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Policymaking related to immigration and integration. The Dutch Case.

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1. Introduction

The making of immigration and integration policies in the Netherlands has undergone notable changes over the past decades. While for a long time the Netherlands was celebrated for the success of its multiculturalist approach, nowadays there is an increasing emphasis on integration and adaptation to Dutch norms and values. In this regard, the Netherlands is one of the most striking examples among countries that have renounced the multiculturalist approach (Joppke & Morawska 2004). The trend from multiculturalism to assimilation has been accompanied by a second shift: from conflict avoidance to the politicisation and polarisation of immigration and integration issues. While in the 1980s there was agreement among the elites of main political parties not to raise immigrant issues, but instead to resolve them through technocratic compromise (Rath 2001), immigration and integration policies have now become a top political priority, even taking on a central symbolic importance to the Dutch political establishment. Given these changes, the central questions of this paper are: how and why Dutch immigration and integration policies have developed into what they are today. And to what extent the development path of these policies accounts for either a degree of Dutch exceptionalism or a more general development applicable to other European countries as well.¹

To understand how and why immigration and integration policies have developed into the controversies they arouse today requires an understanding of how and why the policies have developed as such. In this paper, therefore, we will focus not so much on the content of immigration and integration policies per se, but on the processes that have led to these policies.² This means that we will focus on what actors were involved in policymaking processes at particular times, how the policymaking was institutionally organised and how the policymaking process may have been affected by developments in wider institutional and political contexts. The focus will be both on immigration and integration policies. Although clearly interconnected, both domains have, at moments, evolved quite independently, involving different actors and self-organising in different ways. Therefore, we will approach immigration and integration as different policy subsystems – that is, as different institutionalised systems involving the participation of particular sets of actors around particular definitions of the issue at hand (Sabatier 1999). Such subsystems include, as well as exclude, particular others

¹ This paper arose in the context of a series of meetings among an international network of researchers studying the development of immigration and integration policies in Western European, Central-Eastern European and Southern European countries, including Spain, Italy, Switzerland, France, Hungary, Austria and Germany. This network was part of the IMISCOE network, namely Cluster C9.

² Most of the literature on the Dutch case focuses on the content of immigration and integration policies and its developments over the course of time. The literature addressing questions around the processes of policymaking in these fields is rather modest and recent at that. It has been borne not only of the field of political and administrative sciences, but also from other disciplines such as history, sociology of law and anthropology (Penninx et al. 2005). This report is founded on such literature, and is additionally based on a series of interviews conducted for this project by the authors. Our interviewees comprised actors involved in the making of immigration and integration policies in the Netherlands.
(i.e. ‘selective mobilisation’), while tending to reinforce those policy ideas that are supported by the actors involved.

To this end, we will first describe the development of subsystems of immigration (Section 2) and integration policy (Section 3). In these sections, we will especially focus on two questions: 1) what the dominant pattern of governance has been and how it has evolved, and 2) who the actors in policymaking have been. Secondly, by comparing the internal dynamics of immigration and integration policies, and examining how both domains have become more and more integrated (Section 4), we will analyse the dynamics of interaction between the two domains, as they have become strongly interrelated over the past decade. Thirdly, we will analyse how macro-political developments such as depillarisation, reconstruction of the welfare state and changes in political culture have influenced the making of immigration and integration policies (Section 5). Finally, we will draw some conclusions about the Dutch case (Section 6) by focusing on the following questions: what patterns of policy dynamics do we find? How do these compare to the patterns that were found in other countries? Is there a case for Dutch exceptionalism, or is there a convergent pattern of dynamics in immigration and integration policies in other countries as well?

2. Immigration policymaking

In the post-war period, the central idea was that the Netherlands was not – and should not be – an immigration country (Ministerie 1970). With this perspective, immigrants from the Dutch East Indies (Indonesia) and Suriname, as well as labour migrants from Southern Europe, Morocco and Turkey, were seen as repatriates, temporary migrants or guest workers. Paradoxically, until the mid-1970s, migration was only minimally regulated. Although residence and labour permits were officially required in order for migrants to live and work in the Netherlands, the enforcement of these provisions was limited and regularisations granted on an individual basis were common (Doomernik Forthcoming).

The Netherlands’ precedent reputation of not being an immigration nation was contrary to the fact that large immigrant groups were staying in the country for long periods of time, if not permanently. This led to mounting tensions in the mid-1970s (Entzinger 1975) and produced a gradual shift in immigration and integration policies. Since the beginning of the 1980s, the presence of long-term factual immigrants had been recognised. It was a major political goal to integrate them into Dutch society, yet the immigration of immigrant groups was still seen as a historically unique event, and it was believed that further immigration should be restricted or prevented (Penninx et al. 2005). The policy’s shift towards integration was thus not an implication that the current immigration was recognised any differently. Alongside the implementation of integration policies, in the 1980s and 1990s, more restrictive immigration policies were implemented and enforced regarding labour migration, and later, on family migration and asylum.

Since there was no discussion on whether the Netherlands should be an immigration country or not, throughout the 1980s and 1990s, increasing restrictive immigration policies were formulated and implemented in a rather de-politicised
context. Indeed, in comparison with integration policies, until recently, new immigration regulations were passed with little political debate and relatively low implication of different political and social actors. In this regard, immigration policymaking was less explicit than integration policies. This explains why migration policies have often been seen as ‘quasi non-policies’. As pointed out in our earlier publication (Penninx et al. 2005) of the literature on Dutch immigration and integration policymaking, this perception has also shaped the scholarly debate. Indeed, the literature on immigration policymaking in the Netherlands (particularly in the social sciences) is relatively scarce.

However, in the past years, increasing restrictive migration policies and the politicisation of integration and immigration issues have opened up the public and political debate. This has been accompanied by the inclusion of new actors in the formulation and implementation of immigration policies. In particular, the evolution of the network of actors in immigration policy seems to have followed that of integration policies: while such policies used to be formulated at the national level and implemented top-down, the last years have seen a more complex picture of the involved actors emerge. The making and implementation of policies has been shifted up – to international and supranational instances; out – to private actors such as NGOs and churches; and down – to local authorities.

In contradistinction to integration policies, immigration policies have not been comprehensive and coordinated. This has been due to the lack of clear policymaking structure. Indeed, the formulation of labour, family and asylum migration policies has been determined by different ministries, institutions and other political and social actors, as well as by different dynamics and at varying moments in time. For instance, while the Ministry of Justice has been responsible for the general admission and residence permits of foreigners, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment has been assigned to deal particularly with labour migration, and the Ministry of Culture, Recreation and Social Work has been given competency over the reception of asylum seekers. Consequentially, any description of the Dutch immigration policy subsystem must refer to three distinctly assigned processes: labour, family and asylum. Interactions among these three processes have taken place over the course of time, but their interrelations have been neither stable nor held within a unitary structure.

2.1. Labour migration

By the mid-1950s, the post-war reconstruction efforts in the Netherlands had led to labour shortages in various sectors, leading to the recruitment of foreign workers to fill these vacancies, which were mainly jobs for unskilled or low-skilled workers. With this purpose, recruitment agreements were signed with sending countries such as Italy (1960), Spain (1961), Portugal (1963), Turkey (1964), Greece (1966), Morocco (1969) and Yugoslavia (1970). These arrangements were formulated in consensual agreement among the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, the employer’s organisations and trade unions. As in other Western European countries, it was generally accepted by social partners and the state that
continuous economic growth could only be achieved by relying on (presumably) temporary foreign labour.

Recruitment activities came to an end, however, upon onset of the economic recession that followed the first oil crisis in 1973. This was more the result of a lack of employers’ interest in new foreign workers than the consequence of an explicit immigration policy (De Lange Forthcoming). Unlike in France and Germany, measures to force migrant workers to return home were never implemented in the Netherlands. The government proposal to introduce a return bonus for those who would return voluntarily was broadly rejected. And while from 1973 onwards, the Netherlands proclaimed itself closed to labour migration, the declaration was more a matter of rhetoric than factual policy. Labour migration policies (the Labour of Foreign Workers Act, from 1979 to 1995, and the Labour of Aliens Act, from 1995 onwards) continued to channel the entrance of those workers deemed beneficial to the Dutch labour market. In the new economic context that was characterised by a loss of employment in industry and a parallel expansion of the service sector, these policies were meant to restrict the entrance of low-skilled foreign workers while channelling that of high-skilled immigrants, often from highly industrialised countries (Böcker & Clermonts 1995). In contrast to the 1950s and 1960s when corporatist structures were fully functioning, labour migration policies were formulated by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment with little cooperation by trade unions and employers. For instance, the Labour of Foreign Workers Act was passed in 1979 notwithstanding criticisms of both employers’ organisations and trade unions. The weakening of the corporatist structure allowed Parliament, and hence its different political parties, to gain clout in labour migration policymaking. The parliamentary discussions on the Labour of Foreign Workers Act of 1979 illustrate how labour immigration policies were increasingly created by the government and discussed at length in Parliament. Unlike previous measures, this new law was widely debated. Left-wing parties, left-wing liberals and the liberal party were opposed to the law. They argued that it would affect the position of foreign workers and institutionalise unequal treatment.

By the end of the 1980s, persistent labour shortages in particular economic sectors forced the Dutch government to deal with the demand for foreign labour in a more structuralised fashion. Consequently, the Dutch Employment Organisation, together with trade unions and employers, started to manage temporary labour migration through so-called ‘covenants’. These tripartite agreements permitted workers in particular economic sectors to be temporarily admitted to the country, while anticipating the availability of newly trained, qualified Dutch workers. Contrary to what would be expected, however, these agreements did not always lead to more liberal admission policy (De Lange 2004). In fact, in terms of policymaking, these covenants reinstated the corporatist tripartite body. The questions to ask then are: why did the government return to employers’ organisations and trade unions? And, moreover, why did employers’ organisations and trade unions agree to participate in these agreements?

In her analysis of a tripartite agreement on the recruitment and admission of non-EEA nurses, De Lange (2004) argues how the government might assume that employers will comply with the temporality of migrant labour more willingly, if they themselves have previously agreed on it. As far as the participation of employers’ organisations and trade unions, De Lange identifies one of the main
possible reasons: a means to get financial support from the government for projects initiated by health care institutions, so as to lessen shortages on the national health care labour market. Although more research should still be done on the covenants, it seems that these tripartite agreements were made to legitimate particular government initiatives, rather than to represent the common interest of three different parties. Parallel to measures designed to control the admission of foreign workers, the Dutch government has, since the early 1990s, aimed to reduce irregular immigration. Although this initiative was particularly fuelled by the 9/11 attacks and the Netherlands’ electoral turnaround in 2002, the process was started long before. After several measures designed to reduce irregular migration, the Ministry of Justice introduced the Linkage Act (1998) as the centrepiece to the principle of an ‘integrated immigration policy’ (Pluymen 2004: 76). This measure made all social security benefits dependent on an immigrant’s legal residence status, including rights and access to secondary or higher education, housing, rent subsidy, handicapped facilities and health care. Driving this act was the assumption that an exclusion of access to public services would push back irregular migration.

While previous measures to reduce irregular migration passed with little public discussion, beyond Parliament, the Linkage Act generated widespread protest from doctors, teachers, legal experts, prominent politicians and representatives from a broad range of public, semi-private and private organisations. Representatives of local governments also campaigned against the new law and seemed to steer a course for non-enforcement. In general terms, the new law was claimed to be unnecessary, immoral and unworkable. This general opposition, in contrast to the ramifications of creating other labour migration policies, resulted in a number of substantial alterations to the bill. For instance, professionals were not forced to report irregular immigrants to the Aliens Department; restrictions concerning education for children were lifted; and whereas irregular immigrants would initially have only been entitled to medical care in ‘acute and threatening situations’, this term was eventually superseded by the prospect of requiring ‘imperative medical treatment’.

Moreover, the Linkage Act led to the inclusion of other actors. First of all, private actors became the masterworkers of its implementation, since they were supposed to control the access to social services. By having private actors participate in migration management, they could simultaneously work to influence the actual process of implementation. For instance, various studies (Van der Leun 2003, 2006; Pluymen 2004) have shown that workers in the domain of social assistance and housing have displayed a much more accepting attitude towards the Linkage Act than doctors and teachers who, in contrast, might tend to let their professional ethics prevail over the new regulations. Secondly, the exclusion of undocumented immigrants from social services led to the shift of new support activities downwards, to local authorities, and out to churches and other support organisations. In other words, local funds and churches, societal organisations and private individuals came forward to support irregular immigrants in those services that were no longer being covered by the Dutch state.
2.2. Family migration

In the 1960s and early 1970s, the assumption that labour migration in the Netherlands was temporary resulted in relatively strict regulations regarding family reunification. Although in the 1970s, family immigration was not yet a central issue, when evoked in parliamentary debates, the issue was discussed within a highly moral discourse framework (Bonjour 2006: 4). In particular, Christian parties regularly emphasised the importance of taking into account the ‘human’ and the ‘social’ aspects of labour migration, referring to the ‘forced’ separation of guest workers from their families as ‘extremely painful’ and a source of ‘suffering’ (Kamerstukken II 1960-1: 3653-5, quoted in Bonjour 2006: 4). Despite explicit concerns over family unity, the government did not change family migration regulations, arguing that circumstances unfortunately did not allow for less ‘strict policies’ (Kamerstukken II 1962-63b: 19-20, quoted in Bonjour 2006: 5).

In response to the first report of the Scientific Council for Government Policy (1979), in 1983, the government published a memorandum on minorities, entitled ‘Minderhedennota’ (Ministerie 1983). In this memorandum, protection of the unity of the immigrant family remained unquestioned, but now the permanency of immigrants’ stay was accepted as a starting point for integration policies. In principle, this new approach made the family part of the integration process. And in practice, family reunification (i.e. the bringing over of spouses and children of resident families) peaked in the early 1980s. Thus, when in the same year the Ministry of Justice decided to introduce restrictions to family formation (i.e. bringing over new marriage partners), the measure was immediately met with fierce resistance from progressive parties (PvdA, GroenLinks, SP and D66), who argued that it undermined the principle of equal treatment at the heart of the new minorities policy. In this regard, liberal family migration policies were part and parcel of the ethnic minorities policy, and particularly, of their emphasis on socio-economic integration with respect for own cultural identity.

However, the shift in the early 1990s, from a group-oriented approach to one focusing on individual integration, caused a turn away from the principles of protecting family unity. This neglected the family’s key role in the development of cultural identity and integration, for the sake of fostering protective measures to promote social cohesion in society (Van Walsum 2002: 143). In other words, family migration started to be seen as a problem for the integration of individuals, of families and, thus, of society as a whole. This reasoning justified restrictive family migration policies. As presented in the media and stated in many public debates, a broad majority of Parliament believed that, due to a lack of knowledge and skills, those newcomers who immigrated in the framework of family formation or reunification would fail to integrate, or at least retard the integration process. Therefore, unlike in the early 1980s, in the 1990s and 2000s, more restrictive family migration measures were introduced with little debate.

As family migration regulations became more and more restrictive, international treaty obligations, particularly Article 8 of the ECHR’s European

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3 The Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR) is an advisory body that gives solicited and unsolicited advice to the national government regarding all kind of policy issues.
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Liberties, became an increasingly important counter reference. To prevent violations to the right of family life, in 1994, a clause was introduced in the ‘Instructions for the Aliens’ Police’. It stated that the government could – in cases of ‘compelling reasons of a humanitarian nature’ (Kamerstukken II 1995-96, quoted by Bonjour 2006: 15) – use its own discretion to grant admission to aspiring family members, even if predetermined conditions were not met. As Bonjour observes, this demonstrates how ECHR Article 8 came to be considered an external constraint on national policy options. Not only is this a contrast to the ethical and ideological considerations presented by Dutch parliamentarians in the 1970s (Bonjour 2006: 16), but it also introduces an important new and external actor in Dutch family migration policymaking.

The current dominant discourse that family migration is a potential threat for integration is most clearly embodied in a new law that was passed in 2005. This law requires non-Dutch family members of residents who want to immigrate to pass an exam that tests their basic knowledge of the Dutch language and how well-informed they are about Dutch society. The exam must be taken in the country of origin and is a requirement for permission to enter the Netherlands on the basis of family reunification. However, a number of recent verdicts by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) pose important challenges to this requirement. In particular, the Court has emphasised the notion that states must allow parents and children the freedom to enjoy in each other’s company. Moreover, a recent jurisprudence has stressed the need to respect the right of both married and unmarried couples to be able to continue to cohabit, even when issues of immigration or public order are at stake (Van Walsum 2004). We can thus conclude that family migration policymaking has gone beyond the scope of the Dutch political arena, bringing in the EU and international human rights organisations as potentially important actors.

2.3. Asylum migration

Asylum policies in the Netherlands have been developed, mainly on an ad hoc basis, following the increase of asylum seekers during the 1980s and 1990s. From 1977 to 1987, annual quotas were established to determine the number of refugees invited to resettle in the Netherlands. However, policy shifted with 1987’s introduction of the Regulation on the Reception of Asylum Seekers (ROA), the growing numbers of spontaneous asylum seekers, a housing shortage and an increase in the costs municipalities had to pay for social benefits, etc. The first aim of the ROA regulation was to curtail giving asylum seekers access to independent housing and social benefits, and instead to offer them central reception and modest sums of pocket money. Muus (1997) observes that the ROA regulation, described as ‘austere but humane’, was not only made to relieve the growing housing and financial problems of the major cities but also – and above all – in order to prevent the Netherlands from becoming an attractive destination country. This shift made evident how reception policies were in fact, and in perception, a significant component for managing asylum flows.
Due to the growing number of newly arriving asylum seekers from 1989 onwards, the ROA regulation became a policy of providing minimal first accommodation, yet within a few years it became overburdened. In 1990, for example, the Ministry of Welfare, Health and Culture, which was in charge of the reception of asylum seekers, ‘tried to solve the problem by means of buying or renting holiday bungalows and caravans and finding more municipalities that were prepared to accommodate asylum seekers’ (Muus 1990: 47). As a consequence, in 1992 the New Admission and Reception Model for Asylum Seekers (NTOM) was introduced. An important difference found in NTOM was that asylum seekers would no longer be accommodated by decentralised ROA housing within municipalities, and municipalities would hence only bear responsibility for the reception and integration of those who had passed asylum procedures, namely status-holders and gedoogden (persons with a temporary expulsion waiver).

Moreover, in the early 1990s, the Ministry of Justice introduced several measures in order to reduce the number of asylum requests. First and foremost, this policy was manifested in measures taken to prevent asylum seekers from even arriving to the Netherlands. For instance, the increasing refusal to grant visas, though not exclusive to asylum seekers, limited entrances and hence constrained applications for asylum in the Netherlands. Secondly, introduced in 1994 was a temporary status referred to as a Conditional Residence Permit (VVTV). This new status only carries with it a relatively weak provisional residence title and hardly any access to public facilities. Thirdly, measures were also introduced to restrict access to asylum proceedings. As other European countries have done so, the Netherlands, in 1994, introduced procedures to expedite certain asylum applications, such as ‘manifestly unfounded applications’, those that were filed by people coming from safe countries of origin or safe transit countries where they could have applied for asylum, multiple applications and others. What’s more, people who had applied elsewhere were excluded. In the same vein, the new Aliens Act of 2000 introduced a single temporary status for the first three years of stay in the country, a limit to the right to appeal a negative decision and the duty of the rejected asylum seeker to leave the Netherlands within a fixed period.

Since asylum migration policies have been evidently ad hoc and based on arguments of manageability, rather than on grounds of principles, the general debate around their formulation and implementation has been highly technocratic. In this context, the creation of asylum migration policies has mainly taken place within the government, while there has been relatively little debate in Parliament. Opposition from lawyers and interest groups has hardly been a successful means to prevent the introduction of a series of restrictive measures. Neither cities nor local government have directly participated in asylum migration policymaking, although incorporated into the implementation of reception policies process.

Analysing the process of policymaking that began in 1986 and which resulted in the declaration of the ROA regulation, Puts (1991) observes that government is not a monolithic actor, but rather, a fragmented organisation. The seeming fragmentation of the government may be explained by the fact that its various ministries have different considerations and concerns, such as the Ministry of Welfare, Health and Culture’s manageability of reception; the Ministry of Interior’s defence of municipal interests; and the Ministry of Justice’s legal concerns over admission and deportation procedures. But on top of such
preoccupations, different dilemmas and ambivalent positions within the ministries have also had to be negotiated. What's more, relations between party politics and ministries have differed. These differences were finally resolved through compromises, thanks to various formal and informal decision-making rules, and as the consequence of particular triggering events.

As in the cases of labour and family migration, a lack of debate and the relatively low impact of different political and social actors in policymaking led to the subsiding politicisation of integration and immigration issues. In particular, two sets of measures aroused concerns and rising responses from external actors. First of all, there was the progressive exclusion of ‘failed asylum seekers’ from social benefits and the government’s insistence on their return to countries of origin. Secondly, there came the introduction of accelerated asylum procedures and a common temporary status for the first three years, as well as a limit on the right to appeal a negative decision.

The first set of measures sought to reduce the number of undocumented residents. This kind of measure was directly opposed by local authorities, who had to deal with these residents in day-to-day practice. Notably, in February 2004 when the Dutch Tweede Kamer (Parliament’s lower house) accepted the Minister for Immigration and Integration’s proposal to expel up to 26,000 ‘failed asylum seekers’ over the following three years, many big cities opposed the policy, arguing for their settlement and integration into Dutch society. Neither did front-line organisations, such as the Central Reception of Asylum Seekers (COA), commonly comply with the Minister’s rulings on this issue. Finally, church organisations and a strong network of the approximately 10,000 volunteers of the Dutch Refugee Council came to provide support for these failed asylum seekers. This opposition by local authorities and grassroots organisations illustrates the tension between policy formation at the national level and the often clashing effects that surface once policy is implemented.

The second set of measures was aimed at reducing the number of asylum applications and the duration of asylum procedures. These measures have aroused immediate concerns not only from refugee advocacy groups and academics within the Netherlands, but also from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and Human Rights Watch (HRW). One basic criticism was that the measures resulted in a ‘routine infringement of asylum seekers’ most basic rights’ (HRW 2003). Other concrete criticisms were voiced over the erosion of the Convention Status, the accelerated procedures and the limit on the right to appeal a negative decision. This last measure is considered incompatible with the European Court of Human Rights case law. According to the Court, the claim by an alien that his or her deportation would result in a violation of the Court Convention’s Article 3 must be given rigorous scrutiny by the domestic courts. The fact that in 2003 the Council of State of the Netherlands replied to these concerns, by arguing that it does apply the rigorous scrutiny required by the ECHR, again illustrates how international and supranational institutions are becoming part of the policymaking process at the national level.
3. Integration policymaking

As mentioned in the preceding section, in the post-war period, the Netherlands considered itself a non-immigration country (Ministerie 1970), a perception that explains not only the absence of explicit policy to regulate incoming flows of immigrants, but also the absence of integration policies for these newcomers during the 1960s and 1970s (Blok Commission 2004). The beginning of the 1980s in the Netherlands saw the design and implementation of explicit integration policies: collectively known as the Ethnic Minorities (EM) Policy. This was a relatively early development within Europe: only Sweden had started integration policies in the mid-1970s; other countries followed much later.

Dutch integration policy itself, as well as the creation of such policies, have shown remarkable shifts and changes in the 25 years of their existence. EM Policy started – much like in Sweden – as a welfare state policy intended to stimulate equality and the equity of vulnerable groups in society during the 1980s. It was developed in a relatively depoliticised context and laid down in a number of governmental documents (Ministerie 1980, 1981, 1983). In its implementation phase, this policy led to significant policy activity in many domains throughout the 1980s.

But towards the end of the 1980s, public and political discourse began to look critically at EM Policy: it had ‘failed in important areas of labour and education’ (Scientific Council 1989), with criticism falling on the collective character of the policy (vis-à-vis target groups and their emancipation) and its ‘overemphasis on cultural aspects’ (ibid.). This led to the formulation of further Republican Integration Policies throughout the 1990s. The new policy document (‘Contourennota’ Ministerie 1994) thus put the emphasis on the individual – rather than the group; accentuated the socio-economic aspects of integration – rather than the cultural and religious ones; and stressed, more than ever before, individuals’ citizenship responsibilities in integration processes. This led to new directions of policy implementation throughout the 1990s including, at one end of the spectrum, the nationally instituted courses given to newcomers as an introduction to Dutch society, and at the other end, more area-based and urban policies.

The beginning of the 21st century was primed for a new shift in policy orientation, by now embedded in a full-fledged politicisation of the topics of immigration and integration. The dominant view came to be that integration processes and policies had fundamentally failed, and moreover, that the social cohesion of Dutch society was endangered. The topics, framed in such a light, were successfully exploited in 2002’s national election campaigns, thus also reinforcing the politicisation. What followed was the so-called Integration Policy New Style, as formulated in a letter of the Minister for Aliens’ Affairs and Integration (TK 2003-2004 29203, Nr. 1). A series of proposals and measures followed to significantly diminish immigration figures (the Netherlands has had a negative net migration balance since 2003), and to introduce mandatory forms of integration for newcomers and oldcomers alike. Observers have called these forms ‘neo-assimilationist’.

How could such a remarkable development take place? The following section will analyse in more detail how these shifts and changes have occurred,
what triggers have contributed to these developments and which actors have been involved. Since these processes of change are gradual periods of time will be demarcated by decade. As indicated above, following somewhat later were the basic policy documents that embody such changes: the EM Policy in 1983 (Ministerie 1983), the Integration Policy in 1994 (Ministerie 1994) and the Integration Policy New Style in 2003.

3.1. Policies of the 1970s and before

Because the Netherlands did not regard itself as an immigration country, those who happened to be there, such as guest workers, were supposed to return to their home countries (Scientific Council 2001). As a result, ad hoc measures for accommodation were the rule, and reception facilities were short-term-oriented and scarce (Penninx 1996). (The only exception to this rule was the assimilation policy for repatriates from the former Dutch East Indies). Accordingly, the two main policy goals concerned remigration and the accommodation of guest workers to Dutch society as long as they would stay in the Netherlands. Maintaining migrants’ own identity was thus considered important, but as part of the mind frame that saw migrants as planning to return to their countries of origin.

In the 1970s, mainly within the Ministry for Culture, Recreation and Social Work (CRM), a welfare policy was developed to respond to the needs of some vulnerable groups, such as guest workers, asylum seekers, migrants from Surinam and the Dutch Antilles, Moluccans and the travellers known in Dutch as woonwagenbewoners, literally meaning ‘caravan dwellers’. Within this policy, many private institutions were initiated (and subsidised) to separately provide welfare services for each of these groups (Molleman 2004; Blok Commission 2004; Penninx 1979). Notwithstanding, many guest workers’ facilities, such as housing, were supposed to be offered by the companies employing them. Increasing family reunions, along with the concentration of guest workers and their families in specific urban areas, pushed local authorities to get involved. Often municipalities took their own initiatives in the domains of housing, education, health care and welfare, thus pressuring the national authorities to recognise – and to finance – these measures. One of the most notable measures of the decade was the Mother Tongue and Culture Programme (1974), which was explicitly aimed at the reintegration of migrant guest workers’ children in their societies of origin. But, contrary to all prognoses, many guest workers did not return to their sending countries after the recruitment stopped and the economic crisis that followed in the late 1970s. In fact, migrant communities, particularly those from North Africa and Turkey, grew significantly through family and asylum migration. The rising unemployment rates of migrant workers and the arrival of their families brought demands for specific measures on the political agenda. For instance, schools with high numbers of immigrant students demanded funds for specific reception
courses, creating the Landelijke Commissie Voortgezet Onderwijs aan Anderstaligen (LCVO), a national federation to lobby in that direction.4

The administrative layout of the policies described above was problematic. Different ministries were involved for individual target groups and policy domains. For example, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, which was responsible for the labour market and work permits, tended to hold onto the idea of temporality of migration. The Ministry of Culture, Recreation and Social Work, which oversaw matters of general welfare, was directly confronted with the problems of reception, becoming more aware of the growing tensions between supposed temporary stay and factual long-term settlement and thus pleading for change. There were thus difficulties in coordinating the measures among ministries and, what’s more, a certain rivalry existed (Hoppe 1987; Blok Commission 2004; Penninx 1979; Scholten & Timmermans 2004).5

It was also during the 1970s that scientists started to get involved. As one of the first, Entzinger (1975) drew attention to the gap between de facto permanent settlement of immigrants in the country and a policymaker’s view of temporary migration.6 He emphasised the risk of not acknowledging the problem. In 1976, the Ministry of Culture, Recreation and Social Work installed the Advisory Committee on Research on Minorities (ACOM), which united academics in this domain within a policy frame.

In sum, there had been a mixture of pressures for policy change coming from the public opinion and the media, local authorities, academics and civil servants. It was the Scientific Council for Government Policy’s report ‘Ethnic Minorities’ (1979) that acted as a catalyst: it pleaded to fully recognise that a number of immigrant groups had settled permanently in the Netherlands and to start an active policy aimed at the integration of what it called ‘ethnic minorities’ in society. In a first reaction to the report (Ministerie 1980) the government accepted the advice, decided to develop an EM Policy and to install a strong coordinating structure for such policy within the Ministry of Home Affairs. The new direction of policies gained full parliamentary support, which was symbolised in the fact that the government coalition of Christian Democrats and Liberals nominated the oppositional Labour Party politician Henk Molleman as director of the coordination department within the Ministry of Home Affairs.

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4 A special case illustrating the discrepancy between the reality of permanent settlement and the norm of temporal stay has been that of the Moluccans: ex-soldiers of the colonial army in the East Indies who came to the Netherlands with their families in 1951. According to some observers, the terrorist acts of hijacking trains and the occupation of the Indonesian Consulate and Embassy, a Dutch school in Assen and a provincial government building by young Moluccans in the mid-1970s has contributed significantly to pressures towards policy changes.

5 Such difficulties of coordination were brought to the political fore in a 1978 parliamentary motion (motion Molleman, PvdA) in which the Minister of Home Affairs was asked to take responsibility for coordinating policy pertaining to all minorities. This idea was realised later in 1980 when the government had decided to work towards the general Ethnic Minorities Policy.

6 Notably, Han Entzinger was working at the staff department of the Ministry of Culture, Recreation and Social Work when he wrote this article.
3.2. Ethnic Minorities Policy in the 1980s

The basic rationale of EM Policy was that specific groups in Dutch society that combined a low socio-economic status with being perceived as ethnically and/or culturally different would run the risk of becoming permanently marginal groups in society. Low-status immigrant groups thus became target groups of this policy, as did some native groups such as the *woonwagenbewoners* and the long-established gypsies. The main principles of the new EM Policy can be summarised in three points:

1) The policy aimed to achieve the equality of ethnic minorities in the socio-economic domain; inclusion and participation in the political domain; and equity in the domain of culture and religion within constitutional conditions.

2) The policy was targeted at specific groups regarded as endangered of becoming distinct minorities: guest workers, Moluccans, Surinamese and Antilleans, refugees, gypsies and *woonwagenbewoners*.

3) The policy should cover all relevant domains and ministries, and be anchored strongly in the governmental organisation. As a result came the creation of a department for the coordination of minorities policy (Directie Coordinatie Integratiebeleid Minderheden) within the general directorate of Home Policies, as opposed to within that of Security and Order (Mollemann 2004). The idea behind placing the coordinating unit in the Ministry of Home Affairs was that it was a policy for new citizens, and therefore that the Ministry responsible for cities and provinces should be in charge. Migration policy was defined as a non sector-specific responsibility (Scholten & Timmermans 2004).

In order to prevent ethnic minority formation by promoting socio-economic equality and cultural and religious equity, emancipation of these groups was seen as important. Thus, their participation in all spheres of society, including the political, was to be encouraged. An important assumption was that development of identity – both individual and group – would stimulate the minority’s emancipation within the community and would have a positive influence on its integration in broader society as well (Blok Commission 2004).

The 1980s have come to be seen as the heyday of the EM Policy. Irrespective of how the outcomes are evaluated, the range of policy initiatives is impressive, especially when compared to other European countries in the same period. In the legal-political domain, for example, the Netherlands’ full legislation was scrutinised for discriminatory elements on the basis of nationality, race and religion (Beune & Hessels 1983), and many changes were made. Anti-discrimination legislation was reinforced, and a structure for discrimination-related reporting and consultation was established. What’s more, in 1985, active and passive voting rights for alien residents were introduced. In 1986, Dutch nationality law was modified to include more elements of *ius soli*, thus making it much easier for alien immigrants and their children to become Dutch citizens. Over the course of time, a consultation structure for all target groups of EM Policy was established to give them a voice in
matters regarding their position in society. 7 Subsidising EM organisations, both at national and local levels, and trying to engage them in integration efforts became an important strategic aspect of policy implementation.

In the socio-economic domain, three themes were key: the labour market/unemployment, education and housing. In EM Policy, several initiatives were taken to combat high unemployment rates, including a law inspired by the Canadian Employment Equity Act, and even affirmative action by national and local governmental employers during the period 1986 – 1993. The effects of these measures, however, have proven weak.

Measures in the domain of education have been an important part of EM Policy from the beginning. Actually, most of the specific financial resources of EM Policy have, by far, been spent in this domain, predominantly on measures to compensate arrears of immigrant children in the regular educational system. That was implemented by a point system in which schools received significantly more money for children of immigrant background than they received for standard middle-class, native pupils. Immigrant and minority children were rated at 1,9, while native children of low socio-economic background were rated at 1,25 (the standard was 1). Apart from this general financial assistance to schools, a relatively small part was also dedicated to specific measures: education in the native language and culture of immigrants.

In the domain of housing, a fundamental change was introduced in 1981 to allow legally residing aliens full access to social housing, which had been previously denied. Given the fact that social housing comprises the majority of all housing in big cities in the Netherlands, this measure had very positive consequences for the position of alien immigrants.

In the domain of culture, language and religion the EM Policy may be called ‘multicultural’ avant la lettre. 8 The aim to develop migrants’ culture, in keeping with the EM Policy philosophy, was theoretically left to the groups and their organisations, and delimited by acknowledgement of general laws in the Netherlands. The role of the government was defined as that of facilitating, i.e. creating opportunities for minorities, such as special programmes in immigrant languages in the media.

As for religion, ‘new religions’ could legally claim facilities, such as denominational schools and broadcasting resources, on the same conditions as established religions. The outcome was the relatively quick institutionalisation of Islam (Rath et al. 2001).

Throughout the late 1980s, disappointment with EM Policy was growing, but it was only by the early 1990s that it became the topic of intense public debate and surrounding criticisms. The first strong critique on the EM Policy was formulated in a new Report of the Scientific Council for Government Policy (1989). Briefly stated, its message was that too little progress was being made in two crucial

7 In 1985, a National Advisory and Consultation Body (LAO) was established to represent the most important minority organisations. The LAO was to advise the government on issues of immigrant integration and to be consulted in the context of administrative issues relating to integration policy. In 1997, the LAO was replaced by the National Consultation Body for Minorities (LOM), an institution with a weaker mandate.

8 In the policy documents of 1981 and 1983, the term ‘multiculturalism’ was not used. Referring to EM Policies as ‘multiculturalist’ policies, particularly by adversaries, is something that was only later introduced.
domains: labour market and education. This evaluation intimated another criticism: too much attention was being given to issues of multiculturalism and the subsidising of organisations. It was feared that this imbalance of attention could result in hindering – rather than enhancing – individual participation to better the labour market and opportunities in education. The subsequent advice of the Scientific Council (1989) was to make more efforts in the key areas of labour and education, and to do so, in a more compulsory way. ‘Obligations of migrants should be more balanced with the extended rights’; policies should focus less on cultural rights and facilities.

Other elements of criticism were later added. For one, Frits Bolkestein, the then Liberal Party leader and head of the political opposition in Dutch Parliament, suggested in a public speech in 1991 that Islam formed a threat to liberal democracy, it was a hindrance to the integration of immigrants, and that immigrant integration should be handled with more courage.

3.3. Integration Policy in the 1990s

Policy did not change immediately in response to such critiques, but the seeds for a different conception of it were sown, to grow later. A first distinct change in policy focus is found in new policy document, ‘Contourennota’ of 1994 (Ministerie 1994). In this document a renewed integration policy with a more ‘republicanist’ character was adopted, focusing on ‘good citizenship’ and ‘self-responsibility’ as its guiding principles. The argument was that citizenship entails not only rights, but also duties, and that each citizen must be active and responsible for himself or herself. In accordance with the advice of the 1989 report of the Scientific Council for Government Policy, this new ‘integration policy’ reflected three main changes in comparison with EM Policy: 1) a shift away from target groups to individuals who are in a disadvantaged position; 2) a strong focus on the socio-economic incorporation through labour market and education measures; 3) a shift away from cultural and multicultural policies as well as away from the strong reliance on immigrant organisations.

The social-democrat victory in the national elections of 1994 led to the so-called Purple Coalition: the Labour Party (PvdA) together with the conservative liberals (VVD) and left-wing liberals (D66). This meant that the cabinet chose to put ‘the delicate cultural dimension outside of the field and to focus on the economic activation of individual migrants’ (Scholten & Timmermans 2004). The focus on economic integration of individual immigrants recommended by the 1989 Scientific Council report fitted very well with the general policy line of the government, whose motto was ‘work, work, and once again work’. Thus, measures specifically targeted at ethnic minorities were abandoned. From 1997 until 2001, considerable sums were invested in general schemes to fight unemployment. And although these schemes were not specifically earmarked for

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9 Top measures included those such as the subsidised Melkert jobs for the long-term unemployed.
Policymaking related to immigration and integration. The Dutch Case

ethnic minorities (Blok Commission 2004), one hope was that they would promote their participation nevertheless.

A new policy instrument apropos of the new philosophy was the civic integration courses\(^{10}\) that aimed to facilitate the initial integration of newcomers. This instrument for integration was developed at the local level among a number of cities in the Netherlands beginning in the early 1990s. In these reception courses, newcomers were given a toolkit comprising Dutch-language training material and information about how important institutions in Dutch society function. Local policymakers felt the urge to provide these tools to all newcomers whom they believed needed them, and so the policy was systematically developed in their cities. However, this instrument for integration, as it were, was later consumed by national politics, and through 1998’s WIN law (Wet Inburgering Nederland), it was made national reception policy.

Another way of transforming policies to keep in accordance with the new philosophy was framing much of integration facilities in area-based policies (rather than group-based ones). In 1994, the Ministry of Home Affairs started establishing a policy for deprived areas in major Dutch cities. This practice could be understood as a replacement of integration policies, for these targeted areas are, for the most part, comprised of an ethnic minority population. The ‘area’ is chosen as primary policy category instead of groups in society.\(^{11}\) Area-based development programmes were – and still are – a way of introducing redistributing measures in neighbourhoods where ethnic minorities are important recipients. The emphasis shifted in the course of time from housing and urban renewal (sociale vernieuwing 1990) to more holistic programmes that integrated measures on housing, economic issues and socio-cultural dimensions (grotestedebelasting 1994). Reflecting the above-mentioned preoccupations of the Purple Coalition, this holistic approach thus focuses on socio-economic development.

The change from group-based towards area-based policies was also institutionally reflected. In 1998, a new so-called Minister for Urban Policies and Integration was nominated within the Ministry of Home Affairs. Although such area-based policies have served as a way of quitting group-oriented policies, group-specific policies still survive at the local level of policy.

A series of events around the turn of the millennium triggered a new shift in the public and political discourse on immigration and integration issues, which would prove to later cause a revision of policy towards assimilationism (Vasta

\(^{10}\) In Dutch, these are called *Inburgeringscursussen*. The word ‘*inburgering*’ contains the word ‘*burger*’ (meaning ‘citizen’), but its denotation is not that of naturalisation (i.e. becoming a national citizen). To avoid such confusion, the authors of this paper prefer the term ‘civic integration courses’ rather than ‘citizenship programmes’, for the courses do not necessarily prepare people for national citizenship.

\(^{11}\) According to De Zwart (2005), a replacement is a policy option often chosen by governments to ‘avoid official recognition of social divisions thought to cause the problem, yet permit redistribution that benefits disadvantaged groups’ (see also De Zwart & Poppelaars 2004). The reason governments choose replacement is out of fear for side-effects of targeted redistributive policies, which, ‘though considered necessary to reduce group inequality, may also promote ethnic conflict, create vested interests in group distinctions, diminish public support for redistribution, and thus defeat their own purpose’ (De Zwart 2005). In this sense, replacement could be considered a compromise between denial and accommodation of ethnic minorities.
The shift brought the social and the cultural dimensions of integration back onto the agenda, though in a different light than it was before inspected. The search was no longer for ‘compatibilities’, but more for ‘commonalities’ that would help preserve national norms and values, thereby restoring and enhancing the social cohesion of society (Entzinger 2003). The integration issue also became increasingly cast in light of what was perceived to be a ‘clash of civilizations’ (Snel 2003).

One of the initial catalysts in this development was the new national debate that was spurred on by publication of a newspaper article by Scheffer (2000). The article stated that the multicultural society in the Netherlands could be dismissed as either a ‘tragedy’ or a ‘disaster’ 12. Integration policy was declared a failure and, moreover, a call was made for a more assimilationist policy that would revive Dutch history and norms and values. As in the first debate over national minorities that took place in 1992, Islam and the integration of Muslim immigrants were identified as being especially problematic. International developments, such as the 9/11 attacks in the United States reinvigorated such beliefs. Fennema (2002) has shown how the attacks triggered particularly fierce responses in the Dutch media, and led to several incidents of ethnic and religious violence.

In the meantime, the Dutch political arena witnessed the rise of the populist politician Pim Fortuyn. A true populist, Fortuyn profiled himself with harsh statements on criminality, direct democracy, immigration and integration. He pleaded for ‘zero migration’, argued that ‘the Netherlands was full’, and called for ‘a cold war against Islam’. 13 To these arguments that were not completely new, as we have seen, he added two elements: first, the accusation that the political elite had enhanced the failure of integration in the past by ‘hiding the real problems behind a curtain of political correct speech’; and second, the contention that the victim of all this was the common – and native, at that – Dutch voter.

Fortuyn’s populist campaign exploited this discourse very successfully. First, his party won a great victory in the local elections of March 2002 in Rotterdam, the second largest Dutch city. And although a few weeks later, Fortuyn was murdered – just before the national elections of May 2002 – his newly established LPF Party (Lijst Pim Fortuyn) won a landslide victory. In spite of (or perhaps thanks to) his death, LPF gained 26 out of the 150 parliamentary seats and thus entered Parliament as its second largest party. This success changed the political discourse on immigration and integration radically. In fact, the aftermath of the Fortuyn victory compelled most parties to adapt their discourse on these issues (Penninx 2006).

A new series of notable events followed. However, beginning in 2002, it becomes uncertain whether the events themselves have truly triggered attention to the issues of migration and integration, or that the already high-alert status of these issues on the political agenda gave these events the appearance of being trigger events (Snel & Scholten 2005). First of all, a series of violent acts committed by immigrants drew broad media attention: in 2003, after being reprimanded for his improper behaviour by a young Dutchman, a young Moroccan kicked the Dutchman to death. In that same year, a group of North African youngsters in

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12 Depending on the translation of the Dutch word ‘drama’ in the title of the article, ‘Het multiculturele drama’.
Amsterdam kicked a homeless woman to death. And in 2004, a Turkish youngster shot his teacher to death. Secondly, several events emerged around the issues of so-called fundamentalist mosques and radical imams: an imam labelled homosexuals as inferior; in a radical mosque, books were found in which people were called to kill homosexuals; and broad media attention was given to the mosque incident involving an imam who refused to shake hands with Rita Verdonk, the then Minister for Aliens’ Affairs and Integration, because she is a woman. Finally, a major climax came when the Dutch film-maker Theo van Gogh was murdered by a Dutch-Moroccan youngster who was affiliated to a radical Islamist network in the Netherlands.

All these events had two significant effects. First of all, they contributed to an image of policy failure. Parliament thus established a Parliamentary Research Committee on the Integration Policy in order to examine ‘why policy had thus far resorted in such limited successes.’ However, upon the Committee’s conclusion that integration had actually been relatively successful (Blok Commission 2004), the conclusion was widely dismissed as naïve. In fact, some observers complained how now a new political correctness had emerged that tabooed positive statements on the integration policy and on multiculturalism. Secondly, these events reinforced a new mode of policy discourse, described by Prins (2002) as ‘hyperrealism’: a shift from the 1990s ‘realist’ style of discourse demanding a ‘tough’ approach to integration so as to turn immigrants into full citizens, to a type of discourse in which ‘being tough’ in itself became a goal, regardless of its potentially problematic amplifying effects. As such, it could be argued that Fortuyn, and later Verdonk, used the immigration and integration issue as an example with which to demonstrate their ‘tough’ approaches to the political establishment, in so doing promoting their own places in Dutch politics.

3.4. Integration Policy New Style since 2002

Thus, from 2002 onwards, the policy took another turn, as a new political majority was in power. The renewed institutional setting foreshadowed changes: the coordination of integration policies was moved from the Ministry of Home Affairs (in which it had been located for 22 years) to the Ministry of Justice under a new Minister for Aliens’ Affairs and Integration. Integration Policy New Style, formulated in a letter by the Minister for Aliens’ Affairs and Integration (TK 2003-2004, 29203, nr. 1), very much follows the paradigm of the 1990s, as it is based on the leading concepts of ‘citizenship’ and ‘self-responsibility’, but its emphasis is much more on the cultural adaptation of immigrants to Dutch society. The concept of integration policy was thus narrowed considerably. In addition, integration policy had become clearly linked, instrumental even, to immigration policy. It facilitated the selection of migrants and restricted new flows, in particular those of asylum seekers, family reunion and marriage migration.

14 TK, 6 April 2004, 63-4112.
15 Cabinet Balkenende I was a short-lived coalition of Christian Democrats, liberals and the extreme right LPF; it was followed in 2003 by Cabinet Balkenende II, a coalition in which the LPF was substituted by the progressive liberals of D66.
The star measure in this new policy is the early integration of new migrants, something which was reformulated to serve purposes of both integration and migration control. Before entering the Netherlands, newcomers are obliged to pass an exam that proves their language skills and knowledge about Dutch culture and society. Once admitted, they have to follow civic integration courses. The granting of renewals of temporary and permanent permits is subject to successfully passing these courses.

The reception policy New Style thus includes significant modifications, when compared with the former decade. On the one hand, it introduces a new distribution of responsibilities among the various partners involved, the migrants’ own responsibility being the starting point. Beginning in 2007, newcomers have been expected to find and finance the civic integration courses themselves, and only if they pass the exam successfully, are they entitled to a refund of up to 70 per cent of their training expenses. In this programme, local authorities forego many responsibilities.

Erstwhile Minister for Aliens’ Affairs and Integration Verdonk had aimed to expand the target population of the new reception policy. In her first proposal, the target group for mandatory civic integration courses included all migrants between ages sixteen and 65, regardless of the amount of time they had spent in the country and even if they had been naturalised as Dutch. Deemed unacceptable, this proposal was revised with a vision to extend the requirements to everyone who has completed less than eight years of obligatory schooling in the country. This target would include the so-called oldcomers – people of migrant origin already living in the country – as well as naturalised immigrants and native Dutch who had been living abroad. Verdonk also specifically attempted to extend the requirement to immigrants from the Netherlands Antilles, justified by the supposedly problematic character of this minority group. The proposal, however, was rejected by Parliament, being deemed unconstitutional and discriminatory, since Antilleans have Dutch nationality to begin with. A final proposal was ultimately passed at the very end of the cabinet’s legislative term, in July 2006: it removed the new reception policy requirements for Dutch citizens – native or naturalised – and postponed its actual implementation to the next legislature. The proposal’s fate is therefore contingent on the next majority in power.

Four years into this New Style, a number of observations can be made regarding content, the policymaking process and the governance of policy. The first observation is that immigration and integration policies have been brought together, both in terms of content among a number of policy measures and in their institutional arrangement – within the Ministry of Justice, under the special Minister for Aliens’ Affairs and Integration.

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16 Another element introduced – without much debate – since implementation of New Style integration policy concerns the financial: all costs of admission and immigration for the state are to be borne by the immigrants themselves. This means that immigrants have to pay sums of money for visas and residence permits, as well the renewal of them – this was previously unheard of. The application for a temporary residence permit costs €430 (its renewal €285 per family member), and for a permanent residence permit, €890 (VluchtelingenWerk Nederland 2004).
The second observation is that the process of policymaking – in the context of strong politicisation – is predominantly led, as well as set forth, by the Minister and the political parties in Parliament. At the same time, this policymaking process is rather selective in the topics it chooses: restrictive admission of new immigrants, forced return of failed asylum seekers and illegal immigrants, and mandatory civic integration courses. Undergoing a major recentralisation, these new policies were spearheaded from a top-down approach dominated by the Ministry and Parliament.

At the same time, as the third observation, which was also made by our interviewees at the local level, demonstrates, the majority of still-standing policies were left untouched or changed only marginally. Both ministries at the national level (such as those for education, housing and labour market) and local authorities continued most of their standing policies. This means that – contrary to the widespread image – many of the earlier instruments, developed over more than twenty years of integration policies, are still in place. Despite the predominant concordance that these policies have failed, they have had – and still have – their effects.

A fourth observation is that there is a growing resistance to the new national policies, particularly at that local level, coming from both the local government and civil society at large. Actors that were marginalised by earlier welfare policies, such as churches and action groups, have become active in favour of immigrants, trying to protect them against governmental action that is deemed unjust. Immigrants themselves are becoming – as citizens – important actors too, although in a different way than before: the local elections of March 2006 have shown that the migrant vote has become an important instrument for redress, particularly in big Dutch cities (Van Heelsum & Tillie 2006). In Rotterdam, for example, migrants have contributed significantly to the exit of the local LPF’s power by voting systematically for leftist parties, and thus bringing the Labour Party back in. And this has not gone unnoticed by political parties. Also on the national level, there have been growing indications of resistance against tone and content of migration and integration policies. One example is April 2006’s manifest ‘Één land, één samenleving’ (meaning ‘one country, one society’), which was signed by former politicians from political parties across the board; another illustration comes from October 2006 when sixteen university chair-holders in migration and integration studies sent an open letter to the senate, in protest of the newly proposed WIN law.

The most significant reason for a swing back from populist policies in this domain is probably the fact that these populist politics have become an internal time bomb within the Liberal Party. This is best illustrated by the case of MP Ayaan Hirsi Ali. Hirsi Ali came to the Netherlands as an asylum seeker of Somali origin in the early 1990s, became naturalised and then went into politics. She was first affiliated to the Labour Party, but was later welcomed into the Liberal Party because of her clear stance against oppressive Islamic traditions. An ally to Verdonk in this respect, Hirsi Ali put the Minister (who profiled herself as the iron lady of tough immigration and integration policies in a difficult position when she admitted ‘en plein public’ that she herself had manipulated the asylum procedure with incorrect information. Verdonk’s immediate reaction – that her asylum and thus her naturalisation and membership in Dutch Parliament were not valid and should
be withdrawn – led not only to a crisis within the Liberal Party, but also to the fall of Cabinet Balkenende II. The migrant vote’s strengthening power and the divisive effect of populist politics within parties were what led to the remarkable fact that in the campaign for national elections on 22 November 2006 the topics of immigration and integration were no longer key topics. The topics have proven to be divisive within all major parties, not just the Liberal Party; and they further accentuate differences between national and local politics. Interestingly, these divisions do not run along mere ethnic lines (as the Hirsi Ali case shows).

4. The interaction of immigration and integration policies

So far in this paper, the dynamics of policymaking in the domains of Dutch immigration and integration policies have been described and analysed. It was observed how, although only gradually, the Netherlands’ identification as a country of de facto immigration, and possibly even a society of immigration or multicultural society, triggered policy responses in both subsystems. The dynamics of immigration policymaking varied significantly for each type of migration: labour migration, family migration and asylum migration. However, within this policy subsystem a general trend became discernable. The once relatively ad hoc responses to migration, along with a depoliticised, corporatist governance style of policy formulation, had evolved into more concerted political and administrative efforts in order to minimalise all sorts of migration. What’s more, this occurred in a policy context that itself had become much more politicised. Over time, the dynamics of integration policymaking also seem to have altered significantly, as illustrated by the succession of different policy paradigms over the past decades, from the 1970s’ ‘quasi-non policies’ and the 1980s’ Minorities Policy to the Integration Policy of the 1990s and eventually, effective since 2002, the Integration Policy New Style. This subsystem also revealed a trend: beginning in the 1970s, from a rather technocratic style of governance towards a more politicised style of governance (new realism/hyperrealism), begun in the 1990s and especially notable after the turn of the millennium.

This section will discuss the dynamics of interaction between these two policy subsystems. We will ask questions such as: how do patterns of internal dynamics in the subsystems of immigration and integration policy compare? And to what extent has there been interaction between developments in these two policy subsystems? Some observations in the above sections have already pointed to a certain degree of interdependence between developments in both subsystems, and to a growing ‘integration’ of immigration and integration policies. Thus, we will first observe some differences and similarities between the two sub-systems before examining their interaction with one another.

4.1 Patterns of convergence and divergence
As for differences, they are first and foremost demonstrated by the way the subsystems are institutionalised within the central government. Whereas the integration policy has been characterised by a comprehensive or strongly unitary and centralised policy coordination structure (Guiraudon 2000), the institutional structure for the coordination of immigration policies appears to have been less comprehensive. Integration policies had been assigned since the early 1980s within the Ministry of Home Affairs (until their reallocation to the Ministry of Justice in 2002). Within this department a strong – albeit fluctuating – structure was constructed and maintained to coordinate policies horizontally, between ministries, and vertically vis-à-vis local authorities, subsidised organisations, co-opted experts, ethnic elites and civil society actors. This system produced policy documents, monitored implementation, and had an explicit budget (separate from funds supposed to come from the regular budgets of ministries, municipalities and other policy actors). In contrast, the institutional location of immigration policies was (only until recently) far less clear: the Ministry of Justice had always had formal responsibility over admission of aliens, residence permits and possible expulsions, but the Ministry was not always the body to decide on policies regarding admission. This was the case, for example, with economic and asylum migrants, over whom other departments shared responsibility. As such, immigration policies were notably less comprehensive and less unitarily coordinated than integration policies. Immigration policies were, for a long time, subject to little debate, and policies were usually formulated ad hoc, in response to actual influxes of immigrants. Immigration policies thus have long been considered ‘quasi non-policies’.

Another difference between the two policy fields has, since the 1990s, become more manifest. While both policies had originated largely on the national level, as would be expected in view of the Dutch tradition of a centralised consensus democracy, they are developing in different directions of multilevel governance. Immigration policy has been shifting upwards (to the EU level), outwards (among private agencies) and downwards (in implementing the Linkage Act for example) (Lahav & Guiraudon 2006). The shift upwards to the European level has also served to provide new intergovernmental venues for strengthening national control, as opposed to handing over policymaking competencies to the supranational level; within the European ‘intergovernmental’ arena there would be less resistance to tightening migration control than within many national political arenas (Guiraudon 2000). Only in domains like anti-discrimination is a more significant trend of Europeanisation apparent (Guiraudon 2006). By contrast, in the integration policy, a more pronounced trend of recentralisation can be observed. This is especially apparent in terms of policy formulation and how issues are framed, as well as in the specific topics that have spearheaded national policies and that have been linked to other issues on the national agenda. The 1990s’ trend towards decentralisation had thus been halted and, to some extent, reversed after the turn of the millennium. In the instance of civic integration courses, the shift outwards to private agencies has coincided with the recentralisation of state control over the courses, as in the case of the national integration exam. At the same time, however, this top-down dynamics of recentralisation appears to be limited: the institutional locus of many policy measures, such as in the domains of labour and education, has remained with specific ministries and local governments, all carrying
out their own measures over these files. This has led to the growing gap between national and local integration policies, similar to the decoupling or ‘décalage’ that Schain (1999) observed in France. There seems to be an increasing divergence between symbolic politics at the national level and more pragmatic problem-coping at the local level.

Similarities in internal policy dynamics between the two policy fields have been observed as well. Perhaps the most significant convergence is the politicisation of immigration and integration policymaking over the last decade. Both have become the subject of intense political debate, often framed in rather rhetorical and symbolical terms, and dominated by a negative tone. The attention implies that both policy subsystems have become less isolated from macro-politics and, what’s more, that they are increasingly vulnerable to external perturbations. Both have become top political priorities, also in electoral politics, leading to a different logic of policymaking processes. This has also led to similar patterns of resistance in both subsystems. Local governments especially have attempted to counteract the politicising tendencies in immigration and integration policies, calling for a more positive and pragmatic approach.

Another similarity, related to this politicisation, concerns the growing gap in both domains between policy rhetoric and policy practice. On the one hand, a strong variability in policymaking can be observed in the past decades, with both domains characterised by episodes of relative stability and punctuated with dramatic policy change (Scholten & Timmermans 2004). Such variability creates difficulties for evaluating policies, as the rules for measuring success or failure have also been in constant flux (Entzinger 2005). On the other hand, policy practice has shown what appears to be a strong tendency towards path-dependency (Snel & Scholten 2005). Policy practices that were established in one policy episode have often proven very resilient in periods that follow. For instance, the Mother Tongue and Culture Programme had a chameleon-like existence, with its multi-hued contributions to return migration in the 1970s, to the multicultural society in the 1980s, and to acquisition of Dutch as second language in 1990s, before it was finally abandoned in 2001. Another example of policy resilience is shown by the persistence of labour migration long after its official termination in 1973 into the present day – despite all the discourse on bringing it to an end. National politics’ tough rhetoric on illegal migration notwithstanding, actual policy practices vis-à-vis illegal migrants appear to be much more subtle (Van der Leun 2006). The growing gap between policy rhetoric and policy practice emerges as the result of a general institutional path dependency, as well as the diverging patterns of multi-level governance (albeit differently manifested in the immigration and integration policy domains).

4.2 Towards a common policy subsystem?

How has the interaction between the two subsystems of immigration and integration developed in the course of time? At present, there seems to be a common policy system in the works for both immigration and integration policies, which since 2002, have been united and coordinated within the Justice
Department, under a special Ministry for Aliens’ Affairs and Integration. However, the relationship between immigration and integration has not always been like this.

In the early 1980s, the arrivals of newcomers were interpreted as historically unique events, demanding a – what was, in principle, temporary – minorities’ policy for these groups, as well as a restrictive immigration policy for preventing further immigration. The need for a restrictive immigration policy was then justified as a condition for a successful EM Policy: a constant influx of new immigrants would create a constant need for new policy efforts (Scientific Council for Government Policy 1979).

Such understanding of the relation between immigration and integration policies changed in the 1990s. The 1989 report of the Scientific Council for Government Policy called for a more realistic recognition of the permanent character of immigration: not only would the presence of minorities, but also immigration itself, be responsible for creating a permanent phenomenon in Dutch society. While the report did support a restrictive immigration policy, it also suggested adaptations in the integration policy, so as to cope with the constant influx of newcomers. In this vein, it recommended the development of civic integration programmes that would provide the link between the constantly arriving newcomers and their subsequent integration in Dutch society.

This definition of the relation between immigration and integration was largely adopted by government in the early 1990s. It soon led government to abandon the preceding decade’s relatively lenient policies on family migration, which came to be viewed as a growing problem for integration. But there were also ideas within governmental circles that went some steps further. By the end of the 1980s, the Interdepartmental Working Group on Immigration (IWI), which was chaired by the Justice Department, argued that a realistic recognition of the nature of immigration should produce more than mere efforts to optimally restrict immigration. What needed to be accounted for was the immigration effect promoted by the very facilities to which minorities had access under the integration policy. Thus, immigration was not only to be restricted so as to promote integration, but integration policy should was to be restricted so as not to attract further immigration (Scholten Forthcoming 2007). These ideas, however, were not yet taken over in government policy.

Since 2000, Dutch society has witnessed the development of a more systemic connection between immigration and integration. Not only do policy memoranda speak explicitly of the need to restrict immigration so as to not endanger the ‘absorption capacity’ of Dutch society (Ministerie 2001), tougher integration policies have increasingly become a tool for restricting immigration. The new reception programmes described in Section 3 of this paper have become a means for the Dutch government to promote the integration of newcomers, as well as to discourage further immigration. In doing so, the programmes may simultaneously function as a mechanism through which to select those migrants who could prove beneficial for the Dutch economy.

5. External factors
A number of developments external to immigration and integration policy have also influenced these subsystems. In this section, we will discuss the more important among them, including: the legacy of pillarisation, the development of the Dutch welfare state and the development of political culture in the Netherlands over the past decades.

5.1 The legacy of pillarisation

The legacy of pillarisation is an often raised explanation for Dutch exceptionalism in many domains (Hoppe 1987). Beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, the Netherlands had grown into a segmented society, which was structured around four ‘pillars’. The pillars comprised specific social, political or religious groups (Protestants, Catholics, Socialists, Liberals), and were brought together only at the top where any inter-pillar conflict was ‘pacified’ by the elites of the pillars. As such, it was in the Netherlands’ tradition to accommodate pluralism through pillarisation and assuage conflict through elites. This particular facet of Dutch history has had pervasive effects on the country’s political culture and the structure of its political system as a ‘centralized consensus democracy’ (Lijphart 1968). Since the 1960s, secularisation and individualisation came to erode the social basis of Dutch society’s once pillarised structure. The role of religious institutions in society gradually decreased, their relation to the nation state was loosened, and a new citizenship-notion emerged to make a direct connection between individuals and the nation-state.

These changes notwithstanding, pillarisation has had an important influence on immigrant integration policies in two basic ways. The first way relates to how migrants themselves were ‘framed’. Whereas in other European countries immigrants were defined on the basis of class, race or colour, in the Netherlands, they were defined as ethno-cultural groups and ‘minorities’. Framing immigrants as minorities reflected the Dutch style of an accommodating pluralism: defining immigrants as another minority added to all those already existing. In addition, the pillarist tradition was reflected in how immigration and integration issues were coped with. The fragile coalition system of Dutch politics, a legacy in the history of pillarism, demanded that politically sensitive issues, such as immigration and integration, were depoliticised so as to avoid centripetal forces: ‘playing the race card’ for electoral gain, for example, could drive the political system apart (Guiraudon 2000). Especially in the 1970s and 1980s, these issues were systematically depoliticised (De Beus 1998; Hoppe 1987, 1993), accommodating conflict within relatively closed networks of policymakers, experts and ethnic elites. Issues ‘too hot to handle’ for politics were resolved through technocratic compromise (Rath 2001), creating a so-called ‘consensual style’ of using expertise (Renn 1995) as an authoritative source to create political consensus, rather than creating such a consensus through open political confrontation. But this style of policymaking started to break down in the 1990s, giving way to a much more conflictive style after the turn of the century.

The second way pillarisation has proven influential is in the institutionalisation of its laws and regulations. Steady secularisation of the Dutch population and
decreasing significance of pillar institutions and organisations notwithstanding, laws and regulations did not change as much, nor at the same pace. Although ethnic minorities themselves never were as cohesive, sizeable and strong as the traditional pillars in the Netherlands used to be, the institutional legacy provided minorities with opportunities for the development of some of their own institutions. Legal provisions of all kinds, disseminated on an equal basis, led, for instance, to the recognition and establishment of Islamic institutions in the Netherlands. State-subsidised Islamic schools and an Islamic Broadcasting organisation are other remarkable examples (Rath et al. 2001). It was only from the 1990s onwards that such developments became politically contested.

5.2 Welfare state regime

Another factor that has had a significant impact on immigration and integration policymaking is the development of the Dutch welfare state over the past decades. The Dutch welfare state regime has traditionally been classified as a conservative-corporatist type (Esping-Andersen 1990; Van der Veen & Trommel 1999). This conservative-corporatist type involves a relatively high level of decommodification of citizens from market forces and the strong involvement of state and civil society actors, such as churches, labour unions and employers unions, in welfare state provisions. This model does not encourage universal labour participation among individuals, but tends to preserve the prevailing socio-cultural structure of society as expressed in family, class, status and, to some extent, also gender. It was in the context of this welfare state regime that Dutch integration policies started to develop in the 1980s. This was reflected in a policy that did not see immigrants exclusively as part of market forces; it did not just permit, but also stimulated, them to become emancipated as recognised cultural groups in Dutch society.

The end of the 1980s reveals poor results vis-à-vis the socio-economic aspect of the EM Policy: there is a general, fact-supported consensus that EM policies in the field of labour were ineffective throughout the 1980s, expressing in continued high unemployment and the low labour market participation of immigrants. The position of constant weakness experienced by minorities was –

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17 There are several interpretations of these results. Some focus on the basic assumptions behind the combination of socio-economic and cultural emancipation. They maintain that the focus on socio-cultural emancipation would have contributed to the perpetuation of socio-economic inequality, in contrast to the government’s expectation otherwise. Rath (1991), for example, has argued that the social construction of ‘ethnic minorities’ was meant to hide the economic and institutional dimension of the presence of immigrants behind the ethno-cultural dimension. As such, government interference in the position of ‘minorities’ would have the adverse effect of perpetuating socio-economic disparities while legitimising socio-cultural differences; it would contribute to so-called ‘minority-formation’, rather than prevent it. In the same vein, Entzinger (2006) has recently labelled this the ‘misdiagnosis effect’ of EM Policy, as the focus on socio-cultural differences would obstruct a realistic diagnosis of class differentials. Others put forward the interpretation that the government has made specific choices in its policy: compared with the original recommendations of the 1979 report by the Scientific Council, the government would have reversed the relation between socio-cultural emancipation and
in a direct sense – due to the general restructuring of Dutch economy, with its particular consequences for immigrants, as well as the result of deficiencies in the Dutch welfare state. It was argued that the lenient regime of access to benefits had turned minorities too much into ‘welfare categories’, trapped in and overly dependent on state provisions (Scientific Council for Government Policy 1989). By then, the welfare state’s viability had also become questionable for a number of reasons. Thus, the issues of immigration and integration and the need for welfare state retrenchment (Entzinger 2006) were brought together, producing a new perspective. The same Scientific Council pleaded in several reports for a more activating type of welfare state (Ferrington 1997) of a more liberal regime. For immigrants, this meant encouraging them to ‘stand on their own feet’, as well as discussing their civic rights and duties as new citizens.

The rise of the 1990s Integration Policy was thus closely related to the general reform of the welfare state at the time, particularly involving a recalibration of the responsibilities of citizen, state and market. State interference vis-à-vis the socio-cultural position of immigrants gradually lost importance. Immigrants came to be treated more as ‘citizens’ endowed with specific civic responsibilities, who were also more exposed to market forces, and for which the policy facilitated citizens’ accommodation. Civic integration became a specific new instrument to ‘equip’ immigrants so they might live up to their civic responsibilities for integrating in Dutch society. The relation between welfare state reform and restrictive immigration policy was embodied in the Linkage Act: this law should exclude all illegal residents from facilities of the welfare state.

Recent policy has witnessed the addition of a new element to the logic of political discourse. Whereas the articulation of socio-cultural differences has traditionally been perceived as a ‘corroding effect’ on social cohesion, it may, in the same vein, be seen as undermining the type of social solidarity necessary to maintain a viable welfare state (Entzinger 2006). So now, the basic issue is no longer how to promote socio-economic participation in order to keep the welfare state affordable, but rather, how to maintain social cohesion and solidarity in order to generate sufficient support for the welfare state.

5.3 The macro-political context

Finally, there came changes in the Dutch macro-political context specifically connected to developments in the domains of immigration and integration. First of all, the political style of the Netherlands has transformed from its pillarist tradition of a politics of accommodation to a new style particularly pronounced since the socio-economic participation, arguing that an amelioration of the socio-cultural position of minorities would lead to an amelioration of their socio-economic position (Verwey-Jonker Institute. 2004). Still, others do not question the principles behind the policy; instead, they assert that the government simply lacked means and instruments to implement effective distributive policies in the domain of labour. The government had lost its direct influence on the distributive mechanisms of the labour market and was not able to mobilise its social partners to take effective action (Penninx 1996, 2006).
2002 so-called Fortuyn Revolt in Dutch politics. The style of politics has shifted from conflict accommodation and de-politicisation towards primacy of politics and a more confrontational political culture. From its inception, the Fortuyn Revolt was at odds with the accommodating Dutch style, dismissing it as an undemocratic form of ‘back-room politics’. And immigration and integration policy have become the playing fields for this new political style (Wansink 2004). Especially in light of these issues, a ‘politics of avoidance’ has been replaced by a ‘politics of confrontation’ (De Beus 1998). This new style has had serious consequences for actors such as experts and ethnic elites. For example, 2004 witnessed the fierce contestation of the role of experts in this policy domain. Politics and media criticism emerged on how the development of policy ideas might in fact be in the hands of scientists who have multiculturalist biases. The technocratic type of science-politics relations that would have characterised this domain in earlier periods was now dismissed as undemocratic. As a consequence, the consensual style of using expertise in policymaking and implementation was now replaced by a more selective ‘pick-and-choose’ strategy aiming at scientific expertise (Penninx 2005).

However, immigration and integration policies appear to have been as much a cause – as an effect – of macro-political developments, especially in recent years. Immigration and integration have been at the centre of the Fortuyn Revolt. For Pim Fortuyn, these issues provided a vehicle for political plans, which were turned into symbols for broader popular dissent as Dutch government and democracy malfunctioned (Wansink 2004). In the 2002 and 2003 Parliamentary elections, immigration and integration were, more than ever before, central electoral issues that not just the Pim Fortuyn Party, but all political parties, had to take a distinct stance on (Pellikaan & Trappenburg 2003). Failing integration policies and an alleged ignorance towards public concerns about immigration and integration became the greater symbols for a failing political system. In response, government and politics tended to politicise these issues more than ever before. This phenomenon has recently been described as the ‘articulation function’ (Verwey-Jonker Institute 2004: 201): politics must name and articulate the public’s sentiments and problems. Integration is here interpreted as encompassing something broader than mere immigrant integration, but namely, the integration of immigrants and natives within multicultural society (ibid: 197).

6. Conclusions

This paper has analysed the creation of immigration and integration policies in the Netherlands, distinguishing between internal dynamics in the two subsystems, the interaction between them and a number of external factors. Why did these policies developed as such in the Netherlands, and is the Dutch case exceptional or does it reflect a more general trend to be found across Europe?

The Dutch case has revealed a sequence in policymaking, from the 1970s’ ad hoc policy responses to a technocratic type of policymaking throughout the 1980s and 1990s, and finally, to the more symbolic politics that began in 2002. Initially, issues of immigration and the reception of newcomers were met with a
rather pragmatic, bottom-up approach. Welfare organisations and churches took care of most of the services for immigrants during the 1960s and 1970s, while businesses had an important role in the organisation of migration, especially when it came to labour migration. No official integration policy was developed until the 1980s, as this would not have concurred with the idea that the Netherlands was not a country of immigration. Consequently, government was to cope with the pressure of concrete problems in a rather piecemeal way, as opposed to rethink the principles underlying matters of immigration and integration; such debates were even systematically avoided.

A different mode of policymaking was adopted in the 1980s, following the recognition that issues of immigration and integration required a more systematic government approach. Immigration and integration policy were now embedded in more fully institutionalised, albeit separate, policy subsystems with a limited number of actors who were involved in a technocratic design of policy. As for labour migration, corporatist triangles of government, employers and trade unions that regulated migration policies were re instituted around the covenant policies. As for integration, government developed a strongly unitary coordination structure with a key role for the Home Affairs Department, and with the co-optation of ethnic elites and experts. These forms of policymaking involved a top-down design and pursuing a politics of de-politicisation, a delimiting of the debate, scaled down to a specific set of actors.

In the 1990s, this strong centralist practice changed. A trend of decentralisation is visible in the domain of integration. Local governments, particularly ones of the Netherlands’ largest cities, became more active, formulating their own local integration policies. Such policies addressed integration problems as they appeared on the local level, often approaching them more pragmatically than at the national level discourse. Tensions between local and national policies developed around certain issues, particularly immigration issues. The development of more explicit local integration policies in this period correlates with a shift from target group policies towards area-based policies. During the 1990s, immigration policies were primarily located at the national level, but at the same time, a trend of Europeanisation, privatisation and decentralisation (upwards, outwards and downwards) was also visible.

Finally, after the turn of the century, rapid changes took place. The topics of immigration and integration became a symbolic politics that were linked to broader issues in Dutch society that imbued them with for the power for popular dissent toward the political establishment. An unprecedented politicisation took place following the rise of Fortuyn in the Dutch political arena, which led to the articulation of popular ideas and sentiments concerning immigration and integration. As a result, the immigration and integration subsystems became more and more integrated, for restrictive immigration policies not only served the aim of facilitating integration, but tough integration policies worked towards the goal of discouraging immigration. These new policy developments are considered top-down in the sense that they particularly involve a recentralisation of policy formulation; integration was framed in response to national developments, rather than to the concerns of local governments or other local actors. However, this has also contributed to the growing gap, or ‘decoupling’, between policy formulation
and policy implementation; that is, between symbolic politics at the national level and a more pragmatic, troubleshooting approach at the local level.

In certain respect, the Dutch case’s development differs from other European countries. It contrasts with Great Britain, where immigration and integration were politicised much earlier, but where the mode of policymaking has continued to be bottom-up rather than top-down (Favell 1998). It is different from the German case as well, where politicisation was held off for considerable time, much like in the Netherlands, but where, until recently, a pragmatic approach of coping with integration problems persisted (Guiraudon 2000; Joppke 1999). On the other hand, similarities are found in the way French policymaking has developed: as in the Netherlands, a pragmatic approach to coping with problems was initially exchanged for a sub-systematic form of technocratic governance, eventually to be replaced by symbolic politics (Favell 1998). However, this development occurred at a much quicker pace: the subsystem of technocratic governance was already emerging in the 1970s with the politics of insertion, and a politicised form of symbolic politics showed up by the early 1980s following the rise of the Le Pen-movement (Feldblum 1999).

The perceived Dutch exceptionalism in immigration and integration policymaking stems in particular from the combination of a persistent top-down policy formulation and what was a relatively late politicisation of the topics. More than elsewhere, immigration and integration policies have been formulated mainly on the national level, within centralised and strongly institutionalised subsystems involving the participation of a limited number of actors. The scale of public debate was actively limited for a considerable time, thus evading the politicisation of these sensitive issues.

Our analysis has put forward some explanations for this specific Dutch exceptionalism. First of all, we analysed, in terms of an internal dynamics, how the subsystem form of governance could persist in the Netherlands for such an extended period of time. Given the societal definitions that separated immigration from integration, and thanks to the subsequent de-politicisation of the topics, specific policy coalitions could develop. In the domain of immigrant integration, iron triangles supported group-specific policies in the 1970s, to be succeeded in the next decade by the strongly centralised technocratic structure. In the domain of immigration, the topic has long been implicitly defined as a ‘non-issue’ that led to ad hoc reactive policies and coalitions in policymaking. This sub-system model became criticised in the course of the 1990s, but showed simultaneously a great resistance to change. It was after the turn of the millennium that this subsystem pattern of governance disappeared, that the two policy topics got tied up together – in a very specific way, no less – and then became issues of high politics.

Explaining the situation on an altogether different level, we explored external factors that may account for Dutch exceptionalism. First of all, the Dutch legacy of pillarism, in the form of a political culture of conflict accommodation and consensus searching, may explain why policymaking has for so long remained behind closed doors in the Netherlands. This history of pillarism contributed to the framing of immigrants as ‘minorities’, as well as to the initial development of a multicultural policy approach. It may also have contributed to the tendency to depoliticise issues such as immigration and integration that were ‘too hot to handle’ for politics. We have argued how the Fortuyn Revolt in Dutch politics that led to
the emergence of a more confrontational political style may be interpreted as much as a revolt against the legacy of pillarisation as against specific immigration and integration policies.

Furthermore, we have argued that changes in the Dutch welfare state – from a corporatist model to a neo-liberal one – have been influential, catalysing modifications in the policy objectives and target populations of policy. Finally, as immigration and integration became issues of electoral politics, they have merged with macro-political issues, such as a collective unease with the Dutch political establishment and concerns about national identity and social cohesion. As such, the issues have become symbols for a ‘New Politics’ that tries to regain popular legitimacy by articulating the voice of ‘the ordinary citizen’ and adopting a neo-conservative line of tough policies.

A crucial question concerns how the near future will develop vis-à-vis conflicts within the growing gap between these new politics and policies – predominantly manifested at the national level – and other partners in policymaking and implementation. Critique and resistance arrive from different sides: civil society organisations including churches, employers, trade unions and immigrant organisations, European and international institutions, but also particularly from local government pressing for approaches to immigration and integration that are less symbolic and more problem-solving.
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