Exaggerating unintended effects? Competing narratives on the impact of conflict minerals regulation

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ABSTRACT
This article contributes to the literature on unintended effects by adding a dimension to existing typologies: exaggerated unintended effects. It analyses the existence of this dimension resulting from the adoption of the United States' conflict minerals legislation, the Dodd-Frank act, article 1502. The article makes evident that there were two competing narratives on the unintended effects of the American regulation: the duration and the scope of the de facto embargo. While in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC; the target of the legislation) the negative unintended effects were declining, the dominant narrative on unintended effects was not changing and omitted crucial elements. A quantitative analysis shows that especially those companies that stood to gain from deregulation did not incorporate these positive developments into their narrative. The narratives of other stakeholders, such as non-governmental organizations and investors, progressed together with the changes observed in the DRC. The research indicates how the discussion on unintended effects impacted the formulation on conflict minerals regulation in the European Union. The article concludes by drawing parallels to debates on unintended negative effects in other domains of international cooperation, such as migration. It is suggested that policy makers, researchers and journalists verify claims of negative unintended effects before integrating them into their own narratives.

1. Introduction

This article explores unintended effects of the conflict minerals legislation of the United States government in 2010, the Dodd-Frank act, article 1502. Prominent public figures, such as the chair of the Securities and Exchange Commission have argued in 2017 that the law has led to 'unintended consequences washing over the Democratic Republic of the Congo and surrounding areas' (United States Securities Exchange Commission, 2017). The consequences of the Dodd-Frank act in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) have been enormous and have led to an overhaul of the mineral trading system in the eastern part of the DRC (OECD, 2015). Various types of unintended effects have been noted with respect to the conflict minerals legislation, and they will be analysed in detail in this paper (Cuvelier et al., 2014; Parker et al., 2017; Parker and Vadheim, 2017).

There has been a marked increase in academic interest in the unintended effects of international policies (e.g., Burlyuk, 2017; Jabeen, 2016; Koch & Schulpen, 2017a). The Evaluation and Program Planning journal has even devoted an entire special issue to it in 2017, with figures, such as the chair of the evaluation panel. The article builds on the existing literature and asks the following key questions: can one, also in the debate on conflict minerals regulation, speak of exaggerated unintended effects? If so, how does this exaggeration come about? Who is driving it?

This paper starts with an introduction to the conflict minerals legislation in the United States and minerals in the DRC (Section 2), followed by a brief section on the methodology used (Section 3). Then, it focuses on the different dimensions of typologies of unintended effects (Section 4). This section also describes which of those effects were encountered in the DRC according to the academic literature. Subsequently, two competing narratives on the de facto embargo resulting from the Dodd-Frank act, article 1502, will be analysed in detail in this paper (Cuvelier et al., 2014; Parker et al., 2017; Schulpen, 2017b). Dijkstra's article is of particular interest as it highlights an unintended effect that was hitherto not debated: the exaggerated unintended effect. Dijkstra analysed the unintended negative effects of international aid on the quality of governance in recipient countries. By means of a systematic literature review, those often-cited unintended effects appear to be exaggerated, as the empirical literature has failed to identify such a link since the fall of the Berlin wall.

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This paper starts with an introduction to the conflict minerals legislation in the United States and minerals in the DRC (Section 2), followed by a brief section on the methodology used (Section 3). Then, it focuses on the different dimensions of typologies of unintended effects (Section 4). This section also describes which of those effects were encountered in the DRC according to the academic literature. Subsequently, two competing narratives on the de facto embargo resulting from the Dodd-Frank act, article 1502, will be analysed in detail in this paper (Cuvelier et al., 2014; Parker et al., 2017; Schulpen, 2017b). Dijkstra's article is of particular interest as it highlights an unintended effect that was hitherto not debated: the exaggerated unintended effect. Dijkstra analysed the unintended negative effects of international aid on the quality of governance in recipient countries. By means of a systematic literature review, those often-cited unintended effects appear to be exaggerated, as the empirical literature has failed to identify such a link since the fall of the Berlin wall.

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from the conflict minerals legislation are described (Section 5). That section also shows how the situation in the DRC changed while at the same time the narrative of some actors remained the same. Section 6 turns to a qualitative and statistical analysis, which shows in a systematic way which actors support which narratives, and whose narrative evolved with the developments in the DRC, and whose narratives remained unaltered. This statistical analysis provides some insight into why some narratives stay, even though circumstances change. Finally, Section 7 discusses the implications of these narratives on the conflict minerals regulation process in the European Union. The final section concludes by drawing parallels to other sectors in the area of international cooperation, where claims of unintended effects have also potentially been exaggerated.

2. Conflict minerals and legislation

2.1. Minerals and conflict in the DRC

DRC played a globally significant role in the world's production of cobalt, copper, diamond, tantalum, and tin. In 2014, the country's share of the world's mined cobalt production amounted to 51%; tantalum, 17%; diamond, 13%; copper, 6%. Congo accounts for about 47% of the world's cobalt reserves (United States Geological Survey, 2014). Minerals are very important to the DRC: 95% of the export earnings are from its exports, and it contributes to 28% of government revenue (Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, 2017). It employs 11% of the formal labour force, but in addition to that hundreds of thousands of people are working on informal mine sites (IPIS Research, 2016).

Minerals from the three Eastern provinces North-Kivu, South-Kivu and Maniema are often referred to as conflict minerals. Most often it concerns the ‘3 T+G’, meaning Tin, Tantalum and Tungsten and Gold. Something is considered a conflict mineral if the extraction and trade contributes to conflict or human rights abuses, for instance through the financing of armed groups. In the DRC from 1996 onwards, many rebel groups were indeed profiting from the trade in natural resources. An International Peace Information Service (IPIS) study executed in 2009 and 2010 found that in 56% of the 3 T+G mines, armed forces (either rebels or from the government) were present (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2015).

Also in other parts of the world minerals have contributed to conflict, such as gold in Colombia and Jade in Myanmar, and prior to this diamonds in Angola and Liberia. However, this article focuses on the aforementioned Dodd-Frank Act, focusing exclusively on the DRC and surrounding countries, and on 3 T+G. (Fig. 1)

2.2. The Dodd-Frank act - article 1502

During the financial crisis of 2008–2010, the Obama administration sought to develop extra regulation to reduce the risks in the financial sector, and it developed the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010. As part of this wider regulation, one article, article 1502, was inserted with respect to conflict minerals originating from the DRC. This was done after intense lobbying by Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). Article 1502 obliges stock listed companies in the United States to declare which due diligence they exercised to prevent Tin, Tungsten, Tantalite and Gold (3TG) in their supply chain from contributing to conflict in the Great Lakes region of Africa. The focus in this paper is on Article 1502 of the Dodd-Frank legislation, as it was the first of its type, and had an enormous impact on the way in which minerals are being exploited and exported in the DRC (Bashwira, 2017; Radley and Vogel, 2015; Vogel and Raeymaekers, 2016; Wakenge, 2017). In addition, it has stimulated other jurisdictions, notably the Chinese chamber of commerce (CCCCMC) and the European Union, to develop similar initiatives and legislation (Chinese Chamber of Commerce of Metals, 2016; European Commission, 2017).

Fig. 2 presents a timeline of the Dodd-Frank act implementation. Above the arrow, major moments in the implementation of the Dodd-Frank act in the United States are mentioned. Below the arrow the regulatory changes in the DRC, as well as the main changes in the operational environment in DRC are highlighted. Some relevant elements to note are that the DRC government adopted an export ban on minerals from North & South Kivu and Maniema, before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) approved the final rules. Other elements of note are that there was not a functioning traceability scheme active in North and South Kivu and Maniema when the export ban was lifted. A last pertinent element is that the review process of the SEC started just after all the traceability schemes were up and running.

3. Methodology

To analyse potential unintended effects of the Dodd-Frank act in the DRC, a systematic literature review was performed with respect to the term ‘unintended effects’ and ‘Dodd Frank Act’ (section 4.2). Within the systematic review, a snowball method was used, in which relevant references (which did not appear in the initial search) cited in articles could still be pursued. A total of 12 texts were analysed and this led to a list of five unintended effects. These unintended effects were classified according to the existing dimensions of typologies. The existing dimensions didn’t include references to one of the encountered unintended effects: the exaggerated unintended effect.

To identify the two dominant narratives (Section 5), an analysis of the non-academic literature was executed, focused on major international English language journals and magazines, such as the New York Times, Foreign Policy and the Washington Post. To juxtapose the narratives as laid down in those premium outlets to the developments in the DRC, primary data on actual mineral exports and military and rebel activity were gathered from the Congolese Ministry of Mines and independent research institutes, such as IPIS Research in Belgium.

To perform a quantitative analysis (Section 6) on who is driving the narrative of unintended effects, all the comments that the SEC received when it launched the public consultation in early 2017 were reviewed. A total of 281 comments were received during the consultation period. To analyse an evolution in the narratives of key actors over time, where possible, their comments from different years were compared to each other.

4. Academic literature review of unintended effects

Table 1 describes six different dimensions that are commonly used to classify unintended effects. The last row of the table indicates the dimension that this article adds. The last column provides an overview of the findings of the academic literature review on the unintended effects of the Dodd-Frank act. More information on those studies can be found in Annex 1.

12 academic studies dealing with unintended effects of the Dodd-Frank act in the DRC were encountered and analysed. A first unintended effect that surfaced related to increased human rights violations, such as looting in the minerals trade (2 documents focused on this). Secondly, one paper mentioned the unintended effect of section 1502 on gender relations, and noted that it had a negative unintended effect on women in mining. A third unintended effect related to smuggling and the black-economy: section 1502 is allegedly stimulating more of both (1 document). A fourth unintended effect surfaced in the more
recent literature, which focused on the unintended effects of the traceability schemes, which has led to ‘dispossession’ of artisanal and small-scale miners (ASM) (1 document). One of the studies is the odd one out and focuses on how some authors have misrepresented unintended effects (1 document). Half of all the papers dealt with the de facto embargo of DRC minerals (6 documents). Of these, four papers highlighted the de facto embargo of minerals from the DRC as an unintended effect. An additional two papers explored the impact of this unintended de facto embargo, e.g., increased mortality and school drop-outs. We therefore decided to focus the remainder of our analysis on this particular unintended effect.

A last dimension of the typology that emerges from the reviewed literature, but was not captured in the first six dimensions of unintended effects that are normally used, is the ‘exaggerated unintended effect’. Salter and Mthembu-Salter (2017) argue in their working paper that in Vogel and Raeymaekers (2016) the negative unintended effects of the embargo are actually out of context. In a complete and impartial analysis, the authors should have included the unintended effects on other resources, such as gold, other provinces, such as Katanga, and more recent data (such as from 2014 and 2015). If these data had been taken into consideration by Vogel and Raeymaekers, the negative unintended effects would have been much smaller and more proportionate, according to Salter and Mthembu-Salter. Section 6.3 will focus on the question of the current size of the unintended effects of this de facto embargo.

5. Competing narratives on unintended effects of conflict minerals legislation

The literature review clearly shows that references to different types of unintended effects of the Dodd-Frank act section 1502 in the DRC are manifold. The academic literature review indicated that in the debate on unintended effects of this particular section one element stood out: the de facto embargo. Whereas some presented this as a widespread and ongoing phenomenon, others (e.g., Salter & Mthembu-Salter) argued that this was ‘out of context’. Hence, this section focuses on the narratives of unintended effects with respect to the de facto embargo and distinguishes two competing narratives.
Table 1
Overview of academic literature focusing on unintended effects of Dodd-Frank act.
Sources for dimensions: (Baert, 1991; Portes, 2000; Zwart (2015). Sources for Dodd-Frank literature in Annex 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimensions</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
<th>Findings in 12 studies on unintended effects of Dodd-Frank act</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Traditional Dimensions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Degree of (un)intentionality</td>
<td>Unintended effects can actually be intended, but policy makers can claim it was an accident</td>
<td>No examples found intended unintended effects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Degree of (un)anticipation</td>
<td>Unintended effects can be foreseen, but if their impact is less and the probability low, the action might still go ahead</td>
<td>Seay (2015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Value (positive / negative)</td>
<td>Unintended effects can also be positive</td>
<td>No examples found of the positive unintended effects in the literature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Affecting whom (target group or spill over effects)</td>
<td>Unintended effects can be both on the target group or spill over beyond the target group</td>
<td>None of the studies focused on the target group of the legislation: the armed groups. They all focused on spill-over effects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Degree of avoidability</td>
<td>Unavoidable unintended effects can be collateral damage. Since they are bound to happen, they are also referred to as double effects</td>
<td>Seay (2015) argues as the only one that the negative unintended effects could have been avoided</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Relationship to original objective</td>
<td>If the size of the unintended effect is small and it goes in the opposite direction, it is a drawback effect. If the size of the unintended effect is larger than the intended effect and goes in the opposite direction, it is called a perverse effect.</td>
<td>Wolkenge (2017) argues that there are drawback effects. Parker, D., &amp; Vadheim, B. (2017) notice perverse effects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>New additional proposed dimension in this article</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Level of exaggeration</td>
<td>Unintended effects in all likelihood smaller than presented or less certain than presented</td>
<td>Salter and Mhembu-Salter (2017)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.1. The dominant narrative: a de facto and ongoing embargo hurting the population

Public discussion on the unintended effects of Dodd-Frank seems to have been launched in earnest by a 2011 op-ed in The New York Times entitled ‘How Congress Devastated Congo’ by David Aronson, an independent writer and scholar who had focused on eastern Congo for 25 years. Aronson (2011) stressed the unintended and devastating consequences of the act and stipulated how the law has brought about a de facto embargo on the minerals mined in the region.

A narrative, such as that of Aronson, can only become dominant if it is legitimised; the legitimisation process often involves supposedly neutral players, such as scientists (Boden and Epstein, 2006). They provide the ‘value free intelligence’ that is used to substantiate claims. This process of legitimization is precisely what happened with the narrative of the unintended de facto embargo. Both scientists, journalists and lobby organisations started to use this narrative starting in 2014 with a public letter being published. The open letter claimed the following: ‘As a result, the conflict minerals movement has yet to lead to meaningful improvement on the ground, and has had a number of unintended and damaging consequences’ (Tegera et al., 2014). Even though the letter was the initiative of two researchers who published more details on this (Ratcliffe and Vogel, 2015), it was signed by more than 60 academics, including Congolese scholars. International media, such as Foreign Policy (How Dodd-Frank is failing Congo, 2015) and the Washington Post (How a well-intentioned U.S. law left Congolese miners jobless, 2014) started referring to the letter in their stories. Increasingly, also lobby-organisations started to make use of this dominant narrative in their letters. The submission of the National Association of Electrical Distributors (NAED, 2017) provides a typical example (submitted in a letter to the SEC):

4. Sec. 1502 harms the people it is meant to protect

[…] This regulation disproportionately harms all of the DRC while doing little to combat the violence caused by the militia…Rescinding this rule and allowing Congress and the Executive to develop better policies to this problem is the ultimate solution (NAED, 2017; italics added by authors).

5.2. The alternative narrative: the de facto embargo was intended and is over

There was also a counter-narrative on the unintended effects of the Dodd-Frank act. The academics and organisations holding to this narrative did not deny that the de facto embargo that Aronson saw in 2011 actually existed. They did however argue that this de facto embargo was anticipated and maybe even necessary in order to flush out the rebels and that this was hence a deliberate choice of the government of the DRC. Without ignoring the unintended effect resulting from this embargo, contrary to the dominant narrative, in this alternative narrative these unintended effects are no longer considered to be substantially present.

In response to the open letter with the dominant narrative, a rebuttal letter was written. The rebuttal letter, to which many local researchers were also associated (Bahala et al., 2014; Viso, 2014), argued the opposite: ‘Today, more than 72,000 artisanal, small-scale miners in the Congo countryside and Africa’s mineral-rich Great Lakes Region are back at work; can access a legal market for the tin, tantalum and tungsten that go into our smartphones, tablets and other gadgets; and enjoy a growing freedom from fear and violence’.

Is this alternative narrative downplaying the negative unintended effects? This question will be dealt with in Section 5.3 in which both narratives are critically analysed in light of actual developments in the DRC. This critical analysis of how the dominant narrative might have taken certain elements ‘out of context’ will focus on the key area of disagreement between the two narratives: the duration and scope of the de facto embargo and its effects on the local population.

5.3. A changing situation in the DRC, but a fixed dominant narrative

One of the main and independent data sources on mining in the DRC is IPIS research. This is an Antwerp (Belgium) based institute and it has been monitoring rebel and military involvement in Congolese mining sites since 2009. IPIS found in their 2009/2010 survey that 56% of the mining sites for tin, tungsten and tantalum were under the influence of armed actors whereas the 2013–2015 survey found that only 21% of artisanal miners worked under the influence of armed actors. For the gold sector, however, no such decrease was noted.

Three major changes took place that had a profound effect on the degree to which the de-facto boycott persisted. First, the number of smelters with functional audit schemes increased significantly; this meant that these smelters could source from the DRC region and still be in compliance with the Dodd-Frank Act. Second, the number of mining sites in the DRC that were certified, and thus had legal exports, continued to rise. Last, and consequently, the exports continued to increase (Ministère de Mines, 2016).
What are the exact figures? Within the Conflict Free Sourcing Initiative’s Conflict-Free Smelter Program, more than 40 smelters now source responsibly from the covered countries, contributing to local economic and social stability (Conflict Free Smelter Program, 2017). This increase was possibly due to an increase in independently validated conflict-free mine sites in the DRC Region (from zero in 2010 to nearly 383 in 2016) (Ministère de Mines & Coopération Allemande, 2016). This is also reflected in the export statistics: more T3s are exported in a legal way from the troubled provinces of Maniema, North-Kivu, and South-Kivu. Virtually all metals and minerals are exported with the iTSCi mechanism (a new traceability system), so this provides a reliable picture. Unfortunately, no reliable data broken down per province prior to 2011 exist. The year 2016 was the first year that more materials were exported from the three troubled provinces than from the Katanga region. Fig. 3 demonstrates that the number of (3 T) minerals from the eastern provinces in the DRC has been increasing steadily since 2011, and that for the Katanga province there was never a boycott. While the data for exports of the DRC are often patchy, their recent increase is not contested. However, higher exports do not often translate automatically to better livelihoods since the price they receive for minerals is determined largely by the international market price, which has been fluctuating.

Two influential studies question the veracity of the alternative narrative and argue that the embargo on the livelihoods of the Congolese is devastating (Parker et al., 2017; Parker and Vadheim, 2017). Interestingly, the data for both of these studies stem from the immediate post-Dodd-Frank era ending in 2012, even though their articles were published in 2017. These articles were often used by those substantiating the claims that the boycott was still ongoing and the unintended effects still prevailing even though the data used in the articles related to 2010 and 2011 and not to 2015 and 2016. Data from 2015 and 2016, as depicted in Fig. 3, shed a more positive light on the developments.

In sum, whereas the alternative narrative appears to have evolved together with the changes on the ground, the dominant narrative does not take into account that the effects of the de facto embargo are persisting. The statement made by the chair of the SEC, who claimed in 2017 that unintended consequences are washing over the Democratic Republic of the Congo and surrounding areas, thus appears exaggerated in light of these statistics.

While the narrative of the unintended embargo effects might have been exaggerated in 2017, the literature review shows that indeed there were serious unintended effects of the legislation. The design of article 1502, with its limited geographic focus, its focus on desiring companies to be totally conflict free contributed to aggravating these unintended effects. Section 7.1 explains what the EU has done to anticipate these unintended effects.

6. The drivers of the narrative

6.1. A qualitative analysis: changing narratives for some, but not for others

The previous section clearly shows that the dominant narrative refrains from including some important changes taking place on the ground in the DRC. We now analyse the continuities and discontinuities in the narrative of unintended effects of specific groups and individuals. To enable this analysis, the narrative of a couple of actors who have provided on multiple occasions submissions to the American regulatory body, the SEC, were analysed. The SEC was the regulation body that was entrusted with the task of implementing the Dodd-Frank article 1502. At various points it has organised public consultations, enabling an analysis of the narratives over time.

The Congolese Minister of Mines, Mr. Martin Kabwelulu, wrote letters to the SEC in both 2011 (Kabweulu, 2011) and 2017 (Kabweulu, 2017). In the first letter, there was a strong sentiment that the law should be postponed and modified because of its unintended effects. However, in the second letter, a different tone was struck. He was pleased to inform the SEC that Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act provides an opportunity break the link between recurring conflicts, the production and trade in minerals in the Democratic Republic of Congo, as well as to foster the responsible commitment of companies operating in or outside the Democratic Republic of Congo. No further mention of the original unintended effects was made; a frameshift seems to have taken place for the DRC government.

A similar change in narrative was found in the narrative of one of the leaders of the NGOs in South Kivu, Eric Kayembe, director of the Observatoire de Bonne Gouvernance. In 2014, he signed the ‘open letter’ which stipulated that the Dodd-Frank Act had unintended and damaging consequences. In 2017, he signed the letter of the civil society of Sud-Kivu to the SEC stating that the civil society organisations of South Kivu were convinced that suspending Section 1502 would undoubtedly lead to conflict minerals infiltrating the supply chain with devastating effects. While there were unintended effects, they had been overcome.

Researchers Mitchell and Garrett (2009) also changed their narrative of unintended effects. In 2009, they stipulated clearly that there was a clear risk of unintended effects: ‘A ban on, whether intended or unintended, or a disruption of the present economies of Eastern DRC risks creating additional violence rather than reducing it, including violence against the ordinary miners who depend on the activity to survive’ (Mitchell and Garrett, 2009). However, these contributors’ language in their 2017 submission had evolved from scepticism on the potential impact of section 1502 of the Dodd Frank act on conflict dynamics in the region into a conviction that the act resulted in increased transparency in mineral supply chains and in doing so provided much needed insight into the structures which enable extreme poverty, child- and forced labour and human rights abuse, including conflict (Mitchell and Garrett, 2017).

However, there are also those parties whose collective action frame has remained markedly similar over time. For instance, the IPC (Association Connecting Electronics Industries) had a similar narrative in their contributions on the negative unintended effects for the local population in both 2011 and 2017 (IPC, 2011; IPC, 2017). They were the ones who cited in their 2017 contributions the articles by Parker et al. (2017) and Parker and Vadheim (2017), which used outdated data, to claim that the unintended effects were still ongoing. The quantitative analysis that will follow in the next section will be used to determine if the outcomes of this qualitative review, namely that especially companies who would gain from deregulation stick to an outdated narrative, hold.

6.2. A quantitative analysis of the drivers of the narrative

This section analyses which type of actor was pushing which...
After this classification, an analysis was performed to determine whether the organisations made use of unintended effects in their narrative. For 40% of them this was the case. This group was then analysed in detail to determine how they referred to unintended effects. To determine if proponents of deregulation pronounced themselves significantly differently with respect to unintended effects, two-tailed T-tests assuming equal variances were executed. A full overview of all the comments that were included in the analysis, as well as how they were classified, can be found in Appendix 2.

Table 2 indicates that companies that have an interest in deregulation referred to the unintended effects of the legislation in 48% of the submissions, whereas NGOs and other stakeholders did so only in 27% of the cases. This difference is significant at the 5% level.\(^5\)

Table 3 provides some very interesting insights into what the various organisations mentioned, or did not mention, when they discussed the unintended effects of the regulation. Of the 20 companies and industry associations that referred to unintended effects, 80% did not mention the fact that the de-facto embargo is over or petering down. For the NGOs and the others (banks, governments), this was only 33%. In the majority of their comments, it was made clear that unintended effects have existed in the past, but that this is no longer the case. It is not clear why 33% of the remaining NGOs and others didn’t incorporate recent changes in their narrative. The two-tailed T-test of difference showed that this was significant at the 1% level.

The main finding from this analysis is that entities that stand to benefit from a certain frame (in this case the dominant unintended effects discourse) tended to support the dominant narrative. Even though the facts on the ground change, they will aim to maintain the status quo of the dominant narrative, if that suits their interest. Interestingly, of the six companies that are benefitting from the Dodd-Frank Act, five noted unintended effects. None of those five companies failed to mention that the de-facto boycott was over and hence supported the alternative narrative. This seems to corroborate the finding that on average organisations that can benefit from a narrative on unintended effects use it.\(^6\)

This article does not argue that all narratives of all organisations are uniquely driven by their interests. As Section 6.1 demonstrates, actors that do not have a financial interest in either regulation or deregulation have evolved in their narrative over time, which might indicate that there is a space for genuine learning.\(^7\) This article is neither of the opinion that only those in favour of deregulation are making use of exaggerated narratives. Seay (Seay, 2015) has focused her analyses on those that were seeking the regulation and shows that they been in other organisations, such as governments and banks. All individual comments were removed from the sample, which means that the comments of 95 organisations remained and could be analysed. The submissions varied between one page and 31 pages. The average comment length was 3.9 pages; there were some differences between parties, with the six companies benefitting from the regulations writing somewhat longer submissions (5.7 pages) and the NGOs and other categories somewhat shorter submissions (3.5 pages). Companies and industry associations scored closest to the average, with 4.0 pages on average. This is important to note; potential omissions on new development in the DRC in submissions cannot hence be attributed to shorter contributions in general.

As a second step, the 281 individuals and organisations were classified in seven different categories: (1) businesses using 3 T + G in their supply chains; (2) business associations of businesses using 3 T + G in their supply chains; (3) businesses earning income with the conflict minerals regulation; (4) Western NGOs; (5) Congolese NGOs; (6) individuals; and (7) other organisations, such as governments and banks. All individual comments were removed from the sample, which means that the comments of 95 organisations remained and could be analysed. The submissions varied between one page and 31 pages. The average comment length was 3.9 pages; there were some differences between parties, with the six companies benefitting from the regulations writing somewhat longer submissions (5.7 pages) and the NGOs and other categories somewhat shorter submissions (3.5 pages). Companies and industry associations scored closest to the average, with 4.0 pages on average. This is important to note; potential omissions on new development in the DRC in submissions cannot hence be attributed to shorter contributions in general.

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As a second step, groups 1 and 2 (business and business associations using 3 T + G) in their supply chain were grouped together. Both these actors would gain from a continuation of the current dominant narrative as the unintended effects in the dominant narrative are so sizeable that they overshadow the positive effects, and therefore the regulation ought to be dropped. This deregulation would reduce their reporting burden and audit costs, so they would benefit from it. The other actors were also grouped together (Western NGOs, Congolese NGOs, other organisations, such as governments and banks) as they would neither gain nor lose financially from deregulation. The third group, the group of business that earns money from the conflict minerals legislation was too small to be a stand-alone group in the statistical analysis (N = 6), but could neither be merged with the first grouping (business that would benefit from deregulation), nor with the second grouping (organisations financially neutral to deregulation). For illustrative purposes they will be mentioned separately in the analysis.

**Table 2**

Analysis of occurrence of unintended effects.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number of organisations</th>
<th>Average number of pages of comments</th>
<th>Mention of unintended effects</th>
<th>P(T &lt; = t) two-tailed (on mention of unintended effects)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Firms using 3 T + G &amp; industry associations</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>0.043**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs (Western and Congolese) &amp; other</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>3.53</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{**}\) denotes significance at the 5% level

\(^{***}\) denotes significance at the 1% level

narrative (the dominant narrative, or the counter narrative) and tests if this might happen because some actors stand to gain from the continuation of the existing narrative. We focused on the unintended effects of the de facto embargo as this was the one that was most prominently featured in the academic literature (see Section 5).

To be able to undertake a quantitative analysis of the discourses, the case study considers all the comments that the SEC received when it launched a public consultation on section 1502 of the Dodd Frank act in early 2017. A total of 281 comments were received during the consultation period, which lasted from 1 February to 24 March, 2017.

As a first step, the 281 individuals and organisations were classified into seven different categories: (1) businesses using 3 T+G in their supply chains; (2) business associations of businesses using 3 T+G in their supply chains; (3) businesses earning income with the conflict minerals regulation; (4) Western NGOs; (5) Congolese NGOs; (6) individuals; and (7) other organisations, such as governments and banks. All individual comments were removed from the sample, which means that the comments of 95 organisations remained and could be analysed. The submissions varied between one page and 31 pages. The average comment length was 3.9 pages; there were some differences between parties, with the six companies benefitting from the regulations writing somewhat longer submissions (5.7 pages) and the NGOs and other categories somewhat shorter submissions (3.5 pages). Companies and industry associations scored closest to the average, with 4.0 pages on average. This is important to note; potential omissions on new development in the DRC in submissions cannot hence be attributed to shorter contributions in general.

As a second step, groups 1 and 2 (business and business associations using 3 T+G) in their supply chain were grouped together. Both these actors would gain from a continuation of the current dominant narrative as the unintended effects in the dominant narrative are so sizeable that they overshadow the positive effects, and therefore the regulation ought to be dropped. This deregulation would reduce their reporting burden and audit costs, so they would benefit from it. The other actors were also grouped together (Western NGOs, Congolese NGOs, other organisations, such as governments and banks) as they would neither gain nor lose financially from deregulation. The third group, the group of business that earns money from the conflict minerals legislation was too small to be a stand-alone group in the statistical analysis (N = 6), but could neither be merged with the first grouping (business that would benefit from deregulation), nor with the second grouping (organisations financially neutral to deregulation). For illustrative purposes they will be mentioned separately in the analysis.

**Table 3**

Analysis of unintended effect of the ‘de facto embargo’.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Omitting changes in the DRC</th>
<th>P(T &lt; = t) two-tailed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Firms using 3 T + G &amp; industry associations &amp; mentioning unintended effects</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>0.007**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs (Western and Congolese) &amp; others &amp; mentioning unintended effects</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{**}\) denotes significance at the 1% level

5 Interestingly, the companies that are benefitting from this regulation, such as those involved in supply chain due diligence consultation, referred in two-thirds of the cases to the unintended effects of the legislation.

6 A robustness check that was executed was to split up the sample of NGOs into two subgroups: Western NGOs and Congolese NGOs: 24 NGOs belonged to the former category and eight to the latter. This was a useful extra check, as there might be a difference of opinion between the two, with the former group being more interested in cutting the trade in conflict minerals, and the latter more interested in stimulating responsible mineral extraction (Radley, 2016). However, an analysis of the narratives on unintended effects in their comments did not display any major differences; their answers were markedly similar.

7 We would like to thank an anonymous referee for this contribution.
certain instances engaged in ‘policy-based evidence making’. She argues that a predetermined narrative overrode evidence contrary to the narrative’s claim.

7. Discussion: Consequences and broader implications

The discussion focuses on two questions. Firstly: what were the repercussions of this dominant narrative on unintended effects for other legislative efforts in the field of conflict minerals, especially the EU conflict minerals rule, which was finally adopted in May 2017? Secondly, does the usage of exaggerated unintended effects only exist with respect to the conflict minerals regulation, or is this a broader phenomenon?

7.1. Consequences of exaggerated unintended effects narrative in conflict minerals

This section will demonstrate how the narratives of the unintended effects were important in shaping the regulation on conflict minerals in the EU. This section will first demonstrate how various parties aimed to influence the negotiation process by making use of the alleged unintended effects of the Dodd-Frank act.

In October 2010, the European Parliament passed a resolution calling for the EU to legislate along the lines of the US ‘conflict minerals’ law; and subsequently the European Commission announced its intention to explore ways of improving due diligence throughout supply chains (European Commission, 2011). It took a period of 6 years before the final ‘conflict mineral’ regulation was adopted by the European Parliament and by the European Council in May 2017 (regulation 2017/821) (Official Journal of the European Union, 2017)⁸.

In a forward-looking impact analysis of the proposed measure of the European regulation the authors noted that ‘the US DFA has created an incentive to avoid sourcing from that region, and in particular from DRC. Sourcing outside the region is therefore a low-cost and a low-risk business decision […]. The probably unintended result is that DRC minerals continue to be exported, yet informally and at very low prices, to countries from which sourcing is considered conflict free’ (European Commission, 2014a; p.29). Hence the EU regulators were keenly aware of the potential negative unintended effects. Therefore, the Oeko Institute, which was asked to perform an analysis of the Dodd-Frank act to prepare the EU regulation argued that the European Union had the opportunity to develop an alternative approach effectively contributing to stabilising the DR Congo while avoiding unintended and adverse side-effects on legitimate economic activities and people’s livelihood in the region (Oeko Institute, 2014).

Taking into consideration the lessons learned of the Dodd Frank act, the initial proposal of the European Commission of 2014 differed from the Dodd-Frank act in three aspects. Firstly, it chose a global geographic scope, so as to avoid one particular region being boycotted. It focused on all ‘conflict affected and high risk areas’. Secondly, it opted for a risk based approach. Thus, companies would not be asked to claim that their products were ‘conflict free’, but they needed to show that they had a due diligence system in place in line with the OECD Due Diligence guidance on mineral trade from conflict affected and high risk areas. Lastly, they proposed a voluntary self-certification approach. By not making it mandatory for importers, this de facto embargo effect was sought to be avoided (European Commission, 2014b).

After this initial proposal, various parties shared their views on the unintended effects, including the IPC, the electronics lobby association. The IPC, which had not updated their narrative, argued that the de facto boycott was unabatedly ongoing, despite the rise in exports from the DRC as demonstrated in Fig. 3. They supported the voluntary approach to avoid unintended effects as experienced in the DRC as a result of the Dodd Frank act (IPC, 2015).

Also those who supported the counter narrative made their voices heard. EURAC, the European Network for Central Africa, for example, argued that the regulation ought to be mandatory stating that despite the negative economic consequences the de facto embargo has had, it has also led to decreased revenue for the armed groups and an improved security situation for certain mining sites. Also more companies are back sourcing from the DRC after their initial withdrawal (EURAC, 2014).

In the end, after long negotiations between the European Council, the European Parliament and the Commission, the first two signature elements of the EU version of the conflict minerals rules stayed intact (global scope and no obligation to declare imports ‘conflict free’). With respect to the voluntary vs. mandatory nature of the regulation, a compromise was reached. It was decided that for some actors (the importers) the regulation would be mandatory, whereas for the downstream, e.g. electronics firms operating at the consumer end of the supply chain, users it would be voluntary. In reaching this compromise, negotiators from all sides regularly used the competing narratives on unintended effects (e.g. Ploumen, 2014).

The EU conflict minerals regulation process provides an interesting insight into how to potentially attenuate negative unintended effects, especially ‘stigmatisation effects’. The de-facto embargo is one of those stigmatisation effects. Instead of singling out a specific country or region, such as the DRC, it gave the regulation a global scope, reducing the potential for stigmatisation.

7.2. Broader implications of exaggerated unintended effects narratives

This section will highlight that the discussion on unintended effects, and their alleged exaggeration, is also occurring in other domains of international cooperation.

The narrative of unintended effects of public action has been a pervasive one, and has been used in a variety of domains to argue for a roll-back of regulation or other forms of collective action. An interesting example has been provided by the 2015 Nobel-prize economics laureate Sir Angus Stewart Deaton. He is of the opinion that unintended effects of international aid on the quality of governance are so great that aid should be reduced as soon as possible (Deaton, 2014). A detailed meta-analysis on the unintended effects of aid on governance, however, has shown that the unintended effects Sir Deaton referred to were exaggerated (Dijkstra, 2017). The findings of this article, namely that special interests might contribute to this exaggeration, can stimulate authors to further research the reasons why unintended effects were overdrawn in their case.

Within the international migration debate, discussion of unintended effects occasionally takes centre stage. For instance, unintended effects resulting from migrant rescue operations in the Mediterranean Sea, undertaken by both European military organisations and NGOs, have been considered to be responsible for an increased number of migrants. The Search and Rescue operations were thought to lead to a change in tactics by the smugglers fuelled by moral hazard. However, as a result smugglers switched to mainly placing people on unseaworthy dinghies and had to be rescued by European navies, coast guards and NGOs — thereby facilitating the work of the smugglers’. As a result, more migrants are drowning and fewer smugglers are caught than before. It is therefore argued that this collective action has to stop (European Political Strategy Centre, 2017).

However, researchers from the University of London reach exactly the opposite conclusion and argue that the unintended effects of the Search and Rescue operations are exaggerated (Heller and Pezzani, 2017). They conclude that the Search and Rescue operations should hence continue. Heller & Penanzi go one step further in their analysis than Dijkstra and explain that the exaggeration of unintended effects

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⁸ The full name is ‘regulation laying down supply chain due diligence obligations for Union importers of tin, tantalum and tungsten, their ores, and gold originating from conflict-affected and high-risk areas’.
was driven by a desire to keep out of the spotlight and justify the failure of the “solutions” that EU actors had proposed in the wake of the April 2015 shipwrecks; the SARs by NGOs were an easy scapegoat. The extra attention developed in this article could enable authors such as Heller & Penanzi to link their findings with respect to migration to the broader literature of exaggerated unintended effects.

It is not just in the field of conflict minerals regulation that unintended effects play a role, but also in various topical debates in international relations (Burlyuk, 2017). Yet, the possibility that some of these unintended effects might be exaggerated has hardly been part of the literature. The dimension of exaggerated unintended effects developed in this article facilitates a further analysis into the drivers of this narrative. Instead of noting that unintended effects might have been exaggerated and stop there, scholars of unintended effects are now invited to analyse what interests push scholars or policy makers to reach these conclusions.

8. Conclusion

This paper has established that organisations are promoting narratives on unintended effects of regulation without conveying the full story. In an official submission to the SEC in 2017 80% of the businesses using minerals or representing those companies claimed that because of the Dodd-Frank Act there still is a de-facto boycott of minerals from the Congo case study, with delays in implementing traceability schemes, with lack of reliable data, and lack of easy access to the affected sites, it might not be surprising that deregulation was needed. By doing so they hoped to reduce the compliance costs, which are estimated at 200 million USD per year (Geenen, 2017).

Therefore, this paper argues that there might be a need to add the ‘exaggerated unintended effect’ to the existing dimensions of unintended effects. Especially in an era with both a strong push for deregulation, it is important to critically assess who propagates a certain narrative and if this push is driven by a particular agenda. The article hence suggests that policy makers, journalists and researchers critically examine claims of unintended effects, before reproducing them.

Appendix A. Supporting information

Supplementary data associated with this article can be found in the online version at dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.resourpol.2018.03.011.

References