

‘We the People’ or ‘We the Peoples’? A Comparison of Support for the Populist Radical Right and Populist Radical Left in the Netherlands

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Abstract: *Research on the supply side of politics demonstrates that populism acts as a common denominator even though populist parties possess very different ideological positions. However, it is uncertain whether this translates to the demand side: Do voters support left and right-wing populist parties for similar reasons? Using the Netherlands as our case study, we investigate the common demand side characteristics of supporters of populist radical right and populist radical left parties. The paper concludes that populist attitudes (i.e. a people-centered notion of political representation) unify supporters of both populist radical left and populist radical right parties. Supporters of both parties also demonstrate lower levels of political trust (than voters for other parties): this is particularly the case for PVV supporters. Beyond these similarities we find that the PVV and the SP attract very different supporters. PVV supporters demonstrate low immigrant tolerance, while SP voters support more income equality.*

KEYWORDS: Populism, Radical Right Populist Parties, Left Populist Parties, Voting Behavior

1. Introduction¹

Populist movements have been present in North and South America since the 19th century. It is also evident, however, that there has been a surge in the number of populist movements since the 1990s in Europe, Latin America, and North America (Rovira Kaltwasser 2015). The most prominent examples are Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, Rafael Correa in Ecuador, Evo Morales in Bolivia, the Tea Party and Donald Trump in the United States, radical right parties in Europe (e.g., the Front National in France, the Party for Freedom in the Netherlands), and more recently, left-wing parties such as SYRIZA in Greece and *Podemos* in Spain.

This surge in populism over the last 10 to 15 years has been accompanied by a large body of scholarship addressing a wide range of related issues, such as defining populism (Mudde 2004; Weyland 2001), voting for populist radical right parties (e.g., Ivarsflaten 2008; Van der Brug et al. 2000), populist parties in government (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2010), the influence of the radical right (populism) on public policy

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(Akkerman 2012), and the link between populism and democracy (Abts and Rummens 2007; Rovira Kaltwasser 2012).

Research on the so-called *supply side of politics* (i.e., the ideologies and mobilizing strategies of parties and politicians) demonstrates that even though populist parties possess very different (left- and right-wing) ideological positions, populism is the common denominator. However, we do not know whether this translates to the demand side: Do voters support left- and right-wing populist parties for similar reasons? Specifically, what unites and/or divides the supporters of left- and right-wing populist parties? In this paper, we seek to address this question: we investigate whether there are common *demand-side* characteristics that unite supporters of populist radical right and populist radical left parties. To answer this question, we engage with an emerging body of literature that attempts to measure the demand side of populism, that is, populist attitudes (e.g., Akkerman et al. 2014; Hawkins et al. 2012; Spruyt et al. 2016). So far, the latter has focused on the development and validation of scales and measures of populist attitudes among voters. In this paper, we seek to advance this literature by providing an empirical test of which attitudes unite and divide voters of the populist right and the populist left.

We test our hypotheses on a sample (N: 1005) of citizens to examine voter support for the populist radical left *Socialistische Partij* (SP) and the populist radical right *Partij voor de Vrijheid* (PVV) in the Netherlands. The Netherlands is a suitable case for analysing the attitudes that unite or divide the supporters of left and right populist parties because it is one of very few countries (in Europe) with both populist radical left (PRL) and populist right (PRR) parties.

2. Defining Populism

We use a thin-centred ideological approach to studying populism (Mudde 2004). Populism, much like other ideologies, such as socialism, liberalism, or communism, is based on a core set of ideas. Previous research has identified four central ideas that represent the core of populism. First, populism is people centred (Rooduijn 2014). Populism is about ‘government of the people, by the people, for the people’ (Canovan 1999: 10). Second, the notion of the sovereign people in populism is defined in sharp contrast with the status quo in which the people oppose the (corrupt) elites (Mudde 2004). Third, populism is antagonistic, making a (moral) distinction between the ‘good’ people and the ‘corrupt’ (or ‘bad’) elite (Manichean) (Mudde 2004). Fourth, the populist movement or party claims to represent the “general will” of the people (Mudde 2004).

The difference between thin and thick ideologies is that the core ideas of a thin-centred ideology (i.e., populism) are not sufficiently comprehensive to articulate positions on a wide range of policy perspectives (Mudde 2004; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013; Stanley 2008). Thus, thin-centred ideologies such as populism must attach themselves to other ‘host’ ideologies, such as liberalism or socialism. This attachment process accounts for the left and right wings of populism (Mudde 2007; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013; Stanley 2008).

We focus on the populist radical left (PRL) and the populist radical right (PRR). There is relative consensus regarding the parties and their ideological positions (i.e., the supply side). Populist (radical) right parties combine populism with nativism and authoritarianism (Mudde 2007), while populist radical left parties combine populism with a left-wing economic ideology (see below).

3. Attitudes and Party Preferences

Before we proceed, we explain how our analysis of the demand side of populism fits within a more general understanding of voting behaviour. It is well established that vote choices are determined by the fit and interplay between the demand for – i.e., the views, preferences and concerns of voters – and the supply of politics – i.e., the discursive strategies, issues positions and ideologies of parties and politicians (Leighley 2010; Thomassen 2005). To influence electoral outcomes, a latent demand for populism, for example, is not sufficient. Populist voting only influences elections when there is also a party for which citizens can vote that promises to address their populist and other ideological concerns, views and policy stances if elected to office (Mudde 2007). As indicated earlier, here we focus on the demand side of politics. We attempt to explain how party preferences are embedded in voters' more general attitudes towards society and politics and specifically what unites and divides left- and right-wing populist voters in attitudinal terms. Attitudes are viewed as the constituting pieces of a citizen's general view of society, that is, of how society is evolving and how it should develop in the future (Elchardus and Spruyt 2012). In our view, attitudes act like schemas, that is, they not only partially reflect past experiences but also guide the processing of past experiences (Bornschieer 2010: 58-59). This view on attitudes and their relevance for party preferences dovetails with the more ideational approach to populism from which we start. We consider support for populism to be an attitude in the same way that other scholars view attitudes, such as ethnic prejudice or egalitarianism, as essentially a set of ideas.

How do attitudes influence party preferences? Whereas the idiosyncratic elements of a specific election – the issues salient among voters, a voter's specific evaluation of past performances of parties, etc. – may generate volatility among the voters, more general socio-political attitudes restrict the range of parties among which a voter is likely to switch (Kriesi et al. 2012). In other words, attitudes draw the boundaries between the groups of parties an individual chooses.

In the theoretical section (below), we draw on the literature on the PRR and the PRL to generate our hypotheses. The focal point of the paper is the demand side; thus, whenever possible, we draw on the extensive literature on voting for the PRR and, to a lesser extent, on voting for the PRL. At times, however, we need to revert to the supply side literature given that there are gaps in the demand side literature on voting for populist parties. As we assume that there exists a certain degree of symmetry between the demand and the supply sides of politics, the literature on the supply side of populism may fill gaps in the literature on the demand side of populism. Lest we be misunderstood, we do not argue that supply must match demand. We argue that if a party, for example, shifts its political platform to the economic left (and it proves electorally successful), it is plausible that we may find similar attitudes among its supporters.

3.1 *The Unifying Elements: Populism and Economic Attitudes*

Given that we are examining voting for populist parties, the most logical place to begin is with populism, i.e., populism as an attitude. We expect that populist attitudes will be the unifying element among supporters of the PRL and the PRR. Although this is a logical place to begin, a first problem arises: How do we measure a populist attitude? Until recently, populism was measured via proxies, such as trust and dissatisfaction with government, given that a key component of populism is a fierce anti-establishment

thinking justified in terms of discontent with the current state of affairs. Indeed, one of the core features of populism is its capacity to unite different grievances, including those related to political representation (Laclau 2005). However, populism is more than simple anti-establishment thinking. Indeed, the people centrism of populism – i.e., the representation of the people as a pure and homogeneous group whose will should be the only reference for politicians – is the key element that theoretically distinguishes populism from mere political discontent. As Canovan (1999: 4) stresses, “Populism is not just a reaction *against* power structures but an appeal *to* a recognized authority [emphasis in original]”. Populism remains a politics of hope, i.e., the hope that where established parties and elites have failed, ordinary folks, common sense and the politicians who give them a voice can find solutions. This hope is embedded in the people-centred notion of political representation that yearns for a more direct and unmediated relationship between citizens and their political representatives. Overall, then, a populist vote may not *only* be a vote *against* but also *for* something, and any measure of support for populism should take this element into account. This also implies that a proper test of the idea that support for populism unites the voters of PRR and PRL parties should take commonly used measures of low trust and anti-establishment thinking into account when assessing the impact of populism, as a coherent set of ideas, on voting choice.

These considerations have encouraged scholars (e.g., Akkerman et al. 2014; Hawkins et al. 2012; Spruyt et al. 2016) to attempt to measure support for populism directly by converting the four dimensions of populism (people-centred, anti-elite, Manichean, general will) as a thin-centred ideology into a series of survey questions.

Assuming that these four dimensions capture populist attitudes, we formulate the following hypothesis:

H1: The higher a voter scores on the populist attitude scale the more likely s/he is to vote for a populist party (PRR and/or PRL), rather than for other parties.

There is also reason to believe that supporters of the PRR and the PRL hold common economic attitudes. According to Hanspeter Kriesi et al. (2012), the “losers of globalization,” i.e., less educated and unskilled workers, are more likely to possess protectionist ideas. It is thus not unreasonable to expect that these so-called “losers of globalization” may vote for PRR and PRL parties. Protectionism is a broad concept. In practice, this will have different implications for PRR and PRL voters, ranging from demands for more welfare (social policies) to more economic regulation or economic equality (see below).

To be sure, the existing demand side literature argues that economic attitudes cannot explain voting for the PRR (Ivarsflaten 2008; Oesch 2008; for an exception Ivaldi and Zaslove 2015). However, there has been a gradual move towards economic leftist (or centrist) positions by PRR parties, i.e., on the supply side (De Lange 2007; McGann and Kitschelt 2005), and in some cases, economic issues have also become increasingly *important* for PRR parties (Ivaldi 2015). In sum, populist parties are welfare chauvinists, that is, they combine a focus on redistribution with an exclusionary discourse about who may benefit from social welfare services (Schumacher and van Kersbergen 2016; c.f. De Koster et al. 2013). Given our theoretical assumption that there is a certain degree of symmetry between supply and demand, we also expect that these left-wing economic attitudes towards the welfare state have become more important for those who vote for PRR parties.

Evidence from recent studies supports these claims (Ivaldi and Zaslove 2015). Thus, we expect support for welfare policies – inspired by the idea that the people deserve better than what they obtain from the established politics (cf. economic resentment; see Derks 2006) – to be higher among supporters of the PRR compared to supporters of non-populist parties.

Although the literature on the PRL remains rather sparse, the existing literature highlights the importance of economic protectionist attitudes among supporters of the radical left. March and Rommerskirchen (2015), for example, demonstrate that anti-globalization sentiments are important for explaining support for radical left parties. Although these studies do not explicitly address the issue of the welfare state, using the literature on feelings of economic resentment as a basis, we expect that supporters of the PRL also have pro-welfare attitudes, i.e., they will be supportive of social benefits.

H2: The more voters support the welfare state (i.e. social benefits) the more likely they are to support PRR and PRL parties, rather than other parties.

3.2 *Twins But Not Identical: How Do They Differ?*

We have discussed how and where we expect the attitudes of supporters of the PRR and the PRL to be similar. However, we also expect that they will differ (March 2017; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013; Rooduijn and Akkerman 2017; Stavrakakis et al. 2017). Indeed, given that populism is a thin-centred ideology and thus attaches to a host ideology (in this case, left and right), we expect the voters of populist parties to possess a range of other attaching attitudes (see also, March 2017; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013; Stavrakakis et al. 2017).

As we argued above, we expect overlap between PRR and RPL voters regarding support for welfare and social benefits. At the same time, we also expect differences regarding other economic attitudes. Although there has been a move towards the economic left (again, examining the supply side), this does not imply that PRR positions have become synonymous with traditional left-wing economic policy. Early on, the PRR favoured “market-liberal” positions (Kitschelt and McGann 1997) and even neo-liberal policies (Ivaldi 2015); many of the PRR parties in question continue to evoke economic liberal policies (Ivaldi 2015; Pauwels, 2010). As Ivaldi notes, in the case of France, “The more recent economic refashioning should not conceal the persistence of a small array of ‘residual’ right-wing liberal elements, making up about a fifth of the party’s policies in 2012” (2015: 360). Substantiating this argument, a recent study (Zhirkov 2014) found that those who oppose economic redistribution are more likely to vote for the PRR.

In sum, *despite their welfare chauvinism*, we argue that supporters of the PRR will not be anti-market, and they will not be supportive of a more equal society, more broadly speaking. In other words, support for welfare state policies is about helping those in need (in most cases, natives) and is not about economic redistribution (i.e., it differs from left-wing redistributive economic policy). Second, PRR supporters are not radical in an economic sense; thus, we do not expect them to be supportive of a highly regulated economy.

Regarding the radical left, however, we expect that more traditional anti-capitalist, anti-globalization, and pro-redistribution attitudes will prevail. As March and Rommerskirchen (2015) note, supporters of the radical left possess anti-globalization sentiments, while those with a radical left ideology are more likely to support income redistribution (Visser et al. 2014). Thus, we expect PRL voters to favour economic equality, and they will demand

more economic control of large businesses (i.e., the regulation of capital emanating from opposition to globalization). From this discussion, we derive the following hypotheses.

H3: The more voters favour economic equality (i.e., income equality) the more likely they are to support the PRL, rather than the PRR and other parties.

H4: The more voters demand more control of large businesses the more likely they are to support the PRL, rather than the PRR and other parties.

Immigrant tolerance. Most studies demonstrate that opposition to immigration is the most important attitude explaining support for the PRR (Ivarsflaten 2008; Oesch 2008; Van der Brug et al. 2000, 2013; Zhirkov 2014). There is less research, however, on the link between immigration and left-wing populist parties (for an exception, see McGowan and Keith 2016). Given that left-wing voters are also often globalization losers, it is not unreasonable to assume that those who vote for the populist radical left may also be critical of migration (Kriesi et al. 2012; Visser et al. 2014). However, the existing literature on the PRL and the radical left does not substantiate these claims (for the supply side, see McGowan and Keith 2016). Those who possess a radical left ideology do not demonstrate anti-immigrant or nativist attitudes (March 2015; Visser et al. 2014). Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis:

H5: The more voters exhibit higher anti-immigrant attitudes the more likely they are to support the PRR, rather than the PRL and other parties.

Authoritarianism. There is a long history within the social sciences of linking authoritarian attitudes with radicalism and extremism (e.g., Adorno et al. 1969; c.f. Mudde 2007). Within the literature on populism, authoritarianism tends to refer to support for policies based on traditional moral and ethical claims. Thus, Mudde employs authoritarianism as follows. He argues that it is based on “the belief in a strictly ordered society, in which infringements of authority are to be punished severely” (2007: 23). People in socio-economically or culturally vulnerable positions are often characterized by a longing for hierarchy, conformity and tradition. In trying to cope with their vulnerability, they accept a view of the world in which everything is simple, predictable and conforms to long-established habits and traditions (Elchardus and Spruyt 2012).

The supply side literature on the PRR argues that authoritarianism – embodied in a strong leader who is responsive to and defend the needs and wants of the people – is an important defining characteristic of these parties (Mudde 2007). However, if we turn to the demand side, the link between authoritarianism and the attitudes of PRR supporters is less clear. In some cases, authoritarian values are an indicator of radical right voting, and in other cases, it is not (Dunn 2015). Despite these inconclusive conclusions, Dunn (2015) does not rule out the importance of authoritarian values, proposing that they may act as mediating factors in combination with other factors. After taking these considerations into account, we maintain our original expectation.

H6: The more voters exhibit authoritarian values the more likely they are to support the PRR, rather than other parties.

Very little research has been conducted on the PRL and authoritarianism. Two arguments are possible. As noted above, globalization losers, i.e., those in vulnerable socio-economic and cultural positions, often turn to authoritarian values (Elchardus and Spruyt 2012). Since working-class supporters of left-wing parties are often losers of globalization, they may also be prone to authoritarian values. On the other hand, we also know that some left-

Table 1: Summary of the Hypotheses

| Unites Supporters of the Populist Radical Right and the Populist Radical Left | Divides Supporters of the Populist Radical Right from those of the Populist Radical Left | Direction |
|---|--|--|
| H1: High scores on populist attitudes | H3: Attitude towards income equality | Populist Radical Right supporters < Populist Radical Left supporters |
| H2: More support for social benefits | H4: Controls on large businesses | Populist Radical Right supporters < Populist Radical Left supporters |
| | H5: Anti-immigrant attitudes | Populist Radical Right supporters > Populist Radical Left supporters |
| | H6: Authoritarian attitudes | Populist Radical Right supporters > other parties |

wing parties combine (on the demand and supply side) libertarian values (Gomez et al. 2016), i.e., values that challenge authoritarian values. The question of which of these two explanations will prevail is an empirical one, and we therefore do not formulate a hypothesis on authoritarian preferences and PRL. We summarize the hypotheses in Table 1.

4 Context of the Study

For three reasons, we consider the Netherlands a suitable case through which to study what unites left- and right-wing populist voters.² First, the Netherlands is one of the few Western European countries where there is a sustained presence of radical right and radical left populist parties (Akkerman et al. 2014). Successful PRR parties came to the Netherlands relatively late compared with other Western European countries. However, since 2006, after the success of the List Pim Fortuyn in 2002, Geert Wilders' Party for Freedom (PVV) has been one of the most successful PRR parties in Europe. Indeed, besides Marine Le Pen of the French Front National, Wilders is probably one of the best examples of a PRR leader in Western Europe. Ideologically, the PVV combines populism and nativism. Although the party does favour a strong law and order discourse, it is not authoritarian regarding questions, for example, of sexual orientation.

The PRL SP entered parliament in 1994. As a former communist party, the SP differs from the success of recent leftist populist parties in Southern Europe (e.g., SYRIZA, *Podemos*). The latter are embedded in a much stronger and broader social movement. In contrast, the SP has often combined its historical focus on the working class and vulnerable people, addressed in positive terms as 'the people', with anti-elitist rhetoric. In contrast to the Dutch PVV, however, populism is not a stable core ideological feature of the SP's rhetoric. The economic crisis, however, served as a temporary catalyst for the SP's populist rhetoric primarily targeting bankers, shareholders, managers and the government for letting them get away with it (in an overview, Van Kessel 2015). March (2011) considers the SP a 'populist socialist party' (rather than a social populist party) whose populism is not the core feature of this party's ideology but used for strategic purposes and thus varies depending on

² A similar argument for the suitability of the Netherlands as a suitable case has been made in a previous publication. See Akkerman et al. 2014.

Table 2: Percentage of the Vote for a Populist Party in National Elections for the Dutch Parliament (*Tweede Kamer*), 2002-2017

| Party | 2002 | 2003 | 2006 | 2010 | 2012 | 2017 |
|--------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| List Pim Fortuyn (LPF) | 17 | 5.7 | 0.2 | – | – | – |
| Proud of the Netherlands (TON) | – | – | – | 0.6 | – | – |
| Party for Freedom (PVV) | – | – | 5.9 | 15.5 | 10.1 | 13.0 |
| Socialist Party (SP) | 5.9 | 6.3 | 16.6 | 9.8 | 9.7 | – |
| Forum for Democracy (FVD) | – | – | – | – | 9.1 | 1.8 |
| Total % populist vote | 22.9 | 12.0 | 22.7 | 25.9 | 19.8 | 23.9 |

Source: Results for 2002-2012 from <http://www.verkiezingsuitslagen.nl/> [accessed: 16.08.2017]; Results for 2017 from <http://nos.nl/artikel/2163380-vvd-33-zetels-pvv-voorlopig-tweede-partij.html> [accessed: 16.08.2017].

its status as ‘an outsider’. Despite these differences concerning the way they embrace populism, both the PVV and the SP present themselves as challengers to established parties.

A second reason why the Netherlands is a suitable test case derives from the absence of an electoral threshold in the Netherlands. This (1) renders it easy for parties to rally support based on single or limited set of issues and (2) yields a multi-party system with numerous parties and high electoral volatility in which no party usually secures an overall majority of votes. This also implies that voters who are dissatisfied with the government and/or with the existing political parties have a high number of (populist *and* non-populist) options. Thus, it is plausible to assume that voters who are dissatisfied with mainstream parties may vote for one of the two populist parties, but they may also vote for one of the other smaller parties. We would thus expect voters who agree with the populist message (or the attached ideology) of one of the two populist parties to vote for either the SP or the PVV, and voters who are not populist (or are less populist) will choose one of the other options (Akkerman et al. 2014).

Finally, the Netherlands is among the group of European countries that has been only weakly affected by the recent economic and political crises that followed the financial crisis of 2007. This renders it likely that the main ideological views on which we focus in this contribution (support for populism per se, leftist and rightist ideologies) dominate voters’ party choices. See Table 2 for electoral results of populist parties in the the Netherlands since 2002.

5 Methods

5.1 Data Collection

We use data from the 2013 Work and Politics Survey, which we initiated by Radboud University. This web-based survey contains a large and diverse set of questions on work and political behaviour and was distributed to Dutch adults (≥ 18 years) in the labour force. This sample is representative of the Dutch labour force with regards to age, gender and geographic region. We developed the survey questions, and the survey was prepared within the web application by a student assistant. It was then distributed by MWM2, a commercial survey bureau, to its panel members.³ The survey was closed as soon as 1080

³ <http://www.mwm2.nl/english> [accessed: 16.08.2017]

Table 3: Voting Preferences of the Sample

| Voting preference | % (n) | Polls ^a |
|---|-------------|--------------------|
| Socialistische Partij (SP) | 15.3% (154) | 13.6% |
| Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV) | 14.8% (149) | 16.1% |
| I don't know | 14.8% (149) | n.a. |
| Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (VVD) | 11.3% (114) | 17% |
| Partij van de Arbeid (PvdA) | 11.3% (114) | 14% |
| VijftigPlus (50PLUS) | 7.2% (72) | 7.4% |
| Democraten 66 (D66) | 6.2% (62) | 10.6% |
| ChristenDemocratisch Appèl (CDA) | 5.2% (52) | 8.9% |
| I would not vote | 3.5% (35) | n.a. |
| ChristenUnie (CU) | 2.7% (27) | 4.2% |
| Partij voor de Dieren (PvdD) | 2.5% (25) | n.a. |
| Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij (SGP) | 1.9% (19) | 2.5% |
| GroenLinks (GL) | 1.5% (15) | 2.7% |
| I prefer not to say | 1.1% (11) | n.a. |
| A different party | 7% (7) | n.a. |
| Total | 1005 | |

^aPoll Jun 1, 2013, <http://peilingwijzer.tomlouwse.nl/p/laatste-cijfers.html> [accessed: 16.08.2017].

respondents had completed it (1000 was the target N, an additional 80 were included to secure 1000 respondents after data cleaning and non-response). Within a week, the target sample size was reached. Because it took the survey testers at least 7 minutes to complete the longest possible route of the survey, we deleted all respondents who took less than 7 minutes to complete the survey. The final sample contains 1005 respondents.

5.2 Research Strategy

We construct four models. The base model includes measures of populism, standard control variables (gender, age, education), trust, and satisfaction with democracy variables (see below). In the second model, economic attitudes are added. The third model includes immigrant attitudes. The fourth model includes authoritarianism. In all four models, we compare those who declared that they would vote for the Party for Freedom (PVV) and/ or the Socialist Party (SP) and with voters for other parties. We also compare PVV voters with SP voters.⁴

5.3 Measures

5.3.1 Dependent variable

To construct our dependent variable, we used the survey question, ‘*What party would you vote for if elections for the National Parliament were held today?*’ The answers for this question include all parties present in Parliament at the moment of the survey (the end of May and beginning of June 2013) and the alternatives ‘I would not vote’, ‘A different party’ (than those offered in the survey), ‘I do not know’ and ‘I do not want to say.’ Table 3 reports the frequencies for this variable.

⁴ We run multinomial models, distinguishing between PVV, SP, other parties, and non-voters. In the paper, we refer to PVV, SP, and other parties. However, the models include all respondents, i.e. also non-voters. For non-voter results please consult the appendix (Table B).

The multinomial variable indicates whether the respondent intends to vote (1) PVV (n=149), SP (n=154) or another party (or would not vote) (n=702). Overall, more than 30% of the respondents indicated a preference for a populist party. They were more or less equally distributed across leftist and rightist populist parties (15.3 and 14.8%, respectively) (see Table 3).

5.3.2 Independent variables

Populist attitude. To measure a populist attitude, we replicated the procedure as described in Akkerman et al. (2014).⁵ Respondents were asked to rate the following six items on a Likert scale ranging from 1 (totally disagree) to 5 (totally agree):

POPI *The politicians in the Dutch Parliament need to follow the will of the people.*

POP2 *The people, not the politicians, should make the most important political decisions.*

POP3 *The political differences between the elite and the people are larger than the differences among the people.*

POP4 *I would rather be represented by an ordinary citizen than by a professional politician.*

POP5 *Elected officials talk too much and take too little action.*

POP6 *What people call 'compromise' in politics is really just selling out on one's principles.*⁶

Table 4 shows the descriptive statistics and correlations of the items used in the analyses. With the populism items, we constructed a summation scale (Cronbach's $\alpha = .818$, mean 3.5, st.d. .68).

*Economic attitudes.*⁷ We measured the economic attitudes of respondents via three survey questions, which represent three different aspects of economic attitudes. The first measures respondents' attitudes regarding the free market economy and the role of large businesses; it was determined by using the following survey item: '*The government should allow more freedom for companies (1) – the government needs to better control companies (10)*' (mean 5.5; st.d. 2.1 N= 893). The second aspect we measured is economic egalitarianism for which we used the following survey item: '*In this country, the difference in incomes should be larger (1) – incomes should be more equal (10)*' (mean score 6.40, st.d. 2.5 N=914). The third aspect of economic attitudes we capture is respondents' opinions about the welfare state using the following survey item: '*The present level of social benefits should be lowered (1) – the present levels of social benefits should be increased (10)*' (mean score 5.4, st.d. 2.3, N=886). All items included an option to select '*I don't know*'.

Immigrant Tolerance. The anti-immigrant attitude variable is a summation scale constructed from five survey items of different aspects of people's attitudes towards immigrants as follows:

⁵ We only present the populism dimension items here. We performed a PCA of political attitudes towards populism, elitism and pluralism. Table A in the appendix presents the results of this PCA with the other attitudes.

⁶ The original Dutch versions of the questions are available upon request from the authors.

⁷ The economic questions (often adapted) come from the European Values Study (EVS) (1999), European Social Survey (ESS) (2008), and Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies (DPES) (2010); immigration items come from the EVS (2008) and the DPES (2010); authoritarianism questions come from the DPES (2010); and trust and the satisfaction with democracy questions come from the DPES (2010) and EVS (1999).

Table 4: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations of the Explanatory Variables

| | mean | st dv | min-max | N | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | |
|--------------------------------|-------|-------|---------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|-----|------|-----|----|--|
| 1. Gender (1=female) | 50.4% | - | 0-1 | 1004 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2. Age | 46.13 | 15.6 | 18-89 | 1004 | .02 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 3. Primary/lower secondary | 13.2% | - | 0-1 | 1005 | .09 | .21 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 4. Middle secondary | 38.1% | - | 0-1 | 1005 | .08 | .06 | -.28 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 5. Higher secondary | 14.5% | - | 0-1 | 1005 | .00 | -.10 | -.15 | -.32 | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 6. Higher tertiary | 34.1% | - | 0-1 | 1005 | -.14 | -.12 | -.28 | -.58 | -.31 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 7. Populist attitude | 3.50 | .69 | 1-5 | 1005 | .07 | .20 | .13 | .12 | .01 | -.21 | | | | | | | | | | |
| 8. Political trust | 2.59 | .76 | 1-5 | 1004 | -.04 | -.22 | -.12 | -.15 | .05 | .20 | -.46 | | | | | | | | | |
| 9. Law and order trust | 3.33 | .03 | 1-5 | 1004 | .01 | -.11 | -.12 | -.06 | .03 | .12 | -.22 | .51 | | | | | | | | |
| 10. Trust large enterprises | 2.84 | .84 | 1-5 | 1004 | .01 | -.13 | -.05 | -.05 | .01 | .08 | -.03 | .37 | .32 | | | | | | | |
| 11. Action against crime | 4.07 | 2.87 | 1-10 | 935 | .02 | .04 | -.01 | .00 | .04 | -.03 | -.07 | .14 | .04 | .04 | | | | | | |
| 12. Control large enterprises | 5.47 | 2.21 | 1-10 | 893 | .05 | .06 | .10 | -.05 | .03 | -.04 | .02 | .02 | .02 | -.16 | .20 | | | | | |
| 13. Income difference larger | 6.39 | 2.47 | 1-10 | 914 | .10 | .04 | .06 | .07 | -.04 | -.08 | .17 | -.09 | .01 | -.13 | -.33 | .07 | | | | |
| 14. Social benefits restricted | 5.39 | 2.25 | 1-10 | 886 | .06 | .08 | .10 | .02 | .00 | -.09 | .16 | -.07 | -.07 | -.14 | .08 | .19 | .32 | | | |
| 15. Immigrant tolerance | 4.33 | 2.12 | 1-10 | 946 | -.02 | -.02 | -.05 | -.06 | .01 | .08 | -.18 | .24 | .12 | -.04 | .35 | .18 | -.09 | .13 | | |

- (1) *For society, it is better that immigrants keep their own traditions (1) – lose their traditions (10)* (reverse coded before analysis).
- (2) *Immigrants take away jobs from inhabitants of our country (1) – don't take away jobs (10)*.
- (3) *Immigrants are a threat to the cultural life in our country (1) – are not a threat (10)*.
- (4) *Immigrants aggravate crime in our country (1) – do not aggravate crime (10)*.
- (5) *Immigrants put pressure on our welfare state (1) – do not put pressure on our welfare state (10)*.

All items ranged from 1 to 10, and there was a category for “*I don't know*”. Respondents were asked to rate their positions on this scale (Cronbach's $\alpha = .872$, mean 4.7, st.d. 2.1, $N=946$). Higher scores on this variable represent higher levels of immigrant tolerance; thus, lower scores indicate anti-immigrant attitudes.

Authoritarian attitude. We use attitudes towards crime to proxy for authoritarian attitudes. In the Netherlands, acceptance of homosexuality and moral issues, such as euthanasia, are so common that other indicators of authoritarian attitudes are more likely to capture the authoritarian dimension. Specifically, we used the survey item, “*The government should take stronger action toward crime (1) – the government already takes enough action against crime (10)*”, as well as the category “*I don't know*”. All items ranged from 1 to 10, and respondents were asked to rate their position on this scale. Lower scores on this scale represent ‘tough on crime’ opinions (mean 4.7, st.d. 2.9, $N=935$).

5.3.3 Control Variables

To avoid spurious correlations between the attitudes mentioned so far and voting choices, we include variables that measures political trust and satisfaction with democracy. We test these variables with our populism measure given that the existing literature on voting for populist, radical right and/or radical left parties demonstrates that voters often possess lower levels of trust and/or lower levels of satisfaction with the government (Lubbers et al. 2002; Norris 2005; Ramiro 2016; Werts et al. 2013). These measures often function as a proxy for populism. However, given that populism cannot be reduced to either mistrust or dissatisfaction with democracy – as explained earlier, populist voting is not only *against* something but also *for* something – we expect that populist attitudes are related to voting for populist parties even after taking into account levels of trust and dissatisfaction with how democracy works.

What is not clear, however, from the literature on trust and populism is the degree to which different forms of trust play different roles among supporters of PRR and PRL parties. The literature on populism focuses on the strong people/elite distinction: mostly on the tension between the people and the *political* elite. However, the literature on populism also notes that populist parties are wary of what is referred to as “dangerous others” (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2008). Thus, there is reason to believe that populist parties might also exhibit mistrust of other elites in addition to merely political elites. Moreover, supporters of left and right populist parties may distrust trust different elites. It is possible, given their left-wing ideology, that supporters of left-wing populist parties view large businesses as “dangerous others” and display mistrust of these organizations. In a similar manner, it is possible that supporters of populist radical right parties may be more wary (and less trustful) of the police and of judges, based on, for example, the extent to which we expect them to exert authoritarian values. To control for these potential effects of institutional trust, we include three separate dimensions of institutional trust: political trust, trust in law and order, and economic trust (trust in large businesses).

For the measure of institutional trust, we include eight trust items asking how much trust respondents have in (1) Government, (2) Parliament, (3) Civil Servants, (4) Police, (5) Political Parties, (6) European Union, (7) Judges, and (8) Large Enterprises. Trust was scored on a Likert scale ranging from 1 (very much trust) to 5 (no trust at all). For theoretical reasons, we reduced these trust items to three variables (in addition, this reduces the required degrees of freedom). We first performing Principal Component Analyses on the eight items (Oblimin Rotated), which produced two dimensions of trust. Next, based on a reliability analysis, we decided to create a separate variable for large enterprises. Thus, we constructed three trust variables by using the sum of the item scores:

- (1) Political Trust (items trusted: Government, Parliament, Civil Servants, Political Parties and European Union; Cronbach's $\alpha = .835$; mean 2.6, st.d. .76, N = 1004);
- (2) Trust in Law and Order (items trusted: Police and Judges; Cronbach's $\alpha = .683$, mean 3.3; st.d. .84; N = 1004); and
- (3) Trust in Large Enterprises (mean 2.5; st.d. .90; N = 1004).⁸

Satisfaction with Democracy. We also include ‘*I am satisfied with the way democracy works in the Netherlands*’. This item was scored on a Likert scale ranging from 1 (totally disagree) to 5 (totally agree) (mean 3.0; st.d. .83; N=1005).

Demographics. We also control for education by way of the three following dummies for education: primary and lower secondary education (13.2%), middle secondary education (38.1%), higher secondary education and postsecondary education (14.5%). Higher tertiary training served as the reference category (34.1%). We further controlled for age (mean 46; st.d. 15.6) and gender (0=male; 1=female).

6 Results

Tables 5.1 - 5.2 report the results of the multinomial logit regression analyses for the four models. The first column in Table 5.1 shows the differences among supporters of the PVV and supporters of other parties (using the last category as the reference group); the second column compares supporters of the SP and supporters for other parties (again using the last category as the reference group). In the third column in Table 5.1, we repeat the analyses but change the reference group, reporting on the differences between supporters of two populist parties, namely, PVV and SP (SP voters being the reference group).

We first discuss the results of the populist attitude scale, inspecting the similarities between supporters for left and right populist parties and the differences between the supporters of these parties and the supporters of other parties. Subsequently, we address the differences between the supporters of the PVV and those of the SP according to the attaching ideologies.

6.1 Does populism unite supporters of populist parties?

We began our theoretical discussion with the assumption that populism would unify the supporters of the PRR and those of the PRL. Models I-IV in Tables 5.1 and 5.2 show

⁸ Table A in the Appendix shows the PCA results for the trust items. To examine the extent to which trust constitutes a latent variable distinct from populism, we included the trust items and the items tapping into satisfaction with democracy in the PCA of the populism items. The PCA shows that the trust and satisfaction with democracy items constitute different latent variables than the populism items.

Table 5.1: Results of the Multinomial Regression on Populist Vote for the Basemodel and Economic Model^a

| | Basemodel (populism + controls) | | | | | | Economic | | | | | |
|---|---------------------------------|---------|------|------------------|------|---------|-------------------|---------|------|------------------|-------|---------|
| | pvv-other parties | | | sp-other parties | | | pvv-other parties | | | sp-other parties | | |
| | rrr | st | rrr | rrr | st | st | rrr | st | rrr | st | rrr | st |
| Populist Attitude | 1.81 | 0.32*** | 1.88 | 0.32*** | 0.97 | 0.20 | 1.78 | 0.35*** | 1.61 | 0.29** | 1.11 | 0.25 |
| Gender (0=man) | 0.81 | 0.17 | 0.97 | 0.19 | 0.83 | 0.20 | 0.79 | 0.18 | 0.84 | 0.18 | 0.94 | 0.25 |
| Age | 0.97 | 0.01*** | 0.98 | 0.01** | 0.99 | 0.01 | 0.97 | 0.01*** | 0.98 | 0.01* | 0.98 | 0.01 |
| Primary/Lower sec. | 3.10 | 1.08*** | 1.27 | 0.42 | 2.44 | 0.98* | 2.65 | 1.03* | 0.80 | 0.30 | 3.31 | 1.53*** |
| Middle secondary | 2.93 | 0.78*** | 1.11 | 0.25 | 2.65 | 0.81*** | 2.84 | 0.80*** | 0.95 | 0.24 | 3.00 | 0.98*** |
| Higher secondary | 1.51 | 0.54 | 0.99 | 0.30 | 1.52 | 0.62 | 1.25 | 0.49 | 0.79 | 0.27 | 1.58 | 0.72 |
| Political trust | 0.32 | 0.06*** | 0.59 | 0.11* | 0.55 | 0.13** | 0.28 | 0.06*** | 0.69 | 0.14 | 0.40 | 0.11*** |
| Large enterprise trust | 1.11 | 0.14 | 0.59 | 0.07*** | 1.89 | 0.27*** | 1.09 | 0.15 | 0.60 | 0.08*** | 1.83 | 0.30*** |
| Law & order trust | 0.95 | 0.13 | 1.35 | 0.18* | 0.70 | 0.11* | 1.00 | 0.15 | 1.23 | 0.18 | 0.81 | 0.14 |
| Satisfied with Democracy | 0.80 | 0.10 | 0.89 | 0.10 | 0.90 | 0.13 | 0.78 | 0.10* | 0.86 | 0.11 | 0.91 | 0.14 |
| Gov. less control business vs. more control | | | | | | | 1.02 | 0.05 | 1.02 | 0.05 | 1.00 | 0.06 |
| Income diff larger vs. more equal | | | | | | | 0.94 | 0.04 | 1.19 | 0.06*** | 0.79 | 0.05*** |
| Social Benefits restricted vs. increased | | | | | | | 1.03 | 0.05 | 1.08 | 0.06 | 0.95 | 0.06 |
| Immigrant Tolerance | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Harder action against crime vs. enough as it is | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Intercept | 3.10 | 3.09 | 0.72 | 0.70 | 4.31 | 5.09 | 5.67 | 6.40 | 0.28 | 0.30* | 20.27 | 27.16* |
| Log likelihood | -1118.40 | | | | | | -906.8 | | | | | |
| LR Chi Square | 241.65 | | | | | | 241 | | | | | |
| Pseudo R | 0.10 | | | | | | 12 | | | | | |
| N | 1004.00 | | | | | | 838 | | | | | |

#ref.= (post)academic and higher vocational. *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

^aAs noted above, the multinomial models include all respondents (non-voters are not shown). See appendix for models with PVV, SP, other parties and non-voters.

Table 5.2: Results of the Multinomial Regression on Populist Vote for the Immigrant Model and the Authoritarian Attitude Model

| | Immigrant model | | | | | | Authoritarian attitude | | | | | | | | |
|---|-------------------|---------|------|------------------|-------|---------|------------------------|---------|------|------------------|------|---------|-------------|---------|---------|
| | pvv-other parties | | | sp-other parties | | | pvv-sp(ref) | | | sp-other parties | | | pvv-sp(ref) | | |
| | rrr | st | st | rrr | st | st | rrr | st | st | rrr | st | st | rrr | st | st |
| Populist Attitude | 1.72 | 0.31*** | 1.85 | 0.32*** | 0.93 | 0.20 | 1.81 | 0.33** | 1.78 | 0.31** | 1.02 | 0.21 | 1.02 | 0.21 | 0.21 |
| Gender (0=man) | 0.76 | 0.17 | 0.93 | 0.19 | 0.82 | 0.21 | 0.81 | 0.18 | 0.97 | 0.19 | 0.84 | 0.21 | 0.84 | 0.21 | 0.21 |
| Age | 0.97 | 0.01*** | 0.98 | 0.01** | 0.98 | 0.01 | 0.97 | 0.01*** | 0.98 | 0.01* | 0.99 | 0.01 | 0.99 | 0.01 | 0.01 |
| Primary/Lower sec. | 2.97 | 1.09*** | 1.25 | 0.42 | 2.38 | 1.00* | 3.32 | 1.18** | 1.20 | 0.41 | 2.77 | 1.15* | 2.77 | 1.15* | 1.15* |
| Middle secondary | 3.01 | 0.84*** | 1.20 | 0.28 | 2.50 | 0.80** | 3.00 | 0.82*** | 1.18 | 0.28 | 2.54 | 0.79*** | 2.54 | 0.79*** | 0.79*** |
| Higher secondary | 1.51 | 0.57 | 1.00 | 0.31 | 1.52 | 0.65 | 1.46 | 0.55 | 1.06 | 0.32 | 1.38 | 0.59 | 1.38 | 0.59 | 0.59 |
| Political trust | 0.34 | 0.07*** | 0.60 | 0.11** | 0.57 | 0.14* | 0.32 | 0.07*** | 0.63 | 0.12* | 0.51 | 0.12** | 0.51 | 0.12** | 0.12** |
| Large enterprise trust | 1.08 | 0.14 | 0.58 | 0.07*** | 1.85 | 0.28*** | 1.13 | 0.15 | 0.57 | 0.07*** | 1.98 | 0.29*** | 1.98 | 0.29*** | 0.29*** |
| Law & order trust | 0.91 | 0.13 | 1.34 | 0.18* | 0.68 | 0.11* | 0.94 | 0.14 | 1.33 | 0.18* | 0.71 | 0.12* | 0.71 | 0.12* | 0.12* |
| Satisfied with Democracy | 0.83 | 0.11 | 0.85 | 0.10 | 0.97 | 0.14 | 0.79 | 0.10 | 0.85 | 0.10 | 0.92 | 0.13 | 0.92 | 0.13 | 0.13 |
| Gov. less control business vs. more control | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Income diff larger vs. more equal | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Social Benefits restricted vs. increased | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Immigrant Tolerance | 0.75 | 0.04*** | 1.04 | 0.05 | 0.71 | 0.04*** | 0.99 | 0.04 | 0.98 | 0.03 | 1.01 | 0.04 | 1.01 | 0.04 | 0.04 |
| Harder action against crime vs. enough as it is | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Intercept | 11.86 | 12.55 | 0.68 | 0.69 | 17.33 | 21.56* | 2.86 | 2.91 | 0.90 | 0.89 | 3.16 | 3.80 | 3.16 | 3.80 | 3.80 |
| Log likelihood | -1029.8 | | | | | | -1039 | | | | | | | | |
| LR Chi Square | 275.77 | | | | | | 234.4 | | | | | | | | |
| Pseudo R | 12 | | | | | | 10 | | | | | | | | |
| N | 946 | | | | | | 935 | | | | | | | | |

#ref.= (post)academic and higher vocational. *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

that both PVV and SP voters score significantly higher on the populist attitude scale than do voters for other parties. The effects are highly significant in Model I, which controls for demographics, educational attainment and more commonly used proxies for support for populist votes, which are trust and satisfaction with democracy. The higher the score on the populism scale, the higher the probability of voting for PVV or SP instead of voting for other parties. We report relative risk ratios and illustrate the interpretation of this parameter by interpreting the effect of a populist attitude in model I. For example, a score of 1.81 in the base model for PVV voters means that if a respondent increases by one unit on the populist attitude scale, the chances of him/her preferring the PVV over another party (or not voting) increases by a factor of 1.81.

The third column of the base model compares PVV and SP voters with one another. It shows that the differences between PVV and SP voters on the populism scale are not significant, meaning that their scores on the populism scale do not significantly differ. Thus, a populist attitude does not distinguish supporters of the PVV and SP, whereas populist attitude scale scores differ between supporters of both populist parties and supporters of other parties. These results remain significant in the subsequent models, i.e., when we add measures for the attaching ideology. These findings support Hypothesis 1.

6.2 *The Attaching Ideology*

In models II-IV, we examine the relevance of the attaching ideology. None of the economic variables are significant for PVV supporters (Model II, Table 5.1), suggesting that PVV voters do not support any type of left-wing economic agenda. The only item that has a significant effect on voting for the SP is demand for more income equality in comparison to the supporters of other parties and supporters of the PVV. This further highlights that SP and PVV supporters think differently about economic issues. In addition, support for the welfare state and demand for more control of large businesses *do not* distinguish SP voters from voters of other parties, and PVV voters. Thus, H3 is the only economic hypothesis that can be supported (i.e., there is no support for hypotheses 2 and 4). Finally, it is interesting to note that once we include economic attitudes in the model, political trust remains significant only for the PVV vis-à-vis voters for other parties, while the difference in political trust for the supporters of the SP vis-à-vis supporters for other parties becomes not significant.

Model III, in Table 5.2 shows the differences among PVV supporters, SP supporters, supporters of other parties with regard to immigrant tolerance. From the first column in model III, we observe that PVV supporters are less tolerant of immigrants; this is the case in comparison with the supporters of other parties and in comparison with SP voters. These findings support H5: we expected that PRR supporters would express lower immigration tolerance than the supporters of other parties and SP supporters.

We now turn to our last model (Table 5.2; model IV), which examines authoritarian attitudes. As noted in the methods section of this paper, we use the survey question regarding the state's position on crime to test voters' authoritarian attitudes. Authoritarian attitudes measured by this item do not significantly distinguish PVV voters from the voters of other parties⁹ (i.e., there is no support for Hypothesis 6). There is also no significant

⁹ It should be noted that we only use one question to measure the authoritarian dimension. Attitudes towards law and order do not cover the full possible range of authoritarian values. Additional questions may produce more robust results.

difference between SP supporters and other parties but also not between PVV and SP supporters.

We have also introduced a series of control variables. We first turn to the trust variables, for which we note some interesting observations. The political trust variable is significant and distinguishes SP and PVV voters from supporters of other parties in three models; only in model two, when economic issues are added, is political trust not significant for SP voters. However, we also find differences between PVV and SP voters. When PVV and SP voters are compared, PVV voters demonstrate lower levels of political trust than SP voters. In all four models, trust in law and order is not significant for PVV voters. However, perhaps somewhat surprisingly, SP supporters demonstrate higher levels of trust in this regard vis-à-vis the voters of other parties and also compared with PVV supporters in all models except for the economic model.

There are also significant differences between the two parties regarding trust in large businesses. In all four models, supporters of the SP demonstrate lower levels of trust in large businesses than do the voters of other parties and PVV voters. This adds weight to the importance of economic attitudes and voting for the SP, while it also confirms our findings regarding economic issues and PVV supporters. Supporters of the PVV are less sceptical of large businesses and the market economy than SP supporters. Surprisingly given this finding, as we saw earlier, a desire for more control of large businesses did not distinguish SP voters from the voters of other parties.

Finally, after taking into account all other attitudes, satisfaction with democracy is only significant in one model: it only distinguishes PVV voters from other parties when economic attitudes are included.

PRL and PRR supporters differ, to some extent, from one another and from supporters of other parties. PVV and SP voters are significantly younger than supporters of other parties. In addition, compared with the voters of other parties, the educational level of PVV voters is distinct from that of SP voters; those who completed higher tertiary education are less likely to vote for the PVV than are voters with primary and lower secondary education or with middle secondary education.

7. Discussion and Conclusion

The central purpose of this paper is to examine how supporters of the PRR and the PRL differ and where they share attitudes. We used data from the Netherlands to empirically test our theoretical claims. The literature on populism points to the supply side overlap between populist parties on the left and on the right. If we turn to the demand side and to voters in particular, we find that there are similarities and differences between the supporters of the PVV and those of the SP.

Regarding the similarities, our findings show that supporters of both the PVV and the SP distinguish themselves from voters for other parties in terms of populist attitudes. Indeed, whereas PVV and SP voters do not significantly differ in terms of populist attitudes, they are more populist compared to voters for other parties. The fact that this pattern remains after taking into account a considerable number of other attitudes and opinions can be seen as support for the idea that (1) populism also concerns a coherent set of ideas that can and should be distinguished from other attitudes and opinions on the demand side of politics (i.e., populist attitudes have independent predictive power) and that (2) the populism index used in this paper taps fairly well into these populist attitudes. One of the main challenges in current research on populist attitudes is that there are very

few cases where both right- *and* left-wing populist parties exist. This renders the empirically testing of the ideas behind the thin-centred ideational approach to populism difficult because of a lack of variation in the host ideas/ideologies to which populism attaches in *the same context*. Although the SP is most likely a ‘populist socialist party’ rather than a ‘social populist party’ (cf. March 2011), we should be careful when generalizing from a single case study. We believe the results presented in this paper strongly encourage further research that assesses the extent to which populist attitudes can be combined with other attitudes at the voter level and how these combinations relate to the supply side of politics.

Although populism unifies PRR and PRL supporters, we also see that the supporters of populist radical right and populist radical left parties differ. Supporters of the PVV demonstrate lower levels of immigration tolerance, while other attitudes, such as authoritarianism and economic views, do not significantly differentiate between PVV voters and those of other parties.

The electorate of the SP has a left-wing economic profile: they support income equality and are less trusting of large businesses. However, our analysis also questions the degree to which SP voters should be considered economic radicals. SP voters are not more supportive of additional social benefits, and they do not demand additional controls on large businesses. In sum (in part corroborating Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser’s claim 2013; see also Rooduijn and Akkerman 2017), the PRR seems to attach to a cultural ideology (of exclusion), while the PRL attaches to an economic ideology (possibly of inclusion).

In addition, we find that supporters of both populist parties demonstrate significantly higher levels of political mistrust. Three notable observations are found with respect to how institutional trust differs between PRR and PRL supporters. First, political distrust is not significant for SP voters if we include economic attitudes. Second, PVV supporters consistently demonstrate lower levels of political trust than do SP voters. Third, SP voters are particularly mistrusting of large businesses.

An implication of the finding on the trust differences of PRR and PRL supporters is that although lower levels of trust are an important ingredient, we should not be too quick to reduce populist supporters to those who merely exhibit lower levels of trust. Thus, we claim that it is equally fruitful to focus on the populist, anti-elitist and people-centred conception of political representation inherent in our measure of populism. Thus, populism, as understood and measured in this manner, need not be viewed as simply a protest vote (Van der Brug 2003). It is possible that a new cleavage, a people/elite cleavage, has emerged. This cleavage appeals to voters from both the left and the right sides of the political spectrum. Thus, we hypothesize that demands for a new form of political representation may be underfoot, i.e., a populist notion of political representation.

Finally, and equally important, we have demonstrated that the success of populist parties should not be reduced to populist attitudes. Populists also differ with respect to their attitudes toward immigrants and economic concerns. From this, it follows that it is highly likely that supporters of the PRR and the PRL possess different conceptions of the people; the right may have a more ethnic and homogenous notion, whereas the left may have a less homogenous and less exclusionary understanding of the people (c.f. Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013). Different conceptions of the people might also imply that we rethink the idea that all forms of populism (especially left-wing populism) posit a homogenous conception of the people.

We contend that these similarities and differences in voter support for populist parties shed light on the causes and continued success of populism. To delve deeper into this question, comparative research using the above measure of populism in a variety of political contexts is needed. Such research should introduce a more dynamic element into the analysis. Indeed, one of the defining characteristics of the emerging literature on the demand side of populism is that it relies on cross-sectional data to study phenomena that are dynamic in nature. Indeed, the finding that populism is only one component of a populist vote, for example, begs the question whether and how the relative weight of populism in people's vote choice is a function of parties' discourses and changing social circumstances.

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Appendix

Table A: PCA of Populism, Trust and Satisfaction with Democracy Items

| Item: | Factor I Eigenvalue 4.12 | Factor II Eigenvalue 1.67 | Factor III Eigenvalue 1.27 | Factor III Eigenvalue 1.00 |
|---|-----------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| % squared loadings (after rotation) Cum.62.23 | 34.5 | 14.1 | 7.3 | 6.3 |
| POP1 The politicians in the Dutch Parliament need to follow the will of the people. | .017 | .745 | -.332 | .056 |
| POP2 The people, not the politicians, should make the most important political decisions. | .072 | .826 | -.010 | .159 |
| POP3 The political differences between the elite and the people are larger than the differences among the people. | -.338 | .554 | -.096 | -.241 |
| POP4 I would rather be represented by an ordinary citizen than by a professional politician. | -.325 | .595 | -.107 | -.075 |
| POP5 Elected officials talk too much and take too little action. | -.325 | .595 | -.107 | -.075 |
| POP6 What people call 'compromise' in politics is really just selling out on one's principles. | -.338 | .554 | -.096 | -.241 |
| Trust in: | | | | |
| Government | .807 | -.141 | -.161 | .086 |
| Parliament | .771 | -.091 | -.186 | .011 |
| Civil Servants | .509 | -.055 | .089 | -.381 |
| Political Parties | .694 | -.067 | -.047 | -.132 |
| European Unions | .749 | -.065 | .037 | -.048 |
| Police | .076 | -.047 | -.034 | -. 808 |
| Law (Judges) | .091 | -.156 | -.085 | -. 754 |
| Satisfaction Dutch Democracy | .374 | -.130 | -. 619 | .027 |
| A democracy is the best form of government ^a | -.042 | .086 | -. 865 | -.122 |
| Trust in Large Enterprises | .561 | .261 | .083 | -.192 |

The text in bold highlights the factor loadings.

^aDue to theoretical considerations we do not use this item in the model.

Table B: Results of the Multinomial Regression including Non-Voter Categories

| | Basemodel (populism + controls) | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---------------------------------|---------|------------------|---------|-------------------------|---------|-------------|---------|------|---------|
| | pvv-other parties | | sp-other parties | | nonvoters-other parties | | pvv-sp(ref) | | | |
| | rrr | st | rrr | st | rrr | st | rrr | st | rrr | st |
| Populist Attitude | 1.81 | 0.32*** | 1.88 | 0.32*** | 1.21 | 0.18 | 0.97 | 0.20 | 0.97 | 0.20 |
| Gender (0=man) | 0.81 | 0.17 | 0.97 | 0.19 | 1.36 | 0.24 | 0.83 | 0.20 | 0.83 | 0.20 |
| Age | 0.97 | 0.01*** | 0.98 | 0.01** | 0.97 | 0.01*** | 0.99 | 0.01 | 0.99 | 0.01 |
| Primary/Lower sec. | 3.10 | 1.08*** | 1.27 | 0.42 | 2.17 | 0.63** | 2.44 | 0.98* | 2.44 | 0.98* |
| Middle secondary | 2.93 | 0.78*** | 1.11 | 0.25 | 1.54 | 0.33 | 2.65 | 0.81*** | 2.65 | 0.81*** |
| Higher secondary | 1.51 | 0.54 | 0.99 | 0.30 | 1.62 | 0.43 | 1.52 | 0.62 | 1.52 | 0.62 |
| Political trust | 0.32 | 0.06*** | 0.59 | 0.11* | 0.74 | 0.12 | 0.55 | 0.13** | 0.55 | 0.13** |
| Large enterprise trust | 1.11 | 0.14 | 0.59 | 0.07*** | 0.89 | 0.10 | 1.89 | 0.27*** | 1.89 | 0.27*** |
| Law & order trust | 0.95 | 0.13 | 1.35 | 0.18* | 0.91 | 0.11 | 0.70 | 0.11* | 0.70 | 0.11* |
| Satisfied with Democracy | 0.80 | 0.10 | 0.89 | 0.10 | 0.87 | 0.09 | 0.90 | 0.13 | 0.90 | 0.13 |
| Gov. less control business vs. more control | | | | | | | | | | |
| Income diff larger vs. more equal | | | | | | | | | | |
| Social Benefits restricted vs. increased | | | | | | | | | | |
| Immigrant Tolerance | | | | | | | | | | |
| Harder action against crime vs. enough as it is | | | | | | | | | | |
| Intercept | 3.10 | 3.09 | 0.72 | 0.70 | 1.91 | 1.60 | 4.31 | 5.09 | 4.31 | 5.09 |
| Log likelihood | -1118.42 | | | | | | | | | |
| LR Chi Square | 241.65 | | | | | | | | | |
| Pseudo R | 0.10 | | | | | | | | | |
| N | 1004.00 | | | | | | | | | |

Table B: Continued

| | Economic | | | | | | | |
|---|-------------------|---------|------------------|---------|-------------------------|---------|-------------|---------|
| | pvv-other parties | | sp-other parties | | nonvoters-other parties | | pvv-sp(ref) | |
| | rrr | st | rrr | st | rrr | st | rrr | st |
| Populist Attitude | 1.78 | 0.35*** | 1.61 | 0.29** | 1.16 | 0.19 | 1.11 | 0.25 |
| Gender (0=man) | 0.79 | 0.18 | 0.84 | 0.18 | 1.13 | 0.23 | 0.94 | 0.25 |
| Age | 0.97 | 0.01*** | 0.98 | 0.01* | 0.98 | 0.01*** | 0.98 | 0.01 |
| Primary/Lower sec. | 2.65 | 1.03* | 0.80 | 0.30 | 1.71 | 0.59 | 3.31 | 1.53** |
| Middle secondary | 2.84 | 0.80*** | 0.95 | 0.24 | 1.37 | 0.33 | 3.00 | 0.98*** |
| Higher secondary | 1.25 | 0.49 | 0.79 | 0.27 | 1.54 | 0.45 | 1.58 | 0.72 |
| Political trust | 0.28 | 0.06*** | 0.69 | 0.14 | 0.62 | 0.11** | 0.40 | 0.11*** |
| Large enterprise trust | 1.09 | 0.15 | 0.60 | 0.08*** | 0.91 | 0.12 | 1.83 | 0.30*** |
| Law & order trust | 1.00 | 0.15 | 1.23 | 0.18 | 1.00 | 0.14 | 0.81 | 0.14 |
| Satisfied with Democracy | 0.78 | 0.10* | 0.86 | 0.11 | 0.90 | 0.11 | 0.91 | 0.14 |
| Gov. less control business vs. more control | 1.02 | 0.05 | 1.02 | 0.05 | 1.00 | 0.05 | 1.00 | 0.06 |
| Income diff larger vs. more equal | 0.94 | 0.04 | 1.19 | 0.06*** | 1.02 | 0.04 | 0.79 | 0.05*** |
| Social Benefits restricted vs. increased | 1.03 | 0.05 | 1.08 | 0.06 | 1.09 | 0.05 | 0.95 | 0.06 |
| Immigrant Tolerance | | | | | | | | |
| Harder action against crime vs. enough as it is | | | | | | | | |
| Intercept | 5.67 | 6.40 | 0.28 | 0.30* | 1.50 | 1.48 | 20.27 | 27.16* |
| Log likelihood | - | 906.83 | | | | | | |
| LR Chi Square | 241 | | | | | | | |
| Pseudo R | 12 | | | | | | | |
| N | 838 | | | | | | | |

Table B: Continued

| | Immigrant model | | | | | | | |
|---|-------------------|---------|------------------|---------|-------------------------|---------|-------------|---------|
| | pvv-other parties | | sp-other parties | | nonvoters-other parties | | pvv-sp(ref) | |
| | rrr | st | rrr | st | rrr | st | rrr | st |
| Populist Attitude | 1.72 | 0.31*** | 1.85 | 0.32*** | 1.30 | 0.20 | 0.93 | 0.20 |
| Gender (0=man) | 0.76 | 0.17 | 0.93 | 0.19 | 1.31 | 0.25 | 0.82 | 0.21 |
| Age | 0.97 | 0.01*** | 0.98 | 0.01** | 0.97 | 0.01*** | 0.98 | 0.01 |
| Primary/Lower sec. | 2.97 | 1.09*** | 1.25 | 0.42 | 1.85 | 0.58* | 2.38 | 1.00* |
| Middle secondary | 3.01 | 0.84*** | 1.20 | 0.28 | 1.44 | 0.33 | 2.50 | 0.80** |
| Higher secondary | 1.51 | 0.57 | 1.00 | 0.31 | 1.71 | 0.46* | 1.52 | 0.65 |
| Political trust | 0.34 | 0.07*** | 0.60 | 0.11** | 0.67 | 0.12* | 0.57 | 0.14* |
| Large enterprise trust | 1.08 | 0.14 | 0.58 | 0.07*** | 0.87 | 0.10 | 1.85 | 0.28*** |
| Law & order trust | 0.91 | 0.13 | 1.34 | 0.18* | 0.94 | 0.12 | 0.68 | 0.11* |
| Satisfied with Democracy | 0.83 | 0.11 | 0.85 | 0.10 | 0.94 | 0.11 | 0.97 | 0.14 |
| Gov. less control business vs. more control | | | | | | | | |
| Income diff larger vs. more equal | | | | | | | | |
| Social Benefits restricted vs. increased | | | | | | | | |
| Immigrant Tolerance | 0.75 | 0.04*** | 1.04 | 0.05 | 0.96 | 0.04 | 0.71 | 0.04*** |
| Harder action against crime vs. enough as it is | | | | | | | | |
| Intercept | 11.86 | 12.55 | 0.68 | 0.69 | 1.85 | 1.67 | 17.33 | 21.56* |
| Log likelihood | -1029.79 | | | | | | | |
| LR Chi Square | 275.77 | | | | | | | |
| Pseudo R | 12 | | | | | | | |
| N | 946 | | | | | | | |

Table B: Continued

| | Authoritarian attitude | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|------------------------|---------|------|---------|------------------|---------|------|---------|-------------------------|---------|------|-------|-------------|---------|
| | pvv-other parties | | | | sp-other parties | | | | nonvoters-other parties | | | | pvv-sp(ref) | |
| | rrr | st | rrr | st | rrr | st | rrr | st | rrr | st | rrr | st | rrr | st |
| Populist Attitude | 1.81 | 0.33** | 1.78 | 0.31** | 1.21 | 0.19 | 1.02 | 0.21 | 0.97 | 0.18 | 1.34 | 0.25 | 0.84 | 0.21 |
| Gender (0=man) | 0.81 | 0.01*** | 0.98 | 0.01* | 0.98 | 0.01*** | 0.99 | 0.01 | 3.32 | 1.18** | 2.19 | 0.68* | 2.77 | 1.15* |
| Age | 3.00 | 0.82*** | 1.18 | 0.28 | 1.49 | 0.34 | 2.54 | 0.79** | 3.00 | 0.82*** | 1.73 | 0.48* | 1.38 | 0.59 |
| Primary/Lower sec. | 1.46 | 0.55 | 1.06 | 0.32 | 1.73 | 0.48* | 1.38 | 0.59 | 0.32 | 0.07*** | 0.72 | 0.13 | 0.51 | 0.12** |
| Middle secondary | 0.32 | 0.07*** | 0.63 | 0.12* | 0.90 | 0.10 | 1.98 | 0.29*** | 1.13 | 0.15 | 0.90 | 0.10 | 1.98 | 0.29*** |
| Higher secondary | 1.13 | 0.15 | 0.57 | 0.07*** | 0.90 | 0.10 | 1.98 | 0.29*** | 0.94 | 0.14 | 0.96 | 0.13 | 0.71 | 0.12* |
| Political trust | 0.94 | 0.14 | 1.33 | 0.18* | 0.96 | 0.13 | 0.71 | 0.12* | 0.79 | 0.10 | 0.89 | 0.10 | 0.92 | 0.13 |
| Large enterprise trust | 0.79 | 0.10 | 0.85 | 0.10 | 0.89 | 0.10 | 0.92 | 0.13 | | | | | | |
| Law & order trust | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Satisfied with Democracy | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Gov. less control business vs. more control | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Income diff larger vs. more equal | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Social Benefits restricted vs. increased | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Immigrant Tolerance | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Harder action against crime vs. enough as it is | 0.99 | 0.04 | 0.98 | 0.03 | 0.95 | 0.03 | 1.01 | 0.04 | | | | | | |
| Intercept | 2.86 | 2.91 | 0.90 | 0.89 | 1.67 | 1.49 | 3.16 | 3.80 | | | | | | |
| Log likelihood | -1039.4 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| LR Chi Square | 234.37 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Pseudo R | 10 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| N | 935 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

#ref.= (post)academic and higher vocational. *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

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