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The relevance of Foucauldian art-of-living for ethics education in a military context: Theory and practice

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\section*{ABSTRACT}
How can ethical decision-making in organizations be further reinforced? This article explores the relevance of Michel Foucault’s ideas on art-of-living for ethics education in organizations. First, we present a theoretical analysis of art-of-living in the work of Foucault as well as in the work of two philosophers who greatly influenced his work, Friedrich Nietzsche and Pierre Hadot. Next, we illustrate how art-of-living can be applied in ethics education. In order to examine some of the benefits and challenges of applying the art-of-living in the practice of ethics education, we discuss an example of how the art-of-living concept has been used in a train-the-trainer course on military ethics. We suggest that Foucauldian art-of-living may foster awareness of power dynamics which are in play when military personnel face moral dilemmas.

\section*{1. Introduction}
Ethics education in organizations is not limited to teaching ethical theory such as deontology and utilitarianism (Crane, 2008). It includes, for example, attention to pragmatism (Rorty, 2006; Rosenthal & Buchholz, 2000), Habermasian discourse ethics (Metselaar & Widdershoven, 2015; Rudnick, 2007; Scherer & Palazzo, 2007), dialogical ethics (Molewijk, Verkerk, Milius, & Widdershoven, 2008), moral imagination (Werhane & Gorman 2005), narrative ethics (Nelson, 2014; Wilks, 2005) and virtue ethics (Moore, 2005; Olsthoorn, 2008). These approaches aim to investigate what it means to act in a morally responsible way when faced with a moral dilemma. Yet, the organizational context of moral reflection tends to be neglected and this implies a similar neglect for the consequences thereof. To what extent do organizations affect the ability of individuals to engage in autonomous, critical thinking, to recognize and to actively reflect on practices and moral dilemmas?

Ethics education is important in the armed forces (Baarda & Verweij, 2006; Coleman, 2013; Cook, 2013; Robinson, de Lee, & Carrick, 2008): its core function is ‘to assist
professionals to think through the moral challenges and dilemmas inherent in their professional activity and, by helping members of the profession better understand the ethical demands upon them, to enable and motivate them to act appropriately in the discharge of their professional obligations’ (Cook & Syse, 2010). Yet, when military personnel deal with moral dilemmas, there may be occasions when tensions arise between acting in accordance with personal values and acting as a professional, in this case: ‘a soldier’ (van Baarle, Bosch, Widdershoven, Verweij, & Molewijk, 2015). Elements which can influence this tension in the military organization include: group bonding and loyalty; uniformity; hierarchy; lack of privacy and masculinity. As Martin Cook notes, the ability to recognize that there are ethical aspects worthy of consideration in the situation before us (referred to as ‘ethical sensitivity’) may seem obvious, but this ability is even more important ‘in a military environment where there is so much reliance on Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), and such a strong pressure toward conformity and risk of group-think, this is an aspect of moral development we should perhaps reflect on more deeply’ (Cook, 2013, p. 81). While reflection and fostering self-awareness can be regarded as general aims of ethics education, strived for in many ethics programs, using insights from Foucault can be helpful to raise awareness of the tensions involved in situations of conformity pressures and hierarchy.

This is in line with the work of Thornborrow and Brown (2009) who analyzed paratroopers’ discourse on work identities in a military organization, in an elite military unit. Thornborrow and Brown show how paratroopers are ‘manufactured’ (Thornborrow & Brown, 2009, p. 355). Conceptions of being a paratrooper and the techniques of paratroopers’ production form a tight web of discursive constraint. The idea that paratroopers are professional, elite and macho/combat-ready was, according to the soldiers, ‘manufactured’ in three principal ways:

… through ‘rites of becoming’ that restricted entry to the Regiment; storytelling (especially in using Regimental history); and through the maintenance of an informal culture of suspicion and surveillance Thornborrow & Brown, 2009, p. 355.

This raises important questions with regard to the possibility of ethics education within these institutional disciplinary forces. What are the organizational factors that might impact the ability of employees to think for themselves? Are they able to recognize the relevant power relations at stake in moral dilemmas and do they experience the possibility of choice? We will examine Foucault’s suggestions that power relations are always present and produce or manufacture subjects, while at the same time ‘these power relations only seem possible insofar as the subjects are free.’ (Foucault, 1997, p. 292).

Interestingly, for Foucault, this freedom implies ‘the possibility of ethics’ (Foucault, 1997, p. 284) because this freedom involves the opportunity to reflect upon and perhaps modify these power relations.

Several authors claim that Foucault’s theory provides a rich conceptual framework for ethics education in organizational ethics because it frames the employee as an ‘active’ ethical subject who is responsible for his or her own self-creation in contrast to a docile or normalized self-creation and mere obedience to rules and values set forth in a coherent doctrine. It focusses on the importance of a critical attitude to processes of normalization (i.e., judgments about what is considered normal and what is not in a given population) and expert authority, while acknowledging the reality of processes of normalization in organizations (Barratt, 2008; Iedema & Rhodes, 2010; Munro, 2014; Starkey & Hatchuel, 2002). However, Foucault’s work still seems to have had little impact on the actual practice of applied ethics.
education in organizations (Coleman, 2013; Crane & Matten, 2007). Various authors have proposed to formulate organizational ethics in terms of a ‘care of the self’, that requires an active self-disciplined attention of the self to develop and transform oneself, to actively reflect, choose and act upon one's moral compass (Munro, 2014, p. 1127) and new ways of ‘acting and being’ (Ibarra-Colado, Clegg, Rhodes, & Kornberger, 2006; Iedema & Rhodes, 2010; Munro, 2014, p. 1127; Randall & Munro, 2010). The idea that the self can be transformed is one of the most popular themes taken up by management scholars (Kosmala & McKernan, 2011; Loacker & Muhr, 2009; Munro, 2014). Foucauldian art-of-living can be defined as a kind of self-direction and self-development within existing power relations and the ability to learn to think critically. In contrast to ethical codes and pre-determined values, Foucauldian art-of-living requires us ‘to attend effectively to the self, and to exercise and transform oneself’ (Foucault, 1984b, p. 73). Equally, in educational theory, a Foucauldian art-of-living is regarded as relevant and fruitful (Biesta, 1998, 2008; Gunzenhauser, 2007; Infinito, 2003; Nicoll, Fejes, Olson, Dahlstedt, & Biesta, 2013; Pignatelli, 2002). These contributions are, however, mostly theoretical in nature. This article is a theoretical exploration of the possibilities of applying a Foucauldian art-of-living approach in ethics education, reflecting on a Dutch train-the-trainer course on military ethics. What is the relevance of Foucauldian art-of-living for ethics education and does it assist personnel in dealing with concrete moral dilemmas?

The first aim of this article is to better understand Foucauldian ideas on art-of-living and their relevance for ethics education. In order to do so, we focus on the work of Foucault as well as on the work of two philosophers who greatly influenced him, Nietzsche and Hadot (Foucault, 1984c, 1988). After having elaborated on this philosophical foundation, we explore how the ideas of Nietzsche, Foucault and Hadot regarding art-of-living might be applied in education practice. We do so by introducing the train-the-trainer course on military ethics and show how several elements of this course are related to ideas on art-of-living. We focus on fostering awareness as an important element of the course. In the discussion we relate the example to the theory on art-of-living and the practice of ethics education.

2. Art-of-living in the work of Nietzsche, Foucault and Hadot

This section describes art-of-living in the work of Nietzsche, Foucault and Hadot. We start by describing Nietzsche’s concept of Bildung. It provides a background for understanding what Foucault was aiming at with the notion of art-of-living. We subsequently turn to the work of Foucault himself. In order to better understand Foucault's work, it is important to interpret Foucault's early and late works as a critical continuum (Deleuze, 1994). This shows that art-of-living and ‘the relation to oneself’ should be understood in terms of power relations. Finally, we will look at what Hadot identifies as spiritual exercises. Like Nietzsche, the work of Hadot greatly influenced and inspired the work of Foucault. Yet, at the same time, Hadot also criticized Foucault, emphasizing the importance of being part of a community, rather than focusing only on the self. What all three philosophers have in common is their critique on academic philosophy and its inability to address the ‘art-of-living’.

3. Nietzsche's concept of Bildung

About 130 years ago Nietzsche proclaimed the ‘death of God’. This metaphor implies the loss of absolute principles regarding truth and fundamental values. How do we educate
students without the existence of an absolute moral, an absolute measure? Nietzsche's views on Bildung (education and formation) are relevant in this respect. His views on Bildung were presented for the first time in a narrative that formed an integral part of six subsequent lectures at the ‘Academic Society’ in Basel in 1872. We will take a closer look at the most relevant elements in this narrative with regard to both Bildung and the art-of-living.

The story Nietzsche tells is about a conversation between a philosopher and his companion that was overheard by Nietzsche and his friend when they were young students. At first the young students only listened, later on they participated in the conversation that took place on a hill in the woods, during an afternoon and an evening. The setting is interesting, Nietzsche not only meticulously describes the ‘warmth of the sun endlessly mixed with blue autumn freshness’ (Nietzsche, 1981b, p. 180), he also makes clear that he and his friend and the philosopher and his companion all came to this place to discuss philosophical issues. In the case of the two young students this meant becoming philosophers themselves, discussing the existential issues related to their future lives, as Nietzsche points out (Nietzsche, 1981b, p. 184). The narrative presented as a conversation, not only shows the importance of dialogue as a pedagogical instrument for Nietzsche, but also the need for space and time in order to learn to reflect and the inspiration coming from people who can actually teach you something and can thus contribute to your Bildung.

The conversation starts with the philosopher’s critical statements about the ‘pedagogic poverty’ of his time (Nietzsche, 1981b, p. 197). Education at the gymnasium used to be about Bildung and development, however this focus has been lost. The gymnasium educates people for ‘bookishness’ and sometimes not even that. ‘Bookishness is for scholarly people, but a scholarly person is not the same as a developed and bilded person. There is a big difference between the two’ (Nietzsche, 1981b, p. 200). The philosopher points to the sterile study of antiquity by the majority of the scholars and refers to ‘Bookishness’ being a ‘hypertrophic swelling up of an unhealthy body’ (Nietzsche, 1981b, p. 224) and gymnasia as educating for ‘bookish obesity’ (Nietzsche, 1981b, p. 224) and not for humanitarian Bildung as used to be the case.

The philosopher continues that everything is focused on becoming a money earning being and education is focused on realizing this goal as fast as possible. So, what should be done? What is needed? One of the things mentioned is the importance of a naïve, trustful and personal relation to nature. A young person needs to be able to mirror himself in nature; to recognize himself in what he experiences in nature. In this way he will be able to learn to understand the connectedness of all things and reflect on who he is. This is also present in the description of the goal of Bildung as ‘Humanitatsbildung’ (Nietzsche, 1981b, p. 210) which refers to the connectedness to other people.

This idea of Bildung is quite contrary to what modern learning implies, according to the philosopher, namely learning how to manipulate nature. As such, Bildung is the opposite of the calculating, economized attitude towards one’s surroundings. The nature metaphor with regard to Bildung is also present in Nietzsche’s text ‘Schopenhauer als Erzieher’ (Schopenhauer as educator) (Nietzsche, 1981a). Development and Bildung imply freeing a person, which means, as Nietzsche maintains, ‘clearing away the ill weeds and garbage and the worms that corrode the soft core of the plant’ (Nietzsche, 1981a, p. 290). This metaphor of Bildung as care for the young plant is an old Greek metaphor. Care and nourishment form the basis of human flourishing. The more fertile the ground, the better the roots can grow and branch off in all directions, laying a solid basis for flourishing.
The elements that form the metaphor of the plant are explicitly discussed in Nietzsche’s text on Bildung. The importance of inspiration (nourishment) provided by good teachers (philosophers) is underlined, as is the importance of learning to listen and to speak (present one thoughts) and subsequently learn to reflect and think in a critical way, refraining from a too premature judgment. It is made clear that the goal of Bildung is not science, as such, it is the ability to answer the existential questions of one’s own life and practice.

Bildung as education aims at freeing and helping people to flourish in and through connectedness with communities, and nature, of which they are an inalienable part. It implies openness and willingness to learn, acknowledging diversity and difference, which starts with acknowledging the diversity and difference that is in us, within ourselves.

This insight contributes to ethics education based on the art-of-living, for acknowledging diversity and difference in ourselves is a prerequisite for respecting the difference and diversity around us and thus the different values that people can adhere to. Dialogue can be viewed as an important pedagogical tool in achieving this.

On the basis of Nietzsche’s insights with regard to Bildung, we will now focus on the work of Foucault, who introduces several ideas for applying the art-of-living concept in ethics education, that are clearly inspired by Nietzsche.

### 3.1. Foucault on techniques of the self

In his earlier books, *Madness and Civilization* (Foucault, 1965), *the Birth of the Clinic* (Foucault, 1973) and *Discipline and Punish* (Foucault, 1977) Foucault examines how power operates in our society. While we may be inclined to consider power as sovereign, in the hand of the government, and exerted by institutions such as local governments, the police and the Army, Foucault states that complex power relations are always present and are widely exercised and reproduced in institutions. Power relations are implicitly present in disciplining institutions, for instance our educational systems, in hospitals and in psychiatry. These implicit power relations are often not made explicit in laws and the enforcement thereof, yet they construct the subject.

Foucault maintains that, due to these power relations, there is no external referent for certainty or truth. This also holds for the ‘truth’ about the subject that is produced by science. Foucault argues that both truth and the subject are constructed. ‘Human beings are made subjects’ (Foucault, 1982, p. 208). He examines how truth games (a set of rules and procedures by which truth is produced) were set up and how they were connected to power relations, in processes of objectification and categorization. In this context he introduces the term ‘normalization’, which refers to judgments about what is considered normal and what is not in a given population. The term is closely related to another Foucauldian term: ‘disciplinary technology’ which aims at forging a ‘docile body, that subsequently may be subjected, used, transformed and improved’ (Foucault, 1984a, p. 180).

In *Discipline and Punishment*, Foucault introduces the terms normalization and disciplinary technology to show how subjects are produced (Foucault, 1977). His architectural example of the panopticon illustrates that when surveillance is permanent, ‘the perfection of power should render its actual exercise unnecessary’ (Foucault, 1977, p. 200). Accordingly, if participants are disciplined in a similar way, they might be ‘caught up in a power situation of which they are themselves the bearers’ (Foucault, 1977, p. 201).
One of the examples Foucault introduces to illustrate what he means by implicit power relations in disciplining institutions is the example of a soldier:

By the late eighteenth century, the soldier has become something that can be made; out of formless clay, an inapt body, the machine required can be constructed; posture is gradually corrected; a calculated constraint runs slowly through each part of the body, mastering it, making it pliable, ready at all times, turning silently into the automatism of habit. (Foucault, 1984a, p. 179)

Systematic surveillance, classification, hierarchy and military drill or the routinization of actions, are techniques aimed at the formation of a trained, docile body. As such, military personnel are produced, the normalization takes place through the sharing and internalization of explicit and implicit norms during the military socialization process which aims for a perfect fit of military personnel in the military institutions and its culture.

While soldiers are constructed and produced by power relations, the later work of Foucault makes it explicitly clear that due to these power relations there is also space for freedom and therefore for the possibility of ethics:

These power relations are … mobile, reversible, and unstable. It should also be noted that power relations are possible only insofar as the subjects are free. If one of them were completely at the other’s disposal and became his thing, an object on which he could wreak boundless and limitless violence, there wouldn't be any relation of power [but rather a state of domination]. Thus, in order for power relations to come into play, there must be at least a certain degree of freedom on both sides. (Foucault, 1997, p. 292)

In the History of Sexuality (1984b) and in several interviews, Foucault stated that he tried to understand the way in which the human subject fits in these power relations, also referred to as ‘critical activity’ (Foucault, 1984b, p. 336) and ‘games of truth’ (Foucault, 1982, p. 281). Through the work of Hadot, Foucault discovered the importance of the ‘techniques of the self’ in the Greco-Roman world (Foucault, 1984c, p. 342). The concern for the self and care of the self was required to the proper practice of freedom. The Greeks had a specific word to describe this: ‘epimeleiaheautou’, which means working on or being concerned with something (Foucault, 1984c, p. 359). The care of the self is not purely an individual exercise; one always remains part of practices of power and truth games (Foucault, 1997).

One has to attempt to decide how to shape power relations. Power relations sometimes appear to be forms of domination that seem immobile, yet, most of the time these power relations can be modified, influenced or changed by individuals or social groups. Foucault uses the notion of modifying power relations, rather than liberating oneself from power relations (Foucault, 1997). According to Foucault, we have to be careful not to fall back on the idea that there ‘exists a human nature or base that … has been concealed, alienated, or imprisoned in and by mechanisms of repression’ (Foucault, 1997, p.282). In a military context, codes of conduct and underlying military values can be regarded as such power relations. A freedom practice does not exist apart from power relations, but ‘it paves the way for new power relationships’ (Foucault, 1997, p.284). Nevertheless, Foucault acknowledges that liberation is sometimes the political or historic precondition for freedom practices. One needs to be free from certain forms of repression in order to be able to use this freedom in a constructive way. Modifying these power relations, when necessary, Foucault states, is a practice of freedom (Foucault, 1984c). These freedom practices include taking care of the self, an exercise of the self to develop and transform oneself, to actively reflect, choose and act upon one’s moral compass. Foucault suggests that we can create our life by deciding
how to give style to it and make a ‘work of art’ of our own life (Foucault, 1984c, p. 350). However, he does not provide a blueprint with respect to creating these practices nor does he mention explicit values or virtues one should strive for.

If we translate Foucauldian ideas into ethics education, it implies that fostering an ethics of art-of-living should first of all focus on awareness. Education should advocate a way of life in which people become more self-aware (Vintges, 2001). This implies that we discover ourselves in our concrete situation, in other words, we become aware of the power relations which we are part of. Important questions are: What kind of power relations do we recognize, which institutions are involved, what effects do they have? Becoming aware of power relations might enable people to judge, and choose, how to shape these power relations. Instead of being a passive subject, an ‘active subject constitutes itself in an active fashion through practices of the self’ (Foucault, 1997, p. 291). Becoming aware of power relations, underlying values and possibly colliding values does not guarantee moral decision-making. However, it can be viewed as a pre-condition for morally responsible decision-making. Without the awareness of choice, it seems impossible to carry out the techniques of the self, to defend and enlarge the space for freedom-practices within the disciplinary structures in our society at large and within organizations.

Foucault provides several techniques to put the art-of-living into practice. He introduces the importance of walking exercises determining one’s motives, meditation, silence, listening to others and hypomnemata, a copybook or a notebook (Foucault, 1984c, p.363). Writing for oneself and others can function as a means to struggle with defects, such as anger, fear and envy. Following Foucault, ethics education can assist people to work on what Foucault refers to as ‘the relationship with oneself’ (Foucault, 1984c, p. 352).

3.2. Hadot on spiritual exercises and the relationship with oneself

According to Hadot, the relationship with oneself is fostered by ‘spiritual exercises’, which involve all aspects of one’s existence and can lead to a transformation of our ‘vision of the world and a metamorphosis of our personality’ (Hadot, 1995a, p. 83). These exercises, or techniques, include attention, concentration on the present moment, which increases our vigilance; meditation, a mental exercise focusing on, for instance, suffering and death, which allows us to be ready for these circumstances; reading, and taking time to pause, return into ourselves.

For Hadot, the feeling of belonging to a whole is an essential element of these exercises. It implies belonging, both to the whole constituted by the human community and to that constituted by the cosmos (Hadot, 1995b, p. 208). Hadot uses the term ‘spiritual’ to stress the importance of transcending oneself: re-placing oneself with ‘the perspective of the Whole’. One ‘attains self-consciousness, an exact vision of the world, inner peace and freedom’ (Hadot, 1995a, p. 83). Nietzsche also mentions such a trustful and personal relation to nature in order to understand that we are part of it.

Philosophizing should be about learning how to have a dialogue with oneself (meditation) as well as with others. ‘The Socratic dialogue turns out to be a kind of communal spiritual exercise’ (Hadot, 1995a, p. 90), an examination of conscience and of attention to oneself, ‘to know oneself in one’s true moral state, that is to examine one’s conscience’ (Hadot, 1995a, p. 90). As such, a Socratic dialogue provides insight into one’s way of thinking, the values that one holds and the preconceived opinions one might have. We often believe things that,
once we learn to critically think about them, turn out to be incorrect. Following Hadot, a guideline for working on the art-of-living might focus on engaging in these dialogues in order to reflect on our own thinking, the thinking of others and to construct our own moral compass, learning to prioritize values, in order to become ‘the helmsman of our own existence’ (Nietzsche, 1981a).

To summarize, for Nietzsche education should be aimed at Bildung. Bildung is not aimed at bookishness, but at freeing a person, enabling him or her to flourish and learn to think in a critical way; it aims at receptivity for change and acknowledging diversity and difference in oneself and others. Foucault’s work on ethics focuses on the importance of discovering oneself in one’s situation, to gain self-awareness of the power relations one is part of. This may empower people, to consciously choose and prioritize between values. Hadot stresses the importance of being and remaining part of a community and being able to have a dialogue about this with oneself as well as with others.

In the following section we examine how the ideas of these philosophers, with regard to art-of-living, might be applied in practice. We investigate an example from a train-the-trainer course on military ethics and discuss some of the benefits of working with this approach.

2. Case example: Art-of-living in the train-the-trainer course on military ethics

In order to explore how the ideas of Foucault regarding art-of-living as influenced by Nietzsche and Hadot, might be applied in practice, we examine a train-the-trainer course on military ethics. As awareness of power relations is a key element in the work of Foucault we focus on stimulating awareness in this course.

The example is based on notes of the trainers of three different train-the-trainer courses, which are organized by the Faculty of Military Sciences of the Netherlands Defense Academy. We chose an example which shows the relevance of using the concept of art-of-living as a basis for ethics education in this context.

2a. Translating ideas on art-of-living in the train-the-trainer course on military ethics

The train-the-trainer course on military ethics is a nine-day course organized four times a year by the Faculty of Military Sciences of the Netherlands Defense Academy. The course participants are commissioned and non-commissioned officers who already teach military ethics to military personnel or plan to do so in the future. The participants work within the four Dutch armed forces Services (i.e., the Army; the Navy; the Air Force and the Military Police Corps).

The aim of the course is to train participants to become ethics trainers in their own military work environment and at the same time foster their own moral competence. Fostering moral competence is not restricted to the knowledge domain. The willingness to act upon one’s judgement is part of moral competence and shows that it concerns a particular attitude. A distinction to be made here is that between schooling and education. Schooling (in German: ausbildung; in Dutch: opleiden) refers to the teaching and learning of cognitive and practical knowledge, while the central focus of education (in German:
bildung; in Dutch: vorming) is the mastery and internalization of that knowledge (Baarda & Verweij, 2006, p. 11; see also, Wortel & Bosch, 2011).

For the majority of the participants, taking this course is a formal requirement for teaching military ethics at their respective military education establishments within the Netherland’s armed forces. More than half of the group had been asked by their superiors to attend the course, the other participants applied for the course themselves.

The theoretical ethical approach underlying this course has gradually moved from a focus on a virtue ethics approach (Wortel & Bosch, 2011) to a focus on what we would reconstruct as a Foucauldian art-of-living approach to ethics education. There are certainly parallels between a virtue ethics approach and Foucauldian art-of-living approach to ethics education (see for instance, Kekes, 2002), as both approaches focus on character education. However, Foucault’s approach is different from a virtue ethics approach. Foucault emphasizes the role of power relations in practices, whereas virtue ethics stresses the importance of developing excellence in a practice (for instance, being courageous in military combat). Foucault sees the need for awareness of the power relations involved and reflection on moral dilemmas. If we regard the subject as being constructed and produced, as Foucault argues, we have to discover ourselves in our concrete situation and understand how we are constructed in terms of power relations and related values in order to be able to think for ourselves when we are confronted with moral dilemmas. As such, Foucauldian art-of-living approach not only invites participants to reflect on themselves but also to take a critical look at their environment, the norms and structures of the military institution they are part of. A sole focus on character is sometimes regarded as a limitation of a virtue ethics approach since it overlooks the fact that unethical behavior can also be ‘the product of deficiencies in institutions or practices’ (see also, Cook, 2015; Robinson, 2007, p. 31).

During the training, trainers assist participants to practice and discuss freedom practices by encouraging a reflective relation to the ‘here and now’. Ethics courses themselves also imply power relations, a pervasive operation of power associated with disciplinary processes and ultimately moral regulation. It is naive to propose that practices of reflection are separate and different from discursive practices (Gilbert, 2001). With regard to power relations participants are explicitly invited to be co-responsible for the learning process during the training. While ‘training’ in a military context can sometimes be regarded as inducing certain behavior, our concept of training implies an interactive way of education. During so called ‘co-directing sessions’ participants can actively influence the program of the course by reflecting on the training and the group-process. This approach presupposes that trainers are willing to share power, to adapt the course to learning needs of each individual participant, to be transparent in their choices and able to engage in self-reflection.

The content of training is based on theoretical notions on art-of-living by Foucault as influenced by Nietzsche and Hadot. The training includes the following elements:

First, participants of the course are made familiar with a dialogical approach. They are provided with a list of dialogue-guidelines, including: taking time, listening carefully, suspending judgment, asking critical questions that make you and the other person think, thinking ‘with’ the other person, not ‘against’ the other person, analyzing underlying values and not fixating on solutions, and finally reflecting critically on one’s initial opinion, one’s moral intuition, impression and emotion. During several exercises, participants learn to engage in a dialogue with each other by putting these guidelines into practice. This element
is particularly inspired by Hadot’s view that philosophizing is engaging in dialogue with oneself as well as with others.

Secondly, during the course, space is created for ‘counterstories’ (Nelson, 2001, p.1) with regard to the military profession. These stories may include doubt, uncertainty and vulnerability and as such they are not in line with stereotypes of ‘military heroism’ (Thornborrow & Brown, 2009, p. 368). This element of storytelling, recognizing diversity and values in stories, may broaden the discourse, acknowledging diversity and difference with regard to what it means to be a soldier. This element can be seen as a translation of what Nietzsche aims at with Bildung, to foster openness and the willingness to learn, acknowledging diversity and difference, which starts with acknowledging the diversity and difference within ourselves.

Thirdly, a key element of the course is a focus on Socratic thinking. The Socratic dialogue resembles what Nietzsche refers to as Bildung and Hadot as philosophy as a dialogue with oneself as well as with others. One full day is devoted to engaging in a Socratic dialogue, by means of the ‘hourglass model’ method introduced by Jos Kessels (2001), in which participants are first invited to formulate a fundamental ethical question based on their experiences in the military organization (such as ‘What is integrity?’ or ‘What is good leadership?’). This question is examined within the context of a personal, concrete experience of one of the participants (i.e., ‘the case’), in which ‘integrity’ or ‘leadership’ is at stake. Subsequently, the participants develop answers and identify values or principles which are related to the fundamental question and the concrete experience. These values or principles not only apply to this specific experience but may also be valid in a broader sense. The direction within this moral inquiry, from the broad and abstract fundamental question, to the concrete case and back to answers and general values or principles, resembles the figure of an hourglass. Biases, assumptions and values that direct the experience are reflected upon. This is also referred to as elenchus, the process of ‘approximation, refutation and reformulation’ (Miller, 2007, p. 66). The answer to the question, although relevant, is not the most important part of the dialogue; most important is experiencing the process of engaging in a dialogue together and reflecting on the presented values and the ability to think together and develop openness to new ideas and suggestions.

Fourthly, inspired by Foucault, recognizing and discussing power relations is a crucial element of the course, focusing on tensions with regard to the power relations participants themselves experience in their daily practice. A short introduction on the work of Nietzsche, Foucault and Hadot is followed by a session in which the participants are asked if they recognize the power relations discussed by Foucault in their own practice. Participants reflect on how they regard freedom and the possibility of freedom practices in the military organization. This element of the course will be elaborated on in the example below.

2b. Example: Working on awareness

In this section we present an example of how art-of-living might be applied in the practice of ethics education. In this example Foucauldian concepts regarding the art-of-living are translated and applied to the daily practice of participants who participate in ethics education. For instance, during this session participants are asked if they recognize the power relations discussed by Foucault in their own practice. They are invited to reflect on Foucault’s notion of freedom and the possibility of freedom practices in the military organization. Every participant is asked to think about the following question: ‘Am I imprisoned or can I
use my freedom within this organization?’ This question relates to a previous session which includes both an introduction to Foucauldian art-of-living and the experience of watching the movie Das Experiment. This movie shows that power relations, even inside a prison, remain mobile. The question mentioned above aims to motivate all participants to reflect on power relations and freedom practices based on their own experiences, in order to allow for an in depth-discussion while at the same time providing focus. Based on previous interaction with the group, the session is structured by asking each individual participant to express their first reaction with regard to the question posed, followed by a group discussion.

Anna is the first one to respond. She states: ‘I feel free inside this prison but I know that I am not. The prison bars are the agreements we made, I don’t really mind.’ Hank, who sits next to her, continues: ‘power is indeed important in our organization, in fact the clear rules within our organization are a good thing. I may be imprisoned, but isn’t that also what is needed in a military organization? Frank agrees with this point, he argues ‘we need these clear frameworks even though it implies a loss of freedom and thus a possible obstacle to freedom practices’. Josh adds ‘the clear structures in the organization provide me with a sense of security, there is structure and hierarchy I know where I am at’. Peter argues that: ‘I know I am imprisoned but joined the organization myself, it doesn’t worry me. I’m in prison but am fine with it’. Max states: ‘I feel like I wear an ankle monitor, I have some freedom, as long as I display the required conduct.’ Roy argues that: ‘I believe that I can use freedom to make my own choices on important occasions, or when it is necessary. Hank asks: ‘what kind of occasions are you referring to?’ Roy: ‘for instance with regard to the situation I described earlier in Afghanistan, I received an order but I trusted my own judgement’. Rob argues: ‘I think that in the gaps between the prison bars, I can free myself, which I do heavy-handedly, if necessary’.

Following this first round, the participants engage in a plenary conversation about the statements. Peter starts, ‘perhaps we are, to some extent, like the prisoners in the prison, the panopticon, who have internalized the disciplinary power and the military values. We feel free, but if we think about it, we know we are not.’ Roy asks the other participants: ‘what impediments do you encounter in the organization when you try to exercise your own freedom and make your own choices?’ Hank answers, ‘It is not easy, I recognize that there are situations when these (freedom) practices are needed. … While I definitely consider myself as very loyal to the organization, there may also be limits to loyalty. For instance, why did I accept shortages of equipment and material, which can put our safety at risk?’ Roy notes: ‘We have this ‘can do mentality’, we are all very loyal, that is what is expected of us’. Hank adds: ‘Perhaps we should be instructed that we have a personal responsibility, this will make it easier to use freedom.’ The other participants seem to agree with this point of view. This in turn makes Anna pose the question: ‘by whom should we be instructed? Do we need someone else in order for us to engage in freedom-practices?’

During this session participants recognize Foucault’s concepts of normalization (e.g., judgements about what is considered normal and what is not) and disciplinary technology (e.g., the production of the behavior of individuals by techniques of control such as hierarchical observation, normative judgements and examination) within the military organization by addressing concrete experiences. In fact, as some participants argue, these power relations also produce security and safety. Does this make it hard to engage in freedom practices? Some participants argue that they feel free but know they are not. Although the power relations are regarded as strong, some participants mention that rules need not always be followed blindly. Roy explicitly refers to a situation in which he trusted his own judgment instead of following orders. Hank starts a discussion on the limits of loyalty and the need for instructions on personal responsibility. In the end, Anna highlights the ambiguity of this very idea, questioning whether responsibility can be the result of processes of instruction.
The discussion can make the participants aware that power relations cannot be ignored or put aside, but that some room for freedom-practices is needed.

4. Discussion

In this section, we reflect on the case presented above, considering two sets of issues. First, we focus on the military socialization process and the internalization of power relations by soldiers. This leads us to elaborate on the tensions participants experience between existing power relations, internalized through the military socialization process and the possibility of ethics by engaging in freedom practices. Second, we turn to the relation between awareness of power relations and freedom practices, following the distinction between ‘being free’ and ‘willing oneself free’ made by Simone de Beauvoir (1947), in order to understand the challenge for military personnel to engage in freedom practices and the relevance of Foucauldian art-of-living for ethics education in a military organization.

4.1. Military socialization and the internalization of power relations

The military organization is known for its strong hierarchy, uniformity and lack of privacy and conformity to authoritative interpretation of rules. Within such an organization there seems to be little room for agency or autonomy (Hardy & Clegg 2006). Are participants in the train-the-trainer course on military ethics able to modify power relations on ‘important occasions’? With reference to Foucault, to what extent are they different from the inmates in the panopticon with their internalized gaze? Today, it is quite common for (Western) armed forces to pay attention to military ethics and integrity in education and training programs. This includes empowering people to say ‘no’ when it is legally and, or ethically appropriate (Coleman, 2013; Robinson et al., 2008). Notably, power is an interesting concept in this context. It is often seen as something you can have, as the ability to get other people to do what you want them to do, even against their will (Weber, 1978). Foucault introduced a different concept of power, which he refers to as power relations. Power relations are ways in which we become normalized through routine aspects, which are in play in the society at large but equally in our organizations. Supervision, routinization, formalization and legalization result in control of employee behavior, dispositions and identity formation (Hardy & Clegg 2006). All of us operate within a web of power relations. These power relations are not easily modified by saying ‘no’ when it is legally and, or ethically appropriate, as it is difficult to even become aware of the influence and workings of these power relations in the first place.

In general, the socialization process in the military organization is aimed at forming soldiers to be subjected to the will of their superiors and obey orders. The military training and instruction program aims to ‘transform’ young civilians—often nicknamed ‘denims’—into soldiers. A uniformed profession, such as that of a soldier, not only literally means learning to wear a uniform, but also pertains to a ‘uniform for the inner self’ (van Baarle et al., 2015). Socialization in the armed forces generally takes place in a residential context. For example, in the Netherlands, officers’ training programs comprise more than four years of internal training. Upon entrance, the self is, through the socialization processes, at least partly, mortified (Goffman, 1961) and substituted by military morality. For instance, group loyalty is a key value in the armed forces, which is ‘often emphasized to military personnel’ (Coleman, 2013, p. 48). This loyalty does not primarily concern loyalty to personal values, but rather
'loyalty towards one's peers, one's group, one's organization or nation' (Olsthoorn, 2011, p. 69). In that sense it is internally focused on the ‘we’ rather than on the ‘I’, or on others. The example shows that this kind of loyalty is felt so deeply, that it is rather difficult to recognize situations which may demand going against this feeling.

Each military unit has its own rituals and practices and unwritten traditional values that the unit conveys through initiation rituals. As Foucault states, during this socialization period, military personnel are produced and power relations are internalized. During their socialization process, they learn to incorporate existing power relations into their sense of self. These power relations are focused on the importance of group bonding rather than valuing one's autonomy and the ability to think for oneself. Operational deployment requires teamwork. Military training therefore aims to develop both horizontal and vertical cohesion (Kirke, 2009; Winslow, 1999). Horizontal cohesion involves liaising with colleagues and vertical cohesion involves allegiance to the commander.

Foucault states that power relations are only possible insofar as people are free; as long as there is not a situation of domination, power relations remain mobile and therefore open to the possibility of change (Foucault, 1997). As the example shows, there are indeed situations that participants of the train-the-trainer course mention, that illustrate their ability to recognize 'important occasions', where they were able to address the moral dimension of situations and subsequently decide and act upon their moral judgement (see also, van Baarle, Hartman, Verweij, Molewijk, & Widdershoven, 2017). However, participants do experience tensions between the culture and characteristics of the military organization on the one hand and acting upon their moral judgement on the other hand. Within the armed forces, it is common to think in a framework of legality, hierarchy and loyalty, standards, regulations and obligations (van Baarle, Hartman, Verweij, Molewijk, & Widdershoven, 2017). These elements can turn into power relations which are perceived as 'normal', which might make it difficult to recognize them in moral dilemmas and that, in turn, might make it difficult to deliberate and to act upon one's judgement.

To determine when it is appropriate to break with communal norms and expectations is not always easy. It may be clear in a situation in which for instance unlawful orders are given, yet in many other cases, freedom practices, making choices and modifying power relations, are not self-evident. In order to further explore the relevance of freedom practices in a military context, we will briefly elaborate on the distinction between 'being free' and 'willing oneself free', introduced by Simone de Beauvoir.

4.2. From ‘Being free’ to ‘willing oneself free’

For Foucault, ethics is the practice of freedom, informed by reflection (Foucault, 1997). In order to reflect on power relations and on how to practice one's freedom, the first step is to become aware of existing power relations. What is the relevance of becoming aware of power relations during ethics education?

The example described above illustrates that participants recognize what is expected of them in the military organization. Several participants argue that, for them, power relations within the organization are a good thing, even though it may limit the possibility of freedom practices. The example shows that existing power relations have a positive effect as they provide participants with a sense of safety and structure. Freedom practices, on the other hand, seem to be marked by uncertainty.
In the essay ‘Pour une morale de l’ambiguïté’ (1947), De Beauvoir distinguishes between être libre (being free) and se vouloir libre (willing oneself free). Being free can be viewed as the release from the ‘chains’ of the restricting and confining dogmas of for instance the church and repressive political systems. Yet, being free says nothing about what to do with this freedom. De Beauvoir acknowledges that the freedom to shape one’s own life, to will oneself free, is not self-evident, but difficult. When engaging in freedom practices, the options are overwhelming. Everything is possible; many roads can be taken. Yet, since two or more roads cannot be taken simultaneously, the question of which way to choose arises. The choice between available paths has to be contemplated, discussed, considered and reconsidered, for the choice one makes will have an impact on all subsequent choices. But, what option should be chosen from the dazzling myriad of possibilities? Moreover, what can be expected of one’s ability to choose when the chains of the past have been the only focus point? Can one make an adequate choice, a responsible choice? Especially for people who have worked most of their lives in a hierarchical and highly structured organization, engaging in freedom practices is challenging.

Becoming aware of the power relations does not necessarily imply being able to choose and to ‘will oneself free’ (de Beauvoir, 1947, p. 133). Fostering freedom practices assumes a will and ability to modify existing power relations, if necessary. This presupposes that participants of ethics training courses have the courage to leave the security and safety of existing frameworks behind. Ethics education may help to find free space, to experiment with a different type of behavior. By openly discussing the fact that power relations produce positive effects, but also have limitations, it may become possible to engage in a dialogue about the challenges of freedom practices in a military context and the way in which one can deal with them. The techniques used in the training course, focusing on delaying judgments, listening to others and fostering dialogue, can in themselves provide room for experiencing the possibility of not merely accepting given rules, but creating room for inquiry about what is good in a specific situation. Thus, the training course may create a context in which participants become acquainted with what ‘willing oneself free’ might entail.

Ethics courses based on the art-of-living aim at fostering self-awareness and a reflexive attitude towards power relations and the exploration of freedom practices. Without advocating that reflection and deliberation should be practiced on the battlefield or in situations that favor decisive and quick action, techniques fostering openness and dialogue may help participants to experience the possibility of choice with regard to moral dilemmas and to open up ways and alternatives for decision-making. Ethics education based on Foucauldian art-of-living is relevant for ethics education as it aims at fostering the ability to reflect critically on what happens in term of power relations and related values during ‘socialization processes’ as well as in daily work practice. As such, it can assist participants to understand their own values as well as those of others as they are embedded in the power relations that are part of social practices, and foster the willingness of participants to learn to think for themselves, to make adequate conscious decisions and as such to engage in freedom practices, leading to morally responsible decision-making.

5. Conclusion

The aim of this study was to explore how Foucault’s ideas on ethics can be used as a foundation of ethics education. First, ideas regarding art-of-living were explored in the work
of Nietzsche, Foucault and Hadot. Secondly, by means of a concrete example taken from a train-the-trainer course on military ethics, we examined the relevance of working with this approach.

Nietzsche’s concept of Bildung can be viewed as a key element in the Foucauldian foundation for ethics education as art-of-living. As illustrated it aims at freeing a person, learning people to critically reflect on themselves as well as on others. Foucauldian art-of-living aims at fostering awareness of power relations by which we are constructed. It also aims at empowering people to use space for freedom-practices, to actively choose and act upon certain values. Hadot states that philosophy is not purely an academic exercise, but rather, an education in living. Education should thus be practical; it requires effort and training. Hadot’s work further stresses that the art-of-living is never a purely individual exercise, as one always remains part of complex power relations with others.

A Foucauldian art-of-living seems to be relevant for ethics education because it assists people to discover themselves in their concrete situation, in other words, to become aware of the power relations which they are part of. Such reflections assist people to see the ‘whole’ of a moral dilemma and their place in it: which will help them to come to a morally responsible decision (i.e., a decision that takes the different points of view of the stakeholders in question into account). Power relations imply the possibility of ethics, of choice and the possibility of modifying these power relations through freedom-practices. Soldiers may be produced by power relations but they can also be stimulated to think for themselves, to become aware of tensions between values (such as loyalty and safety), and to form their own morally responsible judgment.

If the aim of ethics education is to assist professionals to carry out the task entrusted to the profession as honorably and correctly as possible, the first step might be to develop moral self-awareness or moral sensitivity (Cook, 2013). The work of Foucault can be of help in understanding the complexity of fostering this self-awareness. ‘The appreciation of individuals as sophisticatedly agentic includes recognizing that their ‘choices’ are made within frameworks of disciplinary power which both enable and restrict their scope for discursive manoeuvre’ (Thornborrow & Brown 2009, p. 355).

Foucauldian art-of-living does not provide a clear structure through which one can arrive at a morally responsible decision. However, techniques with regard to reflection, listening and dialogue may enable people to become aware of power relations and to investigate alternative and possibly more adequate options, enlarging the space for freedom-practices within organizations. Acknowledging and discussing power relations and tensions, can be regarded as both a pre-condition for choosing how to deal with moral dilemmas and as part of ethical deliberation and decision-making.

In this article we have examined an example from training based on Foucauldian art-of-living. The example shows that participants can become aware of existing power relations, which opens the door to the possibility of individual empowerment. Even though it is important to acknowledge that the freedom to shape one’s own life is not self-evident, ethics education based on Foucauldian art-of-living assists in fostering awareness of existing power relations in order for participants to engage in freedom practices and adequate decision-making. Ethics education focusing on awareness of and reflection on power relations and active self-formation within existing power relations can offer an opportunity for organizations and their employees to understand how they have come to believe what they value, to help them understand their own values as well as those of others and assist
employees in active reflection and decision-making when faced with complex moral dilemmas in their daily practice.

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