HESTER MOERBEEK

Friends and Foes in the Occupational Career

The Influence of Sweet and Sour
Social Capital on the Labour Market

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Vrienden en vijanden in de be-roepsloopbaan
De invloed van zoet en zuur sociaal kapitaal op de arbeids-markt

Een wetenschappelijke proeve op het gebied van de
Sociale Wetenschappen

Proefschrift

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volgens besluit van het College van Decanen
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Hester Hagar Susan Moerbeek
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te Amsterdam

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For my parents

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Chapter One - General Introduction

1.1. Introduction and plan of the book

When people are asked how they acquired their job, the answer will probably boil down to "I happened to be the best person for the job" rather than "My father knew the company director in high school". The Netherlands are a supposedly meritocratic post-industrialised society. Such a society holds the value that people should be judged on their own merits. The basic idea is that people with the same level of education should be able to find a job at a similar level, regardless of their social background, race, religion, sex, age or sexual orientation. This idea of 'universalism' is part of the dominant ideology of our society. A prominent theory in sociology, the modernisation theory, predicts that in post-industrialised societies the effects of ascribed characteristics (such as the education and status of the father) are replaced by the effects of achieved characteristics (such as education and work experience). Although we know that the ideal form of universalism is not met by reality, we do approach it in the strictest sense. We know that people with a similar level of education often have jobs at different occupational levels and we perceive this to be an imperfection with regard to universalistic values. Regardless of imperfections, universalism apparently remains an ideal. This book wants to contribute to the explanation of this phenomenon, by specifying conditions under which universalism prevails and conditions under which particularistic values are of more influence.

In the following chapters I will first argue that particularism still exists but that it has taken on a different form. Instead of a sort of particularism in the sense of people inheriting the job or status of their fathers, particularism now exists in the form of the people we know and who help us.

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The people someone knows, his or her social network, can be beneficial or harmful to his or her labour market position. Through the people someone knows or the people who know them, someone can reach other people and their resources. The social resources one can reach constitute one's social capital. Although the term 'capital' has a Marxist ring to it, we are already used to speaking of human capital in reference to human resources. Social resources, and the second-order resources reached through them, can have a positive influence on someone's labour market position and thus prove to be 'sweet social capital'.

A new aspect of this research is that we emphasise that social resources can also have a negative effect on someone's labour market position; in that case we speak of 'sour social capital'. The theoretical ideas on sweet and sour social capital, and the extent to which they explain someone's occupational career form the subject of this book.

The two main questions of this study are, in their simplest form:

1) *to what extent does having friends lead to an improvement of someone's position in the labour market and to what extent do friends prevent a deterioration in someone's labour market position?*

2) *to what extent does having foes lead to a deterioration in someone's labour market position and to what extent do foes hinder someone in improving his or her labour market position?*

These two questions mirror each another. In this book it will be shown that both questions follow from the same theoretical assumptions, and that they lead to an investigation of the influence of social capital on the labour market.

This book deals with the Netherlands, and the data used (roughly) describe the situation in 1993. Where data are available, I will also compare the Dutch situation to that in the United States and in the Netherlands in earlier times.

The first step in this chapter is to present the theoretical background of the central questions. In the idea of social capital as an important asset on the labour market, stratification research and network research converge.

A description is given of some central theoretical notions in this area of overlap. After the general introduction, the different aspects of sweet social capital, friends on the labour market, will be analysed in Chapter Two and Chapters Five to Seven. Sour social capital, i.e. foes, is elaborated upon in Chapters Three, Eight and Nine. Chapter Four describes the data and Chapter Ten contains a summary of the results and a general overview of the conclusions, as well as some suggestions for further research.

1.2. Theoretical and empirical background: the remaining influence of the father

How people attain their status and their level of income, and how differences in status and income level emerge have been central questions in sociology for a long time. Two factors known for causing differences in status and income in industrial societies are family background and education. In the transition from a pre-industrial society towards an industrial one several things are presumed to change. Before the shift towards industrialism, sons tended to inherit their father's jobs, and were often trained by him personally. This changed when more complicated machines were introduced into the production process, and the home ceased to be the major work place. Due to the rise of a demand for specialisation on the labour market, education became a more important factor in acquiring a job. Since then education has been claimed to be a necessary requirement for obtaining a place on the labour market (Collins, 1971; 1979). Accordingly, a transition from particularistic values to universalistic values is expected to have occurred (Parsons, 1951).

In the Netherlands, the shift from a pre-industrial towards an industrial and later on a post-industrial society has resulted in norms according to which all individuals, whether male or female, young or old, etcetera, should have equal chances to get a good education and a good job, plus, given a certain level of education, have equal chances to acquire similar-status jobs.

These days, the Dutch government provides free education until the end of the compulsory schooling period. Further education is provided below cost price. A grant and loan system is available to anyone wishing to pursue further studies. On the labour market people should officially be judged only on their own merits - when they start their employment career people should be judged on their education, and later on also on their work experience, and not on basis of their social origin, sex, race, religion or sexual orientation. In other Western industrial societies the same norms seem to prevail, for instance in the United States. In the United States the same underlying idea applies that people should be treated equally, irrespective of characteristics like sex and age, although the line of reasoning is somewhat different. With hard work and perseverance, everybody should be able to reach the top: 'The American dream'.

In the study that tested the true value of this American dream is Blau and Duncan's *The American occupational structure* (1967). Blau and Duncan conducted their study for men and their sons only, due to a lack of data on women. They found that the education and occupational status of someone's father had a large effect on someone's education, even in an industrialised society like the United States in 1962. The father's characteristics also directly and indirectly influenced his son's occupational status, although the occupational status of the son was mainly explained by his own education.

In Figure 1.1, the status attainment model as Blau and Duncan formulated it for the US in 1962 is depicted. The part of occupational status that is explained by education and work experience, measured by Blau and Duncan as the status of someone's occupation in 1962, is called achieved status. The part of the status that is explained by the characteristics of the father is called ascribed status. The path model in Figure 1.1 is a visualisation of the standardised regression effects. As can be seen from Figure 1.1, there is one direct effect from the characteristics of the father on the son's attained occupational status in 1962, that of the occupation of the father.

The occupation of the father also has a direct effect on the son's first job. All remaining influence of the father is expressed in his son's education, which, in its turn has a strong effect on the son's occupation. By making several models for different cohorts, Blau and Duncan arrived at the conclusion that the influence of the father had diminished over time.

Figure 1.1: Path-coefficients in basic model of the process of stratification (source: Blau & Duncan, 1967, p. 170)

Blau and Duncan predicted that, with ongoing modernisation, the influence of education and work experience on occupational status would increase at the cost of the influence of paternal characteristics. They expected the effect of the characteristics of the father to disappear altogether in time, as a consequence of a societal transition to universalistic norms. Does this mean that the American Dream is becoming true?

Following Blau and Duncan, a lot of research has been done on factors that influence labour market mobility. In this research, a distinction is made between two forms of mobility: **inter**generational mobility, which means that the son gets a higher or lower occupatio-nal status than his father (the arrow in Figure 1.1 from father's occupational status to son's first occupation), and **intra**-generational mobility, which means that the son rises or falls in occupational status during his own career (the arrow in Figure 1.1 from the son's first job to his occupation in 1962). For both forms of mobility,

mobility, explanations have been sought in the same group of factors. First, the aforementioned social background characteristics 'education of the father' and 'occupational status of the father' were considered, but later on characteristics such as race, sex, degree of urbanisation, religion, and intelligence were included as well (see for instance Duncan, Featherman & Duncan, 1972). In the Netherlands, research has shown a trend towards less influence of the characteristics of the father (see, for instance, Ganzeboom & De Graaf, 1983; Ganzeboom, Luijkx, Dessens, De Graaf, De Graaf, Jansen & Ultee, 1987; Ganzeboom, Luijkx & Treiman, 1989). Despite these theoretical and methodological contributions to the model, the main conclusions of Blau and Duncan's research have remained intact. The characteristics of the father continue to have an effect on his son's achieved education and occupational prestige. The question remains <u>why</u> the father's influence is still so prominent, especially in the beginning of the son's career.

Mainly in an effort to explain the lasting parental influence on children, Bourdieu has come up with two important new explanatory notions: cultural capital and social capital (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977 [1970]; Bourdieu, 1973; Bourdieu, 1983; Bourdieu, 1984 [1979]). Bourdieu claims that the differences between the upper class and the lower classes have diminished over time. Material capital is no longer the only means for the upper class to distinguish themselves from the lower classes. To compensate for this, the people in the upper class have started using cultural capital to distinguish themselves from the lower classes. So, besides material capital, parents can pass on cultural capital to their children. In the Blau-Duncan model, cultural capital can be seen as an intervening variable between paternal characteristics and son's education. The idea behind this is that parents can teach their children the 'upper class culture', which will also supply the children with the skills they need in school and later on the labour market. Cultural capital theory, thoroughly studied by sociology in the past decades, predicts that the influence of parents' cultural capital will increase, while the influence of material capital will decrease.

The findings are mostly that the influence of material capital does indeed decrease, but that the influence of cultural capital does not increase. Most research into cultural capital has tried to explain education, and in our present-day Dutch society it seems logical that the influence of material capital should diminish, due to (virtually) free education. The conclusion has to be that the hypothesis that cultural capital will take over the influence of material capital is often, at least partly, refuted (see, for instance, Janssen & Ultee, 1994).

However promising the research that follows Bourdieu's idea that cultural capital will replace material capital as a distinguishing feature for the upper classes may be, part of the effect of the father's characteristics still remains unexplained. In order to try to explain this remaining effect of the father, I will follow another line of research: that into social capital. The idea has gained ground that the social networks people constitute with one another are of influence on their life chances, such as their success on the labour market. The next section describes some major research that has been done on the influence of this so-called social capital. Although cultural capital and social capital probably correlate, in the study presented here parents are assumed to be part of their children's social network. In fact, I will later on hypothesise that parents, as social capital, initially have a large effect on their children's career, while later on the influence of friends takes over. I will therefore not present parents as determiners of their children's cultural capital. When social capital has been studied sufficiently in the future, it will undoubtedly be useful to theorise about the interaction or maybe even a causal sequence between the two factors; however, such an exercise falls outside the scope of this research. Cultural capital will therefore not be an issue in this book.

1.3. The introduction of social capital into the status attainment model

In this book, the shift from particularistic values to universalistic egalitarian values will be referred to as modernisation. The ideal in our society is that people with equal merits, expressed in their attained level of education and, if applicable, work experience, should have equal chances of acquiring similar jobs. If one interprets this ideology in the strictest sense, it means that individual characteristics other than education and work experience should be of no influence on the chance of finding a job. Rather than saying that social capital can also be considered a 'merit', I propose to regard it as an ascribed, as opposed to an achieved characteristic, which is not directly linked to the labour market. From this point of view, the widely accepted idea that people can profit from their having friends on the labour market seems puzzling, since it closely resembles favouritism. If universalistic values do indeed prevail, one would expect no profit from having friends on the labour market.

Still, the idea that friends are assets on the labour market has been with us for a long time. This idea was not explored in sociology, however, until the early 1970s. Bourdieu introduced the term 'social capital' but he did not specify any testable hypotheses regarding its effect. Granovetter (1973; 1974; 1982; 1992; 1995) did. Granovetter stressed the theoretical importance of informal resources - friends and acquaintances - for labour market outcomes a few decades ago. Through friends and acquaintances people can, for instance, obtain information on job openings, or a friend or acquaintance can put in a good word. Granovetter distinguished ties by their strength. His hypothesis (and finding) was that weak ties more easily lead to the acquisition of a job than strong ties do. The reasoning behind this hypothesis is that people usually have friendly relationships with people who are similar to them (the 'like me' principle). Consequently, people who are more 'like' each other, like each other more, and thus have stronger ties. Because of this homogeneity, the people at the heart of someone's network tend to know each other and all have access to practically the same body of information.

Acquaintances however, i.e. people in the periphery of someone's network, move in different social circles and therefore have access to different bodies of information. Because of this, acquaintances can better serve someone's goals.

Granovetter defined the ties of ego with acquaintances as weak ties. Furthermore, he stated that ties of acquaintances with individuals in the periphery of other networks can form 'bridges' between networks. These 'bridges' can provide someone with more information than he or she can obtain from his or her own social network alone. Thus, given the hypothesis that weak ties provide someone with more information, there lies more 'strength' in weak ties, or rather more help, than in strong ties. A logical consequence of the assumption that bridges are non-redundant ties between two networks is that a strong tie can never be a bridge. Of course this does not mean that all weak ties are bridges. Following Granovetter, a great many researchers have tested the 'strength-of-weak-ties' hypothesis, rejecting as often as confirming it (see, for instance, Lin, Vaughn & Ensel, 1981a; Lin, Ensel & Vaughn, 1981b; Marsden & Campbell, 1984; Lin & Dumin, 1986; De Graaf & Flap, 1988; Marsden & Hurlbert, 1988; Wegener, 1991).

The most elaborate follow-up on Granovetter's research has been conducted by Lin and associates. Their research can mainly be seen as a criticism of Blau and Duncan's status attainment model (Lin et al., 1981a; 1981b; Lin, 1982; Lin & Dumin, 1986). Lin's main interest lies in the explanatory questions that are left unanswered by Blau and Duncan's prediction of a shift from particularistic values to universalistic values. Unlike Blau and Duncan, Lin does not interpret the lasting effect of social class of origin on class of destination as a remainder of old particularistic values that will disappear in time. Instead, he turns to social resources as an explanatory factor. Social resources are defined as resources to which a person has access via other people. Weber already recognised that people have different life chances due to differences in the resources they possess. Weber

distinguished economic, political and symbolic resources. He did not mention social resources. However, political resources can also be considered social resources, since the main resource in politics is 'friends'. Symbolic resources translate into what we defined earlier as cultural resources. By adopting the idea of the influence of different resources on life chances, and recognising labour market position as one of these life chances, Lin got to formulating four hypotheses (Lin, 1983):

The first hypothesis is the '*social resources*' hypothesis. When someone can reach a relatively high position, this improves the resources that he or she has access to and thus improves his or her chances of reaching a certain goal (i.e. obtaining a higher income or a higher occupational status).

The second hypothesis is the '*strength-of-position*' hypothesis. The higher someone's initial social position, the higher someone's reach on the social ladder by means of his or her contacts, and the more worthwhile the social resources are someone can access through his or her contacts. People from a family of high status can more easily reach a contact person with a relatively higher status than people with a low-status family background. Blau and Duncan would have interpreted this as the influence of father's occupational status on his son's education and the status of his first job.

Following Granovetter, Lin's third hypothesis is the '*strength-of-weak-ties*' hypothesis. Weak ties provide access to a wider range of social resources than strong ties do.

Lin's fourth hypothesis predicts a different effect of the 'strength of ties' for people with a different initial position. People with a high status can reach equally good resources through their strong ties as through their weak ties, since their strong ties will generally have an equally high position. People with a low initial position will reach higher-quality social resources through their weak ties, and will therefore profit more from their weak ties. This
interaction indicates a ceiling effect: if someone starts off relatively high, the possibilities for improvement are relatively low.

Lin has found confirmation of all four hypotheses in the United States (see, for instance, Lin & Dumin, 1986). It has to be noted, however, that Lin defines strong and weak ties differently than Granovetter. Strong ties are defined as family, while weak ties concern friends and acquaintances. According to Lin's results, friends give access to the most and best resources, as compared to family and acquaintances. Lin considers this a confirmation of the 'strength-of-weak-ties' hypothesis. However, had he, like Granovetter, defined family and friends as strong ties and acquaintances as weak, the hypothesis would not have been confirmed.

For several reasons Granovetter's approach seems the logical one. First, one can argue that an acquaintance may want to help ego in order to *become* ego's friend. Second, and this is closely related to the first argument, ego may view upon the people that have helped him or her as friends. An argument against both Granovetter's and Lin's definition of strong ties is that family relations are not by definition warm and close relationships. One does not choose one's own family, while one presumably does so with friends. Moreover, as Wegener (1991) emphasised, not all relations with acquaintances or colleagues are distant ones. Wegener chose to use multiple indicators to identify social ties and measure tie strength.

Basically it seems as if the 'strength-of-weak-ties' argument is supported as long as 'friends' are considered weak ties. As stated above, there has also been criticism of Granovetter's way of measuring the strength of ties (see De Graaf & Flap, 1988; Marsden & Hurlbert, 1988; Wegener, 1991; and Lin, 1999 for an overview).

From the foregoing, it may be clear that network research and stratification research have converged more and more over the years. This convergence of the two research fields finds its outlet mainly in what can perhaps best be summarised as social capital theory (Flap & Arts, 1988; Coleman, 1990; Burt, 1992). Social capital theory assumes that people strive to improve their living conditions and that those with better access to social resources will succeed better in doing so, also with regard to their labour

market position. To strive for better chances on the labour market can mean looking for a job when unemployed, striving for a job with a relatively high income, or striving for a job with higher status. In these instances, social capital consists of people who spend their resources on others, not only to satisfy direct needs, but also as an investment in the future.

Burt takes a more structural approach to social capital (see, for instance, Burt, 1976; 1982; 1992; 1997; Burt & Celotto, 1992). His idea is that within someone's network, non-redundant ties (ties that link you to people no other ties link you to) are the most efficient ones. To me, Burt's research is most interesting because of what he says about the structural equivalence of actors. If two actors occupy similar positions in a network (in Burt's research this means similar positions within the network of a firm) they may, on the one hand, end up as each other's beneficiaries, but, on the other hand their competitive positions may cause them to become opponents. I will discuss this subject in Chapter Three.

1.4. What is new in this book? Sweet and sour social capital

In the previous sections, it has been shown that the research on labour market positions started out as stratification research, with modernisation theory as the main explanatory framework. This strategy left some aspects of paternal influence unexplained, and cultural and social capital entered the picture. Social network research and social stratification research converge in the hypothesis that social capital improves someone's labour market position.

Although the importance of social networks for one's chances on the labour market has been fully recognised since Granovetter's research, basically social capital theory is built on two general findings. The first finding is that when ego finds a job via a contact person, this job is more likely to be of a higher status if the status of the contact

person is higher. Important with regard to this first finding is the fact that simply the use of a contact person (without taking account of the contact's status) leads to a decline in status. This is why I give several conditions in Chapter Two, besides that of a relatively high status of the contact person, that influence the importance and profitability of social capital. The second finding is that if people have 'friends' with a higher-status job, they themselves also tend to have a higher-status job (Lin et al., 1981a; Lin & Dumin, 1986; De Graaf & Flap, 1988).

The flaw in the first finding is that it does not take account of those people who *try* to find a job through a contact person, *but do not succeed*. This causes an over-estimation of the success of using a contact. Furthermore, up till now the characteristics of the unsuccessfully used contact person (such as status and strength of the tie) have not been measured. This means that we do not know whether these contacts have the same or maybe different characteristics as compared to the contacts that were used successfully. This may mean that the general finding until now, that a high-quality (relatively high-status) contact has a positive effect on ego's status is unsound. To mend this flaw, in Chapter Six, I will also take 'failures' in uses of contacts into account.

As to the second finding, a prominent deficit is that most research so far has been of a cross-sectional nature. This means that the questions regarding someone's social resources pertain to the same period as the questions regarding someone's job, which makes it difficult to decide upon the causal sequence. The question whether social capital helps people to obtain a good social position or whether a good social position leads to more social capital, remains unanswered in a cross-sectional design. This fault can be corrected by using a *longitudinal design* in which, for the total career, job changes and the role of social capital therein are determined. In such a longitudinal design, every start and ending of a job is considered an event, and one can study the factors that have had an effect on these events. A design like this can give answers to

questions like: is it true that having friends, family, and acquaintances with a higher (social) position leads to more success with job applications, or should the causal sequence be turned round, in the sense that a lack of social capital (having no such friends, family or acquaintances) prevents people from sustaining a high position?

Besides improving on earlier research, the assumption that people without social capital will more often fail to achieve their goals leads to new hypotheses. If people have compulsory relationships (for instance in the work place) with others who want to frustrate their attempts to find a better job or who might even dismiss them, this may lead to a decline in status.

The inclusion of ties with people wishing to hinder ego, amounts to an even more far-reaching extension of social capital theory. People may not only possess sweet social capital, in the form of friends, they may also have *sour social capital*. With a little exaggeration one could call the people who provide someone with sour social capital 'foes'. The use of the term 'foes' is an exaggeration because in everyday language the word 'foes' seems to have a more negative connotation than the positive connotation of the word 'friends'. In this study, the words are used as two sides of the same coin.

The hypothesis concerning sour social capital is that if people have 'foes' on the job, or if they have 'foes' with a relatively high status, this can lead to a decline in status because they are more likely to accept a job with a lower status in another firm. In extreme cases, sour social capital may even cause (in)voluntary unemployment. And during, for example, reorganisations the lack of 'friends' and the presence of 'foes' may increase the chance of discharge. That people with bad personal relations at work will sooner loose their job and/or apply for another (lower status) job is not the only hypothesis implied by including sour social capital, though. Another interesting hypothesis is that people without 'foes' have a more prosperous career than people with 'foes'.

Another aspect of job careers should not be neglected either. In the Netherlands, most people stay in the same job during their entire career. Granovetter has pointed out that, although there is an extensive body of literature on labour market mobility and job satisfaction, most research has focused on *mobility*; this, while the majority of people stay (close to) *immobile* during their entire professional life (Granovetter, 1986; De Graaf & Luijkx, 1995). Do these occupationally immobile people have less social capital than occupationally mobile people? Are they people without company-specific social capital in their own or other firms, or do they only have social relations at their own status level in the firm? This may even lead to a certain inertia: why leave a job if all your 'friends' work at the same level, or within the same company?

Instead of only accounting for the so-called *'push'-factors* of sour social capital, we also need to stress the *'pull'-factors* of relationships with people in other firms. If someone already has company-specific social capital in another firm, the chance that he or she will apply for a job in that firm is higher. Social capital should therefore not only be divided into sweet and sour social capital, but also into *within-* and *outside-the-company* social capital.

To summarise, there are several new aspects in this book. First, the range of social capital theory is widened by including sour social capital. Besides this, I will improve on previous research by using a longitudinal design, by including 'failures' into the models and by considering immobility as well as upward and downward mobility. Furthermore my research pertains to the Netherlands. In short, besides posing new questions regarding foes, I will also formulate new hypotheses to answer 'old' questions regarding friends.

We can now turn to the specifications of the two main questions in this book. The first main question was "to what extent does having friends lead to an improvement of a someone's labour market position, and to what extent does having friends prevent a deterioration in someone's labour market position?" The second main question was "to

what extent does having foes lead to deterioration of someone's labour market position and to what extent does having foes hinder someone in improving his or her labour market position?"

With inclusion of the longitudinal perspective, and the chance at immobility, these main questions can be specified in the following four research questions:
- Are people who apply for a job, especially for a higher-status job, via a friend, more likely to get this job if that friend has a higher status?
- Are people who have foes at their work, especially foes with a higher status, more likely to accept a job in another company than people without foes at work?
- Are people who have foes and only few friends at work more likely to become unemployed and to remain unemployed for a longer time, as compared to people without foes but with friends at work?
- Do people who remain in the same job for a long time have fewer friends and foes at work than upwardly and downwardly mobile persons, or do they only have friends at their own occupational level?

The theory behind these four research questions will be further specified in the form of hypotheses in the relevant chapters.

Of course, the scope of this book is not wide enough to answer all questions that follow from the extended version of social capital theory presented in this chapter. Yet most of the improvements of and additions to the social capital theory will be tested on their fruitfulness.

In the next chapter, I will elaborate on the theoretical background in order to satisfactorily answer three questions regarding the effects of sweet social capital on the occupational career: Who are friends?; Why would people help each other?; And under which conditions can friends influence a person's occupational career? The same questions regarding foes are elaborated upon in Chapter Three.

Chapter Two - Friends: An Introduction

2.1. Who are friends?

In the first chapter the word 'friends' was put between brackets most of the time. The reason for this is that the term 'friends' as it is used in this book does not just mean friends as in everyday life. As stated before, part of someone's status can be explained by the people someone knows. The people in someone's network provide access to their resources (information about job vacancies in other companies, for instance) but also to other people they know (the latter could be called 'second-order resources' (Lin) or 'borrowed social capital' (Burt)). The people someone knows and the access they provide to other people are called social resources. Ego's social resources are the result of the number of people who are willing to help ego, the amount of support these people are willing to offer, and the resources ego can mobilise in this indirect way. Information about vacancies, putting in a good word, giving references, are all very useful products of social resources. The amount and nature of social resources can discriminate between people with the same education and social background, and thus be a source of social stratification (Lin et al., 1981a & 1981b; De Graaf and Flap, 1988; Lin, 1999). The amount of social resources someone has relates to more than just the number of people who are willing to help. The 'quality' of the contacts is of great importance as well. When a contact has a relatively high status, ego will benefit more in terms of achieved status than when a contact has an equal or lower status than ego.

In this research, the people someone is socially involved with outside of a formal work relation, and who, through their social involvement are willing to help ego are called friends. This does not necessarily mean that ego considers them friends. They can be

close friends, but also acquaintances, colleagues or family members. Friends can now be defined as persons who have *helped* ego (in some way) in the past and/or might be willing to *help* ego (in some way) in the future. The resources and second-order resources friends give access to can be designated as 'sweet' or 'positive' social capital. The adjective 'sweet' to social capital is new. I explicitly use it here, to contrast it with 'sour' social capital which will be dealt with in Chapter Three.

2.2. Why would people help each other in general?

Although it is not strictly necessary to know why friends help each other to achieve certain goals to answer the central questions of this book, which were formulated in Chapter One, it does help to know why 'friends' would be willing to support each other. The arguments for the existence of supportive relationships between people are pretty well-known and accepted. When someone helps someone else, he or she expects a certain reciprocity to follow in the future. In game theory, this has been called the 'shadow of the future' (see, for instance, Axelrod, 1984). From rational choice theory we know about the assumption of the calculating human being, striving for social approval and physical well-being. By helping someone else one can gain social approval, whereas being helped can ensure physical well-being. But helping someone can also ensure physical well-being in the future. Although all this sounds pretty calculative, it does not necessarily have to be that way. When, for instance, I run some errands for a sick neighbour, I expect something in return. The reward for the help I gave does not have to be money or some other scarce good. Gratitude or friendship may also be viewed as returns on delivered support. Expectations in this regard are rarely expressed, but still, if I run those errands for that sick neighbour and he or she does not even say 'thank you', I will think twice before doing it again. That is, unless this neighbour has done

the same thing (or something comparable) for me in the past, like taking care of my pet during the holidays.

Another way of getting a favour returned would be being praised by other people for what I do for my neighbour. The argument remains that people who help each other expect something in return (though not necessarily directly from the receiving party). It is this expectation of reciprocity that makes giving help a rational act. We also know the assumption of reciprocity very well from exchange theory (see, for instance, Blau, 1964). Offering help can be interpreted as a sort of investment in the future, based on expectations from the past. Dual exchange theory (Ekeh, 1974; Uehara, 1990) states that, in close friendships or close family relations, the relationship is considered so stable and lasting that the expectation of and need for immediate reciprocity loses its importance. Not only is it no longer necessary to reciprocate instantaneously, it is even no longer important to receive reimbursement from exactly the same person as the one to whom help was given in the first place. This phenomenon is known as 'generalised exchange'.

People may resent the idea of friendship being as strategic as it is presented here. One has to realise, however, that not all 'use' of friends is done strategically or even consciously. someone can even have friends without knowing it: it is possible that you are recommended as a good worker to some employer by someone you do not even know personally, but who heard good things about you. It is also possible that someone you do know recommends you to a third party without your being aware of it (Burt, 1992). Transitivity of friendship is an important feature of networks that can cause this unawareness of being helped by someone. When I have a friend, say person A, and another friend, person B, there is a fair chance that person A and B will know and like each other. In addition, they may show (through their contact with me) the same willingness to help each other as they show towards me. And B may help me, because in that way he pleases my other friend A.

We still need to consider the possibility that parents, siblings, friends, acquaintances or colleagues have different reasons for helping someone. In this book we will focus on the willingness to help in work-related affairs, such as finding a job or finding a good candidate for a job. Parents may want to help their children just to do good by them, or to make sure their children fare at least as well or maybe even better on the labour market than they themselves do or did. Moreover, it reflects badly on parents if their children do not do too well in occupational life, which may motivate parents to help their children. Parents may also help their children on the labour market in order to be relieved of financial parental duties, or to receive help, or at least attention, in old age.

Parents who are employers may find it easier to employ their own children since it saves them the search costs. There is also less risk in hiring somebody you already know useful facts about, like the prospective employee's productivity and social skills. The arguments of search costs and risk are important to all employers, so they also hold true for siblings, friends, and acquaintances who are in charge of a company or part of an office or a department.

Friends or relatives who are employees themselves may have the aforementioned expectation of reciprocity in mind, but they can also recommend ego to their boss or make ego aware of a vacancy just because it is nice to work with someone you know. There is also status to be gained by recommending a good employee. And in some companies, financial bonuses are issued to employees who bring in new employees.

Of course, there is also a risk involved in recommending someone. The recommended person may not live up to expectations. On the other hand, someone who enters a company by means of an advertisement can also be a big disappointment, or even damaging to a company.

If the labour market is tight, employers will ask their own friends, acquaintances and employees if they know any good prospective employees.

The same motives that apply to friends can be valid for acquaintances. Moreover, an acquaintance may help ego because he or she wants to become a closer friend of ego (Grieco, 1987; Boxman, 1992, Flap & Boxman, 2001).

2.3. Why people help each other on the labour market

In this section I want to explore the reasons people have to help each other on the labour market. By looking into the reasons people have to help each other in general, and on the labour market in particular, I try to contribute to the theory of social capital. Rather than to just assume that using social capital is profitable, I want to conditionalise the profit of social capital. In order to achieve this, I will first describe the labour market in more detail.

The labour market consists of employers on the one hand and (prospective) employees on the other. The group of prospective employees consists partly of people who already have a job and partly of unemployed people. There are therefore two types of job-seekers. There are people who currently do not have a job but want one, and there are people who do have a job but are in search of another. The latter type is a different kind of job search. I assume that people who do not have a job and who are in good health want to find a job. Furthermore, I assume that people who do have a job want a still 'better' job, that is, one that pays more, that gives a higher status or more satisfaction. These two assumptions are consistent with the underlying assumption that people want to improve their life chances.

People who already have a job but who would like another job can, to that end, try to obtain a different position within the company they are currently working for. They can also try to acquire a similar or different job in another company. When looking at the role of social capital in getting a job or a new position, there are three basic transitions to be reckoned with: from unemployed to employed, from employed to unemployed, and from employed to different employment. The last transition can again be divided into

obtaining a different position within the same company, or finding a similar or different job in another company.

With respect to employers, there are fewer assumptions to be made. An employer supposedly wants the 'best' person for a vacancy. 'Best' would be expressed as adequately trained, with the appropriate job experience. Furthermore, an employer wants an employee with potential, who fits in with the other employees, and who will get along with the employer him- or herself. Besides that, a prospective employee should not be looking immediately for another job, especially not if the function concerned requires on-the-job training, or if the employee has to handle information of strategic interest to the competition or has to do a job in which serious (expensive) mistakes can be made. Jobs with the latter characteristics can be designated as jobs with a high damage potential. Last but not least, employers want their search costs to be as low as possible.

So, under what conditions can social capital be profitable to (prospective) employees and employers? In the following section, I will discuss a number of conditions at the individual, organisational and societal level, which may influence the effect of social capital on one's chances on the labour market.

2.3.1. Conditions at the individual level that influence the importance and profitability of social capital

On the basis of the theory and assumptions described, we can formulate hypotheses on the factors that conditionalise the importance and profitability of social capital at the individual level. In this section, I will give four of these hypotheses.

Initial and current social and occupational status. The idea that initial or current status affects the amount and effect of social capital follows from Lin's *strength-of-position* hypothesis, which was mentioned in Chapter One. The higher one's initial or current status, the easier one can reach other people with an equally high or higher status. There is also a ceiling effect: if one's initial status was high, the relative increase in status can never be as large as when one's initial status was low. The same is true for current status. One condition for the instrumentality of social capital is therefore that there has to be room for improvement. Furthermore, one may need to secure one's position. Friends can help ego to gain status or to secure his or her position.

Status of friend. The higher the status of the contact, as compared to one's own status, the more profitable the contact can be.

Network size. This condition relates to the number of friends that one's friends have. If one has a friend who is willing to help in principle, but who has another friend who is also in need of help and has a higher priority, the chance of drawing benefit from this friend is small. So the use of social capital, friends, is more profitable if those friends do not have too many other friends with needs similar to one's own, and who they would rather help.

Of course the size of someone's own network is of importance too. Although it is not necessarily true that more 'friends' is always better, it will generally mean that one has more options to choose from. Size and quality interact here, in the way that relatively many friends with a relatively high status will prove more profitable.

Personal unemployment. If we assume that someone's first wish is to have a job and that people only want a better job if that first condition is met, unemployed people can be expected to profit more from the use of social capital than employed people. Research conducted by Sprengers (1992) shows that the longer people are unemployed, the lower their chances of finding a job are. For the long-term unemployed, the benefits of social capital (one or more worthwhile contacts) may thus be even higher, since social

capital enhances the chance of finding a job. Employment bureaus already adopted this idea by initiating workshops on how 'to network' ('to network' is used here as a verb) in which the participants screen their existing contacts for possible relevancy to the labour market, and also learn how to make and use new contacts when they are in search of a job.

There are also some conditions under which the use of social capital is **not** profitable, at least not for career chances, e.g. if people have different priorities, such as being at home with their children or leisure time, or if people near retirement. In the latter case, social capital might be useful, however, for instance to obtain an advantageous pension agreement.

If people have already reached the top of the social ladder or their own particular ceiling and already made the best possible use of their education, work experience and social capital, and thus can no longer improve their position, they can only use social capital to secure their position.

If people become disabled or too ill to be active in the workforce, so that a further career is out of the question, social capital will no longer give them any profit on the labour market. By the same token, if people have been out of work for such a long time that they have given up hope, social capital on the labour market is no longer of any use. One can occasionally read stories in newspapers about long-term unemployed people for whom social capital has failed, and to whom even the most recent initiatives of the official institutions are of no help. In the Netherlands, unemployment agencies have started special programmes for long-term unemployed people. Yet in some cases even these special efforts are of no avail. Maybe long-term unemployed people are perceived as a risk group by employers, or maybe these people just do not have any useful social capital to draw on. The latter might even be the cause of their unemployment, and of its duration.

2.3.2. Conditions at the organisational level that influence the importance and profitability of social capital

Besides hypotheses at the individual level, we can also formulate hypotheses on the factors that conditionalise the importance and profitability of social capital at the organisational level. In this section I will give two of such hypotheses.

Company size. The size of a company can influence the effect of social capital on the occupational chances of an individual in two ways. First, if a company is large, this can mean that one can profit more from social capital, mainly because there are more job opportunities in larger firms. If one knows the right person(s), this can be useful both in case of an internal promotion and on entering the company. If an employer has to choose between a large number of prospective employees for a certain position, the person who the employer knows more about (preferably good things) is at an advantage. It shortens the search period for the employer and diminishes the risk of making a wrong choice. The search costs for employers are therefore smaller, and the profit to the prospective employees from their social capital is larger (see also Sprengers, 1992).

Secondly, if a company is small, a lot depends on the atmosphere on the work floor. In a small company people run into each other all the time, which makes it important that an employee fits in with the other employees regarding lifestyle and character. The only way for an employer to find out whether a prospective employee fits in, is by using his or her social capital. If an employer uses informal channels in the search for employees, this, in its turn, makes it more profitable to prospective employees to use their social capital. Thus, the expectation is that the use of social capital is profitable in both large and small companies, but more so in large ones. Of course the latter has to be seen as a consequence of the relatively high number of available jobs in large companies.

Besides the expectation of *profitability*, one could say that large companies can allow for mistakes. Large companies do not need to search as thoroughly for employees as small companies. This leads to the expectation that there is relatively less *use* of social capital in large companies than in small companies. However, I believe that the wish to get the best person for the job weighs stronger than the risk of losses. Large companies will also want the best possible employees, even if they can afford mistakes. If a mistake has been made, for instance, the employee does not perform to satisfaction, a large company can solve such a problem by means of internal transfer or demotion.

Type of position and business sector. The number of applicants for a job also depends on the type of position and the business sector concerned. If a position requires specialist training, the number of applicants will generally be smaller than if a position can be fulfilled after some basic training. It is, however, too simplistic to assume that the use of social capital is only profitable in the latter case and not in the first. Especially with regard to specialist positions, which often involve higher salaries and higher risks, the employer will want to know the person he or she hires as well as possible. The same is true with respect to positions at the top of an organisation (control positions) and positions where the person who hires the new employee will have to work personally with him or her. For all these positions with a high damage potential, social capital is profitable (Flap & Boxman, 2001).

The profitability of social capital also varies between business sectors. In construction, for instance, it is very common for workers to recruit their own co-workers. Furthermore, there is the so-called 'old boys network' in some business sectors. Within the labour market, several 'sub-markets' seem to exist, with their own possible returns on social capital. At this point, I do not see a clear argument as to why social capital would be more profitable in one particular business sector than in another. Empirical analysis will have to show whether such differences exist.

Summarising, there is no such thing as a homogeneous labour market. The profitability of the use of 'friends' can vary with the kind of position concerned and the business sector. For positions with a high damage potential, the returns on social capital are higher.

2.3.3. Conditions at the societal level that influence the importance and profitability of social capital

After the conditions at the individual and the organisational level, I will now give two hypotheses on the factors that conditionalise the importance and profitability of social capital at the societal level.

Unemployment level. If the level of unemployment is high, the number of people applying for the same job will (in general) be high. This makes it more difficult for the employer to choose between prospective employees. As stated before, the employer can reduce search costs by trying to find the right employee through informal channels, i.e. use social capital. In case of high unemployment, the use of social capital is profitable to both the employer and the employee. If, on the other hand, the labour market is tight, social capital will mainly benefit the employee. He or she can find out more about the employer and the company by using social capital, and thus make a more informed choice. The risk of a job transfer is much higher if unemployment is high. If unemployment is high and one considers a change of job, secondary information can also be useful. Job candidates will want to know about how the employer treats new personnel, what the atmosphere at work is like, what happens in case of a reorganisation, etcetera. The idea, however, that if job and prospective employees are both available, the person and the job will automatically come together, is not a realistic one. Even if the employee and the job are compatible, there can be obstacles because of which the match cannot be made. One possible obstacle is that the employee may not know about a vacancy. Social

capital can be useful in solving that problem. But an employee can also live too far away from the company, or the salary can be

too low. Thus, even if the number of job-openings equals the number of job-seekers, this does not have to mean that every job-seeker finds a job and every vacancy is filled.

Government regulations. As stated before, in the Netherlands the dominant ideology is one of equal rights and opportunities for everyone. On the labour market, this should amount to laws on equal chances for everyone with the same educational background. To ensure these equal chances, some laws have been issued. The 'equal chances' law prohibits differential treatment of people on the basis of sex, race, social background, age and sexual orientation. Although it is not explicitly mentioned, one would expect, on the basis of these laws, that social capital is, at the least, not meant to be profitable. Formulated in more general terms, a government cannot prohibit someone from, say, informing someone else about a job-vacancy, but a government can prohibit nepotism and favouritism. In the Netherlands, for instance, there are several regulations concerning application procedures. Most procedures are public, and there are several rules on the grounds of which an employer can decide to hire or not hire a prospective employee. Such rules and regulations should reduce the profitability of social capital. Of course these rules can and will be evaded. But the stricter a government sticks to the rules, the less profitable the use of social capital is.

2.4. Summary of the conditions that influence the profit from sweet social capital

As stated before, until now the assumption with regard to social capital has mainly been that the use of social capital is profitable on the labour market. In this chapter I have tried to conditionalise the relation between the use of social capital and the benefit someone

has from it.

In the previous three sections I have discussed the following conditions that assure relatively high returns on sweet social capital:

1. High (but not the highest possible) initial status

2. Contact persons with a relatively high status (as compared to ego's status)

3. Contact persons who have few other friends in need of help

4. Many potential contact persons

5. If unemployed, short duration of unemployment (although for long-term unemployed persons social capital may be their last chance)

6. Unemployment should not be due to lack of social capital to begin with

7. Very large or very small companies

8. Specialised business sectors

9. High damage potential of function

10. Unbalanced labour market or parts of the labour market. This can mean a too high demand as well as a too high supply of labour on (parts of) the labour market.

11. Few government regulations on the use of social capital.

I will be able to account for most of these conditions in the empirical analyses, but of course some conditions are harder to measure than others, and some are not included at all in the datasets used. More attention will be given to the last point in Chapter Four, where I discuss the data, measurements and research methods.

In the next chapter I will give a theoretical introduction to the hypothesis that foes can hinder someone's occupational career.

Chapter Three - Foes: An Introduction

3.1. Who are foes?

As I described in Chapter Two, the word 'friends' means something else in this book than it does in everyday life. With 'foes' it is the same. As stated before, part of someone's status can be explained by who he or she knows (or who know him or her). During their lifetime people may not only have friendly contacts. They can also have negative encounters with people who may want to obstruct their occupational development. Whereas we expect that friends can cause an increase in status, we expect that 'foes' can have a negative effect on the achieved status in one's occupational career (Moerbeek, Flap & Ultee, 1995; Moerbeek, Ultee & Flap, 1996). In some studies 'hints' have been made at a negative side to social capital (see, for instance Rook, 1984; Burt & Celotto, 1992; Granovetter, 1992), but these studies concentrated mainly on a negative outcome of a positive network-feature, that of friends. This chapter will deal with the questions who foes are and why people would obstruct one another in their careers.

Over the past few years more and more magazines have published articles about 'teasing at the workplace'. In a good Dutch word, this is called 'mobbing'. The best English term would probably be 'bullying'. Most articles (and the research they draw on) focus on the effect of bullying on the Gross National Product. Because of bullying many employees fall ill, and this has nation-wide consequences. Most articles also give good examples of how bullying can lead to a decline in the victim's status. The Dutch opinion magazine *HP/de Tijd* gave an example of a woman who used to work in a management function, but who now organises knitting courses (HP/de Tijd, 25-4-1997). Other articles

were published in, for instance, the Dutch woman's magazine *Viva* (Viva, 9-18-1995) and the Dutch men's magazine *Panorama* (Panorama, no. 28, 1997). The emotional personal stories show the most extreme possible outcomes of foeships at the workplace. People have become unemployed and are sometimes even unable to ever join the workforce again. *Panorama* gives the example of a woman-secretary who was completely ignored at work and never spoke to anyone except the lady from the canteen. Another example from *Panorama* describes the work situation of an older man who used to work in construction. His younger colleagues bullied him every day, which even created personal risk when two of his colleagues tried to push him off a twelve-feet-high construction. At a more public level, we have seen striking examples of the impact personal foeships can have on matters that should not be influenced by personal relationships at all, according to common sense and ideological values.

A good example at the level of international business is the remarkable story of the Spanish national telecommunication company Telefónica. Telefónica and the former Dutch state telecommunication company KPN were negotiating a merger worth billions of dollars. The Spanish Prime Minister, Aznar, and the president of Telefónica, Villalonga, had been friends since their school years. In fact, they had remained such good friends that when Aznar had to appoint a president for the state company Telefónica, he immediately thought of Villalonga. Their wives were also good friends. When Villalonga left his wife and started an affair with the rather extravagant Mexican actress Adriana Abiscal, he was no longer welcome in the house of the Aznar family. The animosity between Villalonga and Aznar reached its first public peak when Villalonga speculated with stocks against Aznar's explicit wishes. Villalonga personally gained from this 'stock options affair' and Aznar feared this would damage his own electoral campaign. Aznar had his chance for revenge when Villalonga tried to close the merger deal with the Dutch KPN. Apparently Villalonga thought he could easily push the merger through, since he made the prospective deal public before even notifying his own board of

directors, or the Spanish government. The Spanish government - read: Aznar - reacted with the publication of a governmental letter directed to the Dutch Minister of Finance. The Netherlands were demanded to sell their 43 percent share in KPN (a former state company). The Dutch government was put off the deal by the suggestion made in the letter that KPN was in fact still a state company. A large minority (9 out of 20) of Telefónica's board of directors voted against the deal, and KPN withdrew from the negotiations (source: de Volkskrant, 8 May, 2000). This will probably not be the end of the story. By now, it seems as if the deal may be closed after all. The story, however, remains a good example of how personal feelings of friendship or foeship can have nationwide, and sometimes even worldwide, consequences.

Another example of a friendly relation that publicly went sour is one at the level of international politics. The example concerns the relationship between Chancellor Kohl of Germany and the former Dutch Prime Minister Lubbers. When Lubbers reached the end of his third term as Prime Minister, he was looking for a new function. At the same time, nominations were made for the function of President of the European Commission. Although there are no written rules for this, there is usually a rather strict sequence of steps to be taken in nominations for such high diplomatic functions. Usually, one or two distinguished persons are recommended, from different countries. Countries are assigned such high functions in turns. And at that time the Dutch government thought the Netherlands were up for an appointment. Lubbers was recommended and considered a suitable candidate, who enjoyed worldwide support. But, seemingly all of a sudden, Federal Chancellor Kohl turned against Lubbers. Since Mitterand voted with Kohl, the race was run. There were rumours about personal motives having played a role, but at the time the reasons for Kohl's sudden U-turn were unclear. Some time later, however, it became clear what had caused Kohl to become Lubbers' opponent. The Dutch news show *Brandpunt* devoted some attention to the topic. Apparently Lubbers had not supported Kohl when the latter opted for the European Bank (which, at that time, still had to be

founded) to be located in Frankfurt. Since Lubbers and Kohl had agreed on almost everything in the past, and had almost become personal friends, Kohl experienced Lubbers' lack of support as treason. Although there was not such a clear case of foeship as that between Villalonga and Aznar, it certainly became one later. The difference between the two cases is that Villalonga knew he had a strong opponent in Aznar, while Lubbers thought he could count on both Kohl and Mitterand for support. Of course I should add that the personal background of the Lubbers-Kohl affair was later denied by Wim Kok, the Dutch Prime Minister who succeeded Lubbers.

Let us turn from these examples of foeship towards a more formal theoretical exploration of foes and their influence on someone's occupational career. The reasoning behind the idea of foes runs parallel to the reasoning behind the idea of friends. Whereas friends are defined as 'people who have *helped* ego (in some way) in the past, and/or might be willing to *help* ego (in some way) in the future', foes are defined as 'people who have *hindered* ego (in some way) in the past and/or might be willing to *hinder* ego (in some way) in the future'. In order to keep the terminology on one line, foes and their resources are called 'sour social capital' as opposed to the 'sweet social capital' formed by friends and the resources they give access to. The central questions regarding foes are whether sour social capital leads to a deterioration of someone's labour market position and whether foes hinder someone in improving his or her labour market position.

In the next section I will explain why foes would want to harm someone else's labour market position. I will use the same theoretical notions as I used in Chapter Two on friends.

3.2. Why would people want to harm each other?

As stated before, until now little attention has been paid to the negative aspects of human relationships in the sociology of stratification and social networks. Feelings like hatred, envy and revenge can have positive or negative effects, but up till now there has not been any real attention for the effects this has on the labour market.

Granovetter acknowledged the negative side of social networks, but unfortunately he did not explore it thoroughly. He did discuss the case of a factory where a black man was promoted to a department with only whites. These white men did not intentionally obstruct him, but they decided not to help him with anything either. This made it impossible for him to do his very specialised and high-risk work safely (Granovetter, 1992: 252). This example shows that social networks at work can have negative effects. In the case cited the negative effect was caused by abstaining from providing help. The idea of sour social capital as presented in this book entails something different than just denying help. Foes can block someone's way up on the social ladder by mobilising their (social) resources, just like friends can help someone by doing so. By including the negative, or sour, side of social capital in this research I hope to take the explanation of the effects of informal networks on the labour market a step further.

The explanation why people would be willing to hinder each other can be argued in the same way as that of why people would want to help each other. In Chapter Two, I already spoke of the shadow of the future and the shadow of the past with regard to friends. If I expect someone to be obstructive in the future, I will be willing to hinder this person in the present. If someone has obstructed me in the past, I will also be willing to take action to this person's disadvantage. Of course there are some basic conditions for this obstructive behaviour, just like there are conditions for supportive behaviour. For instance, it is only possible to hinder someone without limit if one does not need this

person now or in the future. There have to be alternatives. It also has to lie in one's power to hinder the other person.

Again analogous to the argumentation on friendship, I assume that foeship is a transitive good. If ego does not like a certain person, his or her friends will also dislike this person. And if ego is willing to obstruct this person, his or her friends will show the same willingness.

Taking the argument of transitivity a step further, it can be stated that people may be willing to hinder someone, if this person constitutes a threat to a friend. On the labour market this can include unknown foes. Suppose there is someone with certain friends who applies for a job. These friends are willing to help this person, and while doing so, may obstruct another applicant in his or her way up, just to help their friend. This is a foeship without any negative feelings. Someone can obstruct someone else without even knowing him or her, just to help a certain friend. And of course someone can have foes without knowing them or without knowing their (negative) intentions.

Burt's concept of distrust also allows for the idea of sour social capital (Burt & Knez, 1995). Although Burt and Knez do not specifically mention 'foeship' or 'sour social capital', their concept of distrust comes very close as to its intrinsic meaning. Burt and Knez also make an implicit statement about the transitivity of distrust (and trust) by saying that "third-party gossip amplifies both the positive and the negative in a relationship, making ego and alter more certain of their trust (or distrust) in one another". Burt has conducted thorough research on the structure of competition within firms (Burt, 1992). According to him, people can be 'structurally equivalent' within networks, within firms, in the sense that they have the same role in a similar network structure. These people are, in a way, interchangeable and are each other's competitors unless they decide to form coalitions. This choice between competition or coalition can lead to (in my terminology) either friendships or foeships.

Implicitly then, the idea of sour social capital already existed in social research,

but it has never been explicitly turned into testable hypotheses on particularism in the stratification process.

So, who are foes? All kinds of persons can be foes: acquaintances, colleagues and even family members. The only ones who cannot be foes are friends, at least not at the same time. There is one major difference between friends and foes: one does not choose to have foes in one's network. One may leave a network because of the foes, though. Relationships with foes will be involuntary relationships. The labour market and work organisation are liable to force people into relationships with others and, because of this, it is the perfect environment in which to investigate negative relationships and the sour social capital they produce.

In the next sections, some conditions at the individual, organisational, and societal level will be described under which sour social capital can be disadvantageous.

3.3. The harm of foes

As opposed to the theoretical notions about friends, for foes we do not need to take account of differences in the reasons family, acquaintances and others have for obstructing a person in his or her way up. The motives for obstructive behaviour are not inherent to the type of relationship. People can obstruct one another for reasons of jealousy or competition, or maybe for other reasons, but in this study I am mainly interested in the outcome of supportive and obstructive behaviour. The motives for this behaviour are of no direct interest, because they do not influence the outcome. First and foremost, the new idea of friendship versus foeship in the labour market has to be explored.

Also, as opposed to theoretical notions on supportive behaviour, we cannot explicitly differentiate between an employer's or employee's reasons for (trying to) obstruct someone. It is important to realise, though, that in general the average employer

has more power and a higher status than the average employee.

Since we do not have to consider these matters with regard to foes, we can focus directly on the conditions under which foes cause most harm. The next sections will show that the same conditions that guarantee most profit from sweet social capital generally warrant most harm from sour social capital.

3.3.1. Conditions at the individual level that influence the importance and potential harm of sour social capital

On the basis of the assumed analogy between friendship and foeship, we can come to hypotheses on the factors that conditionalise the importance and potential harm of sour social capital at the level of the individual. In this section, I will give four of these hypotheses.

Initial and current social and occupational status. In the discussion on friends, I have argued that if someone has a very high initial status, friends will not be of much profit. If someone has a very low initial status, foes cannot cause a large decline in status. Of course, foes can hinder a person considerably in his or her way up. For people with a very high status, the risk of having foes will be low, in the sense that the foes are probably of lower or at most equal status. Moreover, there will probably be friends with an equally high status. The high position may be at risk due to foes, but be protected by friends.

Status of the foe. A foe with a relatively high status will be of more influence than a foe with an equal or lower status than ego.

Network size. As stated in the foregoing section, one basic condition for obstructing a person is that one does not need this person now or in the future. There have to be alternatives. The alternatives one has are related to the size and quality of one's own network.

Furthermore, if someone has a foe with many other foes who have 'higher priority', the chance of being disadvantaged by him or her is relatively small. Sour social capital is more destructive if someone's foes have few other foes.

Personal unemployment. For unemployed persons, having foes may be the reason they got unemployed in the first place, but it can also be an explanation for the duration of unemployment. Someone who became unemployed due to a bad (work) relationship with his or her supervisor, for instance, will sometimes have a hard time finding a new job because of the lack of recommendations. A boss with whom one had a bad contact will most likely not give good references. People who do have a job, but have many foes, may be at risk of losing their job because of these foes. This may, for instance, occur in case of a company reorganisation. When jobs are on the line, people with many foes are at high risk. Also, if someone only has a temporary contract, which may or may not be prolonged, foes are a potential danger.

3.3.2. Conditions at the organisational level that influence the importance and potential harm of sour social capital

Besides hypotheses at the individual level, we can also formulate hypotheses on the factors that conditionalise the importance and potential harm of sour social capital at the organisational level. In this section I will give two such hypotheses.

Company size. In small companies, having foes is more likely to be destructive. If employees do not get along within a small company, everyone meets the consequences. Employers of small companies will therefore be all the more careful about whom they hire. In a large company the effects of sour social capital will be less noticeable. Yet if an employer needs to hire personnel, foes will be disadvantageous for both the

prospective employee and the employer. Prospective employees will not want to work for an employer about whom they hear only bad things, and employers will not hire persons who are spoken ill of.

Business sector and type of function. Foes are especially damaging in sectors in which sweet social capital can be very advantageous. Likewise, sour social capital is especially disadvantageous in positions with a high damage potential: e.g. very specialised positions, control positions, and positions where the person who hires the new employee has to work with him or her, and functions where trust is a prerequisite.

3.3.3. Conditions at the societal level that influence the importance and potential harm of sour social capital

After the conditions at the individual and the organisational level, I will now give two hypotheses on the conditions that influence the importance and potential harm of sour social capital at the societal level.

Unemployment level. If the level of unemployment is high, sour social capital will have a large influence. Since employers already have difficulties with selection if the labour supply is high, negative accounts of someone will have a large effect. If, on the contrary, the labour market is tight, employers may be willing to run the risk of hiring the wrong person, just because supply is so low.

Government regulations. While a government can issue laws that prohibit nepotism, favouritism and discrimination, a government cannot prevent employers from trying to find the best person for a job. In order to help an employer to do so, and in order to help a prospective employee to get chosen for a certain job, a system of giving references exists. Foes can have an influence here, since they can withhold a reference or give a bad reference. So, in line with the argumentation concerning the potential profit

from friends, government regulations have little influence on the potential harm of foes.

In some countries there are very strict regulations on the conditions under which a person can be fired. This makes it difficult for an employer to get rid of unwanted employees. But employers or co-workers can make life near-impossible for an employee. Employees get 'bullied away' from jobs. Since quitting a job oneself usually leaves a person without the right to unemployment benefit, people that are bullied at work may become ill or disabled. This phenomenon has been acknowledged in the sociology of organisations by, for instance, Van Philips (1968). Van Philips states that a high level of sickness absence in a company points to bad relations in that company. More recently, in the Netherlands, social and organisational psychologists have recognised the problem of bullying, and its effect on the employers as well as on the Gross National Product (see, for instance, Van der Meer, 1997).

People who get bullied at work are also more likely to accept a job elsewhere, even if this job is below their level of expertise. So, regulations that were meant to protect employees can sometimes lead to a deterioration in status of those people the rules mean to protect.

3.4. Summary of the conditions that influence the effect of sour social capital

In the previous three sections, I have tried to conditionalise the relation between the possession of sour social capital and the harm it can do. This led to the following conditions under which sour social capital constitutes most potential harm:

1. High (but not the highest possible) initial or current status. (Although people at the top will want to maintain their position).

2. Foes with a relatively high status (as compared to one's own status).

3. Foes who have few other enemies.

4. People with many foes are at higher risk of unemployment.

4a. If unemployment was due to a lack of social capital or due to having foes, the risk of not finding new employment is high. Having foes may prolong unemployment.

5. In small companies, having foes is more disadvantageous.

6. In business sectors where sweet social capital is very important and in very specialist functions.

7. A high unemployment level (in the entire labour market or sections of the labour market).

8. If government regulations cannot prevent giving bad references or withholding good references by foes.

Of course, it is a bit artificial to conditionalise the benefits of sweet social capital and the disadvantages of sour social capital without considering relative effects. If someone has only one foe, no matter how high that foe is in status, and many friends with a high position, it is quite unlikely (though possible) that this foe will be able to cause much damage. The reverse is equally true: if someone has many foes, one high status friend will probably not be of much help. This is, however, not a subject of this study. There has been a lot of research into sweet social capital, but the assumptions about the effects of sour social capital are still very new. The object of this research is in the first place to investigate whether the idea of sour social capital can face the confrontation with empirical testing.

In the next chapter I will discuss the datasets used for this research. In line with recent trends, I will use not one but two sets of data. I will describe the operationalisation of the concepts of friends and foes, and give some frequencies. Next, some measurement problems concerned with this kind of research will be discussed, as well as the methods of analysis to apply. In Chapter Five and onwards, I will use the data described in Chapter Four.

Chapter Four - Data, Measurements and Methods

4.1. Introduction

In this book I will make extensive use of two large-scale datasets. The 'Netherlands Family Survey 1992-1993' (Ultee & Ganzeboom, 1993) provides data for almost all analyses. The 'Dutch Telepanel Survey' (ESR/Telepanel, 1993) is especially useful for the more sophisticated analyses of the importance of friends and foes.

In the following section, I will first give a description of the sampling methods used in both surveys. I will then describe the measurement of 'friends' and 'foes' and some other key variables. Some descriptive analyses will follow. The chapter closes with an explanation of the methods of analysis to be used.

4.2.1. The Netherlands Family Survey

The Netherlands Family Survey 1992-1993 gives an account of various important life histories, such as educational and labour market careers, of 1000 primary respondents and their 800 spouses. The sample was drawn randomly from the population registers of a stratified collection of 75 Dutch communities. For a thorough description of the data collection procedures and a justification of response rates I refer to the extended code book of the survey (Ganzeboom, Rijken & Weygold, 1994). The response table, as it is depicted in the code book, is reproduced in Table 4.1.

Table 4.1: Response primary survey of the Netherlands Family Survey, 1992-1993.

1. Oversample	Frequency	Percentage
Not used	339	10.4%
Skipped	375	11.5%
Dead, other	26	0.8%
2. Miscellaneous		
Wrong address	50	1.5%
Moved abroad	22	0.7%
Insufficient Dutch	57	1.7%
Ill/handicapped	34	1.0%
3. Response		
Response	1000	30.7%
Refusal	1110	34.1%
3 x not at home	245	7.5%

Response: initial 1000 = 43%

The response rate of 43% is not atypical to Dutch surveys. Response rates are rarely over 50%. The relatively low response in the Family Survey may partly have been caused by the length of the interviews (almost two hours) and the fact that both spouses had to be present at the same time. The survey was primarily designed to collect data on couples. A consequence of this design is that the data had to be weighed for over- or under-representation of groups of respondents (especially single persons). The exact weights that were used can be found in the extended code book (Ganzeboom et al., 1994, page A-16). Later in this chapter, I will discuss the possible consequences of under- or over-representation for the survey-questions used in this research.

4.2.2. The Dutch Telepanel Survey

The sampling of the Telepanel Survey took place in two stages. In the first stage, 8000 phone numbers were selected at random. To reach ex-directory numbers as well, the last two digits of the phone numbers were randomised. From every 100-bank constructed in this manner, one phone number was selected. If the number turned out not to belong to a household, another one was selected from the 100-bank and if necessary this procedure was repeated until a household was found.

All 8,000 households were contacted and asked to co-operate with a telephone interview. Fifty-seven percent of all households agreed. At the end of the telephone interview, the household was asked to participate in the longitudinal research (Telepanel was not yet mentioned as such). Through this procedure, 3,583 households were selected that were willing to co-operate. From these households, a sample of 3,000 was taken. Since income was an important variable for many future users of the Telepanel data, it was necessary to first make sure that the people in the households would answer questions about their income. If they were not prepared to do so, a similar household was obtained for the sample through a 'random walk and random talk' procedure. This procedure means that the interviewer walks through the neighbourhood until a similarly looking house is found.

The Telepanel Survey consisted of three waves, of which the second wave is most relevant to this research. The second wave contains about 1,900 households, with approximately 3,500 household members. Background characteristics generally comply with Dutch households in general.

A complete justification of the representativity of the total survey can be obtained from the Steinmetz Archive (ESR/Telepanel, 1992-1993, Steinmetz Archive).

4.3.1. Operationalisations of 'friends' and 'foes' in both datasets

For several reasons, it is not possible to just ask people who their friends or foes in the workplace are.

First, people may simply not know who their friends and foes in the workplace are. Sometimes help may come from an unexpected direction, and of course the same is true for opposition.

Second, people may have different perceptions of the terms friends and foes. It is quite understandable that someone does not grasp the meaning of the words 'friend in the workplace' as somebody who might be able and willing to help him or her upwards, and a foe as the opposite.

Mainly for those reasons, in the 'Family Survey' the primary respondents were asked to answer two questions about every job they had had (or still had) at the time of the interview, namely 'How did you get the job?' and 'What was the reason for leaving the job?'. The number of jobs could amount to 12. The spouses were not asked these two questions, which is why I have first checked whether the weight constructed to control for under-representation of single persons had any influence on the division of the answers to these questions. The weight turned out to have no consequences for this division, which led to the conclusion that the key variables in this research are not influenced by under-representation of single persons. I therefore decided not to weight the data, to keep the outcomes of subsequent analyses as transparent as possible.[1] For the question 'How did you get the job', respondents could choose between sixteen categories. I recoded the answers 'friend, relation', 'partner', 'father', 'mother', 'brother, sister', 'family of partner', 'other family', and 'asked' all into 'friends'. The answers 'apply to advertisement', 'placed advertisement', 'open application', 'employment bureau', 'secretarial bureau', 'internal transfer', 'internal promotion', and 'other' I labelled 'different ways'. I then added up all the answers in both categories for all twelve (possible) jobs. In total, 3,095 jobs were

mentioned, of which 1,142 (37%) were found through friends, and 1953 (63%) through different channels.

With respect to the question 'What was the reason for leaving the job?' there were, again, sixteen different categories of answers. Only 'problems with colleagues' was recoded into 'foes'. 'Close company', 'discharge', 'retirement', 'temporal contract', 'discharge because of marriage', 'change job partner', 'care family', 'own health', 'health partner', 'better-paid job', 'other suitable job', 'closer to home', 'internal promotion', 'internal transfer', and 'other' were all recoded as 'different reasons'. Again added up for all twelve possible jobs per respondent, a total of 2,586 jobs resulted, of which 44 (2%) were left because of foes and 2,542 (98%) because of different reasons.

In the 'Telepanel' similar questions were asked. For the question 'How did you get in contact with your employer?', 14 answer categories were given. I recoded 'family', 'good friend', 'acquaintance', and 'asked' into 'friends'. 'School/education', 'advertisement', 'employment bureau', 'secretarial bureau', 'approached by personnel manager', 'own initiative', 'job during studies', 'other', 'through former job', and 'internal transfer' were labelled 'different ways'. Respondents could answer this question for as many as 36 jobs. Of the 9,596 jobs mentioned, 2,867 (30%) were found through 'friends', and 6,729 (70%) were found through 'different ways'. The slight difference with the Family Survey can most likely be ascribed to the much lower number of possible answer categories for 'friends'.

In the Dutch Telepanel Survey, the respondents were not asked about the reason for leaving all previous jobs in their career. The question was only asked for the job before last, and was posed as 'Did you leave your job before last because of problems with colleagues?'. To this question 31 respondents (2%) replied 'yes' and 1,759 (98%) replied 'no'. This question was also asked for all other possible reasons for leaving a job, ending with 'Did you leave your job before last because of other reasons?'. Here the respondents could type their own reply. Many of these replies indicated serious problems with the boss

or work leader. Although we cannot really use these data in our analyses, they still give some striking examples of the emotions with which work relations can be surrounded. One respondent used very strong terms to express how awful a person he considered his boss to be. This example is, however, not fit for citation (sic). However emotional some of the answers, they gave clear indication that we are 'on to something' with the idea of sour social capital on the labour market.

Of course the problem of underestimating the importance of friends and foes is not resolved by just asking people how they got their job or why they left it. With respect to friends, underestimation may still occur because of the norm of equality (we presume) in our society. People living in a society with such a norm will have incorporated this norm. This may make it less politically correct to admit to having been helped to a job by a friend, or even through favouritism. People may still consider it an open application, for instance, when a friend has drawn their attention to a job opening in a certain company. The 'friend' as a source of information will then remain unrecognised, and unmeasured by our instrument.

To control for this possible measurement error, some more or less objective 'friend-and-foe' generating questions were included. For every job, the respondents of the Netherlands Family Survey were asked whether they could get along with the work leader, their colleagues, and what the atmosphere at work was like. I recoded the answers 'very bad' and 'bad' into 'bad'. 'Pretty well', 'well' and 'very well' were captured by 'good'. Again added up for all jobs, 231 (8%) of the contacts with the work leader were considered to be 'bad', as opposed to 2,801 (92%) 'good' contacts. 109 (4%) of the contacts with colleagues were 'bad', and 2,953 (96%) were 'good'. The atmosphere at work was judged as 'bad' in 145 (5%) of the cases, and 'good' in 3,122 instances (95%).

In the Dutch Telepanel Survey, people were asked about the quality of their contacts with their colleagues in the job before last. 99 (6%) of the respondents answered

'bad', whereas 1583 (94%) claimed that these contacts were good. In addition, the respondents were asked, 'In your job before last, did you have very good personal contacts?' To this question 267 (25%) respondents replied 'no', and 801 (75%) replied 'yes'. When asked 'In the job before last, did you have bad contacts with colleagues' 373 persons (21%) replied 'yes', and 1,411 (79%) replied 'no'. The question that generated foes in the most direct way was 'In your job before last, were there persons obstructing you?'. 1,564 (87%) of the respondents said 'no', while 226 (13%) claimed to have been obstructed.

All in all, we seem to have succeeded in measuring friends and foes. Although many more people claim to have friends than foes, both cases occur in both surveys. It has to be kept in mind that I counted the answers on foes in the strictest possible way, to avoid discussion about the content of the variables to be used in the analyses.

With 'foes', the issue of over- or underestimation is a bit more complicated than with 'friends'. In general, foes can be overestimated or underestimated for several reasons. Underestimation can occur for the two reasons that were mentioned for friends: first, people may simply not know their foes in the workplace, and people may not perceive someone who is willing to block their way up as a foe. Second, it appears to be a taboo to admit to having foes, even if having foes just means that you do no not get along with your colleagues. As described in Chapter Three, in the written press in the Netherlands there appear more and more articles on people who are literally driven away from the workplace by their colleagues. It seems as if the taboo is being lifted.

Yet there can also be reasons why the number of foes is overestimated. In the first instance, one would think that opponents are always negative assets. But if people get to a higher level in spite of opposition, this may be considered a major accomplishment; it will at least be considered more of an accomplishment than rising on the status ladder with the help of friends.

The general expectation even seems to be that people at a higher level have more to endure, as the saying 'high winds blow on high hills' illustrates.

Measurement errors may also occur due to frustration. When, for instance, someone doesn't manage to climb the status ladder, he or she may get discontented or even a bit paranoid. This will lead to an overestimation of the number of 'foes'.

Of course, this is all speculation, which is exactly the problem. Since research into negative relationships in the workplace, and their impact (*sour* social capital) has not been performed before, there is no way of knowing how large the degree of under- or overestimation is. Moreover, although there has been done ample research on *sweet* social capital, we also do not *know* how many people with 'friends' we can expect. This problem is reduced by using several questions that generate information about 'friends' and 'foes'. Moreover, since both over- and underestimation are likely to occur, they will probably rule each other out.

The Dutch Telepanel Survey included a whole set of questions about friends and foes, designed especially for this research. Besides the questions that run parallel to the questions in the Family Survey (which have all been mentioned before), a second series of questions were posed. The questions are depicted in Table 4.2. The frequencies and percentages are also given in the table. Regarding the questions on 'good' colleagues, 'bad' colleagues, opponents and old acquaintances in jobs during the career, the exact formulation was as follows: 'This question relates to the people you got on with well/badly in the job before last. If you think of these people (with a maximum of 3), was their position higher than, equal to or lower than yours?'; and 'This question relates to the people who obstructed you in the job before last. If you think of these people (with a maximum of 3), was their position higher than, equal to or lower than yours?' For old acquaintances at the job before last, a similar question was asked.

Table 4.2: Frequencies and percentages of answers to more elaborate questions on friends and foes from the Dutch Telepanel Survey.

question	answer	freq.	%	question	answer	freq.	%
1st job through personal contact?	no	970	54%	good colleague3, higher or lower?	higher	224	18%
	yes	820	46%		equal	687	55%
job before last through personal contact?	no	852	63%		lower	346	27%
	yes	502	37%	bad colleague1, higher or lower?	higher	196	54%
current job through personal contact?	no	1321	60%		equal	121	34%
	yes	891	40%		lower	43	12%
sex contact person 1st job?	male	610	74%	bad colleague2, higher or lower?	higher	65	33%
	female	210	26%		equal	95	48%
sex contact person job before last?	male	402	80%		lower	37	19%
	female	101	20%	bad colleague3, higher or lower?	higher	39	24%
sex contact person current job?	male	648	73%		equal	74	47%
	female	243	27%		lower	44	28%
sex contact person last application?	male	36	63%	opponent1 at work, higher or lower?	higher	155	73%
	female	21	37%		equal	37	17%
how well did you know contact person 1st job?	slightly	329	40%		lower	21	10%
	pretty well	200	24%	opponent2 at work, higher or lower?	higher	50	50%
	very well	291	36%		equal	29	29%
how well did you know contact person job before last?	slightly	195	39%		lower	21	21%
	pretty well	149	30%	opponent3 at work, higher or lower?	higher	24	37%
	very well	159	32%		equal	23	35%
how well did you know contact person current job?	slightly	306	34%		lower	18	28%
	pretty well	293	33%	old acquaintance1, higher or lower?	higher	348	48%
	very well	292	33%		equal	325	44%
how well did you know contact person last application?	slightly	13	23%		lower	60	8%
	pretty well	23	40%	old acquaintance2, higher or lower?	higher	153	27%
	very well	21	37%		equal	345	60%
good colleague1, higher or lower?	higher	532	38%		lower	72	13%
	equal	712	51%	old acquaintance3, higher or lower?	higher	90	18%
	lower	150	11%		equal	285	56%
good colleague2, higher or lower?	higher	225	17%		lower	134	26%
	equal	888	67%	already knew people in company before job?	no	1389	63%
	lower	214	16%		yes	823	37%

. . . .   51

In addition to the questions depicted in Table 4.2, some questions were asked about the profession of the respondent's two best friends when the respondent was aged 35 and 50 (of course, taking the current age of the respondent into consideration), and about the two best friends of the parents or the caretakers of the respondent at the age he or she left regular full-time education. Furthermore, the respondents were presented with a list of 30 professions, for each of which they were asked to indicate whether they had a friend, acquaintance or family member with such a profession. This was done to also investigate the respondent's access to social capital, rather than just the use of social capital (see Lin & Dumin, 1986).

In the next section I will discuss the operationalisations of some other key variables in this research.

4.3.2. Operationalisations of some other key variables

In Chapter One, I explained that I want to include indicators of sweet and sour social capital into Blau and Duncan's status attainment model (1967). In order to do so, the key variables in that model need to be operationalised. As can be seen in Figure 1.1, I need indicators for the education of the father, the occupation of the father, the education of the respondent, the respondent's first job and the respondent's current occupation.

In the Family Survey, respondents were asked about their father's highest completed education and his occupation at the time that the respondent was 15 years old. The respondents were also asked after their own complete educational and occupational careers, from which it is easy to derive the highest completed education, the first job and the current or last job.

In the Telepanel Survey, respondents were asked roughly the same questions, except that here, the respondents were asked to state their father's occupation when they were 12 years old. Two complementary questions were asked to obtain the father's first

occupation and his current or last occupation.

To be able to use the variables in the analyses in the following chapters, I recoded them into ordinal-level scales:

Level of education. For this the Standard Educational Index from 1978 (Central Bureau of Statistics) was used: (1) primary; (2) low vocational, extended primary; (3) middle vocational, grammar; (4) higher vocational; (5) university.

Occupational prestige. The Ultee-Sixma prestige scale was used for this. This scale takes on values from 13 (garbage collector) to 87 (surgeon). For information on the construction of this scale I refer to Sixma and Ultee (1982).

In some of the analyses, I will extend the status attainment model with income as a dependent variable. For this, I will use the net monthly income in Dutch guilders. This variable has imputed values for missing cases (Ganzeboom et al., 1994). I will not use income in the dynamic longitudinal analyses, since I consider it an unreliable variable if the respondent has to recall this information for the past.[2]

Another important factor in the analyses is whether people have ever unsuccessfully applied for a job. In order to measure this, respondents in the Telepanel were asked about the last time they ever unsuccessfully applied for a job. About this last application we know how the respondent learned about the job opening. Furthermore, if a contact person was used, we know the sex and occupational prestige of this contact person, and how well the respondent knew the contact person.

The operationalisations and codings of relevant context variables will be explained in the sections where they are being used in the analyses. In the following section, I will check on selectivity in the groups of people that claim to have friends and foes.

4.4. What kind of people have friends and foes and what kinds of friends and foes do people have?

In order to answer the question posed in the title of this section, we first had to establish whether people have friends and foes at all. In Section 4.3 this was thoroughly examined and the conclusion was that people indeed have friends and foes. In addition, we would like to know what kind of people have friends and foes and what kinds of friends and foes people have. It is important to establish that the groups of people who claim to have friends and foes on the labour market are not select ones. If the absence of selectivity with regard to certain aspects cannot be established, one might argue that 'good' people have friends and 'bad' people have foes. Such an argument would reverse the causal order in our model. One could then state that people with friends find better jobs, because they are better suited to those jobs, rather than because they have friends. And for people with foes the opposite could be true. In order to check for selectivity, and to show what kinds of friends and foes people have, the next sub-sections show some cross-calculations of the friends and foes variables with sex, age, education, status of ego, and the status of the friends and foes.

4.4.1. What kind of people have friends and foes?

In order to show that the people who claim to have (had) friends and/or foes in the occupational career are different from people without friends and/or foes, I first broke down the 'friends' and 'foes' variables from the Family Survey by sex and age. Age was divided into five categories (< 25, 25-35, 35-45, 45-55, and 55 >). There is no rationale behind this division. The conclusions from the table are not influenced by chosen categories, since I used row-percentages. The results of the cross-calculations are shown in Table 4.3.

The cells in Table 4.3 show first the row percentage of that cell, which is the number of cases in the cell divided by the row total. The percentages in one specific column should not vary (too much) for the groups to be equal with regard to the friend or foe variable concerned. Besides the percentages, the number of cases is put between brackets. This has been done to show that occasional, seemingly big differences are not important. In some cells (especially of the foe categories) the number of cases is very low. Note that the unit of measurement here is not 'respondents', but jobs. From Table 4.3 it can be seen that the number of jobs found through friends does not differ for men and women. The same is true for the number of jobs left because of foes. In fact, the only difference between the sexes is the contacts with colleagues. Of the jobs where the contacts with colleagues were bad, relatively much were held by women. For the age groups there are no large differences, although there seems to be a slightly higher percentage of jobs with foes in the age group of 25-35, and a lower percentage in the oldest age group.

The best conclusion that can be drawn from Table 4.3 is that the people who have friends and foes do not differ with regard to sex and age. Sex and age are, however, useful factors if one is only interested in what kind of people have friends and foes. In this research, it is of utmost importance, though, that we know whether the group of people who claim to have friends and foes is not selective with regard to characteristics that are relevant to the labour market. The most relevant characteristics are presumed to be intelligence, talents, and job skills. As indicators of those characteristics I chose education and occupational prestige.

Table 4.3: Cross-calculations of friend- and foe-generating questions from Family Survey with sex and age. Row percentages (N between brackets).

		Sex			Age					
		male	female	total	< 25	25 - 35	35 - 45	45 - 55	55 >	total
How did you find job?	friends	54% (612)	46% (530)	100% (1142)	7% (79)	27% (308)	30% (347)	22% (256)	13% (152)	100% (1142)
	different	56% (1088)	44% (865)	100% (1953)	8% (157)	28% (552)	31% (605)	21% (411)	12% (228)	100% (1953)
	total	55% (1700)	45% (1395)	100% (3095)	8% (236)	28% (860)	31% (952)	21% (667)	12% (380)	100% (3095)
Why did you leave job?	colleagues	61% (27)	39% (17)	100% (44)	9% (4)	43% (19)	41% (18)	2% (1)	5% (2)	100% (44)
	different	54% (1364)	46% (1178)	100% (2542)	6% (162)	26% (651)	31% (795)	23% (575)	14% (359)	100% (2542)
	total	54% (1391)	46% (1195)	100% (2586)	6% (166)	26% (670)	31% (813)	22% (576)	14% (361)	100% (2586)
Contact work-leader	bad	57% (131)	43% (100)	100% (231)	6% (13)	36% (83)	32% (75)	19% (43)	7% (17)	100% (231)
	good	56% (1560)	44% (1241)	100% (2801)	8% (213)	27% (790)	31% (861)	21% (595)	13% (362)	100% (2801)
	total	56% (1691)	43% (1259)	100% (3032)	8% (226)	28% (853)	31% (936)	21% (638)	12% (399)	100% (3032)
Contact collea-gues	bad	47% (51)	53% (58)	100% (109)	5% (6)	32% (35)	29% (32)	26% (28)	7% (8)	100% (109)
	good	58% (1643)	42% (1201)	100% (2844)	8% (223)	28% (805)	32% (900)	20% (580)	12% (336)	100% (2844)
	total	56% (1694)	43% (1259)	100% (2953)	8% (229)	28% (840)	32% (932)	20% (608)	12% (344)	100% (2953)
Atmo-sphere at job	bad	50% (72)	50% (73)	100% (145)	12% (17)	35% (51)	25% (37)	17% (25)	10% (15)	100% (145)
	good	56% (1667)	44% (1310)	100% (2977)	7% (218)	27% (811)	31% (938)	21% (641)	12% (369)	100% (2977)
	total	56% (1739)	44% (1383)	100% (3122)	8% (235)	28% (862)	31% (975)	21% (666)	12% (384)	100% (3122)

In Table 4.4 the friends and foes variables from the Family Survey are broken down by these indicators. Education was divided into low, middle and high, and prestige into very low, low, average, above average, high, and very high. Again, these divisions are of no consequence for the conclusions that can be drawn from the table. The table is constructed in the same way as Table 4.3: in the cells first the row percentages are given, followed by the number of cases (jobs) between brackets.

From Table 4.4 it can be seen that a slightly higher percentage of jobs found through friends fall into the category of 'low' education. Although this is a form of selectivity, it is opposite to what was expected. Rather than the argument that 'good' people have friends to help them, the argument that 'not-so-good' people think they need help to get a job, seems to hold. This is no disturbing selectivity for the theory as presented in this book. Thus, from Table 4.4 it can be concluded that there is no real selectivity with regard to education. For prestige, something similar is found. The percentage of jobs found through friends is relatively high in the prestige category 'low'; again, this represents no disturbing selectivity.

In the Dutch Telepanel Survey there are also some friend and foe generating questions. In order to check for selectivity, I have constructed a similar table for these data as for the Family Survey. A major difference is that, for the Telepanel, I have only used the questions on the job before last, and broken these data down into sex and age groups. The units in the cells are now the people who gave a certain answer to the question instead of jobs, as was the case in Tables 4.3 and 4.4. In Table 4.5 the answers to the friend and foe generating questions are broken down into sex and age groups, with again row percentages and number of cases in the cells.

Table 4.5 leads to the same conclusions as we drew from Table 4.3 for the Family Survey: there is no real selectivity with regard to sex and age in the number of people naming friends and/or foes.

Table 4.4: Cross-calculations of friend- and foe- generating questions from the Family Survey with education and occupational prestige. Row percentages (N between brackets).

		education				occupational prestige						
		low	middle	high	total	very low	low	average	above average	high	very high	total
How did you find job?	friend	47% (530)	28% (322)	25% (287)	100% (1139)	5% (55)	48% (528)	18% (195)	19% (207)	7% (77)	4% (45)	100% (1107)
	different	31% (609)	36% (704)	33% (631)	100% (1944)	4% (73)	30% (571)	23% (436)	30% (577)	9% (173)	5% (89)	100% (1919)
	total	37% (1139)	33% (1026)	30% (918)	100% (3083)	4% (128)	36% (1099)	21% (631)	26% (784)	8% (250)	4% (134)	100% (3026)
Why did you leave job?	col-lea-gues	25% (8)	34% (11)	41% (13)	100% (32)	5% (2)	39% (17)	18% (8)	34% (15)		5% (2)	100% (44)
	different	38% (661)	33% (576)	29% (492)	100% (1729)	5% (116)	37% (925)	21% (524)	25% (630)	8% (203)	4% (94)	100% (2492)
	total	38% (669)	33% (587)	29% (505)	100% (1761)	5% (118)	37% (942)	21% (532)	25% (645)	8% (203)	4% (96)	100% (2536)
Contact work leader	bad	40% (93)	26% (59)	34% (79)	100% (231)	6% (14)	40% (91)	17% (38)	24% (56)	7% (17)	6% (13)	100% (229)
	good	37% (1034)	33% (924)	30% (831)	100% (2789)	4% (112)	36& (973)	21% (572)	26% (716)	9% (244)	4% (112)	100% (2729)
	total	37% (1127)	33% (983)	30% (910)	100% (3020)	4% (126)	36% (1064)	21% (610)	26% (772)	9& (261)	4% (125)	100% (2958)
Contact col-lea-gues	bad	46% (50)	31% (34)	23% (25)	100% (109)	8% (8)	49% (52)	18% (19)	16% (17)	6% (6)	3% (3)	100% (105)
	good	35% (995)	33% (944)	32% (895)	100% (2834)	4% (115)	33% (923)	21% (581)	28% (764)	9% (263)	5% (132)	100% (2778)
	total	36% (1045)	33% (978)	31% (920)	100% (2943)	4% (123)	34% (975)	21% (600)	27% (781)	9% (269)	5% (135)	100% (2883)
Atmo-sphere at work place	bad	35% (50)	32% (45)	33% (47)	100% (142)	6% (8)	41% (58)	21% (30)	26% (37)	4% (6)	2% (3)	100% (142)
	good	36% (1090)	33% (975)	30% (900)	100% (2965)	4% (121)	35% (1022)	21% (599)	26% (752)	9% (267)	5% (141)	100% (2902)
	total	37% (1140)	33% (1020)	30% (947)	100% (3107)	4% (129)	35% (1080)	21% (629)	26% (789)	9% (273)	5% (144)	100% (3044)

Table 4.5: Cross-calculations of friend- and foe-generating questions from the Telepanel Survey with gender and age. Row percentages (N between brackets).

		sex			age					
		male	female	total	> 25	25-35	35-45	45-55	55 >	total
Why leave job before last?	colleagues	42% (13)	58% (18)	100% (31)	16% (5)	23% (7)	39% (12)	10% (3)	13% (4)	100% (31)
	different	56% (986)	44% (773)	100% (1759)	6% (106)	25% (447)	24% (424)	18% (324)	26% (458)	100% (1759)
	total	56% (999)	44% (791)	100% (1790)	6% (111)	25% (454)	24% (436)	18% (327)	26% (462)	100% (1790)
Good contact colleagues?	bad	48% (47)	52% (52)	100% (99)	15% (15)	28% (28)	27% (27)	14% (14)	15% (15)	100% (99)
	good	57% (897)	43% (686)	100% (1583)	5% (92)	26% (404)	25% (390)	18% (286)	26% (411)	100% (1583)
	total	56% (944)	44% (738)	100% (1682)	6% (107)	26% (432)	25% (417)	18% (300)	25% (426)	100% (1682)
Very good pers. contact?	no	54% (143)	46% (124)	100% (267)	8% (22)	30% (80)	25% (66)	18% (49)	19% (50)	100% (267)
	yes	59% (474)	41% (327)	100% (801)	7% (60)	27% (219)	25% (201)	16% (131)	24% (190)	100% (801)
	total	58% (617)	42% (451)	100% (1068)	8% (82)	28% (299)	25% (267)	17% (180)	22% (240)	100% (1068)
Bad contact colleagues?	no	55% (772)	45% (639)	100% (1411)	5% (73)	22% (314)	25% (351)	20% (283)	28% (390)	100% (1411)
	yes	60% (223)	40% (150)	100% (373)	10% (38)	37% (138)	22% (84)	12% (43)	19% (70)	100% (371)
	total	56% (995)	44% (789)	100% (1784)	6% (111)	25% (452)	24% (435)	18% (326)	26% (460)	100% (1784)
Opponents in job before last?	no	55% (855)	45% (709)	100% (1564)	6% (93)	25% (389)	24% (377)	19% (292)	26% (413)	100% (1564)
	yes	64% (144)	36% (82)	100% (226)	8% (18)	29% (65)	26% (59)	15% (35)	22% (49)	100% (226)
	total	56% (999)	44% (791)	100% (1790)	6% (111)	25% (454)	24% (436)	18% (327)	26% (462)	100% (1790)
Job through contact?	no	56% (474)	44% (378)	100% (852)	7% (57)	25% (213)	26% (222)	19% (163)	23% (197)	100% (852)
	yes	64% (320)	36% (183)	100% (503)	4% (21)	20% (99)	25% (124)	19% (97)	32% (162)	100% (503)
	total	59% (794)	41% (561)	100% (1355)	6% (78)	23% (312)	25% (346)	19% (260)	27% (359)	100% (1355)

Table 4.6: Cross-calculations of friend- and foe-generating questions from the Telepanel Survey with education. Row percentages (N between brackets).

		Education			
		low	middle	high	total
Why leave job before last?	different	40% (507)	33% (414)	27% (336)	100% (1257)
	colleagues	40% (8)	25% (5)	35% (7)	100% (20)
	total	40% (515)	33% (419)	27% (343)	100% (1277)
Good contact colleagues?	bad	31% (22)	37% (26)	32% (23)	100% (71)
	good	40% (446)	33% (375)	27% (302)	100% (1123)
	total	39% (468)	34% (401)	27% (325)	100% (1194)
Very good personal contact?	no	46% (89)	32% (62)	22% (43)	100% (194)
	yes	40% (224)	31% (170)	29% (163)	100% (557)
	total	42% (313)	31% (232)	27% (206)	100% (751)
Bad contact colleagues?	no	44% (444)	32% (327)	24% (248)	100% (1019)
	yes	28% (70)	35% (90)	37% (94)	100% (254)
	total	40% (514)	33% (417)	27% (342)	100% (1273)
Opponents in job before last?	no	41% (216)	36% (222)	29% (179)	100% (617)
	yes	33% (53)	35% (56)	33% (53)	100% (162)
	total	40% (515)	33% (419)	27% (342)	100% (1277)
Job through contact?	no	35% (216)	36% (222)	29% (179)	100% (617)
	yes	43% (148)	32% (110)	26% (89)	100% (347)
	total	38% (364)	34% (332)	28% (268)	100% (964)

In Table 4.6 the friend and foe generating questions from the Telepanel are broken down into educational groups. In Table 4.6, the same non-disturbing selectivity occurs as in Table 4.4. People with a low education more often say that they used a contact to acquire a job.

The question what kind of people have friends and foes, can now be answered with reference to sex, age, education and occupational prestige. And the answer is that men and women, people from all age groups, people with a 'low', 'middle' and 'high' education, and people with jobs with different occupational prestige all have relatively the same number of friends and foes.

In the next sub-section I will answer the question what kinds of friends and foes people have

4.4.2. What kinds of friends and foes do people have?

In order to answer the question what kinds of friends and foes people have, we need to look into the more elaborate questions on the characteristics of contact persons and opponents measured in the Telepanel. In Tables 4.7A and 4.7B I have broken down the answers to these questions into sex and age groups; in Table 4.8, I have done the same with education. So in fact the question to be answered should read: what kind of people have what kinds of friends and foes?

Table 4.7A: Cross-calculations of characteristics of friends and foes from Telepanel Survey with sex and age. Row percentages (N between brackets).

		Sex			Age					
		male	female	total	< 25	25-35	35-45	45-55	55 >	total
Sex of contact ?	male	74% (297)	26% (105)	100% (402)	3% (10)	19% (77)	25% (102)	19% (76)	34% (137)	100% (402)
	female	23% (23)	77% (78)	100% (101)	11% (11)	22% (22)	22% (22)	21% (21)	25% (25)	100% (101)
	total	64% (320)	36% (183)	100% (503)	4% (21)	20% (99)	25% (124)	19% (97)	32% (162)	100% (503)
Knew contact person well?	slight-ly	64% (125)	36% (70)	100% (195)	5% (9)	21% (41)	27% (52)	17% (34)	30% (59)	100% (195)
	pretty well	61% (91)	39% (58)	100% (149)	3% (4)	21% (32)	23% (34)	22% (33)	31% (46)	100% (149)
	very well	65% (104)	35% (55)	100% (159)	5% (8)	16% (26)	24% (38)	19% (30)	36% (57)	100% (159)
	total	64% (320)	36% (183)	100% (503)	4% (21)	20% (99)	25% (124)	19% (97)	32% (162)	100% (503)
Good col-league 1, higher or lower?	higher	56% (296)	44% (236)	100% (532)	6% (31)	26% (140)	21% (111)	18% (93)	29% (157)	100% (532)
	equal	55% (388)	45% (324)	100% (712)	7% (47)	27% (192)	27% (192)	18% (125)	22% (156)	100% (712)
	lower	73% (109)	27% (41)	100% (150)	3% (4)	18% (27)	25% (37)	17% (25)	38% (57)	100% (150)
	total	57% (793)	43% (601)	100% (1394)	6% (82)	26% (359)	24% (340)	17% (243)	27% (370)	100% (1394)

Table 4.7B: Cross-calculations of characteristics of friends and foes from Telepanel Survey with sex and age. Row percentages (N between brackets).

		Sex			Age					
		male	female	total	< 25	25-35	35-45	45-55	55 >	total
Bad colleague 1, higher or lower?	higher	61% (119)	39% (77)	100% (196)	14% (27)	39% (77)	19% (37)	9% (18)	19% (37)	100% (196)
	equal	57% (69)	43% (52)	100% (121)	8% (10)	40% (49)	26% (32)	13% (16)	12% (15)	100% (121)
	lower	67% (29)	33% (14)	100% (43)	---	23% (10)	26% (11)	19% (8)	33% (14)	100% (43)
	total	60% (217)	40% (143)	100% (360)	10% (37)	38% (135)	22% (88)	12% (42)	18% (66)	100% (360)
Opponent 1, higher or lower?	higher	68% (105)	32% (50)	100% (155)	10% (16)	32% (50)	23% (35)	16% (24)	19% (30)	100% (155)
	equal	49% (18)	51% (19)	100% (37)	5% (2)	30% (11)	27% (10)	16% (6)	22% (8)	100% (37)
	lower	73% (44)	27% (16)	100% (60)	13% (8)	20% (12)	12% (7)	17% (10)	38% (23)	100% (60)
	total	60% (440)	40% (293)	100% (733)	8% (56)	27% (197)	22% (158)	17% (123)	27% (199)	100% (733)
Old acq. 1, higher or lower?	higher	62% (216)	38% (132)	100% (348)	7% (24)	27% (94)	19% (65)	18% (63)	29% (102)	100% (348)
	equal	53% (180)	45% (145)	100% (325)	7% (24)	28% (91)	27% (86)	15% (50)	23% (74)	100% (325)
	lower	73% (44)	27% (16)	100% (60)	13% (8)	20% (12)	12% (70)	17% (10)	38% (23)	100% (60)
	total	60% (440)	40% (293)	100% (733)	8% (56)	27% (197)	22% (158)	17% (123)	27% (199)	100% (733)
Status contact person	very low	63% (5)	37% (3)	100% (8)	13% (1)	---	635 (5)	12% (1)	12% (1)	100% (8)
	low	67% (56)	33% (28)	100% (84)	4% (30)	14% (12)	24% (20)	32% (27)	26% (22)	100% (84)
	average	60% (41)	40% (27)	100% (68)	35 (2)	18% (12)	26% (18)	15% (10)	38% (26)	100% (68)
	above average	54% (47)	46% (40)	100% (87)	75 (6)	30% (26)	15% (13)	16% (14)	32% (28)	100% (87)
	high	69% (48)	31% (22)	100% (70)	4% (3)	19% (13)	26% (18)	20% (14)	31% (22)	100% (70)
	very high	70% (110)	30% (46)	100% (156)	4% (6)	20% (32)	27% (42)	14% (22)	35% (55)	100% (156)
	total	65% (307)	35% (116)	100% (473)	4% (21)	20% (94)	24% (116)	19% (88)	33% (154)	100% (473)

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Table 4.8: Cross-calculations of characteristics of friends and foes from Telepanel Survey with education. Row percentages (N between brackets).

		Education			
		low	middle	high	total
Sex of contact person?	male	43% (114)	32% (84)	26% (68)	100% (266)
	female	42% (34)	32% (26)	26% (21)	100% (81)
	total	43% (148)	32% (110)	26% (89)	100% (347)
Knew contact person well?	slightly	46% (64)	30% (42)	23% (32)	100% (138)
	pretty well	33% (35)	39% (41)	28% (30)	100% (106)
	very well	48% (49)	26% (27)	26% (27)	100% (103)
	total	43% (148)	32% (110)	26% (89)	100% (347)
Good colleague 1, higher or lower?	higher	34% (127)	38% (139)	28% (102)	100% (368)
	equal	42% (211)	28% (139)	30% (153)	100% (503)
	lower	22% (24)	48% (52)	30% (32)	100% (108)
	total	37% (362)	34% (330)	29% (287)	100% (979)
Bad colleague 1, higher or lower?	higher	30% (40)	33% 944)	38% (51)	100% (135)
	equal	26% (22)	41% (34)	33% (27)	100% (83)
	lower	11% (3)	41% (11)	48% (13)	100% (27)
	total	27% (65)	36% (89)	37% (91)	100% (245)
Opponent 1, higher or lower?	higher	33% (35)	36% (38)	31% (33)	100% (106)
	equal	27% (8)	30% (9)	43% (13)	100% (30)
	lower	38% (6)	31% (5)	31% (5)	100% (16)
	total	32% (49)	34% (52)	34% (51)	100% (152)
Old acq. 1, higher or lower?	higher	36% (87)	32% (78)	32% (79)	100% (244)
	equal	39% (95)	33% (79)	28% (68)	100% (242)
	lower	19% (8)	43% (18)	38% (16)	100% (42)
	total	36% (190)	33% (175)	31% (163)	100% (528)
Status contact person?	very low	86% (6)	14% (1)	---	100% (7)
	low	63% (37)	36% (21)	2% (1)	100% (59)
	average	45% (21)	32% (15)	23% (11)	100% (47)
	above average	34% (20)	32% (19)	34% (20)	100% (59)
	high	18% (8)	32% (14)	50% (22)	100% (44)
	very high	40% (44)	30% (33)	29% (32)	100% (109)
	total	42% (136)	32% (103)	26% (86)	100% (325)

The clearest difference in the tables is the difference between men and women when it comes to the sex of the contact person. Two conclusions can be drawn: 1) contact persons are mostly men, and 2) women have relatively more female contacts than men, whereas men have relatively more male contact persons. However interesting these facts may be, they are of no disturbing selective influence on the theory at hand. As for the rest, the tables show little selectivity or differences between the characteristics of friends and foes. This answers our initial question: all kinds of people have all kinds of friends and foes.

The aim of this section was to show that there are no real disturbing differences between groups of people with respect to their having friends and foes and with respect to the kinds of friends and foes they have. Note that this is only of importance for the cross-sectional analyses in this research. In the dynamic analyses, such selectivity would show in the results. Now that the absence of selectivity has been established, we can safely proceed with our analyses in the following chapters. Before doing so, however, I will describe the methods of analyses used.

4.5. Methods: regression analysis and event history analysis

Since this research focuses essentially on a new topic, most analyses bear a descriptive character. Some explanatory analyses will be performed however. In the past, Ordinary Least Squares regression has proved to be a useful method of analysis for explanatory questions. The beauty of this method is that it provides standardised coefficients, which enables us to calculate the strength of indirect effects. The coefficients in the path model in Figure 1.1 form a nice graphic example of a tool obtained by Ordinary Least Squares

regression. If one multiplies the coefficients of subsequent arrows (following the direction of the arrows), one obtains the indirect effect of one variable on another. If including an indirect effect in the model, leads to the disappearance of a direct effect, the direct effect is explained 'away'.

The method of Ordinary Least Squares regression can, however, not deal with multinominal variables or with life-chances data. In order to analyse such data, a research method has been developed that is generally known as Event History Analysis. Although this method is most thoroughly described by, for instance, Allison (1984) and Yamaguchi (1991), I find it useful to give a brief description of what the method entails, and what kinds of questions it can provide answers to.

For several questions we posed in Chapters One, Two and Three, a cross-sectional design will suffice. For the questions regarding changes over time, a longitudinal design is required. In both the Netherlands Family Survey and the Dutch Telepanel Survey, questions about lifelong careers were posed, as was described in Section 4.3. In order to make maximum use of the available information, it is necessary to approach the data in a somewhat different manner than we did before. Instead of taking the respondent as the primary unit, as is customary in most data files, a period (usually a month) in the respondent's life is taken as the primary unit. In Figure 4.1, the two different ways of structuring data files are depicted.

In a person period file the value a variable takes indicates whether an event has happened or not. For instance, one can include a variable 'employed', which will have a value of '1' in case of employment and a value of '0' in case of unemployment. If an unemployed person finds a job in month 10, and loses this job in month 13, the file gives a score of '1' in the months 11 to 13, and a score of '0' for the months 1 to 10 and for month 14 and onwards.

Data file with respondent as the primary unit			Data file with person-periods as the primary unit			
Resp. number	Sex	Age	Months	Resp. number	Sex	Employed
001	1	18	01	001	1	0
002	2	63	02	001	1	0
003	1	25	03	001	1	0
004	1	33	04	001	1	0
005	1	79	05	001	1	0
006	2	42	06	001	1	0
007	2	19	07	001	1	0
008	1	26	08	001	1	0
009	1	38	09	001	1	0
010	1	50	10	001	1	0
011	2	54	11	001	1	1
012	2	65	12	001	1	1
013	2	22	13	001	1	1
014	1	18	14	001	1	0
015	2	71	15	001	1	0
016	1	46	01	002	2	1
.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

Figure 4.1: An example of the structures of a data file with respondents as the primary unit and a data file with person periods as the primary unit.

By using such a person-period file, one can predict the occurrence of a certain event (for instance 'finding a job') through other, either continuous or dynamic, variables (for instance, sex or educational career).

In this study, the central event is either finding a job or leaving a job. The occurrence of an event assumes a prior situation in which the event has not yet occurred (Yamaguchi, 1991). For each analysis, we select the months in the lives of the respondents in which they are 'at risk' to a certain event.

For a person to be at risk of becoming unemployed, he or she of course has to have an occupation. In the analysis in which becoming unemployed is the event under study, we therefore select *respondent-months* in which a respondent was either employed or experienced the event of becoming unemployed.

Similarly, in the analysis of the event of finding a job after a spell of unemployment, a person has to be unemployed or experience the event of finding a job. When we analyse the event of finding another job, we again make a selection of respondents who had an occupation. In each analysis, we thus make specific selections of respondent-months from the *person-month data file*.

Event history models make use of hazard rates. The hazard rate, h(*t*), expresses the conditional probability that a person will find (or quit) a job at time *t*, given that he or she is unemployed (or employed) at time *t*. The hazard rate is described by the following function:

(1) $h(t) = P(T = t_i \mid T \geq t_i)$

Next, we model the odds of the conditional probabilities. The following function expresses this model:

(2) $\ln (h(t) / 1 - h(t)) = a_i + Ó_k b_k X_{kt}$

In equation (2), a_i is the baseline hazard function for an individual with covariate vector X=0. The parameters b_k indicate the effect of covariate X_{kt} on the odds that someone will make the transition from being unemployed to being employed (or the other way around). Equation 2 can be estimated by performing a logistic regression analysis on the respondent-months selected from the person-period file. One drawback of event history analysis can be that respondents can appear more than once in the person-period file. This is due to the structure of the file, which has person-months rather than respondents as its basic unit. Since people can have more than one job, they can disappear from the dataset

if the event of loosing a job takes place, and reappear in the event of finding a new job. Nevertheless, because the characteristics of the independent variables that refer to characteristics of the previous job differ for individuals from job to job, this procedure does not lead to a bias in our estimates (Blossfeld, 1986).

The advantage of using event history analysis is twofold. First, it is possible to examine events in their causal order. We can study, for instance, if there are friends capable of helping someone's career, or if it is true that people who perform well in their jobs have friends wherever they happen to work. Second, it is possible to examine so-called duration effects. By incorporating these duration effects we can, for instance, answer the question whether people who have foes at work remain unemployed for a longer period of time if they lose their jobs than persons without foes.

In this chapter, I have discussed the data collection, the nature of the measurements and the analytical techniques to be used. In the following chapters I will analyse the data. In Chapters Five and Six, I will perform regression analyses on the data on friends. Next, I will perform an event history analysis on the data about friends, after which I will analyse the data on foes.

Notes

(1) In my opinion, when using a person-period file, it is not wise to weight the data. When weighted cases (respondents) are transformed into months of a respondent's life, one will have to deal with weighted person-months. This makes the interpretation of the results quite difficult.

(2) The Netherlands Family Survey 1992-1993 contains data on the complete 'income career' of respondents. We considered using these data, but thought it wise to focus on jobs; we leave income to a later moment and for other persons to study. Some measurement problems that occur with income (like inflation and periodic raises) do not occur with occupational prestige. However, interesting results were obtained with these income data (see, for instance, Bernasco, De Graaf & Ultee, 1998). Wherever income is the dependent variable in my analyses, I will use the current or last income mentioned by the respondents.

Chapter Five - A Naive Approach To Sweet Social Capital

5.1. Introduction

In this chapter I will discuss the use of sweet social capital as an explanation of occupational prestige and income. This will be done from a modernisation perspective, as was described in Chapter One. The tool I use is Blau and Duncan's original status attainment model (Blau & Duncan, 1967). A first alteration made to the model concerns the inclusion of women. Also, I will examine trends by using a cohort approach. The next step is to include the use of sweet social capital in the model.

The questions to be answered are: (1) Do the effects of the father's characteristics differ for men and women? (2) Is the influence of education increasing and the influence of social origin decreasing?; (3) Has the use of and profit from social resources decreased over time? And, (4) do men and women differ in the use of and profit from social resources?

I contrast the modernisation perspective - which implies a transition from social origin to education as the main determinant of status and income - with a hypothesis that postulates a shift from ascribed to achieved social capital. According to this hypothesis, the transition from social origin to education should be seen as a shift from the attainment of status through help of the father towards obtaining status by using friends as social resources.

In the next sections I will more thoroughly describe the theoretical background of the aforementioned questions, and explain why the use of social resources contradicts modernisation theory. Possible trends and differences between the sexes will be discussed.

5.2. Differences between the sexes

Up till now the research tradition that followed the original status attainment model (Blau and Duncan, 1967) has never really incorporated the 'mothers' or the 'daughters'. The reasoning behind this 'conventional view' is mainly that stratification research concentrates on the stratification of families. In most cases, the occupation of the father is decisive for the 'class' or prestige of the family (Goldthorpe, 1983). In the past few decades, however, women have entered the labour market in ever greater numbers, and thus started to attain their own occupational prestige. Many women (and men) no longer live within core families (Van Doorne-Huiskes, 1984). I think, therefore that it is no longer justified to exclude women from the research into status attainment. However, because of the relative novelty of wide-spread female labour force participation, and because until relatively recently the core family was the most important familial structure in society, I will not include 'mothers' in the model. Some Dutch researchers have studied the influence of the characteristics of the mother on her children (see, for instance, Kalmijn, 1994; Van der Lippe, Van Dam & Ganzeboom, 1995; Korupp, 2000). Yet, the mother's influence on educational attainment was studied. The inclusion of daughters in

the status attainment model for the Netherlands is relatively new, especially in the model where network influences are considered as well. Some descriptive questions concerning women in the Netherlands have therefore to be answered. The first questions to be asked are whether the same or different factors influence the status attainment of women, as compared to men, and whether these factors influence status attainment to the same extent. From a modernisation perspective, there is no reason to expect different determining factors for men and women. If the Netherlands is a modern society, universalism should prevail, and according to universalistic norms men and women with the same education should have equal chances to acquire a certain job with a certain occupational prestige. A related assumption is that fathers influence their daughters in the same way as they do their sons.

The next explorative question relevant to this research is whether women also make use of social resources when looking for a job, and if they do so in the same manner as men or differently. Again, from a modernisation perspective there is no reason to expect any differences. Part of the research problem in this chapter therefore implies the following *gender-equality hypotheses*:

a) The effects of social origin and education do not differ for men and women.

b) Men and women use informal resources to the same extent and with the same profits in status and income.

Of course this part of the research problem is not as strictly separated from the rest of the research as it seems. In fact, the differences between men and women are intertwined and tested simultaneously with the other research problems. In the next section, I will describe the theoretical considerations which lead to the expectation that changes have occurred over time.

5.3. Changes over time: a shift towards universalism or from ascribed social capital to achieved social capital?

As stated before, two well-known factors causing differences in prestige are social origin and education (Blau and Duncan, 1967). The part of status attainment that is explained

by social origin has been called 'ascribed status' while the part that is explained by education is called 'achieved status'. According to modernisation theory, the influence of education has increased, and the influence of social background has decreased over time. Ascribed individual characteristics that are not directly linked to productivity (such as class, race, religion, or what your father did for a living) should no longer be reasons for (not) obtaining a job.

In my alternative to modernisation theory, social resources are an important means to obtain a better position on the labour market, even in supposedly meritocratic societies. In contemporary societies, the important social resources are not those of the father, but those of the friends. According to modernisation theory, fathers provide economic resources to their children. I argue that the father (or in fact, the family) is also a social resource. In contemporary societies, the influence of the family as a social resource should have declined relative to the influence of friends as social resources. In addition, I predict that during someone's occupational career, the family are more important for the status of the first job than in later stages. Friends are more important in later stages, since people start to make their own friends during the educational period and when they take their first steps on the labour market.

As stated in Chapter One, modernisation in the Netherlands has led to an ideology of equal opportunities for everyone. This egalitarianism has resulted in norms that state that people should only be judged on their own merits, that is, on the basis of their educational achievements and work experience. I view social resources as an individual characteristic, which in principle is not directly linked to productivity. So, according to modernisation theory and its universalistic values, social resources (embodied by friends, acquaintances and family) are of no influence on someone's status attained.

Previous research in the United States and in the Netherlands (and in many other

Western industrialised countries) has shown that education and work experience are not the only factors that influence job status. The education and occupation of the father are still important factors in the acquisition of a high education and a good job and income, although some of the effects are indirect. Social resources are also seen as being of important influence on whether a person has a good chance of finding a job, and what the status of that job is. Research has shown that in the United States the use of informal resources is a lot more intensive than in the Netherlands (59% of all men in the US use informal resources, against 32% in the Netherlands) (Lin et al., 1981a & 1981b; De Graaf and Flap, 1988). In both countries, the use of a contact with a relatively high status affects job status positively. Using personal contacts does not necessarily improve one's occupational prestige, but some people or groups are still better off on the labour market by means of their social connections (see also Corcoran, Datcher & Duncan, 1980). The American dream and the Dutch dream (if the Dutch ever dreamed) really are dreams. Although universalist values prevail, the situation is not as egalitarian as expected. The gap between ideals and practice persists.

The greater part of the research mentioned above was conducted over ten years ago. Because a dream does not become true overnight, I consider it worthwhile to try the original status attainment model out on the Netherlands Family Survey and the Dutch Telepanel Survey, because these data were collected in 1992 and 1993. The model tests the effect of the education and occupational prestige of the father on the education and occupational prestige of the first and the current or last job of his children. As stated before, the inclusion of 'daughters' in the model is relatively new; I will check for differences between men and women.

In short, some of the research problems in this chapter boil down to a replication and extension of part of De Graaf and Flap's research, this time using data from 1992/1993. In order to derive hypotheses from modernisation theory, I prefer to interpret this theory in the strictest possible sense. This means that I interpret modernisation theory

as predicting strict equality between people with the same education and work experience. Admittedly, this is a naive point of view, since former research has already refuted this egalitarianism. In order to be sure, though, what the findings in this chapter mean for the development of stratification research, I will pursue this as being the most promising approach.

The prediction of a transition from particularism to universalism leads to the following ***universalist hypotheses***:

a) with ongoing modernisation, the direct influence of the education and occupational prestige of the father (social background) on own occupational prestige diminishes,

b) with ongoing modernisation, the influence of own education and occupational prestige of the first job (human capital) on own occupational prestige increases.

Another part of the research problem in this chapter is the assumption that a relatively high effect of education on occupational prestige necessarily means that a shift has taken place from ascription to achievement. I will test this by looking whether the use of and profit from social resources on the labour market have increased or decreased. If informal resources are indeed used (more often) this would at least mean that some particularism still exists, namely in the form of the people someone knows. This leads to two more ***universalist hypotheses***:

c) with ongoing modernisation, the use of social resources decreases,

d) with ongoing modernisation, the profit from social resources decreases.

In this research, the argument of social resources will be taken a step further. I think it is reasonable to expect that parents form a large part of someone's social capital in the beginning of the occupational career. Either the father himself (or the mother) is a contact or their friends or family are. I call this 'ascribed social capital'. During their lives

(in school and on the labour market) people build up their own social network. I call this 'achieved social capital'. I hypothesise that part of a transition from ascription to achievement in a person's lifetime can be explained by a transition from 'ascribed social capital' to 'achieved social capital'. Since we do not have the ideal situation of complete knowledge of people's networks, such as when exactly they meet and under which circumstances, this transition means that in the beginning of someone's professional life the father (and other family) plays an important role in the process of finding a job, whereas at a later age friends and acquaintances have more influence. These expectations can be summarised in the following ***achieved social capital hypotheses***:

a) the family is more important as a social resource for the prestige of someone's first job than friends are,

b) friends are more important as a social resource for the prestige of someone's current or last job than they are for the first job.

Note that there are two ways of looking at these last two hypotheses. In this chapter they are treated as contradictory to modernisation theory, but they can also be seen as a contribution to that theory. Instead of a shift in the influence of ascribed characteristics to achieved characteristics, a shift takes place from ascribed to achieved social capital. Family resources used to be more important, while resources of friends are not only becoming more important over historical time, but also during the life course. Although I cannot test for changes over time to this regard, I will test for changes during the life course.

In the next sections, I will test Blau and Duncan's original status attainment model for the Netherlands in 1992/1993. Next I will include possible changes over time. After that, I will include informal resources into the model. First only the use of contacts, and later also the status of the contact persons will be included. Finally, I will look into a possible shift from ascribed social capital to achieved social capital. Women will be included in all analyses, but I will check on gender-differences in every model if necessary.

5.4. Analyses

In this section I will present the analyses required to test the gender-equality hypotheses and the universalism hypotheses that were formulated in the preceding sections. Because there are two different datasets, it is necessary to explain why I used one dataset for some analyses and the other dataset for the rest of the analyses. For the analyses of the original status attainment model with income as a dependent variable, I have used the Netherlands Family Survey. I have done this because I do not trust the contents of the income variable in the Dutch Telepanel Survey.[1] For the analyses where knowledge of the status of the contact person is required, I could only use the Telepanel Survey, since this question was simply not included in the Family Survey.

In the next sections, I will clearly indicate which dataset is used in a particular instance. The first analyses will all be done with the Netherlands Family Survey, since income is included as a dependent variable.

5.4.1. The original status attainment model revisited

In order to answer the research questions of this chapter and test the hypotheses introduced in the preceding sections, I will first estimate the original status attainment model. One main difference with Blau and Duncan's model which was depicted in Figure 1.1, is the inclusion of income as a dependent variable. Furthermore, to increase statistical power - especially in later analyses, where more variables are included in the model - I have constructed one variable called 'father', which contains the standardised mean of the standardised education of the father and the standardised occupational prestige of the father.

Table 5.1: Original status attainment model repeated with the 1992/93 data. Unstandardised and standardised regression coefficients (pairwise deletion of missing values, standard errors between brackets). Minimum N=922.

	Education	First job	Current job	Income
Current job				20.568
				0.265
				(2.087) **
Number hours current job			0.145	49.628
			0.135	0.594
			(0.029) **	(1.881) **
First job			0.305	1.794
			0.273	0.020
			(0.035) **	(2.298)
Number hours first job		0.035	0.118	9.043
		0.023	0.068	0.067
		(0.044)	(0.047) *	(2.994) **
Education		6.403	5.436	106.487
		0.440	0.333	0.084
		(0.453) **	(0.533) **	(35.531) **
Father	0.508	2.983	1.586	29.299
	0.426	0.172	0.081	0.019
	(0.034) **	(0.538) **	(0.577) **	(36.627)
Intercept	2.761	21.440	11.120	-735.537
R^2	18.05%	28.09%	36.12%	57.79%

* significant at 5% level
** significant at 1% level

This is not only a good way to increase statistical power, it may also prevent multi-collinearity, which could occur due to the high correlation between the characteristics of the father and the inclusion of a large number of variables (and interaction-terms) in the model. In the Netherlands Family Survey, the correlation between the characteristics of the father is 0.52. In Table 5.1 the model as it was found for the Netherlands in 1992/1993 is presented.

The first objective of the analysis in Table 5.1 is to determine whether the characteristics of the father still influence the achievements of his children. As can be seen from the table, the variable 'father' has a direct influence on education, the first job

and the current job of the children. An indirect effect on income occurs through education, the first job, as well as the current job. These indirect effects can be calculated by multiplying the direct effects, following the causal sequence of the model. For instance, the indirect effect of 'father' on income via education is: 0.426 * 0.084. Apparently, ascription still occurs in the Netherlands in 1992/93.

There are two questions to be answered next. The model in Table 5.2 pertains to sons and daughters. In order to see whether the effects differ for men and women, the interaction of the variable 'father' with the variable 'woman' (0 for men, 1 for women) was calculated and included in the analysis. From Table 5.2 it can be seen that the characteristics of the father do not influence women differently than men. Women seem to profit somewhat less from their education with respect to the first job, but apart from that the effect of education does not differ for men and women. Another clear finding is that women do differ from men where income and prestige of the current job are concerned. Although this is of no direct interest to this research, I have checked on this. If an interaction with the number of hours worked is included the difference largely disappears, but still remains (not reported).

The next step is to check for changes over time with regard to the influence of the father. Modernisation theory is a dynamic theory in the sense that it predicts a *transition* from particularistic to universalistic values. This transition is operationalised as a decrease in the influence of father's characteristics and an increase in the influence of education on attained prestige (and, in this research, also income). In order to measure these supposed changes over time in a cross-sectional design, I have included a variable 'cohort'. This variable is based on the year of birth, and is coded as follows: lowest year of birth until 1938 is 0, 1938-1948 is 1, 1948-1958 is 2, and 1958 till highest year of birth is 3. Since only respondents of 18 years and older were included, the highest year of birth is 1975.

Table 5.2: Status attainment model with multiplicative interactions for women. Unstandardised regression coefficients (pairwise deletion of missing values, standard errors between brackets). Minimum N=922.

	Education	First job	Current job	Income
Current job				18.305 (1.850) **
Number hours current job			0.120 (0.034) **	34.909 (1.940) **
First job			0.306 (0.035) **	3.823 (20.036) *
Number hours first job		0.037 (0.044)	0.121 (0.047) *	10.497 (2.644) **
Education		7.242 (0.642) **	6.096 (0.723) **	126.868 (41.945) **
Father	0.531 (0.049) **	2.315 (0.781) **	1.944 (0.827) *	36.795 (46.351)
Woman	-0.291 (0.068) **	4.759 (2.688) ^	1.812 (3.027)	-840.236 (169.247) **
Father*woman	-0.049 (0.068)	1.265 (1.072)	-0.567 (1.130)	29.750 (63.174)
Education*woman		-1.654 (0.905) ^	-1.509 (0.969)	-85.122 (54.225)
Intercept	2.909	18.841	10.842	59.133
R^2	19.42%	28.13%	36.51%	67.15%

* significant at 5% level
** significant at 1% level
^ significant at 10% level

In this analysis, the inclusion of 'cohort' alone suffices, since I am not interested in the increase or decrease of actual income and prestige. These changes are now captured by the main effect of cohort, and probably express more of an age effect than a cohort effect. I am, however, only interested in the changes of the influence of the father and in the effect of education. It is highly unlikely that these effects vary with the age of the respondent.

For this research only the interactions of 'cohort' with the characteristics of the father and education were included. In Table 5.3 these multiplicative interactions are included in the status attainment model.

Table 5.3: Status attainment model with multiplicative interactions for cohort. Unstandardised regression coefficients (pairwise deletion of missing values, standard errors between brackets). Minimum N=922.

	Education	First job	Current job	Income
Current job				16.705 (1.951) **
Number hours current job			0.189 (0.031) **	55.671 (1.848) **
First job			0.278 (0.035) **	-1.427 (2.143)
Number hours first job		0.004 (0.044)	0.073 (0.048)	1.411 (2.834)
Education		6.695 (0.837) **	6.552 (0.923) **	403.152 (55.879) **
Education*cohort		0.000 (0.422)	-0.390 (0.449)	-124.410 (26.463) **
Father	0.522 (0.065) **	5.080 (1.031) **	0.972 (1.103)	48.339 (65.108)
Father*cohort	-0.022 (0.032)	-1.156 (0.500) *	0.433 (0.530)	5.875 (31.264)
Cohort	0.184 (0.032) **	-1.977 (1.230)	-1.465 (1.332)	-20.656 (78.597)
Intercept	2.448	25.270	13.121	-462.020
R^2	20.65%	29.76%	36.63%	64.08%

* significant at 5% level
** significant at 1% level

From Table 5.3 the following conclusions can be drawn:

-        The effect of education on income is lower for later (younger) cohorts.

- The effect of the father's characteristics on the first job has decreased over the cohorts.

- Other effects of the father remain intact, and the effect of education has not increased over the cohorts.

In this analysis we therefore find no evidence for a transition from ascription to achievement. There seems to be no increase in achievement, but a small decline in ascription. These findings refute two predictions Blau and Duncan made: ascription (the influence of the characteristics of the father) has not disappeared, and achievement (the influence of education) has not increased. Recapitulating the first two hypotheses from Section 5.3., we see that **universalism hypothesis a)**, "with ongoing modernisation, the influence of the education and the occupational prestige of the father diminishes", and **universalism hypothesis b)**, "with ongoing modernisation, the influence of own education and occupational prestige of first job on own occupational prestige increases", have to be refuted. The continuing effect of the father remains to be explained. In the next sections I will introduce social resources into the status attainment model, in an attempt to explain the lasting effect of the father.

5.4.2. The status attainment model with inclusion of social resources

In this section the next two universalism hypotheses from Section 5.3 will be tested. First I will look at hypothesis c), which states that "with ongoing modernisation, the use of social resources decreases over time". Simultaneously I shall test the gender-equality hypothesis b) that "men and women use informal resources to the same extent and with the same profits in status and income". In order to do so, I will follow the approach of Lin et al. (1981a & 1981b) and De Graaf and Flap (1988). The means through which a job was found was recoded into three categories: 'formal' (responding to an advertisement, via

employment agency, via employment bureau); 'informal' (friend/acquaintance, family, asked); 'direct' (placing an advertisement, open application). In order to look into changes over time with respect to these matters, the only option I have is to compare cross-sections. In my opinion, it is impossible to make a distinction between age and cohort effects when studying the use of social resources. A cross-tabulation of the source through which a job was found and cohort would give a complex mix of age, period and cohort effects and be impossible to disentangle. To avoid this problem, I will compare the percentages found by Lin and by De Graaf and Flap with the ones found in the Netherlands Family Survey.

In correspondence with De Graaf and Flap's analysis of the 1982 data (Sixma and Ultee, 1984), in Table 5.4 all men and women between 20 and 65 years of age in the Netherlands Family Survey are included. To allow for comparisons, a second selection was made of people who worked full-time (32 hours or more).

In panel A of Table 5.4, the figures for full-time working men in the Netherlands in 1982 and in 1992 and for the United States in 1975 are given. In panel B of Table 5.4, similar percentages are reported for women. No figures for the United States were included in this panel, because Lin et al. did not include women in their analyses. Of course our group of women is a very select one, because only full-time working women were included, but the question through which channels full-time working women found their jobs is at least as interesting as the same question concerning to men.

In panel A of Table 5.4, it can be seen that the use of informal resources by men in the Netherlands has vastly increased. This 20% increase has caused a decrease in the use of direct channels. Apparently direct application is no longer lucrative. The situation in the Netherlands in 1992 resembles the situation in the United States in 1975 more than it does the situation in the Netherlands in 1982. These findings definitely point to more

particularism, in contrast to the expectations of modernisation theory.

Table 5.4: Sources for finding the first and current/last job in the Netherlands in 1982 and 1992/1993, and in the US in 1975 (%).

	PANEL A: MEN					PANEL B: WOMEN			
	First job		Current/last job			First job		Current/last job	
	NL 1982[*]	NL 1992 /93	NL 1982[*]	NL 1992 /93	US 1975[*]	NL 1982	NL 1992 /93	NL 1982	NL 1992 /93
Formal	34	32	43	35	24	47	45	45	42
Informal	34	46	32	53	59	29	37	33	42
Direct	32	22	24	12	17	24	18	22	16

[*]Source: De Graaf & Flap, 1988 (p.461)

From panel B of Table 5.4, it can clearly be seen that women make less use of informal channels than men. It seems as if in 1992 they even used fewer informal resources than in 1982, but it has to be kept in mind that it is a very select group of women we are looking at.[2]

In 1992, only 37% of the women, as opposed to 46% of the men, found their first job through informal resources. Forty-two percent of the women as opposed to 53% of the men, found their current job through informal channels. Apparently women use formal ways more often than men when they are looking for a job. The percentage of respondents who found their job through direct channels is almost the same for men and women.

The next step is to look into the profit gained from the use of social resources. We have seen that the first form of profit one can get from using social resources, namely finding a job, does exist. But what does the use of social resources mean for status and income? From Lin's and De Graaf and Flap's research we have learned that informal resources, as compared to direct resources - which is the reference category - usually have no or a negative effect on job prestige.

Table 5.5: Status attainment model with inclusion of source of finding the job. Unstandardised regression coefficients (pairwise deletion of missing values, standard errors between brackets). Minimum N=856.

	Education	First job	Current job	Income
Current job				20.729
				(2.162) **
Number hours current job			0.145	49.386
			(0.031) **	(1.959) **
Formal versus direct			1.569	14.175
			(1.714)	(107.888)
Informal versus direct			1.514	161.675
			(1.629)	(102.506)
First job			0.300	2.395
			(0.037) **	(2.392)
Number hours first job		0.023	0.114	9.371
		(0.045)	(0.049) *	(3.109) **
First job formal versus direct		-0.040	0.080	45.091
		(1.421)	(1.609)	(101.206)
First job informal versus direct		-3.741	-1.669	146.458
		(1.379) **	(1.546)	(97.322)
Education		6.153	5.342	112.197
		(0.472) **	(0.557) **	(36.866) **
Father	0.508	2.854	1.553	31.131
	(0.034) **	(0.566) **	(0.601) **	(37.965)
Intercept	2.761	24.240	11.175	-956.365
R^2	18.05%	29.00%	36.04%	58.08%

* significant at 5% level
** significant at 1% level

Table 5.6: Status attainment model with inclusion of source of finding the job and interactions with sex. Unstandardised regression coefficients (pairwise deletion of missing values, standard errors between brackets). Minimum N=856.

	First job	Current job	Income
Current job			19.170
			(1.895) **
Number hours current job		0.120	35.544
		(0.034) **	(1.938) **
Formal		4.196	-71.548
		(2.335) ^	(131.054)
Informal		3.917	111.609
		(2.215) ^	(124.307)
Formal*woman		-5.028	204.308
		(3.191)	(179.071)
Informal*woman		-5.659	102.397
		(3.060) ^	(171.771)
First job		0.308	4.215
		(0.036) **	(2.094)
Number hours first job	0.021		
	(0.045)		
First job formal	0.418		
	(1.992)		
First job informal	-5.766		
	(1.892) **		
First job formal *woman	0.649		
	(2.841)		
First job informal*woman	4.180		
	(2.747)		
Education	6.172	5.134	64.279
	(0.477) **	(0.542) **	(31.888) *
Woman	-1.594	1.996	-1190.727
	(2.306)	(2.711)	(151.931) **
Father	2.858	1.489	40.240
	(0.566) **	(0.589) *	(33.109)
Intercept	24.995	14.423	507.847
R^2	29.19%	36.00%	66.71%

* significant at 5% level

** significant at 1% level

^ significant at 10% level

From Table 5.5, it can be seen that the same holds for the Netherlands in 1992/93. The only significant effect of the dichotomised variables is that of informal resources on the prestige of the first job. This is, however, a negative effect. The conclusion to be drawn from the table is that the use of informal resources as such does not lead to higher prestige or a higher income.

Although the results in Table 5.5 are somewhat discouraging, I still want to know whether men and women maybe profit in different degrees from the use of informal resources. In fact, the findings in Table 5.5 may not be significant due to the omission of sex as an explanatory variable. In Table 5.6, I have included the dummy 'woman' (man is 0, woman is 1). Also, I created multiplicative interaction variables for the dummies of the sources of finding the job with the dummy 'woman'. For reasons of clarity, and to enhance statistical power, I left out the variables that only pertain to the first job in the analyses of income and the prestige of the current job, but naturally I only did so after checking on possible significance of any of these variables. The result of the analysis is reported in Table 5.6.

From Table 5.6 it can be concluded that there are a few small differences between men and women with respect to the profit drawn from informal social resources. The use of informal resources has a somewhat larger negative effect on the prestige of the current job of women, although this effect is only significant at a 10% level. When controlling for sex the effects of the dummy variables for formal and informal resources also become significant at a 10% level, and the effects become positive, in contrast to direct resources. The effect of informal resources on the prestige of the first job remains significant and negative. The interaction effects and the main effect of 'woman' are not significant.

Table 5.7: Status attainment model with inclusion of source of finding the job and interactions with cohort. Unstandardised regression coefficients (pairwise deletion of missing values, standard errors between brackets). Minimum N=856.

	First job	Current job	Income
Current job			16.465
			(2.051) **
Number hours current job		0.205	57.463
		(0.032) **	(1.938) **
Formal		0.814	-155.675
		(3.279)	(195.074)
Informal		2.211	105.455
		(3.126)	(186.012)
Formal*cohort		0.508	99.159
		(1.672)	(99.466)
Informal*cohort		-0.604	3.323
		(1.588)	(94.463)
First job		0.263	-1.004
		(0.037) **	(2.259)
Number hours first job	0.000	0.082	4.674
	(0.046)	(0.050)	(2.981)
First job formal	0.873	6.330	634.372
	(2.856)	(3.163)	(188.609) **
First job informal	-4.168	1.497	353.560
	(2.719)	(3.048)	(181.357) ^
First job formal *cohort	-0.493	-3.540	-320.571
	(1.407)	(1.621) *	(96.715) **
First job informal*cohort	0.086	-1.978	-144.599
	(1.374)	(1.575)	(93.817)
Education	6.474	5.767	195.617
	(0.474) **	(0.559) **	(35.299) **
Cohort	-1.966	-0.367	-210.206
	(1.172) ^	(1.525)	(90.715) *
Father	2.894	1.730	58.950
	(0.551) **	(0.594) **	(35.519) ^
Intercept	27.651	11.793	-429.384
R^2	30.38%	37.83%	63.55%

* significant at 5% level
** significant at 1% level
^ significant at 10% level

The next step is to look into changes over time. From Table 5.4 we already learned that the use of informal social resources has increased in the Netherlands. This contradicts the expectations of modernisation theory. In Table 5.7, I included the variable cohort in the analysis. Again, interaction variables were created, this time of cohort with the dichotomised variables for the resources of finding the job. Due to the problem mentioned earlier of the difference between cohort and age effects, the results have to be interpreted very carefully. First, it can be seen that the model is less concise than the one in which sex was included. In fact, with respect to income and prestige of the current job, only the dummy variables for formal and informal resources of the first job seem to have an effect. Formal resources seem to offer less profit to younger than to older cohorts. The interactions with informal resources have no effect at all. Due to the inclusion of cohort, the negative effect of informal resources on prestige of the first job seems to disappear. The hypothesis that with ongoing modernisation the profit drawn from social resources decreases cannot be confirmed. But testing this hypothesis seems a bit artificial, because there is no profit or only a negative outcome of the use of social resources to start with. This illustrates another finding of Lin et al. and De Graaf and Flap. The use of informal resources does not necessarily yield any profits. It is better to include the status of the contact person in the model.

I did exactly this in the analysis reported in Table 5.8. Note that this analysis was done for the Dutch Telepanel Survey. The number of cases is very low here, because only the respondents who stated that they used a contact to find the job were asked about the status of this contact person. In addition, not all respondents knew this status. Because of the low number of cases, and because only respondents who actually found a job through a contact person were included, I consider this analysis to be exploratory in nature rather than explanatory. Still it can at least give us an idea of the profits yielded by informal resources. To enhance statistical power, I have left out non-significant effects wherever possible.

From Table 5.8, it can be seen that the profit from using social resources is indeed positive, and higher if the status of the contact person is higher. This is consistent with earlier findings of Lin et al. for the United States and of De Graaf and Flap for the Netherlands and Germany. With the dataset of the Dutch Telepanel Survey we have the unique opportunity to test whether the effect differs for men and women. The results of the analysis with inclusion of the dummy for 'woman' and interaction effects of 'woman' with the status of the contact person are depicted in Table 5.9.

Table 5.8: Status attainment model with inclusion of status of contact person - Telepanel data. Unstandardised regression coefficients (pairwise deletion of missing values, standard errors between brackets). Minimum N=330.

	First job	Current job
Number hours current job		0.174 (0.055) **
Status of contact current job		0.203 (0.028) **
First job		0.503 (0.043) **
Number hours first job	-0.010 (0.094)	
Status of contact first job	0.072 (0.032) *	
Education	5.940 (0.711) **	1.579 (0.675) *
Father	2.417 (0.751) **	
Intercept	20.379	2.868
R^2	24.10%	36.48%

* significant at 5% level
** significant at 1% level

Table 5.9: Status attainment model with inclusion of status of contact person and interactions with 'woman' - Telepanel data. Unstandardised regression coefficients (pairwise deletion of missing values, standard errors between brackets). Minimum N=330.

	First job	Current job
Number hours current job		0.170 (0.059) **
Status of contact current job		0.293 (0.039) **
Status of contact current job*woman		-0.195 (0.056) **
First job		0.504 (0.042) **
Woman	0.494 (4.059)	10.010 (3.811) **
Number hours first job	-0.008 (0.096)	
Status of contact first job	0.073 (0.040) ^	
Status of contact first job*woman	-0.003 (0.067)	
Education	5.972 (0.752) **	1.780 (0.661) **
Father	2.405 (0.755) **	
Intercept	19.990	-2.514
R^2	23.73%	37.94%

* significant at 5% level

** significant at 1% level

^ significant at 10% level

From Table 5.9 it can be concluded that the effect of the status of the contact person on the current job is smaller for women. The main effect of the status of the contact person remains positive and significant. For the first job, the interaction effect with 'woman' is not significant. So, for the first job men and women draw equal profits from

a contact person with a relatively high status, while for the current job men profit relatively more.

In the next section, I will test the achieved social capital hypotheses formulated in Section 5.3.

5.4.3. A shift from ascribed to achieved social capital?

As I explained in the beginning of this chapter, I believe that a shift from ascription to achievement does not necessarily have to take the form of a shift from an effect of the characteristics of the father to an effect of own education. Another possible shift that might be taking place is that from ascribed social capital to achieved social capital. The line of reasoning I advocate is that parents are a significant part of their children's social capital, especially in the beginning of the career. During the process of education and the beginning of the occupational career, parents have a large influence on their children's lives, while later on these children make their own 'friends'. In the early stages of the occupational career, children start creating their own stock of social capital, which will later on become more important than the social capital produced by their parents.

In order to investigate the shift from *ascribed* to *achieved* social capital during the life course, the categories of the sources for finding the first and the current job were recoded into 'family' (ascribed social capital); 'friends and acquaintances' (achieved social capital), and 'unknown' (the baseline category). The meaning of 'family' and 'friends and acquaintances' is clear. In the 'unknown' category all formal and direct ways of obtaining a job are incorporated. In panel A of Table 5.10 the percentages of these dichotomised variables are given for the men in our sample. In panel B the percentages for the women can be found.

Table 5.10: Ascribed and achieved sources for finding the first and current/last job in the Netherlands in 1992/1993 (%) - Netherlands Family Survey.

	PANEL A: MEN		PANEL B: WOMEN	
	First job N=436	Current/ last job N=453	First job N=444	Current/ last job N=453
Unknown	55	63	56	61
Achieved	27	29	26	32
Ascribed	18	8	18	7

In Table 5.10 it can be seen, first, that family are indeed used as a source for finding the first and the current job. Second, it appears that family are used more frequently to obtain the first job. Eighteen percent of the men in the sample used family to find their first job, while only 8% did so for their current job. For women the percentage decreases from 18 to 7. Third, a decrease in the use of family seems to lead to a slight increase in the use of friends and a more prominent increase in the use of other resources. Finally, all foregoing conclusions apply to both men and women. This indicates that *ascribed* social capital diminishes in importance and *achieved* social capital and other sources for finding a job increase in importance during the occupational career.

The next step is to include the dichotomised variables for ascribed and achieved social capital in a regression analysis with prestige of the current job and of the first job as the dependent variables. The results of this regression analysis are displayed in Table 5.11.

Table 5.11: Status attainment model with inclusion of ascribed and achieved social capital - Netherlands Family Survey. Unstandardised and standardised regression coefficients (pairwise deletion of missing values, standard errors between brackets). Minimum N=858.

	First job	Current job	First job	Current job
Number hours current job		0.145 0.135 (0.029) **		0.145 0.136 (0.030) **
Achieved social capital current job				-2.450 -0.058 (1.214) *
Ascribed social capital current job				-6.050 -0.081 (2.240) **
First job		0.305 0.273 (0.035) **		0.297 0.265 (0.036) **
Number hours first job	0.035 0.023 (0.044)	0.118 0.068 (0.047) *	0.023 0.015 (0.045)	0.110 0.064 (0.049) *
Achieved social capital first job			-2.437 -0.062 (1.186) *	-1.247 -0.028 (1.312)
Ascribed social capital first job			-5.751 -0.128 (1.388) **	0.409 0.008 (1.537)
Education	6.403 0.440 (0.453) **	5.436 0.333 (0.533) **	6.009 0.413 (0.475) **	5.281 0.324 (0.556) **
Father	2.982 0.172 (0.538) **	1.586 0.081 (0.577) **	2.815 0.162 (0.554) **	1.555 0.080 (0.597) **
Intercept	21.440	11.120	24.623	13.567
R^2	28.09%	36.12%	29.39%	36.72%

* significant at 5% level
** significant at 1% level

From Table 5.11 it can be seen that ascribed and achieved social capital have an effect on the prestige of both the first and the current job. The effect of ascribed social capital seems somewhat larger in both instances. The effects are all negative, but this is not really surprising if one recalls that the effects of informal resources were also found to be negative in the earlier analyses. We can conclude that ascribed social capital is indeed more important for the first job than for the current or last job. From Table 5.11 we can also see that the effects of the characteristics of the father and of education become only slightly smaller (to see this, we look at the standardised coefficients, and compare those of the model without the social capital variables with those of the model with the social capital variables). This does not point to a transition from ascribed to achieved social capital as opposed to a transition from the characteristics of the father (ascription) to education (achievement). Stated briefly, the hypothesis that achieved social capital is more important for the current job than for the first job, has to be rejected.

In Table 5.12 the multiple interactions of the social capital variables with the dummy for 'woman' are included; this allows us to check for differences between men and women. Table 5.12 clearly shows some important differences between men and women with regard to the influence of ascribed and achieved social capital on occupational prestige. The main effect of ascribed social capital on the prestige of the current job is -9.871 for men, while it is -9.871+8.084=-1.787 for women. For the first job, the main effect of achieved social capital is -5.066; for women the effect turns to a (small) positive one: -5.066+5.240=0.174.

In the next section I will give a summary of the results found in this chapter, and present some conclusions about what these results mean for the hypotheses that were formulated in Section 5.3.

Table 5.12: Status attainment model with inclusion of ascribed and achieved social capital and interactions with 'woman' - Netherlands Family Survey. Unstandardised regression coefficients (pairwise deletion of missing values, standard errors between brackets). Minimum N=858.

	First job	Current job
Number hours current job		0.117 (0.035) **
Achieved soc. capital current job		-3.831 (1.644) *
Ascribed soc. capital current job		-9.871 (2.866) **
Achieved current * woman		2.196 (2.296)
Ascribed current * woman		8.084 (4.103) *
First job		0.299 (0.036) **
Woman	-2.036 (1.345)	-3.674 (1.432) *
Number hours first job	0.021 (0.045)	0.116 (0.048) *
Achieved soc. capital first job	-5.066 (1.673) **	
Ascribed soc. capital first job	-7.623 (1.930) **	
Achieved first * woman	5.240 (2.357) *	
Ascribed first * woman	3.734 (2.682)	
Education	6.025 (0.479) **	5.206 (0.544) **
Father	2.823 (0.554) **	1.628 (0.586) **
Intercept	25.709	15.879
R^2	29.60%	37.21%

* significant at 5% level

** significant at 1% level

5.5. Conclusions and discussion

In this chapter I have tried to go beyond modernisation theory by using social resources as an explanation for the attainment of prestige and income. In order to do so I first interpreted the implications of modernisation theory in the strictest possible sense. This resulted in two 'gender-equality' hypotheses, and in four 'universalism' hypotheses.

The ***first two universalism hypotheses*** predicted a decline in influence of the father, and an increase in influence of education on prestige and income to have occurred over time. Both hypotheses have to be refuted since the effect of education on income is lower for later (younger) cohorts; the effect of the characteristics of the father on the first job decreases over the cohorts, but the effect of the father on other variables remains intact. The effect of education does not vary positively with cohort.

The ***third universalism hypothesis*** stated that the use of social resources has declined. From a comparison with findings from 1982, it becomes clear that the use of informal resources by men in the Netherlands has vastly increased, and that the use of informal resources by women in the Netherlands has not decreased. These findings lead to the rejection of the third universalism hypothesis.

The ***fourth universalism hypothesis*** predicted that the profit drawn from social resources has declined. The analyses show that the use of social resources (that is, if we don't control for the status of the contact person) hardly has any effect on status and income in the Netherlands. This is neither a strong rejection nor a confirmation of the hypothesis. If a cohort-variable is included in the analysis, this conclusion does not change. If the prestige of the contact person is taken into account in a cross-sectional analysis, however, the contact with a relatively high prestige does have a positive effect on the occupational prestige of the respondent, especially for men.

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The ***first gender-equality hypothesis*** stated that the effects of social origin and education do not differ for men and women. Apart from a slight difference in profit from education in terms of the prestige of the first job, this hypothesis cannot be refuted.

The ***second gender-equality hypothesis*** stated that men and women use informal resources to the same extent, and with the same profits in terms of status and income. In fact, this hypothesis consists of two parts. With respect to the first part, the conclusion is that men seem to make relatively more use of informal channels to find a job. As to the second part of the hypothesis, the most interesting finding is that men and women both profit from the use of a contact with a relatively high prestige, but men profit more than women where the current job is concerned. Hence, the second gender-equality hypothesis has to be refuted.

After testing and rejecting most of the modernisation hypotheses, I tested the ***achieved social capital hypotheses***, which postulated that the transition from social origin to education as the main factors of influence on occupational prestige should be seen as a shift from the attainment of status through help of the father to obtaining status by using friends as social resources. The first alternative hypothesis stated that the family as a social resource is more important for the prestige of the first job than friends. The conclusion with regard to this hypothesis is threefold. First, family are used more often as a source for finding the first job than for the current job. Second, this conclusion applies to both men and women. Third, family are of more influence on the prestige of the first job than friends for men as well as women. There is a difference between men and women, however, because the effect of achieved social capital is positive (although small) for women, while it is negative for men.

The last hypothesis stated that friends are more important for the prestige of the current or last job than they are for the first job. My analyses showed that this hypothesis has to be rejected.

Several things have been demonstrated in this chapter. The first conclusion is that the transition to universalism as predicted by modernisation theory is not perfect. Universalistic values may prevail, but particularism still exists. The effect of the characteristics of the father on his children's attained income, prestige and education are still found. Moreover, not only does the use of informal resources, especially the use of a contact with a relatively high status, show some effect, but the fact that people actually make use of them is a strong indication that they expect to benefit from this. In a perfectly universalistic society, such expectations could not and would not exist.

Second, I found rather strong support for making the distinction between ascribed and achieved social capital. This is an important finding for further research into social capital theory.

A large drawback of the analyses in this chapter, is that they focused on people who actually found a job through informal resources. In the next chapter, I will therefore focus on *access* to social resources rather than the *use* of social resources. Failures in use will also be taken into account.

Notes

(1) In the Dutch Telepanel Survey, respondents were first asked to tell how much they earned, and after that whether the income was earned per week or per month, or different. It is the latter 'or different' category that worries me. Many respondents gave this answer and it could mean per hour, per year, per four weeks, etcetera. In short, I do not know exactly what it measures. For this reason, I decided to only use the Netherlands Family Survey for analyses of income.

(2) If the restriction on the number of working hours is removed, the results become as follows: in 1992 44% of the women found their first job through informal channels, and 46% found their current or last job through informal channels. The percentages for men stay (roughly) the same.

Chapter Six - A More Elaborate Approach To Sweet Social Capital

6.1. Introduction

In the previous chapter we saw that the number of people in the social network is not the only factor of importance to enhancing one's chances on the labour market, but that the network also has a certain 'quality'. It is more profitable to know someone with a relatively high status and a lot of influence than someone with a relatively low status (see also: Lin et al., 1981a & 1981b; De Graaf and Flap, 1988). People with a higher education have more opportunity to reach people with a high status and thus have access to better social resources. If the quality of social resources is included in the explanation of status attainment, part of the direct effect of education disappears, as has been shown in the earlier-mentioned research by Lin and De Graaf and Flap. Most of the research up till now, though, has been concerned with how people find their jobs. If people find jobs through informal resources (friends, acquaintances, family) and the status of the contact persons is relatively high, the effect on occupational prestige is significant and positive.

However interesting these results are, this is not all there is to say about social resources. Of course contact persons are an important social resource, but due to the way in which most research has been carried out we only have knowledge about the actual use of social resources. Moreover, most research only considered the cases in which the use of social resources was successful. As Lin and Dumin (1986) pointed out, it is also interesting to know what social resources people have access to, regardless of whether they use them or not. Thinking of social resources as social capital hints at the importance

of *access* to in addition to the *use of* social resources. As it is the case with money, it is not only important what you actually spend, but also what assets you have, such as savings, for instance. In other words, it is important to know what you *can* spend. Instead of the use of social resources, this chapter will focus on people's *access* to social resources. Some research has already been done in this field for the United States, China, and former Eastern Germany (GDR)(Lin & Dumin, 1986; Lin & Bian, 1991; Lai, Lin & Leung, 1998; Völker and Flap, 1999). In this chapter, I will replicate part of these studies, but the focus will be on the transition from ascribed to achieved social capital. I will also look at those people who applied for a job with help of a contact person, but failed to get that job. In the following section, I will explain the theoretical background that leads to the hypotheses on the ascribed and achieved access to social resources.

6.2. Theory and hypotheses regarding access to social resources

The reason why it is interesting to know what kind of resources people have access to, regardless of whether they use them or not, is that it gives a clear picture of the way in which someone's network connects him or her with a multitude of positions. As we saw in the previous chapter, using informal resources is only profitable if these resources are of a relatively high quality. And logically access comes before use. Although Völker and Flap (1999) showed that access does not necessarily lead to use, the causal order can never be the other way around. If we make the logical assumption that access comes before use of social contacts, the same hypotheses that applied to the use of social resources should apply to access. In our search for the reasons why the characteristics of the father continue to have an effect on his children's professional life, even in this day and age of

modernisation, access cannot be left out as an explanatory factor. In addition to the theoretical importance of access itself, the link between access and use is interesting. If one only has access to people with the same or a lower prestige, one can logically only make use of these contacts.

In order to explore the importance of access to social resources we turn to Lin's propositions, which were described in Chapter One. The social-resources proposition states that, when seeking a job, an individual who has access to a contact of higher socioeconomic status can find a better job than someone whose contact has a lower status. The strength-of-positions proposition implies that the higher someone's initial position is, whether this position is inherited or achieved, the higher the quality of the social resources reached through a contact is. The strength-of-weak-ties proposition follows directly from Granovetter's work (1973; 1974), and states that weak ties give a wider reach to other parts of the social structure than strong ties. This enables someone who uses weak ties to reach better social resources.

Besides these three propositions, Lin predicts an interaction between the effects of the strength of someone's social position and the strength of ties. The lower the initial position, the more the strength-of-weak-ties proposition will apply. Because of the possibility of a ceiling effect, the strong ties of someone with a high status ought to provide him or her with social resources which are as good as (or better than) the resources available through weak ties. The weak ties of someone with a low status, however, should prove more useful than his or her strong ties.

According to Lin's propositions, certain aspects of the access to social resources appear to be particularly important for status attainment. First, in the social-resources proposition, the (relative) prestige of a contact one has access to is important. In the strength-of-positions proposition, initial position is an important factor. Finally, from the strength-of-weak-ties proposition we learned that the nature of the tie is of importance to t

he possible effect of access. My first step in the analyses in this chapter is to consider the importance of these three aspects.

The next step is to apply modernisation theory and the notion of ascribed versus achieved social capital to Lin's propositions. Modernisation implies that own education has a larger effect on the social resources one has access to than the characteristics of the father (initial position). I call this the *modernisation hypothesis*. Apart from considering explanations of differences in access, it is interesting to look at differences in the effect of access on attained prestige. We hypothesise that inherited access is of greater importance early on in the occupational career, while in later life achieved access gains in importance. This means that social resources accessed through the family are of greater importance to the first job and social resources accessed through friends are of greater importance to later jobs. I call this the *achieved-access hypothesis*.

The interaction between the strength of ties and achieved social capital is a bit more complex. Granovetter perceived the ties with relatives as strong ones and the ties with friends and acquaintances as weak. If we follow him in this, the hypothesis should be that access to relatives has a stronger effect on occupational prestige early on in one's career, and access to friends and acquaintances has a stronger effect in later stages. But if we follow Homans' "like me" principle (Homans, 1950), things change. If we do indeed choose our friends because they are alike, they will most likely have a similar status. Furthermore, due to the transitivity of friendships, as described in Chapter Two, our friends will most likely know the same (kinds of) persons we know. This makes the ties with friends strong ties rather than weak ones. The ties with relatives are forced upon us. Relatives can be very diverse as to their occupations and the persons they know. Thus, ties with relatives can widen the reach to other parts of the social structure. Yet calling relatives weak ties is intuitively strange. To avoid this problem, I distinguish between

relatives, friends, and acquaintances, rather than between strong and weak ties.[1] Moreover, I stick with my initial ***achieved-social-capital hypothesis*** that ascribed social capital is more important in the early career, and achieved social capital is of more influence in later stages.

The next step is to explore the influence access to social resources has on the actual use of social resources. This step is mainly based on the research Völker and Flap did for the former GDR (Völker & Flap, 1999). Völker and Flap found a small positive (though hardly significant) effect of access on use. I will also assume a positive relation between these two factors. In fact, I expect to find a stronger effect. Völker and Flap's research pertained to the communist GDR where there was danger involved in using personal contacts. For the Netherlands no such danger can be assumed. My ***access-leads-to-use hypothesis*** therefore reads as follows:

Better access to social resources leads to more intensive use of social resources.

The last elaboration upon the naive approach taken in Chapter Five is the promised inclusion of failures. For this I will simply make a distinction between those people who ever applied unsuccessfully for a job and those people who did not. Furthermore, I will make a distinction between those people who ever unsuccessfully applied for a job with use of a contact person, and those who unsuccessfully applied without a contact person. In fact this is a test for selectivity, comparable to the ones I did in Chapter Four. It is very important nonetheless. The research conducted so far on the use of social resources on the labour market, has only considered those people who actually found jobs through a contact person. Because so-called failures were excluded, the effects found may have been biased.[2] Only allegedly 'good' prospective employees get jobs through contacts, while 'bad' prospective employees are not selected for the analyses, because they fail to get a job. This possible selectivity has been one of the main criticisms of the research of Lin et al.

In the hope of avoiding making the same mistake, I will approach this problem with an open mind. With this I mean that I will not formulate hypotheses regarding 'failures'. In the last analysis section of this chapter, the phenomenon will be disentangled in a purely descriptive way.

6.3. Measurements and operationalisations

In order to measure the access people have to other people with a certain occupational prestige, the respondents in the Dutch Telepanel Survey were confronted with a list of 30 occupations and were asked whether they had a friend, relative or acquaintance with a certain occupation. We call this the 'position generator'. The method of questioning resembles the one Lin and Dumin used, except that Lin and Dumin had only 20 occupations on their list. Völker and Flap used a list with 33 occupations. The beauty of this apparently simple measurement instrument is that it incorporates almost all relevant aspects of social capital that I need for testing my hypotheses.

As a general indicator of access to social resources I simply use the number of occupations people have access to, or, in other words, the access network. To measure the 'quality' of the access network, I use the highest prestige level of the accessed occupations. As an indicator for the range of the network I simply use range of prestige (highest minus lowest prestige). For the respondent's initial prestige, I use the prestige of the father as an indicator. For the nature of the tie, we only have to look at the original position generator, which distinguishes between friends, relatives, and acquaintances.

To distinguish between ascribed and achieved access, I make use of a particularly nice set of questions asked in the Dutch Telepanel Survey. In this survey the respondents

were asked to name the occupations of their parents' two best friends when they were young and the occupations of their own two best friends at the time of the interview. The occupational prestige of the friends of the parents are used as indicators of ascribed access to social capital. The occupational prestige of the own best friends are used as indicators of achieved social capital.

For the description of possible differences between people who ever applied for a job and did not get it, I can use two questions from the Dutch Telepanel Survey. First, people were literally asked whether they ever unsuccessfully applied for a job and second, they were asked how they learned about this job.

In the following section I will first translate the described theory and hypotheses into testable hypotheses, that is, into hypotheses that are stated in terms of variables.

6.4 Propositions and hypotheses in terms of variables

In this section, I will translate Lin's propositions and my own hypotheses in terms of variables.[3] The strength-of-position proposition states that the higher someone's initial position, the higher the quality of the social resources reached through a contact is. In terms of the variables described in the foregoing section, this leads to the following ***strength-of-position hypothesis***:

The higher the occupational prestige of someone's father, the higher the lowest prestige accessed, the highest prestige accessed, the range of prestige accessed, and the number of occupations accessed are.

The strength-of-weak-ties proposition states that weak ties rather than strong ties permit a wide reach to other parts of the social structure. In terms of variables this reads as the following ***strength-of-weak-ties hypothesis***:

Contacts with acquaintances give access to more occupations, with higher prestige, and access to a wider range of occupations, as compared to contacts with friends and relatives.

The ***modernisation hypothesis*** states that own education has a larger effect on the social resources accessed than the characteristics of the father. In terms of variables this means that own education has a larger effect on the number of occupations accessed, the prestige of the occupations accessed and the range of prestige of occupations accessed than the father's occupational prestige.

The ***achieved-access hypothesis*** states that access through relatives has a stronger effect on own prestige in the early phase of the occupational career, and access through friends has a stronger effect in later stages. In terms of variables this means that the occupational prestige of the friends of the parents when the respondent was young has an effect on the prestige of the respondent's first job. Regarding the occupational prestige of the respondent's job at the time of the interview, the prestige of the respondent's own friends has a larger effect. These four hypotheses will be tested in Section 6.5.1.

The ***access-leads-to-use hypothesis*** states very straightforwardly that better access to social resources leads to more intensive use of social resources. I will start with testing this hypothesis in its strictest form. This means that all access variables constructed, e.g. number of occupations accessed, access through relatives, access through friends and access through acquaintances, will be applied to explain the use of informal contacts for the first job, the job before last, and the current or last job. This leads to the following hypothesis:

A higher number of occupations accessed and wider-ranging access to occupations through relatives, friends and acquaintances leads to more intensive use of social resources for the first job, the job before last and the current or last job.

This form of the access-leads-to-use hypothesis is, however, a very unrefined one. If we take into account the achieved-access hypothesis, we expect more influence of relatives on the first job, and more influence of friends and acquaintances on the job before last and the current or last job. This expectation leads to the following refinement of the access-leads-to-use hypothesis:

First, we can refine the hypothesis into the ***higher-number-leads-to-more-use hypothesis***:

For all jobs, a higher number of occupations accessed leads to more intensive use of social resources.

The next refinement is the ***achieved-access-leads-to-more-use hypothesis***:

For the first job, access of occupations through relatives leads to more intensive use of social resources, while for the job before last and the current or last job access through friends and acquaintances leads to more intensive use of social resources.

If we combine the ***achieved-access-leads-to-more-use hypothesis*** with the ***strength-of-weak-ties hypothesis***, we reach the even more refined formulated ***achieved-access-through-weak-ties-leads-to-more-use*** hypothesis:

For the job before last and the current or last job, access through acquaintances leads to more intensive use of social resources than access through friends.

Note that I do not include family in this hypothesis. This is done to avoid the discussion about whom to call weak ties and who not. I will let the empirical results decide on this matter.

With regard to 'failures' - those people who ever unsuccessfully applied for a job, either through informal resources or not - I have formulated no hypothesis. Yet, to rule out the form of selectivity that I have described earlier (only 'good' prospective employees find jobs through friends), I can formulate an ***expectation of absence of selectivity***. This means

that I expect no differences between those people who unsuccessfully applied for a job and who learned about this job through friends and those people who unsuccessfully applied for a job and who learned about this job through other sources.

6.5. Analyses

6.5.1. Access to social resources

In order to test the hypotheses derived from Lin's propositions, I will first construct two descriptive tables. In Table 6.1 the 30 occupations on the list used in the survey are listed under four main categories: upper white-collar occupations, lower white-collar occupations, upper blue-collar occupations, and lower blue-collar occupations. The percentage of respondents who declared to know a person with a certain occupation is mentioned in the table, as well as the percentage of respondents who declared to know someone in one of the four occupational groups.

From Table 6.1 it can be seen that the diversity of access is large. Many respondents seem to know people in all kinds of occupations. In general, the access to 'white' occupations seems larger than the access to 'blue' occupations, but this may also be due to the fact that less 'blue' occupations were listed. Lin and Dumin (1986) had a more balanced list of occupations and they did not find this difference. Völker and Flap (1999) had a list largely similar to ours, and they did find the same difference.

Table 6.2 depicts the means and standard deviations of the number of occupations accessed, the lowest prestige accessed, the average prestige accessed, the highest prestige accessed, and the range of the prestige of occupations accessed.

Table 6.1: Access to occupations through social ties.

Occupations accessed, N=2362		
Upper white	85%	
Direct. public works		8%
Real estate agent		16%
Computer programmer		43%
Lawyer		19%
Union official		12%
Social scientist		22%
Manager of supermarket		17%
Musician		29%
Building contractor		27%
Head of school		34%
University professor		17%
Direct. industr. org. (50 pers.)		17%
Reporter		18%
Business economist		22%
Teacher elementary school		45%
Hotel manager		10%
Lower white	84%	
Salesman		40%
Secretary		50%
Insurance agent		31%
Geriatric attendant		43%
Telephone operator		26%
Nurse		58%
Upper blue	50%	
Car mechanic		38%
Team boss metal constr. company		14%
Lathe operator		21%
Lower blue	65%	
Warehouseman/supply clerk		23%
Waiter		19%
Garbage collector		7%
Shop assistant		42%
Dairy farmer		27%

Table 6.2: Access to occupations through social ties.

	Mean	S.D.
Number of occupations accessed	8.39	4.98
Lowest prestige	33.50	10.42
Average prestige	52.68	7.98
Highest prestige	72.07	11.74
Range of prestige	38.57	15.81

From Table 6.2, it can be seen that on average people state that they have access to 8 occupations. This seems to be quite a universal number of accessed occupations; the same number was found by Lin and Dumin for Albany (USA), and by Völker and Flap for the GDR. Although the list of occupations has a lowest prestige score of 23, and a highest prestige score of 85, the mean lowest prestige of occupations accessed is 33. The mean highest prestige is 72. The average level of prestige accessed is about 53, which is more interesting if we compare it to the average level of occupational prestige of the respondents, which is 46. On average, people seem to have access to relatively high quality social resources.

The descriptive analyses displayed in Tables 6.1 and 6.2 sketch the phenomenon we wish to explain. In order to explain differences in occupations accessed I will first look at the **strength-of-position hypothesis**. In Table 6.3, I have classified the occupational prestige of the respondents' fathers into three categories: high (prestige of 65 and higher), medium (prestige between 45 and 65), and low (prestige lower than 45). The number of occupations accessed, the lowest prestige accessed, the average prestige accessed, the highest prestige accessed, and the range of prestige of occupations accessed are broken down by the fathers' prestige scores in Table 6.3.

From Table 6.3 we see that the occupation of the father has a lot of influence on his children's access to occupations. The higher the initial (i.e. the father's) position, the

higher the mean lowest prestige, the mean highest prestige, the range of occupations accessed, and the number of occupations accessed.

Table 6.3: Access to occupational categories by father's occupational prestige.

	Father's occupational prestige (Ultee-Sixma prestige scores)				
	High (65+) N=216	Medium (45=65) N=282	Low (45-) N=574	Total N=1072	Linearity
Lowest prestige	35.03 (11.36)	33.90 (10.69)	32.61 (9.74)	33.44 (10.37)	**
Highest prestige	75.84 (9.07)	72.86 (11.58)	69.93 (12.09)	71.89 (11.63)	**
Range of prestige	40.81 (14.75)	38.96 (15.67)	37.32 (16.27)	38.45 (15.86)	**
Number of occupations	8.97 (4.84)	8.36 (4.87)	7.90 (4.84)	8.24 (4.86)	**
Between group p	**	**	*	*	

* significant at 5% level
** significant at 1% level
Note: Standard deviations between brackets

The effect is linear and the differences between the groups are significant. This means that we can translate the findings into the conclusion that the higher the occupational prestige of the father, the higher the prestige of the occupations his children have access to. Apparently the ***strength-of-position hypothesis*** cannot be refuted.

In order to test the ***strength-of-weak-ties hypothesis*** I have constructed Table 6.4, which depicts the percentages of respondents mentioning relatives, friends and acquaintances in the four main occupational groups.

In the lower panel of Table 6.4, again the lowest, average and highest prestige accessed are depicted, as well as the range of prestige accessed and the number of occupations accessed. These factors are now broken down by the nature of the tie.

Table 6.4: Access to occupations through relatives, friends and acquaintances (N=2362).

	Percentage of respondents mentioning			
Occupational groups	Relatives	Friends	Acquaintances	Any
Upper white	63%	49%	70%	85%
Lower white	59%	46%	65%	84%
Upper blue	26%	17%	32%	50%
Lower blue	40%	27%	46%	65%
Any	85%	71%	86%	
Mean (S.D.)	Relatives	Friends	Acquaintances	Any
Lowest prestige	40.20 (13.79)	42.98 (14.22)	37.65 (12.83)	33.50 (10.42)
Average prestige	52.09 (11.09)	52.85 (11.72)	52.85 (9.77)	52.68 (7.98)
Highest prestige	64.78 (14.43)	63.20 (14.81)	67.96 (13.67)	72.07 (11.41)
Range	24.59 (17.87)	20.22 (17.68)	30.30 (18.40)	38.57 (15.81)
Number	3.82 (2.75)	3.42 (2.87)	5.72 (4.31)	8.39 (4.98)

In Table 6.4 we find some support for the **strength-of-weak-ties hypothesis** as Granovetter (1974) first formulated it. Not only do acquaintances provide wider access to the upper white-collar occupations, they also provide access to the widest range and the highest number of occupations. The "like me" principle of friendship also finds some support, since friends provide access to the lowest range of occupations, as compared to relatives and acquaintances.

The next step is to incorporate other factors explaining the access to social resources into the analyses, this in order to test the **modernisation hypothesis**. As I stated in Section 6.2, on the basis of modernisation theory I expect education to have a higher

effect on access than initial position (i.e. prestige of the father). With regard to the strength-of-weak-ties proposition, my only expectation is that acquaintances have a stronger effect on access than friends or relatives. In the upper panel of Table 6.5 the first expectation is tested, and in the lower panel the second hypothesis is being looked at.

Table 6.5: Regression of access variables on father's occupational prestige and respondent's education and on strength of ties variables, Unstandardised and standardised coefficients.

Minimum N=1014	Number	Highest prestige	Lowest prestige	Range of prestige
Father's prestige	0.511 **	2.587 **	1.126 **	1.504 *
	(0.081)	(0.178)	(0.085)	(0.075)
Education	0.081	0.853 **	0.262	0.588 *
	(0.026)	(0.118)	(0.040)	(0.059)
Constant	7.365	65.937	31.060	34.815
R^2	0.62%	5.37%	8.33%	8.97%
Minimum N=796	Highest prestige	Range of prestige		
Father's prestige	2.635 **	1.238 *		
	(0.182)	(0.062)		
Friends	-0.001	0.069		
	(0.000)	(0.012)		
Relatives	0.872 **	1.724 **		
	(0.209)	(0.300)		
Acquaintances	0.946 **	1.615 **		
	(0.355)	(0.440)		
Constant	58.913	20.432		
R^2	25.74%	38.86%		

** Significant at 1% level

* Significant at 5% level

From Table 6.5 it can be seen that the expectation derived from modernisation theory, that education has a relatively large effect on occupational access does not hold. The standardised coefficients in the table show that, in fact, the occupational prestige of the

father is of greater influence on all aspects of access. From the lower panel of Table 6.5, it can be seen that access through acquaintances indeed gives the highest maximum occupational prestige accessed. Access through acquaintances also has the largest effect on the range of occupations accessed. Access through friends has no effect on either the maximum or the range of occupations accessed.

Table 6.6: Regression of prestige of first and current job on access variables, unstandardised and standardised coefficients (pairwise deletion of missing values, minimum N=560).

	First job	Current job
First job		0.534 **
		(0.467)
Education	1.351 **	0.538
	(0.132)	(0.046)
Friend parents 1	0.143 **	-0.010
	(0.173)	(-0.011)
Friend parents 2	0.062 ^	0.037
	(0.074)	(0.037)
Own friend 1		0.180 **
		(0.184)
Own friend 2		0.078 *
		(0.082)
Constant	28.650	8.796
R^2	7.10%	32.65%

** significant at 1% level
* significant at 5% level
^ significant at 10% level

However, access through relatives also has a large and positive effect on both aspects of access under investigation. This may either mean that the strength-of-weak-ties argument does not hold, or it may mean that relatives are weaker ties than they have been perceived until now. Intuitively, I opt for the second explanation.

The next and last step in this section is to test the ***achieved-access hypothesis***. In order to do so, I have regressed prestige of the first and the current job on the access variables. The prestige of the parents' friends when the respondent was young is used as an indicator for ascribed access to social capital. The prestige of the respondent's own best friends at the time of the interview is used as an indicator for achieved access to social capital. According to the achieved-social-capital hypothesis, the prestige of the friends of the parents is of dominant influence on the respondent's first job, while the prestige of the respondent's own friends is of more influence on the prestige of the respondent's current job. In Table 6.6, the results of the analysis are reported.

From Table 6.6 we can see that the achieved-social-capital hypothesis cannot be refuted with regard to access. The parents' first best friend has a highly significant effect on the prestige of the first job. The parents' second best friend also has a positive effect, although this is only significant at the 10% level. Regarding the prestige of the current job, we see that the prestige of the respondent's best friends has a highly significant positive effect, although the effect of the first best friend is larger than that of the second best friend. The prestige of the parents' best friends has no effect on the prestige of the respondent's current job. This is in line with the prediction of the ***achieved-social-capital hypothesis***.

The results in Table 6.6 seem to provide firm proof for the ***achieved-access hypothesis***. Nevertheless, the true test of the ***achieved-social-capital hypothesis*** (whether it concerns access or use) can only be performed if the characteristics of the father are

included in the analysis. The transition Blau and Duncan (1967) originally predicted was the one from ascription (characteristics of the father) to achievement (education). If this transition is indeed to be read as a transition from ascribed social capital (friends of the parents) to achieved social capital (own friends), inclusion of the social capital variables should diminish the effects of the characteristics of the father and of education. In Table 6.7, the analysis of the status attainment model with the inclusion of ascribed and achieved social capital is depicted.

From Table 6.7, the following conclusions can be drawn (we need to compare the standardised coefficients now):

- Indeed, for the first job, the effects of own education and the education of the father[4] become smaller after the inclusion of the ascribed social capital variables.

- For the current job, the effect of education disappears after inclusion of the achieved social capital variables. The education of the father had no effect on the prestige of the current job to begin with.

- The fact that the parents' best friends still have an effect on the prestige of the first job (note that the effect is higher than that of own education) while the respondent's own two best friends still have an effect on current occupational prestige - even after controlling for own education and education of the father - gives strong confirmation of the ***achieved-social-capital hypothesis***.

Table 6.7: Regression of prestige of first and current job on access variables, unstandardised and standardised coefficients (pairwise deletion of missing values, standard errors between brackets). Minimum N=445.

	First job	Current job	First job	Current job
First job		0.606 0.529 (0.028) **		0.545 0.475 (0.047) **
Education	1.289 0.126 (0.272) **	0.801 0.068 (0.280) *	1.124 0.110 (0.472) *	0.608 0.052 (0.468)
Father's education	3.659 0.241 (0.407) **	-0.291 -0.017 (0.423)	2.832 0.187 (0.758) **	-1.096 -0.063 (0.756)
Friend parents 1			0.106 0.129 (0.043) *	0.002 0.002 (0.043)
Friend parents 2			0.025 0.029 (0.043)	0.049 0.051 (0.043)
Own friend 1				0.181 0.185 (0.041) **
Own friend 2				0.080 0.084 (0.041) *
Intercept	20.534	31.340	27.006	9.018
R^2	8.46%	29.04%	9.53%	33.64%

** Significant at 1% level

* Significant at 5% level

^ Significant at 10% level

6.5.2. Does access lead to use?

In this section, I will test the general ***access-leads-to-use hypothesis***. As I described in section 6.4, this hypothesis can be divided into three more refined hypotheses:

1) the ***higher-number-leads-to-more-use hypothesis***, which states that a higher number of occupations accessed leads to more intensive use of social resources.

2) the ***achieved-access-leads-to-more-use hypothesis***, which states that, for the first job, access of occupations through relatives leads to more intensive use of social resources, while for the job before last and the current or last job access through friends and acquaintances leads to more use of social resources.

3) the ***achieved-access-through-weak-ties-leads-to-more-use hypothesis***, which states that, for the job before last and the current or last job, access through acquaintances leads to more intensive use of social resources than access through friends.

In order to test all these hypotheses, I have regressed the way people found their first job, their job before last and their current or last job on the access variables. The three dependent variables are dichotomous. Officially one cannot use dichotomous variables within Ordinary Least Squares regression. This has to do with one of the assumptions of the method, namely that all variables are measured at interval (or at least ordinal) level. Strictly speaking, the dependent variables in my analyses are measured at nominal level. However, because the variables are coded 1 when the job was found through a personal contact and 0 if it was not, a nominal measurement level constitutes no problem. If the coefficients are positive (and significant) this will still mean that more of the independent variable leads to more of the dependent variable; in this case, it means that more access

leads to more intensive use. Because of the clear interpretation of the coefficients in OLS regression, I prefer this method to other, normally more appropriate methods of analysis.

The analyses needed to test the ***higher-number-leads-to-more-use hypothesis*** are reported in Table 6.8. From Table 6.8, we can conclude that a higher number of occupations accessed indeed leads to a slightly more intensive use of informal resources where the job before last and the current or last job are concerned. The intensity of use is, however, only slightly higher, and the effects are only significant at the 10% level. This is a similar result to that found by Völker and Flap (1999). The meaning of the results become clearer if we put them in regression equations. This leads to the following two equations:

1) job before last informal? = 0.331 + 0.005 * number of occupations accessed.

2) current or last job informal? = 0.372 + 0.004 * number of occupations accessed.

From Table 6.3, we learned that on average people have access to eight different occupations. If we impute this into the equations, we get the result of 0.371 for the job before last and 0.404 for the current or last job. These numbers have to be interpreted on a scale from 0 to 1. The conclusion from these findings has to be that the ***higher-number-leads-to-more-use hypothesis*** cannot be refuted.

The analyses needed to test the ***achieved-access-leads-to-more-use hypothesis*** and the ***achieved-access-through-weak-ties-leads-to-more-use hypothesis***, are reported in Table 6.9. With regard to the first hypothesis, we can conclude that access to occupations through relatives indeed leads to more intensive use of informal resources for the first job. Regarding the job before last and the current or last job, only access through acquaintances leads to more use.

Table 6.8: Regression of the way a job was found on the number of occupations accessed. Unstandardised and standardised regression coefficients (pairwise deletion of missing values, standard errors between brackets).

	Job 1 informal? N=1711	Job before last informal? N=1300	Current/last job informal? N=2105
Number of occupations accessed	0.003 0.028 (0.002)	0.005 0.050 (0.027) ^	0.004 0.038 (0.002) ^
Intercept	0.434	0.331	0.372
R^2	0.02%	0.17%	0.14%

** significant at 1% level

* significant at 5% level

^ significant at 10% level

Table 6.9: Regression of the way a job was found on the number of occupations accessed through friends, acquaintances and relatives respectively. Unstandardised and standardised regression coefficients (pairwise deletion of missing values, standard errors between brackets).

	Job 1 informal? N=1298	Job before last informal? N=994	Current/last job informal? N=1532
Access through friends	0.000 0.005 (0.006)	0.003 0.021 (0.006)	-0.000 -0.002 (0.006)
Access through acquaintances	-0.002 -0.017 (0.004)	0.009 0.077 (0.004) ^	0.007 0.065 (0.004) *
Access through relatives	0.014 0.076 (0.005) *	-0.005 -0.031 (0.006)	0.002 0.010 (0.005)
Intercept	0.414	0.331	0.354
R^2	0.31%	0.40%	0.27%

** significant at 1% level

* significant at 5% level

^ significant at 10% level

This result does not lead to a rejection of the ***achieved-access-leads-to-more-use hypothesis***. It is also not a strong confirmation of the hypothesis.

In the case of the ***achieved-access-through-weak-ties-leads-to-more-use hypothesis*** we only have to look at the last two columns of Table 6.9. In these columns, we see that the effect of occupations accessed through acquaintances is significant (although only at a 10% level), while the occupations accessed through friends have no effect on the use of informal resources. From this, we can conclude that the hypothesis cannot be rejected.

What do the results from the analyses in this section mean for the general ***access-leads-to-use hypothesis***? In general, we can conclude that better access leads to more intensive use, but the effects are very small and hardly ever significant above the 10% level. 'The more the better' seems to apply to social capital, but not very strongly. A more theoretical conclusion is that social capital is productive in other ways than just through the use of social resources. There seem to be other mechanisms through which social capital has an effect on success on the labour market than just the process of looking for a job.

6.5.3. Failed use of informal resources

As promised in Section 6.3, I will now turn to the subject of people who have ever unsuccessfully applied for a job. To tackle this subject, I have made two distinctions. First, I will compare people who have ever unsuccessfully applied for a job with people who have not. Of the 2,362 persons who answered the question whether they had ever unsuccessfully applied for a job, 1,128 (48%) said 'no', and 1,234 (52%) said 'yes'. Second, I will select the people who have ever unsuccessfully applied for a job, and make a

comparison between those respondents who learned about this job through informal resources and the group who learned about it through formal resources. Of the 1,234 persons who have ever unsuccessfully applied for a job, 1,131 answered the question about how they learned about this job. Of these 1,131, 1,066 (94%) answered 'through formal resources'. Sixty-five respondent (6%) learned about the job through informal resources.[5] To make the comparisons mentioned above, I have broken the groups down by a few background characteristics: own education, education of the father, prestige of the first job, age and sex. In Table 6.10, the means of these control variables are shown per selected group. The significance pertains to between-group significance, which tells us if the groups really differ with respect to the control variables.

Table 6.10: Unsuccessful job applications and the way people learned about the job broken down by education, father's education, prestige of first job, age and sex. Means of control variables per group in cells (number of cases in groups between brackets).

Ever unsuccessfully applied?	Education	Father's education	Prestige of first job	Age	Sex
No	1.925 (1127)	1.842 (499)	39.702 (772)	47.438 (1127)	0.543 (1127)
Yes	2.232 (1234) **	2.026 (564) **	43.523 (889) **	40.179 (1234) **	0.425 (1234) **
If yes, how did you learn about the job?	**Education**	**Father's education**	**Prestige of first job**	**Age**	**Sex**
Formal	2.253 (1066)	2.034 (503)	44.008 (773)	39.665 (1066)	0.431 (1066)
Informal	2.185 (65)	2.154 (26)	40.289 (45)	37.631 (65)	0.369 (65)

Between-group significance:
** significant at 1% level

From Table 6.10 it can be seen that the people who have unsuccessfully applied for a job are in general better educated, have or had a better educated father, and a higher first job prestige. Furthermore, the unsuccessful applicants are younger. More men than women have unsuccessfully applied (a number closer to 1 indicates more women, a number closer to 0 indicates more men). These results tell us that, on average, the people who have ever unsuccessfully applied appear to be more successful in the rest of their lives. In fact, I suggest the conclusion from the table should be that 'better' people have applied unsuccessfully, because they could afford to go in search of another job. A failed application does not mean that one gets fired, but may result in a better job. Another explanation for the results may lie in the direction of the assumptions I made to explain a possible overestimation of 'foes'. Acquiring a good job, through hard work and perseverance looks better than getting a job 'without effort'.

We will now look at the bottom half of Table 6.10. Here the people who unsuccessfully applied for a job are divided into people who learned about this job through formal resources and people who heard about the job through informal resources. From the table, we can clearly see that there are no significant differences between these two groups. Note, however, that the number of people who learned about the job through informal resources is only small (65 respondents). Nevertheless, the results in Table 6.10 confirm my ***expectation of absence of selectivity***.

In the last section of this chapter, I will summarise the results of the analyses.

6.6. Conclusions and discussion

In this chapter, I have looked at the aspects that influence the access to social resources and at the influence access to social resources has on attained prestige. Regarding the aspects influencing access, I have leaned heavily on Lin and Dumin (1986).

With respect to the aspects that influence the access to social resources, the following conclusions can be drawn. First, the diversity of access is large: many respondents appear to know people in all kinds of occupations. Second, on average, people seem to have access to relatively high quality social resources. Third, we found that the prestige of the father, as an indicator of initial position, has a large effect on the access to social resources, and that this effect is larger than the effect of education. This finding constitutes a rejection of *the modernisation hypothesis*, and it strengthens our conviction once more that modernisation has not led to a transition from particularistic to universalistic values. The father, or rather social background, remains a factor of great importance for status attainment, although the effect is in greater part indirect. This is a confirmation of *the strength-of-position hypothesis*. The fourth conclusion to be drawn with respect to aspects influencing the access to social resources is that acquaintances provide the best access, as compared to relatives and friends. Yet relatives also provide rather good access to social resources. In fact, friends give least access to social resources. These findings reject *the strength-of-weak-ties hypothesis*.

With these findings, we can contribute to the discussion concerning the strength-of-weak-ties argument, which was started by Granovetter (1974). Relatives have always been perceived as strong ties, but if the argument is started from another point, following Homans' "like me" principle, this does not seem very logical. Looking back on the analyses performed in this chapter, I am still convinced that acquaintances provide us with

the best access to social resources, because they are the least "like us". But I also believe that friends are more "like us" than relatives. We do not choose our relatives; they are forced upon us. There is no real reason to believe that relatives in general have a similar occupational reach as we do. One only has to consider the broad meaning of the word 'relatives'. It incorporates our parents and siblings, but also our grandparents, uncles, aunts, cousins, nephews, and our own children. In short, based on the findings in this chapter, I am not willing to refute the strength-of-weak-ties argument, but I would like to take a closer look at it in the future.

The analyses of the influence of access to social resources on attained prestige leave us with two conclusions. First, access through relatives (ascribed access to social resources) has a highly significant and strong positive effect on the prestige of the first job. Second, access through friends (achieved access) has a strong positive effect on the prestige of the current job, while ascribed access has no effect on the prestige of the current job. Since ***the achieved-access hypothesis*** about the influence of ascribed and achieved access on attained prestige consists of two elements, namely that 1) ascribed access has more influence early on in the occupational career, while 2) achieved access becomes more important in later stages, this hypothesis cannot be refuted. In fact, the findings demonstrate the importance of including ascribed and achieved social capital in the explanation of status attainment. We also found proof that the transition from ascribed to achieved social capital may be an explanation for the perceived general transition from ascription to achievement.

To answer the question whether access leads to more intensive use of social resources, I formulated one general hypothesis and three more specified hypotheses. The ***higher-number-leads-to-more-use hypothesis***, which states that a higher number of occupations accessed leads to more intensive use of social resources, could not be refuted. Although the effects are rather small, a higher number of occupations accessed leads to

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more intensive use of informal resources when someone is looking for a job.

The ***achieved-access-leads-to-more-use hypothesis*** stated that, with respect to the first job, access to occupations through relatives leads to more intensive use of informal resources, while for the later jobs access through friends and acquaintances is of greater importance. In the analyses I found nothing to contradict this hypothesis, although friends were found to be of no importance for the job before last and the current or last job. Access through acquaintances showed to have an effect on the use of informal resources for the job before last and the current or last job. The hypothesis therefore cannot be refuted.

In fact, this last finding points at the importance of including the ***achieved-access-through-weak-ties-leads-to-more-use hypothesis***, which claims that for the job before last and the current or last job access through acquaintances leads to more intensive use of social resources than access through friends does. Not surprisingly, this hypothesis could not be rejected. Indeed, access through relatives was the only variable that had an effect on the use of informal resources for the first job. Only access through acquaintances had an effect on the use of informal resources for the job before last and the current or last job.

The results described provide proof for the general ***access-leads-to-use hypothesis***. Indeed it seems that 'the more the better' applies to access to social capital, although not very strongly.

The last analyses in this chapter concerned failures in the use of informal resources. For this, I first compared the group of people who have ever unsuccessfully applied for a job with the group of people who have never done so. The conclusion was that, on average, people who have ever unsuccessfully applied for a job have a higher education, a father with a higher education and a higher first job prestige. Furthermore, this group is on

average younger and contains more men than the group of people who have never unsuccessfully applied for a job. The most straightforward conclusion from this is that 'more successful' people more often unsuccessfully apply for a job. As I stated in Section 6.5.3, I find the most logical explanation for this that these people could afford to go in search for another job. A failed application does not mean that one gets fired, but it may result in a better job. Those who do not expect to be able to find a better job probably do not continue their job-hunt either.

Second, I compared (of the group of people who ever unsuccessfully applied for a job) the people who learned about the job through informal resources to those who heard about it through formal channels. The conclusion from this comparison was that there is no significant difference between the two groups. From this, I concluded that my ***expectation of absence of selectivity*** is confirmed. This is a hopeful result for the research into the influence of social capital on the labour market. Because up till now a lot of the research into this subject has analysed how people found their jobs, and has excluded those people that used informal resources but did not find a job, there has always been a chance of selectivity. The results in Section 6.5.3 show that this selectivity does not occur, at least not in the Netherlands in 1993.

In the next chapter, I will present a dynamic approach to sweet social capital. This will be the last step in the analysis of sweet social capital.

Notes

(1) In a lot of research into social networks role-based forms of measurements have been used. In these forms of measurements, colleagues are by definition weak ties (see, for instance, Fischer, 1982). I do not believe in this definition of the ties with colleagues. In my research, colleagues can be acquaintances, friends and even relatives.

(2) The bias due to the exclusion of failures only pertains to the models in which the way someone found his or her job was used as an explanatory variable. The analyses that include characteristics of the former job, e.g. atmosphere, contacts with colleagues and contact with work leader, do not solely consider those who found jobs through friends, and are thus not subject to this bias. In the dynamic analyses in Chapter Seven, this problem does not occur either, because all people who ever had a job are included in the analyses.

(3) Note that I will not check for gender-differences with regard to access in this chapter and have not formulated hypotheses about this. The choice not to analyse gender-differences in this chapter is partly pragmatic. Studying differences between men and women would open up a whole Pandora's Box about which an entire book could be written. The choice is also partly based on empirical considerations. Sometimes the number of cases in the analyses gets so dangerously low, that a division into even finer categories would render no reliable results.

(4) Here, I have only used the education of the father as an indicator of social background to assure parsimony of the model. Due to the high correlation between the education of the father and his occupational prestige, including both these variables in the model would enhance the risk of multi-collinearity, especially when many other variables are included in the model. In the present case the choice for the education of the father was based on empirical considerations. Apparently the recollection of the respondents is better with regard to their father's education: this variable had far fewer missing values than the father's occupational prestige.

(5) This percentage of use of informal resources is low as compared to the percentage of people who did find a job through informal resources. Maybe the people who unsuccessfully applied for jobs were already in a job at the time. If one has a job and applies for another job, one usually wants as little people as possible to know about this. It may also be the case that the jobs these overall successful respondents applied for were not really important to them. If one really wants a job, one will use all resources available to get it. Consequently, if a job is not that important, one may refrain from using these resources.

Chapter Seven - A Dynamic Approach To Sweet Social Capital

7.1 Introduction

In the past few chapters, I have first taken a rather naive and later on a more elaborate approach to sweet social capital. In this chapter the last step in the analysis of sweet social capital will be taken by approaching social capital in a dynamic way. As discussed earlier, the advantages of this dynamic approach are that the problem of causal order can be solved and that the influence of positive social capital can be expressed in terms of the likelihood that a certain event will happen. This chapter focuses on the influence of positive social capital on mobility and immobility (the time people spend in the same job). Both the likelihood of becoming unemployed and the duration of unemployment will be analysed.

In the following sections I will first reformulate the main hypotheses of Chapters One and Two in dynamic terms. After that, the method of event history analysis, which was described in Chapter Four, will be applied.

7.2 Operationalisation of the hypotheses

7.2.1. Hypotheses in terms of the likelihood of experiencing employment or unemployment

In Chapter One, I posed two questions regarding positive social capital on the labour market. The first question was: are people who apply for a job, especially for a higher job, via a friend more likely to get this job if that friend has a higher job? The second question was: do people who remain in their job for a long time have fewer friends at the workplace, as compared to upwardly and downwardly mobile persons, or do they only have friends at their own occupational level?

The first question has in part been answered in Chapter Five, where we saw that using a contact person with a relatively high prestige indeed leads to a 'better' job in terms of prestige. In this chapter we can elaborate on this in terms of likelihood. I will only look at those respondents who ever had a job. This means that people who never had a paid job are not included in the analyses. If someone has a job, there are three future outcomes possible. The first future outcome possibility is the event of finding another job. This is a transition from one job to another. The ***finding-another-job hypothesis*** states that:

People who have friends with a relatively high occupational prestige, are more likely to find a new job than people who do not have such friends.

The second possible outcome is a sort of non-event, namely, that someone who has a job stays in that same job. This is a 'transition' from a job to the same job. From the theoretical assumptions in Chapters One and Two the following ***immobility hypothesis*** can be derived:

People who have friends with (approximately) the same occupational prestige remain in

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the same job for a longer period, as compared to people with friends with a higher occupational prestige or people with no friends.

The third possible transition is the event of becoming unemployed. Since we are not analysing foes in this chapter, the ***unemployment hypothesis*** about the event of becoming unemployed is a negatively formulated one:

People who have friends in the workplace are less likely to become unemployed than people who do not have friends in the workplace.

The last thing to analyse in this chapter is the duration of unemployment. Whereas I distinguish three possible future outcomes if someone is employed, I will consider only two possible outcomes of being unemployed. One can either remain unemployed or find a new job. In fact, I again analyse the chance of the event of finding a job. This time, however, the event is conditional on the duration of unemployment. The ***first unemployment-duration hypothesis*** is:

People who had friends in the job they held *before* they became unemployed, remain unemployed for a shorter period than people who had no friends in the preceding job.

In Chapter Two, I mentioned several conditions under which social capital provides most profit in terms of mobility and prestige. The conditions I have data on will be incorporated in the analyses in this chapter. The condition of high initial status is captured by including the characteristics of the father. The condition of contact persons with a relatively high status is already included in the other hypotheses. Two new conditions will be introduced in this chapter. The first of these conditions is that of short duration of unemployment, if unemployed. This leads to the following ***second unemployment-duration hypothesis***:

People who have been unemployed for a relatively short period have a better chance of finding a new job than people who have been unemployed for a relatively long period.

Combining the first and the second unemployment duration hypotheses leads to the ***third unemployment-duration hypothesis***:

People who had friends in the job they held *before* they became unemployed remain unemployed for a shorter period and thus have a better chance of finding a new job than people who had no friends in the preceding job.

In Chapter Two, I also stated that jobs with a high damage potential increase the influence of social capital. Jobs with a high damage potential are jobs in which the employee handles information of strategic interest to the competition or is liable to make serious (expensive) mistakes. The ***high-damage-potential hypothesis*** is:

People who have a job with a high damage potential, and who found that job through friends, have higher prestige than people with a job with a high damage potential who did not find their job through friends. Furthermore, they stay in their jobs for longer periods of time.

In the next section, I will elaborate on the hypotheses formulated here and specify them in terms of actual variables.

7.2.2. Hypotheses in terms of the relationships between variables

In this chapter, I will make use of the Netherlands Family Survey 1992-1993. The main advantage of this dataset is that it contains information on the respondents' complete careers. This makes it possible to perform a 'dynamic' analysis and follow the respondents over the course of their lives. I will not analyse respondents, but respondent-months. For each respondent and for each month, a record is made of whether the respondent has a job and, if so, what the prestige of this job is, how the respondent got the job, how the contacts with the colleagues are, and so on. For all analyses in this chapter, I selected the

respondent-months after a respondent started in his or her first job. Thus, respondents who never had a job are not analysed here. Because I know the actual dates of the occurrence of events like finding a job, finding a new job and losing a job, the causal order of variables is certain. Like I did in Chapter Five, I use indicators for the prestige of the contact person, instead of any direct forms of measurement.

The *finding-another-job hypothesis* formulated in the preceding section is operationalised as follows:

People who had a good contact with their work leader in a certain job are more likely to find another job with relatively high prestige than people who had a bad contact with their work leader.

For the *immobility hypothesis*, according to which people who have friends with the same prestige remain in the same job for a longer period of time, I use good contacts with the colleagues and a good atmosphere at work as indicators of friends with the same level of prestige. Hence, the operationalised hypothesis is:

People who have good contacts with their colleagues and think the atmosphere at work is good remain in their job for a longer period of time, as compared to people who have bad contacts with their colleagues and experience a bad atmosphere at work.

For the *unemployment hypothesis*, which concerns the event of becoming unemployed, I use the way of finding the job before the unemployment spell as an indicator of friends. Other indicators are the quality of the contacts with the work leader and the colleagues, and the atmosphere at work. The operationalised hypothesis reads as follows:

People who found their job through friends, have a good contact with their work leader and/or colleagues, and/or who describe the atmosphere at work as good are less likely to become unemployed than people who found their job through other channels, have no

good contact with their work leader and/or colleagues, and/or define the atmosphere at work as bad.

For the *first unemployment-duration hypothesis*, the same indicators for friends will be used. Hence, unemployed people who had good contacts with their colleagues and/or a good atmosphere at work before their unemployment spell remain unemployed for a shorter period than people who had a bad contact with their colleagues and/or experienced a bad atmosphere at work in the preceding job.

The *second unemployment-duration hypothesis*, which states that people who have been unemployed for a relatively short period have a better chance of finding a new job than people who have been unemployed for a relatively long period, needs no further operationalisation. The duration of unemployment will simply be expressed in months.

The *third unemployment duration hypothesis* is a combination of the first two unemployment duration hypotheses, and can thus be operationalised as follows:

Unemployed people who had good contacts with their colleagues and/or experienced a good atmosphere at work before their unemployment spell, remain unemployed for a shorter period and thus have a better chance of finding a new job than people who had bad contacts with their colleagues and/or experienced a bad atmosphere at work before their unemployment spell.

For the *high-damage-potential hypothesis*, I use as an indicator of a high damage potential whether the respondent is being a supervisor or not. The hypothesis then reads as:

Supervisors stay in their jobs for a relatively long period; if they found their job through friends, their prestige is relatively high, as compared to supervisors who found their jobs through other channels.

In the following sections I will test the seven hypotheses that have been operationalised in this section.

7.3. Analysis of the influence of sweet social capital on the likelihood of finding a job or becoming unemployed

In order to test the hypotheses regarding the event of finding a job and the duration of a job, I made a selection of employed persons. Because we are working with a person-month file, this means that all the months were selected in which the respondents were employed, after they started their first job. For the subsequent analyses in this chapter, I will use selections of this person-month file. For the analysis of the likelihood of finding a new job, I will select respondent-months of respondents who have a job, up till the month that the respondent finds a new job. Then I will select them again, up until they find a new job or until the moment of the interview. I will omit all respondent-months during which a person was unemployed. In the analysis of the likelihood of finding a job, given that someone is unemployed, I will, of course, select those respondent-months in which a respondent was either unemployed, or had just found a new job. The analysis of job prestige will pertain to respondent-jobs instead of respondent-months. For this analysis, all respondent-months in which a respondent found a new job will be selected. The prestige of this new job will be considered and related to the characteristics of the previous job.

In Table 7.1 the analysis of the likelihood of finding another job, given that one has a job, is presented. From the data file I selected those respondent-months in which a respondent either had a job or had just found one. There are 1,689 'events' in this analysis. This means that in 1689 instances a respondent found a new job. Due to the structure of

the data, job duration can be analysed simultaneously with the event of finding another job. Job duration is simply the number of months someone stays in the same job. Hence, I test the ***finding-a-job hypothesis*** and the ***immobility hypothesis*** by one and the same procedure.

In Table 7.1 the effects of some time-varying variables are recorded: number of hours worked per week, age of the respondent, prestige of the job, job duration, contact with the work leader, contacts with the colleagues, and atmosphere at work. The last three variables take on the value 1 for 'good' and 0 for 'bad'. Three time-constant variables are also included, namely the highest completed education of the respondent, the education of the father[1] and the variable female[2] (1 for women, 0 for men). In order to analyse job duration, three interactions were included: those of job duration with the atmosphere at work, with the contact with the work leader, and with the contacts with the colleagues.

In Table 7.1 the logistic regression of the event of finding a job on all the variables mentioned is presented. As stated before, the units of analysis are the months in which the persons in the data file are 'at risk' of finding a job. First, let us look at the effects of the time-constant variables. The positive effect of the highest completed education means that if the highest completed education is higher, the chance of finding a new job is also higher. The effect of the education of the father is similar. From the effect of the variable 'female', I conclude that women have a lower chance of finding a new job than men. As for the time-varying variables, the number of hours worked has a negative effect on the chance of finding a new job. So, people with a full-time job have a lower chance of finding a new job than people with a part-time job.

Table 7.1: Logistic regression explaining the event of finding a job.

		B	Standard Error
Number of events: 1689			
Number of person-months: 101931			
Control variables		B	Standard Error
Time-constant control variables	Highest education	0.066 *	0.028
	Education of father	0.071 **	0.023
	Female	-0.110 *	0.052
Time-varying covariates	Hours work p/week	-0.011 **	0.002
	Age	-0.001 **	0.000
	Prestige	0.002	0.002
	Job duration	-0.029 **	0.008
	Contact work leader	0.525 **	0.144
	Contacts colleagues	-0.213	0.204
	Atmosphere	-0.595 **	0.173
Interactions	Duration * work leader	-0.029 **	0.004
	Duration * colleagues	0.005	0.008
	Duration * atmosphere	0.014 *	0.006
	Constant	-2.153	

** significant at 1% level
* significant at 5% level

Prestige of the current job has no significant effect on the chance of finding a new job. Older people have a lower chance of finding a new job than younger people.

It may look a bit artificial to discuss the findings listed in terms of the chance of finding a new job. It seems obvious that older people and people who work full-time have a lower chance of being *in search of* a new job than younger people and people who work part-time. Because the event under analysis is that of *finding* a new job, and because the variables age and number of hours worked are of no direct interest to this research, I will pay no further attention to the difference between *searching for* and *finding* a new job.

The effects described above are all effects of the control variables. Now we arrive at discussing the hypotheses. From Table 7.1, it can be seen that having a good contact with the work leader indeed improves the chance of finding a new job and reduces job duration, which is shown by the significant effect of the interaction of this variable with job duration. The atmosphere at work also has the expected effect: a good atmosphere diminishes the chance of the event of finding a job and increases job duration. The contacts with the colleagues have no significant effect (although the effect is in the expected direction); neither has the interaction with job duration. From these results, I conclude that a higher status contact indeed improves one's chances of finding a new job, and that people with friends at (approximately) the same prestige level remain in the same jobs for a longer period. These findings confirm the ***finding-a-job hypothesis*** and the ***immobility hypothesis***.

In Table 7.2, the analysis of the ***unemployment hypothesis*** is presented. Here I analyse the likelihood of becoming unemployed, given that one is employed. To do this, I selected all months in which a respondent was unemployed, until the moment that a new job was found. This does not have to be restricted to one period of unemployment for each respondent: it is possible that someone was unemployed in different periods of his or her life. The first conclusion from Table 7.2 is that the event of unemployment does not occur very often for people who have ever had a job. There are 130 events to be explained.

From Table 7.2 it can be seen that only the effect of the contact with the work leader is significant. The effect is negative, which means that a good contact with the work leader reduces the chance of becoming unemployed. The contacts with colleagues and the atmosphere at work are no predictors of the chance of becoming unemployed.

Table 7.2: Logistic regression explaining the event of becoming unemployed.

Number of events: 130			
Number of person-months: 127784			
Control variables		B	Standard Error
Time-varying covariates	Contact work leader	-1.200 *	0.507
	Contacts colleagues	0.401	0.827
	Atmosphere	0.375	0.840
	Prestige	-0.005	0.008
	Constant	-6.671	

** significant at 1% level
* significant at 5% level

The ***unemployment hypothesis***, which states that people who have friends at work are less likely to become unemployed than people who have no friends in a job has to be narrowed down to people who have friends at work with a relatively high prestige as opposed to people who have no such friends.

In Table 7.3, the analysis of the factors explaining the duration of unemployment is presented. Here the group 'at risk' consists of all unemployed persons in the months they were unemployed, until a job was found again. From Table 7.3 we see that there are 84 instances in which a respondent found a job after having been unemployed.

With Table 7.3 we can test the three ***unemployment-duration hypotheses***. First, it can be seen from the table that the ***first unemployment-duration hypothesis***, which states that people who had friends in the job before they became unemployed, remain unemployed for a shorter period than people who had no friends in their former job, has to be rejected. None of the 'friends in the former job' indicators have a significant effect on the duration of unemployment, as can be concluded from the fact that none of the effects of the interactions of duration with the 'friends in the former job' indicators are significant.

Table 7.3: Logistic regression explaining the event of finding a job, given unemployment.

Number of events: 84

Number of person-months: 2547

Control variables		B	Standard Error
Time-varying covariates	Unemployment duration	-0.209 **	0.042
	Former work leader	0.505	0.621
	Former atmosphere	-0.545	0.885
	Former colleagues	1.161	0.749
	Way former job was found	0.401	0.396
Interactions	Duration * work leader	-2.105	27.122
	Duration * atmosphere	0.734	37.380
	Duration * colleagues	-6.330	31.130
	Duration * way job found	-4.116	18.047
	Constant	-2.095	

** significant at 1% level

* significant at 5% level

What can also be seen in Table 7.3, however, is that most effects are in the expected direction. From the interaction effects, we can conclude that good contacts with the work leader and the colleagues in the former job, seem to have a negative effect on the duration of unemployment. Furthermore, the only significant effect in the whole table is that of the duration of unemployment. This leads me to suspect that the non-significance of the other effects may be due to the small number of cases. Although this is probably true, I cannot prove it here and now, so I have to stick with the conclusion that the hypothesis has to be rejected.

The ***second unemployment-duration hypothesis***, which states that people who have been unemployed for a shorter period of time are more likely to find a new job than

people who have been unemployed for a longer period, cannot be rejected. This can be concluded from the negative effect of the duration of unemployment on the chance of finding a job.

The ***third unemployment-duration hypothesis***, which states that people who had friends in the job before they became unemployed have a better chance of finding a new job has to be rejected, however. None of the indicators of having friends in the former job have a significant effect on the event of finding a new job.

The next step in the analysis is to test the ***high-damage-potential hypothesis***, which states that supervisors stay in their jobs for a relatively long time, and that if they found their job through friends, their prestige is relatively high, as compared to supervisors who found their jobs through other channels. This hypothesis consists of two parts. I will first test the second part of the hypothesis, which states that the prestige of supervisors who found their job through friends is relatively high, as compared to supervisors who found their jobs through other channels. In order to do so, I first made a selection of all the events of finding a new job. These are only 'new' jobs, because the first job is not included as an event. Afterwards I performed a regression analysis of job prestige on all control variables and on whether the respondent was a supervisor or not. In addition, an interaction of the state of being a supervisor with whether the job was found through friends or not was included.

The results of this regression analysis are depicted in Table 7.4.

Table 7.4: Regression analysis explaining job prestige. Unstandardised regression coefficients (listwise deletion of missing values, standard errors between brackets). N=1933.

	Prestige
Hours work p/week	0.078 *
	(0.031)
Highest completed education	7.034 **
	(0.361)
Education father	1.580 **
	(0.321)
Female	-0.202
	(0.731)
Supervisor	3.728 **
	(0.411)
Age	0.006
	(0.004)
How was job found	-1.083
	(1.354)
Prestige former job	0.114 **
	(0.014)
Supervisor * how was job found	-0.364
	(0.748)
Intercept	11.539
R^2	33.70%

** significant at 1% level
* significant at 5% level

In Table 7.4, we see that the control variables, that is, prestige of the former job, the number of hours worked, highest completed own education and the education of the father, all have a significant positive effect on job prestige. The variable 'female' has no effect on prestige; neither does age. Being a supervisor has a very large significant, positive effect on prestige, but the way the supervisor acquired the job does not differentiate this effect. So our hypothesis that people with jobs with a high damage potential who found their job through friends have a higher prestige than their counterparts has to be refuted.

The next hypothesis regarding damage potential states that people with a job with a high damage potential remain in the same job for a longer period of time, especially if they found their job through friends. In order to examine this, I have again selected employed persons as the group 'at risk'. The event to be explained is, again, that of finding a new job. In Table 7.5 the results are given of the logistic regression analysis of the event of finding a new job on all control variables, on the state of being a supervisor or not, and whether the job was found through friends or not.

In Table 7.5 we see, as we did in Table 7.1, that people who work part-time, older people and women have a lower chance of finding a new job than full-time workers, younger people and men. People who have a higher education or whose fathers had a higher education have a higher chance of finding a new job than people with a lower education or with a father with lower education. Furthermore, the table shows that supervisors remain in their job longer, but whether the supervisors found their job through friends or not makes no difference for either the chance of finding a new job or the job duration. From the Tables 7.4 and 7.5, I conclude that the **high-damage-potential hypothesis** has to be refuted. The damage potential of a job does not seem to have an effect on the influence of sweet social capital.

Table 7.5: Logistic regression testing the high damage potential hypothesis.

		B	Standard Error
Number of events: 1937			
Number of person-months: 124890			
Control variables		B	Standard Error
Time-constant control variables	Highest education	0.068 *	0.021
	Education of father	0.074 **	0.021
	Female	-0.106 *	0.049
Time-varying covariates	Hours work p/week	-0.009 **	0.002
	Age	-0.002 **	0.000
	Prestige	0.002	0.001
	Job duration	-0.045 **	0.002
	Supervisor	-0.238 **	0.035
	Way job found	-0.055	0.115
Interactions	Duration * supervisor	0.008 **	0.001
	Duration * way job found	-0.004	0.004
	Supervisor * way job found	0.014	0.063
	Duration * way job found * supervisor	0.001	0.001
	Constant	-2.197	

** significant at 1% level
* significant at 5% level

7.4. Conclusions and discussion

From the analyses in this chapter several conclusions can be drawn. We have seen that people with a friend or friends with higher prestige have a better chance of finding a new job. Also, we have seen that people with friends with (approximately) the same prestige are more immobile than people with friends at a higher level or with no friends at work. Although this finding is not confirmed by the findings on the contacts with colleagues, I

still dare to believe in it, on the basis of the findings pertaining to the atmosphere at work. I believe that the atmosphere at work is a better indicator of the general idea of having friends at work at the same prestige level. If people are asked whether they have good contacts with their colleagues, just one bad colleague can make the answer negative, while the question about the atmosphere at work will probably still get a positive answer. In short, I found confirmation for both the *finding-a-job hypothesis* and the *immobility hypothesis*.

The next conclusion is that people who have friends with a higher prestige have a lower chance of becoming unemployed. This is a clearer version of the *unemployment hypothesis* that was formulated in Section 7.2.

Another conclusion regarding unemployment is that people who have been unemployed for a relatively short period of time have a better chance of finding a new job than people who have been employed for a relatively long period, which forms a confirmation of my *second unemployment-duration hypothesis*. This finding is not new. Sprengers (1992) already drew the same conclusion in his study of unemployment in the Netherlands. The same phenomenon has also stimulated Dutch unemployment agencies to launch special programmes for short-term unemployed persons, to prevent their becoming unemployed for a longer period. For long-term unemployed persons there are special programmes to improve their chances on the labour market. Although 'networking' is an important element of both programmes, the findings in this chapter are not very encouraging if one considers the positive effect of the social network on unemployment duration. The analyses showed that the fact that someone had friends in the job one held before unemployment does not decrease the duration of unemployment or improve the chance of finding a new job. This finding leads to the rejection of my *first* and my *third unemployment-duration hypothesis*.

Still, I would not wish the unemployment agencies to despair: the data used do not include new 'friends' made during the period of unemployment.

The last steps in the analyses of this chapter considered the damage potential of certain functions. Although the analysis showed that people with a job with a high damage potential have higher prestige, it does not make any difference whether they found their job through friends or through other channels. Likewise, finding the job through friends does not explain job duration. Jobs with a high damage potential just generally have higher prestige, and are held for a longer period. This last finding may only show that employers usually choose well whom to employ for functions with a high damage potential. However, the findings lead to a rejection of my ***high-damage-potential hypothesis***.

In general, the conclusion from this chapter has to be that social capital is a worthwhile explanatory factor for mobility as well as immobility in the occupational career. It offers a less promising explanation of unemployment and the duration of unemployment.

In Chapters Five, Six and Seven, I have described three forms of including positive social capital into the models of status attainment. The main conclusion from all three chapters is that the positive side of social capital certainly deserves its place in these models. With the step-by-step approach, I have gained on earlier research. Especially the achieved social capital approach and the dynamic approach have produced new possibilities for research on social capital. More elaborate remarks on this will be made in the concluding chapter, Chapter Ten. In the following two chapters, I will attempt to take the same step-by-step approach to the negative side of social capital: the foes in the occupational career.

Notes

1) We have only used the education of the father as an indicator of social background, to assure parsimony of the model. Because of the high correlation between the education of the father and his occupational prestige, including both variables in the model would enhance the risk of multi-collinearity. In this case, the choice for the education of the father was an empirical one. Apparently the respondents' recollection of their father's education is best, since this variable produced far less missing values than the father's occupational prestige (see also Chapter Six of this book).

(2) Again, I have not formulated specific hypotheses regarding sex-differences in this chapter. The reason for this choice was an empirical one. To include interactions with sex in the analyses, one would need three-way interaction coefficients. When the number of cases is as low as is sometimes the case in this study, an interpretation of such coefficients could not be justified.

Chapter Eight - A Naive Approach To Sour Social Capital

8.1. Introduction

In this chapter I will take a naive approach to sour social capital, in the sense that this will be a first attempt to incorporate this new concept into the original status attainment model. In the previous chapters, I have already demonstrated the importance of incorporating sweet social capital into the explanation of achieved status and income. In this chapter, the importance of sour social capital will be explored.

As stated in earlier chapters, the negative side of peoples' lives has often been neglected by sociology. With suicide as the great exception, most prominent sociological theories deal with prosperity and how it comes about. Of course one can argue that all factors that lead to progress in someone's life are already counterparted by a possible lack of those factors. Where, for instance, higher education leads to a relatively high status and income in the status attainment model, lower or no education leads to relatively low status and income. One could call this the negative side of education. But the opposite of being educated is not really captured by having no or low education. The opposite would be a type of education that aims to make people less rather than more informed, which would be very counterproductive.

In effect, sour social capital can be counterproductive too. Since people do not stand alone in the world, but are embedded in social networks, all kinds of relationships can develop. The most extreme forms of these possible relationships are friendship and foeship. In this study, we concentrate on social networks in the workplace. This rules out one of the

most important differences between friends and foes. The difference lies in the possibility to choose: one can, in greater part, choose one's own friends. With foes this choice doesn't exist; foes are neither chosen nor wanted. Yet in the workplace people are forced into relations all the time. One cannot choose one's colleagues, and sometimes one cannot even choose which colleagues to interact with socially. Work-related social functions force people into social relations with others they may or may not like.

In Chapters Two and Three, I gave several possible reasons for the occurrence of either friendships or foeships at work. In Chapter Four the measurements and operationalisations of these terms were clarified. By friends I mean people who have helped ego (in some way) in the past and/or who may be willing to help ego (in some way) in the future. Foes are people who have obstructed ego (in some way) in the past and/or who may be willing to obstruct ego (in some way) in the future. In this chapter, I will include sour social capital into the status attainment model, in order to answer the question posed in Chapter One. This question was:

To what extent does having foes lead to a deterioration of someone's labour market position and to what extent does having foes prevent someone from improving his or her labour market position?

In order to answer this question, some hypotheses will be formulated in the next section.

The word 'naive' appears in the title of this chapter for three reasons. The first reason is that this is a new and still exploratory approach to social capital. The second reason is that, in part, this chapter mirrors Chapter Five, which was called "A naive approach to sweet social capital". The third reason is that Chapter Nine will show a dynamic approach to sour social capital - and a dynamic approach is anything but naive.

In the following sections, I will first specify the hypotheses about foes, and then report on the regression analyses of the status attainment model with inclusion of the foe-variables.

8.2. Hypotheses about the obstruction of prestige and income attainment

As stated before, *in part* this chapter mirrors Chapter Five on friends. With 'in part' I mean that I will not return to modernisation theory to derive hypotheses about foes. As a starting point for the hypotheses about foes, I will use the finding that if people find a job through a friend, in particular if this friend has a relatively high occupational prestige, they are more likely to obtain relatively high prestige themselves. For foes, this translates into the general hypothesis that if people have a foe at work, in particular if this foe has a relatively high prestige, they are more likely to be obstructed on their way up.

In order to test this general hypothesis concerning foes, I will first define what I mean by being obstructed. 'Being obstructed' can mean that someone with foes is unable to reach the prestige a similarly educated and experienced person without foes would reach. It can also mean that someone with foes cannot obtain the same amount of income a similarly educated and experienced person without foes would obtain.

In the first case, where a person is obstructed in his or her prestige attainment, we can formulate the following *prestige-obstruction hypothesis*:

If people have foes at work, in particular foes with a relatively high prestige, they themselves have a relatively low prestige, as compared to people without foes.

In the case of the attainment of income, a similar *income-obstruction hypothesis* can be formulated:

If people have foes at work, in particular foes with a relatively high prestige, they themselves have a relatively low income, as compared to people without foes.

The next step in the derivation of hypotheses is dictated by the findings in Chapter Five. Although there is no theoretical reason to expect differences between men and women with respect to the effect of having foes in the workplace, the findings of Chapter Five show that it may be useful to explore possible differences between the sexes. In Chapter Five, it was shown that having a friend with a relatively high prestige paid off more for men. Because of this result, I want to derive the following ***gender-prestige-difference hypothesis***:

The negative effect of having foes (in particular foes with a relatively high prestige) on attained prestige is stronger for men than it is for women.

The ***gender-income-difference hypothesis*** runs parallel to the hypothesis concerning occupational prestige:

The negative effect of having foes (in particular foes with a relatively high prestige) on attained income is stronger for men than it is for women.

In Section 8.3, I will describe the data I will use to test the four hypotheses formulated.

8.3. Measurements and operationalisations

For the testing of the hypotheses about prestige attainment formulated in Section 8.2 I will make use of the Dutch Telepanel Survey. For the hypotheses concerning income attainment the Netherlands Family Survey 1992-1993 will be used.

As described in Chapter Four, the Dutch Telepanel Survey contains several questions about opposition in the workplace. The questions I use for the analysis of the influence of foes on occupational prestige attainment are:

"In your job before last, did you have a very bad contact with one or more of your colleagues?"

"In your job before last, were one or more persons obstructing you?"

"The first colleague you said you had a bad contact with: did he or she have a higher function, a function at the same level or a lower function than yourself?"

"The first person you said who was obstructing you: did he or she have a higher function, a function at the same level or a lower function than yourself?"

Besides occupational prestige, I want to analyse the influence of sour social capital on income. Having foes may, either directly or indirectly through occupational prestige, have an effect on obtained income. For the reasons discussed in Chapter Five (note 1), I consider income as it was measured in the Dutch Telepanel Survey an unreliable variable. I will therefore use the data of the Netherlands Family Survey 1992-1993 to examine the effects of foes on income attainment. In order to do so, I will use the following variables from the Netherlands Family Survey:

The reason for leaving the former job. Because we analyse income here, the reason for leaving the job before last is needed. The answering category 'colleagues' is singled out as a dichotomous variable.

The contacts with the colleagues in the job before last. A dichotomous variable is constructed, which can assume the values 'bad' and 'zero'.

The contact with the work leader in the job before last. Again a dichotomous variable for 'bad' is constructed. This variable is considered an indicator of higher-status foes.

The atmosphere in the job before last. Again a dichotomous variable with the values 'bad' and 'zero' is constructed.

In Section 8.4, I will translate the hypotheses from Section 8.2 into testable hypotheses, using all eight variables described in this section.

8.4. Hypotheses in terms of variables

As described in Section 8.3, for the analysis of the ***prestige-obstruction hypothesis*** (which states that if people have foes at work, in particular foes with a relatively high prestige, they themselves have a relatively low prestige, as compared to people without foes) I use four variables from the Dutch Telepanel Survey. The use of these four variables leads to the following four ***prestige-obstruction hypotheses***:

a) People who had a very bad contact with one or more of their colleagues in the job before last have a relatively low prestige in their current or last job, as compared to people who had no foes in the job before last.

b) People who had one or more persons obstructing them in the job before last have a relatively low prestige in their current or last job, as compared to people who had no foes in the job before last.

c) People with a very bad contact with a colleague in the job before last have a relatively low prestige in their current or last job, especially if the colleague concerned had a relatively high function.

d) People who had someone obstructing them in the job before last have a relatively low prestige in their current or last job, especially if the person obstructing him or her had a relatively high function.

In order to test the ***gender-prestige-difference hypothesis***, which states that the negative effect of having foes (in particular foes with a relatively high prestige) on attained prestige is stronger for men than it is for women, I will use the same indicators for foes. This leads to the following operationalised ***gender-prestige-difference hypotheses***:

a) Men who had a very bad contact with one or more of their colleagues in the job before last have a relatively low prestige in their current or last job, as compared to women with a very bad contact with one or more of their colleagues in the job before last.

b) Men who were obstructed by one or more persons in the job before last have a relatively low prestige in their current or last job, as compared to women who were obstructed by one or more persons in the job before last.

c) Men who had a very bad contact with a colleague with a relatively high prestige in the job before last experience a greater loss in prestige than women who had a very bad contact with a colleague with a relatively high prestige in the job before last.

d) Men who were obstructed by someone a relatively high prestige in the job before last experience a greater loss in prestige than women who were obstructed by someone with a relatively high prestige in the job before last.

To test the ***income-obstruction hypothesis*** (people who have foes at work, in particular foes with a relatively high prestige, have a relatively low income compared to people without foes) I will also use four indicators of foes, but this time the indicators will be taken from the Netherlands Family Survey 1992-1993. The use of these indicators leads to the following operationalised ***income-obstruction hypotheses***:

a) People who left their job before last because of their colleagues have a relatively low income in their current or last job, as compared to people who left their job before last for other reasons.

b) People who had bad contacts with their colleagues in the job before last have a relatively low income in their current or last job, as compared to people who had good contacts with their colleagues in the job before last.

c) People who experienced a bad atmosphere in the job before last have a relatively low income in their current or last job, as compared to people who experienced a good atmosphere in the job before last.

d) People who had a bad contact with their work leader (a higher prestige foe) in the job before last have a relatively low income in their current or last job, as compared to people who had a good contact with their work leader in the job before last.

Again, gender differences have to be tested. The ***gender-income-difference hypothesis*** runs parallel to the hypothesis concerning occupational prestige:

The negative effect of having foes (in particular foes with a relatively high prestige) on income attainment is stronger for men than it is for women. With the use of the four indicators of foes, the ***gender-income-difference hypotheses*** are operationalised as follows:

a) Men who left their job before last because of their colleagues have a relatively low income, as compared to women who left their job before last because of colleagues.

b) Men who had bad contacts with their colleagues in the job before last have a relatively low income, as compared to women who had bad contacts with their colleagues in the job before last.

c) Men who experienced a bad atmosphere in the job before last have a relatively low income, as compared to women who experienced a bad atmosphere in the job before last.

d) Men who had a bad contact with their work leader (a higher prestige foe) in the job before last have a relatively low income, as compared to women who had a bad contact with their work leader in the job before last.

In the following sections, I will first report the analyses with occupational prestige as the dependent variable. These analyses are consequently done with data of the Dutch Telepanel Survey. Afterwards, the analyses with income as the dependent variable will be described. As stated before, these analyses will be carried out with data of the Netherlands Family Survey 1992-1993.

8.5. Analyses

8.5.1. Inclusion of foes in the status attainment model

In earlier stages of this research, it was shown that most of the variables that were included in the original status attainment model still have an effect on occupational prestige in this day and age. With this in mind, I want to explore the influence of sour social capital while taking the original 'status attainment effects' into account.

In Table 8.1 the results are given of the regression of occupational prestige of the current or last job on the number of hours worked, the first job, own education and the father's characteristics. The sour social capital indicators are also included in the model. These indicators are: having a very bad contact with one or more colleagues, having one or more persons obstructing you, the relative prestige of the first-mentioned bad colleague, and the relative prestige of the first-mentioned 'obstructive person'. With respect to the last two variables, only 'bad' colleagues and 'obstructive persons' with a higher prestige than the r

espondent were included in the model. All foes variables pertain to the job before last. Also included in the model are the 'normal' control variables, i.e. characteristics of the father and own education, the number of hours worked per week and the prestige of the first job. This was done to establish whether the inclusion of foes contributes to the status attainment model and whether the effects of the father's characteristics and own education change due to this inclusion.

From Table 8.1 it can be seen that, although having a bad contact with one or more colleagues shows an effect in the expected negative direction, this effect is far from significant. This leads me to reject the ***prestige-obstruction hypothesis a)*** that people who had a very bad contact with one or more of their colleagues in their job before last have a relatively low prestige in the current or last job.

Table 8.1 also shows that opponents in the job before last has a significant *positive* effect on occupational prestige. Maybe this finding resembles the earlier finding that having friends in itself has no or even a negative effect on occupational prestige. What makes a difference is the prestige of the friend. However, the results in Table 8.1 lead to rejection of the ***prestige-obstruction hypothesis b)*** that people who were obstructed by one or more persons in the job before last, have a relatively low prestige.

In the fourth column of Table 8.1, only 'bad' colleagues with a higher prestige than the respondent's are included in the model. Of course the number of cases drops dramatically because of this selection. It is probably to be attributed to this fact that only prestige of the first job has a clear significant effect in this model. The ***prestige-obstruction hypothesis c)*** that people who had a very bad contact with a former colleague with a higher prestige have a relatively low prestige also has to be rejected. The same goes for the ***prestige-obstruction hypothesis d)*** that people who had an 'obstructive person' with a higher prestige in the job before last have a relatively low prestige.

Table 8.1: Status attainment model with inclusion of 'foe' variables. Unstandardised and standardised regression coefficients (pairwise deletion of missing values, standard errors between brackets).

	Occupational prestige N=1055	Occupational prestige N=1055	Occupational prestige N=1060	Occupational prestige N=197	Occupational prestige N=106
Number of hours per week	0.193 0.114 (0.034) **	0.193 0.115 (0.043) **	0.185 0.109 (0.043) **	0.204 0.122 (0.101) *	0.197 0.117 (0.141) **
Prestige of first job	0.545 0.475 (0.027) **	0.545 0.475 (0.033) **	0.547 0.477 (0.033) **	0.552 0.481 (0.078) **	0.548 0.478 (0.109) **
Education	2.424 0.139 (0.413) **	2.438 0.139 (0.524) **	2.363 0.135 (0.518) **	2.234 0.128 (1.216) ^	2.335 0.133 (1.715)
Father	-0.120 -0.006 (0.409)	-0.120 -0.006 (0.515)	-0.156 -0.008 (0.512)	0.006 0.000 (1.201)	-0.017 -0.000 (1.708)
Very bad contact with colleagues		-0.256 -0.217 (1.185)			
Obstructive persons			3.355 0.060 (1.432) *		
Bad colleague with higher prestige				-3.548 -0.095 (2.240)	
Obstructive persons with higher prestige					-0.982 -0.023 (3.603)
Intercept	10.689	10.676	10.631	12.532	11.404
R²	31.34%	31.18%	31.54%	30.62%	28.13%

** significant at 1% level

* significant at 5% level

^ significant at 10% level

This can be seen in the last column of Table 8.1, where only opponents with a higher prestige are included in the analysis. The positive conclusion from the last two columns of Table 8.1 is, however, that the effects predicted by the hypotheses in his chapter are in the expected direction. The low number of cases with which we are dealing in these analyses remains a problem. It may be the reason why we find no significant effects.

From Table 8.1 another conclusion has to be drawn. If the indicators of sour social capital are included, the effects of the father's characteristics or own education on occupational prestige do not change.

Although the results from the analyses appear somewhat discouraging, we still have to look at differences between men and women. Maybe the expected negative effect of foes only occurs for one of the two sexes, which would make it disappear in the overall analysis. In Table 8.2, interactions of the variable 'woman' with the sour social capital variables are included. Because of the inclusion of these interactions, no standardised regression coefficients are depicted in this table. With the second column of Table 8.2, we can test the ***gender-prestige-difference hypothesis a)*** that men who had a very bad contact with one or more of their colleagues in the job before last have a relatively low prestige, as compared to women who had a very bad contact with one or more of their colleagues. The hypothesis has to be rejected.

From Table 8.2 we can see that the interaction effect is negative, but not significant. The variable 'woman', however, has a significant negative effect on the prestige of the current or last job.

In the third column of Table 8.2, an interaction of 'woman' with having one or more opponents is included in the analysis. With this analysis, the ***gender-prestige-difference hypothesis b)*** can be tested, that men who had one or more 'obstructive persons' in the job before last have a relatively low prestige, as compared to women who had persons obstructing them.

Table 8.2: Status attainment model with inclusion of 'foe' variables and interactions with 'woman'. Unstandardised regression coefficients (pairwise deletion of missing values, standard errors between brackets).

	Occupational prestige N=1055	Occupational prestige N=1055	Occupational prestige N=1060	Occupational prestige N=197	Occupational prestige N=106
Number of hours per week	0.139 (0.036) **	0.141 (0.046) **	0.135 (0.046) **	0.078 (0.109)	-0.182 (0.166)
Prestige of first job	0.546 (0.026) **	0.547 (0.033) **	0.547 (0.033) **	0.555 (0.077) **	0.667 (0.107) **
Education	2.182 (0.415) **	2.198 (0.527) **	2.143 (0.521) **	1.148 (1.243)	-1.571 (1.903)
Father	-0.014 (0.408)	-0.015 (0.514)	-0.011 (0.513)	0.427 (1.185)	1.194 (1.638)
Woman	-3.289 (0.817) **	-3.043 (1.142) **	-2.841 (1.087) **	-13.580 (4.387) **	-36.649 (9.488) **
Very bad contact with colleagues		0.241 (1.528)			
Very bad contact with colleagues * woman		-1.172 (2.370)			
Obstructive persons			4.364 (1.796) *		
Obstructive persons * woman			-3.077 (2.951)		
Bad colleague with higher prestige				-9.912 (3.172) **	
Bad colleague with higher prestige * woman				36.150 (12.992) **	
Obstructive persons with higher prestige					-17.760 (5.595) **
Obstructive persons with higher prestige * woman					117.836 (31.682) **
Intercept	14.702	14.520	14.326	28.512	57.628
R^2	31.96%	31.73%	32.12%	33.31%	36.39%

** significant at 1% level

* significant at 5% level

^ significant at 10% level

Again (as in Table 8.1), the presence of opponents has a positive effect on prestige. 'Woman' again has a negative effect, and the interaction effect is negative but not significant. The hypothesis has to be rejected.

In the fourth column of Table 8.2 an interaction is included of 'woman' with a higher-status 'bad' colleague. With this, we can test the ***gender-prestige difference hypothesis c)*** that men who had a very bad contact with a colleague with a higher prestige in the job before last experience a greater loss in prestige, as compared to women with such a bad contact with a colleague with a higher prestige. The column in Table 8.2 shows some very interesting findings. First, we see that, if gender-differences are controlled for, the main effect of a higher-status 'bad' colleague becomes strongly negative and significant. This is the effect that men experience from such a higher-status foe. Second, on average women have a lower prestige than men. And, third, women with a higher-status 'bad' colleague have a significantly *higher* prestige than women without such a colleague. This is a very surprising finding. It is a confirmation of our hypothesis, but it is more than that. It suggests that the theory of social capital, in particular the theory of sour social capital, ought to differentiate between men and women. Of course we can speculate on explanations for this finding. Maybe women with a higher prestige evoke more negative opinions than men, or maybe old prejudices survived the increased entry of women into the labour force. There is no way of finding out about this with the present set of data.

The last hypothesis to be tested with regard to obstruction in prestige attainment is the ***gender-prestige difference d)*** which states that men who were obstructed by someone with a higher prestige experience a greater loss in prestige than women who were obstructed. In the last column of Table 8.2, again an interaction is included, this time of 'woman' with a higher-prestige opponent. The same curious conclusion has to be drawn from this analysis as the one that followed from the fourth column of Table 8.2: women

with a higher-status opponent have a higher prestige than women without such an opponent. Again, the main effect of having a higher-prestige opponent becomes significant and negative. This is, of course, the effect men experience from having a higher-prestige opponent. The only possible conclusion to be drawn from Table 8.2 is that whereas men suffer from sour social capital, women seem to benefit from it.

The last comment to be made on Table 8.2 pertains to a comparison of the model without sour social capital (column one) with the other models (columns two to five). If gender is included in the analyses, the inclusion of sour social capital seems to be more productive. If we compare the explained variance in the last column of the table with the explained variance in the first column, we see an increase. In Table 8.1, the inclusion of the sour social capital variables caused no increase in explained variance. In fact, this inclusion caused a reduction of explained variance. Apparently the inclusion of sex in the model is necessary when studying sour social capital. In Chapter Five, it was shown that including sex is also necessary in the model studying sweet social capital.

In the following section, I will describe the influence of sour social capital on income attained.

8.5.2. Inclusion of sour social capital in the explanation of income attainment

In this section, I will describe the influence of sour social capital on attained income. As stated before, the Telepanel Data do not contain a reliable measure of income. I therefore use the data of the Netherlands Family Survey 1992-1993 for the analyses in this section.

For the purpose of testing the hypotheses regarding income I have constructed several variables, which, in fact, concern the job before last. These variables are: the reason for leaving the job before last (1=colleagues, 0=other reasons); contacts with the colleagues in the job before last (1=bad, 0=good); contact with the work leader (1=bad, 0=good); and atmosphere in the job before last (1=bad, 0=good). Furthermore, I have constructed a variable which captures the prestige of the job before last. Because of the inclusion of this variable, I have decided to leave the prestige of the first job out of the model.

In Table 8.3 the sour social capital variables are included[1], together with the usual explanatory variables. With the analysis reported in the second column of the table, I can test the ***income-obstruction hypothesis a)*** that people who have left their former job because of colleagues have a relatively low income, as compared to people who have left their former job for other reasons. Table 8.3 shows that the reason for leaving the former job has no effect on income. The hypothesis has to be rejected.

In the third column of Table 8.3, I have included the contacts with colleagues in the analysis. Now we can test ***income-obstruction hypothesis b)*** that people who had bad contacts with their colleagues in the job before last have a relatively low income, as compared to people who had good contacts with their colleagues. Although the effect is in the expected negative direction, it is not significant. This is probably due to the fact that not many respondents claim to have had bad contacts with their former colleagues. Due to the low number of positive scores on this variable, the standard error is very high. However, this is mere guesswork. If biased answers really are the reason for lack of significance, we may find different results with the dynamic approach in the following chapter. For now, the conclusion has to be that having had bad contacts with one's former colleagues has no effect on current income. The hypothesis has to be rejected.

Table 8.3: Income attainment model with inclusion of 'foe' variables. Unstandardised regression coefficients (pairwise deletion of missing values, standard errors between brackets). Minimum N=789.

	Income	Income	Income	Income	Income
Number of hours per week	50.830	50.831	50.886	50.800	50.742
	0.608	0.608	0.609	0.608	0.607
	(1.941) **	(1.942) **	(1.942) **	(1.941) **	(1.944) **
Prestige of current/last job	19.788	19.762	19.843	19.818	19.908
	0.257	0.256	0.257	0.257	0.258
	(2.325) **	(2.333) **	(2.326) **	(2.325) **	(2.330) **
Prestige of job before last	9.814	9.833	9.720	9.854	9.806
	0.120	0.121	0.119	0.121	0.120
	(2.499) **	(2.504) **	(2.501) **	(2.500) **	(2.500) **
Education	38.682	38.775	38.118	39.280	39.805
	0.030	0.030	0.030	0.031	0.031
	(36.747)	(36.776)	(36.751)	(36.751)	(36.776)
Father	-2.488	-2.713	-1.786	-4.246	-5.236
	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.002	-0.003
	(43.533)	(43.587)	(43.538)	(43.566)	(43.657)
Left job because of colleagues		44.371			
		0.003			
		(302.688)			
Bad contacts with colleagues			-224.723		
			-0.023		
			(223.366)		
Bad atmosphere				178.043	
				0.023	
				(174.428)	
Bad contact with work leader					125.728
					0.020
					(145.780)
Intercept	-590.670	-591.147	-583.483	-601.926	-604.375
R²	59.73%	59.68%	59.73%	59.73%	59.72%

** significant at 1% level

* significant at 5% level

^ significant at 10% level

In the fourth column of Table 8.3 we test the ***income-obstruction hypothesis c)***; here the atmosphere at work is included. We find the opposite effect for atmosphere than expected. Leaving a workplace with a bad atmosphere seems to have a positive, though not significant effect on income. The hypothesis that people who experienced a bad atmosphere in their former job have a relatively low income compared to people who experienced a good atmosphere has to be rejected.

In the last column of Table 8.3, I included 'bad contact with the work leader in the job before last'. My hope was that this would be an indicator of a higher-status foe. With this analysis, I test ***income-obstruction hypothesis d)*** that people who had a bad contact with their former work leader have a low income, as compared to people who had a good contact with their work leader. Unfortunately Table 8.3 shows no significant effect of a bad contact with the former work leader.[2] The hypothesis has to be rejected.

If we compare the standardised coefficients of 'father' and 'education' in the first column of Table 8.3 with the same coefficients in the other columns, we see that the inclusion of the sour social capital variables in the income attainment model has no influence on the effects of the father and own education. We also see no increase in the explained variance. The conclusion has to be that sour social capital does not seem to contribute much to the explanation of income attained.

The next step in these analyses is to check for gender differences, like we did for occupational prestige. The results of the inclusion of interactions of the variable 'woman' with the four indicators of sour social capital are depicted in Table 8.4. These analyses were performed in order to test the ***gender-income-difference hypotheses*** which state that the income obstruction-hypotheses apply more strongly to men than women. In short, the negative effect of sour social capital is expected to be stronger for men than for women.

Table 8.4: Income attainment model with inclusion of 'foe' variables and interaction with 'woman'. Unstandardised regression coefficients (pairwise deletion of missing values, standard errors between brackets). Minimum N=789.

	Income	Income	Income	Income	Income
Number of hours per week	36.427 (1.983) **	36.425 (1.985) **	36.511 (1.983) **	36.360 (1.983) **	36.364 (1.988) **
Prestige of current/last job	18.094 (2.065) **	18.072 (2.078) **	18.255 (2.066) **	18.146 (2.065) **	18.198 (2.074) **
Prestige of former job	9.325 (2.216) **	9.349 (2.230) **	9.207 (2.217) **	9.324 (2.217) **	9.314 (2.219) **
Education	28.763 (32.591)	28.776 (32.638)	24.428 (32.687)	29.437 (32.584)	29.551 (32.643)
Father	28.132 (38.657)	27.998 (38.736)	34.265 (38.831)	25.773 (38.674)	25.913 (38.830)
Woman	-1040.291 (71.129) **	-1039.640 (71.513) **	-1053.064 (71.750) **	-1050.789 (72.219) **	-1037.322 (72.599) **
Left job because of colleagues		38.975 (367.476)			
Left job because of colleagues * woman		-52.031 (538.941)			
Bad contacts with colleagues			-473.261 (293.590)		
Bad contacts with colleagues * woman			594.646 (399.522)		
Bad atmosphere				108.220 (230.115)	
Bad atmosphere * woman				209.307 (310.633)	
Bad contact with work leader					107.608 (176.530)
Bad contact with work leader * woman					-37.292 (258.764)
Intercept	400.106	399.548	417.896	393.849	388.153
R^2	68.34%	68.26%	68.37%	68.36%	68.28%

** significant at 1% level
* significant at 5% level
^ significant at 10% level

Two conclusions jump out in the four last columns of the table. The first conclusion has to be that none of the interaction effects are significant. The second conclusion is that the main effects of the sour social capital variables remain insignificant. There is no effect of sour social capital on income, neither for men nor for women.[3] All four ***gender-income-difference hypotheses*** have to be rejected. If we compare the first column in Table 8.4 with the subsequent columns, we see no increase in explained variance. Apparently, sour social capital is important for the explanation of status attainment, but not for the explanation of income attainment.

The somewhat disappointing findings with regard to the effect of sour social capital on income may be due to the low number of cases for the 'foe' variables. It may also be due to the income structure in Dutch society. There are several rules and regulations surrounding income in the Netherlands. The Netherlands do not have a meritocratic income system, in the sense that you earn more if you work harder (or if the boss likes you).

8.6. Conclusions and discussion

In this chapter, I have taken a naive approach to sour social capital. This approach was meant as an exploration of the importance of sour social capital. Two 'problems' became clear during this exploration. First, the low number of cases for the variables indicating sour social capital caused many of the effects to be non-significant. Although it seems logical to assume that the lack of significance is attributable to the low number of cases, one can never be sure. Second, there are the large differences between men and women. Of course this is not really a problem; it is, in fact, a rather interesting finding. However, in the analyses where men and women were tested as one group, this gap caused all effects to be

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non-significant. This is not as grave as it sounds; as I stated before, the approach taken here was an exploratory and naive approach of sour social capital, from which we learned a lot.

I will now summarise the results of this chapter. I performed the analyses within the context of the status attainment model, with occupational prestige and income as dependent variables. For the ***prestige-obstruction hypotheses***, I found:

a) People who had a very bad contact with one or more of their colleagues in their job before last, do not have a relatively low prestige, as compared to people who did not have such bad contacts.

b) People who were obstructed by one or more persons in the job before last do not have a low prestige, as compared to people who were not obstructed.

c) People who had a very bad contact with a colleague with a higher prestige do not have a relatively low prestige, as compared to people without such foes.

d) People who were obstructed by a person with a higher prestige do not have a relatively low prestige, as compared to people without such foes.

Testing for gender differences, I found the following results for the ***gender-prestige-difference hypotheses***:

a) Men who had a very bad contact with one or more of their colleagues in the job before last do not have a relatively low prestige, as compared to women who had a very bad contact with one or more of their colleagues.

b) Men who were obstructed by one or more persons in their former job do not have a relatively low prestige, as compared to women who were obstructed by one or more persons.

c) Men who had a very bad contact with a colleague with a higher prestige experience a negative effect from this on their own prestige, while women experience a positive effect from a very bad contact.

d) Men who were obstructed by someone with a higher prestige experience a negative

effect from this on their own prestige, while women experience a positive effect.

These last results suggest that the theory of sour social capital should differentiate between men and women.

The second dependent variable analysed in this chapter was income. For the *income-obstruction hypotheses* I found:

a) People who have left their former job because of colleagues do not have a relatively low income, as compared to people who left their former job because of other reasons.

b) People who had bad contacts with their former colleagues do not have a relatively low income, as compared to people who had good contacts with the colleagues in their former job.

c) People who experienced a bad atmosphere in their former job do not have a relatively low income, as compared to people who experienced a good atmosphere in their former job.

d) People who had a bad contact with the work leader in their former job do not have a relatively low income, as compared to people who had a good contact with the work leader in their former job.

I explored gender differences with regard to the negative effect of sour social capital on income. My findings for the *gender-income-difference hypotheses* are:

a) Men who left their former job because of colleagues do not have a relatively low income, as compared to women who left their former job because of colleagues.

b) Men who had bad contacts with the colleagues in their former job do not have a relatively low income, as compared to women who had bad contacts with their colleagues.

c) Men who experienced a bad atmosphere in their former job, do not have a relatively low income, as compared to women who experienced a bad atmosphere.

d) Men who had a bad contact with their work leader in their former job do not have a relatively low income, as compared to women who had a bad contact with their work leader.

As I said in the previous section, the disappointing findings regarding the influence of sour social capital on income may be due to the low number of cases for the 'foe' variables or to the Dutch income structure.

The overall conclusion from this chapter is that sour social capital is an important factor in the explanation of status attainment. Gender differences can, however, not be overlooked. For the explanation of income attainment, sour social capital is no factor of importance.

In the next chapter, I will take a dynamic approach to sour social capital. Although this will not solve the problem of the low number of cases, it may help, because with the dynamic approach we can look at the influence of foes for all jobs in people's careers, instead of only looking at the former job.

Notes

(1) I did not construct a scale from these variables for several reasons. The first reason was a theoretical one: for my assumption that a foe with a relatively high prestige has a larger effect, I needed the variable 'contact with the work leader' to be separated from the other variables. The second reason was a methodological one: the correlation between the sour social capital variables was not high enough to construct a consistent scale. This is also apparent from the different directions of the effects of the variables shown in the tables. Furthermore, it is not sound to build a scale out of only two variables.

(2) We do find a negative effect of a bad contact with the work leader on the occupational prestige (significant at a 10% level). This analysis (of data of the Netherlands Family Survey 1992-1993) is not reported here.

(3) On average women have a lower income than men, even when prestige, education and the number of working hours are controlled for. This is not a new finding. Many studies have shown similar findings. Although this is a subject for a different study, the conclusion is so evident from the tables that it had to be mentioned.

Chapter Nine - A Dynamic Approach To Sour Social Capital

9.1. Introduction

As Chapter Seven was following Chapter Five, Chapter Nine is following Chapter Eight. In the previous chapter I described a naive approach to sour social capital. In this chapter a dynamic approach will be taken in the analysis of foes in the occupational career. As I stated in Chapter Seven, a dynamic approach solves the problem of causal order and renders the possibility to express the influence of sour social capital in terms of probabilities.

I will again look into mobility and immobility, into the likelihood of becoming unemployed and into the duration of unemployment. The syntax of this chapter will be exactly the same as that of Chapter Seven. This means that I will first operationalise the main hypotheses that were formulated in Chapters One and Three in terms of probabilities and variables. After that, the method of event history analysis, which was described in Chapter Four, will be applied.

9.2. Operationalisation of the hypotheses

9.2.1. Hypotheses in terms of probabilities

In Chapter One, I posed two questions regarding negative social capital on the labour market. The first question was: are people who have foes at work, more likely to accept another job at a lower prestige level, or less to likely find another job at a higher prestige level? The second question was: are people who have foes at work more likely to become unemployed and to remain unemployed for a relatively long period of time? In this section, I will formulate some hypotheses about these likelihoods. For this, I will turn to the conditions I mentioned in Chapter Three that enhance the risk of having foes in the occupational career. The conditions I will use are the prestige of the foe and the duration of unemployment.[1]

Because I will only study people who ever had a job, we are looking at three possible future outcomes. The first possible event is that of finding another job. The ***finding-another-job hypothesis*** with respect to sour social capital is then:

People who have foes with a relatively high prestige are less likely to find a new job than people who do not have such foes.

In the transition from one job to another, one can obtain higher prestige, keep the same level of prestige, or get lower prestige. Based on the assumptions on foes made in Chapters One and Three, I formulate the following ***settle-for-lower-prestige hypothesis***:

People who have foes with a relatively high prestige are more likely to settle for a job with a relatively low prestige level than people without such foes.

The second possible outcome of having a job is a sort of non-event, namely, that someone who has a job stays in that job. This is a 'transition' from a job to the same job.

From the theoretical assumptions in Chapters One and Three the following ***immobility-hypothesis*** can be derived:

People who have foes at their own prestige level remain in their jobs for a longer period of time than people with foes with a relatively high prestige or people without foes.

In a way, the 'immobility hypothesis' complements the 'settle-for-lower-prestige hypothesis', since the assumption made in Chapter One is that people strive to make progress in their lives and careers.

The third possible transition from having a job is the event of becoming unemployed. The ***unemployment hypothesis*** concerning sour social capital is a pretty straightforward one:

People who have foes at work are more likely to become unemployed than people without foes at work.

The last aspect of sour social capital to be analysed in this chapter is its effect on the duration of unemployment. While, as I did in Chapter Seven, I distinguished three possible outcomes of being employed, I consider only two possible outcomes of being unemployed. One can either remain unemployed or find a new job. In the present case, however, the event of finding a job is conditional on the duration of unemployment. The ***first unemployment-duration hypothesis*** with respect to sour social capital is:

If people had foes in the job they held *before* they became unemployed, they remain unemployed for a longer period than people who had no foes.

From Chapter Seven, we learned that people who have been unemployed for a relatively short period have a better chance of finding a new job than people who have been unemployed for a relatively long period. Consequently, this finding can be reformulated as:

People who have been unemployed for a relatively long period are less likely to find a new job than people who have been unemployed for a relatively short period.

This finding and the first unemployment-duration hypothesis, lead to the ***second unemployment-duration hypothesis***:

If people had foes in the job they held *before* they become unemployed, they remain unemployed for a longer period and are thus less likely to find a new job than people who had no foes in the last job.

To summarise, the general assumption is that foes can hinder a person in his or her occupational career. In Chapter Eight we looked at the negative effects of having foes on prestige and income attainment. The hypotheses formulated above also indicate negative effects of having foes: the inability to obtain a higher prestige, the inability to hold on to a certain prestige level, the inability to keep a job, and the inability to find a new job.

9.2.2. Hypotheses in terms of the relationships between variables

In this chapter I will make use of the Netherlands Family Survey 1992-1993. I will perform a dynamic analysis, and will once more make use of the person-month file, that was described in Chapters Four and Seven. As I did in Chapter Eight, I will use indicators for the prestige of foes instead of direct measures. The ***finding-another-job hypothesis*** formulated in the previous section is operationalised as such:

People who have a bad contact with their work leader in a certain job are less likely to find another job than people who have a good contact with their work leader in a certain job.

The ***settle-for-lower-prestige hypothesis*** is then operationalised as follows:

People who had a bad contact with their work leader more often settle for a job with a lower prestige than the prestige they enjoyed before, as compared to people who had a good contact with their work leader.

For the ***immobility hypothesis***, which states that people who have foes with the same level of prestige remain in the same job for a longer period of time, I use bad contacts with the colleagues in a job and a bad atmosphere at work as indicators of foes with (approximately) the same level of prestige. Hence the operationalised hypothesis is:

People who have bad contacts with the colleagues in a certain job, and experienced the atmosphere at work as bad remain in that job for a longer period of time than people without foes.

For the ***unemployment hypothesis*** concerning the event of becoming unemployed, I use the reason for leaving the job before unemployment set in as an indicator of foes. If someone left the former job because of colleagues, I consider the reason for leaving to be foes. In addition, I use a bad atmosphere in the former job, bad contacts with colleagues in general in the former job, and a bad contact with the work leader in the former job as indicators of foes. The operationalised hypothesis is then:

People who claim to have left their former job because of foes, who experienced a bad atmosphere, had bad contacts with the colleagues and/or the work leader in the former job are more likely to become unemployed than people without foes.

For the ***first unemployment-duration hypothesis*** the same indicators of foes will be used. The operationalised hypothesis is:

People who left their job because of colleagues, who had bad contacts with their colleagues and/or experienced a bad atmosphere in the job before the unemployment spell remain

unemployed for a longer period than people without foes.

The *second unemployment-duration hypothesis* can be operationalised as follows: People who left their former job because of colleagues, had bad contacts with their colleagues, and/or experienced a bad atmosphere in the job before the unemployment spell remain unemployed for a longer period and are therefore less likely to find a new job than people without foes.

In the following sections I will test the six hypotheses that were operationalised in this section.

9.3. The likelihood of finding a job or becoming unemployed

In order to test the hypotheses regarding the event of finding a job and job duration, I made a selection of people that were employed. Because we are working with a person-month file, this means that all the months were selected in which the respondents were employed after they started their first job. As I did in Chapter Seven, I use selections from this person-month file for the subsequent analyses. For the first analysis, the selection to be made is that of respondents in the months where they had a job, up till the month that they found a new job. The procedure is repeated up till the respondent found a new job, or until the moment of the interview. We are therefore studying the event of finding a job from the second job onwards.

In Table 9.1 the results are given of the likelihood of finding another job, given that one has a job. There are 1,689 'events': in 1,689 instances a respondent found a new job. The structure of the data allows for job duration to be analysed in the same procedure. In Table 9.1, the *finding-another-job hypothesis* and the *immobility hypothesis* are tested.

Table 9.1: Logistic regression explaining the event of finding a job.

Number of events: 1689

Number of person-months: 101931

Control variables		B	Standard Error
Time-constant control variables	Highest education	0.066 *	0.028
	Education of father	0.071 **	0.023
	Female	-0.110 *	0.052
Time-varying covariates	Hours work p/week	-0.011 **	0.002
	Age	-0.001 **	0.000
	Prestige	0.002	0.002
	Job duration	-0.033 **	0.001
	Contact work leader	-0.539 **	0.145
	Contact colleagues	0.209	0.204
	Atmosphere	0.563 **	0.176
	Reason left job	0.307 **	0.302
Interactions	Duration * work leader	0.023 **	0.004
	Duration * colleagues	-0.005	0.008
	Duration * atmosphere	-0.013 *	0.006
	Duration * reason left job	-0.011	0.014
	Constant	-2.436	

** significant at 1% level

* significant at 5% level

Because Table 9.1 has the same structure as Table 7.1, I will not describe all the effects, but I will concentrate on the effects that are important for the hypotheses in this chapter. The ***finding-another-job hypothesis*** states that people who have a bad contact with their work leader are less likely to find another job than people who have a good contact with their work leader. In Table 9.1, the reason for leaving the job is coded '1' for leaving the job because of colleagues, and '0' for other reasons. The variables 'contact with work leader', 'contacts with colleagues' and 'atmosphere at work' are all coded '1' for bad and '0' for good.

Interactions of all these 'foe' variables with job duration are also included.

From the table, it can be seen that people who have a bad contact with their work leader are indeed less likely to find another job. This can be concluded from the negative effect a bad contact with the work leader has on the likelihood of the event. The interaction of a bad contact with the work leader with job duration is positive and significant. This means that people who have a bad contact with their work leader stay in their job for a longer period. If people experience a bad atmosphere at work, they stay in their job for a shorter period, and are more likely to find another job. This contradicts the ***immobility hypothesis***. The other 'foe' variables have no effect on either the chance of finding a new job or job duration.

The ***settle-for-lower-prestige hypothesis***, according to which people with a bad contact with their work leader more often settle for a job with a lower prestige than the prestige they enjoyed before, is tested in Table 9.2. For this analysis, I selected all the events of finding a new job. I then regressed the prestige of all these new jobs on some control variables and on the 'foe' variables. I will first discuss the effects of the control variables on prestige. In Table 9.2, we see that the higher the number of hours worked is, the higher the prestige is of the job. The higher the education, the higher the prestige of the job. The same goes for the education of the father. Older people have higher prestige, and if the prestige of the former job was relatively high, the prestige of the next job is also higher. The 'foe' variables 'bad atmosphere in former job', 'bad contacts with former colleagues' and 'leaving the former job because of colleagues' have no effect on job prestige. A bad contact with the work leader in the former job has a significant negative effect on the prestige of the next job. With these findings, the ***settle-for-lower-prestige hypothesis*** cannot be rejected.

Table 9.2: Regression analysis explaining prestige. Unstandardised regression coefficients (listwise deletion of missing values, standard errors between brackets). N=1867.

	Prestige
Hours work p/week	0.097 **
	(0.032)
Highest completed education	7.494 **
	(0.370)
Education father	1.849 **
	(0.334)
Female	-1.004
	(0.754)
Age	0.013 **
	(0.004)
Prestige former job	0.145 **
	(0.015)
Colleagues reason leaving job	-0.062
	(3.740)
Bad contact with work leader	-6.809 **
	(2.070)
Bad contact with colleagues	-1.060
	(2.921)
Bad atmosphere	-3.041
	(2.863)
Intercept	12.424
R^2	30.43%

** significant at 1% level

* significant at 5% level

The fourth hypothesis to be tested in this section is the ***unemployment hypothesis*** which states that people who claim to have left their former job because of colleagues, who had bad contacts with their colleagues and/or their work leader and/or experience a bad atmosphere in their former job are more likely to become unemployed.

In order to test this hypothesis, I have selected all the person-months in which the respondents were employed, up till the moment that they became unemployed. The results of the logistic regression analysis of the chance of becoming unemployed on the 'foe' variables are depicted in Table 9.3. Prestige is also included in the analysis, serving as a control variable.

Table 9.3: Logistic regression explaining the event of becoming unemployed.

Number of events: 22			
Number of person-months: 107035			
Control variables		B	Standard Error
Time-varying covariates	Bad contact work leader	-0.889	1.147
	Bad contact colleagues	-5.013	14.362
	Bad atmosphere	1.932 *	0.832
	Colleagues reason job left	-5.482	21.813
	Prestige	0.005	0.011
	Constant	-8.736	

** significant at 1% level
* significant at 5% level

From Table 9.3 we can see that only a bad atmosphere in the job has a significant effect on the likelihood of becoming unemployed. If the atmosphere is bad, the likelihood of becoming unemployed is higher than if the atmosphere is good. Although only one of the effects is significant, I am still not inclined to reject the unemployment hypothesis. The number of events to be explained is extremely low. Here, we have the double problem that only few people in our data set experienced the event of becoming unemployed *and* not many respondents claimed to have 'foes'. Considering the low number of cases, I find it convincing that a significant effect of bad atmosphere was found.

The next and last step in this chapter is to test the ***unemployment-duration***

hypotheses. To be able to do this, I have made a selection of all person-months during which the respondent was unemployed up till the moment a new job was found. From Table 9.4 we can see that the number of events to be explained is again very low, i.e. 84. I have regressed the likelihood of finding a job after a period of unemployment on some characteristics of the job that was held before unemployment.

Table 9.4: Logistic regression explaining the event of finding a job, given unemployment.

Number of events: 84			
Number of person-months: 2547			
Control variables		B	Standard Error
Time-varying covariates	Unemployment duration	-0.305 **	0.051
	Former work leader	0.138	0.646
	Former atmosphere	1.135	0.913
	Former colleagues	0.232	0.923
	Reason former job was left	-2.196	1.365
Interactions	Duration * work leader	-0.128	0.287
	Duration * atmosphere	-5.204	15.481
	Duration * colleagues	-3.639	15.298
	Duration * reason job left	9.291	21.401
	Constant	-1.843	

** significant at 1% level
* significant at 5% level

In Table 9.4 we see that the results of the test of the ***unemployment-duration hypotheses*** are a bit disappointing. None of the effects in the table are significant, except for age, which has a negative effect on the likelihood of finding a new job. Unemployment duration has

a significant effect, but not only did we see this before, the effect is inherent in this procedure. Of course, the number of cases is again very small. Nevertheless, we have to reject the first unemployment-duration hypothesis that people who had foes in the job they held before they became unemployed remain unemployed for a longer period than people without foes. We also have to reject the second unemployment-duration hypothesis, according to which people who had foes in the job they held before they became unemployed are less likely to find a new job.

9.4 Conclusions and discussion

From the analyses in this chapter several conclusions can be drawn. We saw that people with foes with a relatively high prestige are less likely to find another job than people without such foes. This is a rather strong confirmation of the ***finding-another-job hypothesis***.

Moreover, the analyses showed that if people have foes with a relatively high status, they often experience a decline in prestige. This finding is evidence to support the ***settle-for-lower-prestige hypothesis***. If we combine this with the earlier confirmation of the hypothesis that people with foes are less likely to find a new job, we can conclude that people with foes are less likely to find a new job and, if they do, that they settle more easily for a job with lower prestige than they enjoyed before.

With regard to the ***immobility hypothesis*** I found no supportive evidence. In fact, it turned out that the opposite was true. People with foes at work do not stay immobile but, in fact, tend to 'flee' from their jobs. Because this did not turn out to have an effect on prestige, we cannot conclude that 'fleeing' the job has a negative effect on someone's career.

The testing of the ***unemployment hypothesis*** gave some more promising results. It turned out that a bad atmosphere at work causes a higher likelihood of becoming unemployed. This may mean that with regard to the immobility hypothesis we should look in another direction. Instead of a decline in prestige, the negative effect may exist of becoming unemployed. This is a very interesting finding, and it provides strong grounds for using the concept of sour social capital.

The last analyses in this chapter were aimed at the two ***unemployment-duration hypotheses***. I found no confirmation for the hypotheses that people with foes will remain unemployed for a longer period than people without foes, and that people with foes will have less chance of finding a new job. As I stated before, these findings are rather disappointing, but can probably be attributed to the low number of cases.

In the following, concluding chapter, I will summarise the results of the research in this book. I will provide comments on what the results mean for the initial theory of sweet and sour social capital, and I will share some thoughts on what future research could bring us.

Notes

(1) I will not use damage potential as a condition in this chapter, the way I did in Chapter Seven. Due to the low number of cases for all sour social capital variables, a three-way interaction needed to test the assumptions on the damage potential of a job would only lead to empty categories.

Chapter Ten - Summary of the Results and an Eye to the Future

10.1. Introduction

In the tenth and last chapter of this book, I will give a summary of my research and point out what improvements have been made on former research. During the process of this study I have also stumbled upon various difficulties. I will list these difficulties and make suggestions as to how they could be solved. In the last part of this chapter, I will propose subjects for further study. Throughout this book, I have made several hypotheses I could not test within the context of this book. Testing these hypotheses would enhance the impact of social capital theory. For this reason, I believe that it is important that these hypotheses are subjected to further research.

Furthermore, I encountered several problems with the data. In general, for all the social capital variables - in particular for the sour social capital variables - the number of cases was very low. In the last part of this chapter I will make suggestions about how to improve the collection of data for this type of research.

In this book I have, first, contrasted modernisation theory with social capital theory. Many stratification researchers have adopted the main prediction of modernisation theory that in western industrialised societies a transition has taken place from particularistic values to universalistic values. This transition has often been translated into the assumption that whereas status attainment in pre-industrialised societies was mainly influenced by social background, in industrialised societies education and work experience are the main

determinants of status attainment. This assumption was first made by Blau and Duncan (1967). They backed it up with the finding that in the United States a clear reduction in the influence of the occupation and education of the father on his son's occupational attainment had been found. The influence of own education and work experience had clearly increased over time. If this trend would continue, they stated, the influence of the father (ascribed characteristics) would be replaced totally by education and work experience (achieved characteristics). In western industrialised societies, the norm that people with the same level of education and skills should be able to reach a similar occupational level was going to prevail.

The norm of universalism may exist, but what we see is that practice is not perfect. In Chapter One, I have pointed to this imperfection. Social background continues to have an influence on the position someone obtains in life. The first objective of this book was to describe and explain the lasting influence of social background. To do this, I not only included women in Blau and Duncan's original status attainment model, but I also suggested taking a different view at the transition from particularism to universalism. I stated that this transition does take place, but that it takes on the form of a transition from ascribed social resources to achieved social resources. In short, I contrasted modernisation theory with social capital theory. In a perfectly universalistic society, the idea that social networks have an influence on someone's labour market position would make no sense, but our society is not a perfectly universalistic one. Ascription and particularism still exist. I have suggested that ascription and particularism merely have taken on a different form they are the people we know and who can help us. Weber already recognised that people can have different life chances due to differences in the resources they possess. Lin adopted the idea of the influence of different resources on life chances. He considered networks resources, and recognised the labour market position as one of the life chances.

Many social network researchers have explored the positive influence of social resources, i.e. social capital, on people's lives. Not only on the labour market, but in many other areas of (social) life, networks seem to be of influence. Existing research harbours an imperfection though. Whereas modernisation theory assumes universalistic values, social capital theory assumes networks to exist only of positive, friendly relations, although it does not do so explicitly. I consider this an imperfection of social capital theory. I have contrasted modernisation theory with social capital theory and sweet social capital with its negative counterpart, the latter which I called sour social capital. In the following two sections, I will discuss these contrasts and the conclusions they led to.

With my research I have also rectified some other flaws that have come to light in earlier research on social capital. In summary, three large improvements have been made:

1). In this study no only the people who found a job through social contacts were included. People who used social contacts but failed to get a job via these channels were included as well. Moreover, I have improved upon earlier methods of measuring the use of social capital on the labour market, in such a way that selectivity with respect to successes can not occur.

2). Downward mobility and immobility were studied in addition to upward mobility, the latter which has already been given a lot of attention in earlier research.

3). By using a dynamic approach, the question of causal order has been addressed.

In the following two sections, these three, I dare call them major, improvements will be discussed in view of the contrasts between modernisation theory and the enriched social capital theory with inclusion of sour social capital.

10.2. Contrasting modernisation theory with social capital theory

In order to claim that modernisation theory is hampered by imperfections, I first had to prove that these imperfections do indeed exist. To do so, I interpreted the theory in the strictest possible sense. Because I claim that particularism still exists, but has taken on a different from, I had to indicate conditions under which particularism prevails. In simpler terms, I had to specify the conditions under which sweet social capital has most effect. I have listed these conditions in Chapter Two. The actual empirical test of contrasting the predictions of modernisation theory and those of social capital theory was done in Chapter Five.

As stated above, in order to prove that particularism still exists, I formulated several hypotheses that interpreted modernisation theory in the strictest sense. This led to four universalism hypotheses. I have tested these hypotheses in Chapter Five. The first two universalism hypotheses predicted a decline in influence of the father and an increase in influence of own education on prestige and income attainment over time. From the analyses I concluded that both hypotheses had to be refuted. The effect of own education on income is lower for later (younger) cohorts; the effect of the characteristics of the father on the first job has decreased, but other effects of the father have remained intact and the effect of own education has not increased over the cohorts. These results were by and large the same for men and women. The findings refuted two predictions Blau and Duncan made: ascription (the influence of the characteristics of the father) has not disappeared, and achievement (the influence of own education) has not increased. These results therefore did not testify of a transition from ascription to achievement having taken place. There seems to be no increase in the importance of achievement, but rather a slight decline in the effect of ascription.

A second finding in Chapter Five was that the use of informal resources by men in the Netherlands in 1992-1993 is far more intensive than it was in 1982, and that the use of informal resources by women in the Netherlands has not decreased. Since men and women both use social resources in order to obtain a job, they must believe they will benefit from doing so. In a perfectly universalistic society, such a belief could not and would not exist. This finding therefore points at persisting particularism.

The testing of the fourth universalism hypothesis showed that the profit drawn from social resources has not declined, which was what the hypothesis stated. In fact, the analysis showed no significant profit from the use of social resources. The effect was even negative in most cases. There was a slight difference between men and women, though. Using informal resources has a slightly larger negative effect on the prestige of the current job of women. When sex is controlled for, the use of informal resources has a small positive effect on current job prestige.

The finding that using informal resources has no or a negative effect is not uncommon. Research by Lin and associates and De Graaf and Flap already showed that for social resources to be profitable the status of the contact person has to be relatively high. For this reason, I included the status of the contact person into the model. I found that, when the prestige of the contact person is taken into account, a contact with a relatively high prestige has a positive effect on the prestige of the respondent. I also found that this effect is stronger for men than it is for women.

The rejection of most of the universalism hypotheses led me to the conclusion that particularism still exists. In order to find out if the transition from particularism to universalism has taken on the form of a transition from ascribed social capital to achieved social capital, I formulated two 'achieved social capital' hypotheses in Chapter Five. The achieved social capital hypotheses were:

a) Family are more important as a social resource for the prestige of the first job than friends are, and

b) Friends are more important as a social resource for the prestige of the current or last job, than they are for the first job.

The conclusion with regard to achieved social capital hypothesis a) is threefold. First, family are indeed used more frequently during the search for the first job than for the current job. Second, this applies to both men and women. Third, as a social resource family are of more influence on the prestige of the first jobs of both men and women than friends are. All this means that I found strong support for making the distinction between ascribed and achieved social capital.

The results with regard to the achieved social capital hypotheses showed that particularism may have taken on the form of social capital, by which I mean the people someone knows. In Chapter Two, I listed several conditions which would ensure most profit from sweet social capital. In this section, I will only repeat the conditions that I have actually taken into account in this study. Conditions that assure relatively high returns on sweet social capital are: high initial status, contact persons with a relatively high status, having many potential contact persons, a high damage potential of the function, and, if unemployed, a short duration of unemployment.

As we can see, I have already described the effect of the second condition, that is the availability of contact persons with a relatively high status. The presence of contact persons with a relatively high status indeed leads to higher returns on sweet social capital.

The next condition I took into account was the condition of having many potential contact persons. This resulted in Chapter Six, which concentrated on access to social resources. The reason why it is interesting to know what kind of resources people have access to, regardless of whether they use them or not, is that it gives a clear picture of the

way in which someone's network connects him or her with a diversity of positions. In Chapter Six I have studied several factors that influence the access to social resources by means of three hypotheses. The first of these three hypotheses, the modernisation hypothesis, stated that with ongoing modernisation, own education has a ever larger effect on the social resources accessed at the expense of the effect of the characteristics of the father (which indicate one's initial position).

With regard to the factors influencing the access to social resources the following general conclusions could be drawn. First, we saw that the diversity of access is large: many respondents seemed to know persons in all kinds of occupations. Second, on average people seem to have access to relatively high-quality social resources. Third, we found that the position of the father, as an indicator of initial position, has a large effect on the access to social resources, and that this effect is larger than the effect of own education. This last finding lead to rejection of the modernisation hypothesis. In the light of the contrast I made between modernisation theory and social capital theory, this again strengthened my conviction that modernisation has not entailed a transition from particularistic to universalistic values, at least not with respect to the process of occupational attainment. The father, or rather social background, remains a factor of great importance to status attainment. This formed a confirmation of the second hypothesis in Chapter Six, the strength-of-position hypothesis, which stated that the higher someone's initial position is, the higher the quality of the social resources reached through one's contacts is.

The fourth conclusion drawn in Chapter Six was that acquaintances provide better access to social resources than relatives and friends. In fact, friends provide only little access. This finding led to the rejection of the strength-of-weak-ties hypothesis, directly derived from Granovetter's work (Granovetter, 1973). Granovetter theorised that weak ties give access to the best social resources because the people in the periphery of someone's network can form bridges with other networks. If ties with friends and acquaintances are

defined as weak ties and ties with relatives as strong, this hypothesis has to be rejected. However, I argued that ties with relatives are not strong by definition. Relatives are in many respects not 'like us' whereas friends may of the three categories be most 'like us'. This liking and being alike was already defined as a major characteristic of friendships by Homans in 1950. I argue that the same characteristic of liking and being alike is a major determinant of the strength of a tie.

After looking into the factors that influence the access to social resources, the next step was to consider the influence that access to social resources has on once's occupational chances and labour market position. Again, in view of the contrast I wanted to make between social capital theory and modernisation theory, I first studied the influence of access to social resources on attained prestige. The analyses led to two conclusions. First, access through relatives (ascribed access to social resources) has a highly significant and strong positive effect on the prestige of the first job. Second, access through friends (achieved access) has a strong positive effect on the prestige of the current job, while ascribed access has no effect on the prestige of the current job. Since the achieved-access hypothesis formulated in Chapter Six consisted of two parts, namely that ascribed access has more influence early on in the occupational career, while achieved access gains in importance in later stages, this hypothesis could not be refuted. In fact, the findings showed the importance of including ascribed and achieved social capital in the explanation of status attainment. I also found proof that the transition from ascribed to achieved social capital may explain the perceived general transition from ascription to achievement. Parts of the effects of own education and of the characteristics of the father were 'explained away' when ascribed and achieved social capital were included in the model.

I also studied the influence of access to social resources on the actual use of these resources. I found that, although the effects are not strong, it seems as if 'the more the

better' applies to access to social capital. In fact, the hypothesis that achieved access through weak ties leads to more intensive use found strong confirmation. For the last or current job, access through acquaintances leads to more intensive use than access through friends. For the first job, only access through relatives has an effect on the use of informal resources.

The next step in the research concerned failures in use of informal resources. In order to successfully contrast modernisation theory with social capital theory, I had to cure some flaws in the research on social capital theory such as it has been conducted up till now. One of these flaws was the exclusion from the models of people who tried to obtain a job through informal resources but did not succeed. This may have caused bias in the results of earlier research. In my study I have partly cured this flaw by using different and various indicators of social capital. Still I wanted to know whether a bias could occur. Is it indeed true that the positive effect of informal resources on finding a job is only a spurious effect of the fact that the unsuitable people are filtered out because they do not get the job? Based on the results of my research, I have to answer this question negatively. I found no difference between the group of respondents who unsuccessfully applied for a job through informal resources and people who unsuccessfully applied through formal resources. I did find a difference between the group of people who ever unsuccessfully applied for a job and the group of people who never did so. However, this difference was in favour of people who did unsuccessfully apply where occupational prestige and education were concerned. If a bias were to occur, it seems that the effect of social resources is underestimated rather than overestimated.

The last alteration I proposed for social capital to be either a suitable alternative or an appropriate addition to modernisation theory was to approach social capital in a dynamic way. In previous research on social capital, the question regarding causal order has in

greater part remained unanswered. Does having a job with high prestige lead to having high quality resources, or does having high quality resources lead to obtaining a job with high prestige? Stated more generally: does a good social position lead to high-quality social capital, or does high-quality social capital lead to a good social position?

The advantage of taking a dynamic approach (towards any causal problem) is that is analyses events in the sequence in which they occur. I have used the method of event history analysis to study several possible events on the labour market: the event of (upward) mobility, immobility, of becoming unemployed, and of finding a job after a spell of unemployment. From the analyses performed in Chapter Seven, several conclusions could be drawn. We saw that employed people with friends with a higher prestige have a better chance of finding a new job (with higher prestige). And we saw that people with friends with (approximately) the same prestige are more immobile than people with friends at a higher level or people with no friends at work.

Another conclusion was that people who have friends with a higher prestige have a smaller chance of becoming unemployed. With regard to the duration of unemployment, I found that none of the social capital variables had an effect. It seems as if people who have been unemployed for a shorter period are more likely to find a job. Although this finding is not new, I have to make a methodological remark on the way the result was obtained in the analysis. None of the social capital variables in the model had a significant effect on unemployment duration. In cases like that, the method of event history analysis is no longer a reliable method of analysing unemployment duration. The finding that people who remain unemployed for a shorter period are more likely to find a job does not mean anything other than that people who find a job relatively quickly remain unemployed for a shorter period. This is inherent to the method of event history analysis and does not really say anything about my theory.

The last conclusion to be drawn from the event history analyses is that I could not show that people in jobs with a high damage potential draw more profit from social capital.

In general, the conclusions from Chapter Eight are that social capital proves a worthwhile explanatory factor for mobility as well as for immobility and unemployment in the occupational career. It is a less promising explanation of unemployment duration (with the annotation that the data used imposed restrictions; see Chapter Seven).

Taking everything together, what does the inclusion of (sweet) social capital into the models of status attainment mean for the original status attainment model implied by modernisation theory? The main conclusion has to be that social capital certainly forms a good addition. With the step-by-step approach I used, I have gained several new insights. By contrasting modernisation theory with social capital theory, I have shown that the transition of the importance of ascribed characteristics to achieved characteristics for status attainment can be specified as a transition from ascribed social capital to achieved social capital. Rather than discarding modernisation theory, I think it should be refined by using the concepts of social capital theory. Although the use of and profit from social capital contradicts a major assumption of modernisation theory, namely the assumption that universalistic values prevail in western industrialised societies, I do believe that modernisation has changed the value system in these societies. Maybe universalism does not prevail (yet) but I do believe that modernisation has caused a shift from open nepotism and favouritism to a more concealed form of particularism. In short, I think that modernisation theory needs to be refined by incorporating social capital theory. However, in order to do this, social capital theory itself and the research into social capital theory need to be refined.

To refine the research into social capital theory, I first made the distinction between access to and use of social resources. This led to promising results and showed that a high number of potential contacts secures more profit from social capital. Besides that, it strengthened my belief that a transition is taking place from ascribed social capital to achieved social capital. Second, I checked for selectivity in the findings on the use of social capital by including the so-called failures. Third, I took a dynamic approach to social capital in order to confront the classical problem of causal order. This showed that possession of and access to social capital leads to an improvement in the occupational. The effect is not the other way around.

After concluding that applying social capital theory is fruitful for the explanation of status attainment and the refinement of research into social capital, I proceeded to refine social capital theory itself.

10.3. Refining social capital theory: sweet and sour social capital

To improve a theory, there are several paths one can follow. First, one can derive new hypotheses from the existing theory and test these empirically. In the previous section, I described how I did this with respect to modernisation and social capital theory. In this section, I will describe another strategy I followed to refine social capital theory and strengthen its importance as a tool in sociology.

A theory gains in strength if it becomes empirically testable. For instance, one has to be able to derive statements of the type: 'if someone has a certain characteristic (explanatory variable), this goes together with a certain other characteristic (dependent variable)'. The hypotheses I described in the previous section answer this criterion. A

theory gains in strength even more if one can combine the empirically testable statements with other statements of the type: 'if someone has the opposite characteristic (explanatory variable), this goes together with a certain amount of the opposite of the same dependent variable'.

The opposite of sweet social capital (friends) is sour social capital (foes). Confronting sweet social capital with its negative counterpart led to the two main questions of this research, which were formulated in Chapter One. These questions were: "to what extent does having friends lead to an improvement of someone's position in the labour market and to what extent do friends prevent a deterioration of someone's labour market position?" And, "to what extent does having foes lead to a deterioration in someone's labour market position and to what extent do foes hinder someone improving his or her labour market position?"

In Chapter Three, I showed that assumptions about foes can be derived from social capital theory in the same way as assumptions about friends are derived. This led to the conclusion that the same conditions which guarantee most profit from sweet social capital cause most harm from sour social capital. With this thought in mind, I tested the assumptions about foes step by step, the way I did for friends in the first part of the book. I did not contrast the ideas about sour social capital with modernisation theory directly. This was done only implicitly by contrasting the ideas about sweet social capital with modernisation theory.

I started out with a naive approach to foes. At this point I would like to remind the reader of the fact that the measurement of foes took place in a very strict manner. The number of cases was very low in some analyses, which may be due to this strictness of measurement. Nevertheless, the effects that were found cannot be attributed to overestimation. On the contrary, I believe that the lack of significant effects may be due to an underestimation of the number of foes.

From the naive approach to sour social capital several conclusions could be drawn about the attainment of prestige and income. With regard to occupational prestige, I formulated a prestige-obstruction hypothesis, which stated that if people have foes at work, in particular foes with a relatively high prestige, they themselves have a relatively low prestige, as compared to people without foes. For the sake of testing this general prestige-obstruction hypothesis, I formulated four operationalised prestige-obstruction hypotheses. Testing these led to the following conclusions:

a) People who had a very bad contact with one or more of their colleagues in their job before last do not have a relatively low prestige in their current job, as compared to people who did not have such bad contacts.

b) People who were obstructed by one or more persons in the job before last do not have a low prestige in their current job, as compared to people who were not obstructed.

c) People who had a very bad contact with a colleague with a higher prestige do not have a low prestige in their current job, as compared to people who had no such foes.

d) People who were obstructed by a person with a higher prestige do not have a low prestige in their current job, as compared to people who were not obstructed by such a foe.

Although these results were somewhat disappointing, I decided to check for gender differences. The testing of the gender-prestige-difference hypotheses led to the following conclusions:

a) Men who had a very bad contact with one or more of their colleagues in the job before last do not have a relatively low prestige in their current job, as compared to women who had a very bad contact with one or more of their colleagues.

b) Men who were obstructed by one or more persons in the former job do not have a relatively low prestige in their current job, as compared to women who were obstructed by one or more persons.

c) Men who had a very bad contact with a colleague with a higher prestige experienced a negative effect from this on their own prestige, while women experienced a positive effect from such a very bad contact.

d) Men who were obstructed by someone with a higher prestige experienced a negative effect from this on their own prestige, while women experienced a positive effect.

In the next step of the naive analysis of sour social capital in Chapter Eight, I explored the influence of the foe variables on income. In this analysis I found no significant effects, not even after sex had been controlled for.

Regardless of some disappointing findings, the overall conclusion from the naive approach to sour social capital was that sour social capital is an important factor in the explanation of status attainment. Gender differences can, however, not be disregarded. With respect to income attainment, I found that sour social capital does not have any influence.

After the naive approach, I took a dynamic approach to sour social capital. As with friends, I again looked at mobility, immobility and unemployment. This led to five hypotheses.

The first hypothesis I tested was the finding-another-job hypothesis, which stated that people with foes with a relatively high prestige are less likely to find a new job than people who do not have such foes. In Chapter Nine, I found strong confirmation of this. Moreover, the analyses showed that if people have foes with a relatively high status, they often experience a decline in prestige. In this finding, I found evidence for the settle-for-lower-prestige hypothesis. If we combine this with the earlier confirmation of the hypothesis that people with foes are less likely to find a new job, we can conclude that

people with foes are less likely to find a new job and, if they do, that they more often settle for a lower prestige than they enjoyed before.

Next, I tested the immobility hypothesis, which stated that people who have foes with a similar level of prestige remain in the same job for a longer period of time. I found no confirmation of this hypothesis. In fact, it turned out that the relationship works the other way around. People with foes at work do not tend to stay immobile, but rather 'flee' from their job. Because it did not show to have an effect on prestige, we cannot conclude that this job 'fleeing' directly causes a setback in someone's career.

The testing of the unemployment hypothesis gave some more promising results. As it turned out, a bad atmosphere at work leads to a higher chance of becoming unemployed. This may mean that for the immobility hypothesis, we should look in another direction. Instead of a decline in prestige, the setback may consist of becoming unemployed. This is an interesting finding, and it is firm evidence of the value of the concept of sour social capital.

The last analyses in this book concerned the effect of sour social capital on unemployment duration. I found no such effect to exist. This probably has to be attributed to the low number of cases.

To recapitulate, let us once more consider the two main research questions. In Chapter One, I divided these two questions into four more specific research questions, which I will answer here.

1) Are people who apply for a job, especially for a higher job, via a friend more likely to get this job if that friend has a higher job? Yes; I have shown in several ways that a contact person with a relatively high prestige ensures a higher prestige for the 'user' of this contact.

2) Are people who have foes at their work, especially foes with a higher job, more likely to accept a job below their own prestige level than people without foes? Again, we can answer this question positively.

3) Are people who have foes and only few friends at work more likely to become unemployed and to remain unemployed for a longer time, as compared to people without foes but with friends? We can answer this question only partly, because we could not test for the relative influence of friends and foes. In general, though, having foes means that there is a higher chance of becoming unemployed. I could find no effect on the duration of unemployment.

4) Do people who remain in the same job for a long time have fewer friends and foes at work than upwardly and downwardly mobile persons, or do they only have friends at their own occupational level? I found that people with friends at their own occupational level tend to stay in the same jobs, whereas people with foes at their own level tend to flee from their jobs.

All in all, the results of the research in this book are quite satisfactory. However, there is always room for improvement. In the following sections, I will give some suggestions for improvement of the theory and also of the data. I will start with the data, because better data also help to develop better theories.

10.4. Possible improvements in data collection

In this book I have worked with several indicators of sweet and sour social capital. In Chapter Four, I explained why we cannot just ask the respondents whether they have friends or foes in the occupational career. People may not know who their friends and foes are ore may assign different meanings to the words that intended. Also, it seems as if the

word 'foes' has a more negative connotation than the word 'friends' is evaluated positively. Moreover, we had to be very careful not to end up in a teleological measurement of friends and foes. If friends are defined as people who have helped or are willing to help ego, we cannot just go looking for people who have once helped ego, and then call them all friends. The same goes for foes. For these reasons, I used several indicators of friends and foes, and I found that having friends or foes does affect the occupational career. Despite this, throughout the book we were plagued by low numbers of cases. As I said before, if one finds an effect with a low number of cases, the effect must be quite strong. Still, I would like to enhance the analytical power by increasing the number of cases.

One way to find more friends and foes in the process of data collection could be to use even more indicators of friends and foes. For this, we could turn to 'old' ways of measuring friends, and try to apply them to foes. Many researchers have come up with possible ways of measuring sweet social capital. Wegener (1991) gives a nice overview. We also need to come up with more possible ways of measuring sour social capital. If we can find the same effects with different indicators, the analytical power of these effects becomes stronger.

Another way to improve on current research is to repeat the same research with different cross-sectional and/or longitudinal datasets. Particularly worthwhile would be to be able to repeatedly ask respondents about their situation, in other words, to do a panel study. This would solve some problems concomitant of retrospective data. If respondents are asked questions about their current situation, the answers are likely to be more reliable than if situations in that past have to be remembered. In this research, we saw several times that respondents had a hard time remembering past details; for instance, the characteristics of the father showed a lot of missing values. Although panel data would not solve these problems overnight, a long-term panel study might.

On the other hand, a long-term panel study, would have its own methodological problems and it would be very costly and time-consuming.

Although I do believe in the usefulness of such a longitudinal approach, there are problems which would have to be solved before even thinking about making such large investments. Therefore, if I could continue with this research, this is what I would do.

First, I would repeat this research (with approximately the same indicators) for other countries. The countries for which research into sweet social capital has been conducted spring to mind: e.g. the United States, former Eastern Germany and China.

Second, I would propose an approach in which long interviews about positive and negative personal relations would be held with, for example, a bank director, a government official, a garbage collector, a school teacher, a long-term unemployed person, someone who has been in the same job for a very long time, etcetera. In short, I would like to explore if there are indicators of friends and foes we have missed in this study, and whether there are other causes of stratification on the labour market than we normally are aware of. Furthermore, with this method of interviewing, we could explore differences between labour market sectors with respect to sweet and sour social capital.

Third, I would like to apply the insights gained from the comparative study and the long interviews in a panel study.

This approach is also what I would propose for future research into sweet and sour social capital. In short, I suggest to use old and new indicators, do comparative studies in different countries, apply an in-depth approach, and use all this to set up a reliable panel study.

My suggestions until now have been based on what realistically can be done. One can also think about what would be the 'perfect' way to study friendships and foeships in different spheres of life. When I started thinking about this, my first sentiment was that

whatever I came up with would be unethical. For instance, to study the development of friendships and foeships, one could lock up a group of people who do not know each other in a room and see what kinds of relations will develop. This, I thought, could never be done. I *has* been done, though. I am referring, of course, to the recent Dutch television project 'Big Brother', in which a group of ten was locked up in a house together and monitored by twelve cameras 24 hours a day. The people in the Big Brother series have shown us that a lot of the ideas we have about human relations do apply in real life (if a real-life soap reflects real life). Although it did not bear a scientific character, the series taught me a lot about human behaviour. In the ideal case, the people in the Big Brother series would not have been forced to nominate one of their members from time to time for leaving the house. I would rather have seen them vote for someone to become the official leader of the group, for instance. This would have brought possible foeships to the surface more clearly than just the nominations.

In short, there is still a lot to be learned about sweet and sour social capital and their effects on different realms of life. This last bit, 'different realms of life' is exactly where I see possibilities for the development of the theory. The following section will discuss these possibilities.

10.5. Possible improvements in and expansion of social capital theory

As I stated before, I tried to improve on modernisation theory, by adding social capital theory to the basic model. I then tried to improve on social capital theory by incorporating sour social capital. In doing so, I gave some conditions under which sweet social capital is expected to render most profit, and conditions under which sour social capital is expected to cause most harm.

These conditions were described in Chapters Two and Three. I have tested some of these conditions, but still a lot remains to be done. My first proposal for improvement of the theory would be to test the conditions specified in Sections 2.4 and 3.4.

Next, I would suggest to study the relative influence of sweet and sour social capital. Is it true that having many friends protects someone from his or her foes? And do foes matter more if someone has no friends? Questions of this type have remained unanswered; finding these answers would contribute to the future development of social capital theory.

In this research, sweet and sour social capital were used as explanatory variables of status and income attainment. It would improve the theory if sweet and especially sour social capital were studied as well in the capacity of dependent variables. What causes friendships and foeships to develop? Of course a lot is already known about the development of friendships, but combining these insights with knowledge about foeships would greatly improve social capital theory.

A next improvement would be to study the so-called 'failures' more thoroughly. I have introduced failures into my research to control for selectivity. I have also made some suggestions to explain why those people who unsuccessfully applied for a job were successful in other respects. It would be worthwhile to look for empirical explanations of this phenomenon.

This book has studied the influence of sweet and sour social capital on the labour market. There are many other realms of life where social capital can be a factor of importance. Earlier on in life, in high school for instance, people may benefit from friends and be damaged by foes. I have often heard people say that they wanted to do a certain course in high school, but did not do so because they could not get along with the teacher. Sometimes even teachers can hinder pupils.

In neighbourhoods, social capital can also be of importance. The neighbourhood where one lives is an important aspect of people's lives. And in neighbourhoods sweet and sour relationships can develop. In the Netherlands, the saying goes (freely translated) "better a good neighbour than a far friend". What about 'bad' neighbours, though. It probably has a large impact on someone's life if he or she does not get along with the neighbours. Also, a good relationship with one's neighbours can be of practical importance. For instance, if one has pets, neighbours can take care of them during the holidays.

However, before someone comes to live somewhere, he or she has to find a house. Social capital can be of influence on the housing market as well, especially in a densely populated country as the Netherlands. Within families even, social capital may have an effect, with regard to inheritance, for instance. In the Netherlands, there are strict laws on heritage. Parents cannot just disinherit a child. Still if relationships go really sour, there are always ways to circumvent laws.

In short, there are numerous realms of life in which sweet and sour social capital may have an effect, and studying these effects would lead to improvement of the theory.

To summarise, I have proposed five ways to improve and expand the theory of social capital: 1) test the conditions under which sweet social capital ensures most benefit and sour social capital inflicts most harm; 2) relate the effects of sweet and sour social capital to each other; 3) study the development of friendships and foeships in greater detail; 4) study the so-called 'failures' more thoroughly; and, 5) study the effects of sweet and sour social capital in greater detail, not just their effects on the labour market, but also the effect in different realms of life.

With this note on the direction that future research into social capital theory should take in my opinion, I would like to conclude this book.

Summary in Dutch - Nederlandse samenvatting

Hoofdstuk 1 - Algemene inleiding

De twee hoofdvragen van dit onderzoek zijn:

1) in welke mate leidt het hebben van vrienden tot een verbetering van iemands arbeidsmarktpositie, en in welke mate voorkomen vrienden een verslechtering van iemands arbeidsmarktpositie?

2) in welke mate leidt het hebben van vijanden tot een verslechtering van iemands arbeidsmarktpositie en in welke mate weerhouden vijanden iemand ervan zijn of haar arbeidsmarktpositie te verbeteren?

De theoretische achtergrond achter deze hoofdvragen vormt een convergentie tussen het stratificatie-onderzoek en het onderzoek naar de invloed van sociale netwerken.

In een verondersteld meritocratische samenleving als Nederland heerst de idee dat mensen met een gelijk opleidingsniveau gelijke kansen op de arbeidsmarkt zouden moeten hebben, ongeacht hun sociale achtergrond, ras, religie, sekse leeftijd of seksuele geaardheid. Dit idee van 'universalisme' maakt deel uit van de egalitaire ideologie in onze samenleving.

Een prominente theorie in de sociologie, de moderniseringstheorie, voorspelt dat in post-industriële samenlevingen de effecten van toegewezen kenmerken (zoals de opleiding en de status van de vader) op de eigen beroepsstatus worden vervangen door de effecten van verworven kenmerken (zoals de eigen opleiding en werkervaring). Blau en Duncan (1967) voorspelden dat door toenemende modernisering de invloed van opleiding en werkervaring op de verworven beroepsprestige zou toenemen ten koste van de invloed van de kenmerken van de vader. Blau en Duncan verwachtten dat de invloed van de vader ten gevolge van een transitie van particularistische naar universalistische waarden op den duur geheel zou verdwijnen.

Sindsdien is er veel onderzoek verricht naar statusverwerving (zie bijvoorbeeld Ganzeboom & De Graaf, 1983; Ganzeboom, Luijkx, Dessens, De Graaf, De Graaf, Jansen & Ultee, 1987; Ganzeboom, Luijkx & Treiman, 1989). Ondanks de theoretische en methodologische aanvullingen op het model, blijven de conclusies van Blau en Duncan uit 1967 intact. De kenmerken van de vader blijven een effect hebben op het behaalde beroepsniveau van zijn kinderen.

 De norm van universalisme mag dan bestaan, maar in de praktijk zien we dat hij niet gehaald wordt.

Om de blijvende invloed van sociale achtergrond te kunnen beschrijven en verklaren stel ik een andere kijk voor op de overgang van particularisme naar universalisme. Mijn stelling is dat deze overgang wel plaatsheeft, maar dat hij de vorm aanneemt van een overgang van toegewezen sociale hulpbronnen naar verworven sociale hulpbronnen. Weber erkende al dat mensen verschillende kansen in het leven kunnen hebben naar gelang zij verschillende hulpbronnen bezitten. Lin heeft het idee van de invloed van verschillende hulpbronnen op kansen in het leven overgenomen. Hij beschouwt sociale netwerken als hulpbronnen en erkent de positie op de arbeidsmarkt als een van de levenskansen. In het onderzoek van Lin en consorten en veel onderzoek dat daarop volgde, vindt een convergentie plaats tussen stratificatie-onderzoek en onderzoek naar sociaal kapitaal.

Hoewel het belang van sociale netwerken voor de kansen op de arbeidsmarkt volledig erkend is, is de theorie over sociaal kapitaal in feite gestoeld op twee algemene bevindingen. Ten eerste blijkt dat wanneer iemand een baan vindt via een contactpersoon, deze baan een hogere status heeft wanneer de contactpersoon een hogere status heeft. Ten tweede blijkt dat wanneer mensen 'vrienden' hebben met een hoge status, zijzelf ook een hoge status zullen hebben. In deze twee algemene bevindingen schuilt een aantal tekortkomingen van de theorie over sociaal kapitaal.

Veel netwerkonderzoekers hebben de positieve invloed van sociale hulpbronnen (sociaal kapitaal) op het leven van mensen verkend. Niet alleen op de arbeidsmarkt, maar ook op andere terreinen van het (sociale) leven lijken netwerken grote invloed uit te oefenen. De theorie over sociaal kapitaal gaat er van uit dat netwerken alleen bestaan uit positieve, vriendschappelijke relaties, hoewel niet expliciet. Ik beschouw dit als een imperfectie van de theorie over sociaal kapitaal. Ik zet de theorie over 'zuur' sociaal kapitaal tegenover de theorie over 'zoet' sociaal kapitaal. De hypothese over zuur sociaal kapitaal is dat mensen met 'vijanden' op het werk, of met 'vijanden' met een relatief hoge status er in status op achteruit zullen gaan.

Met mijn onderzoek probeer ik ook een aantal andere tekortkomingen die uit eerder onderzoek naar sociaal kapitaal naar voren kwamen te voorkomen. Samenvattend worden drie grote verbeteringen voorgesteld:

1) In dit onderzoek worden niet alleen mensen meegenomen die via sociale contacten een baan hebben gevonden.

Ook mensen die sociale contacten gebruikten maar hiermee geen baan vonden zijn opgenomen. Verder heb ik door mijn manier van meten van het gebruik van sociaal kapitaal op de arbeidsmarkt voorkomen dat een selectiviteit met betrekking tot succes zou optreden.

2) Naast opwaartse mobiliteit wordt ook neerwaartse mobiliteit en immobiliteit onderzocht.

3) Door het gebruik van een dynamische benadering is de causale richting tussen sociaal kapitaal en de positie op de arbeidsmarkt duidelijk.

De hoofdvragen worden met de toevoeging van de longitudinale benadering en de kans op immobiliteit uiteengelegd in de volgende onderzoeksvragen:

1) Hebben mensen die via een vriend solliciteren naar een baan, in het bijzonder een hogere baan, meer kans op het krijgen van deze baan als die vriend een hogere baan heeft?

2) Zijn mensen die vijanden op het werk hebben, in het bijzonder vijanden met een hogere baan, eerder geneigd een baan beneden hun eigen prestigeniveau te accepteren dan mensen zonder vijanden?

3) Hebben mensen die vijanden en slechts weinig vrienden op het werk hebben een grotere kans om werkloos te worden en om langer werkloos te blijven in vergelijking met mensen zonder vijanden maar met vrienden?

4) Hebben mensen die langer in dezelfde baan blijven minder vrienden en vijanden op het werk dan opwaarts en neerwaarts mobiele mensen of hebben zij alleen vrienden op hun eigen prestigeniveau?

Hoofdstuk 2 - Vrienden: een inleiding

Het woord 'vrienden' zoals het in dit onderzoek wordt gebruikt heeft niet dezelfde betekenis als in het dagelijks leven. In dit boek worden de mensen waarmee iemand sociaal omgaat buiten de formele werkrelatie, en die door die sociale omgang bereid zijn om ego te helpen, vrienden genoemd. Dat hoeft niet te betekenen dat ego hen ook als vrienden beschouwt. Het kunnen goede vrienden zijn, maar ook kennissen, collega's of familieleden. Vrienden worden gedefinieerd als mensen die ego (op enigerlei wijze) hebben geholpen in het verleden en/of die bereid zijn om ego (op enigerlei wijze) te helpen in de toekomst. De hulpbronnen waartoe deze vrienden toegang verschaffen kunnen 'zoet' of 'positief' sociaal kapitaal worden genoemd.

De redenen waarom mensen elkaar helpen zijn uitgebreid onderzocht. Ten eerste is er de (impliciete) verwachting van reciprociteit: wanneer wij iets voor iemand doen, verwachten we daar iets voor terug. Hulp kan dan worden gezien als een soort investering in de toekomst, gebaseerd op verwachtingen vanuit het verleden. Gebaseerd op de verwachte duur van de relatie kan reciprociteit worden uitgesteld. En vanwege de transitiviteit van vriendschappen hoeft de 'vergoeding' voor eerdere hulp niet per definitie te komen van de persoon aan wie de hulp werd gegeven.

Deze transitiviteit van vriendschappen zorgt er tevens voor dat mensen 'vrienden' kunnen hebben volgens de definitie van dit onderzoek, zonder dat zij deze mensen persoonlijk kennen.

De redenen dat mensen iemand helpen kunnen verschillen voor familieleden, vrienden, kennissen of collega's en voor werkgevers en werknemers.

Er zijn verscheidene condities aan te geven waaronder zoet sociaal kapitaal de meeste winst zal opleveren:

1) Een hoge, maar niet de hoogst mogelijke, initiële status.

2) Contactpersonen met een relatief hoge status (vergeleken met ego's eigen status).

3) Contactpersonen met weinig andere (hulpbehoevende) vrienden.

4) Veel potentiële contactpersonen.

5) In geval van werkloosheid, een korte duur van de werkloosheid (hoewel voor langdurig werklozen sociaal kapitaal wel eens de laatste kans zou kunnen zijn).

6) De werkloosheid moet niet al het gevolg zijn van een gebrek aan sociaal kapitaal.

7) In zeer grote en zeer kleine bedrijven.

8) In gespecialiseerde bedrijfssectoren.

9) Bij groot afbraakrisico van een functie (als een werknemer met gevoelige informatie omgaat bijvoorbeeld, of een dure interne opleiding heeft gevolgd).

10) In geval van een onevenwichtige arbeidsmarkt of delen van de arbeidsmarkt. Dit kan zowel een te grote vraag als een te groot aanbod van arbeid op (delen van) de arbeidsmarkt betekenen.

11) Weinig regulering door de overheid omtrent gebruik van sociaal kapitaal.

Een aantal van deze condities wordt in dit onderzoek meegenomen, maar over een aantal zijn geen gegevens aanwezig.

Hoofdstuk 3 - Vijanden: een inleiding

Het woord vijanden in dit onderzoek betekent, net als het woord 'vrienden', iets anders dan in het dagelijks leven. In dit onderzoek zijn vijanden gedefinieerd als: mensen die ego (op enigerlei wijze) hebben gehinderd in het verleden en/of die bereid zijn ego (op enigerlei wijze) te hinderen in de toekomst. Vijanden en hun hulpbronnen noemen we zuur sociaal kapitaal.

De redenen waarom mensen elkaar tegenwerken zijn gerelateerd aan de redenen waarom mensen elkaar helpen. Dezelfde 'schaduw van het verleden' en 'schaduw van de toekomst' sturen de verwachting van reciprociteit. Als iemand mij in het verleden heeft gehinderd of ik verwacht dat die persoon dat in de toekomst zal gaan doen, zal ik bereid zijn deze persoon op mijn beurt te hinderen.

Ook bij vijandschappen veronderstel ik transitiviteit. Dit kan ervoor zorgen dat mensen 'vijanden' hebben volgens de definitie van dit onderzoek, zonder dat zij dat weten of deze mensen persoonlijk kennen.

Net als vrienden kunnen vijanden allerlei soorten mensen zijn: kennissen, collega's en familieleden. Alleen vrienden kunnen geen vijanden zijn, althans niet tegelijkertijd.

Dezelfde condities die ervoor zorgen dat zoet sociaal kapitaal de meeste winst oplevert, veroorzaken de grootste schade van zuur sociaal kapitaal.

Het doet wat kunstmatig aan om de opbrengsten van zoet sociaal kapitaal en de schade van zuur sociaal kapitaal los van elkaar te conditionaliseren. Het doel van dit onderzoek is echter in de eerste plaats om uit te vinden of de idee van zuur sociaal kapitaal de confrontatie met de werkelijkheid kan doorstaan.

Hoofdstuk 4 - Data, metingen en methoden

In dit onderzoek wordt gebruik gemaakt van twee grootschalige datasets. De Nederlandse Familie Enquête 1992-1993 (Ultee & Ganzeboom, 1993) en het Nederlandse Telepanel (ESR/Telepanel, 1993).

Je kunt niet gewoon aan mensen vragen of ze vrienden of vijanden in hun beroepsloopbaan hebben. Mensen weten wellicht niet wie hun vrienden en vijanden zijn of ze kennen verschillende betekenissen toe aan de woorden. Ook lijkt het alsof het woord 'vijanden' een negatievere connotatie heeft dan de positieve lading die het woord 'vrienden' heeft. Bovendien moesten we erg voorzichtig zijn niet in een teleologie te vervallen bij het meten van vrienden en vijanden. Als we vrienden definiëren als mensen die ego wel eens hebben geholpen of die bereid zijn om ego te helpen, kunnen we niet op zoek gaan naar mensen die ego wel eens hebben geholpen en die vervolgens vrienden noemen. Hetzelfde geldt voor vijanden. Om die redenen heb ik verscheidene indicatoren voor vrienden en vijanden gebruikt en zodoende aangetoond dat het hebben van vrienden of vijanden de beroepsloopbaan beïnvloedt.

In de 'Familie Enquête' werd aan de respondenten voor maximaal 12 banen gevraagd hoe ze de baan gevonden hadden en waarom ze de baan hadden verlaten. Tevens werd gevraagd hoe het contact met collega's en de werkleider was geweest en hoe de sfeer op het werk was ervaren.

In het 'Telepanel' werden soortgelijke vragen gesteld naar hoe een baan was gevonden en waarom deze was verlaten voor maximaal 36 banen. Tevens werd aan de respondenten gevraagd of ze wel eens een contactpersoon hadden gebruikt en welk beroep deze contactpersoon had. Daarnaast werd nog gevraagd of de respondenten wel eens door iemand op het werk waren tegengewerkt en welke beroepsstatus deze persoon had.

Ik heb gekeken of mensen vrienden en vijanden hadden (volgens de definities van dit onderzoek) en welk soort mensen vrienden en vijanden hadden. De conclusie is dat mannen en vrouwen, mensen van alle leeftijden, mensen van alle opleidingsniveaus en mensen met allerlei beroepen allemaal ongeveer evenveel vrienden en vijanden hebben. Wel worden er in beide datasets veel minder vijanden dan vrienden gevonden. De metingen van vijanden zijn echter zeer strikt om discussies over de inhoud te voorkomen. Het lage aantal cases kan mede door deze strikte meting veroorzaakt zijn.

Vervolgens heb ik gekeken wat voor soort vrienden en vijanden mensen hebben. De algemene conclusie is dat allerlei mensen allerlei soorten vrienden en vijanden hebben.

Hiermee is aangetoond dat het niet zo is dat 'goede' mensen vrienden hebben en 'slechte' mensen vijanden. Dat is van belang voor de causale richting van de onderzoeksvragen.

Aangezien dit onderzoek zich voor een groot deel richt op een nieuw onderwerp (vijanden in de beroepsloopbaan) hebben de meeste analyses een beschrijvend karakter. Maar er zullen ook enkele verklaringsvragen worden beantwoord. Voor de cross-sectionele gegevens (hoofdstuk 5, 6 en 8) maak ik gebruik van (Ordinary Least Squares) regressieanalyse. Voor de longitudinale data (hoofdstuk 7 en 9) wordt gebruik gemaakt van gebeurtenissenanalyse. De analyseeenheden bij regressieanalyse zijn respondenten. Bij gebeurtenissenanalyse zijn dit respondentmaanden.

Hoofdstuk 5 - Een naïeve benadering van zoet sociaal kapitaal

In dit hoofdstuk wordt de moderniseringstheorie gecontrasteerd met de theorie over sociaal kapitaal. Om te bewijzen dat particularisme nog steeds bestaat heb ik een aantal hypothesen geformuleerd die de impliciete veronderstellingen van de moderniseringstheorie naar de letter volgen. Dit leidde tot vier universalismehypothesen. De eerste twee universalismehypothesen voorspellen een afname in de invloed van de vader en een toename van de invloed van de eigen opleiding op prestige- en inkomensverwerving over de tijd. Uit de analyses moest ik concluderen dat beide hypothesen verworpen moeten worden. Het effect van de eigen opleiding op het inkomen is lager voor latere (jongere) cohorten; het effect van de kenmerken van de vader op de eerste baan is afgenomen, maar andere effecten van de vader zijn intact gebleven en het effect van de eigen opleiding is niet toegenomen over de cohorten. De resultaten zijn grotendeels gelijk voor mannen en vrouwen. De bevindingen weerspreken twee voorspellingen van Blau en Duncan: toewijzing (de invloed van de kenmerken van de vader) is niet verdwenen en verwerving (de invloed van de eigen opleiding) is niet toegenomen. Deze resultaten wijzen niet op een transitie van toewijzing naar verwerving. Er lijkt geen toename in het belang van verwerving te hebben plaatsgevonden, maar wel een kleine afname in het belang van toewijzing.

Een tweede bevinding in hoofdstuk 5 is dat mannen in Nederland in 1992-1993 veel intensiever gebruik maken van informele hulpbronnen dan in 1982 en dat het gebruik van informele hulpbronnen door vrouwen in Nederland niet is afgenomen.

Aangezien mannen en vrouwen beide gebruik maken van sociale hulpbronnen om banen te verkrijgen, moeten zij wel geloven in het nut hiervan. In een perfect universalistische samenleving kon en zou een dergelijk geloof niet bestaan. Deze bevinding wijst dan ook op een blijvend particularisme.

Het toetsen van de vierde universalismehypothese wees erop dat de opbrengst van het gebruik van sociale hulpbronnen niet is afgenomen, zoals de hypothese stelde. In feite lieten de analyses geen significante opbrengst van het gebruik van sociale hulpbronnen zien. Het effect was zelfs meestal negatief. Er was wel een klein verschil tussen mannen en vrouwen. Het gebruik van informele hulpbronnen heeft een enigszins groter negatief effect op de beroepsprestige van vrouwen. Wanneer er wordt gecontroleerd voor sekse blijkt het gebruik van informele hulpbronnen een klein positief effect op de beroepsprestige te hebben.

De bevinding dat het gebruik van informele hulpbronnen geen of een negatief effect heeft is niet nieuw. Onderzoek door Lin en consorten en door De Graaf en Flap toonde al aan dat de status van de contactpersoon relatief hoog moet zijn, willen sociale hulpbronnen tot winst leiden. Om deze reden heb ik de status van de contactpersoon in het model opgenomen. Wanneer de prestige van de contactpersoon in acht wordt genomen, blijkt dat een contact met een relatief hoog prestige een positief effect heeft op de prestige van de respondent. Tevens is dit effect sterker voor mannen dan voor vrouwen.

De verwerping van de universalismehypothesen leidde tot de conclusie dat particularisme nog bestaat. Om uit te vinden of de transitie van particularisme naar universalisme de vorm heeft aangenomen van toegewezen sociaal kapitaal naar verworven sociaal kapitaal heb ik twee 'verworven sociaal kapitaal' hypothesen geformuleerd:

a) familie als een sociale hulpbron (toegewezen sociaal kapitaal) is belangrijker voor de prestige van de eerste baan dan vrienden (verworven sociaal kapitaal), en

b) vrienden als een sociale hulpbron zijn belangrijker voor de prestige van de huidige of laatste baan dan voor de eerste baan.

De conclusie met betrekking tot 'verworven sociaal kapitaal' hypothese a) is drievoudig. Ten eerste wordt familie inderdaad vaker gebruikt bij het vinden van de eerste baan dan bij de huidige of laatste baan. Ten tweede geldt dit voor zowel mannen als vrouwen. Ten derde is familie als een sociale hulpbron van meer belang voor de eerste baan dan vrienden voor zowel mannen als vrouwen.

Dit alles ondersteunt het maken van het onderscheid tussen toegewezen en verworven sociaal kapitaal.

De resultaten met betrekking tot de 'verworven sociaal kapitaal' hypothesen tonen aan dat particularisme de vorm van sociaal kapitaal kan hebben aangenomen, i.e. de mensen die iemand kent. In hoofdstuk 2 heb ik een aantal condities geformuleerd die de grootste opbrengst van zoet sociaal kapitaal zouden garanderen. In dit onderzoek heb ik de volgende condities opgenomen: een hoge initiële status, contactpersonen met een relatief hoge status, het bezitten van veel potentiële contactpersonen, een hoog afbraakrisico van de functie en, in geval van werkloosheid, een korte duur van de werkloosheid.

Het effect van de tweede conditie, de aanwezigheid van contactpersonen met een relatief hoge status, heb ik al beschreven. Dit leidt inderdaad tot een hogere opbrengst van zoet sociaal kapitaal.

Hoofdstuk 6 - Een uitgebreidere benadering van zoet sociaal kapitaal

De volgende conditie die zou moeten leiden tot een hoge opbrengst van sociaal kapitaal die ik in ogenschouw nam, was de conditie van het bezitten van veel potentiële contactpersonen. Dit leidde tot hoofdstuk 6, dat zich concentreert op de toegang tot sociale hulpbronnen. De reden waarom het zo interessant is om te weten tot welke hulpbronnen mensen toegang hebben, ongeacht of zij er gebruik van maken of niet, is dat we hierdoor een duidelijker beeld krijgen van de manier waarop het netwerk van mensen hen verbindt met een diversiteit aan posities. In hoofdstuk 6 heb ik de factoren bestudeerd die van invloed zijn op de toegang tot sociale hulpbronnen met gebruik van drie hypothesen. De eerste van deze drie hypothesen, de moderniseringshypothese, stelt dat met het voortschrijden van de modernisering de eigen opleiding een steeds grotere invloed op de toegang tot sociale hulpbronnen heeft ten koste van de invloed van de kenmerken van de vader (die een indicator zijn voor de initiële positie van een persoon).

Met betrekking tot de factoren van invloed op de toegang tot sociale hulpbronnen kunnen de volgende algemene conclusies worden getrokken. Ten eerste zien we dat de diversiteit van toegang groot is: veel respondenten blijken mensen met allerlei soorten beroepen te kennen. Ten tweede blijkt dat mensen over het geheel genomen toegang hebben tot sociale hulpbronnen van een relatief hoge kwaliteit.

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Ten derde blijkt dat de positie van de vader, als indicator voor initiële positie, een grote invloed heeft op de toegang tot sociale hulpbronnen en dat deze invloed groter is dan die van de eigen opleiding. Deze laatste bevinding leidt tot de verwerping van de moderniseringshypothese. Met het oog op het contrast tussen de moderniseringstheorie en de theorie over sociaal kapitaal, versterkt dit wederom mijn overtuiging dat modernisering geen overgang van particularistische naar universalistische waarden omvat, althans niet in het proces van statusverwerving. De vader, of beter, sociale achtergrond, blijft een factor van belang voor de statusverwerving. Dit vormt tevens een bevestiging van de tweede hypothese in hoofdstuk 6, de 'kracht van de positie' hypothese, die stelt dat hoe hoger de initiële positie van een persoon is, hoe hoger de kwaliteit is van de hulpbronnen die deze persoon via zijn of haar contacten kan bereiken.

De vierde conclusie die in hoofdstuk 6 wordt getrokken is dat kennissen een betere toegang tot sociale hulpbronnen verschaffen dan vrienden en familieleden. In feite verschaffen vrienden slechts weinig toegang. Deze bevinding leidt tot de verwerping van de 'kracht van zwakke banden' hypothese, die direct werd afgeleid van Granovetters werk (Granovetter, 1973). Granovetter veronderstelde dat zwakke banden toegang tot de beste hulpbronnen zouden verschaffen, omdat de mensen in de periferie van het netwerk van een persoon bruggen kunnen slaan met andere netwerken. Wanneer de banden met vrienden en kennissen als zwak worden gedefinieerd en de banden met familieleden als sterk moet de hypothese worden verworpen. Ik beargumenteer echter dat de banden met familieleden niet per definitie sterk zijn. Familieleden lijken in sociaal opzicht niet persé op ons, terwijl vrienden van de drie categorieën misschien wel het meest op ons lijken. Deze gelijkenis en aardig vinden werden door Homans in 1950 al beschouwd als een belangrijk kenmerk van vriendschappen. Ik stel dat juist deze kenmerken, op elkaar lijken en elkaar aardig vinden, de sterkte van een band bepalen.

Nadat gekeken is naar de factoren van invloed op de toegang tot sociale hulpbronnen, heb ik mij verdiept in de invloed die de toegang tot sociale hulpbronnen heeft op iemands kansen op de arbeidsmarkt. Wederom met het oog op het contrast tussen de moderniseringstheorie en de theorie over sociaal kapitaal heb ik allereerst de invloed van toegang tot sociale hulpbronnen op verworven prestige bestudeerd. De analyses leiden tot twee conclusies. Ten eerste heeft de toegang via familieleden (toegewezen toegang tot sociale hulpbronnen) een sterk positief en zeer significant effect op de prestige van de eerste baan. Ten tweede, toegang via vrienden (verworven toegang) heeft een sterk positief

effect op de prestige van de huidige baan terwijl toegewezen toegang geen effect heeft op de prestige van de huidige baan. Aangezien de 'verworven toegang' hypothese in hoofdstuk 6 uit twee delen bestaat, namelijk dat toegewezen toegang meer invloed heeft in het begin van de carrière, terwijl verworven toegang aan belang wint in latere stadia, kan deze hypothese niet worden verworpen. In feite wijzen de bevindingen op het belang van het opnemen van toegewezen en verworven sociaal kapitaal in de verklaring van statusverwerving. Ik vind ook bewijzen voor de stelling dat de overgang van toegewezen naar verworven sociaal kapitaal een verklaring kan zijn voor de veronderstelde algehele overgang van toewijzing naar verwerving. De effecten van de eigen opleiding en de kenmerken van de vader worden deels 'wegverklaard' door het opnemen van toegewezen en verworven sociaal kapitaal in het model.

De invloed van de toegang tot sociale hulpbronnen op het daadwerkelijk gebruiken van deze hulpbronnen heb ik eveneens bestudeerd. Hoewel de effecten niet sterk zijn, lijkt het toch alsof 'hoe meer hoe beter' opgaat voor de toegang tot sociaal kapitaal. De hypothese dat verworven toegang via zwakke banden tot intensiever gebruik leidt vindt sterke bevestiging. Voor de laatste of huidige baan leidt de toegang via kennissen tot intensiever gebruik dan de toegang via vrienden. Voor de eerste baan heeft alleen toegang via familieleden invloed op het gebruik van informele hulpbronnen.

De volgende stap in het onderzoek betrof het mislukte gebruik van informele hulpbronnen. Om op een succesvolle wijze het contrast tussen de moderniseringstheorie en de theorie over sociaal kapitaal te kunnen maken, moest ik afrekenen met een aantal tekortkomingen uit eerder onderzoek naar sociaal kapitaal. Een van deze tekortkomingen was de uitsluiting uit het model van mensen die geprobeerd hebben via informele hulpbronnen een baan te krijgen, maar hierin niet zijn geslaagd. Deze uitsluiting kan een vertekening hebben veroorzaakt in de resultaten van eerder onderzoek. In mijn studie heb ik deze tekortkoming gedeeltelijk opgelost door andere en verscheidene indicatoren voor sociaal kapitaal te gebruiken. Maar ik wilde toch weten of een dergelijke vertekening zou kunnen optreden. Is het waar dat het positieve effect van informele hulpbronnen op het vinden van een baan een schijneffect is doordat de ongeschikte mensen uit de resultaten gefilterd worden omdat zij de banen niet krijgen? Op basis van mijn resultaten kan ik deze vraag negatief beantwoorden. Ik vond geen verschillen tussen de groep respondenten die wel eens onsuccesvol hadden gesolliciteerd via informele hulpbronnen en de groep die onsuccesvol hadden gesolliciteerd via formele hulpbronnen.

Ik vond wel een verschil tussen de groep respondenten die wel eens onsuccesvol hadden gesolliciteerd en de groep die nooit onsuccesvol hadden gesolliciteerd. Dit verschil is echter in het voordeel van de groep mensen die wel eens onsuccesvol hadden gesolliciteerd met betrekking tot beroepsprestige en opleiding. Als er al een vertekening optreedt, zal het effect van sociale hulpbronnen eerder worden onderschat dan overschat.

Hoofdstuk 7 - Een dynamische benadering van zoet sociaal kapitaal

De laatste aanpassing die ik voorstel om van sociaal kapitaal ofwel een passend alternatief voor ofwel een geschikte toevoeging op de moderniseringstheorie te maken, is het dynamisch benaderen van sociaal kapitaal. In eerder onderzoek naar sociaal kapitaal is de vraag naar de causale volgorde grotendeels onbeantwoord gebleven. Leidt het hebben van een baan met een hoog prestige tot het verkrijgen van hulpbronnen van een hoge kwaliteit, of leidt het hebben van hulpbronnen van een hoge kwaliteit tot het verkrijgen van een baan met een hoog prestige? Meer algemeen gesteld: leidt een goede sociale positie tot sociaal kapitaal van hoge kwaliteit of leidt sociaal kapitaal van een hoge kwaliteit tot een goede sociale positie?

Het voordeel van een dynamische benadering (van ieder causaal probleem) is dat de gebeurtenissen worden geanalyseerd in de volgorde waarin ze optreden. Ik heb de methode van gebeurtenissenanalyse gebruikt om een aantal mogelijke gebeurtenissen op de arbeidsmarkt te onderzoeken: (opwaartse en neerwaartse) mobiliteit, immobiel blijven, werkloos worden en het vinden van een baan na een periode van werkloosheid. Uit de analyses in hoofdstuk 7 valt een aantal conclusies te trekken. We zien dat werkende mensen met vrienden met een hoger prestige een betere kans hebben om een nieuwe baan (met hoger prestige) te vinden. En we zien dat mensen met vrienden met (ongeveer) dezelfde prestige vaker immobiel blijven dan mensen met vrienden op een hoger niveau of mensen zonder vrienden op het werk.

Een andere conclusie is dat mensen die vrienden hebben met een hoger prestige een kleinere kans hebben om werkloos te worden. Wat de werkloosheidsduur betreft blijkt dat geen van de sociaal kapitaal variabelen een effect heeft. Het lijkt alsof mensen die korter werkloos zijn geweest een grotere kans hebben om een baan te vinden. Hoewel dit geen nieuwe bevinding is, wil ik hier een methodologische kanttekening plaatsen bij de manier

waarop dit resultaat in de analyse is verkregen. Geen van de sociaal kapitaal variabelen in het model heeft een significant effect op de werkloosheidsduur. In zulke gevallen is de methode van gebeurtenissenanalyse niet langer betrouwbaar om werkloosheidsduur mee te onderzoeken. De bevinding dat mensen die korter werkloos zijn geweest een grotere kans hebben om een baan te vinden, betekent niets anders dan dat de mensen die snel een baan vinden korter werkloos blijven. Dit is inherent aan de gebeurtenissenanalyse en zegt niet echt iets over mijn theorie.

De laatste conclusie uit de gebeurtenissenanalyse is dat ik niet kan aantonen dat mensen in banen met een hoog afbraakrisico meer profiteren van sociaal kapitaal.

In het algemeen zijn de conclusies uit hoofdstuk 7 dat sociaal kapitaal een waardevolle verklarende factor voor zowel mobiliteit als immobiliteit in de beroepsloopbaan is. Het is een minder veelbelovende verklaring voor werkloosheidsduur (met de aanmerking dat de gebruikte data beperkingen vertonen.

Hoofdstuk 8 - Een naïeve benadering van zuur sociaal kapitaal

Uit de naïeve benadering van zuur sociaal kapitaal kan een aantal conclusies worden getrokken met betrekking tot de verwerving van prestige en inkomen. Ik heb een prestige-obstructie hypothese geformuleerd, die stelt dat als mensen vijanden op het werk hebben, in het bijzonder vijanden met een relatief hoog prestige, zijzelf een relatief laag prestige hebben in vergelijking met mensen zonder vijanden. Toetsing leidde tot de volgende conclusies:

a) Mensen die een zeer slecht contact hadden met een of meer van hun collega's in hun voorlaatste baan hebben geen laag prestige in vergelijking met mensen die niet zulke slechte contacten hadden.

b) Mensen die waren tegengewerkt door een of meer personen in hun voorlaatste baan hebben geen laag prestige in vergelijking met mensen die niet werden tegengewerkt.

c) Mensen die een zeer slecht contact hadden met een collega met een hoger prestige hebben geen laag prestige in vergelijking met mensen die niet zulke vijanden hadden.

d) Mensen die waren tegengewerkt door een persoon met een hoger prestige hebben geen

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lager prestige vergeleken met mensen die niet werden tegengewerkt door zo'n vijand.

Hoewel deze resultaten enigszins teleurstellend zijn, heb ik toch naar sekseverschillen gekeken. Het toetsen van de sekse-prestige-verschillen hypothese leidde tot de volgende conclusies:

a) Mannen die een zeer slecht contact hadden met een of meer van hun collega's in hun voorlaatste baan hebben geen laag prestige vergeleken met vrouwen die een zeer slecht contact hadden met een of meer van hun collega's.

b) Mannen die waren tegengewerkt door een of meer personen in hun voorlaatste baan hebben geen laag prestige vergeleken met vrouwen die waren tegengewerkt.

c) Mannen die een zeer slecht contact hadden met een collega met een hoger prestige ondervinden hiervan een negatief effect op hun eigen prestige, terwijl vrouwen hier een positief effect van ondervinden.

d) Mannen die waren tegengewerkt door iemand met een hoger prestige ondervinden hiervan een negatief effect op hun eigen prestige, terwijl vrouwen hier een positief effect van ondervinden.

In de volgende stap van de naïeve benadering van zuur sociaal kapitaal in hoofdstuk 8 heb ik de invloed van vijanden op het inkomen verkend. In deze analyses vond ik geen significante effecten, zelfs niet na controle voor sekse.

Enkele teleurstellende bevindingen daargelaten kan over het geheel uit de naïeve benadering worden geconcludeerd dat zuur sociaal kapitaal een belangrijke factor is in de verklaring van statusverwerving. Sekseverschillen mogen echter niet worden veronachtzaamd. Voor wat betreft de verwerving van inkomen blijkt zuur sociaal kapitaal geen invloed te hebben.

Hoofdstuk 9 - Een dynamische benadering van zuur sociaal kapitaal

Na de naïeve benadering heb ik een dynamische benadering van zuur sociaal kapitaal gekozen. Zoals bij vrienden heb ik wederom gekeken naar mobiliteit, immobiliteit en werkloosheid. Dit leidde tot vijf hypothesen.

De eerste hypothese die ik heb getoetst was de andere-baan-vinden hypothese, die stelt dat mensen met vijanden met een relatief hoog prestige minder waarschijnlijk een nieuwe baan vinden dan mensen die niet zulke vijanden hebben.

In hoofdstuk 9 vind ik hier sterke bevestiging voor. Bovendien toonden de analyses aan dat mensen met vijanden met een relatief hoog prestige vaak een afname in prestige ondergaan. Met deze bevinding vind ik bevestiging voor de genoegen-nemen-met-lager-prestige hypothese. Wanneer we dit combineren met de eerdere bevinding dat mensen met vijanden minder waarschijnlijk een nieuwe baan vinden, kunnen we concluderen dat mensen met vijanden minder kans hebben om een nieuwe baan te vinden en dat zij, als ze een nieuwe baan vinden, vaker genoegen nemen met een lager prestige dan zij tot dan toe genoten.

Vervolgens heb ik de immobiliteitshypothese getoetst, die stelt dat mensen met vijanden met een (ongeveer) gelijk prestige niveau langer in dezelfde baan blijven. Voor deze hypothese vind ik geen bevestiging. In feite blijkt de relatie andersom te liggen: mensen met vijanden op het werk blijven niet immobiel maar vertonen eerder de neiging hun baan te 'ontvluchten'. Aangezien dit geen effect blijkt te hebben op de prestige, kunnen we niet concluderen dat dit 'vluchtgedrag' een teruggang in iemands carrière veroorzaakt.

De toetsing van de werkloosheidshypothese leverde wel veelbelovende resultaten op. Het blijkt dat een slechte atmosfeer op het werk leidt tot een grotere kans op werkloosheid. Dit kan betekenen dat we met betrekking tot de immobiliteitshypothese in een andere richting moeten kijken. In plaats van uit een verval in prestige, kan de teruggang in iemands carrière bestaan uit werkloos worden. Dit is een interessante bevinding en het is een stevig bewijs voor de waarde van het concept van zuur sociaal kapitaal.

De laatste analyse in dit boek betrof het effect van zuur sociaal kapitaal op de werkloosheidsduur. Ik vond geen dergelijk effect. Dit moet waarschijnlijk worden toegeschreven aan het lage aantal cases.

Hoofdstuk 10 - Samenvatting van de resultaten en een blik op de toekomst

In dit boek heb ik eerst de moderniseringstheorie gecontrasteerd met de theorie over sociaal kapitaal. Vervolgens heb ik de theorie over sociaal kapitaal aangevuld met zuur sociaal kapitaal.

Wat betekent de opname van (zoet) sociaal kapitaal in de statusverwervingsmodellen voor het oorspronkelijke statusverwervingsmodel, alles

tezamen genomen? De hoofdconclusie moet zijn dat sociaal kapitaal een goede aanvulling is. Met de stap voor stap benadering die ik heb gebruikt, heb ik een aantal nieuwe inzichten verworven. Door de moderniseringstheorie te contrasteren met de theorie over sociaal kapitaal heb ik aangetoond dat de overgang van het belang van toegewezen kenmerken naar verworven kenmerken voor de statusverwerving kan worden gespecificeerd als een overgang van toegewezen sociaal kapitaal naar verworven sociaal kapitaal. Liever dan hiermee de moderniseringstheorie af te wijzen, pleit ik ervoor deze theorie te verrijken met de concepten uit de theorie over sociaal kapitaal. Hoewel het gebruik en de opbrengst van sociaal kapitaal een voorname assumptie van de moderniseringstheorie tegenspreken, namelijk de assumptie dat universalistische waarden overheersen in westerse geïndustrialiseerde samenlevingen, geloof ik toch dat modernisering de waardensystemen in deze samenlevingen heeft veranderd. Misschien overheerst universalisme (nog) niet, maar ik geloof dat modernisering een verschuiving heeft veroorzaakt van openlijk nepotisme en favoritisme naar een meer verborgen soort particularisme. Om kort te gaan denk ik dat de moderniseringstheorie verfijnd moet worden met de theorie over sociaal kapitaal, maar om dit te kunnen doen moet de theorie over sociaal kapitaal en het onderzoek dat daarnaar wordt gedaan ook zelf worden verfijnd.

Om het onderzoek naar sociaal kapitaal te verfijnen heb ik ten eerste het onderscheid gebruikt tussen toegang tot en gebruik van sociale hulpbronnen. Dit gaf veelbelovende resultaten en toonde aan dat een groot aantal potentiële contacten meer opbrengsten van sociaal kapitaal genereren. Daarnaast werd mijn geloof versterkt dat er een overgang gaande is van toegewezen sociaal kapitaal naar verworven sociaal kapitaal. Ten tweede heb ik gecontroleerd of er selectiviteit plaatsvindt in de bevindingen over het gebruik van sociaal kapitaal, door ook mislukt gebruik van sociaal kapitaal te bekijken. Ten derde heb ik een dynamische benadering van sociaal kapitaal gekozen om het klassieke probleem van de causale volgorde op te lossen. Dit toonde aan dat bezit van en toegang tot sociaal kapitaal tot een verbetering in beroepsprestige leidt, en niet andersom.

Na de conclusie te hebben getrokken dat de toepassing van de theorie over sociaal kapitaal vruchtbaar is voor de verklaring van statusverwerving en het verfijnen van het onderzoek naar sociaal kapitaal ging ik verder door de theorie over sociaal kapitaal zelf te verfijnen.

Om een theorie te verbeteren kan men verscheidene paden bewandelen. Ten eerste kan men uit de bestaande theorie nieuwe hypothesen afleiden en deze empirisch toetsen.

In de vorige paragraaf heb ik laten zien hoe ik dat met betrekking tot de moderniseringstheorie en de theorie over sociaal kapitaal heb gedaan. In deze paragraaf zal ik een andere strategie beschrijven die ik heb gevolgd om de theorie over sociaal kapitaal te verfijnen en tot een beter gereedschap voor de sociologie te maken.

Een theorie wint in kracht wanneer hij empirisch toetsbaar wordt. Men moet bijvoorbeeld uitspraken van het volgende type kunnen doen: 'wanneer iemand een bepaalde eigenschap heeft (verklarende variabele), gaat dit samen met een andere eigenschap (afhankelijke variabele)'. De hypothesen die ik in de voorgaande paragraaf heb beschreven, beantwoordden aan deze voorwaarde. Een theorie wint nog meer aan kracht wanneer de empirisch toetsbare uitspraken gecombineerd kunnen worden met uitspraken van het type: 'wanneer iemand het tegenovergestelde van die eigenschap bezit (verklarende variabele), gaat dit samen met een bepaalde hoeveelheid van het tegenovergestelde van dezelfde afhankelijke variabele'. Door de toevoeging van zuur sociaal kapitaal wint de theorie over sociaal kapitaal aan kracht.

Laten we, ter recapitulatie, nog eens kijken naar de twee hoofdvragen van dit onderzoek. In hoofdstuk 1 heb ik deze twee vragen opgedeeld in vier meer specifieke onderzoeksvragen die ik hier zal beantwoorden.

1) Hebben mensen die via een vriend solliciteren naar een baan, in het bijzonder een hogere baan, meer kans op het krijgen van deze baan als die vriend een hogere baan heeft? Ja, ik heb op verscheidene manieren aangetoond dat een contactpersoon met een relatief hoog prestige een hoger prestige voor de 'gebruiker' van dit contact garandeert.

2) Zijn mensen die vijanden op het werk hebben, in het bijzonder vijanden met een hogere baan, eerder geneigd een baan beneden hun eigen prestigeniveau te accepteren dan mensen zonder vijanden? Wederom kunnen we deze vraag positief beantwoorden.

3) Hebben mensen die vijanden en slechts weinig vrienden op het werk hebben een grotere kans om werkloos te worden en om langer werkloos te blijven in vergelijking met mensen zonder vijanden maar met vrienden? Deze vraag kan slechts gedeeltelijk worden beantwoord, omdat we de relatieve invloed van vrienden en vijanden niet konden toetsen. In het algemeen betekent het hebben van vijanden echter dat er een grotere kans op werkloosheid is. Ik kon geen effect op de werkloosheidsduur vinden.

4) Hebben mensen die langer in dezelfde baan blijven minder vrienden en vijanden op het werk dan opwaarts en neerwaarts mobiele mensen of hebben zij alleen vrienden op hun

eigen prestigeniveau? Ik ontdekte dat mensen met vrienden op hun eigen prestigeniveau de neiging hebben om langer in dezelfde baan te blijven, terwijl mensen met vijanden op hun eigen niveau de neiging hebben om hun baan te ontvluchten.

Al met al zijn de onderzoeksresultaten in dit boek behoorlijk bevredigend. Er is echter altijd ruimte voor verbetering. Om het onderzoek naar sociaal kapitaal succesvol voort te zetten, kunnen verbeteringen worden gemaakt in de dataverzameling en de theorie zelf kan worden uitgebreid en verbeterd.

Voor een verbetering van de dataverzameling stel ik ten eerste voor om oude en nieuwe indicatoren te gebruiken voor het meten van zoet en zuur sociaal kapitaal. Wegener (1991) geeft een aardig overzicht van de vele manieren die onderzoekers hebben bedacht om zoet sociaal kapitaal te meten. We moeten ook meer mogelijke manieren bedenken om zuur sociaal kapitaal te meten. Wanneer we dezelfde effecten kunnen vinden met andere indicatoren wordt de analytische kracht van deze effecten sterker.

Ten tweede stel ik voor om hetzelfde onderzoek te herhalen met andere cross-sectionele en longitudinale datasets en dan ook voor andere landen dan Nederland.

Ten derde stel ik voor een dieptebenadering toe te passen met langere, persoonlijke interviews. Dit om eventueel ook indicatoren voor, met name, zuur sociaal kapitaal te kunnen ontdekken waar we zelf niet aan hebben gedacht. En om eventueel onderscheid te kunnen maken naar arbeidsmarktsectoren.

Mijn laatste voorstel is om de bevindingen uit de eerste drie mogelijkheden om de gegevens omtrent sociaal kapitaal te verbeteren, toe te passen om een betrouwbare panelstudie op te zetten. Met een goede panelstudie kan nog beter bestudeerd worden hoe zoet en zuur sociaal kapitaal ontstaat en wat voor effecten zij hebben.

Om de theorie over sociaal kapitaal uit te breiden en te verbeteren stel ik voor om 1) de condities te toetsen waaronder zoet sociaal kapitaal de meeste winst zou opleveren en zuur sociaal kapitaal de meeste schade zou berokkenen; 2) de effecten van zoet en zuur sociaal kapitaal aan elkaar te relateren; 3) de ontwikkeling van vriendschappen en vijandschappen meer gedetailleerd te bestuderen; 4) de zogeheten 'mislukkingen' (mensen die via informele hulpbronnen een proberen te krijgen bij wie dat niet lukt) nader onder de loep te nemen; en 5) de effecten van zoet en zuur sociaal kapitaal meer gedetailleerd te

bestuderen, niet alleen hun effecten op de arbeidsmarkt maar ook op verschillende andere terreinen van het leven.

Met deze opmerkingen over de richting waarin het onderzoek naar de theorie over sociaal kapitaal naar mijn mening moet gaan, zou ik dit boek willen besluiten.

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Curriculum Vitae

Hester Moerbeek was born on August 29th 1968 in Amsterdam, the Netherlands. In 1988, she completed her secondary education and went to the Catholic University of Nijmegen to study Sociology. In August 1993 she graduated. Her Master's thesis reported on an empirical study about reciprocity of social support in primary social support relationships.

After graduating, Hester Moerbeek started her PhD project at the Interuniversity Center for Social Science Theory and Methodology (ICS) at Utrecht University in September 1993. As part of her PhD training she visited the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) for a summerschool in statistics of two months in 1994 (in Ann Arbor, Michigan). She also paid a two month visit to Professor Nan Lin at Duke University, North Carolina in 1995. In November 2000, she completed her thesis.

In December 2000, Hester Moerbeek became an assistant professor at the Department of Sociology of Consumers and Households at Wageningen University and Research Centre, where she is still working.

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