-encompassing strategy for democratic
communication, based on the whole range of communicational needs, i.e. the need to transmit as well as to receive; the need for access to meaningful information; and the need to redefine the framing process developed by other parties (senders).

6. Media Accountability Practices and Struggles

At the present time, over fifty years after the introduction of the “social responsibility theory,” we witness a new increase in attention, including a new sense of urgency for social responsibility in the Media. According to Bardoel and d’Haenens (2004, p. 5), this is due to a number of factors:

“The first being the recent structural media changes that are often characterized by catchphrases such as competition, commercialization and globalization. Second, as a result of the first, public provisions on the media sector, such as public broadcasting and responsible journalism, find themselves in a state of uncertainty, or even crisis.”

In the Indonesian context, structural media changes have taken place primarily because of the successful revolutions against oppression from the government, dating back to the Dutch Colonial period. During the Dutch Colonial era, Indonesian media were famous for their persistent struggle against the Dutch Government in Indonesia, so that they were called “Pers Perjuangan” (the Press of the Struggle). Those efforts continued during the Japanese Occupation era around 1942 to 1945, an era that was also colored by the return of the Dutch and the Allied forces led by the United States troops. Even the proclamation of the Indonesian independence was an astonishing success story that became public thanks to the journalists of RRI (at the time under the name of “Hoso Kyoku,” only allowed to voice the statements of the Japanese Colonial Government) who deceived the controller of RRI’s studio in Jakarta. This was accomplished by producing their programs on two channels: one channel, that was aired in the studio only, broadcast patriotic Japanese songs, while the other channel, airing to the whole country as well as to the entire world, repeatedly broadcast the proclamation of the Indonesian independence read by Soekarno and Hatta on behalf of the whole nation.

After Indonesian independence, the government suppressions sometimes encroached on the spirit of adjusting to or welcoming globalization, for instance in the form of international advertising agencies or international TV programs (Open Sky Policy). This kind of policy certainly needed structural change. Other striking changes could be clearly seen during the May Revolution movement, pioneered by the students and activists since mid-1997, reaching its peak on May 21, 1928, when the revolution successfully ousted Soeharto from power. The consequences of all struggles and calls for the freedom of expression were supposed to produce some (significant) structural changes too (we refer the reader to the first chapter in which all of these structural changes are described in detail).
It was fair to assume that after the downfall of Soeharto there would be a clear popular rejection of the mass media system that was developed during the New Order Era. As a result, the media system, almost without reservation, took on a libertarian form. This has brought in programs such as bloody crime reporting, programs focusing on the supernatural and magic, celebrity gossip shows, imported as well as Indonesian versions of “telenovelas,” and other programs produced or bought – mostly from United States of America and Western countries – for rating considerations only. For the population, the news system was clearly superior to the previous one because it was more entertaining and intervention-free. The media were then concerned only in terms of how well they could sell their technical quality and entertainment commodities. Accordingly, Indonesia fell into what Bagdikian (1997, p. 248) calls “the Fallacy of the Two-Model Choice”: as if people could only choose between an authoritarian system and a libertarian system. Both systems would never provide media organizations and media practitioners with chances and (more importantly) the willingness to perform their social responsibility nor call for the Media Social Accountability from the public’s viewpoint.

Thus, some alternatives to the two models should be sought and offered to the Indonesian public. According to Bardoel & d’Haenens (2004, p. 10), the most prominent provision to foster the public interest in the media is public broadcasting. And political accountability should be a dominant factor in enhancing and maintaining the spirit and operational mechanism of public broadcasting. Political accountability should be, first and foremost, carried out in parallel with the concept of citizenship.

According to Marc Raboy (1999, p. 9), the notion of citizenship has severe implications for broadcasting:

“Citizenship cannot be passive. Citizenship is political. When public service broadcasting is linked to the idea of citizenship, it must logically be de-coupled from the authoritarian power of the State. At the same time, it cannot be commodified. This is not a question of principle but of purpose.”

In Indonesia, those stations that were supposed to be public broadcasting stations, i.e. TVRI (the Television of the Republic of Indonesia) and RRI (the Radio of the Republic of Indonesia) had had a long history as ideological state apparatuses. Therefore, on the one hand, it would be interesting to examine the structural changes which they underwent during the May Revolution movement as well as during the Reform Era following the fall of the New Order Regime. On the other hand, as we are reminded by Cees Hamelink (1994, p. 12), any empowerment (in this case, of both the media and the public) cannot be passively enjoyed, but has to be actively achieved and safeguarded:

“If people want fundamental rights to be recognized and enforced, they cannot escape from the responsibility to actively contribute to the defense of these rights. People cannot expect others (the state or the media) always to defend their rights and
liberties. The less alert people react to the violation of human rights, the more their own dignity comes under threat. If people do not actively engage in the battle for their empowerment, they should not be surprised to find themselves one day totally disempowered.”

In line with Hamelink’s suggestion, academics and people working in public advocacy need to develop a strategy to actively struggle for both citizen’s rights and media liberties as well as struggle for the “new” broadcasting type, i.e. public broadcasting which, according to Bardoel & d’Haenens (2004), constitutes the most prominent provision to foster the public interest in the media. One of our strategies was therefore to conduct action research in representative areas across Indonesia. In action research, according to Nicholas Jankowski (2002, p. 371), researchers can assist practitioners by providing an empirically grounded analysis of the topics investigated, and practitioners can similarly assist researchers by arranging access to archival depositories, personnel and activities. Such alliances on community media can result in a mutually beneficial arrangement, contributing to theoretical insights as well as media practice.

However, action research also has its limitations – among others, it tends to be a kind of advocacy, usually conducted intentionally or unintentionally by media activists and academics. Such inclination to advocacy could easily represent the paternalistic tendency to determine what the public needs or wants. To overcome this limitation, Cohen & Uphoff (1980) suggest a paradigm called “working with the people.” The main concern in this paradigm is developing all stages of action research by listening to the local voices and never trying to (persistently or excessively) persuade the informants (participants) to formulate their assessments and activities according to a certain analysis model. Starting from the pre-assessment, the need assessment workshop, the activities in the field and the evaluation, the locals always take the lead with the researchers providing active facilitation. Again, it is not easy to carry out, and it is often difficult to determine if the researchers really leave everything up to the people. It may be fair to say that the researchers in an action research work must first help the people understand what their problems are and then work together to discover out the solutions.

7. Community Level and Community Media

After suggesting an appropriate approach for action research in an effort to enhance Media Accountability, the next question is to determine which level this kind of effort should be aimed at. Going back to the concept of the social responsibility of the media, we can see remarkable similarities to the German concept of “Öffentlichkeit” (public sphere) that took shape in the 1960s, and became popular again in academic circles during the 1990s. One striking difference, however, according to Bardoel and d’Haenens (2004, p. 6), is that the main exponent of this theory, Jurgen Habermas (1993; 1996), placed more emphasis on the community’s so-called “communicative competence” in contrast to the more individualistic approach that appeared in the Anglo-America System. But we have
to notice that, when some renowned political communication scholars recently
discussed the future of this field, they stated that the community has become a
prominent arena for political communication research (among others McLeod,
2001; Mutz, 2001; Iyengar, 2001; Chaffee, 2001). They paid serious attention to the
concept of “social capital” and “civic participation” at the community level.
McLeod sees civic participation as a function of both the individual’s characteristics
and the community's resources, network connections, and norms as contextual
influences. Hamelink (1990) also emphasizes that even under international law, the
individual has duties towards the community.

Hollander, Stappers & Jankowski (2002, p. 22-23) show why community
communication is one of the forms of public communication that is located at the
heart of the public sphere concept. Firstly, the emphasis of community
communication is on the communicative exchange and social action within the
context of geographical localities and/or communities of interest. Through that
communicative exchange and social action, community communication is expected
to bridge the gap between the policy coming from outside or being imposed on
more than one community (such as State policy) on the one hand, and the collective
(social) authentic experiences and needs, and multiple (i.e., cultural, ethnic,
religious) identities that are relevant to a specific group or category of individuals
on the other.

Secondly, when it comes to institutional aspects, community media are
generally seen as relatively small-scale institutions, concerned with programs
oriented and produced locally, essentially publicly financed, and whose ownership
and control are often shared by members in the community. All these ingredients
together might help the community media to become relatively more independent
from the dictatorship of both the State and the Market.

Thirdly, community communication also may imply *de facto*
decentralization. It means that there should be at least “shared governance” between
the central government and the local government. What is more, in local areas, the
community members are given their basic rights and liberties by the local
government to develop, organize, and maintain the variety of communication forms
that will fit the authentic collective (social) experiences and needs, as well as
multiple (i.e., cultural, ethnic and religious) identities of their communities. For that
purpose, decentralization provides the local governments with the authority to
allocate radio frequencies in accordance with the needs of the communities.

This is particularly relevant in the Indonesian context, through the
implementation of the 1999 Regional Autonomy Law No. 22. All things considered,
there is also an urgent need to find or design a specific model visualizing
interactions of elements in social transition, specifically dedicated to
comprehending the transition process itself, the decentralization policy and the
structural changes in the media system taking place recently. Again, this model
should always be related to the main characteristics of community media. For
instance, an intriguing question was raised in the field, related to the objections
from the owners of commercial TV and radio stations over the opportunities for
community media to explore potential revenues from the market surrounding them.
Meanwhile, some advertising agencies and experts acknowledge that the community media are viable for specific local advertising expenditures. Why should we not leave it to the community members to make a decision about which kinds of advertising or potential local market could be explored by them and still be well-suited to their authentic collective (social) experiences and needs? Royal Colle (2002) reminds us that any effort in community development should empower and provide the community members a chance to achieve long-term sustainability. Hence, he also emphasizes the significance of business plans that fit the culture of the community. Hence Colle (2001) stresses the centrality of research in setting up a viable enterprise.

Moreover, the autonomy of citizens in deciding how to finance their community media and in their cultural development, that is the ability of people to respond according to their own intuitions, are crucial in establishing an adequate cultural system. As a matter of fact, few, if any, cultures have developed as completely isolated phenomena; an important characteristic of adaptive cultural growth is selective borrowing and exchange. However, according to Hamelink (1983, p. 22), in recent decades, a process has emerged that can best be described as “cultural synchronization,” which threatens, as never before, the delicate balance of adaptive cultural relations in many parts of the world. Hamelink (1983, p. 22) writes:

“Cultural synchronization implies that the decisions regarding the cultural development in a given country are made in accordance with the interests and needs of a powerful central nation and imposed with subtle but devastating effectiveness without regard for the adaptive necessities of the dependent nation.”

The principal agents of cultural synchronization today are the international communication firms, largely based in the United States of America as well as in other Western countries, which are most directly involved with the cultural component of the global expansion through the development of a global investment and marketing strategy. This also poses a threat to the idea of broadcasting as a public service. According to Raboy (1990, p. 15), the latter was at a low point, both in Canada and internationally, in view of an increasingly interconnected global system where conservative economic policies antithetical to a democratic public life are in command.

Finally, the struggle for empowering people (starting from the community level) so that they can compel the fulfillment of Media Responsibility, also requires a certain form of institution or mechanism to be put in place. Canada, for instance, offers an interesting public accountability model in which citizens — in all their geographic and ethnic diversity — are actively involved in the evaluation and possible steering of the concrete expression of public responsibility by the media. One example of public consultation is the so-called Public Hearings that the CRTC (Canadian Radio-Television Telecommunications Commission) regularly organizes.
Jo Bardoel & Leen d’Haenens (2004, p. 21) illustrate:

“These are fora on the ‘Public Accountability’ of both public and commercial broadcasters throughout the country, including in remote areas. These public consultations take place whenever a broadcasting license is up for renewal or when the CRTC wants to collect information about new policy directions or licensing decisions. These consultations, in the form of semi-structured interviews, are broad; anyone can participate, including industry representatives, organized public interest groups or ordinary members of the public.”

In addition to these public hearings by CRTC, Mac Raboy and David Taras (2004, p. 59-76) show that other institutions and mechanism also help “compel” the CBC (Canadian Broadcasting Cooperation) to be held accountable to the public in various ways, among others to the courts, interest groups, and through industry self-regulation. Otherwise, the public interest often ends up being poorly served compared to the interests of the state, the government of the day, or the institution itself. This is what Raboy calls “administrative broadcasting,” or “paternalistic broadcasting” in the terminology of William (1976) and d’Haenens & Saeys (2001). In developing a local forum, which will work to ensure the constant and quality relationships between the community members and their media, according to Royal Colle (2002) it is important to build community liaison people into the organizational structure of the system or forum. These are persons who represent groups in the community – preexisting groups or groups organized by the liaison – and who seek information for the community.

8. Recapitulation of the Research Line

Political communication scholars are aware of the two faces of political communication, i.e. the communication of politics and the politics of communication. So far a comprehensive model embracing those two faces does not exist. The literature on political communication tends to pay more attention to the communication of politics. Both faces, especially that of the politics of communication, could best be examined through the Media Performance Model, which could be seen as a simpler design of mediated political communication. We then connect the Media Performance Model to the concepts of Media Responsibility and Media Accountability. Media Responsibility will show the directions the media could take to meet the public’s expectations, while Media Accountability will show the directions the citizens could take to actively compel the media to meet their expectations, so that the politics of communication would be beneficial for all elements in the society.

In Indonesia, it is assumed that the politics of communication matters more than the communication of politics. All things considered, this dissertation tries to examine the Indonesian case by firstly providing a comprehensive Model of Political Communication and its summary (the Media Performance Model) and
secondly by employing that model to investigate the political communication in
Indonesia, scientifically and empirically, up to the community level, being the basic
level of society, as described in the research questions below:

**a. Research Questions**

1. If the assumption about the lack of attention to the politics of
   communication (as the second face of political communication) holds true,
   what kind of model should be designed to explain political communication
   in the Indonesian context and – if valid – to help explain political
   communication in other geographical contexts?
2. What kind of Media Performance Model should be designed to represent the
   larger map of the political communication field into a specific context of
   mediated political communication?
3. Is it appropriate to advance the concept of Media Social Responsibility and
   Media Social Accountability in order to show more clearly the directions of
   the interplay taking place in the Media Performance Model, especially to put
   emphasis on the citizens as active information gatherers and processors?
4. What are the findings when Media Performance Model, Responsibility, and
   Accountability are employed together in an effort to examine the recent
   twenty years of political communication in Indonesia (for general aspects in
   Chapter 1, on the television sector in Chapter 2, on local newspapers and
   radio stations in Chapter 3, on negotiating a diversity of broadcasting, of
   ownership and content in Chapter 4)?
5. What kind of Media Accountability, especially public accountability, should
   be promoted and developed in Indonesia? This question concerns the form,
   institutional aspect and mechanism in which the public could compel the
   fulfillment of the Media Responsibility; and the answers should be based on
   need assessments conducted by the public themselves on the field (while the
   action research takes place).

**b. Goals**

1. To develop a comprehensive model of the political communication field,
   that is able to explain most of the dynamics in the Indonesian context, and –
   if valid – to contribute to explain other contexts outside Indonesia.
2. To develop a Media Performance Model that could still appropriately reduce
   the large map (model) of the political communication field, especially the
   mediated political communication, to its essence.
3. To provide arguments and explanations to support the arguments submitted
   above by which Media Social Responsibility and Media Social
   Accountability could clearly show the directions of the interplay taking
   place in the Media Performance Model.
4. To examine and discover which forms of Media Performance Model,
   Responsibility and Accountability have been employed during the recent
   twenty years of political communication in Indonesia; in general (in Chapter
1), in the television sector (in Chapter 2), in the local newspapers and radio stations (in Chapter 3) and in negotiating public and community media (in Chapter 4).

5. To provide and develop tables, figures and (specific) models needed to support arguments and explanations in each chapter, for example the specific model for negotiating community media before the process of developing and guarding the broadcasting bill in Indonesia.

6. To discover the forms, institutional aspects and mechanism for the public, especially in the community context, to exercise their rights and duties in compelling the Media to fulfill their Media Responsibility.

c. Limitations of the study

1. This dissertation includes four chapters (case studies); each of them can be seen as a separate study. Each has its own background, theoretical framework, concepts, research questions, findings, and some models to help in understanding the particular theoretical approach or paradigm more easily.

2. This introduction aims at making the interconnectedness of all the chapters explicit. It provides a background and a theoretical framework, as well as some models and main concepts to be considered as unifying factors throughout the whole dissertation.

3. Those unifying factors are: (a) the Model of the Political Communication Field which then is reduced to its essence in the Media Performance Model, and the two concepts of Media Responsibility and Accountability which demonstrate the directions of interplay in the Media Performance Model.

4. Even though not all of these unifying models and concepts explicitly appear in each chapter, the four chapters are presented and arranged in such a way that the reader may easily go back and relate most parts of the four chapters to the models and concepts advanced in this introduction.

d. Added Value

1. Each chapter in this dissertation has undergone a reviewing process by editors of international journals or books. Most parts, in the form of shortened articles, have been presented in local, national and international seminars. Each chapter has thus contributed (to a certain extent) to popular and scholarly debate, to policy discussion, and to the general body of knowledge, empirically based and theoretically grounded.

2. Finally, it is hoped that this dissertation might contribute to our collective effort to understand both the position and the potential of political communication with its two faces (communication of politics and politics of communication) in an era often characterized by a growing need for more democratic information and communication systems, relevant to, provided by, and intended for, active citizens, starting from their basic contexts: their communities.
First Chapter

Political Communication in Indonesia:
Revisiting the Media Performance in Three Eras

1. Introduction

Data on political communication research in Indonesia in the past two decades have rarely been recorded. This might be associated with some basic problems in the academic environment as well as in the development and practices of the political and communication systems in the country. In the academic environment, both communication and political scholars in Indonesia have continually struggled to establish their own boundaries and methods, in order to gain more acknowledgement as scientific fields (for a full description, see Dahlan, 1990). They have also struggled to establish departments, generally in the faculties of social and political sciences. For example, out of the forty-eight main state universities in Indonesia, only thirteen universities have an undergraduate communication program, compared to thirty-nine for management (PPSPMB, 2003). Besides, a special forum (division) for scholars from communication and/or politics, that would help accelerate development of political communication field (see Ryfe, 2001, p. 408), is not in place yet. Neither the Association of Indonesian Communication Scholars (ISKI) nor the Association of Indonesian Political Scholars (AIPI) has a political communication division.

Parallel to those situations, the Soeharto Regime (1966 to 1998, better known as the “New Order Regime”) put into place a systematic and comprehensive strategy to ensure that the political and communication systems functioned as a control instrument of power (see Haris, 2004; Gazali, 2002; Hidayat, et al., 2000). Under these circumstances, all research plans had to be submitted for approval to several Government offices. The Government ensured that no research interests posed a threat to the political stability.

From mid-1997 to May 1998, a chapter of Indonesian history was written that some analysts called, “a fascinating chapter in Indonesia’s media history” (Cohen, 1998). The mounting demonstrations by students and activists, simultaneous with the ailing economy (Indonesia was hardest hit by the Asian economic crisis) and the changing attitudes of certain media to the fight against Government control, finally forced Soeharto to step down on May 21, 1998. Afterwards, Indonesia entered the so-called “Era Reformasi” (the Reform Era) characterized by a freer political and communication environment. Certainly, it was expected that the new climate in this new era would stimulate enthusiasm among scholars to conduct political communication research.
This chapter examines what has been done in political communication research in Indonesia during and concerning three periods, i.e., the Soeharto Era (New Order Regime, especially from 1984 to April 1998), the May 1998 Revolution when the peak of the so-called “Indonesian Revolution” took place, and the Reform Era (after May 21, 1998, until the present day). The authors use the historical narrative and develop the triangle of Media Performance Model (as exemplified in the works by McQuail 1992; Hidayat & Sendjaja, 2002; and Bardoel & d’Haenens, 2004) as an analysis tool for documenting and examining the functioning of the media in each period. This triangle is built up by four power entities, i.e., the Government, Market, and Civil Society, and in the middle position the Media themselves (see Figure 1). We have to note that a strong awareness of, and sensitivity to, external pressures and demands has been reported in many accounts of the media at work (McQuail, 1992, p. 82).

![Figure 1: Media Performance Model](image)

At the same time, within each (f)actor, according to Golding and Murdock, 1991, p.19; see also Cottle, 2004, p.5), there is a constant interplay between structure and agency, which constrain as well as facilitate, impose limits on as well as offer opportunities to each other. The term “structure” may be seen as including resources and regulations (Giddens, 1984, p.17). The term “agency,” in general, refers to social actions carried out by social actors, either as individuals or as a group. It can also refer to social actions of human agents in a broader sense, not only individuals, but also including organized groups, organizations, and the state (Burns, 1986, p. 9). The results of interplay within each (f)actor will inevitably have an impact upon the interplay or power relations among those four elements and vice versa. We will mark the resulting tendencies in each era (as put together in Figure 2) and relate them to strands of concrete research interests that have arisen within each period. Using this model could also help to evaluate the contributions and limitations of past studies with respect to certain elements of the model, as well as helping to provide directions for future research.
The data on political communication research were collected from the research collections of the faculties of social and political sciences, and the faculty of communication, at four main state-universities, i.e. the University of Indonesia in Jakarta, Padajajaran University in Bandung (West Java), Gajah Mada University in Yogyakarta (Central Java), and Airlangga University in Surabaya (East Java). A panel of experts, consisting of seven senior researchers from those universities, was formed for the purpose of categorizing research that fits into the political communication area.

2. Indonesia under the Soeharto Regime

The Soeharto Regime came to power in 1966 after ousting Soekarno, a left-leaning nationalist President. Soekarno's policies left the country with a negative growth rate, 600 percent inflation, no foreign reserves to speak of, and a national debt of over US$ 2 billion (see e.g., Vatikiotis, 1994). The Soekarno Regime was also characterized by unstable administration with constant changes in cabinets. In dealing with these problems, Soeharto's economic advisors and technocrats sought to build and restructure political mechanisms that aimed primarily at achieving political stability, and were believed to improve economic life (Moertopo, 1974; Mas’oed, 1989). This plan was then promoted to the international world, especially the anti-communist Western states, as a way of gaining support and attracting foreign investment.

There is no doubt that until the economic crisis of 1997-98, the Soeharto Regime had succeeded in transforming the country from what has been characterized by Higgins as “the number one economic failure among the major underdeveloped countries” (Higgins, 1968, p.678), to an economy that was held up as a model of Third World development. Over the span of the New Order’s first five five-year plans (from 1969 to 1994), the GDP expanded on average 6.8 percent annually; even in the aftermath of declining hydrocarbon prices in the early 1980s, annual average GDP growth accelerated from 6.1 percent (from 1980 to 1990) to 7.6 percent (from 1990 to 1995), while the annual average population growth fell to 1.8 percent (Booth, quoted in Emmerson, 1999, p.113). Such achievements led the World Bank in 1993 to place Indonesia in the same category with South Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Thailand, as high-performing economies responsible for the “East Asian miracle of rapid growth and declining inequality” (World Bank, 1993; pp. 1-3; see also Schlossstein, 1991).

In practice, such a success heavily depended on a systematic and comprehensive strategy to ensure that the political and communication systems functioned as a control of power. In the beginning of 1973, outside the ruling party, Golongan Karya (Functional Group or Golkar), all parties were forced to merge into two parties, namely the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (Indonesian Democratic Party or PDI) and the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party or PPP). Those parties and any mass organizations were required to adopt the Pancasila (Five Pillars) as their sole ideology. The Government then developed an election format that served only to demonstrate the power of Golkar and its domination (Haris in Antlov & Cederroth, 2004). The parliaments elected under the
New Order did not function as legislative bodies, conduits for popular aspirations or as a “checks and balances” mechanism for the executive branch. On the contrary, as Haris (2004, p. 34) writes: “(...) By means of various policies and mechanisms, such as screening, political development, special examination and recalling, the Government was fully capable of controlling the House.”

3. The Shape of the Media Industry During the Soeharto Era

The media industry during the Soeharto era had two faces. Its first face was shaped markedly by the dynamics of Soeharto’s market economy. Rapid economic growth during the Soeharto period brought into being a new middle class with relatively higher education and income levels. This meant greater opportunity for the media to find large audiences with purchasing power. The expansion of the economy also led to the growth of the advertising industry and of advertising expenditures. Transnational advertising agencies arrived en masse during the 1970s.3 This in turn created a greater opportunity for the Indonesian media industry to become profitable by selling access to audiences to producers in various industrial sectors.

The commercialization of the media industry was also marked by the transformation of the Indonesian press from “political press” to “industrial press.” Previously, during Soekarno’s “Guided Democracy” period, the press was defined as a “tool of the Revolution,” responsible for energizing and mobilizing public opinion (see Hill, 1994, p. 14). In addition, most of the press aligned their editorial policies with particular politicized segments of the population. Under the Soeharto Regime, except for a few newspapers, most media aimed at achieving a broad readership across social, cultural and political distinctions, in order to have as large a circulation as possible and hence attract more advertisers. The opportunity for such a transformation was made possible by the annulment of a regulation stipulating that all newspapers had to be affiliated with a political party or mass organization of their choice.

Nonetheless, the media had always been defined by the Soeharto Regime as a “partner in development,” and while pursuing commercial success, the Indonesian press was declared “free but responsible,” in contrast to the presumed irresponsibility of the liberal Western press. This was the second face of the media industry during the Soeharto era that affected almost all aspects of the functioning of the press. The Government controlled -- preventively and correctly -- the ownership of media institutions, through the issuance of printing licenses (SIT), which later became licenses for publishing print media (SIUPP). These licenses were issued primarily on the basis of political criteria. Journalists were required to join the one and only journalists’ organization allowed at the time. Chief editors had to attend courses on state ideology that were in fact part of an indoctrination process. The Soeharto Regime, through the Ministry of Information, monitored closely the production of news texts, among others by means of the so-called “telephone culture”: one call from the Government official was enough to nip any potential revelation in the bud. The Government also forbade press coverage of
opposition leaders. It even went further by controlling paper supplies (see Hidayat et al., 2000, p.6; Gazali, 2002, p. 122).

In the broadcasting sector, the appointment of individuals for certain positions in the Government-owned media, RRI (Radio of the Republic of Indonesia; established in 1945) and TVRI (Television of the Republic of Indonesia; established in 1962) was fully in the hands of the Government. Only after twenty-five years of TVRI monopoly, the first commercial TV station, RCTI (Rajawali Citra Televisi Indonesia), was allowed to operate in Indonesia. It was then followed by SCTV (Surya Citra Televisi, 1990), TPI (Televisi Pendidikan Indonesia, 1990), ANteve (Cakrawala Andalas Televisi, 1993), and IVM (Indosiar Visual Mandiri, 1995). All commercial TV stations were under the control of giant business enterprises owned by Soeharto’s family members and their cronies (for a full description, see d’Haenens et al., 2000, p. 197-232). The commercial radio landscape was slightly different from that of the television industry. After 1970 local commercial radio stations operated in many large cities; the licenses for those radio stations were granted to those whose loyalties to the Ministry of Information branch, or to local Government, was unquestionable. Both commercial TV and radio stations were not allowed to produce their own news programming and had to resort to packaging news items into something like features or soft news. In addition, they had to relay the news from the state-owned stations. Commercial radio stations had to relay RRI news up to eighteen times a day, or almost every hour, while commercial TV stations had to relay two TVRI news programs daily (see Gazali & Menayang, 2002).

There were two contradictory features worth noting about the shape of the media industry during the Soeharto era. First, in line with the open market strategy, the “open sky policy” was announced by the regime in the 1990s, that allowed domestic companies to distribute foreign television direct broadcasts. Government Regulation No.20, of June 1994, also included the mass media sector among previously off-limits sectors to be opened to foreign investment and majority ownership. However, Harmoko, then Minister of Information, sharply criticized the regulation, asserting that it contradicted the 1966 Press Act, which explicitly prohibited any kind of foreign investment in the press industry. Harmoko -- himself the owner of the second largest daily newspaper in the country, Pos Kota, and a significant shareholder in various print media -- declared that irrespective of the regulation he had the full support from the President in keeping foreign investment out of the press industry.

Second, the pattern of vertical integration between private media and the ruling regime was a rare phenomenon in the world’s market economies. In neighboring Southeast Asian countries, e.g., Singapore and Malaysia, the media were under state-controlled holding companies; but in the Indonesian case, it was the individual members of the ruling elite and their cronies who personally owned the media as part of their business empires. 4
4. Press Freedom

The power over licensing was clearly an effective instrument of power to control dissenting views and to promote Soeharto’s pragmatic and ideological interests in the media sector. There was a long record of press crackdowns during the Soeharto era. There were at least two cases of wholesale mass media banning. The first occurred in January 1974, when thirteen newspapers and news magazines were shut down following student demonstrations and riots in major cities. Encouraged by the scale of demonstrations and riots, the press gave heavy coverage and editorial support to the protests.

The second series of multiple bans took place in 1978, when further anti-Government student protests, which were sweeping through the main campuses since 1977, were again reported extensively. The First Family was specifically targeted by the students; there were even calls for Soeharto to step down. The Soeharto Regime finally responded in January 1978 by banning seven Jakarta dailies and seven student newspapers. These bans preceded the disbanding of all student councils, the arrest of some 200 students, and the military occupation of several key campuses in Jakarta, Bandung, and Yogyakarta. Unlike 1974 when the bans were permanent, in 1978 all of the banned commercial publications were back on the streets within weeks, except some of the student newspapers.

In addition to the multiple bans, there were also sporadic bans of individual publications. In April 1981, for instance, Jurnal Ekuin (a specialized magazine on economy, finance, and industry) was shut down after it reported an impending reduction in the Government’s floor price for oil exports. On October 9, 1986, Sinar Harapan, an evening newspaper, had its publication permit withdrawn over commentaries on the Soeharto Regime’s economic policies. In June 1994, in the midst of increasing public demand for more democracy and freer press, three major weekly magazines (Tempo, DeTik, and Editor) were closed down. The reason seems to have been that the magazines had been pursuing, to the embarrassment of the Government, a conflict that had arisen between two of its ministers. One, the minister for science and technology, B.J. Habibie, had close links with Germany and had been the prime mover in the purchase by Indonesia of thirty-nine warships, formerly belonging to the East German Navy. The other, the finance minister, Marie Mohammad, had been critical of the purchase.

In some situations, however, the limits on what could be published were ill defined, and were also a function of Soeharto’s “ideological maturation.” For instance, in 1983, Ekspo, a news magazine, lost its publication permit for publishing a report on “Indonesia’s 100 millionaires,” a list that included an embarrassing number of Soeharto’s family members and cronies. But by the 1990s, when the Soeharto Regime's attitude and behavior towards capitalism had become “more mature,” and when the authorities perceived that it was no longer politically embarrassing to become exceptionally rich, such listings had become common in the media.

Yet, this was not the case when it came to the issue of SARA, which stands for “Ethnicity, Religion, Race, and Groups with differing affiliations and
political backgrounds” (“Suku, Agama, Ras, dan Antar Golongan”). Until the end of the New Order Era, the Government never allowed any media to explore or discuss openly any case related to SARA. What exactly constituted the limitations was ill defined. The main reason was that all elements of society were to uphold the nation’s principle of “Diversity in Unity” (“Bhinneka Tunggal Ika”). For the media, it meant that all differences should be swept under the carpet; what should be promoted and brought into the media was “unity” only. On the other hand, when the Government faced problems rooted in different political views, usually concerning certain radical Muslim groups and violent riots, the Government quickly labeled those problems as SARA conflicts, generally by announcing that the conflict was between the indigenous people and those of Chinese descent, or between Muslims and Christians.

At the same time, a group of individuals in the inner circle of the Soeharto Regime, guided by their own perception of existing socio-ideological conditions, subjectively defined the limits of press freedom. Accordingly, in addition to the dependence on Government-owned media and other Government sources, Indonesian journalists had to rely on their skill to report politically sensitive news that maximized sales and minimized the risk of closure. According to one senior journalist, this meant, on the one hand, that editors had to develop “sensitivity to the Government’s approval and disapproval conveyed through an intricate and culturally conditioned network of subtle gestures and signals” (Makarim, 1978, p.279), while remaining sensitive to the market’s demand for critical reporting.

Such a constraining media structure produced a type of journalism that was very cautious, exercising self-censorship, avoiding direct criticism, resorting to what has been described by the chief editor of the banned Indonesia Raya as, “very subtle allusions to avoid hurting anyone’s feelings, having to be like a snake, circling round and round without ever striking the target” (Lubis, as quoted in Hill, 1994, p.47). Headlines never focused on negatives; criticisms were rarely written in the active voice, and the circumlocutory passive form of speech disguised disapproval (Hill, 1994, p.47). A unique form for criticizing the Government, namely “criticism by praise,” was also common in the Indonesian press during the Soeharto period (Flournoy, 1992, p.2).

On the part of media audiences, interpreting such news reports required a skill for reading between the lines (or for “reading between the lies,” as former editor of the banned Sinar Harapan, Aristides Katoppo, claimed). Such skill seemed to have been widely learned by the media-consuming public in the country. In many situations, such a skill was “improved” by political instinct, beliefs, suspicion of Government sources, and background information.

5. Research Interests During the Soeharto Era

This section deals with research interests that surfaced after assessment of the data on political communication research carried out at four main universities in Indonesia, from January 1984 to April 1998, a month before Soeharto was forced to resign. One might expect that any dictatorship might offer a challenging ground for
political communication research. As a matter of fact, in Indonesia’s case, it could not be cultivated to the fullest extent due to the severe constraints imposed by Soeharto Regime. Even if there were some grounds for research, their aims and scope would be primarily “administrative research” (see Smythe & Dinh, 1983, Dhakidae, 2003), or to the limit described in Chaffee’s words (2001), “(…) [research that] approached political communication practices with a critical eye, [but the] main goal was to understand and explain existing institutions, not to reform them” (p.239). Dahlan (1990) also subscribes to the aversion of communication scholars to conduct political communication research, except in the case of descriptive or normative research, such as “the Information Order of the New World” or “the Pancasila” (Five Pillars Ideology). When scholars carried out research on the freedom of the press, they preferred to examine the foreign press rather than the Indonesian press as the object of the research.

The “Suburi Incident,” that took place during the time preceding the 1972 General Election, contributed to this aversion. The incident refers to the Government reaction to a poll that was about to be conducted by the Subury (Research) Company led by John DiGregorio in several provinces of Indonesia. Respondents were asked to rank political figures, including Soeharto. This type of polling, especially due to its ranking technique, was considered highly sensitive politically, since it could destabilize the national and local security order. Thus, the Government prevented the researchers from conducting the polling in the field. The company was allegedly accused of carrying out espionage and its operating license was revoked (see Sopiann, 2002).
Table 2
Political Communication Research in Indonesia

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<td>Democratic Media System</td>
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<td>Structure of media industry and power relations related to it</td>
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<td>Citizens as active information gatherers &amp; processors</td>
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<td>Diversity of media types, ownership &amp; content</td>
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<td>Access to, &amp; freedom of, alternative media</td>
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<td>Media Roles, Media Uses &amp; Effects</td>
<td>Media effects on political opinions, attitudes, beliefs &amp; perceptions</td>
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<td>Effects of the media agenda on the audience agenda</td>
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<td>Media Reality Construction</td>
<td>(Comparative) Media portrayal of certain issues</td>
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<td>Newsroom analysis</td>
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<td>Political Processes &amp; Interaction among Interest Groups</td>
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<td>Political leadership</td>
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<td>Political socialization</td>
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<td>Political communication in arts/cartoons/ movies</td>
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<td>Political rumors</td>
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<td>Total</td>
<td><strong>55</strong></td>
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<td><strong>96</strong></td>
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Note: *The research period refers to the time when the event or case examined took place. This means that research conducted in 2002 might investigate an issue under the Soeharto Era (and is therefore classified as part of the first period column). One should also keep in mind that certain research plans were not feasible during the Soeharto Era and hence needed to be postponed to more prolific times.

Table 2 (Research on Political Communication in Indonesia) reflects the above-elaborated contexts. The data collection (limited only) at the four main
universities shows the significant increase in quantity and variety of research interest after the Soeharto Era. This is in line with Menayang’s data (2003), that during the final years of the Soeharto Regime and afterwards, there has been an increasing interest in application of critical approach to the research in communication questioning power and its distribution in society, as well as exploring audience resistance to the operations of media as ideological apparatus. The data collected for this chapter show that approximately twenty percent of research during the Reform Era could be categorized as critical studies in contrast to the Soeharto Era which was almost entirely dominated by “administrative research.”

The studies on freedom of the democratic media system (category 1) during the Soeharto Era show two tendencies. First was the tendency to blame the journalists, or the media in general, for most of the political communication ills during the Soeharto Era. For instance, a study by Nasir (1996), that takes the closure of Tempo, deTik, and Editor in 1994 as its case, among others concludes that the Indonesian press tended more to “emphatically” understand the state or power behaviors than to critically question them. The Indonesian journalists were spoiled, desperate, and too worried that the law would never side with the press. Nasir states that one cause of this problem might have been the lack of solidarity within the media itself and the lack of clear support from the public. These factors resulted in media personnel attempting to avoid isolation -- being the only ones questioning the state or those in power.

The second trend was the tendency of research projects to put the limitations faced by the media in a larger context. Researchers in the latter category were keenly aware, even before they planned their research, that the Government and business interests exerted a huge influence over the Indonesian press. For example, a research project conducted by Taufik (2002), examined whether there was an overlapping of interests between the Soeharto Government and a media conglomerate, Bakrie Group which owned several printed media (Sinar Pagi, Berita Buana, and Nusra dailies, as well as Go, a sport weekly). Findings of this research reveal the existence of a systematic and comprehensive strategy launched by the Government during the Soeharto era. A license for publishing print media (SIUPP) was granted to the Bakrie Group by the Government for two reasons. Firstly, the Government knew that the tycoons in this group would never pose any threat to the Government. Secondly, the Government officials dealing with the issuance of this license saw the SIUPP as a commodity, or to be more specific as a “bribe” paid by businessmen to high-ranking Government officials. On the other hand the owners of the Bakrie Group did not really care about that illegal bribery, since the “bribery tradition” being a long-standing practice in the business community in Indonesia, and because they thought the media business would still make money after counting the bribes as a business expense. Regarding the performance of the media, the businessmen fully agreed to act as the Government wished. And then they treated the media industry in the same way as other business commodities.

Support for Government’s paradigm also spread to journalistic practices. A study conducted by Soesilo and Wasburn (1994), noted that a leading national newspapers (i.e. Kompas Daily) was ideologically committed to the norms of a
“developmental press,” that supports the social and economic needs of their nation and gives priority to news and information about their Government. Those researchers employed a framing analysis of the news coverage of the Gulf War in the *New York Times* and the Indonesian *Kompas* between 1990 and 1991 (in Table 2, this research is put under the media portrayal, category 3). This confirmed McCargo’s findings (1999) that much of the Indonesian press was engaged in the kind of essentially uncritical ‘development journalism’ favored by the authorities, serving primarily as an agent of stability. It is exactly what President Soeharto expressed in his speech on National Press Day in 1989 (quoted by Mehra et al., 1989, p. 131):

> As an integral part of our developing society, nation and state, the press has an important role to assist in managing this nation in all its complexity through the dissemination of news, opinions, ideas, grievances and hopes to the masses. (…) It is in this respect that the press has a role to play in helping build and preserve our unity and cohesion as a nation.

Almost all studies into media effects on political opinions, attitudes, beliefs and perceptions (category 2) employed (as usual) quantitative methods. For example, the studies examining how media exposure influences student perceptions regarding human rights in Indonesia; and how exposés by local newspapers affect the attitudes of local Government officials on local autonomy regulations. There was a unique study in this category, attempting to examine the effect of TV-3 (Malaysia) in terms of political socialization among Indonesians living in Medan who had access not only to TVRI Jakarta and TVRI Medan, but also to the spillover from RTM-1, RTM-2 and TV-3 from Malaysia (Djaja, 1990). This research project showed that people living in Medan merely used the spillover from TV-3 Malaysia to enjoy the entertainment programs and some information unrelated to politics. The TV-3 programs neither increased the audience’s feeling of being involved in aspects of the political system in Malaysia nor in the political system in Indonesia. The audience did not consider that the Malaysian programs addressed the problems they had to face in their daily life any better than those of TVRI Jakarta or TVRI Medan. They did not feel encouraged either to carry out actions to support the efforts developed by the local Government or the community as a result of potential inspiration they might receive from the TV-3 programs.

As of the 1990s, studies of religious issues or religious influences in political communication (category 5) seemed to emerge. Most of the earlier studies examined the ways in which political figures, or political issues related to certain religions, were portrayed in different media. Certain newspapers were most frequently used in this kind of comparison, i.e. *Kompas* (presumably representing the Catholic viewpoint), *Republika* (considered to be the Muslim voice), and *Suara Pembaruan* together with *Sinar Harapan* (seen as having Protestant principles in their news). A study by Semma (1998) examined how *Kompas*, *Suara Pembaruan* and *Republika* dailies portrayed two events related to sectarian tension among Christians and Muslims in East Timor (September 1995) and Situbondo (October, 1996). It combined a content analysis with in-depth-interviews with the gatekeepers of those three newspapers. This research found that in principle all three
newspapers sent the same message, i.e. that those conflicts were not supposed to take place! However, in carrying this message, *Kompas* and *Suara Pembaruan* paid much more attention to the Situbondo Case, in a way that defended the position of the Christian background residents. In contrast, *Republika* paid much more attention to the East Timor Case, in a way that defended the interests of the Muslim background residents. This finding might be related to which residents are considered the minority in each conflict area.

The only dissertation in our data collection that dealt with media-related political process (category 4), during the Soeharto era, is entitled, “Roles of the Press in Indonesia’s General Election: a Political Communication Study on the Coverage of Ten Newspapers During the 1987 Election Campaign” (Suwardi, 1993). Suwardi has there been recognized as the first political communication expert in Indonesia, and his dissertation stands as the first academic writing with elaborative political communication definitions and analyses of the effects of media on campaigns. Making use of the content analysis method in the form of symbol coding, he lists symbols and messages in those newspapers systematically and thereafter interprets them. In his conclusion, he states that the newspapers during the 1987 Election Campaign were not capable of carrying substantial political messages. They focused primarily on the political figures instead. Three causal factors were identified. First, the form of the campaign itself (street parades and open-air mass meetings) would not enable the delivery of substantial political messages; second, the incapability of the speakers; and third, the incapability of the reporters. Accordingly, newspapers only carried slogans and on-the-spot reports, without substantial messages, thereby failing to play their role as a forum for political education. Suwardi’s research also discovered that the editorial columns of all newspapers were relatively less controversial compared to opinion articles written by experts or observers. Suwardi associates this finding with the self-censorship developed by the editorial chief or editorial staff of each newspaper.

Even though this research explores quite extensively the newspaper coverage during the 1987 election campaign, and also the tendency for newspapers to favor the ruling party (Golkar), it never strongly suggests possible reforms of the election campaign mechanism. In addition, it does not clearly suggest that reform should be undertaken in Indonesia’s media industry structure, in order to provide a fairer and higher quality political education.

Some analysts might have expected that political communication research in Indonesia would have evolved in a new direction, when a study was conducted (by Lesmana, 1997) comparing the ways in which the news concerning the July 27 Incident was published in a weekly magazine and in a cyber news magazine (this research is put under category 1, access to, & freedom of, alternative media). The July 27 Incident refers to a bloody attack taking place in 1996 on attendees at a forum of expression at the PDI (Indonesian Democratic Party) headquarter in Jakarta, allegedly carried out by members of the Armed Forces and vigilantes, under orders of the Soeharto Regime. The action was a conspiracy by the regime and a faction of PDI that was loyal to Soeharto, led by Suryadi, against the majority of PDI, led by Megawati Soekarnoputri, the daughter of the Indonesia’s first president. Megawati appeared to be a rising political star at that time. Any rising political star,
moreover bringing a famous name like Soekarno, would certainly be regarded a serious threat by Soeharto. This study indeed showed that the cyber news magazine *Tempo Interaktif* was much more transparent in its reports -- described by the researcher as a “mirror” of that event -- than the weekly (printed) magazine. The latter, *Gatra*, still presented its news as “the neutral Government partner.” Therefore, its criticism of the regime pertaining that event was couched in very soft or implicit terms. The editors reasoned that implicit criticism would ultimately be taken into consideration by the Government. In addition, findings of this research showed that *Tempo Interaktif*, the cyber news magazine, tended to focus more on the political and social aspects of that bloody event, while *Gatra* chose to emphasize more on the legal aspects. For the news sources, *Gatra* simply interviewed sources from the armed forces. This was certainly the safest choice for the editors and owners amidst that heated security situation. *Tempo Interaktif*, on the other hand, relied more on sources from non-Government organizations. Unfortunately, even though the cyber news magazine would never have to face the revocation of a license, a fate that the printed weekly could suffer, *Tempo Interaktif* was still not capable of presenting accurate data on the casualties of the July 27 Incident. In other words, *Tempo Interaktif* did not go as far as it could have in making the most of its unique, and expected, role as cyber media.

With the exception of this new hope for a freer press, which might have been made possible thanks to the Internet, an opportunity which unfortunately was not fully taken advantage of, in general we can conclude that during the Soeharto Era the results of interplay among elements in the Media Performance Model showed the dominance of the Government over other elements, i.e. Market, Civil Society, and Media. Of course it is also fair to say that between the Government and the Market there was an overlapping of interests. On the one hand, the Government received guarantees that the media owners watch closely so that their media performance would only follow the Government line. On the other hand, Soeharto’s cronies, or loyalists of the Government, who were granted licenses, had access to the media market and in general treated the media industry in the same way as other business commodities (see Figure 2).

![Figure 2. Media Performance model: Visualising Tendencies in the Power Relations in Three Eras](image-url)
6. The May 1998 Revolution

Without a comprehensive exploration, Indonesia’s May 1998 Revolution that successfully toppled Soeharto, may simply be attributed to the Internet as its significant driving motor (compared with the audio-tape during the Iranian Revolution and with the fax machine during the Chinese student movement around Tiananmen Square, see Hidayat, 2002, p. 157). On the other hand, some analysts postulate that the prima causa of Indonesia’s May 1998 Revolution was the economic crisis, or to be more specific: the capital mobility (see Basri & Iswara, 2000, p. 27-45).

Of the data in our research collection at the four main universities, Ishadi’s dissertation (2002) could be included in the critical research category using historical narrative. According to his research, the motives of establishing TV stations in Indonesia were heavily political. Accordingly, those stations would be seen and treated as ideological state apparatuses. When the first commercial TV station, RCTI, was created in 1987, it brought with it a new function, namely to make a profit in line with the open-market economic policy developed by Soeharto. However, the Government control of the media was still very much in place. These two functions might not have created problems for the TV station owner, but it placed the newsroom journalists in an uncomfortable position. In the meantime, competition became tougher, with the creation of four additional commercial TV stations. The need to achieve high ratings, and therefore a great deal of advertisement, in fact required the newsroom personnel to take seriously the preferences of their audience. One of the outcomes was a conflict between what the audience wanted and what the TV journalists and editors were allowed to deliver. The audience expected more direct and transparent news, including subjects that were forbidden by the Government. Under these circumstances, the interplay between the structure, represented by the interests of the media owners, and the actions of TV journalists and editors crystallized. Of course the degree of those interplays differed from one TV newsrooms to the next. According to Ishadi’s research, some of the journalists could be included in the so-called “critical supporters” category, while other could even be labeled as “spoilers” of the Soeharto Regime.

In early May 1998, those interplay were colored (if not exacerbated) by the mounting economic crisis, political crisis, student and activist demonstrations, and conflicting opinions among the elite. In addition, the pressures on the Government from international institutions, such as the IMF (International Monetary Fund), urging the Government to seriously tackle the economic crisis, had mounted to a climax. At the same time, newsroom personnel were surprised that the ratings for TV news programs significantly increased; they could compete on an equal footing with popular entertainment programs. Certainly the fear that the Government could at any time impose severe sanctions on the TV stations still haunted the media owners, as well as journalists and editors. However, that anxiety was countered by the fear that any TV station that did not broadcast transparent and daring news would be left behind. On top of that, any station wanted to avoid at any price to run the risk would be called a “coward” by students and activists, during their demonstrations across the country. According to Ishadi, because of the above-
mentioned interplay between structures and agencies in the television newsrooms, by mid-May 1998, almost all of the journalists and editors could have been included in the “spoiler” category. He considers that the role of TV personnel as “spoilers” was a relatively dominant cause of the May 1998 Revolution. While doing so, he acknowledges that there were other interplay between structures and agencies in Market, Civil Society, and Government itself that together contributed to the revolution process.

Ishadi’s research was developed as a part of a larger research project on the “Press in the May Revolution,” conducted by a research team of the Graduate School of Communication, University of Indonesia, which was carefully designed to use the historical narrative. Interestingly, the inquiries on what exactly happened in the TV newsrooms during May 1998 were not only assigned to Ishadi but also to another professional TV news manager, Sumita Tobing of SCTV (see “Interactions in the TV Newsrooms” in Hidayat et al., 2000, p. 241-249). In 1994, Tobing was asked by the SCTV management to develop a TV newsroom, due to the fact that since 1990 SCTV only relayed news programs from RCTI. She never gathered complete information about the business holdings of SCTV’s shareholders. Later in the year, she was surprised to receive a phone call from a director of SCTV criticizing a newscast by SCTV. The broadcast concerned a real estate company that did not pay any remuneration to a landowner when the company took over his land. As a matter of fact, the owners of that real estate company were both the main shareholders of SCTV. She was then pressured to fabricate another story to counter the previous news.

Suddenly, on May 12, 1998, the movement pioneered by students and activists was accelerated by the bloody quelling of a student demonstration at Trisakti University in West Jakarta. Four students were killed and many injured by unidentified troops and police. This violent action provoked reactions across the country. Starting the next day, mass riots including shop looting, car and shop burnings, as well as rapes took place in Jakarta and several other cities. In Tobing’s exposition, until May 16, the Government still tried to control the TV news programs by briefing the journalists and editors at the SCTV newsrooms. According to the Government, the opposition figures could only be interviewed if they did not provoke people (there was no further explanation available at that time about what this criterion really meant). On May 17, SCTV news producer Bosco invited an opposition figure, Sarwono Kusumaatmaja, to appear at noon on a live news program. During his interview, Sarwono explicitly called for Soeharto to step down. Tobing, who came to the office later that day, surprisingly found a letter on her desk stating that she was fired, signed by Gontha, the assistant director (also a shareholder) who then directly put himself in charge of the SCTV newsroom!

Tobing’s analysis was confirmed by research conducted by Almard (1999). According to his research, even on the day when Trisakti University students were killed, open arguments about what the journalists and editors could do and what not took place in the newsrooms of RCTI and SCTV; these arguments involved the owners, management staff, as well as newsroom personnel. Also on May 13, or a day after the killing of the four students, the main policy in those newsrooms was merely to present the events, without any expression of support for the student and
activist movements. It was from May 14 onward that the journalists and editors gradually began to openly show their support for the movement through their reporting. On May 18, students and activists entered the Parliament compound and forced the legislators to ask Soeharto to step down.

Thus, Tobing’s exposition and findings, as supported by Almard, did not confirm Ishadi’s theory that the TV newsroom personnel played a leading role in driving the May 1998 Revolution to its culmination. They were also supported by McCargo’s findings (1999), which state that evidence that the media led or initiated political transition is patchy. McCargo further generalizes that the role of the media in political transitions tends to be a supporting one. He also acknowledges that in many Southeast Asian cases, the picture of media as a political actor, and the conflict in which it is involved, is exceedingly ambiguous, and the issues at stake are both complex and subtle. During the May 1998 Revolution, the state-owned TV station, TVRI, never reported the student demonstrations until they occupied the parliament building. Meanwhile students had temporarily occupied several local branches of RRI, in order to force the state-owned radio to air their demands (Abidin, 2000). This again confirms McCargo’s conclusion that the electronic media typically proves easier for the state to control and in many cases television appears to be the last media agency to support political transitions.

In addition to the examination of the TV newsrooms, the research project, “Press in the May Revolution,” also investigated the processes taking place in local media, rumor, cyber media, as well as underground media. Local media in Indonesia were mainly print media and radio stations, as all commercial TV stations were centered in Jakarta and the local branches of TVRI only produced relatively insignificant programs. In May 1998, newsrooms of local media were characterized by the same open arguments between the owners and journalists as those heard in Jakarta. What is interesting to note is the fact that during the Reform movement local radio and print media personnel generally referred to television news programming, particularly the newscasts on commercial stations, as a benchmark for evaluating both the subjects and the depth of the news coverage (Gazali, 2002, p. 138). So, this case represents an exception to McCargo’s findings, in that national commercial TV stations became an agent of change first, and then the local print media and radio stations followed their lead.

At the macro level, the research project, “Press in the May Revolution,” concludes that the collapse of the Soeharto Regime appears to be the product of internal contradictions within the political, economic, and mass media structures. On the one hand, Soeharto had to integrate the economy more deeply with the global capitalist system to strengthen the economy. This was strategically significant for the regime’s survival, since economic prosperity had been its main source of legitimacy. On the other hand, the economy’s proliferating links to global capital markets had made the regime more vulnerable to external pressures and changes, among others to capital mobility due to “the changes in risk perceptions by the parties involved” (de Koning, as quoted in Hidayat, 2002, p. 171). This research also found that under these circumstances the phenomenon of rumor indeed mattered. Rumor that the seventy-six-year-old President Soeharto was ill, for instance, sent the Jakarta Stock Exchange’s main index plunging 20% in mid-
December 1997. The rumors then spread from the financial markets into the street. A rumor that a coup was in progress resulted in a collapse of Indonesia’s currency, the Rupiah, and sent Jakarta’s rich and poor on a buying spree, emptying supermarket shelves of basic commodities, two times in as many weeks (see Christoper Torchia, Associated Press, January 9, 1998). People also queued at banks and moneychangers in order to buy U.S. Dollars, saying they feared losing their Rupiah savings (Hidayat, 2002, p.172).

While the formal or conventional media (print media, TV, and radio) in general waited until the stage when they could not help but report the news about the revolution, the “Press in the May Revolution” research project shows that along with the rumors, the news circulating through the Internet (see Winters, 2002) and the underground media, i.e. campus and student media, pro-democracy non-Governmental organization (NGO) media, and the underground media, targeted at the general public (see Menayang et al., 2002) played significant roles much earlier in that revolution.

Winters (2002, p. 118) concludes:

This combination of an activist tradition among youth in Indonesia and high levels of Internet penetration among the same segment of Indonesian society provided a particularly potent political mixture for mounting a sustained and coordinated reformist movement in the late 1990s. Although fractured in many ways, the Indonesian student movement made excellent use of a wide range of information sources and technologies for analysis, networking and coordination. The explosion of political activism fuelled by the Internet and global media coverage caught the Soeharto Regime off guard.

According to Menayang et al. (2002), various underground media that were emerging and gaining resonance with the public, particularly in the months that preceded Soeharto’s downfall, are in fact a sort of social movement. Their selection and treatment of issues were necessarily carried out differently from the mainstream media, with the purpose of supporting their common goal -- to challenge the status quo. This research provides two explanations regarding the influence of the underground media. First, during the period when the Soeharto Regime was on its way out, the underground movement’s ideology (carried by the underground media) defeated the establishment’s ideology (voiced by the mainstream media), as shown in equivalent news frames and content of both media (p.153). Second, ideologically, there was no significant difference between those working in the authorized press and those working underground. The cause of the grievances was considered to be the same by both groups; however, one group decided to take action, while the other did not. And “only when the Soeharto Regime almost fell, and repression of the press was gradually lifted, did both types of media become similar in terms of the openness of their reports about the common cause of grievances” (p.154).
Again, in most aspects, the above findings are parallel with McCargo’s assumptions (1999) that classify the Soeharto Regime as “semi authoritarian,” based on strong support from the military; and that the regime derived much of its legitimacy from relatively successful economic development. McCargo also considers that Soeharto was forced out by a combination of international and domestic political and economic forces. What happened with the press at various junctures during the final years of the Soeharto Regime, according to McCargo, shows that it performed each of the three alternative modes of agency: stability, restraint, and change. McCargo (1999, p. 25) illustrates:

Central to Soeharto’s demise was his preoccupation with the maintenance of absolute sovereign authority, his unwillingness and inability to coexist either with higher powers (such as the IMF), or with subordinate powers, such as more outspoken press reflecting divisions in his regime, and in Indonesian society. By refusing to allow the Indonesian press to evolve from serving as an agent of stability to functioning as an agent of restraint, Soeharto may actually have destabilized the New Order.

In McCargo’s eyes, the kind of restraining influence practiced by Tempo, Editor and DeTik -- alerting both rulers and readers to important tensions within the elite -- actually served valuable purposes for the regime (for an overview of this kind of interaction, see Sen & Hill, 2000).

In conclusion, we can say that during the May 1998 Revolution, the Media Performance Model shows how the Civil Society and the (more open to global) Market could fight back or corrode the Government control or legitimacy in astonishing ways. The latent performances of alternative Media (Internet) and underground Media, together with rumors, helped enable the Civil Society and Market bring those impacts to bear on the Soeharto Regime. Of course, finally, other (conventional) media could not help but support the revolution (see Figure 2 Part B) that reached its peak with Soeharto’s downfall on May 21. He was succeeded by B.J. Habibie.

7. Indonesia During the Reform Era

Learning from the causes and events of the May 1998 Revolution, analysts might predict that the Media Performance Model during the Reform Era would be more or less similar to that during the May Revolution. This is due to the overthrow of the Soeharto Regime, which was not only a major achievement, but also promised to create a new atmosphere, that would allow more freedom for media performance and be more conducive to political communication practices and research.

As reflected in its name, the Reformasi (Reformation) continues to be the buzzword of the Post-Soeharto Era. The subsequent administrations—under massive internal and external pressures for reformation -- gradually freed the market, the society and the media from state intervention. The market was increasingly
liberalized through a series of “jungle clearing operations” in order to end a web of politically well-connected business privileges and monopolies that surrounded Soeharto’s inner circle. It certainly opened up possibilities for diversity of ownership in the media industry. The newly liberated civil society also expressed itself in the rise of non-Governmental organizations (NGOs), advocacy groups, voluntary social and cultural organizations, independent labor unions, a more independent press council, and some forty new journalist associations. But on the other side of the coin, the rise of civil society can also encourage the spawning of dangerous hate groups --promoting, organizing, and executing violence (see e.g., Chambers & Kopstein, 2001). This phenomenon has appeared in the rise of violence in Indonesia during the Reform Era (see Tadjoeddin, 2002).

Focusing on the media sector, the process of liberalization has included a series of deregulations, and more importantly, the liquidation of the Information Ministry. The Information Ministry was one of the central features of Soeharto’s authoritarian corporatism, responsible for a long record of press bans. A year after the resignation of Soeharto, the House of Representatives passed a new, liberating Press Law (1999) that, among other things, eliminated licensing requirements, revoked the Government’s ability to ban publications, guaranteed freedom of the press, and even imposed a stiff penalty of two years’ prison on “anyone who acts against the law by deliberately taking actions which could obstruct the work of the press.” Since a publishing license was no longer required by the new Government, it is estimated that after Soeharto’s fall in 1998, the number of newspapers soared from 300 to around 1,000, and the number of radio stations increased from 700 to more than 1,000 (Mangahas, in Johannen and Gomez, 2001, p.125). The new law also conforms with the spirit of global neo-liberalism by permitting foreigners to own up to forty-nine percent of shares in media agencies. While a new Broadcasting Bill was being drawn up by the Parliament, five new private television companies entered the media market, competing with the five television companies that had been in the market since the early 1990s. Indonesia’s media sector was then free to disseminate political information and function as a venue for the discussion of political issues. Jonathan Turner, the Reuters Bureau Chief in Jakarta, agrees that, “Indonesia has become one of the world’s most open communities in as much as you can pretty well write what you want without fear of official sanction” (quoted in Goodman, 2000).

The liberalization, in turn, plunged the media into a fierce competition for sales and ratings. In the newspaper sector, for example, it is estimated that out of 1000 newspaper which emerged during the seventeen-month Habibie presidency, only some 600 to 700 remained in the market when Abdurrahman Wahid was inaugurated President in October 1999 (Mangahas, in Johannen and Gomez, 2001, p. 125), or according to AJI (2000) only about 705 publications were still in business, of which a mere fifteen percent were believed to be in good shape financially.
8. Research Interests During the Reform Era

As shown in the previous analysis, the departure of the Soeharto Regime resulted in a more open and democratic, yet weak, Government, and a relatively stronger civil society. As a result, the racial, ethnic, class, and sectarian-related tensions and animosities, most of which had been buried for many years, were able to rise up and color the Reform Era. This situation was worsened by both partisan media and media that treated news merely as a commodity due to the fierce competition for sales, ratings, and advertisings, mainly by capitalizing on sensationalism. This explanation is echoed by a number of researchers in the academic environment who are concerned about democratic media system, media reality construction, political conflicts with violence, and religious issues/influences in political communication.

A study by Paidi (2002) attempts to examine the freedom of press for local newspapers published in Jayapura, the capital city of West Papua (category 1 in Table 1). This province, together with Aceh and Maluku, has long been recognized for its latent or manifest appeals for separation from Indonesia. Paidi’s research found that in general Papuans are genuinely interested in and search for news items from local newspapers concerning the secession issue. As a matter of fact, the news items about the potential independence of West Papua from Indonesia seemed to be more ubiquitous in the newspapers published in Jayapura during the Reform Era than during the Soeharto Era. The gatekeepers in each local newspaper agency, according to the findings of this research, deliberately selected and emphasized news items about secession. Through statistical analysis, Paidi further discovered that the variable attitude about the independence of West Papua alone has a positive correlation with the favorable opinion of the Papuans toward secession. Yet after being exposed to local newspapers contents that are factual and objective, both the attitude and opinion of Papuans in favor of separation from Indonesia increased significantly. This study concludes that, on the one hand, having greater freedom was substantially beneficial for the local press in West Papua, while on the other hand it had a potential danger of putting the integrity of the Republic of Indonesia at risk.

A dissertation by Rusadi (2002) fits the type of research needed to examine the structure of media industry & power relations (also in category 1), and at the same time explores the context of “bad elements” in civil society. This study examined the negative aspects of capitalism in the newspaper institution (Kompas, Media Indonesia, and Republika daily). Rusady analyzed the social riots and the power relationships that were being developed and reproduced at that time to serve the profit motives of the media. The social riots chosen for this study case were: the Tasikmalaya Riot, the Semanggi II Incident, the Cibadak Mall Incident, the Glodak Plaza Incident, fighting among members of different communities, and fighting among students. This research found that the social riots were developed textually in the newspapers as conflicts between powers of the majority and minority religions, between the powers of regime’s legitimation supporters and delegitimation supporters, between powers of the state and the masses, between powers of the up-economy class and the low-economy class, and between powers of the military and civilians. All of those power conflicts were accumulated to give...
the media high selling points. Or in short, the media were inclined to survive and maximize their profits by selling these social uncertainties and disharmonies as commodities!

Among the “media reality construction” studies (category 2), a study by Harahap (2000) was developed quite well and critically -- under the title “Realities of Farmers and Their Organizations in the Media: A Study of State Hegemony in the Media Discourse.” This study examines how eight Jakarta-based media (six dailies, one weekly magazine, and TVRI) as well as six local newspapers, portrayed activities of several farmer organizations. It employs content analysis to see how ideology representation is used when covering three themes or events: farmer protests, the establishment and congresses of farmer organizations, and land disputes. Its findings show that in almost all the exposure, the farmers and their organizations were generally portrayed in violent actions, such as staging protests by blocking roads and forcefully (re)entering land under dispute. In contrast, the violence committed by other parties, such as shootings of farmers by military personnel seemed to be regarded as procedural misconduct only, or as acts of self-defense against the attacks of angry farmers.

Only a very few media have paid attention to the establishment and actions of the new farmer organizations; they have only featured the long-standing farmer organization developed during the Soeharto era, i.e. the Association of Indonesian Farmers’ Cooperative (HKTI, Himpunan Kerukunan Tani Indonesia). Among the few, the coverage by Waspada and Mimbar Umum daily, both local newspapers, is considered quite intensive and objective. During the protest by the farmer organizations in front of the Parliament Building, according to Harahap's findings, the Jakarta Post daily also gave the incident a proportional and objective reporting.

Unfortunately, in the case of land disputes, the media never seemed to take any progressive steps to deconstruct the old image of farmers and their organizations in the media (under the influence of the state hegemony of the Soeharto Era), such as their being easily provoked into those disputes by third parties, or even possessed by the spirit of Communism.

A research by Zen (2001) is quite unique among those studies examining religious issues/influences in political communication (category 5), which generally try to see how various media treat political issues that mix with religious issues in their news content in accordance with their religious alliances. Zen’s study employs critical discourse and framing analysis to explore the historical contexts of political communication and conflict within the largest Muslim group in Indonesia, the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). It also compares the everyday live of this community with the way it was portrayed in several media. The findings of this research show that in general the media pictured the NU members as village people with strong feudalistic and primordial attitudes. Every time NU held its large and special religious meeting (called “istighotsah”), the media tended to portray the meeting not as a religious ritual, but as a political forum for NU leaders, with some outsiders -- usually influential figures -- as honorary guests. Since NU had already vowed to return to “khittah” (their previous stance, that they would not get involved in political practices), NU should have kept a distance from any political parties, especially the PKB (National Awakening Party, Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa).
party was in fact established by some of NU top leaders, including Abdurrahman Wahid (the then president-to-be), as a breakthrough so that NU members, who were interested in political practices, could channel their activities without officially involving the NU name. The problem is that other NU leaders also established political parties, such as the PKU (Muslim Community Awakening Party), etc. Zen’s research found that the media tended to only interview certain prominent figures of NU who were active in PKB (which proved to be the most successful among the parties related to the NU), but rarely asked for comments from NU figures active in other parties. This resulted in conflicts between community members. We have to note that the research also confirmed that the feudalistic practices (attributed by the media to this community) troubled the NU members themselves, especially the young generation. Zen’s research also recorded the expectations of this young generation: that NU ulama (religious teachers or leaders) would gradually abandon those feudalistic attitudes. With this summary, we can see how political communication studies can be conducted creatively at the community level. It might tend to reshape or invent institutions, or “ritual” performance, to meet the collective needs of the community.

Another category of research, that has consistently received much attention, is analysis of media effects (category 2). One such study examines how political realities presented by Kompas, Republika, and Media Indonesia dailies impacted President Abdurrahman Wahid’s proposal to revoke the People’s Consultative Assembly Decree No. XXV/MPRS/1966. This decree dealt with an issue that many Indonesians still consider controversial, i.e. the banning of Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia, PKI). The ban was associated with the 1966 attempted “coup d’etat” (Soeharto’s description) launched by some units under the PKI, an event that is far from being clearly understood. Even though there were some different viewpoints among the three newspapers, as seen in their articles, this research concludes that all three tried to send the message that it was not the right time for Abdurrahman Wahid to continue with his proposed action. They all reminded the President about the critical conflicts he was having with Parliament at that time. According to this research, Abdurrahman Wahid finally listened to this message. The media had a profound impact in this case: the President did not take any decision by himself but instead sent his suggestion to the Assembly for discussion.

The sudden increase in the number of political parties after the fall of Soeharto resulted in a rise in the number of studies regarding effective campaign strategies (category 4). These have included issues such as how the public relations department of a political party should be developed and how this department should deal with given political issues. Examples of this type of study include “Public Relations Management of Nation Awakening Party in the 1999 Election” (Iskandar, 2001) and “Political Campaign of the National Mandate Party in the 1999 Election” (Kulsum, 2002).

The number of gender studies also increased during the Reform Era. Proof of this increase, and its implications in political communication, may be seen in a dissertation by Atmonobudi (2004). While other research projects tended to examine how various media portray a woman’s career or opinion in the context of a
patriarchal society such as Indonesia, this study with its critical approach, examines the ways in which middle-class housewives assign meaning to the political career of President Megawati. The results are then compared with meanings assigned by the contents of *Kompas* daily from January 1993 to the end of 2001, especially concerning whether it is appropriate for Megawati as a woman fill the post of Indonesia’s President; Megawati’s intellectual capacity and emotions; and Megawati’s profile that is not considered outstanding (at least compared with her father, Soekarno, who was considered to be a brilliant political thinker). Atmonobudi concludes that while *Kompas* did not express a clear opinion regarding the appropriateness of a woman President, most informants did “the negotiating reading” over the meaning provided by the media. According to the housewives supporting a woman for the presidency, it is already an accomplished fact that Indonesia has a female President. However, some housewives seriously questioned whether a woman President could carry out the domestic roles of a woman, such as childrearing, given the heavy duties of the Presidency. Some worried that a woman like Megawati could be easily controlled by other people, especially male politicians surrounding her. It is important to note that informants of Chinese descent gave “the critique of silence,” by saying that no matter who becomes Indonesia’s President, regardless of gender, the fate of Chinese Indonesian will never improve. They will still be regarded second-class citizens, who will never be viewed as appropriate even for the lowest political position such as *Lurah* (head of several villages or communities).

Concerning the intellectual capacity and emotions of Megawati, the Muslim housewives who were born during the Soeharto Era assigned the same meaning as that presented by the media: that Megawati is not very intellectual and cannot handle her emotions well. Megawati tends to react emotionally to criticism on unimportant issues, when there is no need to reply at all. Some Christian background housewives who were born before the Soeharto Era held the opposite opinion. As to Megawati’s profile, there was strong agreement; all informants agreed with the media that the Indonesian people did not consider Megawati to possess a high profile, especially when compared with the charisma of her father or the success of her husband, Taufik Kemas.

A dissertation by Gayatri (2002) employs critical discourse analysis to examine how three newspapers construct realities concerning Soeharto’s leadership. This study might simply have fallen into the group of studies comparing media reality constructions, if Gayatri had not chosen a relatively unique context together with that comparison. In this study, Soeharto’s leadership is analyzed in the specific context of Javanese culture (category 5, ethnicity issue in political communication). According to Gayatri’s findings, the realities of Soeharto’s leadership presented in newspapers are primarily based on his speeches and quotations. Thus, they resulted in a myth that Soeharto’s leadership style was Javanese, because he frequently stated his opinions or attitudes using Javanese terminology. He also often stressed Javanese principles of leadership as an example to be followed by all Indonesians. If fact, this research demonstrates that Soeharto’s words and actions were consistent with the traditional Javanese leadership style only during the first of four stages of his *hanggayuh kasampurnaning hoerip* (a Javanese concept referring to stages in a person’s life during which he accomplishes
his vision and mission). In the second period, pengamalan (putting into practice what had been said), and the third period, pematangan (maturation of the leader and fulfillment of his vision), as well as the final, climactic period, Soeharto’s words were in contradiction to his actions. In other words, Soeharto’s actions no longer reflected the values of a Javanese leader. The weakness of the media was that they took Soeharto’s words at face value, never evaluating his actions in terms of Javanese leadership principles. The media portrayed Soeharto’s leadership style as Javanese up until his downfall; this tended to bring the original teachings of Javanese leadership into disrepute.

There is also a research project conducted in the context of Sundanese ethnicity. The subject is the effectiveness of traditional leadership by the utilization of religion and magic (Djuhana, 2002). This study employs an ethnographic method in collecting data and describing the findings. Its object is the “golokmerah leadership” (red machete leadership) known to have existed in the village of Panyingkir, West Java, since the Dutch Colonial Era. The research describes red machete leadership, in the first place, as being related to magic, which is contrary to effective leadership according to Muslim teachings. According to Islam, leadership must be based on religious teachings only. However in practice, the Muslim ulama (leaders) also have long used magic. For example, in case that they thought their roles were treated by other parties, such as people who were categorized as “intellectual” in that area who can give some alternative views differing from the Muslim leaders’ mainstream views. The magic used by these religious leaders was only known to a very limited circle. On the other hand, the red machete leaders also used certain Islamic terminology to maintain or call on their magical powers. Thus, at the same time they employed magic, they justified themselves by using religious terminology. Djuhana concludes that for the people living in that area, Islam could be seen as magic as well as religion, since the religion provided the leaders spiritual teaching while magic gave them practical powers. Their leadership styles depended on how they balanced these two contradictory-but-complementary aspects of leadership. As Indonesia is rich in the plurality of ethnicities and cultures, this line of research is promising, and might contribute to enriching the unique identity of political communication research in Indonesia.

Finally, we have to note that from early 2000 to the end of 2003, a concerted research effort was launched to create a more democratic climate in the broadcasting landscape in Indonesia. It is not easy to say which parties initiated this effort, but it then gained more and more support from various groups working for a freer and equal communication system, and has become an effort belonging to all those parties. The area of promoting diversity of ownership and plurality of contents of broadcasting was jointly pioneered by the Graduate School of Communication, University of Indonesia, together with all state and local universities, as well as a large number of non-Government activists and community leaders in thirteen provinces across Indonesia.

There were at least three motives behind this joint research effort. Firstly, the liberalization of the media industry in the post-Soeharto era, and the domination of market pressures over the media industry, quickly put Indonesia into the so-called “fallacy of the two-model choice” (Bagdikian, 1997, p.248). This fallacy holds that
there are only two choices available: the state-controlled media (as during the Soeharto Era) and the uncontrolled media, characterized by libertarian media content -- such as bloody crime reporting, programs focusing on supernatural or magic, celebrity gossip shows, imported and Indonesian version of telenovela, and other programs produced or bought for the rating consideration only. Secondly, the broadcasting field was in urgent need of a new broadcasting law (replacing the suppressive Broadcasting Law No. 24/1997) and an independent regulatory body to oversee its implementation. Thirdly, in line with the first and the second reasons, the Broadcasting Law should thus recognize the existence of other types of broadcasting in addition to the ten Jakarta-based TV stations, i.e. national public TV, local public TV, local commercial TV, and community TV, as well as local public radio and community radio stations.

This joint effort finally contributed to the passage of the new Broadcasting Law No. 32/2002 in December 2002, and the establishment of the first Indonesian Broadcasting Commission (Komisi Penyiaran Indonesia, KPI) in December 2003 (see Gazali, 2003; Gazali et al., 2003). However, some parties, especially the existing commercial TV station owners, still consider that the new Broadcasting Law only revives the spirit of the Soeharto Era by establishing the KPI in place of the Ministry of Information (Kompas, September 18, 2002). These parties apparently either do not have a clear picture of the roles expected of an independent regulatory body such as the KPI, or they are threatened by the fact that Indonesia currently has approximately 1000 community radio stations, twenty-three local commercial TV stations, and one local public TV station.

Another positive sign is that efforts by a coalition of seventeen NGOs have resulted in a draft Freedom of Obtain Information Act (FOIA). In February 2001, a second draft was released and presented to the Parliament. Basorie (2001: p. 81) writes:

The draft FOIA covers six principles: (1) the right of every person to obtain information; (2) the obligation of public administrators to provide and serve requests for information in a quick, low-cost and simple manner; (3) tightly restricted exemptions; (4) the obligation of public agencies to streamline their information service and documentation system; (5) legal sanctions and penalties for parties that obstruct public access to information; and (6) the public right to exercise legal recourse if the right to obtain access to information has been violated.

9. The 2004 Election

As predicted earlier, the Media Performance Model in the Reform Era might not be extremely different from that which existed during the May 1998 Revolution (see Figure 2 Part C). Certainly, the Market appears to be stronger and is feared as the dominant power capable of determining which media can exist and dictate the style and content of programming. The interplay between Media and Civil Society
could be seen in three directions. First, due to the freer climate, the elements of Civil Society are able to present their views openly in the media. However, in some cases, they have attempted to force the media to carry their views and beliefs through threatening the journalists (it refers to what could then be categorized as a “bad element in civil society”). Second, the media has not played significant roles in supporting Civil Society, because many members of the media are still heady with the freedoms they are enjoying. The result is often sensational and superficial reporting (Basorie, 2001, p.64) or even instances of malpractice and excess (Dharma et al., 2003). Third, media have tried their best to enhance the Civil Society in Indonesia. The second and third directions might be related to McCargo’s observation (1999, p.28) that the “media practitioners are inclined to overstate their own importance, communication specialists are inclined to depoliticise media activity, and political scientists tend to discount the media’s role.”

Amidst those circumstances, approaching the 2004 Election, a heavy responsibility was placed on the shoulders of the Indonesian media. They were, directly or indirectly, entrusted with the task of informing the public about the upcoming election, which was described by King (2004, p.1) as “a series of elections that are some of the most complex and challenging to have been faced by any democracy, let alone an emerging democracy such as Indonesia’s”. It consists of three new election systems. The first system is a single non-transferable election (SNTV) system for the new Regional Representative Council (DPD, Dewan Perwakilan Daerah). This council is equivalent to a Senate in some countries. The candidates running for this Council must sever any attachment to political parties. The second system is the so-called “open-list proportional representation system” for the national legislature (DPR) and regional legislatures (DPRD). Both elections were held on April 5. These elections represent the first time in Indonesian history that citizens can vote directly for a candidate. In fact, the Election Law requires voters to select both a party symbol and a candidate in order to be counted as a valid vote. Voting only for the candidate will be considered invalid. A candidates who does well (receives say 200,000 votes), but still not enough to pass the threshold for a seat in a certain council (say 220,000 votes), must give up the seat to a candidate whose name appears higher on the party's preference list, even though that candidate receives less votes (say 10,000). Democracy activists fear that many parties have already worked the system to ensure their hacks are elected (see Economist, May 4, 2003). The third system is the election for the Presidency on July 5, also the first time in Indonesian history that an Indonesian President is elected directly by the electorate. If no candidate receives a majority of the votes in addition to a threshold in some provinces, a second round will be held between the top two candidates on September 20. Pre-election surveys indicate that a huge, last minute effort is needed to educate the Indonesian public, not only about new election processes, but also about the new and revised institutions being created (quoted in King, 2004).

From what may be observed during the six months prior to the election, it is quite fair to say that the Indonesian media will has not been able to carry out their task very well. What has appeared to be a priority for the media has been how to grab the largest share of the money that will be spent by the political parties to buy media space for political ads during the campaign period. The total amount of
campaign advertising, according to some sources, ranges from three billion Rupiah (data from an interview by the first author with the Chairman of the Indonesian Advertising Companies Association) to thirteen billion Rupiah (according to a businessman, quoted in Fajar Daily, January 12, 2004). The latter figure might include expenditures for promotion outside TV, radio and newspapers, such as T-shirts, umbrellas, banners, posters, and other paraphernalia with political party symbols and slogans. In addition to political ads, some parties have also paid for access to TV programs, such as talk shows; the KPI has alleged that some stations have sold time slots for very high sums.

For TV producers, the main challenge is to design programs that have some relationship to the election and at the same time can ensure a high rating. In this sense, the producers and advertisers consider that spending a lot of time educating the electorate about the new election system would not be very interesting to most audiences. Instead of doing so, some TV stations resorted to polling through SMS (short message services). The polls asked people to select their favorite candidate for President. Of course the stations were criticized immediately, since they didn’t employ any standard scientific polling method, and could easily mislead the audience (see Hidayat, Kompas, Jan. 6, 2004, Qodari, Kompas, Jan. 19, 2004). Even though some media personnel acknowledged those problems, most of them kept conducting this type of poll.

Meanwhile, activists fostering the production and distribution of Public Service Announcements (PSA), in an effort to educate people about the election, frequently expressed their disappointment with the attitudes of all TV stations, which only wanted to carry the PSA as long as it brought with it an economic value. Agus Pambagyo, of the Foundation for the Nation Youth Vision (Yayasan Visi Anak Bangsa), in an email interview said, “We have to pay the full-rate for PSA similar to other commercial ads. Sometime we try to develop a joint program with some TV stations, such as holding a competition to compose songs related to the election. But the chance is really limited!”

This is not to say that the Indonesian media did not contribute anything to the political education process, or provide a variety of information that the people might need in relation to the 2004 Election. A journalist from Kompas daily, Nasrullah Nara, in an email interview with the first author stated:

In general, all media have tried to do their best in presenting the recent stages of political dynamics approaching the election, both in the form of straight informative news and in-depth exploratory articles. Much more spaces are now opened for the public to channel their comments about the election process via comments from the readers, letters to editors, or call-ins for broadcast media. To the best of my knowledge, some media also give free space for the PSA to enlighten people about the new election system. But, unfortunately, there are a few media, by disguising matters, appear to mislead the public by blatantly taking sides with certain political parties or figures! A commercial TV station has even shown one particular presidential candidate conducting campaigns across Indonesia in most of its news
from early morning to late night. It is hard to believe that it even broadcast live a certain party’s last round campaign in Jakarta! This partisanship might spread a bad image to other media too!

The station in question, Metro TV, has been widely criticized for being blatantly partial in its coverage of the political campaign of its owner, Surya Paloh. Surya, one of the six presidential aspirants, clashed with party leader and presidential contender Akbar Tandjung over some of the latter’s party policies. Inside sources told the *Strait Times* (March 18, 2004) that in recent meetings, editors have implied that Metro TV would not run reports on Akbar’s campaign, unless they involved protests against him. In the same *Strait Times*’ report, one of the station’s senior journalists showed his discontent, “A lot of news items, which we thought should be priorities, got bumped off for reports on Surya’s campaign!” Another senior newscaster at Metro TV, after a live interview on Press Day (with the first author, February 9, 2004), also told that they felt uncomfortable doing unbalanced reporting in favor of the owner of that TV station.

Media observers agree that the Indonesian media has made some progress approaching and during the 2004 Election. Agus Sudibyo of the Institute of Information Flow, in an email interview (with the first author) agrees that, except for the Metro TV case, TV stations gave a relatively fair coverage for all political parties. Of course, it is understandable that they pay a bit more attention to the larger political parties. However, Agus Sudibyo also added:

On the other hand, only very few spaces were dedicated to educating and informing the public about the complicated new election system. TV stations are more concerned with the debate among the political elites. In short, it can be said that while the expectations for the role of the media before the complex 2004 Election was significantly high, the attention and capabilities of the media on average have not increased to the same level. What makes it worse, only very few communication scholars have paid attention to these matters.

The main media targeted for observation by relevant parties during the 2004 election were first television and then radio. According to Andreas Harsono, Chairman of the PANTAU Foundation (in an interview with ABC, March 25, 2004), ninety percent of Indonesian voters get their political news from TV; hence, controlling a television station is very strategic in winning voters. The News Director of one of the largest television stations in Indonesia, RTCI, was replaced by order of the ruling party. This party was also reportedly behind a recent reshuffle of the top management of the state-owned TVRI (*The Strait Times*, March 18, 2004).

Outside the broadcasting arena, several publications and Internet sites with close links to parties or presidential contenders have emerged over the past few months. One example is *Mega Demokrat*, which was established in late 2003 by Taufik Kiemas, President Megawati Soekarnoputri’s husband. With a circulation of 15,000, the biweekly tabloid has been providing the latest news about the President and her party, PDI-P. The People’s Mandate Party (led by Amien Rais) also
established its own publication in August 2003 under the name, “The People’s Mandate Media” (MAR). But since January 2004, this publication has been put on hold, as many of its staff members and supporters are embarking on political campaigns; however, its online version continues to be updated on the regular basis.

Analysts have predicted that such websites would not make much of an impact, since they are in general very segmented. According to data from the World Development Report 2000/2001, the number of Internet hosts per 10,000 people in Indonesia was only 1 (quoted in Basorie, 2001, p.64). What is more significant to observe, according to Andreas Harsono (in the interview with ABC, March 25, 2004), is a change in the way politicians and business leaders try to influence the media. Harsono says:

They have developed friendships with the editors of those news organizations. These are friendly phone calls like: "Your reporter is doing this, doing that, I am not happy with that, it is not accurate, it is not proportional, it is not comprehensive, more like social pressure rather than direct business pressure."

Finally, in addition to the controversial polling via SMS, the utilization of SMS to distribute political messages, during the build-up to the 2004 Election, has not yet received the attention it deserves. According to a study by Asia Market Intelligence (quoted in Kompas Cyber Media, August, 12, 2002), 76 percent of the cellular phone users in seven Asian countries (Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines, Vietnam, India, and Indonesia) prefer to use SMS to send message rather than email. Data from the Vice President of Product Development, Selular Indosat, Trias Kater Kartasasminta (quoted in Kompas, April 16, 2004) shows that in the two weeks approaching the voting day, the number of SMS sent every day, which is normally fourteen to fifteen millions SMS, increases by around twenty to twenty-five percent. Kartasasmita also noted some unique phenomena during those weeks, such as SMS sent from a cellular number to a huge number of receivers, let's say 10,000. In terms of economic value, it only costs a political party or candidate approximately 3.5 million Rupiah to send SMS, as opposed to the huge amount required for placing a political ad on TV, for instance.

Political SMS, according to Andi Mallarangeng (ABC, March 25, 2004), serves the public in several ways. For example, when Golkar and PDI-P were buying political ads, a lot of SMS ridiculing those advertisements were sent, among others making jokes about the style of Akbar Tanjung, the Chairman of Golkar, in those ads. However, some parties also take advantage of this popular technology to damage the reputation of other political parties or figures. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, a strong presidential candidate from the newly-established Demokrat Party (PD, Partai Demokrat), needed to give a special press conference to deny accusations launched against him, mainly through SMS, and but also through anonymous letters and phone calls. There are five slanderous accusations surrounding him, i.e. he had converted to another religion (no longer a Muslim), that he has two wives, that the CIA supports his nomination for President, that he received funding from America and some notorious mafia figures in Jakarta, and that he has strong prejudices against Muslims and Chinese Indonesians.
10. Concluding Remarks

In the last two decades, Indonesia has faced three fascinating periods. Firstly, the Soeharto Era, categorized by some analysts as a “semi-authoritarian” regime or a “corporate authoritarian” regime, which came into power in 1966. Using the Media Performance Model as a tool, we can see that during this period, the Soeharto Government became the center of interplay among the Media, the Market, the Civil Society, and the Government itself. Even though phenomena in this era were potentially interesting topics for political communication research, they could not be explored to the fullest extent due to the constraints imposed by the regime in power. Moreover, the political communication major had just been introduced in a very few departments of communication and politics at that time. The Government also ensured that no research interests would pose a threat to political stability as well as to the regime’s political legitimacy. During this era, the success of implementing open-market policies and maintaining political stability were both considered as key factors for achieving economic growth, and hence essential for reproducing the legitimacy of the Soeharto Regime.

Secondly, the May 1998 Revolution, that could be seen as the result of internal contradictions within Soeharto’s political, economic, and communication policies, exacerbated by international pressures. Approaching May 21, 1998, the interplay among elements in the society made the Soeharto Government increasingly vulnerable to, and eventually bow to, the performance of Civil Society, Market and Media. This revolution seemed to arrive and take place in a comparatively short time. Therefore, it has been extremely challenging (even until recently) for political communication researchers to attempt a comprehensive explanation of the event. If the experience with the 1966 Revolution (that brought Soeharto into power) is any indication, the May 1998 Revolution may go down in history with very little comprehensive research. It may be remembered that the 1966 Revolution has never been seriously and consistently explored for a more comprehensive and open-to-the-public exposition.

Thirdly, the Reform Era, after the departure of Soeharto, resulting in a more open and democratic, yet weak, Government, and a relatively stronger Civil Society, Market and Media. This period should have been a new and fertile ground for political communication research. And the researchers indeed have risen to the occasion and have tried to answer this challenge. The data collection at the four main universities in Indonesia shows the increase in quantity of research, as well as in research interests in certain subjects. These subjects include the following: media law and freedom of press, structure of media industry and power relations surrounding it, religious issues or influences in political communication, political conflict with violence, as well as studies on elections and campaigns due to the rise of a great number of political parties.

Two important phenomena are noteworthy, along with those increases, i.e. the fact that research on the May 1998 Revolution and during the Reform Era started to employ a multi-disciplinary approach, and the new way the researchers picture the interplay between structure and agency in the media industry. During the Soeharto Era, almost all of the studies used only either communication or political theories.
Since then, researchers have made use of a significant number of theories from other fields, such as concepts from sociology, political economy of media industry, etc. If, during the Soeharto Era, the most researchers assumed that the journalists could be easily controlled by the political and economic structures, now most researchers have opened their minds to the interplay between structure and agency, as well as to the power relations analysis among the Government, Market, Civil Society and Media at a (more) macro level.

From the data collection, we also learn that research at the community level, such as on political socialization and the selective exposure in the media and content choices among community members, deserves much more attention in the near future. As Indonesia is rich in terms of plurality of religions, ethnicities, and cultures, this line of research -- comparing these matters among communities with different backgrounds -- is certainly promising. Along with research on efforts using mediated and non-mediated political communication in conflict-resolution management, which was still hard to find until recently, they might contribute toward enriching the unique identity of political communication research in Indonesia.

Finally, it is important to note that even though the Reform Era indeed provides an opportunity to open up what was previously considered taboo in political communication, there is still no sign that researchers are enthusiastic about exploring this opportunity. The only study in our data collection on Soekarno’s thinking, for example, does not provide any new dimension for discussion. A fresh historical narrative and critical analysis on the social and political roles of the Armed Forces in the transition era is also still waiting to be developed. In other words, studies concerning concepts and practices surrounding the Government deserve further exploration. Likewise, the power relations between the media and other elements around the 2004 Election clearly shows that Indonesia’s media have just started to learn how to place themselves in a (more) macro interplay with other interest groups beyond their routine institutions and practices. What is more, the concepts and practices surrounding that election -- the first direct election in the Indonesia’s history -- have also received very little attention from political communication scholars.

Again, we have to see the delay in responding appropriately and creatively to the newly and suddenly open challenges in political communication research in Indonesia as part of a larger picture, where this field seems to be just waking up, and thus in need of more effort at keeping abreast with developments taking place in other academic centers. Developing more cooperation with researchers from other countries -- until now only a handful of cooperative efforts are recorded -- could constitute a breakthrough. In that way, political communication researchers in Indonesia could share and learn how to effectively envision this field, given its unique characteristics and elaborate methods, which would enrich their research. Creative research methods, using the Internet for example, are still far from a reality in Indonesia.

However, all these shortcomings might still be compensated for by the fact that not only academicians, but also a great number of activists in non-Government
organizations, together with media practitioners, have jointly undertaken action-
research efforts, placing citizens where they should be, as active information
gatherers and processors. These efforts are very important in enhancing the
relatively equal interplay among Media, Civil Society, Market and Government (in
the Media Performance Model). This endeavor still has a long way to go, but it has,
to a certain extent, contributed to the changing media landscape in Indonesia, with
the passage of the new Broadcasting Law, mushrooming local, public, and
community media, the establishment of Indonesia’s first Broadcasting Commission
(KPI), as well as the submission of the draft version of the Freedom to Obtain
Information Act (FOIA) to Parliament. Together with all the research at the micro
and meso levels -- such as analyses of media content, production and consumption
of media content related to political communication, and its potential effects -- this
effort is clearly in line with the direction for the future pointed out by Chaffee
(2001) envisioning the politics of communication.
Second Chapter

In Search of Quality Measures for News Programming on Indonesian Television

1. Introduction

Television in Indonesia is changing fast: within a short period of time, five commercial stations were launched with objectives that are diametrically opposed to those of the state-owned broadcaster. Until 1989 the state-owned TVRI enjoyed a monopoly that had lasted for more than thirty years. Television, both for informing and entertaining purposes, is relatively young in Indonesia; the same goes for television news reporting. This paper is an attempt to assess the context within which news is currently being produced on television and the developments news reporting is undergoing or may undergo in the near future.

Assessing the state of news reporting becomes even more interesting when one talks to the communicators, that is, the newsmakers and policy makers themselves. Central questions here are: “what is your definition of a good news program and of a good newsmaker?” , “how do you reconcile creativity and station policy and what problems are you facing?”. This paper also aims to formulate suggestions in order to optimize the quality of Indonesian news programs. It is important to never lose sight of the Indonesian news production context. News quality can certainly not be assessed against Western standards exclusively. Neither can one hide behind the Eastern outlook according to which individual interests are invariably subordinate to those of the community or, to put it more politically, where the Government views the interest of the state as the interest of the people, and the will of the state as the will of the people.

2. Historical Background

2.1. Geographical Context

These developments need to be assessed in connection with the country's peculiar geography (an archipelago of 13,500 islands of which 6,000 are inhabited) as well as its specific social, cultural, economic and political context. This is characterized by inequalities in both population spread and level of development. Indonesia's population accounts to more than 200 million (a figure to which 3.5 million people must be added each year) with on average rather low to moderate education levels.
In Search of Quality Measures for News Programming on Indonesian Television

Table 3
Indonesian Population by Educational Level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Educational level (15+)</th>
<th>1996 (,000)</th>
<th>1996 (%)</th>
<th>1997 (,000)</th>
<th>1997 (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No schooling</td>
<td>699</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>653</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary school not finished</td>
<td>1,157</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>1,075</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary school</td>
<td>2,829</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>2,977</td>
<td>21.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior high school</td>
<td>3,046</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>3,159</td>
<td>23.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior high school</td>
<td>4,433</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>4,635</td>
<td>33.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-university higher education</td>
<td>611</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>611</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>618</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>664</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: SRI Media Index, Media Scene, 1996-97. Figures are based upon six major cities: Jakarta, Bandung, Semarang, Surabaya, Medan, Ujungpandang.

Indonesia is a highly diverse ethno-cultural society (more than 300 ethnic groups with each group its own language and culture) – a diversity whose potential development is stifled by the “national” unity discourse heavily propagated through the media (especially television) by the Government, which vehemently puts down every opposition. Even with a rise in prosperity levels for all income groups, including the lowest ones, millions of Indonesians still live below the poverty line, while a small group of people is extravagantly rich. The gap between these two groups is becoming even larger, and so is the anger generated by this state of affairs. Two thirds of the population live in Java and Bali, which together make up 7 percent of the total land mass. The country's nerve center has been (since the Dutch colonization) and continues to be Java, which influences society in many areas, including television (Keuning et al., 1987: 9 and 27-9).

2.2. The Social/Cultural Context: Unity in Diversity

Since the end of the 1960's the Government's “building” programs are part of an active development policy spread throughout the whole region. The definition of “building” is to be understood very largely: in addition to economic and social construction, the Government considers also the political system, the relationship between the local and national culture, the construction of a national judicial system together with religious interaction as building blocks for this definition of unity (Keuning et al., 1987: 49). The strong, centralizing Government in Jakarta misses no opportunity to tell the population they all belong to one country. The interest in ethnic diversity comes second. Nevertheless, the national motto, Bhinneka Tunggal Ika, or Unity in Diversity, is still an unrealized ideal.

The main component of this unity building Government policy is the “five pillar” ideology, or Pancasila (panca means "five," and sila means "pillar"). These pillars, which are presented as indivisible, are as follows: belief in one God, Compassion, State unity, Democracy by negotiation and agreement, and Social justice (Ricklefs, 1981: 197). This state ideology is applicable to all aspects of social life: all organizations, including private businesses, must accept the Pancasila state ideology as
their one and only guiding principle. The same goes for the different television broadcasters: all programs need to be screened according to this ideology (McDaniel, 1994: 215). This attempt on the part of the Government’s to propagate uniform rules for all citizens creates problems, however, because the various ethnic groups have no intention of abandoning their own local customs and cultural habits.

2.3. The Political Context: Applied “Pancasila Democracy”

The Pancasila ideology constitutes the basis of all aspects of Indonesian society. Indonesia cannot look back upon a democratic tradition as experienced in the West. After Indonesia declared its independence from the Netherlands in 1945, a bitter struggle followed, resulting in the recognition of Indonesian independence by the Netherlands in 1949. In 1950 a parliamentary democracy was installed, which led in the following years to an ever growing number of small political parties which were unable to establish a stable coalition, which resulted in growing political unrest (Ricklefs, 1981: 225-44). President Soekarno turned parliamentary democracy into a “Guided Democracy” in 1959. In his opinion Western parliamentary democracy was an unworkable concept in his country. Nevertheless, the Guided Democracy period led to even more chaos: the economic situation grew worse every day and the political situation became even more explosive, which forced the president to look for allies among the members of the rising Communist Party. In 1965 seven senior officers were murdered by a group of soldiers with left-wing sympathies. The coup was defeated by troops under the leadership of Soeharto, commander of the Strategic Reserve Command. The latter seized the opportunity to seize power. Since Communist Party members were suspected of active involvement in this coup, Soeharto chose to eliminate them. It was estimated that half a million of party members and potentially involved individuals were killed. Soeharto was appointed president and replaced Soekarno's Guided Democracy with the Orde Baru, or “New Order”. This New Order aimed at economic growth and restoration of peace and order. From 1971 elections were held every five year (Ricklefs, 1981: 272-9). By order of the president the numerous existing political parties were regrouped in three main parties: on the one hand Golkar (Golongan Karya, professional groups), the largest party which constitutes the political power base of the president, and on the other hand, the PDI (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia, Indonesian Democratic Party) and the PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, United Party for Development). The powerful Golkar party enjoys the support of the Government, the military forces and the business community.

2.4. Governmental Media Control

The increasing reach of radio and television has made it easier for the Government to exert influence. All tools to control what is said and written in public are at its disposal. While newspapers and magazines may be privately owned, they exist only by the grace of the Government, which delivers and revokes licenses at will. The state-owned radio station Radio Republik Indonesia (RRI) and TV station TVRI are considered mere Government propaganda tools. Commercial broadcasters must
renew their license every five years, which guarantees Government censorship. Since 1975, Indonesia has been ruled according to the SARA doctrine, which dictates portrayal of “unity,” or more properly of “diversity within unity.” Four issues are taboo in the media: ethnicity (Suku), religion (Agama), race (Ras) and social class (Antargolongan) (Schulte Noordholt, 1991: 21). This does not only refer to prohibition of negative reporting: any mention of these four issues is prohibited, including neutral news reporting. Consequently any topic loosely connected to the SARA is simply ignored by the print and the audio-visual media. Interpretation of the SARA doctrine is entirely up to the Government. In practice this results in the so-called “telephone culture”: one phone call from security services or the information ministry is enough to dictate what can or cannot be brought into the open (Schulte Noordholt, 1991: 22).

In this relentless pursuit of national unity, a lot of weight is given to the notion of “national culture.” By national culture, one means the dominant Javanese culture which is considered superior to all other cultural expressions. One of the characteristics of Javanese culture is the avoidance of bringing up problems: the notion of non-confrontation in order not to disturb harmony is central here. The acronym for this phenomenon is ABS, which stands for Asal Bapak Senang, that is, “keeping the boss happy,” which means one would rather fit facts to expectations than talk about problems openly. In order to propagate this “national culture” throughout the country, the Indonesian Government has tried to expand access to TVRI and RRI. The launch of Indonesia’s first communications satellite (Palapa) on August 17, 1974 certainly contributed to this enlarged access (Keuning et al., 1987: 51; McDaniel, 1994: 228). From that moment on TVRI and RRI were able to broadcast throughout the entire archipelago: for the Government this was the ultimate opportunity to indoctrinate all citizens with the national unity thought. Due to the arrival of commercial broadcasters, television penetration in Indonesia has increased formidably over the last years and the struggle for audience maximization is at full pitch. The number of television sets rapidly increased from 7.6 million in 1990 to about 20 million in 1997, for a population of over 200 million (or about 18 million households). There are 92 million TV viewers of ten years of age and older, with 52 million living in rural areas (PPI, 1996b: 28). Perception of television as a luxury good has been steadily dwindling: according to the latest research carried out at the Graduate Program in Communications of the University of Indonesia from January to June 1997, people in Jakarta and surroundings watch television for about 4 hours daily. Surrounded by fast changing communications technologies in a global world, the Indonesian Government tries hard to preserve the ideological values of national culture and national unity. But the technology which once favored the Government’s centralizing efforts, now threatens to tear these ideological values apart.
Table 4
Profile of Indonesian TV Viewers (based on sex and age, in millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>0-14</th>
<th>15-19</th>
<th>20-29</th>
<th>30-39</th>
<th>40+</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>172.0</td>
<td>85.6</td>
<td>86.4</td>
<td>65.4</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>37.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>175.6</td>
<td>87.4</td>
<td>88.2</td>
<td>66.0</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>38.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>179.1</td>
<td>89.2</td>
<td>89.9</td>
<td>66.2</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>39.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>195.3</td>
<td>97.4</td>
<td>97.7</td>
<td>65.5</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>45.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>198.3</td>
<td>98.9</td>
<td>99.4</td>
<td>65.2</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>35.9</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>46.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>201.4</td>
<td>100.4</td>
<td>101.0</td>
<td>65.0</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>48.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Unless indicated otherwise, all figures mentioned in the tables and/or throughout this chapter are compiled from several sources: personal interviews with and/or questionnaires sent out to officials at all Indonesian TV stations; Media Scene (the official guide for advertising media established by the Indonesian Association of Advertising Agencies); SRI (Survey Research Indonesia); research conducted at the Graduate Program in Communications at the University of Indonesia, January to June 1997, in Jakarta and surroundings, entitled “Television’s Image and Positioning.”

2.5. The Indonesian Broadcasting Act of 1997

The fast rise of commercial television broadcasters brought along at least one problem: according to the law TVRI was still the one and only television broadcaster. Although the Government did not try to block the emergence of commercial stations, there was no legal recognition of the situation until 1996. Commercial stations thus found themselves in a “twilight zone”, with no official status or guidelines. This situation endured until a new broadcasting bill was passed in December 1996 and approved of by the President on September 22nd, 1997. From then on commercial stations were officially authorized to broadcast their own news programs. This decision formally broke the monopoly in the field of television news. Nevertheless, the commercial stations have to live up to all the same rules and regulations. They are required to broadcast the 7 and 9 p.m. TVRI news programs and all Government messages. The commercial stations already broadcast news before 1996, under the guise of so-called “information programs,” the goal being to circumvent the prohibition on news broadcasting.

Table 5
News and Information Programs on All Indonesian Television Stations (Broadcasting Hours and Minutes)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>TVRI</th>
<th>RCTI</th>
<th>SCTV</th>
<th>TPI</th>
<th>ANTV</th>
<th>IVM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Information</td>
<td>04.45</td>
<td>06.00</td>
<td>02.42</td>
<td>02.30</td>
<td>03.20</td>
<td>00.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News</td>
<td>03.30</td>
<td>05.00</td>
<td>02.30</td>
<td>02.15</td>
<td>03.00</td>
<td>01.30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: “Information” category also includes talk shows, etc. “News” refers to daily news magazines.
Table 6
News Content on the Basis of Origin

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>TVRI</th>
<th>RCTI</th>
<th>SCTV</th>
<th>TPI</th>
<th>ANTV</th>
<th>IVM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>47.0</td>
<td>78.13</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>85.0</td>
<td>30.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>19.25</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>65.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>9.25</td>
<td>3.13</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>18.74</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: “International” category refers to news items mentioning Indonesia; “Foreign” category refers to news items in which Indonesia is not mentioned.

Table 7
Categories of News Items (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>TVRI</th>
<th>RCTI</th>
<th>SCTV</th>
<th>TPI</th>
<th>ANTV</th>
<th>IVM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Politics</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>11.25</td>
<td>14.06</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>30.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>9.38</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technology/Science</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>7.75</td>
<td>3.13</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sports</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>8.25</td>
<td>1.56</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>1.56</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economy</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>16.25</td>
<td>17.18</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>30.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Interest</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>12.14</td>
<td>17.18</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arts &amp; Culture</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>6.88</td>
<td>6.25</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>20.32</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>9.38</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disasters</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter-media Content Analysis</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: At least 25 percent of all crime reporting relates to crimes of a sexual nature such as sexual harassment, rape, etc.
Table 8
Total Program Output per Channel (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>TVRI</th>
<th>RCTI</th>
<th>SCTV</th>
<th>TPI</th>
<th>ANTV</th>
<th>IVM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Film</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drama Series</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comedy Series</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News &amp; Information*</td>
<td>50.7</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>25.36</td>
<td>23.70</td>
<td>27.10</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Music</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>27.80</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quizzes</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sports**</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children (e.g. cartoons)</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other***</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.64</td>
<td>2.30</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
* “News & Information” also includes “religion” (usually 3 to 4%).
** For ANTV, “Sports” is calculated separately from “News & Information,” while at the other stations, it is also part of “News & Information.”
*** The “Other” category includes special event programs, light entertainment, infotainment, and variety shows.

The new broadcasting bill did not end censorship, however: the Government is clearly still pulling the strings. The commercial broadcasters' licenses need to be renewed every five years. If they do not behave according to the Government's will, licenses can be withdrawn: in this way, the threat is always there, as is the case with the print media. While the Government can withdraw print media licenses without cause, withdrawal of a commercial station's license must be decided by a court of justice. The influence of the Government remains very powerful, however: expressions of violence, sadism, pornography, superstition, gambling, permissive and consumption-oriented attitudes, hedonism and feudalism are not allowed on Indonesian television screens in order to “protect the people” (Gatra, 21 December, 1996). Communist and Marxist-Leninist ideas are taboo; the same goes for programs that do not correspond to the religious and national unity doctrines. Infringements are punished with fines or imprisonment of up to seven years, or with license withdrawal. Furthermore, the Government can – pending a court's final decision – “freeze” a commercial station's license. The Government can refuse renewal of a license without a court's sanction. In other words commercial stations remain very dependent upon the Government, nor can they ever be sure of having a future. The parameters within which the commercial stations are required to function hardly differ from those of the state-owned media: although the Government does not exercise direct editorial control, licensing procedures and regulations clearly stipulate newsroom directives. Add to this the lack of diversity in the ownership structure of commercial stations, all of which are in the hands of one big presidential family clan; this guarantees direct compliance with Government policy. The Soehartos' business empire is legendary; it encompasses power generation, toll roads, electronics, paper factories, one commercial airline, construction, broadcasting, banking, telecommunications, newspapers, property, shipping, and cars.
3. Indonesia’s Television Landscape

3.1. Televisi Republik Indonesia (TVRI)

Due to the long-standing monopoly of the state television *Televisi Republik Indonesia* (TVRI), Indonesian TV long remained in a state of stagnation. As a state channel, TVRI's mission is one of propaganda, of informing the population from the perspective of the Government only. The Indonesian Government soon realized the importance of television as a policy instrument: central goals in TVRI's promotion campaigns were and still are national unity, integration and development, and political stability (Alfian et al., 1981: 23). Nevertheless, this mission was hampered by geography (a vast and fragmented archipelago) and by an enormous diversity among peoples and cultures. To overcome this problem, the Indonesian Government decided in 1974 to launch its own communications satellite: *Palapa* (Sanskrit for “unity”) in order to be able to reach the whole country. Television was no longer an exclusively urban phenomenon.

Although the Indonesian Government recognized TVRI's social importance and Palapa's huge possibilities for a rapid expansion of the television network, this does not automatically imply that these media have been efficiently used. Right from the start TVRI had to face major problems of a political, social/cultural, economic, and organizational nature (Alfian et al., 1981: 39). As a state-owned broadcaster, TVRI is under the authority of the ministry of information, which implies a bureaucratic mill slowing down even the smallest decision. Moreover, TVRI has to reckon with the other Government departments, all defending their own interests and all wishing to see their successes shown on television (Alfian et al., 1981: 30).

Social/cultural problems are apparent on the side of the audience, due to numerous differences among the rural and urban population. Television has always been and continues to be a mainly urban phenomenon: city-dwellers only – both as policy makers and TVRI program makers – leave their mark on the programs. Norms and values of the rural and urban population groups do not always match, and the rural audience often recognizes too little of its own cultural values and identity on the television screen. Trying to portray the myriad different values and cultures in a balanced way appears almost impossible (Alfian et al., 1981: 33). An attendant circumstance is the omnipresent dominance of the Javanese culture, which distorts the situation even more.

As for economic problems, TVRI has a very tight budget. The Indonesian Government never provided enough money to adequately equip TVRI's studios. Moreover, TVRI cannot gather advertising revenues. At first it was allowed to do so, but in 1981 president Soeharto banned ads from the television screen, from fear that the ads – being too Western and too urban – might evoke too high expectations among the audience. According to Soeharto, TVRI had to protect the Indonesian public, and had to focus more on developmental issues. This change in policy meant a sudden and important financial loss for TVRI. Given its tight budget, TVRI has to look for ever cheaper, foreign/Western productions that are equally in contradiction with the values and goals set by the Government (Alfian et al., 1981: 39-40). This tight budget also has implications for the staff: even minimal in-service training classes are unaffordable.
TVRI's regional stations throughout the country could all use better trained staff. The training capacity available to TVRI – with only two training schools throughout the country – is insufficient for this.

In 1964, TVRI started with a news department, focusing on developmental activities run by the Government (Alfian et al., 1981: 83). TVRI's news provision is a far cry from balanced information, since only Governmental successes are shown. Nowadays, TVRI schedules four daily news programs on its first channel: regional news (Java) from 5:00 to 6:00 p.m., national news from 7:00 to 7:30 p.m., international news from 9:00 to 9:30 p.m. and the late news from 10:30 to 10:45 p.m. Complementary to this, since 1996, short news flashes of about one minute every hour are broadcast: starting from 3:00 p.m., featuring the most recent events, nationally as well as internationally. The second TVRI channel (TVRI II) broadcasts daily news within the Jakarta area from 5:30 to 6:00 p.m., and English national and international news from 6:30 to 7:00 p.m.

The more TVRI focuses on the Government's developmental activities, the more it avoids any news on possible changes among political and social powers. Any critical comment from influential politicians, intellectuals, religious leaders or students have no chance of making it to the TVRI television news (Alfian et al., 1981: 84). According to the Government, such comments might endanger the country's political stability and unity. What is allowed is “responsible and constructive” criticism. This term is deliberately kept vague, so that nobody really knows what exactly is allowed and what is not. Although self-censorship is widespread among journalists, there is always a risk of displeasing the Government. According to the latter, the Indonesian media are free – free but responsible. In addition to the news criteria - timeliness, interest, and significance - the Government has introduced a fourth criterion: “safety,” meaning that the news item should not provoke social unrest (Wahyudi, 1984: 17). According to the Government, the population is not yet ready for information about, for instance, ethnicity, religion, race and social groups (SARA). Therefore, all information is severely selected and screened before going on air: there is no such thing as freedom of information gathering and dissemination on many social issues.

If TVRI wants to achieve its set goals then, first of all, it needs an audience! Since the start of commercial stations, its audience has shrunk continuously. While in general the number of viewers in Indonesia is increasing rapidly, the numbers of people watching TVRI are decreasing. As a result TVRI is less and less capable of conducting the Government campaigns in an adequate way. In line with its open-sky policy, it is the Government itself which gives out broadcast licenses to commercial stations; the same goes for the licenses to foreign channels, received through the Palapa satellite and the many private satellite dish receivers. This practice begins to conflict more and more with TVRI's mission and goals, and therefore also those of the Government. Commercial pressure might undermine the social goals set by the Indonesian Government (McDaniel, 1994: 299). The attempts of the Indonesian Government to control the situation by putting in place a strong regulatory framework are constantly being challenged by the pressure exerted by commercial stations seeking to maximize their profits. Ironically, these entrepreneurs are part of the president's family or belong to his circle of close friends.
3.2. RCTI: The Pioneer of Indonesian Commercial Television

As early as in 1981 the Government decided that TVRI, as a “state enterprise” with a developmental mission, could not be involved in commercial activities. That is why in 1987 the Government granted a broadcast license to Rajawali Citra Indonesia (RCTI), a commercial station, allowing it to start broadcasting first in Jakarta only, and later on throughout the country (Deppen, 1995: 164). This decision was taken as the result of a process of deregulation within the Indonesian television context (Kuswandi, 1996: 38; Chan & Ma, 1996: 48). Deregulation and commercialization stem from an internationalization process taking place in many Asian countries, including Indonesia, in the sectors of television and new information technologies (Chan & Ma, 1996: 48). Until some years ago the Indonesian public could watch only a couple of foreign programs. Owing to the rapid development of private commercial channels, the public is now overloaded with foreign (mainly Western) programs. These also bring in foreign (Western) influence. Viewed from this angle, the rapid development of commercial broadcasters can be seen as the response from the Government to the ever increasing pressure from transnational television. The Indonesian Government has realized that its best defense against transnational television is “to improve the competitiveness of domestic television industries” (Chan & Ma, 1996: 48). The best way to do so is to ensure the rapid growth of commercial broadcasters able to broadcast attractive, national alternatives. At the same time, the Indonesian Government maintains tight control and therefore the only commercialization allowed is commercialization without independence (Chan & Ma, 1996: 49). The commercial broadcasters avoid crossing the (vague) political and ideological line drawn by the Government, for fear of repercussions that might lead to final closure of the station.

It is significant that the president's son, Bambang Trihatmodjo, is the president and chairman of RCTI's Board of Directors. Bambang's company, Bimantara, also has the majority of the shares. The Government decided that RCTI, and with it all other future commercial broadcasters, had to pay 12.5 percent of its advertising revenues to TVRI per year, beginning in 1992. The Indonesian television culture that existed at the time RCTI started broadcasting was based on the model of state-owned broadcaster TVRI. RCTI's way of working and broadcasting is totally different: less bureaucratic and aimed at maximizing profits.

Right from the start the commercial stations had a much larger budget at their disposal than TVRI. The economic development of Southeast Asia, including Indonesia, has been astounding. This has created a huge demand for more advertising channels in order to be able to sell more products; as a result the advertising industry is developing rapidly. Thanks to the ever growing audience with increasing amounts of money to spend, the commercial broadcasters could start with realistic chances to survive. Currently, the largest part of the advertising revenues goes to the commercial television stations, which signifies important losses for the print media. These advertising revenues give the commercial broadcasters a strong economic base, necessary to cover their own investments (Chan & Ma, 1996: 49). Nevertheless the Indonesian commercial broadcasters still are in their infancy and still have a long way to go before reaching maturity. Indonesia is not yet a real consumption society, although it is rapidly becoming one.
From the start RCTI was not allowed to broadcast its own news programs. There is a law which requires all commercial stations to rebroadcast the TVRI news at 7 and 9 p.m.. In order to broadcast news programs of their own, the commercial stations created “information programs”. The Government turned a blind eye to this stratagem, which was made legal by the Broadcasting Act of December 1996: news broadcasting by commercial stations is now allowed. RCTI has several daily news programs. The first one, *Nuansa Pagi (Morning Nuances)* starts at 6:00 a.m. and features national and international news, in both Indonesian and English, for two hours. At noon starts the 30 minute long *Buletin Siang (News at Noon)*, which includes “ladies subjects.” The third news program, *Seputar Indonesia (Throughout Indonesia)*, starts at 6:30 p.m. and features national news for 30 minutes. Until now this has been the most popular news program of all on commercial stations. It is the backbone of RCTI's news department. At 11:30 p.m. starts the last news program, *Buletin Malam (Evening News)*, which lasts 30 minutes and focuses mostly on international news. RCTI has *PT Sindo Citra Media* as its own production house for all news programs. Since RCTI is a commercial broadcaster, it has other goals than state-owned broadcaster TVRI. Therefore its program content, especially as regards news programs, is also different: its news programming have a higher entertainment value. This means a totally different approach, both content- and format-wise. Moreover, this approach has the overall support of the audience.

### 3.3. SCTV: RCTI’s Little Brother

By the end of 1989 the second commercial station, *Surya Citra Televisi (SCTV)*, was licensed to go on air. SCTV has more or less its origin in RCTI, to which it was attached until August 1993 (Sedel, 1995: 10). Although it is now independent, SCTV is often regarded as RCTI's “little brother”, not in the least by RCTI itself. SCTV is in the hands of *Sudwikatmono*, the president's stepbrother, and businessman *Henri Pribadi*. SCTV broadcasts the following daily news programs: *Liputan 6 Pagi (Morning News at Six)* from 5:30 to 7:00 a.m., *News Watch (English National and International News)* from 7:00 to 7:30 a.m., *Liputang 6 Siang (Noon News)* from 11:30 to 12:00 a.m., *Liputan 6 Petang (Evening News at Six)* from 6:30 to 7:00 p.m.. All these programs focus on national news, with the morning program featuring mainly the most recent news from the night before in Jakarta and Surabaya. International news accounts for about 20 percent of the total news on offer. The evening program mostly concentrates on crime reporting and political news.

### 3.4. TPI: The Educational Commercial Station

In August 1990, a third commercial station was given a license to broadcast. Because there were already two generalist commercial stations, this third one was allowed only provided that it focus on education and that its name reflect this. This was the start of *Televisi Pendidikan Indonesia (TPI)*. Although TPI is a commercial station, it has collaborated with TVRI from the beginning. In the morning TPI rents
equipment and infrastructure from TVRI in order to broadcast its educational programs throughout the whole country. In the afternoon and evening, TPI uses its own equipment and infrastructure.

Until recently, TPI was in the hands of Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana, President Soeharto’s eldest daughter. Apart from formal education, TPI’s program supply also includes out-of-school and informal education, news and information, sports, entertainment programs, music, quiz programs, series and movies. Unlike the other commercial broadcasters, TPI has to hand over 20 percent of its advertising revenues to TVRI: the normal 12.5 percent plus 7.5 percent for the rental of TVRI's equipment and infrastructure (Deppen, 1995: 72).

The amount of local productions in TPI's program supply is striking, especially when compared with the other commercial broadcasters. Although in theory TPI needs to focus mainly on education, its educational programming has been dwindling, being replaced by an increasing entertainment output. As a matter of fact, there is hardly anything educational in TPI’s program supply, and it is being increasingly criticized for this (Kuswandi, 1996: 46). For its defense TPI argues that the notion of education has to be interpreted in a broad way, as it would not be able to survive should it concentrate on narrow, traditional educational programming. Not being sponsored by the Government, TPI has to compete with four other commercial stations. As a result TPI is trying to profile itself as a family channel and considers “education” as relevant only as far as its broadcasting license is concerned.

TPI has two daily news programs of its own – one in the morning, from 6:00 a.m. to 7:00 a.m.: Selamat Pagi Indonesia (Good Morning Indonesia), and one in the afternoon, from 5:00 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.: Lintas Lima (Report at Five). TPI focuses mainly on local news: it has so far broadcast no international news. Concerning the national news, it mostly focuses on crime and news from major metropolitan areas throughout Indonesia.

3.5. ANteve: The Fourth Commercial Station

On January 1993, a fourth commercial station, Cakrawala Andalas Televisi (Anteve or ANTV), was granted a license by the ministry of information. Compared with the other commercial stations, ANteve's reach is smaller. ANteve is in the hands of the Bakrie Brothers Group. They belong to one of the most important entrepreneurial families in Indonesia. As the fourth commercial station to emerge in a short time, it took ANteve a while before it really took off (Kuswandi, 1996: 41). The more numerous the commercial stations, the more difficult survival becomes. Although the percentage of advertising expenditures is still growing (44.4 percent in 1996, as compared to 8 percent in 1990, according to Sedel, 1996: 12), the lion's share still goes to RCTI, the first commercial station. RCTI's position is firmly entrenched, which makes it all the more difficult for the others, especially the newest ones.

Like RCTI and SCTV, ANteve is a generalist commercial broadcaster. ANteve has been striving to profile itself in three areas: news, sports and music. In the
beginning it broadcast mainly music and sports, with a clear focus on young people. In the beginning, ANteve rebroadcast 6.5 hours of MTV programs every day (Kuswandi, 1996: 45). It is still doing this, but the station also started to focus on news and information in order to create a more general image, in order to attract adults as well (PPPI, 1996: 151). The hope is that this strategy will bring about an increase in ANteve's advertising revenues.

ANteve broadcasts two daily news programs: Hallo Indonesia (from 6:00 a.m. to 7:30 a.m.) and Cakrawala (Horizon) from 5:00 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.. Both programs focus on a general audience and deal with topics politics (albeit in a limited manner), economics, sports and foreign news (also strictly limited). Mostly, though, the focus is on national news, with Cakrawala being almost totally dedicated to crime and political news from the capital. Apart from these two programs, there is a short news break every hour (40 seconds) in connection with news program Aktualita (Current Affairs). These center on the most recent national and international news, referring to Cakrawala for more detailed information. ANteve's seriousness with respect to news reporting is apparent inasmuch as it has hired foreign journalists and cameramen in order to significantly improve professionalism in its sports and news department. ANteve was also the first Indonesian station opening an overseas office in Washington in 1997.

3.6. Indosiar Visual Mandiri (IVM): The Latest Newcomer

That it is becoming increasingly difficult to start a commercial station, was shown by Indosiar's difficult take-off. Indosiar, or IVM, is Indonesia's fifth commercial broadcaster. Like RCTI, SCTV and ANteve, IVM is a generalist commercial station. As early as in 1991 IVM was granted a national license, but it was not before January 1995 that the station actually went on air (Kuswandi, 1996: 42; Sedel, 1996: 12). Not that there was a lack of finances: IVM is in the hands of the Salim Group, one of the biggest and most powerful conglomerates in Indonesia, with Chinese businessman Lim Sioe Liong as its president. IVM’s difficulties in getting started stemmed from a lack of advertisers and quite a long search for a conclusive program strategy, both directly linked with the problem of building up a sufficiently large audience base. But after two years IVM was able to attract more advertisers and now reaches the allowed advertising maximum of 20 percent of the total program supply. IVM has been trying to profile itself as a channel for all social/economic groups in all age bands. And this strategy seems to be paying off: while as the most recent newcomer it is in the most difficult position, IVM has been able to secure a good share of Indonesian viewers.

It still remains to be seen whether all commercial broadcasters will be able to survive: five new stations emerging within a four years period (1989-1993) is a lot, and the competition is very tough. Although disposable income is increasing among the Indonesian population as a whole (this is especially true for the expanding middle classes), Indonesia is not yet a consumer society. Besides, owing to the fierce competition among commercial stations, they are all starting to look alike.
IVM used to broadcast one news program, *Horison*, on air twice a week. In November 1996 IVM the program was renamed *Focus*; it is broadcast daily between 12:00 noon and 1:00 p.m. Unlike all other commercial stations, IVM did not produce *Horison* by itself, but subcontracted the task to production house *Indomedia*. The 1996 Broadcasting Act no longer allows this practice: nowadays commercial stations must produce their own news programs.

4. In-depth Interviews with Indonesian News-Makers and Policy-Makers

By “communicator” we mean any person, group, or institution participating directly – either by designing, producing, or controlling – in the production of a message intended for dissemination by a mass medium, namely television. This includes all television broadcasters in Indonesia: state-owned broadcaster TVRI, and the five commercial broadcasters, RCTI, SCTV, TPI, ANteve and IVM. By “program makers” we refer to the creative people such as producers, journalists, camera people – that is, those people responsible for collecting and shaping a station’s news output. By “policy makers,” we mean program directors, editors-in-chief, news managers, general managers, and any persons with decision-making powers with respect to the subjects to be aired and the way in which this should be done. By “news programs” we refer to news programs broadcast every day at a specific time and for a fixed duration.

We tried to interview (at least) one program maker and one policy maker for each one of the above-mentioned stations. Altogether 18 persons were interviewed: eight policy makers and ten program makers. The interviews were conducted between September 30 and October 30, 1996. On average each interview took one and a half hour. The interviews were recorded to ensure accurate transcription afterwards. All interviews were conducted in the Indonesian language, except for one, at the request of the interviewee. When doing qualitative research on sensitive subjects, the use of the interviewees' own language is highly recommended.

The aim of the interviews was to get to know the interviewee, to probe into his or her reality: what meaning does the interviewee give to his/her surrounding in his or her day-to-day-life? In order to do this, the researcher has to be able to place him/herself in the position of the interviewee, to gain an understanding of the interviewee’s thought processes. Only, in this way can the researcher come to a reconstruction of the interviewee's perspective (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1990).

At the beginning of the research, a list of concepts was drawn to be used as a guide by the researcher during the interviews. All concepts needed to be dealt with: the order in which this was done as well as the actual questions to be asked were less important, depending on the interviewee, the orientation and content of each answer. Underlying relationships between the concepts were sought in order to come up with a clear vision of the connections and interrelations among all concepts/categories. Based on these concepts, the goal was to elucidate the various visions of all communicators interviewed in order to establish a measured classification of the various categories.
4.1. Creativity and Freedom

Creativity and freedom of expression are clearly hampered by Government imposed restrictions and control mechanisms. First of all there is self-censorship, which makes people apathetic and excessively cynical. The interviewees agree that some degree of creativity is allowed provided it agrees with station policy. Stations are not able, however, to define their policy without Government interference. They all have a censorship commission of some sort which screens all news before going on air. Although this is a sensitive subject, one interviewee talks in detail about this:

“We have to put up with a censorship commission here. Anything we want to broadcast has to be checked and approved by this commission. The same goes for news programs. If the commission decides that there is too much criticism on certain subjects or individuals – such as the Government, Government policy, the president and his family, the owners of the station and their (business) relations – the whole item must be dropped. This is hardly conducive to creative work. Both the station’s management and the censorship commission interfere too often. I am required to submit any planned item to their approval, without which I cannot do anything.”

Coincidence or not, the telephone starts ringing. On hanging up the interviewee comments:

“There you have it. This is exactly what I mean. From time to time they impose a subject on us which we do not find suitable, but are required to air anyway. We always get lots of memos! Even when the subjects are not interesting at all, we have to broadcast them.”

This situation creates many tensions between policy makers and program makers. Policy is necessary, but the policy makers have great power and according to some program makers this is hampering their creativity, even though some interviewees express say that the restrictions are merely challenges to try to work in a different way, by looking for possibilities that are allowed. One striking example is Perspektif (‘Perspective’), a talk show hosted by Wimar Witoelar on STCV. This talk show received enthusiastic feedback from its captive audience, especially from middle and upper class viewers, due to its topic selection and perspective: acerbic, people oriented, and at times a little too critical of the Government. On September 16, 1995 SCTV management suddenly pulled the plug on this program, without a clear justification. This decision is a clear example of self-censorship on the part of SCTV management: it was thought that should they fail to stop the program, the station’s relationship with the Government would suffer.

Another cause of restricted creativity is a lack of experience and training. The people currently active in television lack professionalism.
4.2. Station Strategy

Generally, it can be said that the commercial stations are beginning to look alike because of the fierce competition between them. Although RCTI, for example, focuses a little more on the Indonesian society’s upper social and economic echelons, and TPI more on the lower ones, actual differences are minimal. All commercial stations share the same aim: maximizing profits. Their news programs all focus on human interest subjects, the grislier, the better: crime stories – assaults, robberies, murders, rapes – are ubiquitous. The same goes for accidents. It is striking that almost all commercial stations focus on metropolitan news mainly from Jakarta, Surabaya, Bandung, and Medan. Chan & Ma (1996: 54) express their concern about the television scene being dominated by the urban centers. This might result in what they call “internal cultural imperialism.” News programming on the commercial stations are mostly intended for city-dwellers, those groups which have the most money to spend. The majority of the people, however, sees wealth and abundance only on television, without being able to take part in it. Lifestyles on offer on television are far beyond their spending capacities.

Some interviewees in commercial stations argue that entertainment is a very important factor in the news making process. According to them the news programs also must be entertaining, or better, “infotaining.” This perspective is obviously the result of hard news often being taboo. So news makers lean towards entertainment because everything else is out of bounds. In addition, commercial stations cannot yet specialize on one news-avid audience segment. Indonesia is not yet ready for this type of channel: the average buying power is still too weak for such stations to survive. On the opposite end of the spectrum is the state-owned broadcaster TVRI, which must follow a strategy of complete subjection to the Government and its policy.

4.3. Importance of Viewing Figures and Program Research

Indonesian viewing figures are collected in six major cities: Jakarta, Surabaya, Bandung, Semarang (all four on Java), Medan (Sumatra) and Ujung Pandang (Sulawesi). Viewing figures are based upon diaries, gathered by Survey Research Indonesia (SRI). Although all interviewees at the commercial stations say that viewing figures are not the only standard for them, they do admit that these figures are important since they are the only indications available for the advertisers.

Table 9
Market Shares of Commercial TV Stations, 1997 (in percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Station</th>
<th>RCTI</th>
<th>SCTV</th>
<th>TPI</th>
<th>ANTV</th>
<th>IVM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>38</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 10
Audience Segmentation by Age, Sex, Education Level (in percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>RCTI</th>
<th>SCTV</th>
<th>TPI</th>
<th>ANTV</th>
<th>IVM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-14</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-19</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-29</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40+</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary school&amp; below</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior high school</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior high school</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-university higher education &amp; university</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The value of these market shares and audience profiles (as shown in Tables 7 and 8) is put into the right perspective by all interviewees: they express their doubts concerning both the validity and reliability of these figures. Apart from the fact that the SRI works with diaries, nobody really knows how the SRI works. Another stumbling-block for many interviewees is the fact that the figures are taken from six major cities only, which is not representative of the whole Indonesian audience. Some interviewees (only from commercial stations) say the opposite, arguing that these figures are in the first place intended for the advertisers and that the largest buying power is located in the six above-mentioned cities. Therefore the figures are representative. For TVRI, viewing figures are not important, although TVRI interviewees say they should be taken into consideration because they are an indication of what is happening: viewers are deserting TVRI en masse. As one of the TVRI interviewees puts it: “What is the use of talking, if nobody is listening?”

Probably because Indonesian television is still very young, little program and audience research, complementary to viewing figures, is being done. Some of the interviewees say they value research, but they add that too often station management underestimates the significance of research. As a result only a small budget is assigned to research and most stations do not have an R&D department of their own. For TVRI reality is a bit different. Since TVRI is directly managed by the ministry of information, all research is being done by and via the latter’s R&D department – but due to budgetary constraints, this does not amount to much.
4.4. The Relationship with the Audience

Commercial stations consider the relationship with the audience as very important. While TVRI’s primary allegiance is to the Government and its policy choices, commercial stations are mainly concerned with the daily life of city-dwellers. They are also more dependent on their audience, which means they need to achieve audience loyalty. But this is a goal not easily met with five commercial stations simultaneously on the air. Furthermore, while commercial stations pay lip service to the importance of their audience, often they do not know much about it. Little research is being done to remedy this situation. Some information on the audience comes from letters and phone calls as well as off-air activities, but this is far from providing a full picture. As regards news programs, one interviewee had the following to say:

“Of course in theory we want the audience to watch our news program and we want people to believe they need to watch it. We want them to feel that had they not watched it, they would have missed something. But it is a difficult matter.”

News programs in Indonesia, however high in quality, cannot compete with a good movie or an attractive entertainment program. Therefore, it is very difficult to build up a loyal audience for news programs. The Indonesian audience (still) does not regard news as a necessity. This has everything to do with the lack of political consciousness among the population, which stems from the highly monotonous nature of the country’s political life. The audience knows that there can be nothing new in political reporting, as far as there is political reporting at all.

4.5. Station Policy and Obstacles for Policy-Making

The main obstacles to station policy are political restrictions and control mechanisms. There is no such thing as editorial independence. This will not change with the new broadcasting act. Every five year commercial stations need to have their license renewed by the Government, which is thus able to keep a tight rein and can even close down a commercial station if it wants to. Another obstacle frequently mentioned is lack of experience – Indonesian television is still very young – and lack of sufficient education and training possibilities. Some schools for TV journalism do exist, but they belong to TVRI and are not accessible to people from other television stations. The people who work for commercial stations and need the training the most can only count on on-the-job-training. There is a great shortage of capable television professionals in Indonesia. Because of this shortage the quality of the news programs is still far removed from what it could and should be.

According to the TVRI interviewees, bureaucracy is among the biggest obstacles. Editors are not allowed to make autonomous decisions: everything has to pass through the ministry of information no matter how painstakingly slow this process may be. The TVRI interviewees plead in favor of more autonomy and freedom for TVRI in order to be able to work faster and more efficiently. With five commercial stations breathing down their neck this is absolutely necessary. Another big obstacle for TVRI is the tight budget which hinders both efficiency and modernization. Several
interviewees also point out that insufficient attention is being paid to research, especially on the part of the management. One interviewee argues that the fact that still too many entrepreneurs consider promotion as an expense rather than as an investment is an obstacle as well. Furthermore, the power of Indonesia's economy to advertise is still not important enough. Another obstacle, mentioned by several interviewees, is the lack of teamwork and team spirit.

4.6. Politics and Political Control

The interviews made it clear that political control is the most powerful and complex factor interfering with all aspects of Indonesian television news making: all program makers interviewed referred to the political limitations imposed on them by the Government. These interventions are to be explained in light of the Government's efforts to maintain an artificial national stability and national culture at all costs. The above-mentioned SARA subjects (ethnicity, religion, race and social classes) remain taboo. Formal and neutral items related to SARA are only becoming somewhat acceptable today. Freedom of expression on societal problems is still very much limited. One of the producers we interviewed (who asked to remain anonymous) put it this way:

“We have to avoid all political issues or all issues that have to do with Government policy, the president, his family or the army. The same goes for economic issues that have anything to do with the Government. Items on owners of the station or their business relations, friends or family are equally to be avoided. There isn’t much freedom of expression in Indonesia: this often leads to frustration. Furthermore, nobody really knows what are the limits of what can and cannot be reported on, because there are no explicit directives given by the Government.”

Limitations are largely dictated by the so-called telephone culture: one call to the newsroom is enough to nip any potential revelation in the bud. In order to ensure that journalists play by the political rules, every station has a censorship commission which screens all items before going on-air. Items ready to be broadcast are often suppressed at the last moment. The opposite also happens: restrictions and control may lead to self-censorship, including cynicism and apathy on the part of the news makers. Excessive interference from above (management and Government) largely determines the relationship between program makers and policy makers: management decides, often on Government orders, and program makers cannot do much against it (if they care for their position). An example in this respect is the talk show Buah Bibir (Talk of the Nation) on RCTI since the beginning of 1997. At first, the majority of the topics explored were related to “deviant” sexual behaviors which are becoming increasingly common in Indonesian society but which most Indonesian people do not find tolerable: infidelity between married people, free sexuality among teenagers, executives, etc. Precisely because of the topics it dealt with, the talk show became highly controversial. The minister of information and the MUI (Indonesian Council of Muslim Leaders) intervened, which resulted in the replacement of Host Lula Kamal and a far less controversial selection of topics. Another striking example is a decision made in November 1997 by TVRI to end its live coverage of
In Search of Quality Measures for News Programming on Indonesian Television

the finance minister’s question time at the House of Representatives because “editing would be needed to ensure that the public gets to hear the right information only.” This was widely criticized in the print media, which questioned TVRI’s right to censor an open session of the House of Representatives. Previously, there was some controversy following a statement by the minister of information that only TVRI has the right to broadcast such sessions: SCTV and ANTV, which had announced that they would broadcast the session live, were not allowed to do so.

In short, there is hardly any room for exploring and researching real conditions in Indonesian society or for any creative use of the medium: according to some of the producers interviewed, any expression of creativity is stifled at birth because in Indonesia the Government always comes first; money comes in second. The print and audio-visual media come in a poor third; they have no substantial power. A social watchdog function for the media is out of the question.

While commercial stations are financially independent, their editorial freedom is practically nonexistent because they are equally susceptible to Government interference, as confirmed by all of our interviewees. This vulnerability is increased by the fact that most commercial stations are owned either by family members of the president or powerful political party figures. As one channel director told us: “The owner is the owner is the owner: it is him who determines the channel's orientation, including the news.” As a result, balance in news reporting is virtually unknown. It is remarkable that all interviewees mentioned an incident dating back to July 27, 1996 as evidence of political control. On that day violent riots took place in Jakarta, attracting a lot of attention from foreign media, but the strongly censored news of the state-owned broadcaster never even mentioned them. The riots were caused by growing dissatisfaction with the lack of political freedom and the authorities' stranglehold on the media, but no interviews with PDI (Democratic Party) leader Megawati conducted on the occasion of the riots were ever shown on TV, due to management or Government pressure. One of the producers we interviewed confessed that political restrictions and control preclude any quality news reporting. Although journalists are expected to work within the framework of Pancasila – with the notion of balance as one of its keywords – the Government clearly fails to meet this very principle. *Golkar* must always get the most attention. This is incompatible with the Pancasila ideology. In this respect, several interviewees referred to election periods, when TV reporting on Golkar is much more extensive than reporting on PDI and PPP. One respondent still believes, however, that despite all the difficulties, there is still some space to do a proper job, as long as one “knows the rules of the game”…

A remark heard many times among the interviewed is that the audience is very well aware of this situation: they know who are the commercial stations' owners and therefore do not have a lot of illusions and do not really consider the news as important. Many of the interviewed believe it will be more and more difficult for the Government to continue to assert political control because, among other things, of a dangerous contradiction in Governmental policy: a great many foreign channels are allowed to broadcast, while national channels remain under strict Government control. What the people are not allowed to see on the national channels they can increasingly view through the foreign channels, which provide a far more complete picture than Indonesian channels ever do. TV signals from a staggering 100 satellites 11 can be
picked up in Indonesia using dish aerials. The companies which invested in satellite TV distribution – Indovision and Astro – are planning on a market of 2 million satellite dish owners in Indonesia. Indovision, the first satellite TV distributor, established by PT Matahari Lintas Cakrawala, started late 1994. At first it offered packages including channels such as HBO, Discovery, ESPN and Turner Broadcasting channels (CNN, TNT Cartoon Network). In addition to dish antennas, viewers also need a decoder. During two years Indovision could only count on 18,000 customers, while the target was 100,000 customers. In 1997, Indovision introduced a digital decoder and four more packages:

- *VISI MULTI* (20 channels): Star Sport, Star Plus, Phoenix Channel, Channel V International, Channel V Asia, CNBC, NBC, CNN International, TNT & CN, BBC, Discovery, Citra Hiburan, Citra Melati, Citra Junior, ESPN, RCTI, TPI, SCTV, ANTV, IVM.
- *VISI SINEMA* (22 channels): 20 VISI MULTI channels plus HBO and Film Indonesia.
- *VISI SINEMA PLUS* (22 channels): 20 VISI MULTI channels plus Star Movies and MGM.
- *VISI SUPER SINEMA* (24 channels): 20 VISI MULTI channels plus HBO, Film Indonesia, Star Movies and MGM.

Currently Indovision can count on about 25,000 customers with digital decoder packages (10,500 of whom switched from analog to digital). Astro is still preparing to launch its own packages to compete with Indovision. This will probably take place next year. Internet access has also become a feasible proposition in Indonesia, offering a wealth of information unheard of on Indonesian TV channels.

### 4.7. Professionalism

Television in Indonesia is still very young. Therefore there still are few people in the country with television production experience. All of our interviewees confirm the severe lack of professionalism and experience, which is felt as an obstacle for both channel strategy and creative freedom in news reporting. After political control, lack of professionalism is the second most important factor responsible for the poor quality of news reporting today. In this respect, the absence of enough training possibilities in television journalism (apart from a couple of training centers created by TVRI and which only take in journalists from the state-owned broadcaster) is a major problem. This is the reason why ANteve decided to hire (mostly American, plus a few European) professional journalists and camera people as on-the-job trainers: the whole newsroom, both technicians and managers, must be familiar with the television medium. Although starting in 1989 five commercial stations were issued a license by the Government, no measures were taken to make the existing schools accessible to their staff. Commercial stations have had to look for guidance elsewhere, finding it in CNN, whose formats they attempted to emulate. All stations try to remedy this lack of professionalism with on-the-job-training, no matter how short and minimal.
4.8. Quality Measures for News and Newsworthiness

Our interviews made it quite clear that political interference is the single most influential factor determining the Indonesian news category and no doubt the main obstacle to quality reporting. According to all respondents, the ways in which the *Pancasila* doctrine is being manipulated in journalistic practice, including the contradictions and hypocrisy which characterize the Government's policy in the matter, will probably lead to an erosion of the doctrine itself. They consider *Timeliness* as one of the most important quality guarantees for quality news and news-worthiness, stressing that political restrictions and control made it impossible to achieve, however. Often news items with high news-worthiness are suppressed by the station’s censorship commission just before going on air, or following a telephone call from the Government. *Rapidity* is seen as another important quality measure, but here again journalists (mostly at TVRI) confess that the bureaucratic way in which the station is run does not allow for swiftness.

*Accuracy*, *correctness* and *balance* (all angles being presented) are highly valued quality assurance criteria by our respondents: for all three criteria the above-mentioned limitations are felt to be significant obstacles. A related criterion, *understandability* of the news through avoidance of jargon, logically structured news items, and relevant off-screen commentary, is also highly valued by the respondents. Every one of them mentioned a low level of *professionalism* together with an overall lack of experience with TV as a medium, and stated that this should be remedied soon. *Proximity* is also mentioned by the interviewees as an interest-arousing element: in order to find the news interesting, viewers must be able to recognize certain elements from their daily life. Some of the interviewees (all of whom, unsurprisingly, work for commercial stations) believe the news must contain some elements with *entertainment* value, something upbeat (arguably to counterbalance the relentless focus on crime).

All these quality criteria as defined by the journalists we interviewed cannot be implemented owing to one single, constant, overwhelming factor: Government interference. In addition there is a major internal problem: an overall lack of professionalism at all levels of the news making process.

5. Conclusions

The first part of the chapter sketched the fast-changing Indonesian television landscape: until a few years ago Indonesian audiences were used to watching the state-owned *TVRI* channel only. Nowadays they can choose among five additional commercial stations: *RCTI*, Indonesia's commercial TV pioneer; *SCTV*, RCTI's “little brother;” *TPI*, the commercial, “educational” station; *An-teve*; and newcomer *IVM*. At the end of December 1996 the Indonesian parliament passed a *Broadcasting Act* which, for the first time, allowed advertising on television and provided at the same time “national” alternatives for the many and popular foreign satellite stations.

These developments need to be assessed in connection with the country's peculiar geography (an archipelago of 13,500 islands of which 6,000 are inhabited) as
well as its specific social, cultural, economic and political context. This is characterized by inequalities in both population spread and level of development. The country's nerve center is Java, which influences society in many areas, including television. Indonesia is a highly diverse ethno-cultural society (300 ethnic groups) – a diversity whose potential development is stifled by the “national” unity discourse heavily propagated through the media (especially television) by the Government, which puts down every opposition. Even with a rise in prosperity levels for all income groups, including the lowest ones, millions of Indonesians still live below the poverty line, while a small group of people is extravagantly rich. The gap between these two groups is becoming even bigger, and so is the anger against this situation. This is a reality, however, which the news media have to handle with care: these are the so-called SARA issues which the people are “not ready yet” to hear about in the media, at least according to the Government, which fears that coverage of these subjects would set the country ablaze.

The second part of the chapter looked at the extent to which the national context allows for “quality” in television news or, on the contrary, constitutes an impediment for it. In-depth interviews with local newsmakers and policy makers in both state television and commercial television stations highlighted two major problem areas for news-making: omnipresent political control and lack of professionalism. Due to fierce Governmental control, stations are restricted to covering low-risk news items that usually also have less news value: human interest and crime stories. Most attention must be paid to the Government and the Golkar party. This tight Governmental control also applies to commercial stations, even though they are financially independent. Moreover, most commercial stations are owned by family members of the President or by powerful politicians. The second major problem area is lack of professionalism: there is still not enough local knowledge of and experience with television journalism around. There is an urgent need of facilities for television journalism education and training where people can get the necessary professional knowledge. In any case, the professionalism problem will be more easily solved than that of Governmental control and interference. Indonesia as a society cannot reach maturity before the dissemination of information becomes free. In other words, what this country needs is actual and full freedom of speech. This could take a long time.
Third Chapter

The Soeharto Regime and Its Fall through the Eyes of the Local Media

The first part of this chapter elaborates on the content and media management dynamics in local newspapers and radio stations during the period leading up to the fall of the New Order in Indonesia. The second part deals with the early reform period after the downfall of Soeharto. In-depth interviews were conducted with editorial policy-makers of the newspapers and with various radio station staff members in four cities where media consumption and other data had rarely been documented. The findings in the first part reveal omnipresent political control at two levels – local and central Government. Because of this control, the local media personnel acknowledge their limitations, but strove for as much freedom as possible within the system. The second part shows that in this historical context, changes are taking place in both agency and structure. Both parts support the thesis that there is an interplay between agency and structure as opposed to the Instrumentalist and Structuralist orthodoxies.

1. Statement of the Problem

The landscape of Indonesia’s mass media is colored by the phenomenon of television which has since 1989 been a striking example of a centralized medium. The first commercial station, RCTI, was established in 1989, followed by a number of others. Attempts were made to expand the bases of commercial stations beyond the capital, Jakarta, but these failed. The new stations which were initially built and based in Surabaya (SCTV) and Lampung (ANTV) were forced to be relocated to Jakarta within the second or third operational year. The main reason was that advertisers were mostly centralized in Jakarta. This is outlined in greater detail by d’Haenens, Gazali & Verelst (1999), among others, in their research on television news-making before and after Soeharto.12

In contrast to television, newspaper and radio have enjoyed a long history as part of the daily life of Indonesia's population. Certainly, the Jakarta-based newspapers also have some captive readers in local areas; however, the sum of local newspaper circulation in most cities outside Jakarta is on average larger than the circulation of the Jakarta-based daily.

During the New Order era, Soeharto (who came to power in 1966), treated the press throughout the country as a state ideological apparatus. The regime sought to be effective through control mechanisms that affected almost all aspects of the life of the press.
Those mechanisms are as follows:

1. Controlling preventively and correctively the ownership of the media institutions, through the issuance of print licenses (SIT), which later became license for publishing press (SIUPP). These licenses were issued mainly on the basis of political criteria.
2. Controlling individual and professional practitioners (journalists) through selection and regulation mechanisms, such as the requirement for journalists to join the one and only journalists' organization allowed at the time, the requirement for chief editors to attend courses on state ideology (Pancasila or “Five Pillars”), which was in fact an indoctrination process.
3. Controlling the appointment of individuals for certain positions in the Government-owned media.
4. Controlling the production of news texts (both content and format) through various mechanisms.
5. Controlling the resources, for example, a monopoly on paper.
6. Controlling access to the press, for example, by forbidding press coverage of opposition leaders (Hidayat et al., 2000: 6).

Given such tight control of the press, over such a long period (more than three decades), one may not easily accept the fact that the regime which enforced them could be brought down. It is worth looking, then, at those factors which, in addition to the student and activist movements, may have significantly contributed to the event which was called “the unthinkable” by some foreign media, and to examine whether the changes had something to do with the press. In the affirmative, we may then want to investigate whether there were distinctions between what was taking place both in the Jakarta-based media and in the local media since the local media should be geared to local communities that might be greatly different from those of the Jakarta-based residents.

2. Theoretical Section

To help analyze the changes that might take place in a mass medium and its circumstances, we can refer to the political-economic studies of mass media. In this analysis, the historical context in which the changes occurred reflected the conditions at a given time in history that should be analyzed comprehensively at the macro level (socio-cultural practices in which the production and consumption of texts were taking place), the meso level (discourse practices or the processes of producing and consuming media texts), and the micro level (texts produced by the media).

At the macro level, most analyses of the political economy of the press tend to be divided into two types: economism and reductionism. In the first approach, the media are featured as capitalist ventures for which the function of producing ideology is only a secondary concern that receives less attention. Smythe (1977: 1) stated:
(...) the media’s primary function is to create stable audience blocks for sale to monopoly capitalist advertisers, thereby generating the propensities to consume which complete the circuit of production.

In the second type, the Marxist Cultural Theories tend to focus more on the ideological function carried out by the media: “(...) the media belong first and foremost to the region of ideology” (Connel in Hibbin, 1978: 75). This is generally done by observing the media text in an excessively isolated manner so that it loses some links with the press as an economic institution within a capitalistic system. In fact, the efforts to understand the function of producing ideology carried out by the press cannot be separated from the efforts to comprehend the dynamic processes taking place at a certain stage of a certain capitalism in which the media industry lives. Golding and Murdock (in Barrett et al., 1979: 210), for example, stated that:

(...) the mass media are first and foremost industrial and commercial organizations which produce and distribute commodities within a Late Capitalism economic order. Consequently, we would argue, the production of ideology cannot be adequately understood without grasping the general economic dynamics of media production and the determination they exert. (see also Hidayat et al., 2000: 432)

Efforts to examine the production of ideology carried out by the press during the New Order in Indonesia cannot be separated from efforts to examine the economic dynamics of the then late capitalism. Furthermore, it might also relate to something more complicated than the late capitalism during the New Order era alone, for example the development of global financial structure at the time in which the New Order political economic structure was included (see Sri Mulyani & Chatib Basri et al. in Hidayat et al., 2000). In this context, external pressures played their roles during the economic crisis that hit Indonesia in the end of the Soeharto era. International financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Found (IMF) at the time could be viewed as: “(...) built-in systemic mechanism of economic deregulation, opposing not only socialism but national capitalism as well, in favor of the progressive extension of international market forces” (Wood in MacEwan & Tabb, 1989).

It means that we cannot relate the analysis of the ideological function of the press during the New Order era only to the general capitalism ideology, but also to the more specific capitalism ideology, i.e. the neo-liberalism that was interested in expanding the global economic liberalism, whose dimensions were in fact contradictory to the New Order capitalism ideology.

This leads us to consider that there are some aspects at the macro level that the capital owners, the media management staff, and the journalists might never have had a chance to deal with. For example, there was the economic crisis that hit Indonesia in 1997, whose epicenter was far from its sphere of influence. A crisis of such scale and intensity was a structural risk for global capitalism, which then achieved a certain stage of structural elaboration, specifically from the aspect of
international capital mobility (Hidayat et al., 2000: 443). This was not only the case for those outside Jakarta, but also for those based in Jakarta itself. The center was probably far from the sphere of influence of the political actors also.

A further macro analysis of the political economy would be beyond the scope of this chapter. We are more interested in the fact that connecting both the micro and meso analysis to the macro analysis will eventually bring us to the analysis of the interaction between structure and agency. In general, the term “agency” refers to social actions carried out by social actors either as an individual or as a group. It could also refer to social actions of human agents in a broader sense, not only individuals, but also including organized groups, organizations, and the state (Himmerstrand, 1986: 9).

By opening our mind to the probable interaction between structure and agency, the analysis of the press on the “May 1998 Revolution” would not easily be trapped in the Structuralist and Instrumentalist orthodoxies. Structuralist analysis tends to view the structure as a monolithic and static entity. It then ignores the capacity of social agencies to respond to structural conditions. Althusser’s structural analysis might lead us to the conclusion that the characteristics of the media texts simply represent the existing structures. But this would amount to ignoring the social interactions between agencies (performers of journalism duties), including the chances for the journalists to produce the news as they want. Schudson (1989: 266) judges that the process of producing news is directly related to the economic structure of the media organization or media industry, and everything in between is a "black box" that needs not be examined.

From this Structuralist approach, the expectation was that the economic structure of the media industry would be found to be controlled by Soeharto’s family and cronies. In cities outside Jakarta, the media were controlled by locals who were considered loyal to the local Governments, the military, and the ruling party, Golongan Karya (Golkar). The changes were then merely associated with the changes taking place in the structure of the mass media.

Conversely, the Instrumentalist approach focuses on the use of media as an instrument of the capitalists to determine the public discourse premises, the information which may be consumed by the public, and the propaganda which will produce the desired “public opinion” (among others Herman & Chomsky, 1998: xi). It tends to assume that the capital owners are fully able to use the media as propaganda tools because they have access surplus to the media, legality to control the media, the monopoly of license, and a superior position over their workers. However this was belied by the findings of Golding and Murdock regarding the position of the Government and the capital owners in the capitalist media industry. Golding and Murdock (in Curran & Gurevitch, 1991: 19) stated that: “They operate within structures which constrain as well as facilitate, imposing limits as well as offering opportunities.” As opposed to the Structuralist approach, the Instrumentalist approach tends to ignore the structural factors, ascribing excessive influence to individuals or journalist groups as actors able to fully use the media as an instrument to actualize their idealism in the social change processes. Again, as a
matter of fact, the journalists’ acts and resistance by various structural contradictions, just as is the case for capital owners.

There is an alternative or third approach chosen for this research, stating that in the studies on the political economy of the mass media we should acknowledge the existence of an interplay between structure and agency. The goal of this approach is: “(...) to explain how structures are constituted through action, and reciprocally how action is constituted structurally” (Giddens, 1976: 161). Or to be more specific, the studies on the political economy of the media should describe: “(...) how structures are produced and reproduced by human agents who act through the medium of these structures” (Mosco, 1996: 213). This approach, then, creates space for social relations and interactions that might take the form of alliances as well as conflicts at certain times, not only in the media industry but also in society at large. At each given time, a certain historical context determines the relative weight put on the causal relationships between agency and structure. Ritzer (1996: 424-425) states:

In some time periods structure may gain ascendancy over agency. At other times the agents may play a greater role, and the significance of structure would be reduced. One cannot posit a single agency-structure relationship for all history.

While trying to capture the comprehensive analysis at those levels, we should pay attention to the fact that the circumstances of the Jakarta-based media may be different from those of the local media. For example, the political concerns of the Jakarta residents could be different from those of people living in other regions. Many studies have concerned themselves with the sense of localism and the role of local media. Studies by Park (1975) show that reading the local newspaper contributes to the feeling of commonness in local organizations. Janowitz (1952) also concludes that reading local newspapers positively contributes to community orientation, to building and maintaining a local consensus, as well as building local traditions. Edelstein and Larsen (1960) report that local print media positively influence community togetherness as well. A study by Greer (1965) shows that the local press encourages involvement in local political activities. Most recently, a study by Viswanath et al. (2000), examining local ties, media uses, and the knowledge gap theory, found that local newspapers are an important source of information for the community.

As for radio, some studies, although not specifically conducted on local media, show that listeners, especially when listening to talk shows, pay a lot of attention to politics and get actively involved in the political process (Hofstetter et al., 1994; Media Studies Center, 1996). In the case of the United States, it was found that such listeners had voted in the four previous elections (Bucy et al., 1997; Media Studies Center, 1996). Surely, there are some studies in certain contexts that reach different conclusions (among others: Weaver et al., 1998).

One conclusion that may be drawn from the above studies is that the media in each location should be geared toward, and adjusted to, local conditions. Thus, the contents of local dailies and radio broadcasts might be different from the contents in the Jakarta-based media. In turn, media content geared to local conditions outside
Jakarta could help local residents to build a community commonness and orientation that might be greatly different from those of Jakarta-based residents.

3. Research Questions

Based on the likely distinctions listed above, on the political and economic analysis of the press, and on the assumption that the press might have played a significant role in toppling the New Order regime, we can ask the following research questions to show directions in elaborating on the content and media management dynamics in the local newspapers and radio stations during the period leading up to the fall of the New Order in Indonesia:

a) How did local media personnel perceive the influence of the New Order regime on their daily lives, given the fact that the New Order administration was mainly based in Jakarta? Or, to be more specific, how did the local media personnel view the implementation of Governmental regulations regarding the press, which were decided upon in Jakarta and implemented across the country?

b) How would local media personnel compare local newspapers or radio stations with media produced or published in Jakarta?

c) How did local media personnel view the reform movement, whose pioneers were largely pictured as students or NGO activists from Jakarta, while in fact the students in their cities might have also already staged similar demonstrations before or concurrent with those in Jakarta?

d) What processes occurred in their respective institutions during the reform movement, which led to the fall of the New Order?

e) What did the early reform era mean to them in terms of new opportunities and challenges?

4. Methodology

4.1 Sampling: Cities and Procedures

In order to elaborate on local perspectives that are rarely documented, we purposely avoided the cities that are frequently referenced in the media rating system in Indonesia, namely Jakarta (the national capital), Surabaya (capital of the East Java province), Bandung (capital of the West Java Province), Semarang (capital of the Central Java Province), and Medan (capital of the North Sumatra Province). We selected four other large cities associated with newspapers which have a long history and a large readership.

First, Yogyakarta, situated in Central Java, which is also the capital city of the province, or special area with the same name. Yogyakarta has the oldest newspaper in Indonesia, “Kedaulatan Rakyat,” published since 1945. Yogyakarta has always been associated with the “Keraton” culture, which constitutes a blend of the
Javanese aristocratic system and Islamic teaching. Second, Makassar, the capital city of the South Sulawesi Province. It has the second oldest daily, “Pedoman Rakyat,” published since 1947. Makassar is also the name of the kingdom which once existed there. The aristocratic system prevails in South Sulawesi as well as Islamic principles, yet the practices are significantly different from those in Yogyakarta. Makassar is famous for its daring sailors, who frequently sailed to other countries and continents. Third, Bali, better known as “the island of the gods.” The “Bali Pos” daily has been published there since 1948. Bali, both as a capital city and as a province, is colored with the Hindu practices. Fourth, Padang, which is the capital city of the West Sumatra Province, in which the newspaper “Haluan” has been published since 1949. The name of the original ethnic group of West Sumatra is Minangkabau. This ethnic group is famous for producing leading intellectuals in the struggling era against Dutch colonialism. In addition to being closely associated with Islamic teachings, they are frequently included among the more egalitarian ethnic groups of Indonesia.

In addition to the above newspapers, this research also elaborates on the perspective of local radio personnel. These interviews were conducted between July 15, 1999 and February 15, 2000. In most cases, two newspapers and two radio stations with different backgrounds were selected in each city. In Padang, the interviews were conducted at three radio stations, since a sectarian issue had recently arisen in that city. Altogether, eighteen persons were interviewed – ten from the newspapers and eight from the radio stations. When it came to the newspapers, we interviewed the editorial policy-makers, such as the chief editor, the deputy chief editor, the senior editor, and the operational editor. At the radio stations, we interviewed radio personnel of various departments, such as the first director, the broadcast director, the news director, the music director, the general manager, the program manager, production staff, and reporters. On average, each interview took one and a half hour. All interviews were conducted in the Indonesian language, the national language, but periodically the interviewees used phrases in their ethnic language; when this occurred, we asked them to translate the phrase into Indonesian.

The aim of the interviews was to get to know the interviewee, to probe into his or her reality: what meaning did the interviewee give to his or her entourage in his or her everyday life? In order to do this, the researcher had to be able to place him or herself "in the shoes" of the interviewee in order to gain an understanding of the latter's thought processes. Only in this way can a researcher come to a reconstruction of the interviewee’s perspective (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1990).

The initial research procedures were similar to those used by other scholars who researched the Indonesian television industry (d’Haenens et al., 1999: 139). These procedures include the following:

A list of concepts was drawn up to be used as a guide by the researcher during the interviews. All concepts needed to be dealt with. The order in which this was done as well as the actual questions to be asked were less important, and depended on the interviewee, the orientation and
content of each answer. Underlying relationships between the concepts were sought, in order to come up with a clear understanding of the connections and interrelations among all concepts/categories. Based on these concepts, the goal was to elucidate the various answers of all the communicators interviewed, in order to establish a measured classification of the various categories.

This research also considers the issue of syndicated newspapers and radio stations that are part of the larger media business based in Jakarta and in other large cities. When conducting interviews with a syndicated medium, we tried to explore the amount of local contents it carried as well as the quality of "localism" in the staff's opinion.

5. Results and Discussion

5.1 New Order Means False Freedom

When asking what freedom during the New Order rule meant for them, all interviewees stated that there was no freedom during the New Order administration. Their overall term for the New Order was “the Smell Order.” The main reason was because all statements made by the New Order were in fact false. As for freedom of press, they concluded that the meaning of the motto, “A free press, but with social responsibility,” is “A free press, as long as it follows at all times what the Government wants.” When asked to point out who imposed media control in their cities, they mentioned the provincial branch of the Ministry of Information, the local Government, and various elements of the Indonesian Armed Forces (at the time still called ABRI) such as the police, Kodam (the regional military command), Kodim (the district military command), Korem (the military command at the level below the residency), and militias – forces that constitute a blend of civilian and military, who also dealt with security issues in smaller political subdivisions, such as RW (neighborhood) and RT (subdivision of neighborhood).

Cases that could serve as examples range from the trivial to the serious. As an example of a trivial issue, the “Kedaulatan Rakyat” daily in Yogyakarta was once ordered by telephone (typical in the then popular “telephone culture”) not to print news about the collapse of a stage built over a swimming pool belonging to a “bupati” (regency head), who had been hosting a traditional ceremonial meal. The incident was caused by a live concert given by a group performing “dangdut,” a popular local style of music. The second case also involving the “Kedaulatan Rakyat” was a ban on printing news about a plane which crashed in Klaten, a town close to Yogyakarta. They were never told the reason behind the ban.

Something relatively serious befell the “Fajar” newspaper in Makassar. It was warned twice by the provincial branch of the Ministry of Information. First, when it printed a letter from a reader criticizing the ruling party, Golkar. Second, when it printed speeches by opposition parties leaders, during a campaign period, which criticized the Soeharto family.
The “Bernas” daily newspaper in Yogyakarta faced two more serious accusations. First, in 1992, its editors were summoned to the Kodam office (office of the regional military command) in Semarang. They were shown a list of mistakes allegedly committed by the editors. One of the “mistakes” was a published photograph showing a platoon of ABRI (armed forces) standing face-to-face with the people in a political rally, during the period preceding an election. In fact, the demonstrators were prevented by the armed forces from continuing their rally. The regional military command thought that the photograph would worsen their image. It even threatened that, if the “Barnas” editors’ response did not satisfy them, they would then be brought before the intelligence section to continue proceedings. Fortunately, the editors were able to make up an excuse: their objective in publishing the photograph was to show that the military were serious and firm in facing any parties who tried to disrupt the election and its preparations. This seemed to satisfy the military.

Another interesting experience of the “Barnas” newspaper concerned the head of the provincial branch of the Ministry of Information. In its editors’ opinion, those officials considered their newspaper to be a serious political threat; so the ministry staff would start each day by checking the contents of the “Barnas” daily. When a student, Moses Gatotkaca, was killed in a demonstration in May 1998, and “Barnas” brought the news, the branch head called the chief editor early in the morning. The call was not made to his office, but to his home. He asked the editor how he knew the victim was a student. The chief editor replied that a reporter got the information from the Panti Rapih Hospital where the victim was treated before dying. The Government official was still not satisfied with the answer, and accused the editor of attempting to pit the armed forces against the students. It is important to note that this occurred only several days before the fall of Soeharto. Ironically, the Jakarta version of the daily also printed the same story.

In the case of radio, there are similar examples. The editor of CDBS FM in Bali was summoned by the local prosecutor’s office; he was even told to report to that office every day for a period of time. This was due to a prediction by the station that unrest would occur during the upcoming elections (1997). As a matter of fact, CDBS FM had only quoted some Jakarta print media. Radio “Smart” in Makassar was also warned that it would only be allowed to produce and air a talk show analyzing the political conditions if the interviewees were not members of opposition parties.

In Padang, according to the General Manager of Radio “Arbes,” it was believed that an official from the provincial Ministry of Information was assigned to monitor each radio station. Periodically, the officials summoned representatives of all private radio stations and informed them of violations. They once accused radio “Arbes” and “SIPP,” its sister station, without giving a clear explanation or writing an official letter.

A different action was taken against radio station “Dikara Bawana,” which is associated with the Padang Catholic Diocese. It was charged with producing a program that disturbed the SARA Doctrine. SARA stands for “Suku, Agama, Ras, dan Antar Golongan,” which means, “Ethnicity, Religion, Race, and Groups.”
These four issues constituted a very serious taboo on the Indonesia media scene (Schulte-Noordholt, 1991: 21). The editors were told to submit scenarios of programs which touched upon those issues. Since they did not know exactly what programs the ministry information staff were talking about, they submitted the scenarios of all programs aired during the preceding two weeks, in order to prove that there were no grounds for indictment. The response was a complete surprise: from then on the officials did not mention the SARA issues again, but shifted their attention to technical matters, such as transmitters, etc.

The various examples mentioned above demonstrate how relentlessly, extensively, and coercively the Government and military officials used their power to control and suppress local newspapers and radios under the Soeharto Regime.

5.2 Local Strategies

Given the omnipresent political control, it is interesting to explore how local media personnel dealt with it, which strategies they adopted in order to survive. Strikingly, all interviewees told us they always attempted to oppose any control mechanism in various ways, yet approximately eighty percent stated there was a need to continuously exercise self-censorship. This is because the local media could be closed down much more easily by the authorities, than their Jakarta-based counterparts. According to those interviewed, before closing down a newspaper or radio in Jakarta, the authorities had to consider the effects of negative publicity resulting from such closings. This negative publicity could involve domestic media in Jakarta, international media, as well some noted non-Governmental organizations (NGOs). Fear on the part of local editors was also due to the two levels of authority they had to face. First, the local authorities; second, the central Government authorities. In other words, when recognizing their existences as local media, there was both a sense of inferiority to, and jealousy toward, the Jakarta-based media.

By means of an illustration, the ban on printing news about the plane crash in Klaten, and the accusation of publishing groundless news about the dead student in Yogyakarta, was not issued to the Jakarta-based media, which carried the same stories the following day. As mentioned in the theoretical framework, the central Government officials might be regarded as problems at the macro level for the local editors and for the local capital owners as well. They might think that the central Government officials were far from their sphere of influence.

In explaining what they meant by “self-censorship,” almost all interviewees gave a relatively similar description, i.e. they had to uphold the principle of neutrality, they had to convey information from as many conflicting or involved parties as possible, and they had to criticize in a subtle manner, hoping that the audience would understand what they were implying. It also meant there was no need to be outspoken or be explicit. This is consistent with the Javanese way of criticizing, given also the context of the relationship between the central/national (or even Javanese) culture on the one hand and the local cultures on the other. It confirms what Keuning et al. (1987: 9, 27-29) observed: “The country’s nerve
center has been (since the Dutch Colonization) and continues to be Java, which influences society in many areas, including television.”

When referring to their strategies, some of the editors mentioned the compromises they felt they had to make with Government and military officials. For example, in May 1998 all media editors in Yogyakarta were forbidden to publish a report about students who demonstrated and set fire to a paper statue of Soeharto in a “becak” (pedicab). The “Kedaulatan Rakyat” editors succeeded in making a compromise by proposing that they would print the story, but not mention the burning of Soeharto’s effigy. They also promised not to print any photographs of the event.

Editors of local radio stations were fully aware that the law prohibited them from initiating any news reports on their own. They were only allowed to relay the news originating from the state-owned RRI (Radio of Republic of Indonesia). In order to manipulate the regulation to their advantage, the local radio stations frequently broadcast live reports of events, for example seminars, without calling them “news.” This strategy was called “guerilla tactics” by the Director of Radio “Geronimo” in Yogyakarta, or “Tom and Jerry tactics” by Radio “Unisi” (also in Yogyakarta) and Radio “Arbes” in Padang.

The tone adopted by the local media personnel reflected the degree to which they were willing to resist Government control. Radio “Geronimo,” which according to its First Director was the number one station in Yogyakarta, showed a more compromising attitude. On the contrary, Radio “Unisi,” which is associated with a university in the same city, was more assertive. Even though they had to face the same warnings – in writing or by telephone – radio “Unisi” tried to produce a talk show to which critical political figures were invited. The issues raised in the discussions were at times quite sensitive, such as the dual role of the armed forces. Through this dual function doctrine, the armed forces had long influenced and controlled many aspects of national life. Radio “Unisi,” in certain cases, had to edit its morning talk shows before rerunning them in the evening. The First Director of Radio “Geronimo” made it clear that his radio would not play with fire. He even elaborated, “we had to survive first. If we were closed down, we would not have had any chance to struggle for anything. We realize that some parties will call us ‘collaborators.’ That's fine with me!” He also compared the strategy he chose with that of Indonesia's largest newspaper, Jakarta-based “Kompas”.

We must note that some of our planned interviewees were representatives of the capital owners. As shown in previous research conducted on Indonesian television, the owners were often not available for an interview. It seemed that generally the owner and his circle avoided talking with interviewers, because the political situation was still fraught with uncertainty in the early days of the reform period. This was true, even though we might assume that they were aware that from then on a greater freedom to express personal opinions would be given to them. The owners also generally talked about the overall picture and referred us to their staff for more details. They tended to be sparing in their comments, while editors were much more outspoken.
5.3 Internal Interaction

During the reform movement, interplay took place in the local mass media structure regarding regulation and institutional structure; delegation of authority became very dynamic. The interviewees divided the first half of 1998 into various periods. They called January to February 1998 an “eye-opening period” during which they saw the portents of massive change. All interviewees realized that they saw clues, yet no local media dared to take part in the movement. The editor of the “Pedoman Rakyat” daily (Makassar) said he was still worried that, if the Soeharto’s regime was in fact still strong and could handle the situation, it might close down his newspaper. He really considered that his employees would be the first group to suffer, had that happened.

By March 1998, certain local media, which had more nerve than others, for example “Bernas” (Yogyakarta), “Pedoman Rakyat” (Makassar), and “Haluan” (Padang), started to get involved in the reform movement. This period could be called “the pioneers’ time.” The editor of “Fajar” (in the same city as “Pedoman Rakyat”) saluted the media that had the courage to participate in the movement by directly or indirectly stating their stances through the content of their newspapers. At the same time, there was no special reaction from the local radio stations. According to the general manager of Radio “Arbes” (Padang), they still kept their neutrality.

From April to May 1998, the local media started to realize that they had no choice but to officially take a stand in support of the reform movement. This was a period of oscillation and soul-searching. While the pioneers were already dedicating a large percentage of each newspaper issue to opinions, demands, and reports of the reform leaders asking for resignation of Soeharto, others who had called themselves “neutral parties” now began to gamble with the political conditions. The word “gamble” was used by several interviewees. Except for the phone call made by the provincial head of the ministry of information to the “Bernas” editor in Yogyakarta, all interviewees said that, especially in the first weeks of May there was a “vacuum of power” in that no one was attempting to control the mass media any more.

During this period, the editors frequently held meetings. Editors of the “Kedaulatan Rakyat” daily (Yogyakarta) even held four meetings daily to update themselves on the minute-to-minute political progress. This also happened at the “Haluan” (Padang) which barely held an editorial meeting once a day before this period.

The situation in each meeting was reportedly tense. In some cases, not only the editors, but also certain staff members from the business or management departments, were also invited or even required to take part, to make sure that all aspects were taken into consideration before issuing an editorial policy. Interviewees from radio “Smart” (Makassar) acknowledged there were conflicts between those sides. For example, at “Pro2” (Bali), which according to its statutes as a subsidiary of RRI (Radio of Republic of Indonesia) should have sided with the Government, in fact supported the student movements by broadcasting much of their rallies. Another example was the serious conflict in the “Singgalang”
newspaper (Padang). As a result of this conflict, shortly after Soeharto stepped
down, eighteen of its editors and reporters demanded the replacement of the chief
tor and reviewed the ownership shares held by the employees and the employer.
Finally, the group of eighteen resigned, found a new investor, and founded a new
daily, the “Mimbar Minang,” claiming to be the first newspaper in Indonesia
belonging entirely to a cooperative.

5.4 Reporters and Audience

The background of the reporters and their basic audience were taken into
account by the interviewees when asking about their personal attitudes and opinions
of their audience, in judging the dynamic changes occurring around them. The
“Bernas” daily (Yogyakarta), for example, proudly stated that most of its reporters
were activists. The editor also discussed the 27 July Incident in Jakarta, when the
New Order used militias backed by military personnel to attack the PDI-P
headquarters (the Indonesian Democracy Party for Struggle). The PDI-P was at the
time led by Megawati Soekarnoputri who is now the Vice President. Soeharto made
every effort to topple Megawati from her position by supporting another national
party congress which elected Suryadi as the new president. So, there were then two
competing presidents of the PDI-P. In that historical attack, one reporter of the
“Bernas” daily was trapped in the headquarters building.

The “Pedoman Rakyat” newspaper (Makassar) felt they had a network based
on synergism with the students. According to the editor, most of their reporters were
either students in their final year of graduation or wishing to complete their
bachelor’s degree. In general they were also activists for the reform movement on
their respective campuses. In the view of the editor of the “Haluan” daily (Padang),
the newspaper could also rely on a very good relationship with the students. He
even thought that the students’ movements in Jakarta and outside were exactly the
same in terms of their militancy. The difference was only due to the greater media
exposure dedicated to the Jakarta-based students.

Radio “Unisi” (Yogyakarta) always based its programs on the needs of its
main audience, i.e. university students, always actively following and reporting on
the demonstrations staged by the students. Most of the reports were live broadcasts.
On the other hand, the director of “CDBS” Radio (Bali) thought that her station
erred by producing and airing news about student demonstrations, since its main
audience is youth. According to her, it should have focused on programs considered
as “fun” for young people. If her radio also aired news about the student
demonstrations, it was only because of pressure from the students. The latter came
to the studio and asked for broadcast time dedicated to information from the student
political action front.
5.5 Freedom as a New Commodity

Evaluating the early reform period, i.e. the first year after Soeharto stepped down, all interviewees said they started to realize that freedom of expression could become a “new commodity.” On average, according to their own sources, circulation of the “Pedoman Rakyat” daily (Makassar) increased by almost fifty percent. Our respondent at the “Haluan” daily (Padang) stated that we could assume that, due to the new climate of freedom, the daily could increase its circulation too; yet, mushrooming of other, new media should also be taken into account. According to him, in and around Padang, the numbers of daily and weekly newspapers in the early reform period increased by three hundred percent, compared to the figures in the Soeharto Era. Given these circumstances, maintaining the previous circulation could already be considered a satisfactory achievement.

Local radio stations did not seem to follow the same trend as radio stations in Jakarta, where news programs became a “new commodity” that sold well. Most sources confirmed this when asked about the opportunity to creatively present and package the news. In general, they recognized that opportunities were wide open now that they no longer had to relay some thirteen Government daily news programs. One of the reasons behind the different trend in local radio was given by the director of Radio “Geronimo.” According to him, the Yogyakarta audience did not feel the need for periodical news yet. They only needed breaking news, when special events took place. This opinion was shared by Radio “Smart” (Makassar) that once aired a ten-hour live broadcast on a flood and received a lot of positive responses from its listeners. The director of Radio “Geronimo” stressed that he waited for new regulations that might be issued by the Government. If the new regulations allowed the production and airing of news programs, his radio station might consider it. We have to note that, since the abolition of the Ministry of Information by the president in August 1999, some parties thought that there were no de facto broadcasting regulations, since there was no Government agency to enforce them.

The quality of the news aired by local radio stations left much to be desired, specifically owing to the lack of depth of their news coverage. According to our respondent at Radio “CDBS” (Bali), for instance, at times news that had already been published in the newspapers or made available on the Internet was merely quoted. Radio “Dikara Bawana” (Padang) supported that choice for a different reason. As a small station, which is functionally associated with the Padang Catholic Diocese, it always avoided deep involvement in political programming – talk shows and news programs. For this station it was more important to provide information that met the needs of Catholics and other people in remote areas like Mentawai.

Radio “Pro2” (Bali) worried that its listeners might become bored with too much news. According to our respondent, the listeners were assumed to read already enough political and violent news in the newspapers; therefore, should his radio station also offer this kind of programming, the audience might choose to shift to other channels. The interviewees at Radio “Arbes” (Padang) added that their
audience did not show a lot of enthusiasm for news programs either; for them, entertainment came first.

5.6. Future Challenges

One serious future challenge, in the view of the editors, is the quality of human resources – not only in terms of education, but also of experience. The news director of Radio “Smart” (Makassar), whose educational background is in communication science, observed that his staff initially served only listeners who made musical requests for themselves or someone else. Now, they were suddenly asked to package and present news programs. Certainly, the gap between the needs and the capacity of available personnel is quite wide. Therefore opportunities are needed to build up that capacity.

The broadcast and production director of Radio “Unisi” stated that the need for trained radio broadcasters, especially for local radio stations, is very urgent. Moreover, most of the interviewees were certain that the development of radio programs (in general, not only news) will be very rapid in the near future.

The respondents also mentioned that some cooperative “radio networking” efforts had already been carried out, with radio news agencies such as the Internews and the 68-H. What they meant by “radio networking” is actually NGOs helping to run workshops, distributing equipment provided by donors to local radio stations, and providing news programs to be aired by stations joining their network. The local radio station staff already asked for more opportunities to attend those workshops and training sessions. Yet, it is interesting to note that small stations dedicated to minority groups such as Radio “Dikara Bawana” in Padang never received invitations to the workshops nor help in the form of equipment.

Apart from the positive responses to the training sessions and workshops, there were also some objections about the way in which they were conducted and what materials were on offer. For instance, the director of Radio “Geronimo” regretted that some of his reporters were invited directly or by name by the NGOs supplying the workshops. In his opinion, the invitations should have been sent to the director who would then have decided which reporters or other staff should attend. He also argued that instead of running training sessions and workshops for reporters, the NGOs should first conduct them for the managers. According to him, if the training sessions and workshops were not in line with the media outlet owner’s vision, they would never work out or be put into practice.

One significant factor in the human resources of the local media is the shift from the old to the new generation of staff. According to sources at the “Pedoman Rakyat” and “Haluan” newspapers, thanks to this shift a climate has developed which is conducive to healthy competition aiming at sufficient openness for new ideas and for improving the overall media performance. The second challenge comes from the need to use alternative media such as the Internet. Since 1997, some local media have begun to look at the Internet as an information source. Yet, they
frequently argue that the Internet cannot be considered a credible information source. They usually refer to the news derived from the internet only to draw an issue map to be elaborated on further.

Our interviewees thought that the information they obtained from the Internet before the downfall of Soeharto was uncertain and unclear, because most of the reports did not provide accurate facts. Only thirty percent of the local media staff we interviewed had access to websites that were popular during the reform movement or which contained protest news, such as “Siar,” “Apakabar,” etc. The local media did not appear to realize yet that, in the new or reform era, they should also use the internet for larger purposes, such as finding out accurate data about events, not only at the national level but also in the global arena. The third challenge comes in the form of a code of conduct. In the view of local media personnel, the downfall of Soeharto also meant the end of a press code of conduct. For the newspaper editors, in the early reform era, there were serious doubts whether it was proper or not to print the full name, or even the photograph, of alleged perpetrators. Initially, they thought it was not appropriate to do so. Yet, they noticed that the TV news programs did mention the full names and showed pictures of people accused, but not yet convicted, of crimes. They eventually changed their stance and started to follow the same practice, even though some of the editors continued to believe it was not a proper thing to do.

The most serious challenge in the future is what our respondents call “the mass dictatorship” or “mob rule.” By this term, the sources mean a mass movement or action that is usually conducted in a violent manner. Some demonstrators also brandish machetes or swords, threatening reporters or even destroying the premises of a media outlet whose news is regarded as detrimental to their cause. The “mass” is comprised of friends or followers of a certain group, who sympathize with the person in the news or (very often) who are unemployed and are paid to join. This threat was stressed by all the interviewees, although only one of them provided a real example involving their office. The “Bernas” daily (Yogyakarta) once printed an article about an affair involving a public figure in Sleman, near Yogyakarta. A large “mass” of people then came to the newspaper’s building to express their disappointment, because according to them the news was false and had ruined the reputation of a person they respected. Apart from the four cities where we conducted this research project, at least five serious cases of a massive attack against a mass media office occurred in the same period in reaction to the news content supplied. In other words, our sources seemed to think that this problem might be a trade-off for the freedom of expression they had newly experienced after the downfall of Soeharto. In fact, it is certainly related to the ineffectiveness of the security agencies, whose personnel are haunted by their bad reputation regarding human rights abuses. They seemed undecided about what constitutes expression of freedom and what exceeds the limit and becomes a criminal act.
5.7 Locality and Capital Movement

Did the respondents see their localities in a new way after Soeharto stepped down? In general, they said that even though they were aware of the fast and massive changes that were taking place, they still regarded their local areas as more positive than Jakarta, in terms of harmony and security.

Further research is needed to ascertain whether the news content of the local newspapers and radio stations at the time indeed already reflected what the editors or directors stated. But, in general, we can say that from our observations, some contents of the local media in Padang could be interpreted as provocative. Or, in other words, it was not really in line with the principles of “peace journalism” that they told us to be more concerned with than the Jakarta-based media.

Regarding news coverage of the widespread autonomy and independence movements in various provinces, the local media seemed to handle it very well. The editors tried to provide their audience with factual accounts of independence movements and comprehensive analyses of the ability of each area or province to survive, in case their demands were accepted. The local media also proved themselves to be good partners of the local audiences in their struggle for human rights and in the tendering for local development projects, which in the past had always been orchestrated by the central Government and won by its cronies in and outside Jakarta.

When responding to questions about the ideal percentage of local news compared with national news, the interviewees generally agreed that, given their local character, they should pay more attention to local problems. Yet, they did not think there would be a significant increase in local news during the reform era. They suggested percentages that ranged from a 60-40 to a 70-30 composition of local vs. national/international news. In terms of what usually influenced them in selecting the main issues for their own media outlets, most of the interviewees mentioned television as the benchmark. Some of them added that what they received from the television news was a sense of how deep an issue was explored on television and how brave television reporters were to expose sensitive aspects of, or persons involved in, that issue. This stance could result in certain headlines or main issues being similar to those of the mainstream media in Jakarta.

Local radio station directors were generally willing to accept incoming capital flow from networks that usually led to syndication. Five of the stations where the interviews were conducted are already part of a network. But such was not the case with the newspapers. Most of the directors or editors stated that they preferred to work for themselves and not be exploited by outsiders. They were confident that with a freer climate and improvements in their internal structure, they could succeed. They were also certain that the local audience would appreciate their long history with the local media, so that the directors and editors did not need to worry much about losing business. Thanks to teleprinting, the morning editions of the Jakarta newspapers could be distributed at the same time as the local papers. This does not mean that they would not welcome cooperation with investors from other cities, especially Jakarta. Nevertheless, they frequently reminded us that, although it
might initially seem to be a win-win situation, they might end up under someone else's control, pointing similar situations noted in certain cities during the New Order Era.

Most of them did not worry about production processes, although there were already some new competitors and there might be more in the near future. Even though the printing facilities in some local newspaper offices were limited, they could still maintain their normal printing schedule. The “Haluan” and “Pedoman Rakyat” dailies had their own printing presses. Their only worry pertained to paper supply. Sometimes they were required to pay in advance for paper; in some cases, the paper was delivered late, even though they had paid in advance. According to them, the syndicated newspapers in their area would have never faced that problem.

6. Concluding Remarks

It is not easy to decide exactly what came first in a large reform movement such as the one which took place in Indonesia. It has been largely believed that the students and NGO activists kick-started the movement with their protests. The Jakarta-based media certainly focused their reports on the protests by students and activists in Jakarta, although they also published some articles about student and activist protests in other locations. Even though we might differ with this belief, we cannot assume that there was no such movement among the media people in Jakarta. We have to take into account that the structure of the media industry in Jakarta might have constrained that movement for a long time.

When we ask this question to the local media, the same conditions may apply. What made the local media face the problems differently, or even weakened their resolve, was the fact that they had to face two levels of authority – local and national. The local media personnel, consisting of the owners, management or business executives, editorial executives and reporters, might take different stances regarding those two levels of control. Moreover, a close relationship with, and loyalty to the authorities was the main prerequisite for the issuance of a license at the time. Therefore, some of the local media personnel assumed that there were problems at the macro-level which they could not handle or influence. In other words, Governmental control was just a fact of life. At the extreme macro level, or global level, there were also problems (capital movements, etc.) which even the New Order regime was powerless to influence.

The alternative approach acknowledging that there is an interplay between the structure and the agency helped us explain why the interrelations of external and internal factors could lead to a movement that forced Soeharto to step down. Using this approach we evaluated the historical context of the Jakarta media and the local media and reached relevant conclusions. We found that some of the local media, taking into account specific internal and external considerations, became immediately involved in the reform movement in their areas, and contributed significantly to its acceleration; other local media, with other considerations, either “gambled” or were forced to support the movement at the last minute before
Soeharto was overthrown. The internal interplay among the local media at the time was very tense and dynamic.

During the early reform period, the local media were challenged to attribute new meanings to their localities, both in terms of opportunities and challenges in facing competition from the Jakarta-based media. Although they worried about the threat of violent “mass” protest against their news content, they thought they could succeed in the reform era. The changes in (social) agencies and structures have helped them seize opportunities and overcome challenges. They are also certain that their long history will cause their local audiences to support them in the foreseeable future. In addition, this connection will encourage the local media to support the goals of the local populations better than outsiders would. By putting into practice local wisdom, however, they are in no danger of pushing the limits of freedom the way it was done by the media in Jakarta and other large cities. One factor that could either help or hinder them is television news programming, which is generally used as the benchmark for evaluating both the subjects and depth of coverage. 15
Fourth Chapter

Negotiating Public and Community Media in Post-Soeharto Indonesia

Abstract

Indonesia and its media are going through a rapid stage of transition. While the goal of this reform movement is the transition to a civil society and creation of a more democratic media system, the main result so far has been the liberalization of the media market, in line with global media trends, which as such does not necessarily guarantee a more democratic communication system. One way to counter this development is though the decentralization of radio and television, and the establishment of public and community media, which was under discussion in the Indonesian Parliament. This chapter presents the results of a qualitative research project carried out in several regions throughout Indonesia, which gave local people a platform to voice their ideas on the media portrayal of their ‘multiple identities’ (e.g., cultural, political, economic, ethnic), and their perception of the ‘viability’ (problems, prospects, and promises) of alternative broadcasting in relation to the state and commercial broadcasters.

1. Background: Indonesian Media in Transition

There is little doubt that the media system during the New Order regime in Indonesia (1966-1998) was authoritarian in nature. The Soeharto administration employed a systematic and comprehensive strategy to ensure that the mass media function as a control instrument of power: by preventively and correctively issuing licenses, controlling news texts, and controlling the career track of the practitioners (journalists). The Government television station, TVRI (Television of the Republic of Indonesia), remained the only television channel until 1987. The first five commercial television stations were in the hands of Soeharto’s family members and cronies. The Government-run RRI (Radio of the Republic of Indonesia) was without competition until 1970. Then, entrepreneurs whose loyalties to the regime were without question could start private radio stations.

What could challenge such a situation? Some analysts state that without a revolution in the commercial television newsrooms, there would have been no reformation in Indonesia (see Ishadi 2002a; 2002b). This is supported by the fact that local radio and print media personnel generally referred to television news programming, particularly the commercial stations’ news during the Reform movement, as a benchmark for evaluating both the subjects and the depth of the
news coverage (Gazali 2002a, 138). Other analyses suggest that, seen from a wider perspective, the demise of Soeharto’s regime had been caused by Asia’s economic crisis. The principal cause of the latter was the market itself that continued to be driven by global capital markets and global liberalization pressures (see Beeson 1998; Emerson 1999; Hidayat 2002b). It is not easy, however, to decide exactly whether media (agencies) or (structural) economic pressures started the Reform movement. Golding and Murdock (1979, 210) consider both analyses as complementary. They state that the efforts to understand the production of ideology by the media cannot de facto be separated from the efforts to comprehend the dynamic processes in the society within which the media industries operate.

Following this political-economic analysis, the Reform movement would be marked further by freer and interrelated market, media, and civil society. This type of analysis is usually presented in a triangular model of those elements (for the Indonesian case, see Hidayat 2002b). According to Charles Taylor (1990, 95-118; also in Keane 2001, 786), there are three different levels of civil society. Firstly, the civil society exists in a minimal sense where there are free associations not operating under the tutelage of the state. Secondly, a stronger sense of civil society ensues “where society can structure and co-ordinate its actions through such associations.” Thirdly, a public dimension of civil society is strongest “where the ensemble of associations can significantly determine or inflect the course of state policy.”

In Indonesia, the Reform movement has led to a liberated civil society together with the rise of hundreds of new non-Government organizations (NGO’s), advocacy groups, voluntary social and cultural organizations and independent labor unions, including 24 new journalist associations. Observers tend to agree that many of such organizations in this new era improve their quality of activities (see Tajoeddin 2002, 23). Accordingly, these developments can meet two of three Taylor’s levels of civil society; for the third one, a recent research reveals that Indonesia’s index only achieves a 2.4 score out of a maximum of 4, according to the Civil Society Index developed by CIVICUS (Yappika 2002). The fact that the third dimension can only be achieved if a democratic communication system is in place (Herman 1995; Heath 1999) explains that still low index.

Checking Indonesia’s current communication system, we can see that the liberalization has taken place hand in hand with deregulation in the media and their related market sector. More important is the liquidation of the Ministry of Information, the executor of the former oppressing system. One year after Soeharto’s resignation, the House of Representatives passed a new Press Law (No. 49/1999) stipulating that a publishing license was no longer required. As a result, the number of newspapers soared from 300 to around 1,000 (Mangahas quoted in Johannen and Gomez 2001, 125; Hidayat 2002b, 3). In addition to that Press Law, the 1999 Broadcasting Bill proposed by the Parliament allows foreigners to own up to 49% of shares in media agencies. These reforms undoubtedly conform the spirit of global neo-liberalism.

This liberalization has resulted in a libertarian interpretation of media-making. Jonathan Turner, Reuters bureau chief in Jakarta, states that “Indonesia has become
one of the world’s most open communities inasmuch as you can pretty well write what you want without fear of official sanction” (Turner quoted in Goodman 2000, 1). As to broadcasting programming, two president directors of commercial television stations openly describe the commodification process taking place. They acknowledge that what commercial stations have really done is nothing else than “competing in order to fool the people” (see Gazali 2002b, 4). A few commercial radio stations, however, still try to serve their audiences with a great deal of news and talkshows on most recent public affairs. In short, the liberalization of media and market brought about by the Reform movement has only resulted in what Bagdikian (1997, 248) calls “the fallacy of the two-model choice,” as if people can only choose between an authoritarian system and a libertarian system; both, in fact, do not meet the conditions required by civil society.

Hidayat (2002b in Gazali 2002c, 4-18) argues that there are at least three reasons why commercial market-driven media – implying “the logic of accumulation and exclusion” (Kellner 1990, 6-7) and preferring large-scale communication forms – cannot guarantee a platform for equal access and democratic discussion. Firstly, issues addressed in these media will be determined by the extent to which they do not interfere with the interest of capital expansion. Secondly, without audience maximization and without access to financial resources, it would be difficult for minority segments in society to acquire broadcasting time to conduct a peaceful, rational discussion on issues of interest to them, such as unemployment and health of the poor. Thirdly, those two previous conditions potentially cause the homogenization of media content. In the end it would just resemble the former state repression which – in the Indonesian case – once led to the so-called “national culture” or to the definition of social reality from the perspective of the Government, which was regarded as the only valid and logical one (see Hill and Sen 1990).

In reality, Indonesia is a very heterogeneous country in terms of local areas, ethnic groups, cultures, and ways of life. Therefore, a centralized television policy could never have answered the needs for media suitable for that plurality. Things were even worse in 2000 with the existence of 10 commercial television stations; all obtained a national license and their bases are all in Jakarta (for a full account of the original set of television stations in Indonesia, see d’Haenens, Gazali and Verelst 1999, 127-152 and d’Haenens, Verelst and Gazali 2000, 197-232). Although the local commercial radio stations had been blooming since 1970, the latter only operate in cities having significant amounts of advertising expenditures. Their programming was also influenced much by the Jakarta-based radio stations.

Against this background, it is clear that what Indonesia needs to address in its Broadcasting Law is the democratic reordering of the media and their public accountability. Splichal (1993, 8) suggests some necessary preconditions to do so: that is providing genuine access to the media and a more equitable distribution of media ownership, media time, and space. These preconditions are based on the abolition of all limitations of rights of citizens. These are also the presuppositions of “public sphere” (Habermas 1993; Curran and Gurevitch 1992). A comprehensive interpretation of public sphere can be found in public communication that includes not only mass communication, but also other forms of communication (Hollander,
Stappers and Jankowski 2002, 22-23). One is community communication whose emphasis is on the communicative exchange and social action within the context of geographical localities and/or communities of interest. Through that communicative exchange and social action, community communication is expected to bridge the gap between the policy coming from outside or being imposed on more than one community (such as state policy) on the one hand and the collective (social) authentic experiences and needs, and multiple (i.e., cultural, ethnic, religious) identities that are relevant to a specific group or category of individuals on the other.

When it comes to institutional aspects, community media are generally seen as relatively small-scale institutions, concerned with locally oriented and produced programming, essentially publicly financed, and whose ownership and control are often shared by members in the community. All these ingredients together might help to become relatively more independent from the dictatorship of both the state and the market. These characteristics are similar to those of public broadcasting institutions, except for, at least in some smaller countries, the coverage area of public broadcasting being larger than that of community broadcasting. Public service broadcasting might start from the idea of a national network like in most Western European countries, similar to TVRI and RRI in Indonesia, serving more than one community, positioned as a national integrating tool, or as a symbol of national unity. Also, the public stations are generally run in a more bureaucratic, politicized, and professional fashion than community media (for an overview of the general characteristics found in community media, see Jankowski et al. 1992; Jankowski and Prehn 2002, 7-8; Fraser and Estrada 2001; for an overview of indicators of public broadcasting performance, see Barnett and Docherty 1991, 23-27 or the Political Declaration of the Council of Europe in d’Haenens and Saeys 2001).

Community communication, in fact, also implies decentralization (Hollander 1992, 9): this is effected in Indonesia through the implementation of the 1999 Regional Autonomy Law No. 22. If one considers decentralization or community communication to be significant in the Indonesian media transition, it should be placed in the model used to comprehend the transition process. Offe’s model (1998, 4-6) is potentially relevant because he includes the ‘community’ as a key element of analysis in an effort to understand where one is on the trajectory of social transition. This understanding, according to him, is a prelude to the construction of a valid social policy. Besides the community, other actors are: the state and the market. Offe (1998) believes that whereas the state is driven by reasons, and the market by interest, the community’s engine runs on passion (e.g., love, loyalty, cohesion, honor, and pride). Whereas the market allows for acquisition, the community provides for identity; or as Hollander et al. (1992) suggest, it provides for collective (social) authentic experiences, needs, and identities. With these senses, ‘community’ is presumably better substituting the position of ‘civil society’ used in Hidayat’s model (2002b, 1-3) or to be addressed first, since the stagnancy of community empowerment might contribute to the current failures to achieve the strongest dimension of civil society as well as failures of decentralization in Indonesia (see Niessen 1999). Yet, our proposed model still leaves the state out (similar to Hidayat’s), as Indonesia is now in a specific juncture: just being freed from the state suppression on media and civil society initiatives. In other words, in current
Indonesia, the struggle to get the state to fairly guaranteeing and enforcing equal rights of citizens, as suggested by Offe, has just started. Thus, communities should first keep a close watch on the state’s performance in dealing with media and market sectors. Also Jakubowicz (1993, 46) states that in a changing context of communication democratization, a potential enemy is “the state” (about the three models see Figure 3 below):

**Figure 3: Interactions of Elements in Social Transition**

The new triangle still stands in a complex relationship to the negotiation of the new broadcasting policy. Among others, due to the recent history, it is much easier to educate the population about the evil of a suppressive Government than about the potential of a manipulative capitalistic structure in the media system. In any case, the proposed model suggests that the essence of the Indonesia's reform should be the creation of opportunities for community members in various provinces to be actively involved in directing the development in Indonesia's broadcasting industry as well as the state media policy.

This chapter presents the results of a qualitative research project carried out in several regions throughout Indonesia in an effort to investigate the ‘viability’ (e.g., problems, prospects and promises) of the decentralization of radio and television, in relation to the former state and new commercial broadcasting agencies. The general research question is: What are the perceptions of potential local stakeholders about the broadcasting situations, the problems with those situations, and the solutions to those problems? Implicitly addressed is the question of the perceived abilities of the community members to assess and interact with other elements of our proposed triangular model. In order to observe the relevant developments of each element of the new triangular model and its surroundings in the field, this research proposes to place the study results in a Media Organizational Performance Model (adapted from McQuail 1992a, pp. 81-95) (see Figure 4 below)
2. Research Questions

Referring to the general research question (above), the data collection and analysis aim at answering four specific research questions:

1. What are the taken-for-granted assumptions about the recent developments of the broadcasting industry in Indonesia in general, and the positioning of TVRI and RRI in particular among the key local representatives in ten provinces throughout the country?

2. What are the perceptions of the stakeholders and their needs relating to public and community types of broadcasting? Answers to this question were ‘triggered’ by introducing concrete community and public broadcasting experiences in other societies (e.g., the United States of America, Canada, Germany, Japan).

3. Do local audiences perceive the need to maintain multiple layers of regional, local, community identities and cultures, using alternative broadcasting sources and how do they position the maintenance of those identities in the context of both national and global programming?

4. What conditions should be fulfilled, including through legislation, in order to guarantee public access to ownership, control of, and participation in community and public broadcasting?
3. Methodology: Stages and Procedures

The present research adopts the qualitative, grounded research approach that relies mostly on observation and records of statements made in private and public meetings as well as in personal interviews. The paradigm used as point of departure is ‘working with the people,’ as opposed to ‘working for the people.’ In other words, this research is based upon so-called comprehensive people participation (Cohen and Uphoff 1980). By people participation is meant participation in assessing, decision-making, implementing, sharing the benefits, and in evaluating. Therefore, every session began with exploring public assessment of all relevant issues (i.e., starting on the access to and use of existing broadcast stations), in other words, starting with their closest environment. This procedure is very much in line with the spirit of the grounded research approach. This approach allows the researchers to reconstruct the interviewees’ perspective (Glaser and Strauss 1977; Strauss and Corbin 1990).

In general, the results from the first stage will determine the subsequent stages.

First stage: pre-assessment sessions

A research team of communication scholars of the University of Indonesia started out with a set of preliminary activities, called ‘pre-assessment’ sessions in ten cities in Indonesia. The selection of the ten cities was carried out purposively with the plan of using each city as a hub where relevant parties from the surrounding areas would gather. Almost covering the whole span of Indonesia, the cities are, from West to East in Indonesia: Medan, Padang, Bandung, Yogyakarta, Surabaya, Denpasar, Samarinda, Makassar, Manado, and Jayapura. The pre-assessment sessions were conducted between July 2000 and January 2001, during which the researchers met key representatives of the local communities. Taking into account the principle of democratic representation of local community members, our sources included: NGO activists, academics, TVRI and RRI staff, commercial radio personnel, local media staff, local Government representatives, local legislative members, social leaders, artists and cultural observers, religious leaders, business leaders, and advertisers.

During this stage, after inquiring the stakeholder representatives about their assessment of the existing broadcasting, the researchers briefed the participants on issues regarding community and public broadcasting (Barnett and Docherty 1991). Relevant laws, specifically the 2000 Government Regulations 36 and 37, were discussed to stress the fact that legally TVRI and RRI were already transformed into public broadcasting stations. At the same time, drawing from experience in other countries (for instance, in the United States of America), it was argued that community and public broadcasting should not be limited to stations established by the state, and that universities, NGOs, and other institutions should equally be allowed to establish public and community broadcasting stations.
**Second stage: assessment sessions or seminars**

During the pre-assessment round, most informants suggested to widen the assessment by including many more relevant parties within the local public. As a response to this demand, a set of large public forums – by means of focus group discussions were organized in the above-mentioned ten cities. These seminars were run between April 26 and August 3, 2001, and in total attended by 1,345 participants originating from the host cities and 64 surrounding cities and villages. The composition of the participants was as follows (figures in parentheses show the range of percentages of each category in each city): NGO people (16-25%), TVRI & RRI staff (14-18%), cultural observers (10-15%), artists (10-12%), scholars (10-12%), students (8-10%), local Government staff (5-10 %), local Parliament members (5-10 %), religious leaders (5–9%), media people (5-6%), business people (5-6%), others (4-5%).

As recommended in the pre-assessment rounds, four international speakers with extensive experience in the public broadcasting sector of their home country were invited: David Brugger and Bob Ottenhoff (United States), Jim Byrd (Canada), and Eric Voght (Germany). In each city, only two international speakers were present, accompanied by on average six national and local speakers. The domestic speakers included academics, NGO activists, media people, local Government officials, local Parliament members, and representatives of the central Government (Ministry of Telecommunications). In addition to the speaker presentations, the seminars also featured program samples brought by the international speakers, the producers of local TVRI and RRI, and some NGOs working on information flow analysis and media production advocacy.

Near the end of the two-day seminars, a session took place where the participants were assigned into two groups. The first one was the broadcasters group composed of producers from TVRI and RRI and other staff as well as some producers from commercial stations. The second group was the users group comprised of the rest of the participants. The results of each group discussion were brought afterwards into a final plenary session. The outcomes of the discussions will be presented in the following sections.

**4. Findings and Thematization of the Data**

We found six major themes revealing essential similarities and differences with regard to the ways in which stakeholders in the ten cities under scrutiny dealt with the research questions. Each theme, not listed in order of priority or significance, will be presented, followed by a brief discussion. The themes include the stakeholders’ perception (1) on community access to the existing broadcast stations; (2) on community identities and cultures; (3) on the positioning of TVRI and RRI; (4) on suggestions for future market strategies of public or community broadcasting; (5) on the making of broadcasting law; and (6) on transnational capital and public sphere.
Theme 1: Community access to the existing broadcast stations

The first emerging theme is that of community access to the existing broadcast stations. The informants expressed expectations for what could be seen as citizens’ “power to communicate” (Andrên 1993, 61). Regarding access to media exposure, our informants state that people living in remote areas can only watch TVRI or listen to RRI, or in some areas, people do not have access to any media; for example, recently in the Sentani area in Papua, the transmitter tower of RRI was broken.

With regard to media ownership, most informants thought that the television stations were still controlled by Soeharto’s family members, their cronies, or by Jakarta-based conglomerates. They strongly criticized the fact that people in local communities never get a chance to build their own television station.

Our informants’ concerns on freedom of expression were clearly revealed in comments such as: “Television and radio programming are determined by the elite. It is not in their interest to channel the voices of minority groups or people living far from Jakarta.” The NGO activists also believed not to have access to the media to evaluate the performance of executive and legislative staff. It was interesting to note that the local Government officials and Parliament members felt that they did not have access to the media either.

Theme 2: Community identities and cultures

A second theme regularly brought up in the discussions are community identities and cultures. This theme became much more prominent when the dominance of Javanese traditional performances was reflected upon (about Java-centrism, see Keuning, van der Mark and Palte 1987, 9, 27-29). Not surprisingly, these comments were mostly voiced by informants living outside Java, especially in Bali, West Sumatra, Papua, and East Kalimantan. They believed that “the Java-based programs are causing alienation to local people from their own culture.” When asked about their appreciation of cultural plurality, they replied: “It is not about resisting other cultures but it is more about demanding to see our local programs in the right proportion,” and “we would like to be the host in our own home.”

About cultural and social standards, cultural observers and community leaders, academics and NGO activists found that commercial television programs aired and supported anti-social messages. They stated: “Look at sex and violence that are always part of television movies!” They referred to the extravagant life style and consumerism achieved without hard work that were blatantly exposed in both imported and local soap operas. Some also accused commercial television and radio programs of airing and supporting anti-traditional norms and values such as living together before marriage and discussing sex matters in public. They were also critical about the sensual outfits worn by famous actors and actresses in commercial television programs: “Attires like the one worn by Britney Spear is dangerous for
our traditional norms on clothing etiquette;” and “We can’t stand much more Britney Spearism!” All religious leaders taking part in the discussions voiced their concerns about the decreasing amount of religious teaching programs on television.

In contrast to all criticisms, there were always some informants (although very few) who showed their appreciation towards commercial television and radio stations as well as towards TVRI and RRI, since both had succeeded in offering informative and entertaining programs helping Indonesian people overcome their alienation from global advancement and international trends.

Theme 3: Positioning of TVRI and RRI

Around 60% of informants think that TVRI and RRI still – to a certain extent – function as Government propaganda tools. The rest acknowledged that TVRI and RRI have improved significantly compared to the days under the Soeharto regime. For example, some saw that, “They have aired some interactive public debates.”

On the use of the existing TVRI and RRI programming, the community leaders together with NGO activists and academics from areas outside Java found that TVRI and RRI air less and less programs that give practical assistance to people living in villages and small towns. For instance, instructional programs on agriculture, animal raising or home economics.

In reaction to these criticisms, the TVRI and RRI staff in general underlined the obstacles they had to face everyday in the production, given the very limited production budget available. In spite of those obstacles, most of them still try to defend that most of their programs already meet public needs and wishes. They also objected to being criticized by the public simply due to the fact that they are the front liners. They stated: “Everybody knows that we really depend on the central policy and its budget allocation!” Finally, it was very important to note that almost all of the TVRI and RRI staff agreed to support any social action that would be carried out by the local community members to improve TVRI and RRI performances.

Theme 4: Suggestions for future market strategies of public or community broadcasting

A fifth theme that emerged from the discussions were the suggestions for future market strategies of public or community broadcasting. Most informants stated: “I think we already agree that the commercial stations define their audience as consumers while the public and community broadcasting see their audience as citizens.” Representatives of the local Government, particularly those from the local offices of information (former local branches of the Ministry of Information), could not hide their ambition to ensure that the local Government should regain their unlimited access to local TVRI and RRI. They argued: “If local TVRI and RRI
stations are to be supported by the local Government budget, they have to serve the functions needed by the local Government!” The NGO people, students, and academics rejected this idea categorically, arguing that the funding from the local Government budget is in fact public money.

Surprisingly, it were the representatives of the community business in Surabaya, Bandung, and Yogyakarta (all big cities in Java) who came forward to suggest the importance of the stakeholders’ support. For local legislators, the justification from the stakeholders is of paramount importance. For instance, they said: “There should be some public agencies to plan and evaluate the program together with TVRI and RRI.”

Most informants supported the establishment of those public forums. They suggested: “These forums should act like the pioneers who keep marketing the basic ideas of public and community broadcasting so that the numbers of stakeholders who are concerned with those alternative broadcasters grow bigger and bigger;” “These forums should be active in obtaining the recognition of both central and local management of TVRI and RRI as well as from local Government staff and legislators. Then, they should propose a program planning together with fund-raising activities;” and “It is very urgent that these forums soon jointly produce programs which catch the attention of the wider stakeholders, for instance in the form of town hall meetings discussing issues of interest to the local public. This will prove to be the most effective marketing strategy!” Some suggestions were made on how to name such a stakeholders’ forum. One widely preferred term was Local Consultative Forum (LCF).

**Theme 5: Broadcasting Law in the making**

A sixth theme that emerged was the making of Broadcasting Law. The NGO activists, students, and academics in all cities strongly advised all participants to pay close attention to the legislation process, as this had been a ‘mystery’ to local people from the beginning.

The proposed ban on nationwide coverage leading to the obligation for the national license holders to develop a joint cooperation with the potential local counterparts, became one of the hot issues. Around 70% of our informants, especially from cities outside Java, like West and North Sumatra, North and South Sulawesi, Papua, and Bali, felt it should be hailed as an important breakthrough. They believed: “Only by forcing the national stations to comply with that kind of regulation can we expect a significant decentralization to take place in Indonesia’s broadcasting scene.”

The difference between discussants from Java and outside Java, however, did not seem significant when referring to public and community broadcasting in the Broadcasting Bill. This was displayed in comments such as: “We should reject the Broadcasting Law if it does not include those two broadcasting institutions.” In order to ensure that public and community broadcasting, including TVRI and RRI,
significantly recognize supervision and evaluation by the public, some academics and NGO activists in Java demanded that this condition be stipulated in detail in the Broadcasting Law.

**Theme 6: Transnational Capital and Public Sphere**

Given the significant amounts of time spent discussing the local versus national political economy and public sphere, one might expect that the transnational flows of capital and transnational public sphere would also receive much attention in the seminar series. In fact, there were only relatively few comments from the informants on how those issues should be addressed in the Broadcasting Bill. Among them were those from three business people from telecommunications companies in Bandung and Padang and two economic observers in Surabaya and Yogyakarta, who commented on the article allowing foreigners to own up to 49% of any broadcasting company in Indonesia. One of their arguments was: “Globalization is a reality we have to face. If a lot of international investors would like to invest their money here in broadcasting companies, it would be great for our provinces.”

One student in South Sulawesi and another in West Java brought about the issue of relayed foreign broadcasting programs. “We have to set a limit on their amount,” said the Makassar’s student. His colleague in Bandung simply gave comments like: “If we don’t try to set a limit on the amount of relayed foreign broadcasting programs, it is exactly the same as allowing foreign broadcasting companies to build their station here!” In contrast, a cultural observer in Surabaya asked the participants not to spend a lot of time discussing transnational flows of capital or transnational public sphere. He said: “If we can develop some healthy public and community broadcasting in this province, I am sure we can survive any kind of potentially bad influence of international capital or international issues.” He then yelled out a proverb in a local language meaning that each area has its own unique traditions and cultures that are not easy to conquer.

**5. Conclusions**

The themes found in this research highlight the following important elements, as raised in the research questions: (1) local people argued that the shifting media system in Indonesia (due to Reform), including the new positioning of TVRI and RRI as public broadcasting, still did not solve the problems of scarcity of community access to the existing broadcasting stations; (2) local people were concerned with the needs to maintain their identities and cultures through the broadcasting programming and at the same time they worried about the impact of the libertarian interpretation of media-making; (3) Indonesia is a heterogeneous country, therefore the local people felt an urgent need to explore other forms of public communication, among others, community communication to be complementary with large-scale mass communication; (4) community and public
broadcasting were considered by the local people as more appropriate media to fulfill their specific needs, and to position the maintenance of their cultures and identities vis-à-vis other local, national and global cultures and identities; (5) the decentralization process, especially to guarantee community access to ownership, needed to be addressed in the making of the Broadcasting Law; (6) the Broadcasting Law should explicitly stipulate that public and community broadcasting must allow supervision and evaluation by the public and community.

As the main aim of this study was to let people have a voice, the researcher did not try to persuade the informants to formulate their assessments according to any analysis model; yet, the prominence of the new triangular model, that community should be advanced as an active element (not just waiting for the state’s initiatives) to directly deal with, and continuously assess the developments taking place in, media and market, appeared strikingly in the research findings. It is partly parallel with Splichal’s (1993, 12) suggestions on socialization and the way in which communication should be organized as a public good, and managed and controlled neither by private (market) nor state interests, but rather by society as a whole. If communities can run those functions, such a public communication system could be seen as an alternative or a middle ground between the authoritarian and libertarian choices.

To enhance these organizing, managing, and controlling functions, after the seminar series ended, the research team continued work with the local people. Up to December 2002, there have been 54 group discussions with the stakeholders of public and community broadcasting in the 10 cities. One of the predominant issues in these meetings was the dynamics of efforts to form Local Consultative Forums (LCF) as stakeholders forum on public and community broadcasting. All conversations in those meetings were also recorded as research data. Besides the meetings, the team also facilitated the production of television and radio programs involving local constituents, as recommended in the workshops. Of the 400 programs aired on TVRI and RRI since November 2001 to December 2002, 30% was produced in ‘town hall meeting’ program format. The topics of these joint local programs of LCFs and local TVRI and RRI stations varied greatly to suit the unique needs of each area. For example, human rights issues in the Aceh conflict, the public health service system in Bandung, violence against children in Banjarmasin, the narcotics problem in Bali, an anthropological view of the HIV/AIDS problem in Papua, prejudice and discrimination on Chinese by the press in North Sumatra.

Along with the joint production activities, some LCFs became more solid. Six of them became already official, namely, the Yogyakarta Society for Public Broadcasting (Yogyakarta), the East Java Forum for Public Broadcasting (Surabaya), the Media Forum for Brotherhood (Manado), the Makassar Local Consultative Forum (Makassar), the Bali Television Society (Denpasar), and “Balarea” in Bandung (“Balarea” also means brotherhood or togetherness). Outside of the ten original cities, there were cities that attempted to establish their own LCFs including Pontianak, Mataram, Banten, Palembang, and Banda Aceh. All these developments have gradually shown that the paradigm ‘work with the people’ used in this research works well and can encourage people to consider the implications of development of people’s capacity, equity, empowerment, and interdependence.
Negotiating Public and Community Media in Post-Soeharto Indonesia

108

(Byrant and White 1982, 15). This awareness also brought changes to the attitude of RRI and TVRI staff. In particular, RRI staff – from the central board of directors to local branches staff – have become more cooperative. They frequently stated that only through working together with LCF’s, they can be free from the former trap of the “paternalistic” vision (d’Haenens and Saey 2001, 120; Williams 1976, 133).

In order to have a sustainable, strategic, and comprehensive flow of endeavors, the research team together with the LCF members have also continuously discussed various developments in reference to McQuail’s Performance Model (1992). For example, in the macro environment (see Figure 5 below), the still gloomy economy in Indonesia (which is now even worsened by the Bali blast) seemed to reduce the enthusiasm of foreign donors. They usually referred to the failure of public and community broadcasting in Eastern Europe because of similar problems leading to the unavailability of sufficient amounts of public funding. On the other hand, there had been some pressures from foreign ambassadors to Indonesia who even paid a visit to the Ministry of Information’s office to demand for further clarifications of an article in the Broadcasting Bill that limits relayed programs from foreign broadcasts.

Figure 5: Media Organizational Performance Model (adapted from McQuail, 1992a, pp. 81-95) applied to negotiating public and community media in Indonesia
In the market environment, most of our sources in the Indonesian Advertising Agencies Association supported the existence of public and community broadcasting since in their opinion there will be enough potential market and advertising shares for them due to their specific characteristics. On the other hand, the position of commercial stations and surrounding corporate organizations was not clear yet. In some formal meetings they stated that they felt the need for alternative broadcasting too, as long as the broadcasting law provides crystal clear rules of the game. Yet, in other occasions, such as the one in East Java, the local branch of Indonesian Commercial Radio Stations Association (PRSSNI) whole-heartedly supported the raids launched by the so-called telecommunications police forces on the newly built local radio stations. These operations were based on ambiguous regulations in which it was uncertain whether the authority to allocate the license laid with the central Government (directorate general of post and telecommunications, according to the Telecommunications Law No. 36/1999) or with the local Government (as stipulated in the Regional Autonomy Law No. 22/1999). Moreover, new media technologies and media convergence were always brought up as arguments for them to reject the article in the Broadcasting Bill proposing limits on vertical integration in the media industry. ATVSI (Indonesian Association for Television; its members are commercial stations only) allegedly masterminded a huge protest at the Parliament building to prevent the legislators from passing the Broadcasting Bill into Law on the scheduled plenary session. The first protest on November 25, 2002 was successful. But, in the following session on November 28, the parliament passed the Bill into Act, even though there was a rumor that the commercial television stations would boycott legislators’ activities should they approve the Bill. It is important to note here that the research team has always kept contacts with the members of the House Special Committee on the Broadcasting Law and the relevant Government officials as well. Reports on developments of this action-research were always submitted to them too. The team even developed a guidance book on the public and community broadcasting, submitted the draft to as many activists, legislators, Government officials, academics, and other relevant parties as possible, and launched and acknowledged it as a collaborative work of all parties (see Acknowledgements).

Although the new Broadcasting Law No. 32/2002 with full recognition of public and community broadcasting never signed by the President, it went into effect on December 28, as endorsed by articles about legislation procedures in the Indonesian Constitution. The details of this new Law will be developed into lower-level regulations and they certainly need to be analyzed again by the advocacy groups together with LCFs and local people. In the field, there have been at least 15 local television stations joining two associations: Indonesian Public and Community Television Association launched in Balikpapan, April 28, 2002, and Indonesian Local Television Association formed in Bali, July 26, 2002. In the meantime, more than 400 community radios have been recorded and most joined the Indonesian Community Radio Network that was established on May 15, 2002.

Finally, while working with the local people, the research team has kept sharing with them the fact that they themselves will determine whether their LCF can make further progress or not. Some key issues contributing to that progress are: (1) the creativity of the LCF members in that area; (2) the cooperativeness and
creativity of the managers and staff of TVRI and RRI; (3) strength of support from local Parliament members and local Government officials; (4) the support from external funding agencies to cover the joint production costs still necessary at this initial stage; (5) the initiatives to develop their own broadcasting stations outside TVRI and RRI. Shortly after the new Broadcasting Law was made effective, the research team and other activists also kicked off the follow-up sessions across the country to discuss those key issues in the new contexts provided by the (new) Broadcasting Law No. 32/2002.
Concluding Remarks

Findings on the Directions of Media Responsibility and Accountability via the Media Performance Model in Order to Comprehend the Field of Political Communication in Indonesia

The findings put forward in this dissertation highlight the following important elements as a response to the research questions raised in the introduction: (1) a model designed to explain political communication in the Indonesian context, embracing the two faces of political communication (i.e. the politics of communication and the communication of politics); (2) the Media Performance Model derived from the Model of Political Communication and designed to fit the specific context of mediated political communication comprising four factors (i.e. the Government, Market, Civil Society, and the Media); (3) the concepts of Media Responsibility and Media Accountability which help show clearly the directions of the interplay taking place in the Media Performance Model, especially putting emphasis on citizens as active information gatherers and processors; (4) a variety of directions of interplay among the Government, Market, Civil Society and the Media over the last 20 years in Indonesia, divided into three eras (i.e. the Soeharto Era, better known as the “New Order Era,” the May 1998 Revolution, and the Reform Era afterwards); (5) two alternatives are promoted and developed concerning the form, the institutional aspects and the concrete mechanisms of Indonesian Media Accountability (i.e. the LCF (Local Consultative Forum) and the Supervisory Body, that is endorsed in the Broadcasting Law No. 32/2002).

1. Model of the Political Communication Field

For academic significance, the research in this dissertation has produced and provided details for what is intended to be a map of political communication studies, a “Political Communication Field Model.” In addition to serving as a structuring tool for this dissertation, this model is expected to have some heuristic

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value for other scholars: as a subject for discussion, as a model for research in other countries, and as an object of comparison with other models, as scholars aim at clarifying the comprehensive and challenging future of the political communication field.

This model demonstrates that this field has certainly made significant and rapid progress in recent years, especially for particular types of research: behavioral and media effects studies and campaign studies. These areas may be regarded as icons of political communication. Since the Model is expected to be relatively comprehensive in describing the political communication field, it asserts the inclusion of behavioral studies, campaign studies and political/civic socialization studies on non-mediated messages or interactions. Most of them are (but are not limited to) interpersonal and group communication. In this way, this model enlarges the range of issues in the field of political communication. For instance, analysis may not only be confined to the study of popular opinion regarding political communication, but also to citizen action. Moreover, media forms not typically included in political communication research, such as movies, popular songs, television shows, radio programs, and even rumors, should be also seen as viable expressions of political communication.
Figure 6: A Political Communication Field Model

1. Citizen as Active Information Gatherer & Processor (at all levels)
   - Community (ethnicity, etc.)
   - Family
   - Peer Group
   - School
   - Etc.

2. Institutions & Processes (+Interactions of Interest Groups)
   - Politics
   - Economics
   - Social
   - Culture
   - Religion
   - Etc.

3. Studies on Political/Civic Socialization (among & by citizens)

4. Studies on Political/Civic Socialization in institutions

5. Studies on Media Reality Construction (MRC) & Inputs from Institutions (political/civic socialization)


7. Diversity in Media Ownership (including new media e.g. internet)

8. Variety of Media

9. (MRC) Interactions in Newsroom & Agenda

10. Plurality of Contents

11. Behavioral Studies (attitude, belief, etc.) without media exposure

12. Media Effect Studies

13. Campaign & Elections Studies

14. Political/Civic Socialization Studies

15. Development Studies

16. Audience Feedback (political/civic socialization)

17. Uses & Gratifications & Selective Exposure on media choices on content choices

18. Behavioral Studies (non-mediated)

19. Campaign & Elections Studies (non-mediated)

20. Political/Civic Socialization Studies (non-mediated)

21. Participatory Development Studies (non-mediated)
In the same spirit, this model embraces the twentieth-century political scientists’ approach, considering politics in terms of group competition for scarce resources. One such approach concludes that the essence of politics is action – not the action of individuals, because they are rarely effective in politics, but the action of groups. It defines groups by their interests. Accordingly, this model visualises a specific arena to analyse various institutions and processes taking place around them, the so-called “interaction of interest groups.” That specific arena comprises governmental institutions, economics, culture, religion, etc.

Political communication in this modern age consists primarily of mediated political communication. Accordingly, studies on media reality construction become interesting and important. These include analyses on agenda-setting and interaction in the newsroom. Three chapters in this dissertation describe the intense, dynamic interactions in the newsrooms of radio and TV stations as well as newspapers across Indonesia when approaching the peak of the May 1998 Revolution.

All of the above-mentioned arenas address primarily (although not exclusively) parts of what Chaffee (2001) calls “communication of politics” (p. 243). Another inseparable part of political communication which, according to Chaffee, needs much more inventive efforts, has to do more with the “politics of communication.” For this part, the Model of the Political Communication Field, attributes a special place to citizens (both as individuals and groups) as active information gatherers and processors at all levels, such as the community, the family, peer groups, school, etc. The Model of the Political Communication Field reminds us that some areas need to be explored as much as the already popular domains, such as uses and gratifications studies with the emphasis on the active role of citizen in terms of selective exposure, media type and content choice, and citizens’ feedback to media contents.

To ensure that citizens play the role of active information gatherers and processors, the Model of the Political Communication Field requires three necessary conditions (hence areas of studies): i.e. diversity of ownership, variety of media, and plurality of media content. Otherwise, in reality, citizens will be trapped into “the fallacy of the two-model choice” (Bagdikian, 1997, p. 248), as if they only have a choice between two systems. The first system allows only very few media to operate under heavy government control; the Media thus become propaganda tools or ideological state apparatuses. The second system frees individuals and companies to found and develop as much media as possible under the “market principle”: the media here produce or buy programs for rating considerations only. Although extreme cases, both systems eventually fall into the trap of hegemony of tastes and goals. The policy of ensuring diversity of ownership, variety of media (such as commercial, public and community media), and plurality of contents will provide the (active) citizens not only with different levels of access to use media contents, but also with the chance to assess and develop media types/genres/output which will be well suited to their needs and contexts of life.
2. The Media Performance Model

The position of citizens as active information gatherers and processors as well as the institutions and processes which include interaction of interest groups in politics, economics, etc, will then relate the Model of the Political Communication Field to another model, which is designed to reduce that larger model to its essence, the so-called “Media Performance Model” (see Figure 1). This (relatively simple) model takes the form of a triangle, built up by four power entities, i.e. the Government, Market, Civil Society, and the Media positioned at the center of the triangle. Within each factor, there is a constant interplay between structure (e.g., defined as resources and regulations) and agency (in general referring to social actions carried out by social actors), which constrain as well as facilitate, impose limits on, as well as offer opportunities to, each other.

The results of the interplay within each factor will inevitably have an impact upon the interplay or power relations among those four elements and vice versa. Researchers could take a certain period in history as an object to be examined using this Media Performance Model. They could then mark the resulting tendencies in a certain era and relate them to other research interests (as explored quite extensively in the first chapter on the three eras in Indonesia, i.e. the Soeharto Era, the May 1998 Revolution, and the Reform Era). One should keep in mind that even though any effort to analyse a certain era would seem to freeze those internal and external interplays for a while or seem to reduce them into a kind of a still-photo, the result should always be placed into an historical narrative. This means that the researcher needs to be highly alert when attempting to structure events into a meaningful and related order, and attempting to organize some well-connected concepts that enable him or her to assess the past, the present, and the future.

3. Media Responsibility and Accountability

Regarding those interconnected concepts, it should be clear that although each chapter in this dissertation has its own theoretical framework and exploration of concepts, the Media Responsibility and Media Accountability concepts are nevertheless put forward together with the Model of the Political Communication Field and the Media Performance Model as unifying units in the overall theoretical framework of the dissertation. These concepts of Media Responsibility and Accountability are expected to enable any researcher to clearly see the directions of interplay among the factors in the Media Performance Model. Media Responsibility deals with the social needs the public should expect media and journalists to respond to. Therefore, it helps to investigate how the media and media professionals work to meet those expectations. Media Accountability describes how society might call on media and journalists to account for
the fulfillment of their responsibility. Hence, it helps to examine how the Government and most importantly Civil Society (elements) work to exercise their rights and duties.

3.a. During the Soeharto Era

The first chapter, “Political Communication in Indonesia: Revisiting the Media Performance Model,” shows on the one hand that during the Soeharto Era (1966 to 1998, better known as the “New Order Era”) the regime in power put in place a systematic and comprehensive strategy to control the freedom of expression and academic exercise. The Government wanted to ensure that no media performance and research interest posed a threat to political stability. On the other hand, the media industry was shaped markedly by the dynamics of Soeharto’s market economy. The rapid economic growth during the Soeharto period created a new middle class with relatively higher education and income levels as large audiences with purchasing power. In addition, the expansion of the economy also led to the growth of the advertising industry and of advertising expenditures, which encouraged the massive arrivals of transnational advertising agencies during the 1970s. It then resulted in the transformation of the Indonesian press from the “political press” during Soekarno’s Guided Democracy (which defined the press as a “tool of the Revolution” responsible for energizing and mobilizing public opinion) into the “industrial press.” In this industrial context, a number of parties were tempted by business opportunities offered by the media sector. That the Soeharto Era was characterized by overlapping interests between the Government and the Market is depicted in the Media Performance Model. The Government issued media licenses (required at that time) on the basis of political criteria, mainly to its cronies or loyalists. In return, the Government received guarantees that the media owners would closely monitor their media performance to ensure that it followed the Government line. The situation was exacerbated by the bribery of government officials by the business community in order to smooth the process of “grabbing” the license. Consequently, the media owners who were granted licenses in general treated the media industry just like any other business commodity and viewed bribery as an inevitable part of their investment.

In general, we can conclude that during the Soeharto Era the results of the interplay among elements in the Media Performance Model showed the dominance of the Government over other elements (see Figure 2 Part A). The overlapping of interests between the Government and the Market strengthened the control of the structure over the agency in the internal interplay within the media organization too. In a parallel way it weakened the potential establishment and performance of the Civil Society. The Media would never give significant space for any discourse (or news items) which inspired, or reported the establishment and performance of, voluntary associations that were independent of the state and commercial relations, working in the name of democracy and public interests.

The above-mentioned conditions explain why during the Soeharto Era, the media performance never demonstrated real Media Responsibilities (McQuail, 2000). The assigned responsibilities, i.e. the obligations established by law, which the Media had to
meet, were kept at the highest level. Besides the printing license and the license for publishing print media, or the broadcasting license, journalists were required to join the one and only journalist organization allowed at the time. Chief editors had to attend courses on state ideology that were in fact part of an indoctrination process. These obligations were clearly not in pursuance of the freedom of expression but of the government interests.

The **contracted responsibilities** that should arise from self-regulated agreements between the press or broadcasters on the one hand and from society or politicians on the other hand with regard to the desired media conduct, were also forcefully exercised. For example, the so-called “telephone culture” meant that one call from a government official was enough to nip any potential revelation in the bud. The government also forbade press coverage of opposition leaders. These practices gradually damaged the **self-assigned responsibilities** indicating voluntary professional commitments to maintaining ethical standards and public goals. Together with the **denied responsibilities** (generally used to refute accusations of irresponsibility that are thought to be undeserved or inapplicable), Indonesian journalists tended more to “emphatetically” understand the state or power behaviors than to critically question them, as shown in research collected for the first chapter. Moreover, according to that research, Indonesian journalists were seen as spoiled, desperate, and too worried that the law would never side with the press.

In the context of **media accountability** (which has to do with compelling the media’s proper conduct in relation to their responsibility), the weak Civil Society during the Soeharto Era could never equally respond to the domination of the Government in conjunction with the Market power. Even though political, market, and public accountability mechanisms seemed to ensure opportunities for citizens and voluntary associations to request the fulfillment of those accountabilities, in practice they never really materialized. As shown in the first chapter, audiences and researchers were keenly aware that the government and business interests exerted a huge influence over the Indonesian press. Such a constraining media structure produced a type of journalism that was very cautious, exercising self-censorship, avoiding direct criticism, and “similar to a snake, circling round and round without ever striking the target.”

As to **political accountability** during the Soeharto era, questions arise about fiduciary practices (i.e., having to do with the media operating as a public trust). For instance, the public was aware of the monopoly in the television landscape (as explored in the second chapter “In Search of Quality Measures for News Programming on Indonesian Television”), so that there would be no public trust reflected in the TV performance, but the public did not have a mechanism to compel proper conduct from the government. The public also knew that under the Soeharto regime journalism considered “harmful” for individuals, groups, organizations, and civil society was thoroughly disliked by the Government, as well as considered wrong for the essential needs of the political and judicial system. But there was no such mechanism to channel the public voice.
Concluding Remarks

The main issues concerning market accountability during the Soeharto Era were relatively different between the print media and radio on the one hand and television on the other. In the television sector, until the first commercial station became operational, the public could never question the quality (in terms of value and pricing) of the service provided. Even after the launch of the first five commercial stations, the public still had to pay the license fee for TVRI (Television of the Republic of Indonesia), but it could never check TVRI’s management and technology aspects in terms of efficiency and innovation. As to the first five commercial TV stations, they started following the market system that appeared to work without conscious overall direction or control (reflecting the proverbial unseen hand) and without normative principles. The journalists described in the second chapter, both from the state-owned TVRI station and commercial stations, acknowledged the importance of viewing figures and program research. As a matter of fact the media market was as usual more likely to be influenced by politics and other ideological concerns than many other market sectors. The serious lack of professionalism at all levels of the news making process doubled the subordination of the Media to the Government and led, in most cases, to the overlapping of interests, whereas, in principle, the professional responsibility and accountability are supposed to complement or, better, compensate for the political or market dependency of media organizations.

The third case study, “The Soeharto Regime and Its Fall through the Eyes of the Local Media,” showed that in Indonesia originally existed what is often referred to as “multi-level governance” as an indicator of the shared responsibility between the central and the provincial governments. Thus, political accountability included the legal framework for regulating the structure and functioning of broadcasting through national political and administrative institutions that were in turn shared by local institutions. What really happened in the field was that the local governmental institutions were only blindly loyal to the central government. They went even further by assigning one official to closely control one commercial radio station or newspaper. As a consequence, under this control, it was much more practical and safe for the local radio stations and print media to merely confine themselves to the boundaries (i.e., what was still allowed to be published or broadcast). These boundaries were mainly set out by the commercial TV stations from Jakarta. This meant that the local media and staff were in the same dark conditions when it came to media responsibility and accountability as Jakarta’s media and staff, both dominated by the overlapping interests of the government and the market. Moreover, since in Jakarta television appeared to be the last media agency to support the student and activist movements, the shift in the practice of responsibility and accountability in the local media usually came much later than in Jakarta.

Regarding media accountability of the state-owned TV and radio station (TVRI & RRI), the local citizenry never had an equal position or enough power to assess how TVRI and RRI discriminated their programs from those of the commercial sector, or to assess TVRI and RRI’s internal pluralism as well as their contribution to a production climate that welcomed public participation. Lack of those accountabilities (as Marc Raboy explains in the CBC experience) would make the public interest poorly served in exchange for the interests of the state, the ruling government, or the media institution
itself; Raboy calls it “administrative broadcasting,” while William as well as d’Haenens and Saeys use the term “paternalistic broadcasting.”

3.b. The May 1998 Revolution

During the May 1998 Revolution, by means of the Media Performance Model, it can be shown how Civil Society and the (more open to the global) Market could fight back or corrode the Government control or legitimacy in astonishing ways. The latent performances of alternative media (the Internet) and underground media, together with rumors, helped enable Civil Society and Market to have a clear impact on the Soeharto Regime. In the end other media could not help but support the Revolution (see Figure 2 Part B), which reached its peak with Soeharto’s downfall on May 21, 1998. It is interesting to note that the May 1998 Revolution was an “ideal” momentum for the Media to put into practice their Media Responsibility, and for the public to compel the Media to carry out their responsibility. Research in the first, second, and third chapter showed that there was a serious and intense interplay in all newsrooms throughout Indonesia between the structure (represented by the interest of the media owners) and the agency (materialized through social actions of TV journalists and editors). Some journalists could be included in the so-called “critical supporters” category, while others could be labeled as “spoilers” of the Soeharto Regime. Of course the degree of those interplays differed from one TV newsroom to the next. These actions were actually the manifestation of **assigned, contracted, and self-assigned responsibilities.** They did not only take place in Jakarta but also in other areas.

Referred to as “interplay,” the social actions displayed by the journalists and editors constituted responses to the social actions by Civil Society, which increasingly compelled the Media to carry out their Media Responsibility. The emergence of mushrooming alternative media and underground media, that struggled for the public interest, were not only a breach in the formal regulations stipulating how broadcasting companies and newspapers should be structured and how they should function, but also constituted a serious threat to the Media that did not carry out their **political responsibility.** The Media were also compelled to conduct their **market responsibility:** to the surprise of the newsroom professionals TV news programs ratings increased significantly and could even compete with popular entertainment programs.

The student action groups, which had frequently and temporarily occupied several local branches of the state-owned radio, RRI, in order to force it to air their demands, should be seen as an effort to compel the RRI to meet its **public responsibility.** The state-owned TV station, TVRI (which never reported the students demonstrations until millions of students and activists entered the Parliament compound in Jakarta and other cities across Indonesia) was forced by reality to finally start reporting the movement. In this way, the students and activists reminded the Media about their assignment (especially for a station funded by public money) of maintaining a more direct relationship with the citizenry, in addition to their relationship with the Market and the
State. The endeavor to compel media professionals (not only those working in the state-owned media) to carry out their *professional accountability* was reflected in the statements voiced by students and activists in their protests in that any media (especially a TV station) wanting to avoid at any price to broadcast the news on the movement deserved to be called a “coward.”

Certainly we also have to mention that the collapse of the Soeharto Regime appears to be the product of internal contradictions within the political, economic, and mass media structures. On the one hand, Soeharto had to integrate the economy more deeply with the global capitalist system to strengthen the economy. This was strategically significant for the regime’s survival, since economic prosperity had been its main source of legitimacy. On the other hand, the economy’s proliferating links to global capital markets had made the regime more vulnerable to external pressures and changes, among others to capital mobility, as a direct consequence of the changes in risk perception by the parties involved. The “Press during the May Revolution” research (Hidayat et al., 2000) shows that under these circumstances the phenomenon of rumors indeed mattered. Again, it could be seen as another effort to indirectly compel the Media to carry out their responsibility; otherwise the Media would lose ground in their competition against the rumors that further proved to negatively affect Indonesia’s currency (the Rupiah) and forced people to queue and face empty supermarket shelves. It also clearly shows that in political communication as a research field, the media forms not typically included in political communication research (sometimes called “non-mediated communication”) certainly deserve more attention, especially in a country like Indonesia whose society is famous for its so-called “high-context” culture. By way of an example, under the domination of Javanese culture, it is taboo to make personal matters related to the first family public in the media. As a result, rumor might be the only medium that fits this situation.

### 3.c. The Reform Era

“Reformasi” (Reformation) continues to be the buzzword of the Post-Soeharto Era. The subsequent administrations -- under massive internal and external pressures for reform -- gradually freed the market, the society and the media from state intervention. The Market was increasingly liberalized through a series of “jungle clearing operations” in order to end a web of politically well-connected business privileges and monopolies that surrounded Soeharto’s inner circle. The newly liberated civil society also expressed itself through the rise of non-governmental organizations, independent labor unions, a more independent press council, and some forty new journalist associations. As to the media sector, the process of liberalization has included a series of deregulations, and more importantly, the liquidation of the Information Ministry, which was one of the central features of Soeharto’s authoritarian corporatism, responsible for a long record of press bans. One year after the resignation of Soeharto, the Parliament passed a new, liberating Press Law (1999) that, among other things, eliminated licensing requirements, revoked the government’s ability to ban publications, guaranteed freedom of the press,
and even imposed a stiff two-year prison penalty on anyone acting against the law by deliberately taking actions which could obstruct the work of the press. In short, from the interplay in the Media Performance Model it can be seen that the tendency that the Market, the Civil Society, and the Media would like to see less government interference in their arenas. Two questions still need to be addressed in this era: Firstly, whether the Market and Civil Society interact on an equal basis, and secondly, whether Civil Society interacts equally with the Media, meaning that the Media encourage the establishment and the development of Civil Society while at the same time the latter encourages citizens to be active information gatherers and processors, and ensures that the Media carry out their responsibility.

Some initial studies in the first and fourth chapter show similarities with the development of broadcasting in the United States: the Indonesian, as well as the American, public was easily trapped into “the fallacy of the two-model choice.” The public is fed up with a system that is unashamedly filled with government propaganda and views the current libertarian program making as the only alternative. This has brought in programs such as bloody crime reporting, programs focusing on the supernatural or magic, celebrity gossip shows, imported and Indonesian versions of “telenovelas,” and other programs produced or bought for rating considerations only. Each element in the Media Performance Model seems to aim at a different level of Media Accountability. The Parliament, as a legislative counterpart to the government, tried to draft the formal regulation stipulating how broadcasting companies should be structured and how they should function (political accountability), among others by fully acknowledging public and community broadcasting in addition to commercial stations. This recognition became law on November 28, 2002. Most media owners and some significant parties among the media practitioners rejected this political accountability, and put forward full market accountability instead.

Civil society, described in the action research of the fourth chapter, made every effort to compel political and public accountability: i.e., requesting the Media to maintain a more direct relationship with citizens, in addition to their relationship with the Market and the State. The action research in the fourth chapter also illustrates that the public tends to choose community broadcasting in the first place, followed by the public broadcasting as the appropriate media to be held responsible politically and publicly.

The action research in the fourth chapter also strongly demonstrates that the paradigm of working with the people (introduced & suggested by Cohen & Uphoff, 1980), especially by listening to the local voices and never trying to persuade the informants to formulate their assessments according to any analysis model, proved well-suited to the local contexts in (so far) more than fifteen provinces across Indonesia.

The six findings and the thematization of the data as well as the answers to the questions raised in the action research of the fourth chapter were in line with the four general themes of the theoretical perspectives for community media (advanced by Jankowski, 2002), i.e. democratic theory, cultural identity, the community, and the operational environment. In the fourth chapter, the operational environment is visualized
in a model based upon McQuail’s Performance Model adapted to the Indonesian case and applied to public and community broadcasting.

The action research in the fourth chapter also shows an urgent need to address the forms, institutional aspects, and mechanisms for the public to exercise their rights and duties to compel the fulfillment of Media Responsibility. So far, there are two alternatives: First, the LCF (Local Consultative Forum) in which the locals could develop cooperation among multi stakeholders in planning and producing programs, as well as in evaluating media performance; Second, the Supervisory Body (Dewan Pengawas), already endorsed in the Broadcasting Law.

One of the problems voiced by the local media practitioners in the action research (described in the fourth chapter) was related to what Cees Hamelink calls “cultural synchronization,” which might become the central threat to cultural autonomy altogether. Cultural synchronization implies that the decisions regarding cultural development in a given country or community are made in accordance with the interests and needs of a powerful central nation and imposed with subtle albeit devastating effectiveness and without regard for the adaptive necessities of the dependent nation or community. Multi-level cultural synchronization is going on in accordance with the national tastes and modes of program making (including news) throughout Indonesia; as well as in accordance with the global tastes and modes of program making, especially from America and other Western countries.

Our continuous action-research efforts successfully promoted the establishment of Indonesia’s first Broadcasting Commission (KPI) on December 2003. This independent regulatory body’s mission is to monitor closely, on behalf of the public, the implementation of the responsibility of the media and compel the media to comply, where appropriate.

On the one hand, as an illustration of the still intense interplays, recent history shows that the State Ministry of Information and Communication (a part of the government’s executive branch) has consistently tried to weaken the position and the authority of the KPI in such a way that it requires consultation with the State Ministry before making important decisions, especially when it comes to granting licenses. On the other hand, the KPI together with civil society elements have tried to block these State Ministry’s efforts. At the same time, the KPI has invited the media practitioners from commercial, public, and community stations to discuss jointly the assigned and contracted responsibilities as well as the political and public accountabilities of each media type that could be adopted as regulations by the KPI later on. Media owners and practitioners of commercial stations have also produced a guidance document on their self-assigned responsibilities, which received some objections from the KPI and civil society elements.
4. Community Media

The community media practitioners are still attempting to formulate their vision of their responsibilities, their public and professional accountability. Their efforts have received support from academics and from civil society elements, as shown in the first National Conference on Community Broadcasting held by the Department of Communication, University of Indonesia, in January 2004.

The National Conference was attended by 34 representatives of community radio stations throughout Indonesia. The academics who attended the conference came from the Indonesian Communication Association (ISKI) and five main communication departments in Indonesia. The elements of civil society attending the event represented, among others, the Press Council, the Indonesian Journalists Association, the Alliance of Independent Journalists, the Association of Local Television Stations, as well as the Press and Broadcasting Communities. Surprisingly some staff members from the Association of Private Television Stations and the Association of Commercial Radio Stations also participated in the conference. In general, it has always been widely believed that the commercial media sector does not support the community media since the latter could be seen as threats towards the commercial radio and TV stations, given the scarcity of frequencies as well as the fierce competition to generate advertising revenues. Their presence, although in very few numbers (only five people in total), showed that every institution has its own dynamic and that the attitudes of the individual members may differ from the general stance of the commercial media sector. From the government side, the State Ministry of Information and Communication failed to participate. Instead an official was sent to read the Minister’s keynote speech, which turned out – as usual - to be very normative and generally emphasized the limitations and obligations of the community media rather than their rights as reflections of the citizen’s media. Fortunately, another representative of the government side, i.e. the Director of Politics and Communication affairs of the Development Planning Agency (Bappenas) presented his office as a strong proponent of the community media for their merits in the new climate of democratization in Indonesia. The participation of five international speakers and observers also demonstrated the support from the international community concerned with the development of community media as the basis for decentralization and bottom-up communication in Indonesia’s Reform Era. Two of them came from the Communication Department of Nijmegen University, one from the Dutch public broadcasting service, one represented the World Bank (the United States Agency for International Development), and another represented the TIFA Foundation. In short, the solidarity and support shown were decidedly promising for the future of community media in Indonesia.

Nonetheless, the lack of concrete outcomes of this National Conference and following meetings show that it seemingly has been much more difficult for the community media pioneers and practitioners to define their media output, quality dimension, distinctiveness, and how to assure a truly community approach than their
painsstaking struggle for acknowledgement by the government! The Program Commission, established to discuss the future output of community media, could not come to an agreement except stating that news, current affairs, and cultural programs should be central program genres. Some Commission members emphasized that instructional programs or practical tips can help community members deal with their real problems in daily life (ranging from problems faced in the rice fields to the red tape at the local government bureaucracies). A few members asserted that entertainment, even though only in the form of “karaoke,” can significantly help lighten the burdens of daily life.

Regarding the quality dimension, the Program Commission unanimously agreed that the reliability of news and current affairs programs, the compatibility of cultural programs with authentic cultural values, as well as the contribution of the programs to the process of empowering the locals are paramount. This is in line with what they think of distinctiveness between the community media on the one hand and the commercial stations on the other, i.e. each community radio should install a so-called “Community Supervisory Board” that will monitor and assess the performance of the station in relation to the reliability of the news and current affairs, the compatibility of the cultural programs with the local cultural values, as well as the dynamic definition of empowerment of community members. Some Commission members strongly suggested that the community media become self-supporting in terms of program supply: depending on outsourcing would make the community station too similar to their commercial counterparts.

The Managerial Commission expressed its concerns as to feasibility, specifically regarding steady financing and professional staffing. Most members did not agree with the suggestion to ask for some allocations of local government budgets since it might only lead to higher dependence on the local government. Instead they recommended further exploration of local advertising sources and other types of revenue. In short, this National Conference clearly illustrates the deductive approach of this dissertation: Departing from the general situation of recent political communication concerns, it flows into the specific case of Indonesian locals as active citizens who gather and process information, current affairs as well as culture through their own media. Notwithstanding the promising discourse and spirit, a serious question, inspired by Colle & Roman (2002) remains: “Can they make it happen?”

The following is an example: it will be very likely that other factors in the Media Performance Model, i.e. the Government and the Market forces, (fully or partially) reject the draft declaration signed by the community media initiators (and supported by elements of Civil Society). Hence the community media practitioners might feel abandoned. Hamelink (1994) already anticipates this phenomenon and reminds us that empowerment cannot be passively enjoyed, but instead has to be actively achieved and safeguarded. According to him, even under international law (most macro contexts), the individual has duties towards the community. People cannot expect others (the state or the media) always to defend their rights and liberties. If people do not actively engage in the battle for their empowerment, they should not be surprised to find themselves one day
totally disempowered. Uniquely, if we put Colle & Roman’s question together with Hamelink’s reminder, the answer then will (again) depend on how empowered the people become after an action-research is accomplished, so that they are capable of fighting for themselves in the near future.

5. Closing paragraph

Back to the political communication field, most of the conditions examined above (also described in full in the second, third, and fourth chapter) are more related to the politics of communication or to the issue “Who gets to say what to whom?” than to the communication of politics. Preferably both directions should be explored in parallel. In view of the most recent developments in Indonesia, i.e. the 2004 Elections, the field of political communication studies may wrongly be considered as merely concerned with the effectiveness of political campaigns. This dissertation aims to serve as a significant reference to show a comprehensive map of the political communication field, that includes (but is not limited to) the following 21 types of studies (as already mapped in Figure 6):

1. Studies on citizens as active information gatherers and processors;
2. Studies on institutions and processes taking place among them;
3. Studies on political/civic socialization among and by citizens;
4. Studies on political/civic socialization in institutions;
5. Studies on media reality construction and input from institutions;
6. Studies on press freedom;
7. Studies on diversity in media ownerships;
8. Studies on variety of media (types);
9. Studies on interactions in the newsroom and agenda setting;
10. Studies on plurality of contents;
11. Behavioral studies (after media exposure);
12. Media effect studies;
13. Studies on campaign and elections (using media);
14. Studies on political/civic socialization (through media);
15. Studies on development;
16. Studies on audience’s feedback (political/civic socialization, using media);
17. Studies on media uses and gratifications or selective exposure on media choices and content choices;
18. Behavioral studies (without using media);
19. Studies on (non-mediated) campaigns and elections;
20. Studies on (non-mediated) political/civic socialization;
21. Studies on participatory development.

Only with this in mind, the goal of enhancing political participation and fostering development studies, which empower the citizen and civil society, can be achieved.
Concluding Remarks

Last but not least, McLeod (2001), Chaffee (2001), Mutz (2001) and Iyengar (2001) indicate a new challenge in this field: How to apply the rise of the Internet, which is quite different from the traditional media and requires a different research approach, to political communication research? With this in view, combined with the urgency to explore more political communication at community levels, Jankowski (2002) reminds us that an area of particular theoretical importance is the emergence of “virtual” communities in the form of digital cities and other network facilities, and the relation of these virtual arenas with geographically based “organic” communities. In this context, Indonesia might still be a far cry from other countries whose citizens are much more attached to the Internet, but it does not necessarily mean that this direction should receive little attention.

Endnotes:

1 For a full description see Baroel & d’Haenens (2004) and McQuail (2003).

2 Except for two mini-theses that were relevant for the discussion section, the data include primarily research conducted at the PhD and Master’s degree levels at various departments of faculties of social and political sciences throughout Indonesia. Obviously, this categorization process has its limitations since the decisions taken by the panel were somehow subjective. Nevertheless, the panel members brought their decisions in line with six articles that included directions for studies in political communication. Those six articles are: one article by Dahl, 1990; four articles by McLeod, Chaffee, Iyengar, and Mutz presented at a symposium in honor of the research contributions of Steven Chaffee (all published in 2001); and one by Ryfe (2001).

3 For instance, data show that from 1988 to 1997 alone, total advertising expenditures increased from Rupiah 314 billion to Rupiah 5,094 billion (PPPI, 1993; PPPI, 1998); of the ten largest agencies in the world, five established offices in Indonesia (Anderson, 1980: 1259).

4 As Vatikiotis (1994: 108) mentions, “one way in which Soeharto appeared to curb the press by early 1990 was by having members of his own family buy into the media.” Another observer wrote that the entry of Indonesia’s ruling elite to the media industry was a change of political strategy to control the mass media (Harsono, 1997).

5 For a full description of the relationships between the Soeharto Regime and religions (see, among others, Dhakidae, 2003; Hefner, 2000).

6 The internal contradiction within the media sector refers to the fact that, on the one hand, the imperatives of political responses dictate the media as instrument for the homogenization of views and opinions. But on the other hand, the logic of economic expansion and of capital accumulation demands diversification of news perspectives and dissenting opinions to be sold as commodities in the audience market. Accordingly, as Hill and Sen observe it, the media always maintain a profitable distance from both the palace and the market. At a time when dissenting against the Soeharto leadership was increasingly fashionable among the middle classes, an increasing distance from the palace was profitable (Hill & Sen, 2000).

7 Studies about the impact of rumors on economic conditions can be traced back as early as the 1950s (see for example, Rose, 1951).
The Soeharto Regime, as a specific type of organization of state apparatus, has been defined in various ways, for instance “authoritarian corporatism” (see Hewison et al., 1993).

The term “Civil Society” refers to the components of society that are based on voluntary association, and independent of the state and of commercial relations.

Unless mentioned otherwise, all interviews were conducted by the first author.

For more information, see the Asiapacific Space Report at http://www.asiaonline.net/spacerep.


“Keraton” means “palace”.

In the Indonesian language the words “baru” (new) and “bau” (smell) almost sound alike.

The field data were gathered by a team consisting of Effendi Gazali, Turnomo Rahardjo, Sunarto, Enny Maryani, M. Kh. Rachman R., and Hendra Harahap. All are associated with the Graduate School of Communication, University of Indonesia.
Concluding Remarks

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Concluding Remarks


Concluding Remarks


Concluding Remarks


Concluding Remarks


**Unpublished research in data collection:**


Concluding Remarks


Samenvatting

Het domein van de politieke communicatie vormt de voedingsbodem voor voorliggende oefening om de constructie van Indonesië’s democratie, te beginnen op het niveau van de symbolische samenleving zoals die wordt afgebeeld en gecommuniceerd door de media, te ondersteunen. Men zou er immers vanuit kunnen gaan dat het trage democratiseringsproces in Indonesië op enige wijze te maken heeft met de kwaliteit (of het gebrek daaraan) van de politieke communicatie. Er is inderdaad altijd weinig aandacht geweest voor politieke communicatie in Indonesië. Zo werden overheidspraktijken, de politieke interactie tussen verschillende actoren zoals die binnen redacties, nooit eerder degelijk onderzocht vanuit het perspectief van de politieke communicatie, laat staan dat ze werden beschouwd als onderwerpen van publieke zorg. Indonesiërs in het algemeen en overheidsambtenaren in het bijzonder verwarren nog steeds analyses van communicatiegerelateerde aspecten van politieke handelingen afkomstig van de leek met diepgaande analyse van de politieke communicatie als een academische oefening. Deze problemen hebben elkaar versterkt rond het moment van de verkiezingen in 2004, waarin de Indonesiërs voor het eerst in de gelegenheid waren om de parlementsleden en hun president direct te verkiezen. Plots werd “politieke communicatie” het toverwoord, maar het denkkader waarbinnen naar dit begrip kon worden verwezen ontbrak.

Politieke communicatiewetenschappers hebben sinds lang het domein van de communicatie van de politiek bestudeerd, hetgeen de ene zijde van de medaille zou kunnen genoemd worden. Toch is het interessant om vast te stellen dat in de geschiedenis van Indonesië het vooral de andere zijde van die medaille is, nl. de communicatiepolitiek, die de drijvende kracht achter de politiek van het land is gebleken. Al in de Nederlandse koloniale tijd werd de relatie tussen de autoriteiten en de media steevast gekenmerkt door conflicten en onderdrukking.

Tegen deze achtergrond poogt het voorliggende onderzoek het theoretische gebrek in de ontwikkeling van het veld van de politieke communicatie in Indonesië te ondervangen aan de hand van de presentatie van een allesomvattend Model van het Politieke Communicatieveld dat beide kanten van de politieke communicatie bestrijkt. De voedingsbodem voor dit model is gevonden in een eenvoudiger model dat ook in essentie de mogelijkheid biedt om een bredere blik op politieke communicatie te werpen. Het “Media Performance Model” beschrijft de continue wisselwerking tussen vier krachten of (f)actoren, d.w.z. de overheid, de markt, de burgers en de media. De resultaten (op een geven moment in de tijd) worden dus gevisualiseerd door wat de media doen, d.w.z. de “media performance”: de externe wisselwerking tussen deze (f)actoren beïnvloedt en levert de input voor de onderlinge interactie van één van de (f)actoren binnen de mediaorganisatie, enzovoorts.

Het is de bedoeling dat het voorgestelde Model van het Veld van de Politieke Communicatie het werk van anderen, zoals McQuail (1992), Hidayat &

Het voorliggende onderzoek illustreert de noodzaak om mediahandelingen, gebundeld onder de noemer “media performance”, te verbinden met noties van mediaverantwoordelijkheid en -verantwoording. Mediaverantwoordelijkheid (opgelegd, toegekend, zelfbepaald of verworpen) zal de richtingen aangeven die de media zullen instaan om de verwachtingen van het publiek in te lossen, dit terwijl de (politieke, markt-, publieksgerelateerde en professionele) verantwoording de richtingen zullen tonen die burgers kunnen volgen om actief de media ertoe aan te zetten om hun verwachtingen in te lossen, dit alles met als bedoeling om de communicatiepolitiek zo gunstig mogelijk te maken voor alle geledingen in de samenleving.

Uitgerust met een inzichtelijke kaart van politieke communicatie, onderzoekt voorliggende studie concrete operationaliseringen van mediahandelingen, mediaverantwoordelijkheid en -verantwoording tijdens de laatste 20 jaar van politieke communicatie in Indonesië: eerst in het algemeen (in het eerste hoofdstuk), dan meer specifiek in de televisiesector (in het tweede hoofdstuk), in de lokale kranten en radiostations (derde hoofdstuk) en in de onderhandelingen tussen het publiek en lokale media (vierde hoofdstuk). De “media performance” was bestudeerd gedurende drie opeenvolgende periodes die het Indonesië van de laatste 20 jaar hebben gekleurd: De Soeharto-periode (beter gekend als de Nieuwe Orde), de meirevolutie in 1998, en de Hervormingsperiode (na de val van Soeharto op 21 mei, 1998).

Het eerste hoofdstuk onderzoekt de media-industrie en kijkt naar de aard van het onderzoek op het terrein van de politieke communicatie in Indonesië gedurende en betreffende de drie onderzochte periodes. Daar waar het onderzoek tijdens het Soeharto-tijdperk ervan uitging dat de mediamakers louter ‘speelbal’ waren in de handen van de overheid en de marktwerking, is onderzoek rond de meirevolutie in 1998 gestart met een nieuwe, multidisciplinaire aanpak, die de wisselwerking tussen structuur en een handelende factor in de media-industrie erkent. De periode van de hervorming bodt de gelegenheid om aan te raken wat voorheen als taboe werd beschouwd in de politieke communicatie. Maar tot dusver blijken de onderzoekers zelf niet al te enthousiast om innovatieve projecten te ondernemen (bv. over de rol van het leger in de overgangsfase). Op dezelfde manier toonden de media tijdens de verkiezingen van 2004 duidelijk aan dat ze nog steeds op zoek zijn naar geschikte manieren om op een professionele en verantwoordelijke wijze op te treden naar de machtsgroepen toe en ook naar hun publiek, nadat ze zo aan banden waren gelegd gedurende al die jaren.

Het tweede hoofdstuk schetst het snel veranderende Indoneesche televisielandschap in de jaren ’90: tot zowat tien jaar geleden was het Indoneesche publiek nog gewend om enkel naar de staatsomroep TVRI te kunnen kijken. Tegenwoordig kan men kiezen tussen vijf bijgekomen commerciële stations.
Diepte-interviews met lokale nieuws-makers en beleidsmakers in zowel de staatsomroep als de commerciële televisiestations hebben de twee grootste problemen aangegeven die als obstakels golden voor nieuwsproductie tijdens het Soeharto-tijdperk (inclusief tot z’n laatste stuipretrekkingen): alomtegenwoordige politieke controle die de stations beperkte tot weinig risicovolle berichtgeving met doorgaans weinig nieuwswaarde (d.w.z. human interest en misdaadverhalen) en een gebrek aan ervaring met televisiejournalistiek.

Het derde hoofdstuk gaat in op de inhoud en de dynamiek eigen aan de berichtgeving in lokale kranten en radiostations, teruggaand op de periode tot en onmiddellijk na de val van Soeharto. Er zijn diepte-interviews gehouden met uitgevers en beleidsmakers van de kranten en met de staf van verschillende radiostations in vier steden waar de mediaconsumptie en andere mediagerelateerde data voorheen zelden waren verzameld. De bevindingen toonden alomtegenwoordige politieke controle aan op twee niveaus – dat van de lokale en centrale overheid. Precies omwille van die controle erkenden de lokale mediamakers hun belemmeringen, maar was hun streven erop gericht om zoveel mogelijk vrijheid te verkrijgen binnen het systeem. Het onderzoek toont aan dat in het licht van deze contextveranderingen een genuanceerde visie op handelende (f)actoren binnen een structuur meer inzichten biedt dan de zuiver instrumentalistische en structuralistische orthodoxe visies.

Aan het eind van het Soeharto-regime dat gekenmerkt werd door verandering en een hang naar een libertaire marktorientatie, hebben NGO’s, communicatiwetenschappers en politici gepoogd een platform te bieden waarop de discussie rond en de juridische implementering van publieke en lokale omroep in Indonesië kunnen worden gevoerd. Het vierde hoofdstuk bespreekt de resultaten van focusgroepdiscussies die gehouden zijn juist met als doel om de decentralisering van de omroep in Indonesië te begeleiden. De gesprekspartners waren lokale mensen en vertegenwoordigers uit diverse geledingen in tien provincies verspreid over het hele land. De publieke hoorzittingen toonden aan hoe representatieve groepen in de samenleving kunnen en moeten betrokken worden in onderhandelingen rond mediabeleid die zich tot dusver enkel hebben afgespeeld op het nationale niveau. Transnationale stromen van mediaproducten versus deregulering van nationale omroepvergunningen en decentralisering van de publieke en lokale media zijn bediscussieerd vanuit een geïntegreerd perspectief.

Al bij al hebben de bevindingen van het voorliggende onderzoek aangetoond dat, in het licht van de dominantie van de overheid over de andere (f)actoren, geen enkel mediatype op een afdwingende wijze verantwoordelijkheid kon dragen of verantwoording kon afleggen onder het Soeharto-regime. Gedurende de meirevolutie in 1998 zijn de burgers en de markt (die opmerker was voor invloeden van buitenaf) er op verbluffende wijze in geslaagd om de overheidscontrole te bevrijden en de overheidslegitimiteit aan te tasten. Het gevolg was dat de overheid opgeleverde, afgesproken en zelfopgelegde verantwoording mogelijk maakte. Precies omdat de Indonesische democratie nog pral is en net was hersteld in 1998 na de val van Soeharto, moeten alle elementen in het Media Performance Model nog leren hoe ze hun verantwoordelijkheden moeten opnemen en hoe ze moeten omgaan met mechanismen om verantwoording te meten. Het parlement (de wetgevende tak van
Samenvatting

de overheid) samen met de burgers zijn blijkbaar succesvol gebleken in het opzetten van mechanismen die de politieke en publieke verantwoording verhogen. De juridische erkenning van de publieke en lokale omroep evenals de oprichting van een onafhankelijke regulerende instantie, de KPI (Komisi Penyiaran Indonesia of het Indonesische Commissariaat voor de Media) zou kunnen worden beschouwd als een vroegtijdig bewijs van deze paradigmawissel. De KPI, in naam van het publiek, heeft als taak om de implementering van mediaverantwoordelijkheid van dichtbij gade te slaan en, waar noodzakelijk, bij de media de naleving van hun verantwoordelijkheid af te dwingen. De KPI heeft ook de mediamakers van allerhande stations uitgenodigd om samen aan de tafel te gaan zitten om de opgelegde en aangegane verantwoordelijkheden evenals de politieke en publieke verantwoording voor elk mediatype met het oog op het behoud van een vergunning te bediscussiëren. Tegelijkertijd hebben de media-eigenaren en mediamakers van commerciële stations een document opgesteld ter oriëntering van hun zelf opgelegde verantwoordelijkheden. De publieke en lokale mediamakers zijn nog steeds aan het proberen om hun visies terzake te formuleren. Kortom, het proces is nog in volle gang. Daarom besteedt voorliggend onderzoek centrale aandacht aan “actieonderzoek” waarin de burgers samenwerken met gewone mensen, de lokale gemeenschap. Het concept van actie is parallel aan Hamelinks advies (1994), nl. dat mensen niet kunnen verwachten dat anderen (d.w.z. de overheid of de media) altijd hun rechten en vrijheden verdedigen. Daarenboven herinnert Colle (2002) ons eraan dat om het even welke inspanning ter ontwikkeling van de lokale gemeenschap, met inbegrip van de lancering van een lokaal radio- of televisiestation, de versterking van de lokale gemeenschap zelf zou bewerkstelligen en de leden van die gemeenschap een kans zou bieden op langdurige ondersteuning.

De concepten van mediawerking, mediaverantwoordelijkheid en -verantwoording geïntroduceerd bij het publiek in Indonesië zouden hen moeten helpen hun nog prille democratie te analyseren en hen in staat stellen om actie te ondernemen.
Summary

The field of political communication constituted the soil for the present exercise of revisiting the construction of Indonesia’s democracy – starting with the level of the symbolic society as portrayed and communicated through the media – since one could assume that the slow process of building democracy in Indonesia is somehow related to the quality (or lack thereof) of political communication. Indeed very little attention was paid so far to political communication in Indonesia. For instance, governmental practices, political interactions among interest groups, including those in the newsrooms, were never appropriately analyzed from a political communication angle, let alone considered a matter of public concern. Indonesians in general, and Government officials and politicians in particular, keep confusing layman’s analyses of communication-related aspects of political practices with the thorough analysis of political communication as an academic exercise. Certainly, these hindrances have cumulatively caused a more serious problem which reached a peak just recently, around the 2004 Elections, in which Indonesians for the first time got the opportunity to directly vote for the members of parliament and the president. Suddenly, “political communication” became a “buzzword,” but the specific framework within which to refer to it was lacking.

Political communication scholars have long explored the communication of politics, what could be called “the first face of the coin.” It is interesting, however, to observe that in Indonesian history, the second face of political communication, i.e., the politics of communication, has been the predominant force driving the country’s politics. As early as the Dutch colonial time, conflicts and suppression continued to be the constants in the relationship between the authorities and the media.

Against this background, the present research attempts to address the theoretical shortage in the development of the political communication field in Indonesia by providing a comprehensive Model of the Political Communication Field embracing the two faces of political communication. The breeding ground for this model was found in a simpler model that is still capable of representing the larger map of the political communication field in its essence. The Media Performance Model describes a continuous interplay among four power entities, also called (f)actors, i.e. Government, Market, Civil Society and the Media. The result of the internal interplay within each (f)actor will inevitably impact on the external interplay among these four (f)actors. Therefore, the outcomes (at a given period in time) are visualized in what the media do, referred to by the so-called “media performance.” In turn, the impact of the external interplay is then brought into the internal media environment as input for the internal interplay of each (f)actor in the media organization, and so forth.

The presented Model of the Political Communication Field is expected to complement the efforts of others, as exemplified in the works by McQuail (1992), Hidayat & Sendjaja (2002), and Bardoel & d’Haenens (2004). Although it puts
emphasis on the mediated political communication usually taking place in this modern era, the design of the model uniquely provides opportunities to analyze non-mediated political communication as well. Taking away the role of the Media (in the middle), the other three (f)actors could be seen interplaying in a non-mediated environment.

The present research illustrates the necessity to connect Media Performance to the concepts of Media Responsibility and Accountability. Media Responsibility (whether assigned, contracted, self-designed, or denied) will show the directions the media are taking in meeting the public’s expectations, while media Accountability (political, market, public, and professional) will show the directions citizens can take to actively compel the media to meet their expectations, so as to render politics of communication beneficial to all elements in society.

Equipped with a comprehensive map of political communication, the present research examines concrete operationalizations of media performance, responsibility and accountability taking place during the recent 20 years of political communication in Indonesia in general (in the first chapter), in the television sector (second chapter), in the local newspapers and radio stations (third chapter) and in the negotiations between the public and the community media (fourth chapter). The performance of the media was examined during the three subsequent eras that have colored Indonesia during the last 20 years – the Soeharto Era (better known as the New Order Era), the May 1998 Revolution, and the Reform Era (after the downfall of Soeharto on May 21, 1998).

The first chapter examines the media industry and looks at the nature of political communication research in Indonesia during and concerning the three above-mentioned periods. While research during the Soeharto Era acknowledged Media makers as mere ‘toys’ in the hands of the Government and the Market forces, Research on the May 1998 Revolution and during the Reform Era started adopting a new, multi-disciplinary approach, recognizing the interplay between structure and agency in the media industry. The Reform Era indeed provided an opportunity to open up what was previously considered taboo in political communication. But so far the researchers themselves do not seem too enthusiastic to undertake innovative projects (e.g., on the role of the Armed Forces in the transition era). Likewise, the media during the 2004 election clearly proved to be still looking for appropriate ways to behave in a professional and responsible fashion with regard to the power groups and their audiences, after being held on a very short leash for so many years.

The second chapter sketches the fast-changing Indonesian television landscape in the 1990s: until a decade ago Indonesian audiences were used to watching the state-owned TVR channel only. Nowadays they can choose among five additional commercial stations. In-depth interviews with local newsmakers and policy makers in both state television and commercial television stations highlighted two major problem areas for news-making characterizing the Soeharto regime (up until its last convulsions): omnipresent political control restricting stations to cover low-risk news items that usually also have less news value (i.e., human interest and crime stories) and lack of experience with television journalism.
The third chapter elaborates on the content and media management dynamics in local newspapers and radio stations going back to the period leading up to and immediately after the fall of Soeharto. In-depth interviews were conducted with editorial policy-makers of the newspapers and with various radio station staff members in four cities where media consumption and other data had rarely been documented. The findings revealed omnipresent political control at two levels – local and central Government. Because of this control, the local media personnel acknowledged their limitations, but strove for as much freedom as possible within the system. The research shows that in this context changes are taking place in both agency and structure and supports the thesis that there is an interplay between agency and structure as opposed to the instrumentalist and structuralist orthodoxies.

At the end of the Soeharto regime characterized by the shift to a libertarian market orientation, a consortium of NGO’s, communication scholars academics and politicians have been trying to establish a ‘middle ground’ for discussions and legal implementation of public and community broadcasting in Indonesia. The fourth chapter discusses the outcomes of focus group discussions held in an effort to establish a platform for decentralization of broadcasting in Indonesia. These groups consisted of local people and spokespersons of constituent groups in ten provinces throughout Indonesia. The public hearings showed how constituent groups in society can and should be involved in media policy negotiations which so far predominantly took place at the national level only. Issues such as transnational flows of media products versus deregulation of national broadcasting licenses and decentralization of broadcasting as well as political economy of public and community media were looked upon from an integrated perspective.

In all, the findings of the present research showed among other things that, given the dominance of the Government over the other elements, no type of Media Responsibilities and Accountabilities could be carried out properly during the Soeharto Era. During the May 1998 Revolution, Civil society and the Market (that was more open to global influences) managed to fight back or corrode the Government control or undermine its legitimacy in astonishing ways. As a result, the Government made the fulfillment of assigned, contracted, and self-assigned responsibilities, as well as public and professional accountabilities possible. The Indonesian democracy was just restored in 1998 after the fall of Soeharto. Meanwhile, all elements in the Media Performance Model are still learning how to carry out their responsibilities and deal with mechanisms for measuring accountability. The parliament (legislative branch of the Government) together with the civil society seem to be successful in establishing mechanisms which enhance political and public accountability. The legal acknowledgement of public and community broadcasting as well as the establishment of an independent regulatory body, KPI (Komisi Penyiaran Indonesia or the Indonesian Broadcasting Commission) could be seen as some preliminary proof of this change in paradigms. KPI, on behalf of the public, is supposed to closely monitor the implementation of the responsibilities of the media, and, where appropriate, compel the media. KPI has also invited the media practitioners from all kinds of stations to jointly discuss the assigned and contracted responsibilities as well as the political and public accountabilities of each media type that will be given a license. At the same time, media owners and practitioners of commercial stations have launched a guidance
document on their self-assigned responsibilities. The public and community media practitioners are still trying to formulate their vision on their responsibilities, public and professional accountabilities.

In short, the process is still underway. Therefore, the present research favours the direction of “action research” in which elements of civil society work together with the people at the grassroots level, the community. The notion of action is in line with Hamelink’s advice (1994) that people cannot expect others (i.e. the State or the Media) to always defend their rights and liberties. Furthermore, Colle (2002) reminds us that any effort in community development, including the set-up of a community radio or television station, should foster the empowerment of the community itself and provide the community members with a chance to achieve long-term sustainability.

The concepts of Media Performance, Media Responsibility and Accountability introduced to the public in Indonesia should help them analyze their society which is still very much “under construction,” and enable them to take action accordingly.
Curriculum Vitae

Effendi Gazali was born in 1965, in Padang, West Sumatra. He received a Bachelor’s degree in Communication from the University of Indonesia, Jakarta, with a thesis on the information exchange flow between the public and the management of the state-owned TVRI (Television of the Republic of Indonesia). While attending the University of Indonesia he worked with TVRI, at that time the only station in the country, to produce youth TV talk shows. He also worked as a correspondent for Bola, the nation foremost sports weekly, mostly reporting on soccer, a sport he loves so dearly. The final event he was assigned to cover was the Italia Novanta (the soccer World-Cup Final 1990 in Italy). After completing his undergraduate study, he started his own television production company. Some of his works, mostly talk shows, were aired on RCTI and SCTV, the first two private TV stations in Indonesia.

In 1992, he was admitted to the Graduate School of Communication, the University of Indonesia, with a scholarship from the World Bank and the Ministry of Education and Culture. He wrote a thesis concerning the Indonesian Television Culture and the Public Sphere Discourse. In 1998, during the Revolution Movement against the Soeharto regime, he formed an action group with fellow graduate students at the University of Indonesia, called the Forum Wacana Indonesia. The Forum set some of the main agendas of the fight against Soeharto. He first served as the chairman of the Forum, and then became a member of its presidium. After the fall of Soeharto, he was granted a Fulbright Grant for conducting research in the area of political communication and psychology of television at Cornell University, USA. While in Cornell, he was admitted to the MPS Program, Field of International Development, in Spring 1999. After finishing his Master’s degree in Cornell, he was admitted to the Ph.D. Program with an international fellowship at the Communication Department, Radboud University Nijmegen, The Netherlands, in 2000. Since he chose an action research for his dissertation, he was then actively involved in a mix of protest, lobby, and advocacy activities across Indonesia, especially in calling for a new Broadcasting Law and for the recognition of public and community broadcasting in Indonesia. The University of Indonesia has also entrusted him with the duty to establishing the first public TV station based on campus, TV UI, for which he acts as the Director of the preparation team.

Effendi has written numerous articles on freedom of the press, media and democratization, and in general political communications in the main Indonesian press outlets. During Indonesia’s first direct elections in 2004 for parliament, senate, and president, he has been a regular source in TV and radio talkshows, giving commentaries on the first presidential debate & dialogues as well as predictions of the election results. He has published several articles in international journals and in national periodicals. The most recent book that includes his articles is Who wants to be the President? (2004, by Kompas Publishing Company). Effendi was acknowledged as one of the University of Indonesia’s Best Researchers in Social Sciences and Humanities in 2003, as well as being awarded the 2004 ICA Award from the Instructional and Developmental Division.
Appendices

Appendix 1

LAW OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA
Number 32 of 2002
Concerning
BROADCASTING

NATIONAL INFORMATION AGENCY
REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA

BY THE GRACE OF GOD THE ALMIGHTY
THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA,

Considering:
a. That freedom to express one’s opinion and to obtain information through broadcasting as the manifestation of human rights in society, nation, and State life, is carried out responsibly, harmoniously and on balance between freedom and equality in using the rights based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution;
b. That radio frequency spectrum is a limited natural resource and a national asset that must be kept and protected by the State and be used for the most of people’s welfare in accordance to the objectives of the August 17, 1945 Proclamation;
c. That to maintain national integration, diversity of the people of Indonesia as well as the implementation of regional autonomy, a national broadcasting system needs to be set up that guarantees the attainment of national information system that is fair, even, and balanced in order to achieve social justice for all the people of Indonesia;
d. That broadcasting institutions are mass communication media that have important roles in social, cultural, political, and economical life, have freedom and responsibilities in carrying out their functions as media of information, education, entertainment, as well as social control and bond;
e. That a broadcast that is transmitted and received at the same time, simultaneously and free, has significant influence in making people’s opinion, attitude, and behavior, therefore broadcasting organizations are obliged to be responsible in maintaining moral values, ethics, culture, personality, and national unity based on the principals of The One and Only One God and Fair and Civilized Humanity;
f. That based on the considerations as mentioned in letter a, b, c, d, and e, Law Number 24 Year 1997 regarding Broadcasting is viewed as no longer suitable, therefore needs to be retracted and changed with a new law.
Appendices

In view of:

1. Article 20 clause (1), (2), and clause (4), Article 21 clause (1), Article 28F, Article 31 clause (1), Article 32, Article 33 clause (3), and Article 36 of 1945 Constitution as changed with The Fourth Amendment To The 1945 Constitution;
2. Law Number 8/1992 regarding Film (State Gazette of Republic of Indonesia No. 32/1992, Supplement to State Gazette of Republic of Indonesia No. 3473);
3. Law Number 5/1999 concerning Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices and Unfair Business Competition (State Gazette of Republic of Indonesia No. 33/1999, Supplement to State Gazette of Republic of Indonesia No. 3817);
4. Law Number 8/1999 regarding Consumers Protection (State Gazette of Republic of Indonesia No. 42/1999, Supplement to State Gazette of Republic of Indonesia No. 3821);
5. Law Number 22/1999 regarding Regional Government (State Gazette of Republic of Indonesia No. 60/1999, Supplement to State Gazette of Republic of Indonesia No. 3839);
6. Law Number 36/1999 regarding Telecommunications (State Gazette of Republic of Indonesia No. 154/1999, Supplement to State Gazette of Republic of Indonesia No. 3881);
7. Law Number 39/1999 regarding Human Rights (State Gazette of Republic of Indonesia No. 165/1999, Supplement to State Gazette No. 3886);
8. Law Number 40/1999 regarding Press (State Gazette of Republic of Indonesia No. 166/1999, Supplement to State Gazette of Republic of Indonesia No. 3887);
9. Law Number 19/2002 regarding Copyrights (State Gazette of Republic of Indonesia No. 85/2002, Supplement to State Gazette of Republic of Indonesia No. 4220);

With the mutual consent of
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA
and
THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA

HAS DECIDED:

To enact:         LAW CONCERNING BROADCASTING

CHAPTER I
GENERAL PROVISIONS

Article 1

Meant in this Act by:

1. Broadcast is a message or series of messages in the form of audio, visual, or audio and visual or that in the form of graphics, characters, both interactive as well as non-interactive, that is receivable through broadcast receiver apparatus.
2. Broadcasting is the activity of transmitting broadcast through transmission facilities and/or transmitter tools on land, at sea or in space by using radio frequency spectrum through the air, cable, and/or other media in order to be received at the same time and simultaneously by the public through broadcast receiver apparatus.
3. Radio broadcasting is an audio mass communication media that channels ideas and information in the form of audio publicly and openly, as systematic and continuous programs.
4. Television broadcasting is an audiovisual mass communication media that channels ideas and information in the form of audio and visual publicly, both openly as well as closed, as systematic and continuous programs.
5. Advertising broadcast is broadcast of information that is commercial and social service on the availability of services, goods, and ideas that can be used by the public with or without recompense for the broadcasting institution concerned.
6. Commercial broadcast is commercial advertising broadcast that is broadcasted through radio or television broadcasting with the aim to introduce, socialize, and/or promote goods or services to the targeted public to influence consumers to use the offered products.
7. Public Service Announcement Broadcast is non-commercial advertising broadcast that is broadcasted through radio or television broadcasting with the aim to introduce, socialize, and/or promote ideas, ideals, advices, and/or other messages to the people to influence the public to do and/or behave in accordance to the message of the advertising.
8. Radio Frequency Spectrum is the electromagnetic waves that is used for broadcasting and moves in the air and space without modified conductor facilities, is a public domain and limited natural resource.

9. Broadcasting Institutions are broadcasting organizers, either public broadcasting institutions, private broadcasting institutions, community broadcasting institutions as well as subscribed broadcasting institutions that in carrying out their tasks, functions, and responsibilities are to be guided by the prevailing statutory regulations.

10. National Broadcasting System is the system of national broadcasting organizations based on the provisions of the prevailing statutory regulations that aims to attain the basis, objectives, functions, and direction of national broadcasting as the effort to achieve the national ideals as mentioned in Pancasila and 1945 Constitution.

11. National Information Systems that is fair, even, and balanced is the condition of information that is orderly, systematic, and harmonious especially concerning the flows of information or messages in the broadcasting between the central and the regions, inter-regions in Indonesia, and between Indonesia and the international world.

12. Government is the Minister or other officials that are appointed by the President or Governor.

13. Indonesia Broadcasting Commission is a state independent institution that is present in the central and in regions of which tasks and authorities is regulated in this Law as the manifestation of public participation in broadcasting sector.

14. Licence of Broadcasting Organization is the right granted by the State to broadcasting institutions to organize broadcasting.

CHAPTER II
PRINCIPALS, OBJECTIVES, FUNCTIONS, AND DIRECTION

Article 2
Broadcasting is organized based on Pancasila and 1945 Constitution of The Republic of Indonesia based on the principals of benefit, fair and even, legal assurance, security, diversity, partnership, ethics, independency, freedom and responsibility.

Article 3
Broadcasting is carried out aiming to strengthen national integrity, to foster personality and identity of a nation that is faithful to and devoted to God, to advance the intellectual life of the nation, to enhance public welfare, in the frame of developing independent, democratic, fair, and prosperous society, as well as developing Indonesian broadcasting industry.

Article 4
(1) Broadcasting as a mass communication activity has functions as the means of information, education, healthy entertainment, social control and bond.
(2) In carrying out the functions as mentioned in clause (1) broadcasting also has the aspects of economy and culture.

Article 5
Broadcasting is directed to:
  a. Highly abide by the implementation of Pancasila and 1945 Constitution;
  b. Maintain and enhance morality and religious values as well as national identity;
  c. Improve the quality of human resources;
  d. Maintain and strengthen national unity and integrity;
  e. Increase the awareness of legal obedience and national discipline;
  f. Channel public opinion and also encourage active role of society in national and regional development as well as in preserving the environment;
  g. Prevent ownership monopoly and support fair competition in broadcasting sector;
  h. Enhance the increase in the ability of people’s economy, achieve even distribution and strengthen national competitiveness in the era of globalisation;
  i. Provide information that is correct, balanced, and responsible;
  j. Enhance national culture.

CHAPTER III
BROADCASTING ORGANIZATION

Part One
General

Article 6
(1) Broadcasting is organized under one national broadcasting system.
(2) Under the national broadcasting system as mentioned in clause (1), the State controls radio frequency spectrum that is used for broadcasting organization for the most of people’s welfare.

(3) Within the system of the national broadcasting there are broadcasting institutions and fair and integrated networking pattern that is developed by setting up network stations and local stations.

(4). For broadcasting operation, a broadcasting commission is set up.

**Part Two**

**Indonesian Broadcasting Commission**

**Article 7**

(1) Broadcasting Commission as in Article 6 clause (4) is called Indonesian Broadcasting Commission (Komisi Penyiaran Indonesia), shortened as KPI.

(2) KPI is a state independent institution, regulating matters on broadcasting.

(3) KPI consists of Central KPI formed at the center level and Regional KPI formed at the provincial level.

(4) In carrying out its functions, tasks, authority and duties, the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia monitors the CENTRAL KPI, and Regional KPI is monitored by Provincial People’s Representative Council.

**Article 8**

(1) KPI as the manifestation of public participation functions to accommodate aspirations and represent public interests on broadcasting.

(2) In carrying out its functions as mentioned in clause (1), KPI has authorities to:
   a. Set up broadcast program standards;
   b. Compose regulations and set up code of conducts on broadcasting;
   c. Monitor the implementation of regulations and code of conducts of broadcasting as well as the broadcast program standards;
   d. Impose sanctions towards violations of broadcasting regulations and code of conducts as well as broadcast program standards; and
   e. Perform coordination and/or cooperation with the Government, broadcasting institutions, and the public.

(3) KPI has tasks and duties to:
   a. Ensure the public to get decent and correct information in accordance with human rights;
   b. Help managing the infrastructure in broadcasting sector;
   c. Help creating fair competition atmosphere among broadcasting institutions and related industries;
   d. Maintain fair, just and balanced system of information;
   e. Accommodate, investigate, and follow-up complaints, counter-statements, as well as criticisms and public appreciation toward broadcasting operation; and
   f. Plan the development of human resources that guarantees professionalism in broadcasting sector.

**Article 9**

(1) The membership of Central KPI consists of 9 (nine) persons and the Regional KPI consists of 7 (seven) persons.

(2) Chairman and vice-chairman of KPI are elected from and by members.

(3) Term of duty of chairman, vice-chairman and members of Central KPI and Regional KPI is 3 (three) years and they can be re-elected only for 1 (one) consecutive term of duty.

(4) KPI is assisted by a Secretariat funded by the state.

(5) In carrying out its tasks, KPI may be assisted by experts when necessary.

(6) The Central KPI fund comes from the State Budget and the Regional KPI fund comes from the Regional Budget.

**Article 10**

(1) To become a member of KPI, one must meet the following requirements:
   a. A citizen of the Republic of Indonesia that is devoted to the One and Only One God;
   b. Loyal to Pancasila and 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia;
   c. Holds a bachelor degree or possesses equal intellectual competence;
   d. Physically and mentally healthy;
   e. Dignified, honest, fair, and has immaculate manners;
   f. Has concerns, knowledge and/or experience in broadcasting sector;
   g. Not directly or indirectly involved in ownership of mass media;
   h. Not a member of legislative and judicative bodies;
   i. Not a government official; and
   j. non-partisan.

(2) Members of Central KPI are elected by the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia and Regional KPI are elected by Provincial People’s Representative Council upon the suggestions from public through an open fit and proper test.
(3) Members of Central KPI administratively are legalized by the President upon recommendations from the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia and the Governor upon the recommendations of the Provincial People’s Representative Council administratively legalizes members of Regional KPI.

(4) A member of KPI quits because of:
   a. The end of official term;
   b. Death;
   c. Resignation;
   d. Being imprisoned following a permanent court decision; or
   e. No longer qualifies for the requirements as referred to in clause (1).

Article 11
(1) When a member of KPI quits from their term of office due to reasons mentioned in Article 10 clause (4) point’s b, c, d, and e, they shall be substituted by substitute members until the end of their term of office.

(2) Substitution of members of Central KPI administratively is legalized by the President upon suggestion from the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia and members of Regional KPI are administratively legalized by Governor upon suggestion from Provincial People’s Representative Council.

(3) Provisions regarding the procedures of substitution of members of KPI as mentioned in clause (1) shall be further regulated by KPI.

Article 12
Further provisions regarding diversification of authorities and tasks of KPI as referred to in Article 8, regulation of connection between Central KPI and Regional KPI, as well as substitution procedure of KPI members as referred to in Article 11 shall be decided by Central KPI Decree.

Part Three
Broadcasting Services

Article 13
(1) Broadcasting services consist of:
   a. Radio broadcasting services; and
   b. Television Broadcasting services.

(2) Broadcasting services as mentioned in clause (1) are organized by:
   a. Public Broadcasting Institutions;
   b. Private Broadcasting Institutions;
   c. Community Broadcasting Institutions; and
   d. Subscribed Broadcasting Institutions.

Part Four
Public Broadcasting Institutions

Article 14
(1) Public Broadcasting Institutions as referred to in Article 13 clause (2) point a are in the form of state founded legal entities that are independent, neutral and non-commercial, and provides services for the interest of the public.

(2) Public Broadcasting Institutions as referred to in clause (1) consist of Radio of Republic of Indonesia and Television of Republic of Indonesia, which broadcasting central station is located in the capitol of the state of Indonesian Republic.

(3) Local Public Broadcasting Institutions can be established in provincial, municipality or city levels.

(4) The supervisory board and managing directors of Public Broadcasting Institutions are established based on the provisions of the prevailing laws.

(5) The supervisory boards for Radio of Republic of Indonesia and Television of Republic of Indonesia are determined by the President upon the recommendation of the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia; or by Governor or Mayor upon the recommendation of Provincial People’s Representative Council for the provincial public broadcasting institutions after they undergo an open fit and proper test upon the inputs from the government and/or public.

(6) The number of supervisory board for Radio of Republic of Indonesia and Television of Republic of Indonesia is 5 (five) persons and supervisory board for Local Public Broadcasting Institution is 3 (three) person.

(7) The managing director is appointed and determined by the supervisory board.

(8) The members of managing director and supervisory board serve for one term of 5 (five) years and can be re-elected only for 1 (one) consecutive term of duty.
(9) The central Public Broadcasting Institutions shall be supervised by the House of Representatives and the provincial Public Broadcasting Institutions shall be supervised by the Provincial People’s Representative Council. 
(10) Further provisions regarding Public Broadcasting Institutions is regulated by KPI together with the Government.

Article 15

(1) The Public Broadcasting Institutions are funded by:
   a. Broadcasting dues;
   b. The national or provincial Budget;
   c. Public donation;
   d. Commercials broadcast; and
   e. Other legal activities related to broadcasting operation;
(2) In the end of every fiscal year, the Public Broadcasting Institutions are obliged to submit financial reports audited by public accountants and announced them on the mass media.

Part Five
Private Broadcasting Institutions

Article 16

(1) Private broadcasting institutions as referred to in Article 13 clause (2) point b are broadcasting institutions in the form of commercial Indonesia legal entities with the sole activities of providing radio or television broadcasting services.
(2) Foreign citizens are not allowed to become the managers of Private Broadcasting Institutions, except in the financial and technical fields.

Article 17

(1) Private broadcasting institutions as referred to in Article 16 clause (1) shall be established with the initial capital wholly owned by the citizens and/or legal entity of Indonesia.
(2) Private broadcasting institutions can make reinvestment and development using foreign capital with the amount of not more than 20% (twenty percent) of the total capital and shall be owned at least by 2 (two) shareholders.
(3) Private broadcasting institutions must provide opportunities to their employees to own the company shares and earn the dividends.

Article 18

(1) Concentration of ownership and domination of Private Broadcasting Institution by one person or legal entity in one broadcasting area or several broadcasting areas is limited.
(2) Cross ownership between Private Broadcasting Institution that operates radio broadcasting services and Private Broadcasting Institution that operates TV broadcasting services, between Private Broadcasting Institution and printed media company, between Private Broadcasting Institution and another Private Broadcasting Institution of different type of media, directly or indirectly, is limited.
(3) Regulation on the numbers and the scopes of local, regional and national broadcast area both for radio and television broadcasting services will be arranged by KPI together with the Government.
(4) Further provisions concerning limitation on ownership and domination as referred to in clause (1) and limitation on cross ownership as referred to in clause (2) will be arranged by the KPI together with the Government.

Article 19

Private Broadcasting Institutions are funded by:
(1). Commercials broadcast; and/or
(2). Other legal activities related to broadcasting operation.

Article 20

A Private Radio Broadcasting Services and a Private TV Broadcasting Services can only operate 1 (one) program through 1 (one) channel in 1 (one) scope of broadcast area.
(2) The Community Broadcasting Institutions as referred to in clause (1) operate on the following bases:
   a. Non profit oriented and not a part of a profit oriented company; and
   b. To educate and teach the community to increase welfare by promoting programs in the field of culture, education and information that reflects national identity.

(3) The Community Broadcasting Institution is a non partisan community organization that:
   a. is neither a representative of a foreign organization or institution nor a member of international community;
   b. is not related to illegal organizations; and
   c. is not a tool for the propaganda of certain groups or factions.

Article 22

(1) A Community Broadcasting Institution is founded by the fund contributed by a certain community and belongs to the community.
(2) A Community Broadcasting Institution receives funding from donation, grants, sponsors and other legal sources with no strings attached.

Article 23

(1) Community Broadcasting Institutions are not allowed to receive initial fund to establish the stations and operational fund from foreign party.
(2) Community Broadcasting Institutions are not allowed to run advertisings and/or other commercials broadcast except the PSA's.

Article 24

(1) A Community Broadcasting Institution is obliged to develop codes of ethics and regulations that must be known widely by the community and other members of the society.
(2) In the case of the existence of grievance from the community or other members of the society on the violation of code of ethics and/or regulations, the Community Broadcasting Institution is obliged to take actions in accordance to guidelines and prevailing provisions.

Part Seven
Subscribed Broadcasting Institutions

Article 25

(1) Subscribed Broadcasting Institutions as referred to in Article 13 clause (2) point d are broadcasting institutions in the form of Indonesia legal entities that only provide subscribed broadcasting services and should first obtain license for subscribed broadcasting operation.
(2) Subscribed Broadcasting Institutions as referred to in clause (1) are transmitting or distributing its broadcast material to its subscribers I particular through radio, television, multimedia, or other media of information.

Article 26

(1) Subscribed Broadcasting Institutions as referred to in Article 25 consist of:
   a. Subscribed Broadcasting Institutions through satellites;
   b. Subscribed Broadcasting Institutions through cable; and
   c. Subscribed Broadcasting Institutions through terrestrial.
(2) In operating their programs, Subscribed Broadcasting Institutions shall:
   a. Conduct internal censorship toward the entire content of the program to be broadcasted and/or distributed;
   b. Provide at least 10% (ten percent) of the channel capacity for programs from Public Broadcasting Institutions and Private Broadcasting Institutions; and
   c. Provide at least 1 (one) channel of domestic production program for every 10 (ten) foreign production programs being channeled.
(3) Subscribed Broadcasting Institutions are funded by:
   a. Subscription fee; and
   b. Other legal activities related to broadcasting operation.

Article 27

Subscribed Broadcasting Institutions through satellites as referred to in Article 26 clause (1) point a must meet the following requirements:
1) It has broadcasting scope that covers within the area of the Republic of Indonesia;
2) It has broadcast control stations located in Indonesia;
3) It has a satellite transmitting station located in Indonesia;
4) It uses a satellite that has a landing right in Indonesia; and
5) It guarantees that the program is only accessible to the subscribers.
Article 28
Subscribed Broadcasting Institutions through cable and through terrestrial as referred to in Article 26 clause (1) point b and point c must meet the following requirements:

a. It has broadcasting scope that covers one service area specified in the operation license issued for the institution; and

b. It guarantees that the program is only accessible to the subscribers.

Article 29
(1) Provisions as stated in Article 16 clause (2), Article 17, Article 18, Article 33 clause (1) and clause (7), Article 34 clause (4) and clause (5) also apply for Subscribed Broadcasting Institutions.

(2) Further provisions concerning procedures and requirements in obtaining license as referred to in Article 25 clause (1) shall be arranged by the KPI together with the Government.

Part Eight
Foreign Broadcasting Institutions

Article 30
(1) Foreign Broadcasting institutions are not allowed to be established in Indonesia.

(2) Foreign Broadcasting institutions and foreign broadcasting office that will perform journalistic activities in Indonesia, either broadcasted live or recorded, must fulfill all the provisions stated in the prevailing laws.

(3) Further provisions concerning the guidelines for coverage activities of foreign broadcasting institutions shall be arranged by the KPI together with the Government.

Part Nine
Broadcasting Stations and Coverage Areas

Article 31
(1) Broadcasting Stations that operate radio or television broadcasting services consist of network broadcasting station and/or local broadcasting station.

(2) Public Broadcasting Stations can operate programs based on networking station system that covers the whole area of the Republic of Indonesia.

(3) Private Broadcasting Stations can operate programs through networking station system with limited coverage area.

(4) Further provisions concerning the operation of networking station system shall be arranged by the KPI together with the Government.

(5) Local broadcasting station can be established in certain locations within the area of the Republic of Indonesia with limited coverage in the location concerned.

(6) The majority ownership of initial capital and operation of the local broadcasting stations are primarily allocated to the local community where the stations are located.

Part Ten
Basic Plan of Broadcasting Technique and Technical Requirements of Broadcasting Instruments

Article 32
(1) Every establishment and operation of broadcasting must meet the requirements of the basic plan of broadcasting technique and the technical requirements of broadcasting instruments.

(2) Further provisions concerning the basic plan of broadcasting technique and the technical requirements of broadcasting instruments as referred to in clause (1) shall be arranged by KPI together with the Government based on the prevailing laws.

Part Eleven
Licensing

Article 33
(1) Broadcasting institutions are obliged to obtain broadcasting operation licenses before starting with broadcasting activities.

(2) The applicants must provide their name, vision, mission, and program format and fulfill the requirements stated in this Law.

(3) The issuance of license as stated in clause (1) is based on the public need, interest and convenience.

(4) License and license extension shall be issued by the state after obtaining:
Appendices

159

a. Input and evaluation result of the hearing between the applicants and KPI;
b. Recommendation of fit and properness for broadcasting operation issued by KPI;
c. The agreement in the joint meeting forum held particularly for licensing issue between KPI and the Government; and
d. Allocation License and radio frequency spectrum utilization by the Government upon the recommendation of KPI.

(5) Based on the result of agreement as referred to in clause (4) point c, administratively the license for broadcasting operation is granted by the state through KPI.

(6) The broadcasting operation license and the extension license of broadcasting operation are obliged to be issued within 30 (thirty) work days at the latest after reaching the agreement from joint meeting forum as referred to in clause (4) point c.

(7) Broadcasting institutions are obliged to pay the fee for broadcasting operation licenses through the State Treasurer’s Office.

(8) Further provisions concerning the procedures and requirements for obtaining broadcasting operation licenses shall be arranged by the KPI together with the Government.

Article 34

(1) Broadcasting operation licenses that are issued shall be as follows:
a. Radio broadcasting operation licenses are granted for 5 (five) years period of time.
b. Television broadcasting operation licenses are granted for 10 (ten) years period of time.

(2) The licenses as referred to in clause (1) point a and point b are extendable.

(3) Before obtaining a fixed license for broadcasting operation, radio broadcasting institutions must undergo broadcast try-out period for 6 (six) months at the longest and 1 (one) year try-out period for television broadcasting institutions at the longest.

(4) Broadcasting operation licenses are prohibited to be transferred to other parties.

(5) Broadcasting operation licenses can be revoked due to:
a. Failure to pass the prescribed broadcasting try-out period;
b. Violation on the utilization of the allocated radio frequency spectrum and/or broadcast coverage;
c. Failure to perform broadcast activity more than 3 (three) months without notifying the KPI;
d. Being transferred to other parties;
e. Violation on the basic plan of broadcasting techniques and the technical requirements of broadcasting instruments; or
f. Violation on the provisions concerning the broadcast program standards after a permanent court verdict.

(6) Broadcasting operation licenses become overdue because they have expired and not to be prolonged.

CHAPTER IV
BROADCAST OPERATION

Part One
Broadcast Content

Article 35

Broadcast content must be in line with the principles, objectives, functions and directions of broadcast as referred to in Article 2, Article 3, Article 4, and Article 5.

Article 36

(1) Broadcast content must contain information, education, and entertainment and be beneficial in the shaping of intellectual, personality, morality, advancement, national endurance, maintaining unity and integrity as well as implementing religious values and the Indonesian cultural values.

(2) Broadcast content of television broadcasting services provided by Private Broadcasting Institutions and Public Broadcasting Institutions must carry at least 60% (sixty percent) domestic programs.

(3) Broadcast content must provide protection and empowerment to the particular public, who are children and youths, by broadcasting programs in a proper time, and broadcasting institutions must include and/or mention public classification in accordance with the broadcast content.

(4) Broadcast content must maintain the neutrality of the program and not to favor the interest of certain groups.

(5) Broadcast content must not include:
a. Slander, instigation, misleads, and/or lies;
b. Exhibiting violence, indecency, gambling, narcotics and illegal drug abuse; or
c. Provoking ethnic, religious, racial and inter-groups conflicts.

(6) Broadcast content must not ridicule, underestimate, molest and/or neglect religious values, the dignity of Indonesian people and violate international relationship.
Part Two
Broadcast Language

Article 37
The primary language media in broadcast program operation must be the right and proper Indonesian language.

Article 38
(1) Local languages can be used as introductory language in the operation of local-content broadcast program and to support certain programs when necessary.
(2) Foreign languages can be used only as introductory language in accordance to the necessity of a broadcast program.

Article 39
(1) Programs in foreign language can be broadcasted using the original language and for TV broadcasting services in particular, must be equipped with the Indonesian subtitles or selectively dubbed into Bahasa Indonesia in accordance to the necessity of certain programs.
(2) Dubbing of foreign language into Bahasa Indonesia is limited to a maximum of 30% (thirty percent) from all foreign programs being broadcast.
(3) Sign language can be used in certain programs for the deaf.

Part Three
Relay and Joint Broadcast

Article 40
(1) Broadcasting institutions may relay programs from other broadcasting stations; either domestic broadcasting stations as well as foreign broadcasting stations.
(2) Broadcast relay used as regular programs, originated both from domestic or foreign, are limited.
(3) Relay of regular programs originated from foreign broadcasting institutions in particular, the number, duration, types and numbers of program are limited.
(4) Broadcasting institutions may perform relay from other broadcasting institutions irregularly upon certain national or international programs and/or favorite programs.

Article 41
Among broadcasting institutions, cooperation may be performed in making a joint broadcast as long as it is not intended to information and opinion-shaping monopoly.

Part Four
Journalistic Activity

Article 42
In conducting journalistic activity, electronic media journalists must comply with Journalistic Code of Ethics and the prevailing laws.

Part Five
Broadcast Right

Article 43
(1) Each broadcasted program must have a broadcast right.
(2) In broadcasting a program, broadcasting institutes are obliged to mention the broadcast right.
(3) The ownership of broadcast right as referred to in clause (2) must be mentioned clearly in the program.
(4) Broadcast rights of every broadcast program is protected by the prevailing laws.

Part Six
Broadcast Rectification

Article 44
(1) Broadcasting institutions are obliged to make rectification when it is come to their attention that there is a mistake and/or error in their broadcast and/or news content, or when there is protest against the content of the program and/or news.
(2) Rectification or correction must be done in less than the next 24 (twenty-four) hours and when unable to do so, the correction can be done in the first opportunity and must be treated as a priority.
(3) Rectification or correction as referred to in clause (2) does not make the broadcasting institutions immune from the responsibility or legal proceeding by the injured parties.
Part Seven
Broadcast Archive

Article 45
(1) Broadcasting institutions are obliged to store broadcast materials including audio records, video records, photos, and documents for at least 1 (one) year after being broadcasted.
(2) Broadcasting materials with high values of history, information or broadcasting must be submitted to the appointed institutions to preserve them in line with prevailing laws.

Part Eight
Advertising Broadcast

Article 46
(1) Advertising broadcast consists of commercial and public service advertisement.
(2) Advertising broadcast must comply with fundamentals, objectives, functions and directions of broadcasting as referred to in Article 2, Article 3, Article 4, and Article 5.
(3) Commercials are not allowed to:
   a. promote something related to the teaching of religions, ideologies, individuals or groups that hurt the feelings or abase other religions, ideologies, individuals or groups;
   b. promote liquor or its equivalent and addictive substance or material;
   c. promote cigarettes by exposing the shape of the cigar;
   d. promote things that are against the public morality and religious values; and/or
   e. Exploit children under the age of 18 years.
(4) The advertising broadcast material to be broadcast through broadcasting institutions must meet the requirements issued by the KPI.
(5) Commercials that are broadcasted shall become the responsibility of the relevant broadcasting institution.
(6) Commercials being broadcasted during the program targeted for children must meet the broadcasting standard for children.
(7) Broadcasting institutions must set aside air time for broadcasting public service advertisements.
(8) The portion of broadcasting time for commercials in private broadcasting institutions is maximum 20% (twenty percent), whilst the portion of broadcasting time for commercials in public broadcasting institutions is maximum 15% (fifteen percent) from the entire broadcasting time.
(9) The portion of broadcasting time for public service advertisements in private broadcasting institutions is maximum 10% (ten percent) of the commercial broadcasting time, whilst for public broadcasting institutions at least 30% (thirty percent) of the advertising time.
(10) The airtime of broadcasting institutions cannot be bought by any parties for any reasons other than for advertising programs.
(11) Advertising materials must utilize domestic resources.

Part Nine
Censor of Broadcast Content

Article 47
Broadcast contents in the form of films and/or advertisements must pass the censorship by the appointed institution.

CHAPTER V
CODE OF CONDUCTS OF BROADCASTING

Article 48
(1) Code of broadcasting conducts for broadcast operation is determined by the KPI.
(2) Code of broadcasting conducts as referred to in clause (1) shall be based on:
   a. Religious and moral values and the prevailing laws; and
   b. Other norms that are valid and acceptable among the general public and broadcasting institutions.
(3) The KPI must issue and socialize the code of broadcasting conducts to broadcasting institutions and the general public.
(4) The code of broadcasting conducts shall determine the standards of broadcast contents that at least related to the:
   a. Respect of religious points of view;
   b. Respect of privacy;
   c. Manner and morality;
   d. Limitation on the exposure of sexuality, violence and sadism;
   e. Protection towards children, youths and women;
f. Program classification that is based on group’s age;
g. Program broadcasting in foreign languages;
h. Punctuality and neutrality of the news program;
i. Live broadcasts, and
j. Advertising broadcasts.
(5) The KPI will facilitate the establishment of Broadcasting Code of Ethics.

Article 49

The KPI shall regularly observe the code of broadcasting conducts as referred to in Article 48 clause (3) in line with the amendments of the laws and the development of norms prevailed in the society.

Article 50

(1) KPI is obliged to monitor the implementation of code of broadcasting conducts.
(2) KPI is obliged to accommodate complaints from every individual or group who finds out violations towards code of broadcasting conducts.
(3) KPI must proceed official complaints on fundamental issues as referred to in Article 8 clause (3) point e.
(4) KPI must submit the complaints to the relevant broadcasting institutions and give them a chance to respond.
(5) KPI must submit a written report on evaluation and examination result to the complainant parties and related broadcasting institutions.

Article 51

(1) The KPI can oblige the broadcasting institutes to broadcast and/or publish the statement related to the complaint as referred to in Article 50 clause (2) when it is proven to be true.
(2) All Broadcasting Institutes must comply with the decisions issued by the KPI that based on the code of broadcasting conducts.

CHAPTER VI
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

Article 52

(1) Every citizen of the Republic of Indonesia has the right, obligation and responsibility to participate in the development of national broadcasting operation.
(2) Non-profit organizations, NGOs, universities, and education circle society can develop literate activities and/or the monitoring of Broadcasting Institutions.
(3) The citizens as mentioned in clause (1) have the right to submit objections against the program and/or broadcast content that considered harmful.

CHAPTER VII
RESPONSIBILITY

Article 53

(1) In exercising its functions, authorities, tasks and obligation, the Central KPI shall be responsible to the President and submit reports to the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia.
(2) In exercising its functions, authorities, tasks and obligation, the Regional KPI shall be responsible to Governor and submit reports to the Provincial People’s Representative Council of the Republic of Indonesia.

Article 54

The president of the legal entity of the broadcasting institution shall be responsible in general upon broadcasting operation and must appoint the responsible party for each executed program.

CHAPTER VIII
ADMINISTRATIVE SANCTIONS

Article 55

(1). Any person whosoever violates provisions as stated in Article 15 clause (2), Article 20, Article 23, Article 24, Article 26 clause (2), Article 27, Article 28, Article 33 clause (7), Article 34 clause (5) point a, point c, point d, and point f, Article 36 clause (2), clause (3), and clause (4), Article 39 clause (1), Article 43 clause
(2) Article 44 clause (1), Article 45 clause (1), Article 46 clause (6), clause (7), clause (8), clause (9), and clause (11) shall be imposed with administrative sanctions.

(2) Administrative sanctions as referred to in clause (1) can be in the form:
   a. Written warning;
   b. Temporary suspension of the problematic program after a certain stage;
   c. Limitation of broadcasting duration and time;
   d. Administrative fine;
   e. Suspension of broadcasting activities for a certain period of time;
   f. Not granting broadcasting operation license extension;
   g. Revocation of broadcasting operation license.

(3) Further provisions on the procedures and issuance of administrative sanctions as referred to in clause (1) and clause (2) shall be arranged by the KPI together with the Government.

CHAPTER IX
INVESTIGATION

Article 56
(1) Investigation toward criminal acts regulated by this Law shall be done in accordance with the Penal Codes.

(2) For criminal acts related to violations of provisions as referred to in Article 34 clause (5) point b and e, the investigation shall be executed by Civilian State Officials in line with prevailing laws.

CHAPTER X
CRIMINAL SANCTIONS

Article 57
The sanction of maximum imprisonment of 5 (five) years and/or a fine of maximum Rp1.000.000.000.00 (one billion Rupiah) for radio broadcasting and the sanction of maximum imprisonment of 5 (five) years and/or a fine of maximum Rp10.000.000.000.00 (ten billion Rupiah) for television broadcasting, for every person who:
   a. Violates the provision as referred to in Article 17 clause (3);
   b. Violates the provision as referred to in Article 18 clause (2);
   c. Violates the provision as referred to in Article 30 clause (1);
   d. Violates the provision as referred to in Article 36 clause (5);
   e. Violates the provision as referred to in Article 36 clause (6).

Article 58
The sanction of maximum imprisonment of 2 (two) years and/or a fine of maximum Rp500.000.000.00 (five hundred million Rupiah) for radio broadcasting and the sanction of maximum imprisonment of 2 (two) years and/or a fine of maximum Rp5.000.000.000.00 (five billion Rupiah) for television broadcasting, for every person who:
   a. Violates the provision as referred to in Article 18 clause (1);
   b. Violates the provision as referred to in Article 33 clause (1);
   c. Violates the provision as referred to in Article 34 clause (4);
   d. Violates the provision as referred to in Article 46 clause (3).

Article 59
Any person who violates provisions as referred to in Article 46 clause (10) shall be sanctioned with a fine of maximum Rp200.000.000.00 (two hundred million Rupiah) for radio broadcasting and the sanction of maximum Rp2.000.000.000.00 (two billion rupiahs) for television broadcasting.

CHAPTER XI
TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS

Article 60
(1) With the enactment of this Law, all the existing implementing regulations in the broadcasting field remain valid as long as they are not contradictory or replaced with new ones.

(2) The existing Broadcasting Institutions before the enactment of this Law may continue to perform their functions and must adjust themselves with the provisions of this Law within 2 (two) years the longest for radio broadcasting services and 3 (three) years the longest for television broadcasting services after the enactment of this Law.

(3) Broadcasting Institutions that already have relay station before the enactment of this Law and after the end of adjustment period can still operate its broadcasting through the relay station until the establishment of local station, networking with the concerned Broadcasting Institution within 2 (two) years at the longest, unless there is a special reason decided by KPI together with the Government.
CHAPTER XII
CLOSING PROVISIONS

Article 61
(1) The KPI must have been established within 1 (one) year at the latest after the enactment of this Law.

(2) For the first time the nomination of KPI members is submitted by the government upon public suggestion to the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia.

Article 62
(1) The provisions arranged by KPI together with the Government as referred to in Article 14 clause (10), Article 18 clause (3) and clause (4), Article 29 clause (2), Article 30 clause (3), Article 31 clause (4), Article 32 clause (2), Article 33 clause (8), Article 55 clause (3), and Article 60 clause (3) shall be determined by Governmental Regulation.

(2) The Governmental Regulation as referred to in clause (1) must be decided within 60 (sixty) days after finished being arranged by KPI together with the Government at the latest.

Article 63
With the enactment of this Law, therefore Law Number 24 Year 1997 concerning Broadcasting (State Gazette of the Republic of Indonesia Year 1997 Number 72, Supplement to State Gazette Number 3701) is declared null and void.

Article 64
This Act shall be declared effective on the day of its enactment.
For public cognizant, it is ordered to publish this Law by placing it in State Gazette of the Republic of Indonesia.

Endorsed in Jakarta,
On December 28th 2002

Enacted in Jakarta
On December 28th 2002

The Minister of State Secretary of the Republic of Indonesia,

(Not signed)

BAMBANG KESOWO

STATE GAZETTE OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA YEAR 2002 NUMBER 139

Copied as original

The Deputy of Cabinet Secretary
Law and Legislation Bureau

(Signed)

Lambock V. Nahattands
Appendices

165

Appendix 2

LAW OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA
Number 40 of 1999
Concerning
THE PRESS

NATIONAL INFORMATION AGENCY
REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA

PROVISIONAL TRANSLATION

LAW OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA
Number 40 of 1999
coming
THE PRESS

WITH THE BLESSING OF GOD ALMIGHTY,
THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA

Considering : a. that the freedom of the press is one of the manifestations of the people’s sovereignty and constitutes an important element to promote a democratic life of the society, nation and state, thereby securing the freedom to express thoughts and opinions as meant in Article 28 of the 1945 Constitution;
b. that in a democratic life of the society, nation and state, the freedom to express thoughts and opinions in accordance with one’s conscience and the right to get information are fundamental human rights, which are necessary to uphold justice and truth, to promote public welfare, and to advance the intellectual life of the nation;
c. that the national press as a vehicle of mass communication, information dissemination, and public opinion building, should be allowed to execute its principles, functions, duties, and roles as well as possible based on professional freedom of the press, thus necessitating that it be given legal guarantee and protection, and also be made free from interference and coercion from any quarters.
d. that the national press shall take part in promoting world order based on freedom, lasting peace, and social justice.
e. that Act No. 11 of 1966 concerning Basic Provisions on the Press, as amended by Act No.4 of 1967 and later amended by Act No. 21 of 1982, is no longer suitable to the demand of temporal change;
f. that based on considerations as meant by letters a, b, c, d, and e, it is deemed necessary to enact a law on the Press.
Appendices

In view of:

1. Article 5 clause (1), Article 20 clause (1), Article 27, and Article 28 of the 1945 Constitution.
2. Decree of the People’s Consultative Assembly No. XVII/MPR/1988 on Human Rights;

With the consent of the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia

HAS RESOLVED

To enact:

LAW ON THE PRESS:

CHAPTER I
GENERAL PROVISIONS

Article 1

As meant in this law:

(1) “The Press” is a social institution and a vehicle of mass communication that performs journalistic activities covering the seeking, obtaining, storing, processing, and disseminating of information, either in the forms of manuscript, audio, visual, audio-visual, and data and graphs, as well as in other forms of the printed media, the electronic media and any other forms of media.

(2) A Press Corporation is an Indonesian corporate body that operates press undertakings, which cover the printed media, electronics media, news agencies, and other media corporations with specialization in managing, disseminating and distributing information.

(3) A News Agency is a press corporation that serves the printed media, electronics media or other media, as well as the community in obtaining information.

(4) A Journalist is a person doing journalistic works on a regular basis.

(5) A Press Organization is an organization of journalists and that of press corporations.

(6) A National Press is the press operated by an Indonesian press corporation.

(7) A Foreign Press is the press operated by a foreign press corporation.

(8) Censorship is the forced removing of some or all parts of information materials to be published or broadcast, or warnings or reprimands with threats from any quarter, and/or obligation to report to, and apply for permit from the authority to carry out journalistic activities.

(9) Bridling or broadcasting prohibition is the terminating of publication and distribution of the printed media, or coerced and illegal broadcasting.

(10) Right of Refusal is the right of a journalist, in the line of his/her profession, to refuse to disclose the name(s) or other identities of the source person(s), which the journalist must keep in secret.

(11) Right of Reply is the right of a person or a group of persons to make responses and denials to publication contents that harm his/her or their good name.

(12) Right of Correction is the right of everybody to correct or rectify mistaken information, either on his/her- self or concerning other persons, which is published by the press.

(13) Obligation of Correction is the obligation to correct or rectify false information, data, fact, opinion, or picture, which have been published by the press concerned.

(14) Journalistic Code of Ethics is a compilation of professional ethics for journalists.

CHAPTER II
PRINCIPLES, FUNCTIONS, RIGHTS, DUTIES, AND ROLES OF THE PRESS

Article 2

Freedom of the Press is one of the manifestations of the people’s sovereignty, which is based on the principles of democracy, justice, and legal supremacy.

Article 3

(1) The national press functions as a medium for information dissemination, education, entertainment, and social control.

(2) In addition to the functions referred to under clause (1), the national press also functions as an economic institution.

Article 4

(1) The freedom of the press is guaranteed as the basic right of the citizens.

(2) Towards the national press, there shall be no censorship, bridling, or broadcasting prohibition.

(3) By the freedom of the press, the national press has every right to seek, get, and disseminate ideas and information.

(4) In bearing legal responsibility for a publication, a journalist has the Right of Refusal.
Article 5
(1) In reporting events and opinions, the press is obliged to pay respect to the religious norms, social morality and the principle of presumption of innocence.
(2) The press is obliged to honor the Right of Reply.
(3) The press has an obligation to abide by the Right of Correction.

Article 6
The national press holds the roles to:
  a. fulfill the right of the people to know;
  b. uphold the basic values of democracy, encourage the observance of legal supremacy and human rights, and pay respect to diversity.
  c. develop public opinion based on correct, accurate and true information.
  d. launch supervision, criticism, and correction, and offer suggested solutions to matters pertaining to public interests.
  e. fight for justice and truth.

CHAPTER III
JOURNALISTS

Article 7
(1) A journalist is free to join any journalist organization of his or her choice.
(2) Journalists should sanction a Journalistic Code of Ethics and abide by it.

Article 8
In executing his/her duties, a journalist is provided with the necessary legal protection.

CHAPTER IV
PRESS CORPORATIONS

Article 9
(1) Every Indonesian citizen has the right to establish a Press Corporation.
(2) Every press corporation must be in the form of Indonesian corporate body.

Article 10
A Press Corporation should always step up the welfare of its journalists and other press workers by offering shares in the ownership of the venture and/or net profit sharing and other forms of incentives.

Article 11
Infusion of foreign capital to a press corporation should be made through the stock exchange.

Article 12
A press corporation is obliged to openly announce its name, address and administrator-in-charge through said media; specific to press publication, name and address of the printer corporation should also be included.

Article 13
A press corporation is prohibited from carrying advertisements that:
  a. dishonor the dignity of a religion and/or disturb the harmonious life among religious followers, and contradict public morality;
  b. feature liquor, narcotics, psychotropic, and other addictive substances in line with provisions of operative statutory regulations.
  c. show the form of cigarette and/or cigarette usage.

Article 14
To disseminate news at home and to abroad, every Indonesian citizen and the state are allowed to establish a news agency.

CHAPTER V
PRESS COUNCIL

Article 15
(1) Within the frame of helping uphold the freedom of the press and improving the national press life, an independent Press Council shall be founded.
(2) The Press Council shall execute its functions as follows:
  a. to protect the freedom of the press from interferences by other parties;
  b. to carry out studies to enhance the development of the press life;
  c. to sanction a Journalistic Code of Ethics and to supervise its implementation;
d. to give considerations and to help settle public complaints over press publication-related cases;  
e. to facilitate communications among the press, the people, and the government;  
f. to help press organizations in formulating regulations in the field of the press and to improve the quality of journalistic profession;  
g. to set up a data bank on press corporations.

(3) The Press Council membership shall consist of:  
a. Journalists chosen by journalist organizations;  
b. Executives of press corporations chosen by press corporation organizations;  
c. Public figures, experts in the field of the press and or communications and other fields, chosen by journalist organizations and press corporation organizations;

(4) The chairperson and vice chairperson of the Press Council are elected from among and by the members of the Council;

(5) The membership of the Press Council as meant by clause (3) of this Article shall be determined by a Presidential Decree;

(6) The membership of the Press Council shall be effective for a period of 3 (three) years and afterward is eligible for reelection for one more term only;

(7) Financial sources of the Press Council shall derive from:  
a. press organizations;  
b. press corporations;  
c. unconditional contributions from the state and other donors.

CHAPTER VI  
FOREIGN PRESS

Article 16  
Foreign press circulation and the establishment of foreign press representative offices in Indonesia shall be done according to the provisions of the operative statutory regulations.

CHAPTER VII  
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

Article 17  
(1) The public may hold activities to facilitate the exercise of the freedom of the press and guarantee the right to obtain required information.  
(2) The activities as meant in clause (1) can be in the forms of:  
a. monitoring and writing analyses on legal violations, ethics and on technical errors of the presentation of new reports committed by the press;  
b. conveying suggestions and recommendations to the Press Council with a view to maintaining and improving the quality of the national press.

CHAPTER VIII  
PENAL PROVISIONS

Article 18  
(1) Whosoever illegally and deliberately takes actions that result in the impediment and obstruction to the implementation of the provisions of Article 4 clause (2) and clause (3) of this law shall be liable to a maximum prison sentence of 2 (two) years and/or a maximum fine amounting to Rp$500,000,000.00 (five hundred million rupiahs).

(2) Any press corporation that violates the provisions of Article 5 clause (1) and clause (2) and Article 13 of this law shall be liable to a maximum fine of Rp$500,000,000.00 (five hundred million rupiahs).

(3) Any press corporation that violates the provisions of Article 9 clause (2) and Article 12 of this law shall be liable to a maximum fine of Rp$100,000,000.00 (one hundred million rupiahs).

CHAPTER IX  
TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS

Article 19  
(1) After the sanctioning of this law, all operative regulations in the field of the press as well as all existing agencies and institutions remain effective and continue to function so long as they are not in contradiction to or not yet replaced by new ones based on this law.
(2) Press corporations already in existence before this Law comes into force, shall adjust themselves with the provisions of this Law within 1 (one) year after this Law is promulgated.

CHAPTER X
CLOSING PROVISIONS

Article 20
At the time this Law comes into force:
(1) Act No. 11/1966 concerning Basic Provisions on the Press (State Gazette of the Republic of Indonesia No.40, Supplementary State Gazette No.2815) that was amended the last by Act No.21 of 1982 on Amendments to Act No. 11 of 1966 on Basic Provisions on the Press as it was amended by Act No.4 of 1967 (State Gazette of the Republic of Indonesia of 1982 No. 52, Supplementary State Gazette No.3235);
(2) Act No. 4/PNPS of 1963 on Control of Printed Matters, the Content of which may Disturb Public Order (State Gazette of the Republic of Indonesia of 1963 No 23, Supplementary State Gazette of the Republic of Indonesia No.2533), Article 2 clause (3) as applied to provisions on bulletins, daily newspapers, and periodical publications; are hereby declared invalid.

Article 21
This law shall come into effect at the date of its sanctioning. In order that everyone may take cognizance of it, it is hereby ordered to place this Law in the State Gazette of the Republic of Indonesia.
Sanctioned in: Jakarta
On: 23rd September 1999

PRESIDENT
OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA

sgd
BACHARUDDIN JUSUF HABIBIE

Promulgated in Jakarta
On 23rd September 1999

MINISTER/STATE SECRETARY
OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA

sgd
MULADI

STATE GAZETTE OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA OF 1999 NUMBER 166

ELUCIDATION
on LAW OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA
Number 40 of 1999
concerning
THE PRESS

GENERAL
Article 28 of the 1945 Constitution guarantees the freedom to associate and assemble, to express thoughts in writing and orally. The press, which includes the printed media, electronic media and other media, constitutes a means to express the thoughts in writing and orally. In order that the press may function maximally as mandated in the 1945 Constitution, it is deemed necessary to produce a Law concerning the Press. The maximum function of the Press will be needed because the freedom of the press is a materialization of the people’s sovereignty and constitutes an important element in a democratic life of the society, nation, and state.
In the democratic life, the accountability to the people is secured, the transparency of the state administration functions, and justice and truth is established.
The press, which enjoys the freedom to seek and impart information, will also be indispensable in observing Human Rights that is guaranteed by Decree No. XVII/MPR/1988 of the People’s Consultative Assembly of the Republic of Indonesia on Human Rights. The decree among other things states that everyone has the right to communicate and to get information, in conformity with the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 19, which reads: “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes the freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.”
The press, which also conducts social control, is very important to prevent power abuse, be it in the form of corruption, collusion, nepotism, or other deviation and misconduct. In implementing its functions, rights, duties, responsibilities and roles, the press shall pay respect to everybody’s basic rights, thus raising the expectation of the Press to be professional and to be open to control by the public. Control by the public shall include the observance of the Right of Reply and the Right of Correction by everybody, by social institutions such as Media Watch, and by the Press Council in various forms and means. To prevent overlapping arrangements, this Law does not stipulate provisions that have been regulated by other statutory regulations.

Article by Article

Article 1
Sufficiently clear

Article 2
Sufficiently clear

Article 3
Clause (1)
Sufficiently clear
Clause (2)
Press corporations shall be managed on the basis of economic principles in order that the quality of the press and the welfare of journalists and other press workers may continuously be improved, without neglecting its social responsibility.

Article 4
Clause (1)
What is meant by “the freedom of the press is guaranteed as the basic right of citizens” is that the press is free from any kind of actions of restraint, prohibition, and/or coercion, thus securing the people’s right to get information. Freedom of the press is the freedom imbued with awareness on the need to uphold legal supremacy that is enforced by the court, and professional accountability as elaborated by the Journalistic Code of Ethics and in line with the conscience of the journalists.
Clause (2)
No censorship, bridling, or broadcasting prohibition shall be applied to the printed and electronic media. Transmission of information which makes no part of the implementation of the journalistic activities shall be regulated in the provisions of other operative regulations.
Clause (3)
Sufficiently clear
Clause (4)
The main aim of the Right of Refusal is to enable a journalist to protect the source of information, by refusing to mention the identity of the source of information concerned. Said right is applicable in case of the journalist is asked to give information by investigative officers or to be a witness before the court. The Right of Refusal can be revoked for the sake of the state interests and security or public order, as ruled by the court.

Article 5
Clause (1)
The national press, in broadcasting information, shall not pass judgment or make a conclusion on someone being guilty or otherwise, particularly, moreover on cases being processed in the court of justice. And the national press should also accommodate the interests of all parties’ related with the report.
Clause (2)
Sufficiently clear
Clause (3)
Sufficiently clear

Article 6
The national press has an important role in fulfilling the people’s right to know and to develop public opinion, by conveying correct, accurate, and true information. This will encourage the upholding of justice and truth, and the realization of legal supremacy towards the creation of an orderly society.

Article 7
Clause (1)
Sufficiently clear
Clause (2)
What is meant by “The Journalistic Code of Ethics” is a code of ethics which is agreed upon by journalists’ organizations and is stipulated by the Press Council.

Article 8
What is meant by “legal protection” is protection by the government and or society to journalists in carrying out their functions, rights, duties, and roles in conformity with the provisions of operative statutory regulations.

Article 9
Clause (1)
All Indonesian citizens are given an equal right or opportunity to work in conformity with Human Rights, including to establish a press corporation in accordance with the operative statutory regulations. The national press has important and strategic functions and roles in the life of the society, nation, and state. As such, the state is entitled to establish a press corporation by founding an institution or a corporation to operate a press undertaking.
Clause (2)
Sufficiently clear.

Article 10
What is meant by “other forms of incentives” is a raise in salary, bonus, insurance policy, and so forth. The provision of welfare shall be implemented on the basis of an agreement between the corporation management and the press workers.

Article 11
Infusion of foreign capital to a press corporation shall be limited to below the majority stake and shall be carried out in conformity with the operative statutory regulations.

Article 12
Open announcement of the name, address and administrators-in-charge shall be done through:
a. for the printed media, the column of the name, address, and administrators of the publication concerned and the name and address of the printing company;
b. for the electronic media, the name, address and administrators of the corporation, the introduction or conclusion of every journalistic broadcasting works;
c. for other media, means adjusted to the form, nature, and characteristic of the media concerned. This announcement is meant as manifestation of accountability on those journalistic works which have been published or broadcast. What is meant by “administrators” are persons in charge of the press corporation, covering the business and editorial departments.
Matters regarding penal accountability shall abide by the provisions of the operative statutory regulations.

Article 13
Sufficiently clear

Article 14
Sufficiently clear

Article 15
Clause (1)
The aim of forming the Press Council is to promote freedom of the press and to step up the quality and quantity of the national press.
Clause (2)
Considerations to the public complaints as meant in clause (2) letter d are in relation with the Right of Reply, Right of Correction, and assumption of violations to the Journalistic Code of Ethics.
Clause (3)
Sufficiently clear
Clause (4)
Sufficiently clear
Clause (5)
Sufficiently clear
Clause (6)
Sufficiently clear
Clause (7)
Sufficiently clear

Article 16
Sufficiently clear
Article 17
Clause (1) Sufficiently clear
Clause (2) To materialize public participation as meant in this clause, it is allowable to set up a media watch institution or organization.

Article 18
Clause (1) Sufficiently clear
Clause (2) In a case of criminal violation done by a press corporation, the administrator shall act on behalf of said corporation, as meant by Article 12.
Clause (3) Sufficiently clear

Article 19 Sufficiently clear

Article 20 Sufficiently clear

Article 21 Sufficiently clear

SUPPLEMENTARY STATE GAZETTE OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA NUMBER 3887.
Laws and Government Regulations concerning the Right to Information

Indonesia has several laws and government regulations that have articles or provisions touching on the right to information. The following is a select listing of these**:


In August 2000, the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR), Indonesia’s highest body empowered to draw and change the Constitution, expanded Article 28 to include human rights. It covers 10 basic rights. The right to communicate and obtain information to develop his or her personal self and social environment, and the right to seek, obtain, own, store, process and deliver information by using all kinds of channels available.”

The Human Rights Charter in MPR Stipulation XVII/1998 on Human Rights. Every person has the right to seek, obtain, own, store, process, and transfer information using all kinds of channels available (Article 20, Section VI on the right to freedom of information).

Act no. 40/1999 on the Press. Article 4, paragraph 1, states: Press freedom is guaranteed as a citizen’s human right. Article 4, paragraph 3, states: to guarantee press freedom, the national press reserves the right to seek, obtain and disseminate ideas and information.

Act no. 28/1999 on State Administrators Clean and Free from Corruption, Collusion, and Nepotism (Good Governance Act). – Every State Administrator is obliged to report and announce his or her assets before and after taking office (Article 5, point 3).

- Participation in the administration of the State is a public right and responsibility to create clean State administrators (Article 8, paragraph 1).
- Public participation meant in Article 8 takes the from of: a. the right to seek, obtain and provide information on State administration (Article 9, paragraph 1).
- Provisions on the how to implement public participation in State administration shall be elaborated in a government regulation (Article 9, paragraph 3)

Government Regulation no. 68/1999 on Implementing Procedures of Public Participation in State Administration (issued July 14, 1999 and effective since November 20, 1999). This regulation provides the implementing procedures for Act no. 28/1999.

- In matters where the public intends to seek and obtain information on State administration, the party concerned has the right to inquire or obtain from the office or agency in question. (Article 3, paragraph 1).
- The right for equal and fair service from a State administrator can be obtained by compliance of conditions and observance of the procedures of obtaining service in line with operating laws and regulation (Article 7).
- Every State administrator who receives a public request to obtain information on State administration is required to provide an answer or explanation in line with his or her duty and function and at the same time paying attention to existing laws and regulations (Article 10).

Act no. 39/1999 on Human Rights. Every person has the right to communicate and obtain information (Article 14).

Act no. 31/1999 on the Eradication of Corruption as a Criminal Act. The public can participate in helping efforts to prevent and eradicate corruption. Public participation can take the from of:

- the right to seek, obtain, and provide information regarding the suspected existence of a criminal act of corruption;
• the right to obtain service in seeking, obtaining and providing information regarding the suspected existence of criminal act of corruption from law enforcement authorities that handle cases of criminal acts of corruption (Article 41).

Act no. 23/1999 on Bank Indonesia. The Central Bank is required to provide the public through the mass media at the start of every fiscal year information containing an evaluation on the implementation of monetary policy the previous year and monetary policy plans and goals for the coming year (Article 58). The governor of the Central Bank and officers down the rank can face up to three years imprisonment and a fine of up to three billion rupiah for illegal disclosure of confidential information. The confidentiality of information is established by a regulation of the board of governors (Article 71).

Act no. 12/1997 on Copyright. The Justice Department draws up a list of copyright for public preview at no charge (Article 29).

Act no. 13/1997 on Patents. The Patents Office provides a special place where interested members of the public can have the opportunity to look at documents for patent applications that have been announced (Article 50).

Act no. 14/1997 on Trademarks. The Trademarks Office will, within 14 days at the latest since receiving an application for trademark registration, announce those applications that have complied with the conditions (Article 19).

Government Regulation no. 18/1999 on the Management of Hazardous and Toxic Waste. Every person has the right of information on hazardous – and toxic – waste management. The responsible authority is required to provide information to every person publicly (Article 54).

Act no. 25/1999 on the Financial Balance between the Center and the Regions. The central government implements a regional financial information system. The information in this regional financial information system is public data that can be made available to the public. (Article 27).

Act no. 41/1999 on Forestry. The government together with the business community and public publish research and information systems development results and information on forestry research and research result services (Article 54).

Act no. 23/1997 on Environmental Management. Every person has the right to environmental information linked to a role in environmental management (Article 5). Every person who undertake a business and/or an activity has the obligation to provide true and accurate information on environmental management (Article 6).

Act no. 24/1992 on Spatial Use Management. Every person has the right to know os spatial use plans (Article 4, paragraph 2, letter a).

Act no 8/1999 on Consumer Protection. Consumer protection has the aim to create a consumer protection system that contains the element of legal certainty and information openness and access to the information (Article 3, letter d).
  • The right of the consumer is the right to true, clear and honest information on the condition and guarantee of goods and/or services (Article 4, letter e).
  • The obligation of the business practitioner is to provide true, clear and honest information on the condition and guarantee of goods and/or services and provide directions on use, improvements and maintenance (Article 7, letter f).

  • Every enterprise and/or activity as determined in Article 3, paragraph 2, must be announced to the public in advance before the party that initiates the enterprise or activity can formulate the environmental impact analysis (Article 33, paragraph 1).
  • All documents concerning environmental impact analysis, suggestions, opinions and responses of citizens concerned, the conclusions of the evaluating committee, and the decision concerning the environmental worthiness of the enterprise and/or activity is for public disclosure (Article 35, paragraph 2).

  • In activities on spatial use, the public has the right to be publicly informed on spatial-use plans (Article 2, letter b).
  • To realize the public’s right to be informed on spatial-use plans as determined in Article 2, spatial-use plans are enacted and published in:
    a. The State Gazette for national-level spatial-use plans.
b. The Provincial gazette for provincial-level spatial-use plans.
c. The district/city gazette for district/municipal spatial-use plans (Article 3, paragraph 1).

- To meet the public’s right as determined in paragraph 1, the government has the obligation to announce/disseminate spatial-use plans that have been stipulated at places that would enable the public to be informed of them easily (Article 3, paragraph 1).

**Act no. 10/1998 on Changes to Act no 7/1992 on Banking.**

- Banks have the obligation to treat information of depositors and their deposits as confidential with certain exemptions (Article 40, letter a).
- For the interest of taxation, the management of Bank Indonesia at the request of the Minister of Finance has the authority to issue a written order addressed to a bank to provide information and present written evidence and documents on the financial situation of certain depositors to the tax authorities (Article 41, letter c).
- For criminal cases before a court of law, the management of Bank Indonesia can provide permission to the place, prosecutors or to judges to obtain information from a bank accounts of a suspect or defendant (Article 42, paragraph 2).

**Act no. 36/1999 on Telecommunications.** Whenever a customer requires the records for the telecommunications service used, the telecommunications service provider has the obligation to make them available. (Article 18, paragraph 2).

- A telecommunications service provider has the obligation to treat as confidential information that is sent and/or received by customers of the telecommunications service through the telecommunications network provided (Article 42, paragraph 3).

**The Criminal Code (KUHP).** Whosoever purposely discloses confidential information that requires that person to keep it by virtue of his or her position, in the present of in the past, can be convicted with a maximum prison sentence of nine months or a fine of up to six hundred rupiah (Article 322).

**Act no. 7/1971 on Archives.** Archives are papers produced and received by state agencies and government bodies in whatever form, either singly or in clusters, for use in implementations of government business (Article 1, letter a).

- Whosever purposefully and illegally owns archives as defined in Article 1, letter a of this law can be prosecuted and liable to a maximum 10 years in prison (Article 11, paragraph 1).
- Whosever stores an archive as defined in Article 1 letter a of this law, who purposely discloses its contents to an unauthorized third party can be prosecuted and liable to life imprisonment or face a maximum 20-year prison sentence (Article 11, paragraph 2).

**Quoted from Basorie (2001).**