4 The case of the Netherlands

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1 Introduction

In the post-war period, the Netherlands regarded itself an ‘overpopulated’ country. Both public opinion and government documents explicitly stated that the Netherlands was not – and should not become – an immigration country (Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Volksgezondheid 1970). To the contrary, emigration was openly encouraged through government policies and, between 1946 and 1972, more than half a million Dutch citizens emigrated to countries such as Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Nevertheless, during that same period, the Netherlands did in fact become an immigration country. Migration statistics show that from the beginning of the 1960s, with the sole exception of the depression of 1967, the country’s net migration balance was consistently positive until 2004, with immigrants arriving in different periods and for various reasons.

This chapter begins with an overview of migration waves to the Netherlands, provided more or less in chronological order. Following the introduction, the second section describes the evolution of Dutch immigration and integration policies over the years. The third section reconstructs the processes of immigration policymaking, while the fourth section deals with integration policymaking. The analysis considers the different processes, actors, levels and governance patterns that have influenced policies in each of these domains. The chapter’s fifth section compares the dynamics of the immigration and integration fields, evaluating their interaction and, in so doing, identifying two types of factors that shape their dynamics. While the fourth section focuses on the internal mechanisms of migration and integration, the sixth section emphasises the role of various external factors such as the welfare state policies, the political framework and the political climate. Finally, the chapter concludes with a summary of the Dutch case’s most salient characteristics.

The first migrants to arrive to the Netherlands were so-called repatriates who came from the Dutch East Indies, or what today are Indonesia and New Guinea. Their arrival was a consequence of the decolonisation process taking place in the former Dutch colonies. In total, this population
was estimated to comprise approximately 300,000 individuals in the years spanning 1946 to 1962. Most repatriates were of mixed Indonesian-Dutch descent, being entitled to settle in the Netherlands on the grounds of their Dutch citizenship. In general, they were well educated and had strong socio-cultural and national orientations towards the Netherlands. Their integration was helped by the active and assimilationist reception and settlement policy that was transpiring under the expanding economy and labour market conditions of the 1960s (Van Amersfoort 1982; Van Amersfoort & Van Niekerk 2006).

In 1951, under pressure of political developments in Indonesia, a second group of migrants arrived to the Netherlands. This group comprised Moluccan soldiers from the former colonial armed forces and their family members. Totalling 12,500 individuals, the migrants themselves and the Dutch government both regarded their stay as temporary because, after all, the Moluccans had intended to return to a free republic of the Moluccas. As such, conditions for this group’s adjustment to Dutch society were very unfavourable. Various contingencies included the government’s policy to keep the group intact (in view of their anticipated return migration), the group’s own seemingly firm intent to return to their native land, as well as their dismissal from the army, low level of education and lack of Dutch language skills (Bartels 1989). Since a free republic of the Moluccas never came to exist, the migrants’ desired return did not materialise. In 1978, after a series of violent occupations of buildings and hijackings of trains by Moluccan youth, policy objectives were explicitly altered (Entzinger 1985; Penninx 1979). Social, cultural and political orientations among Moluccans also changed (Bartels 1989; Steijlen 1996; Smeets & Steijlen 2006). Today, Moluccan immigrants and their descendants in the Netherlands are an estimated population of 42,300 (CBS 2002: 15).

The post-colonial migrations described above were followed by demand-driven labour migration from the late 1950s on. Already by the mid-1950s, post-war reconstruction efforts started to produce labour shortages in certain sectors and guest workers were recruited to fill vacancies. Most were jobs for unskilled or low-skilled workers: first came Italians, followed by Spaniards and Yugoslavs and, still later, Turks and North Africans. The first oil crisis of 1973 led to a factual recruitment stop for workers, though this did not mean a decrease in immigration. Although return migration for Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, Greek and Yugoslav migrants was quite high during the 1970s, the Turkish and Moroccan response differed. From the mid-1970s onwards, these workers brought their families to the Netherlands. Meanwhile, from the mid-1980s onwards, other migrants came as spouses for the young Turkish and Moroccan immigrants who had settled in the Netherlands. By 1 January 2006, the number of residents of Turkish background in the Netherlands was 364,300, 54 per cent of whom were born in Turkey (these residents are thus considered first-generation
migrants) and 46 per cent of whom had at least one parent who was born in Turkey (thus being considered second-generation migrants). By 1 January 2006, Dutch residents of Moroccan background were counted at 323,200, 52 per cent of whom comprise first-generation migrants and 48 per cent, second-generation. The large majority of this population had also acquired Dutch nationality.

The next newcomers to the Netherlands were Surinamese. Up until 1975, Surinam formed part of the Netherlands Kingdom and migration was unregulated. Immigration from Surinam intensified from 1973 to 1975, during the years before the country’s independence, and again from 1979 to 1980, prior to expiration of the transitional agreement on the settlement of mutual subjects of Surinam and the Netherlands. The political turmoil in Surinam in 1982 and the country’s political instability thereafter brought new immigrants to the Netherlands, although at a lower rate than during the aforementioned peak periods (Van Amersfoort & Van Niekerk 2006). The population of Surinamese origin in the Netherlands, as of 1 January 2006, amounted to 331,900, 56 per cent of whom would be considered the first generation and 44 per cent the second generation. A great majority of present-day Surinamese residents have Dutch nationality.

Migration from the Dutch Antilles has not been hampered by regulations because the islands are part of the Netherlands, and Antilleans therefore hold Dutch nationality. Migration movements have long been rather fluid, and return migration among the population is relatively high. As of 1 January 2006, the number of residents of Antillean origin in the Netherlands totalled 129,700. This group’s relatively recent arrival is reflected in the high percentage comprising the first generation, at 62 per cent, and a comparatively small percentage comprising the second generation, at 38 per cent.

Since the mid-1980s, admitted asylum seekers and other refugee populations have become an increasingly significant share of the Netherlands’ immigrant population. Such groups first began arriving from Vietnam, Sri Lanka and the Horn of Africa, and later, from the Middle East and the Balkans. As of 1 January 2006, admitted refugees and asylum applicants to the Netherlands most frequently came from: Iraq (43,800), Afghanistan (37,200), Iran (28,700), Somalia (19,900) and Ghana (19,500).

In addition to the above-mentioned categories of migrants, other immigrants continued to settle in the Netherlands. As of 1 January 2006, the total number of Dutch residents whose background would be considered one of the EU-25 countries rose to 817,000. The number of residents with a background in one of the so-called ‘Western’ countries (including those in the EU) is 1.42 million, or 8.7 per cent of the total population. ‘Non-Western allochthones’ numbered at 1.72 million, or 10.5 per cent of the total population.
Despite the fact that since World War II the Netherlands has not regarded itself an immigration country, many immigrants have in fact settled in the nation. In all, there are now 691,500 aliens (i.e. persons not having Dutch nationality) living in the Netherlands (4.2 per cent of the country’s total population). Of the total population, 1.6 million people (9 per cent) were born outside the Netherlands; these individuals are considered ‘immigrants’ in the strict sense of the term. Meanwhile, 3.15 million (19.3 per cent) are, in the broad definition of the word, _allochthones_ (i.e. first- and second-generation migrants). These newcomers to Dutch society are scattered throughout the country’s geography. To illustrate, in 2000, 40 per cent of all _allochthones_ were living in one of the Netherlands’ four largest cities (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague, Utrecht). By contrast, only 13 per cent of the total Dutch population were recorded as residents of these cities. In general, immigrants to the Netherlands have tended to settle in larger cities, most notably, in the western conurbation of the Netherlands (CBS 2001; Garssen 2006: 19).

2 The evolution of migration policies

The fact that the Netherlands did not see itself as an immigration country is manifested in the various ways the nation went about naming factual immigrants. People from the Dutch East Indies were labelled ‘repatriates’; from Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles,2 ‘Kingdom fellows’ (rijksgenoten in Dutch); and from Southern Europe, Morocco and Turkey, ‘guest workers’. This same national self-perception was also expressed in the noted absence of integration policies for alien newcomers throughout the 1960s and 1970s (Blok Commission 2004). Apart from repatriates from the Dutch East Indies who were, after all, Dutch citizens, all other newcomers’ stays were seen as temporary, thereby deeming sufficient what were merely ad hoc policies for accommodation and return.

However, the Netherlands’ reputation of not being an immigration country contradicted the undeniable fact that large immigrant groups were staying in the nation for long periods of time, if not permanently. This led to mounting tensions in the mid-1970s (Entzinger 1975), and produced a gradual shift in integration policies. Since the beginning of the 1980s, the presence of long-term factual immigrants began to be recognised and it therefore became a major political goal to integrate such individuals into Dutch society. This led to designation and implementation of the first integration policies in the Netherlands, collectively referred to as the Ethnic Minorities (EM) Policy. During the 1980s, EM Policy started, much as it had in Sweden, as a welfare state policy to stimulate equality and equity among a society’s vulnerable groups. It was developed in a relatively depoliticised political context and laid down in a number of governmental documents
Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken 1980, 1981, 1983). In its implementation phase during the 1980s, this policy led to significant policy activity across many domains.

Although the presence of large immigrant groups was recognised, immigration was still seen as a historically unique event. It was, moreover, believed that further immigration should be restricted or prevented (Penninx, Garcés-Mascareñas & Scholten 2005). The policy shift towards integration thus did not imply that the current immigration was recognised any differently. Alongside the realisation of integration policies, the 1980s and 1990s implemented and enforced more restrictive immigration policies vis-à-vis labour migration, and later on, family migration and asylum. Since there was no discussion on whether the Netherlands should be an immigration country or not, throughout the two decades, increasingly restrictive immigration policies were formulated and applied in a rather de-politicised context. In other words, compared to integration policies, new immigration regulations were, until recently, passed with little political debate and relatively low implication of different political and social actors.

Towards the end of the 1980s, the public and the political discourses started to look critically at EM Policy. The policy was seen as having failed in important areas of labour and education, while also being criticised for its common concern (target groups and their emancipation) and its ‘overemphasis on cultural aspects’. This resulted in the formulation of integration policies throughout the 1990s. The new policy document known as ‘Contourennota’ (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken 1994) accentuated the individual over the group, emphasised the socio-economic aspects of integration over the cultural and/or religious ones and stressed, more than before, the civic responsibilities of individuals in integration processes. This led to new directions of policy implementation during the 1990s including, among others, a national policy of introductory courses for newcomers in Dutch society and area-based policies (i.e. urban policies).

The beginning of the new century prepared for another shift in policy orientation that was by then embedded in full-fledged politicisation of the topics of immigration and integration. That integration processes and policies had fundamentally failed and that social cohesion of Dutch society had become endangered became the dominant perception. National election campaigns in 2002 framed these topics in advantageously exploitative lights and thus reinforced politicisation of the themes. Only fanning the fire were internationally and nationally scoped events, such as 9/11 and the 2004 murder of Dutch film-maker Theo Van Gogh by a young Dutch-born radical Muslim in Amsterdam. With the formulation of Integration Policy New Style (Ministerie van Justitie 2003), a series of proposals and measures were developed to significantly bring down immigration figures (the Netherlands had a negative net migration balance for the three consecutive
years following 2004), and to introduce mandatory forms of integration for newcomers and oldcomers alike. Some observers have called these practices neo-assimilationist.

3 Immigration policymaking

In contradistinction to integration policies in the Netherlands, immigration policies have been neither comprehensive nor coordinated. This has been due to the lack of a clear policymaking structure, which has thus led to the formulation of labour, family and asylum migration policies by different ministries, institutions and other political and social actors. Also at play have been varying dynamics, all transpiring at distinct moments in time. For instance, while the Ministry of Justice is responsible for general admission of foreigners and the granting of their residence permits, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment is assigned to deal particularly with labour migration, and the Ministry of Culture, Recreation and Social Work has competency over reception of asylum seekers. Consequentially, any description of Dutch immigration policy must refer to three distinctly assigned processes: labour, family and asylum. Interactions between these three processes have taken place over the course of time, but their interrelations have neither been stable nor held within a unitary structure. The following sections outline these developments and detail their points of convergence.

3.1 Labour migration

By the mid-1950s, the post-war reconstruction efforts of the Netherlands had led to labour shortages in various sectors. This resulted in the recruitment of foreign workers to fill these vacancies, which were mainly jobs for unskilled or low-skilled workers. To this end, recruitment agreements were signed with sending countries such as Italy (1960), Spain (1961), Portugal (1963), Turkey (1964), Greece (1966), Morocco (1969) and Yugoslavia (1970). These arrangements were formulated in consensual agreement among the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, employers’ organisations and trade unions. As in other Western European countries, social partners and the state generally accepted the fact that continuous economic growth could only be achieved by relying on (presumably) temporary foreign labour.

Recruitment activities came to an end, however, upon onset of the economic recession that followed the first oil crisis in 1973. This was more the result of a lack of employers’ interest in new foreign workers than the consequence of an explicit immigration policy (De Lange 2007). Unlike in France and Germany, measures to force migrant workers to return home
were never implemented in the Netherlands. The Dutch government’s proposal to introduce a return bonus for those who would return voluntarily was broadly rejected. And while, from 1973 onwards, the Netherlands proclaimed itself closed to labour migration, this declaration was more a matter of rhetoric than factual policy. Labour migration policies (the Labour of Foreign Workers Act from 1979 to 1995, and the Labour of Aliens Act from 1995 onwards) continued to channel the entrance of those workers deemed beneficial to the Dutch labour market. In a new economic context characterised by a loss of employment in industry and a parallel expansion of the service sector, these policies were meant to restrict the entrance of low-skilled foreign workers while channelling that of high-skilled immigrants, often from highly industrialised countries (Böcker & Clermonts 1995).

In contrast to the 1950s and 1960s when corporatist structures were fully functioning, labour migration policies were formulated by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, with little cooperation from trade unions and employers. For instance, the Labour of Foreign Workers Act was passed in 1979 despite criticisms by both employers’ organisations and trade unions. The weakening of the corporatist structure allowed Parliament, and hence its vying political parties, to gain clout in labour migration policymaking. The parliamentary discussions on the Labour of Foreign Workers Act of 1979 illustrate how labour immigration policies were increasingly created by the government and discussed at length in Parliament. Unlike previous measures, this new law was widely debated. Left-wing parties, left-wing liberals and the liberal party were opposed to the law, arguing that it would negatively affect the position of foreign workers and institutionalise unequal treatment.

By the end of the 1980s, persistent labour shortages in particular economic sectors forced the Dutch government to deal with the demand for foreign labour in a more structured fashion. As a consequence of this, the Dutch Employment Organisation, together with trade unions and employers, started to manage temporary labour migration through so-called ‘covenants’. These tripartite agreements permitted workers in particular economic sectors to be temporarily admitted into the country, while also anticipating the availability of newly trained, qualified Dutch workers. Contrary to what would be expected, however, these agreements did not always lead to more liberal admission policy (De Lange 2004). In terms of policymaking, these covenants reinstated the corporatist tripartite body.

Parallel to measures designed to control the admission of foreign workers, the Dutch government has aimed to reduce irregular immigration since the early 1990s. The Linkage Act (1998) became centrepiece to the principle of an ‘integrated immigration policy’ (Pluymen 2004: 76). This measure made all social security benefits contingent upon an immigrant’s legal residence status, including rights and access to secondary or higher
education, housing, rent subsidy, handicapped facilities and health care. Driving this act was the assumption that exclusion of access to public services would help push back irregular migration.

While previous measures to reduce irregular migration passed with little public discussion, beyond Parliament, the Linkage Act generated widespread protest from doctors, teachers, legal experts, prominent politicians and representatives from a broad range of public, semi-private and private organisations. Representatives of local governments also campaigned against the new law and seemed to steer a course for non-enforcement. In general terms, the new law was claimed to be unnecessary, immoral and unworkable. This general opposition – in contrast to the ramifications of creating other labour migration policies – produced a number of substantial alterations to the bill. For instance, professionals were not forced to report irregular immigrants to the Aliens Department; restrictions concerning education for children were lifted; and whereas irregular immigrants would initially have only been entitled to medical care in ‘acute and threatening situations’, this specification was eventually superseded by the prospect of requiring ‘imperative medical treatment’.

Moreover, in its implementation, the Linkage Act led to the inclusion of other actors. First of all, private actors became master-workers of its implementation, since it was they who were to control the access to social services. Having private actors participate in migration management meant they could simultaneously work to influence the actual process of implementation. For instance, various studies (Van der Leun 2003, 2006; Pluymen 2004) have shown how workers in the domain of social assistance and housing have displayed a much more accepting attitude towards the Linkage Act than doctors and teachers who, in contrast, might tend towards letting their professional ethics prevail over new regulations. Secondly, the exclusion of undocumented immigrants from social services led to the shift of new support activities downwards, both in the direction of local authorities and out to churches and other support organisations. In other words, local funds and churches, societal organisations and private individuals came forward to support irregular immigrants in those services no longer being covered by the Dutch state.

3.2 Family migration

Throughout the 1960s and early 1970s, the assumption that labour migration in the Netherlands was temporary led to relatively strict regulations regarding family reunification. Although family immigration was not yet a main preoccupation during the 1970s, when evoked in parliamentary debates, the issue was discussed within a framework of highly moral discourse (Bonjour 2006: 4). In particular, Christian parties regularly emphasised the importance of taking into account the ‘human’ and the ‘social’
aspects of labour migration, referring to the ‘forced’ separation of guest workers from their families as ‘extremely painful’ and a source of ‘suffering’ (quoted in ibid.). Despite explicitly voiced concerns over family unity, the government did not alter family migration regulations, arguing that circumstances unfortunately did not allow for less ‘strict policies’ (ibid.: 5).

In response to the first report of the Scientific Council for Government Policy (1979), in 1983, the government published a memorandum on minorities. Entitled ‘Minderhedennota’ (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken 1983), this memorandum accepted the permanency of immigrants’ stay as a starting point for integration policies. Protecting the unity of the immigrant family thus went unquestioned. In principle, this new approach made the family part of the integration process. And in practice, family reunification (i.e. the bringing over of spouses and children of resident families) peaked in the early 1980s. When in the same year the Ministry of Justice decided to introduce restrictions to family formation (i.e. bringing over new marriage partners), fierce resistance immediately came from Dutch progressive parties (PvdA, GroenLinks, SP, D66), who argued that the measure undermined the principle of equal treatment at the heart of the new minorities policy. In this regard, liberal family migration policies were part and parcel of EM Policy, particularly when it came to emphasising socio-economic integration vis-à-vis migrants’ own cultural identity.

The shift in the early 1990s, however, from a group-oriented approach to one focusing on individual integration, caused a turn away from the principles of protecting family unity. This neglected the family’s key role in the development of cultural identity and integration, for the sake of fostering protective measures to promote social cohesion in society (Van Walsum 2002: 143). In other words, family migration started to be seen as a problem for the integration of individuals. This reasoning justified restrictive family migration policies. As presented in the media and stated in many public debates, a broad majority within Parliament believed that, due to a lack of knowledge and skills, those newcomers who immigrated within the framework of family formation or reunification would, if not fail to integrate, at least retard the integration process. A contrast to the early 1980s, in the 1990s and 2000s, more restrictive family migration measures were thus introduced with little debate.

As family migration regulations became more and more restrictive, international treaty obligations, particularly article 8 of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR)’s European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Liberties, became an increasingly important counter reference. To prevent violations to the right of family life, a clause was introduced in 1994 to the guidelines for police officers known as ‘Instructions for the Aliens Police’. It stated that the government could – in cases of ‘compelling reasons of a humanitarian nature’ (cited in Bonjour 2006: 15) – use its own discretion to grant admission to aspiring family members,
even if predetermined conditions went unmet. As Bonjour observed, this demonstrates how ECHR article 8 came to be considered an external constraint on national policy options. Not only was this a contrast to the ethical and ideological considerations presented by Dutch parliamentarians in the 1970s (ibid.: 16), but it also introduced an important new, external actor in Dutch family migration policymaking.

The current dominant discourse that family migration is a potential threat for integration is most clearly embodied in a new law passed in 2005. This law requires non-Dutch family members of residents who want to immigrate to pass an exam that tests their basic knowledge of the Dutch language as well as how well informed they are about Dutch society. The exam must be taken in the country of origin and is a requirement for permission to enter the Netherlands on the basis of family reunification. However, a number of recent verdicts by the ECHR pose significant challenges to this requirement. In particular, the ECHR has emphasised the notion that states must allow parents and children the freedom to live together. Moreover, a recent jurisprudence has stressed the need to respect the right of both married and unmarried couples to continue cohabiting, even when issues of immigration or public order are at stake (Van Walsum 2004). What can thus be concluded is that family migration policymaking has gone beyond the scope of the Dutch political arena, bringing in the EU and international human rights organisations as potentially important actors.

3.3 Asylum migration

Asylum policies in the Netherlands have been developed, mainly on an ad hoc basis, following the increase of asylum seekers during the 1980s and 1990s. From 1977 to 1987, annual quotas were established to determine the number of refugees invited to resettle in the Netherlands. However, the growing numbers of spontaneous asylum seekers, a housing shortage and increased costs that municipalities had to pay for social and other benefits led to 1987’s introduction of the Regulation on the Reception of Asylum Seekers (ROA). The first aim of ROA was to curtail giving asylum seekers access to independent housing and social benefits, and instead to offer them central reception and modest sums of pocket money. Muus (1997) observed that ROA, described as ‘austere but humane’, was not only instituted to relieve the growing housing and financial problems of the major cities but also – and above all – to prevent the Netherlands from becoming an attractive destination country. This shift made evident how reception policies were in fact, and in perception, a significant component for managing asylum flows.

Due to the growing number of newly arriving asylum seekers from 1989 onwards, ROA became a policy of providing minimal first accommodation,
yet within a few years it became overburdened. In 1990, for example, the
Ministry of Welfare, Health and Culture, which was in charge of the recep-
tion of asylum seekers, ‘tried to solve the problem by means of buying or
renting holiday bungalows and caravans and finding more municipalities
that were prepared to accommodate asylum seekers’ (Muus 1990: 47).
Consequently introduced in 1992 was the New Admission and Reception
Model for Asylum Seekers (NTOM). An important difference found in
NTOM was that asylum seekers would no longer be accommodated by de-
centralised ROA housing within municipalities, and municipalities would
henceforth only bear responsibility for the reception and integration of
those who had passed asylum procedures, namely status-holders and the
gedoogden (persons with a temporary expulsion waiver).

Moreover, in the early 1990s, the Ministry of Justice introduced several
measures to reduce the number of asylum requests. First and foremost, this
policy was manifested in measures taken to prevent asylum seekers from
even arriving in the Netherlands. For instance, the country’s increasing re-
fusal to grant visas – though not exclusive to asylum seekers – limited en-
trances and hence constrained applications for asylum in the Netherlands.
Secondly, introduced in 1994 was a temporary status referred to as a
Conditional Residence Permit (VVTV). This new status only carries with
it a relatively weak provisional residence title and provides hardly any
access to public facilities. Thirdly, measures were introduced to restrict ac-
cess to asylum proceedings. As other European countries have done so, in
1994, the Netherlands introduced procedures to expedite certain asylum
applications, such as ‘manifestly unfounded applications’, those that were
filed by people coming from safe countries of origin or safe transit coun-
tries where they could have applied for asylum, multiple applications and
other statuses. What’s more, people who had applied elsewhere were ex-
cluded. In the same vein, the new Aliens Act of 2000 introduced a single
temporary status for the first three years of stay in the country, a limit to
the right to appeal a negative decision and the duty of the rejected asylum
seeker to leave the Netherlands within a fixed period.

Analysing the process of policymaking that began in 1986 and which re-
sulted in ROA’s declaration, Puts (1991) observed that government is not a
monolithic actor but, rather, a fragmented organisation. The seeming frag-
mentation of the government may be explained by the fact that its various
ministries have different considerations and concerns. Such examples in-
clude the Ministry of Welfare, Health and Culture’s manageability of re-
ception, the Ministry of Interior’s defence of municipal interests and the
Ministry of Justice’s legal concerns over admission and deportation proce-
dures. But on top of such preoccupations, different dilemmas and ambiva-
 lent positions within the ministries have also had to be negotiated. What’s
more, relations between party politics and ministries have wavered. These
differences were finally resolved through compromises, thanks to various
formal and informal decision-making rules and as the consequence of particular triggering events.

Since asylum migration policies have been evidently ad hoc and based on arguments of manageability, rather than on grounds of principles, the general debate around their formulation and implementation has been highly technocratic. In this context, the creation of asylum migration policies has mainly taken place within the government, while there has been relatively little debate in Parliament. Opposition from lawyers and interest groups has hardly been a successful means to prevent the introduction of a series of restrictive measures. Neither cities nor local government have directly participated in asylum migration policymaking, although they have been incorporated into the implementation of reception policies process. As with labour and family migration, a lack of debate and the relatively low impact of different political and social actors in policymaking led to a subsiding politicisation of integration and immigration issues. In particular, two sets of measures aroused concerns and rising responses from external actors.

In the first place, there was progressive exclusion of failed asylum seekers from social benefits and the government’s insistence on their return to countries of origin. This kind of measure was directly opposed by local authorities who had to deal with these residents in day-to-day practice. Notably, in February 2004, when the Tweede Kamer, Dutch Parliament’s lower house, accepted the Minister for Immigration and Integration’s proposal to expel up to 26,000 failed asylum seekers over the following three years, many big cities opposed the policy, arguing for their settlement and integration into Dutch society. Neither did front-line organisations such as the Central Reception of Asylum Seekers (COA) commonly comply with the Minister’s rulings on this issue. Finally, church organisations and a strong network of the approximately 10,000 volunteers of the Dutch Refugee Council came to provide support for these failed asylum seekers. This opposition by local authorities and grass-roots organisations illustrates the tension between policy formation at the national level and the often clashing effects that surface once policy is implemented.

The second set of measures was aimed at reducing the number of asylum applications and the duration of asylum procedures. These measures have aroused immediate concerns not only from refugee advocacy groups and academics within the Netherlands, but also from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and Human Rights Watch (HRW). One basic criticism was that the measures resulted in a ‘routine infringement of asylum seekers’ most basic rights’ (HRW 2003). Other concrete disapproval was voiced over the erosion of the Convention Status, the accelerated procedures and the limit on the right to appeal a negative decision. This last measure is considered incompatible with ECHR case law. According to the ECHR, an alien’s claim that his or her deportation
would result in a violation of ECHR Convention’s article 3 must be rigorously scrutinised by the domestic courts. The fact that in 2003 the Council of State of the Netherlands replied to these concerns, by arguing that it does apply the rigorous scrutiny required by the ECHR, again illustrates how international and supranational institutions are becoming part of the policymaking process at the national level.

4 Integration policymaking

In comparative perspective, integration policymaking in the Netherlands followed different timing than that of most other European countries, except Sweden. Earlier than elsewhere, the different experiences of immigration form former colonies and labour migration resulted in systematic efforts to better accommodate newcomers whose stay was more permanent than originally expected.

4.1 Policies of the 1970s and before

Because the Netherlands did not regard itself an immigration country, those who happened to be there, such as the guest workers, were expected to return to their home countries (Scientific Council 2001). As a result, ad hoc measures for accommodation were the rule, and reception facilities were short-term-oriented and scarce (Penninx 1996). (The only exception to this rule was the assimilation policy for repatriates from the former Dutch East Indies who were seen and treated as compatriots.) Accordingly, the two main policy goals concerned the remigration and accommodation of guest workers to Dutch society for as long as they would stay in the Netherlands. Maintaining migrants’ own identity was thus considered important, but in one and the same mind frame that viewed migrants as planning to return to their countries of origin.

In the 1970s, mainly within the Ministry for Culture, Recreation and Social Work, a welfare policy was developed to respond to the needs of some vulnerable groups. They included guest workers, asylum seekers, migrants from Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles, Moluccans and the itinerant Dutch people locally known as woonwagenbewoners, literally meaning ‘caravan dwellers’. Within this policy, many private institutions were initiated and henceforth subsidised to provide welfare services for each of these groups (Molleman 2004; Blok Commission 2004; Penninx 1979). Nonetheless, many guest workers’ facilities, such as housing, were supposed to be offered by the companies employing them. Increasing family reunions, along with the concentration of guest workers and their families in specific urban areas, pushed local authorities to get involved. Often municipalities took their own initiatives in the domains of housing, education,
health care and welfare, thus pressuring the national authorities to recognise – and to finance – these measures. One of the most notable measures of the decade was the Mother Tongue and Culture Programme (1974), which was explicitly aimed at the reintegration of migrant guest workers’ children in their societies of origin. But, contrary to all prognoses, many guest workers did not return to their sending countries after the recruitment stopped and the economic crisis that followed in the late 1970s. In fact, migrant communities, particularly those from North Africa and Turkey, grew significantly through family and asylum migration. The rising unemployment rates of migrant workers and the arrival of their families brought demands for specific measures onto the political agenda. For instance, schools with high numbers of immigrant students demanded funds for specific reception courses, creating the Landelijke Commissie Voortgezet Onderwijs aan Anderstaligen, a national federation lobbying for the secondary education of non-native speakers of Dutch.

The administrative layout of the policies described above was problematic. Different ministries were involved for individual target groups and policy domains. For example, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, which was responsible for the labour market and work permits, tended to hold onto the idea of the temporality of migration. The Ministry of Culture, Recreation and Social Work, which oversaw matters of general welfare, was directly confronted with the problems of reception, while becoming more aware of the growing tensions between supposed temporary stay and factual long-term settlement and thus pleaded for change. There were consequent difficulties in coordinating the measures among ministries and, what’s more, a certain rivalry existed (Hoppe 1987; Blok Commission 2004; Penninx 1979; Scholten & Timmermans 2004).

It was also during the 1970s that scientists started to get involved. As one of the first to do so, Entzinger (1975) drew attention to the gap between de facto permanent settlement of immigrants in the country and the policymaker’s view of temporary migration. Entzinger underscored the risks of ignoring the problem. In 1976, the Ministry of Culture, Recreation and Social Work instated the Advisory Committee on Research on Minorities, which united academics in this domain within a policy frame.

In sum, there had been a mixture of pressures for policy change coming from public opinion, the media, local authorities, academics and civil servants. It was the Scientific Council for Government Policy’s report ‘Ethnic Minorities’ (1979) that acted as a catalyst: it pleaded to fully recognise that a number of immigrant groups had settled permanently in the Netherlands and to start an active policy aimed at the integration of what it called ‘ethnic minorities’ in society. In a first reaction to the report (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken 1980), the government accepted the advice, decided to develop an EM Policy and to install a strong coordinating structure for such policy within the Ministry of Home Affairs. The new direction of
policies gained full parliamentary support, which was symbolised in a government coalition whereby the Christian Democrats and the Liberals nominated oppositional Labour Party politician Henk Molleman as director of the coordination department within the Ministry of Home Affairs.

4.2 Ethnic Minorities Policy in the 1980s

The basic rationale of EM Policy was that specific groups in Dutch society that had low socio-economic status and were additionally perceived as ethnically and/or culturally different would run the risk of becoming permanently marginal groups in society. Low-status immigrant groups thus became target groups of this policy, as did some natives such as the *woonwagenbewoners* and the long-established gypsies. The main principles of the new EM Policy can be summarised in three points:

1) The policy aimed to achieve equality of ethnic minorities in the socio-economic domain; inclusion and participation in the political domain; and equity in the domain of culture and religion within constitutional conditions.

2) The policy was targeted at specific groups regarded as being at risk of becoming distinct minorities: guest workers, Moluccans, Surinamese and Dutch Antilleans, refugees, gypsies and *woonwagenbewoners*.

3) The policy was to cover all relevant domains and ministries, while being strongly anchored in the governmental organisation.

As a result, the Directie Coordinatie Integratiebeleid Minderheden, a department for the coordination of minorities policy, was created within the general directorate of Home Policies, as opposed to within that of Security and Order (Molleman 2004). The motivation for placing the coordinating unit in the Ministry of Home Affairs was that it was a policy for new citizens, and therefore the ministry responsible for cities and provinces should be in charge.

Emancipation through socio-economic equality and cultural and religious equity was seen as an important means to prevent ethnic minority formation among these groups. Thus, their participation in all spheres of society, including the political, was to be encouraged. An important assumption was that development of identity – both at the individual and group level – would promote the minority’s emancipation within the community and would also have a positive influence on its integration in broader society (Blok Commission 2004). The 1980s have come to be seen as the heyday of EM Policy. Irrespective of how the outcomes are evaluated, the range of policy initiatives is impressive, especially when compared to other European countries during the same period.

In the legal-political domain, for example, the Netherlands’ full legislation was scrutinised for discriminatory elements on the basis of nationality,
race and religion (Beune & Hessels 1983), and many changes were made. Anti-discrimination legislation was reinforced, and a structure for discrimination-related reporting and consultation was established. What’s more, in 1985, active and passive voting rights for alien residents were introduced. In 1986, Dutch nationality law was modified to include more elements of jus soli, thus making it much easier for alien immigrants and their children to become Dutch citizens. Over the course of time, a consultation structure for all target groups of EM Policy was established to give people a voice in matters regarding their position in society. Subsidising EM organisations, both at national and local levels, and trying to engage them in integration efforts became an important strategic aspect of policy implementation.

In the socio-economic domain, three themes were key: the labour market/unemployment, education and housing. In EM Policy, several initiatives were taken to combat high unemployment rates, including a law inspired by the Canadian Employment Equity Act and even affirmative action by national and local governmental employers during the period 1986 through 1993. The effects of these measures, however, have proven weak.

Measures in the domain of education were an important part of EM Policy from the beginning. By far, most of the policy’s financial resources were spent in this domain, predominantly on measures to compensate arrears of immigrant children in the regular educational system. That was implemented by a point system in which schools received significantly more money for children of immigrant background than for standard middle-class, native pupils. Immigrant and minority children were counted at a rate of 1.9, while native children of low socio-economic background, at a rate of 1.25 (the standard was 1). Apart from this general financial assistance to schools, a relatively small part was also dedicated to specific measures, including education in the native language and culture of immigrants.

As for housing, a fundamental change was introduced in 1981 that allowed legally residing aliens full access to social housing, something that had been previously denied. Given the fact that social housing comprises the majority of all lodging in big cities in the Netherlands, this measure had very positive consequences for the position of alien immigrants.

In the domain of culture, language and religion, EM Policy may be called ‘multiculturally avant la lettre’. The aim to develop migrants’ culture, in keeping with EM Policy philosophy, was left to the groups and their organisations, and delimited by laws for general adherence in the Netherlands. The role of the government was defined as that of facilitating, i.e. creating opportunities for minorities, such as special media programmes in immigrant languages.

When it came to faith, ‘new religions’ could legally claim facilities, such as denominational schools and broadcasting resources, on the same
conditions as established religions. The outcome was the relatively quick institutionalisation of Islam (Rath, Penninx, Groenendijk & Meijer 2001).

Throughout the late 1980s, disappointment in EM Policy was growing, but it was only by the early 1990s that it became the topic of intense public debate and surrounding criticisms. The first harsh critique of EM Policy was formulated in a report by the Scientific Council for Government Policy (1989). Briefly stated, its message was that too little progress was being made in two crucial domains: labour market and education. This evaluation intimated another criticism: too much attention was being given to issues of multiculturalism and the subsidisation of organisations. It was feared that this imbalance of attention could result in hindering – rather than enhancing – individual participation to better labour market and educational opportunities. The subsequent advice of the Scientific Council (1989) was to make more effort in the key areas of labour and education, and to do so with more compulsory measures. ‘Obligations of migrants should be more balanced with the extended rights’ was the message; policies should focus less on cultural rights and facilities.

Other elements of criticism were later added. For one, Frits Bolkestein, then Liberal Party leader and head of the political opposition in Dutch Parliament, suggested in a public speech in 1991 that Islam formed a threat to liberal democracy. He also intimated that it was a hindrance to the integration of immigrants, and that immigrant integration should be handled, in Bolkestein’s words, ‘with more courage’.

4.3 Integration policy in the 1990s

Policy did not change immediately in response to the criticisms, but sown were the seeds for a different conception to grow later. A first distinct change in policy focus was found in the ‘Contourennota’ (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken 1994). In this new document, a renewed integration policy with a more ‘republican’ character was adopted, focusing on ‘good citizenship’ and responsibility for their own situation as guiding principles. The argument was that citizenship entails not only rights but also duties, and that each citizen must be active and responsible for himself or herself. In accordance with advice from the 1989 report of the Scientific Council for Government Policy, this new ‘integration policy’ reflected three main deviations from EM Policy: 1) a shift away from target groups to individuals who are in a disadvantaged position; 2) a strong focus on the socio-economic incorporation through labour market and education measures; 3) a shift away from cultural and multicultural policies as well as from the strong reliance on immigrant organisations.

The social-democrat victory in the national elections of 1994 led to the so-called Purple Coalition: the Labour Party (PvdA) together with the conservative liberals (VVD) and left-wing liberals (D66). This meant that the
cabinet chose to put ‘the delicate cultural dimension outside of the field and to focus on the economic activation of individual migrants’ (Scholten & Timmermans 2004). The focus on economic integration of individual immigrants recommended by the 1989 Scientific Council report fit very well with the general policy line of the government, whose motto was ‘work, work, and once again work’. Thus, measures specifically targeted at ethnic minorities were abandoned. From 1997 until 2001, considerable sums were invested in general schemes to fight unemployment. And although these schemes were not specifically earmarked for ethnic minorities (Blok Commission 2004), one hope was that they would promote their participation nevertheless.

A new policy instrument apropos of the new philosophy was that of civic integration courses that aimed to facilitate the initial integration of newcomers to the Netherlands. This instrument for integration was developed at the local level among a number of Dutch cities beginning in the early 1990s. In these reception courses, newcomers were given a toolkit consisting of Dutch-language training material and information about the functioning of important institutions in Dutch society. Local policymakers felt the urge to provide these toolkits to all newcomers, whom they believed needed them, and so the policy was systematically developed in their respective cities. However, this instrument for integration was later consumed by national politics, and through 1998’s Wet Inburgering Nederland (WIN), the law became national reception policy.

Another way of transforming policies to keep consistent with the new philosophy was by framing much of integration facilities in area-based policies (rather than group-based ones). In 1994, the Ministry of Home Affairs began to undertake a policy for deprived areas in major Dutch cities. This practice could be understood as a replacement of integration policies, for these targeted areas were largely comprised of ethnic minority populations. Area was selected as a primary policy category instead of a group singled out in society. In the mid-1990s emphasis thus shifted from housing and urban renewal (known in Dutch as sociale vernieuwing) to more holistic programmes that integrated measures on housing, economic issues and socio-cultural dimensions (referred to as the grotestedenbeleid). Reflecting the above-mentioned preoccupations of the Purple Coalition, this multi-dimensional approach came to focus on socio-economic development.

The change from group-based towards area-based policies was also institutionally reflected. In 1998, a new so-called Minister for Urban Policies and Integration was nominated within the Ministry of Home Affairs. Although such area-based policies had served as a way of quitting group-oriented policies, group-specific policies still survived at the local level of policy.
A series of events around the turn of the millennium triggered a new shift in the public and political discourses on immigration and integration issues, which would prove to later cause a revision of policy towards assimilationism. This swing brought the social and the cultural dimensions of integration back onto the agenda, though in a different light than was ever before shed on the matter. The search was no longer for ‘compatibilities’, but more for ‘commonalities’ that would help preserve national norms and values, thereby restoring and enhancing the social cohesion of society. More and more, the integration issue came to be portrayed in what was perceived to be a ‘clash of civilizations’.

One of the initial catalysts in this development was the new national debate that was spurred on by the publication of a newspaper article by Scheffer (2000). The article stated that multicultural society in the Netherlands could be dismissed as a ‘tragedy’ or a ‘disaster’. Integration policy was declared a failure and, moreover, a call was made for a more assimilationist policy that would revive Dutch history, norms and values. As in the first debate over national minorities that took place in 1992, Islam and the integration of Muslim immigrants were identified as being especially problematic. International developments such as 9/11 reinvigorated such beliefs. Fennema (2002) has shown how the terrorist attacks triggered particularly fierce responses in the Dutch media, and led to several local incidents of ethnic and religious violence.

In the meantime, the Dutch political arena witnessed the rise of the politician Pim Fortuyn. A true populist, Fortuyn built up his profile with harsh statements on criminality, direct democracy, immigration and integration. He pleaded for ‘zero migration’, argued that ‘the Netherlands was full’ and called for ‘a cold war against Islam’. To these arguments – which were not completely new – he added two elements: the accusation that the political elite had enabled the failure of integration in the past; and the contention that the victim of all this was the common – and, at that, native – Dutch voter.

Fortuyn’s populist campaign exploited his discourse very successfully. Above all, his party won a great victory in March 2002’s local elections in Rotterdam, the Netherlands’ second largest city. And although only a few weeks later, Fortuyn was murdered – just before the national elections of May 2002 – the newly established Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF) won a landslide victory. In spite of (or perhaps thanks to) his death, the LPF party gained 26 of the 150 parliamentary seats and thus entered Parliament as its second-largest party. This success changed the political discourse on immigration and integration radically. In fact, the aftermath of the Fortuyn victory compelled most other parties to adapt their own ways of speaking about the issues (Penninx 2006).

Another sequence of notable events followed. It is uncertain as to whether the events themselves had truly triggered attention to the issues of
migration and integration, or the already high-alert status of these issues on
the political agenda gave these events the appearance of being trigger
events. First of all, a series of violent acts committed by immigrants drew
broad media attention. Secondly, several events emerged around the issues
of so-called fundamentalist mosques and radical imams. Finally, in 2004, a
major climax came when the Dutch film-maker Theo van Gogh was mur-
dered by a Dutch-Moroccan youngster who was affiliated to a radical
Islamist network in the Netherlands.

These events had two significant effects. First of all, they contributed to
a sense of policy failure. Parliament thus established a Parliamentary
Research Committee on the Integration Policy, comprising MPs of all par-
ties in Parliament, in order to examine ‘why policy had thus far resulted in
such limited successes.’ However, when the Committee concluded that in-
tegration had actually been relatively successful (Blok Commission 2004),
the statement was widely dismissed as being naive. This rejection made
some observers complain that a new ‘political correctness’ had emerged,
thus putting taboos on positive statements on the integration policy and
multiculturalism.12 Secondly, these events reinforced a new mode of policy
discourse, described by Prins (2002) as ‘hyperrealism’. This entailed a shift
from the 1990s ‘realist’ style of discourse – demanding a ‘tough’ approach
to integration so as to turn immigrants into full citizens – to a type of dis-
course in which ‘being tough’ became a goal in itself, regardless of its po-
tentially problematic amplifying effects. As such, it could be argued that
Fortuyn, and later, erstwhile Minister for Aliens Affairs and Integration
Rita Verdonk, used the immigration and integration issue to flaunt their
‘tough’ approaches to the political establishment and, in so doing, to pro-
mote their own places in Dutch politics.

4.4 Integration Policy New Style since 2002

Thus, from 2002 onwards, the policy took another turn, as a new political
majority was in power.13 The renewed institutional setting foreshadowed
changes: the coordination of integration policies was moved from the
Ministry of Home Affairs (in which it had been located for 22 years) to the
Ministry of Justice under a new Minister for Aliens Affairs and
Integration. Integration Policy New Style, formulated in a letter by the
Minister for Aliens Affairs and Integration (Ministerie van Justitie 2003),
closely follows the paradigm of the 1990s, as based on the leading con-
cepts of ‘citizenship’ and ‘self-responsibility’, though its emphasis was
much more on the cultural adaptation of immigrants to Dutch society. The
concept of integration policy was thus narrowed considerably. In addition,
integration policy had become clearly linked – instrumental even – to im-
migration policy as it facilitated the selection of migrants and restricted
new flows, particularly those of asylum seekers, family reunion and marriage migration.

The star measure in this new policy was the civic integration of new migrants to the Netherlands, something which was reformulated to serve purposes of both integration and migration control. Since 2006, newcomers have been obliged to pass an exam that proves their Dutch language skills and basic knowledge of Dutch culture and society before even entering the country. Once admitted to the Netherlands, migrants must attend – and successfully complete – civic integration courses in order to be granted both temporary and permanent permit renewals.

The reception policy New Style thus has significant modifications when held up to the former decade. To begin with, it newly distributes responsibilities among the various partners involved, with the migrants’ own responsibility being the starting point. As of 2007, newcomers to the Netherlands have been expected to find and fund the civic integration courses themselves. Only if they pass the exam are they entitled to a refund of up to 70 per cent of their training expenses. In this programme, the responsibilities of local authorities have changed: although they still have to monitor newcomers and their efforts to follow courses, their organisational and financial resources to promote such a process have been minimised.

As Minister for Aliens Affairs and Integration, Verdonk had aimed to expand the target population of the new reception policy. In her first proposal, the target group for mandatory civic integration courses included all migrants between ages sixteen and 65, regardless of the amount of time they had spent in the Netherlands and even if they had been naturalised as Dutch. Deemed unacceptable by legal authorities and politicians, this proposal was revised with a vision to extend the requirements to everyone who had completed fewer than eight years of obligatory schooling in the country. This target would include the so-called oldcomers – people of migrant origin already living in the country – as well as naturalised immigrants and native Dutch who had been living abroad. Verdonk also specifically attempted to extend the requirement to immigrants from the Netherlands Antilles, justified by the supposedly ‘problematic character’ of this minority group. The particular proposal, however, was rejected by Parliament who found it unconstitutional and discriminatory, since Dutch Antilleans hold Dutch nationality to begin with. A final proposal was ultimately passed at the very end of the cabinet’s legislative term, in July 2006, removing the new reception policy requirements for Dutch citizens – native or naturalised – and postponed its actual implementation to the next legislature.

A number of observations can be made regarding content, the policy-making process and the governance of policy. The first observation is that immigration and integration policies have been brought together on two
levels: in terms of content across a number of policy measures; and in their institutional arrangement within the Ministry of Justice, under the special Minister for Aliens Affairs and Integration.

The second observation is that the process of policymaking – in the context of strong politicisation – is predominantly led, as well as set forth, by the Minister and the political parties in Parliament. At the same time, this policymaking process is rather selective in the topics it chooses: restrictive admission of new immigrants, forced return of failed asylum seekers and illegal immigrants, and mandatory civic integration courses. Undergoing a major recentralisation, these new policies were spearheaded from a top-down approach that was dominated by the Ministry and Parliament.

At the same time, as an observation among people interviewed at the local level demonstrates, the majority of existing policies were left untouched or changed only marginally. Ministries at the national level (such as those for education, housing and labour market) and local authorities have both carried on with most of their existing policies. This means that – contrary to the widespread image – many of the earlier instruments that were developed through more than 25 years of integration policies are still in place. Despite the predominant concordance that these policies have failed, they have had – and still have – their effects (Poppelaars & Scholten 2008).

A fourth observation is that there is growing resistance to the new national policies, particularly at that local level, coming from both the local government and civil society at large. Actors that were marginalised by earlier welfare policies, such as churches and action groups, have become actively in favour of immigrants, trying to protect them against governmental action deemed unjust. Immigrants themselves – as citizens – are also becoming important actors, although in a way different from ever before. The local elections of March 2006 showed that the migrant vote has become an important instrument for redress, particularly in large Dutch cities (Van Heelsum & Tillie 2006). In Rotterdam, for example, migrants have contributed significantly to the exit of the local LPF’s power by voting systematically for leftist parties and thus bringing the Labour Party back in. And this has not gone unnoticed by political parties. What’s more, on the national level, there are growing indications of resistance against the tone and the content of migration and integration policies. One example is April 2006’s manifesto of Één land, één samenleving (‘One country, one society’), which was signed by former politicians from political parties across the board; another illustration comes from October 2006 when sixteen university chair-holders in migration and integration studies sent an open letter to the Eerste Kamer, Dutch Parliament’s upper house, in protest of the proposed revision of the WIN.
The interaction between immigration and integration policies

Thus far described have been the dynamics of policymaking in the domains of Dutch immigration and integration policies. It was observed how, although only gradually, the Netherlands’ identification as a country of de facto immigration – and possibly even an immigration and/or multicultural society – triggered responses in both policy fields. This section will look at the dynamics of the interaction between these two fields. How do patterns of internal dynamics of immigration and integration policy compare? And to what extent has there been interaction between developments in these two policy fields? Before turning to this analysis, some observations on their differences and similarities will be drawn.

5.1 Patterns of convergence and divergence

Differences between immigration and integration policy fields are first and foremost demonstrated by the way the subsystems are institutionalised within the central government. Whereas integration policy has been characterised by a comprehensive or strongly unitary and centralised policy coordination structure, the institutional structure for the coordination of immigration policies appears to have been less comprehensive. Since the early 1980s, integration policies had been assigned within the Ministry of Home Affairs (until their reassignment to the Ministry of Justice in 2002). Within this department, a strong – albeit fluctuating – structure was constructed and maintained to coordinate policies horizontally, between ministries, and vertically vis-à-vis local authorities, subsidised organisations, co-opted experts, ethnic elites and civil society actors. This system produced policy documents, monitored implementation and had an explicit budget (separate from funds supposed to come from the regular budgets of ministries, municipalities and other policy actors). In contrast, the institutional location of immigration policies was (only until recently) far less clear. The Ministry of Justice had always held formal responsibility over admission of aliens, residence permits and possible expulsions, but the Ministry was not always the body to decide on policies regarding admission. This was the case, for example, with economic and asylum migrants, over whom other departments shared responsibility. As such, immigration policies were notably less comprehensive and less unitarily coordinated than integration policies. Immigration policies were, for a long time, subject to little debate, and ad hoc policies were usually formulated in response to actual influxes of immigrants. Immigration policies thus have long been considered ‘quasi non-policies’.

Another difference between the two policy fields has, since the 1990s, become more manifest. While both policies had originated largely on the
national level, as would be expected in view of the Dutch tradition of a centralised consensus democracy, they came to develop in different directions of multilevel governance. Immigration policy has been shifting upwards (to the EU level), outwards (among private agencies) and downwards (in implementing the Linkage Act, for example). The shift upwards to the European level has also served to provide new intergovernmental venues for strengthening national control, as opposed to handing over policymaking competencies to the supranational level; within the European ‘intergovernmental’ arena there would be less resistance to tightening migration control than within many national political arenas.

By contrast, a more pronounced trend of recentralisation can be observed in the integration policy. This is especially apparent in terms of policy formulation and how issues are framed, as well as in the specific topics that have spearheaded national policies and have been linked to other issues on the national agenda. The 1990s’ trend towards decentralisation had thus been halted and, to some extent, reversed after the turn of the millennium. In the instance of civic integration courses, the shift outwards to private agencies has coincided with the recentralisation of state control over the courses, as in the case of the national integration exam. At the same time, however, this top-down dynamics of recentralisation appears to be limited: the institutional locus of many policy measures, such as in the domains of labour and education, has remained with specific ministries and local governments, all carrying out their own measures over these files. This has led to the growing gap between national and local integration policies, similar to the decoupling or ‘décalage’ that Schain (1995) observed in France. There seems to be an increasing divergence between symbolic politics at the national level and more pragmatic problem-coping at the local level. Only in domains like anti-discrimination is a more significant trend of Europeanisation apparent.

Similarities in internal policy dynamics between the two policy fields have been evident as well. Perhaps the most significant convergence is the politicisation of immigration and integration policymaking over the last decade. Both have become the subject of intense political debate, often framed in rather rhetorical and symbolical terms, and dominated by a negative tone. The attention implies that both policy subsystems have become less isolated from macro-politics and, what’s more, that they are increasingly vulnerable to external perturbations. Both have become top political priorities, also in electoral politics, leading to a different logic of policymaking processes. This has also led to similar patterns of resistance in both subsystems. Local governments especially have attempted to countervail the politicising tendencies in immigration and integration policies, calling for a more positive and pragmatic approach.

Another similarity, related to this politicisation, concerns the growing gap between policy discourse and policy practice. On the one hand, a
strong variability in policymaking can be observed over the past decades, with both domains characterised by episodes of relative stability and then punctuated by strong changes in the framing of policy. Such fluctuations make it difficult to evaluate policies, as the rules for measuring success or failure have also been in constant flux. On the other hand, policy practice has shown what appears to be a strong tendency towards path dependency. Policy practices that were established in one policy episode have often proven very resilient in periods that follow. For instance, the Mother Tongue and Culture Programme had a chameleon-like existence – with its multivalent contributions to return migration in the 1970s, to multicultural society in the 1980s and to acquisition of Dutch-as-second-language in the 1990s – before being finally abandoned in 2001. Another example of policy resilience is shown by the persistence of labour migration long after its official termination in 1973 into the present day – despite all the discourse on bringing it to an end. National politics’ tough rhetoric on illegal migration notwithstanding, actual policy practices vis-à-vis illegal migrants seem much more subtle. The growing gap between policy rhetoric and policy practice emerges as the result of a general institutional path dependency, as well as the diverging patterns of multi-level governance (albeit manifested in distinctly unique ways in the immigration and integration policy domains).

5.2 Interaction between immigration and integration policy fields

The early 1980s interpreted the arrivals of newcomers as historically unique events. As such, there was demand for a minorities’ policy for these groups as well as a restrictive immigration policy in order to prevent further immigration. A restrictive immigration policy was then justified as a necessary condition for a successful EM Policy: a constant influx of new immigrants would create a constant demand for new policy efforts.

Such an understanding of the relation between immigration and integration policies changed in the 1990s. The 1989 report of the Scientific Council for Government Policy called for more realistic recognition of the permanent character of immigration. Not only would the presence of minorities, but also of immigration itself, be responsible for creating a permanent phenomenon in Dutch society. While the report supported a restrictive immigration policy, it also suggested adaptations in the integration policy so as to cope with the constant influx of newcomers. In this vein, it recommended the development of civic integration programmes that would provide the link between the continuously arriving newcomers and their subsequent integration in Dutch society.

This definition of the correlation between immigration and integration was largely adopted by government of the early 1990s. It soon led the government to abandon the preceding decade’s relatively lenient policies on
family migration, which came to be viewed as a growing problem for integration. But there were also ideas within governmental circles that took some steps further. By the end of the 1980s, the Interdepartmental Working Group on Immigration (IWI), which was chaired by the Justice Department, argued that a realistic recognition of the nature of immigration should generate more than mere efforts to optimally restrict immigration. What needed to be accounted for was the ‘immigration effect’ that was enabled by the very facilities to which minorities had access under the integration policy. In short, immigration was not only to be restricted so as to promote integration, but integration policy should also be less generous so as not to encourage further immigration.

Since 2000, Dutch society has witnessed the development of a more systemic connection between immigration and integration. Not only do policy memoranda explicitly address the need to restrict immigration so as to not endanger the ‘absorption capacity’ of Dutch society, but more stringent integration policies have increasingly become a tool for restricting immigration. The new reception programmes described above have become a way for the Dutch government to promote the integration of newcomers, as well as to discourage further immigration. In doing so, the programmes simultaneously function as a mechanism through which to select those migrants who could prove beneficial for the Dutch economy.

6 External factors

Although it is useful to focus on internal mechanisms in the immigration and integration policy fields, these observations are not unrelated to more general characteristics of Dutch society and its development. Three major developments, it seems, have had a particular influence on the process of policymaking on migration and immigrant integration in the Netherlands. They are the legacy of pillarisation, the Dutch welfare state and the political culture of the Netherlands during the past decades.

6.1 The legacy of pillarisation

The legacy of pillarisation is an oft-raised explanation for Dutch exceptionalism in many domains (Hoppe 1987). Beginning in the mid-19th century, the Netherlands had grown into a segmented society that was structured around four ‘pillars’. The pillars comprised specific social, political or religious groups – Protestants, Catholics, Socialists, Liberals – and were brought together only at the top where any inter-pillar conflict would be ‘pacified’ by elites of the pillars. This particular facet of Dutch history has had pervasive effects on the country’s culture and the structure of its political system as a ‘centralized consensus democracy’ (Lijphart 1968). Since
the 1960s, secularisation and individualisation came to erode the social basis of Dutch society’s once pillarised structure. The role of religious institutions in society gradually decreased, their relation to the nation-state was loosened and a new notion of citizenship emerged to create a direct connection between individuals and the nation-state.

These changes notwithstanding, pillarisation has had an important influence on immigrant integration policies in two basic ways. The first way relates to how migrants themselves were ‘framed’. Whereas in other European countries immigrants were defined on the basis of class, race or colour, in the Netherlands, they were defined as ethno-cultural groups and ‘minorities’. Framing immigrants as minorities reflected the Dutch style of an accommodating pluralism: defining immigrants as another minority added to all those already existing. In addition, the pillarist tradition was reflected in how immigration and integration issues were coped with. The fragile coalition system of Dutch politics, a legacy in the history of pillarism, demanded that politically sensitive issues, such as immigration and integration, be depoliticised so as to avoid centripetal forces. For example, ‘playing the race card’ for electoral gain could drive the political system apart. Especially in the 1970s and 1980s, these issues were systematically depoliticised, accommodating conflict within relatively closed networks of policymakers, experts and ethnic elites. Issues ‘too hot to handle’ for politics were resolved through technocratic compromise, creating a so-called ‘consensual style’ of applying expertise as an authoritative source to create political consensus, rather than imposing such a consensus through open political confrontation. But this style of policymaking started to break down in the 1990s, giving way to a much more conflictive style after the turn of the century.

The second way pillarisation has proven influential is in the institutionalisation of laws and regulations. Steady secularisation of the Dutch population and decreasing significance of pillar institutions and organisations notwithstanding, laws and regulations have not changed that much. Although ethnic minorities themselves never were as cohesive, sizeable and strong as the traditional pillars of the Netherlands used to be, the institutional legacy provided minorities with opportunities for the development of some of their own institutions. Legal provisions of all kinds disseminated on an equal basis, led, for instance, to the recognition and establishment of Islamic institutions in the Netherlands. State-subsidised Islamic schools and an Islamic broadcasting organisation are remarkable examples. It was only from the 1990s onwards that such developments became politically contested.
6.2 Welfare state regime

Another factor that has had a significant impact on immigration and integration policymaking is the development of the Dutch welfare state over the past decades. The Dutch welfare state regime has traditionally been classified as conservative-corporatist. This type of state involves a relatively high level of decommodification of citizens from market forces and the strong involvement of state and civil society actors, such as churches, labour unions and employers’ unions, in welfare state provisions. This model does not encourage universal labour participation among individuals, but tends to preserve the prevailing socio-cultural structure of society as expressed in family, class, status and, to some extent, also gender. It was in the context of this welfare state regime that Dutch integration policies began developing in the 1980s. This was reflected in a policy that did not see immigrants exclusively as part of market forces, but also encouraged them to become emancipated and recognised cultural groups in Dutch society.

The end of the 1980s reveals poor results vis-à-vis the socio-economic aspect of EM Policy. There was a general, fact-supported consensus that EM policies in the field of labour were ineffective throughout the 1980s, as manifested in continued high unemployment and the low labour market participation among immigrants. The position of constant weakness experienced by minorities was due to the general restructuring of Dutch economy, with its particular consequences on immigrants, as well as the result of deficiencies in the Dutch welfare state. It was argued that the lenient regime of access to benefits had turned minorities too much into ‘welfare categories’ trapped in, and overly dependent on, state provisions. By then, the welfare state’s viability had also become questionable for a number of reasons. Thus, the issues of immigration and integration and the need for welfare state retrenchment were brought together, producing a new perspective. The same Scientific Council pleaded in several reports for a more proactive type of welfare state by a more liberal regime. For immigrants, this meant encouraging them to ‘stand on their own feet’, as well as discussing their civic rights and duties as new citizens.

The rise of the 1990s Integration Policy was thus closely related to the general reform of the welfare state at the time, particularly involving a recalibration of the responsibilities of citizen, state and market. State interference vis-à-vis the socio-cultural position of immigrants gradually lost importance. Immigrants came to be treated more as ‘citizens’ endowed with specific civic responsibilities. Civic integration became a specific new instrument to ‘equip’ immigrants so they might live up to their civic responsibilities for integrating into Dutch society. The relation between welfare state reform and restrictive immigration policy was embodied in the
Linkage Act, which excluded all illegal residents from facilities of the welfare state.

Recent policy has witnessed the addition of a new element to the logic of political discourse. Whereas the articulation of socio-cultural differences has traditionally been perceived as a ‘corroding effect’ on social cohesion, it may, in the same vein, be seen as undermining the type of social solidarity necessary to maintain a viable welfare state (Entzinger 2006). As such, the basic issue is no longer how to promote socio-economic participation in order to keep the welfare state affordable, but rather, how to maintain social cohesion and solidarity in order to generate sufficient support for the welfare state.

### 6.3 The macro-political context

Finally, in the early 2000s, the style of politics shifted from conflict accommodation and de-politicisation towards primacy of politics and a more confrontational political culture. In this context, immigration and integration policy have become the playing fields for this new political style. This new style has had serious consequences for actors such as experts and ethnic elites. For example, 2004 witnessed the fierce contestation of the role of experts in this policy domain. Politics and media criticism emerged concerning how the development of policy ideas might in fact be in the hands of ‘scientists who have multiculturalist biases’ (see Scholten 2011). The technocratic relationship between science and politics characterising this domain in earlier periods was now dismissed as undemocratic. As a consequence, the consensual style of using expertise in policymaking and implementation was now replaced by a more selective ‘pick-and-choose’ strategy aimed at scientific expertise.

Immigration and integration policies appear to have been as much a cause – as an effect – of macro-political developments. Immigration and integration were at the centre of the Fortuyn Revolt, whose leader exploited such issues as a vehicle for political designs. As Dutch government and democracy malfunctioned, the issues were subsequently turned into scapegoats for broader popular dissent. For the 2002 and 2003 parliamentary elections, immigration and integration became central electoral issues unlike ever before. The failing integration policies and an alleged ignorance towards public concerns about immigration and integration became the greater symbols of a failing political system. In response, government and politicians politicised the issues more than ever before, a phenomenon that has recently been described as the ‘articulation function’. In this light, politics is seen as naming and articulating the public’s sentiments and problems. Integration is here interpreted as encompassing something broader than mere immigrant integration: namely, the integration of immigrants and natives within a multicultural society.
7 Conclusions

The Dutch case reveals a sequence in policymaking: from the 1970s’ ad hoc policy responses to a technocratic type of policymaking throughout the 1980s and 1990s, and finally, to the more symbolic politics that began in 2002. In a certain respect, the Netherlands’ development differs from other European countries. For instance, in the United Kingdom, immigration and integration were politicised at a much earlier point in history and the model of policymaking was bottom-up rather than top-down. The Netherlands also proves different from Germany where, although politicisation was also held off for considerable time, recently a pragmatic approach of coping with integration problems has come to persist. Similarities, however, are found in the way French policymaking has developed. As in the Netherlands, a pragmatic approach to coping with problems was initially exchanged for a form of technocratic governance, eventually to be replaced by symbolic politics. Still, this development occurred at a much quicker pace: the subsystem of technocratic governance was already emerging in the 1970s with the politics of insertion, and a politicised form of symbolic politics showed up by the early 1980s following the rise of the Le Pen Movement.

The perceived Dutch exceptionalism in immigration and integration policymaking stems, in particular, from the combination of a persistent top-down policy formulation and what was a relatively late politicisation of the topics. More than elsewhere, immigration and integration policies have been formulated mainly at the national level, within centralised and strongly institutionalised structures involving the participation of a limited number of actors. The scale of public debate was actively limited for a considerable time, thus evading the politicisation of these sensitive issues.

This chapter has thereby put forward some explanations for the apparent Dutch exceptionalism. First analysed, in terms of an internal dynamics, was how specific patterns of governance could persist in the Netherlands for such an extended period. Given the societal definitions that separated immigration from integration – and thanks to the subsequent de-politicisation of the topics – specific policy coalitions could develop. When it came to integration, iron triangles supported group-specific policies in the 1970s, to be succeeded in the next decade by the strongly centralised technocratic structure. As for immigration, the topic has long been implicitly defined as a ‘non-issue’, thus resulting in ad hoc, reactionary policies. This was criticised during the 1990s, though the system simultaneously showed a great resistance to change. It was after the turn of the millennium, when this pattern of governance disappeared, that the two policy topics became tied up together as issues of high politics.

On an altogether different level, this chapter also explored external factors that could account for exceptionalism. First of all, the Dutch legacy of
pillarisation, in the form of a political culture of conflict accommodation and consensus-seeking, may explain why policymaking has for so long remained behind closed doors in the Netherlands. This history of pillarisation contributed to framing immigrants as ‘minorities’, as well as to the initial development of a multicultural policy approach. It may also have contributed to a tendency to depoliticise issues, such as immigration and integration, that were ‘too hot to handle’ for politics. The Fortuyn Revolt led to the emergence of a more confrontational political style, which may be interpreted as much as a revolt against the legacy of pillarisation as against specific immigration and integration policies.

Furthermore, changes in the Dutch welfare state – from a corporatist model to a neo-liberal one – have been cited as catalysts for modifying policy objectives and their target populations. As immigration and integration became issues of electoral politics, they came to merge with macro-political issues such as a collective unease with the Dutch political establishment and concerns about national identity and social cohesion. As such, the issues have become symbols for a ‘New Politics’ that tries to regain popular legitimacy by articulating the voice of ‘the ordinary citizen’ and adopting a neo-conservative line of tough policies.

Notes

1 In recent times, allochtoon – which refers to the Netherlands’ allochthonous population, literally meaning ‘from foreign soil’ – has become the standard Dutch term used in statistics and policy. Technically, an allochtoon is defined as a person born outside the Netherlands (i.e. a ‘real’ immigrant) or a person with at least one parent who was born outside the continental Dutch territory. Within the allochthonous population, a further distinction is made between ‘Western allochthones’ (roughly referring to those coming from Europe and industrialised countries) and ‘non-Western allochthones’.

2 Arrival of inhabitants from former and present Dutch colonies or parts of the Netherlands Kingdom was not, by definition, seen as immigration. Its regulation was based on recognition of an individual’s Dutch citizenship. In the case of repatriates from Indonesia, this meant that only those who had natural or acquired Dutch citizenship could ‘repatriate’. Repatriates as such included Dutch citizens who had settled in the Dutch East Indies and those born of mixed relations who were ‘recognised’ by the Dutch partner involved. Inhabitants of Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles were citizens of the Netherlands Kingdom, according to the Treaty of 1954, and were thus free to move. This changed for Surinam in November 1975, when the country gained independence and thus created Surinamese citizenship. During the transition period from 1975 to 1980, however, many Surinamese individuals successfully claimed their Dutch citizenship.

3 The Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR) is an advisory body that gives solicited and unsolicited advice to the national government on all kinds of policy issues.

4 Such challenges among coordination efforts were brought to the political fore in a 1978 parliamentary motion (motion Molleman, PvdA) in which the Minister of
Home Affairs was asked to take responsibility for coordinating policy pertaining to all minorities. This idea was later realised in 1980 when the government decided to work towards the general EM Policy.

5 Notably, Han Entzinger was working at the staff department of the Ministry of Culture, Recreation and Social Work when he wrote the 1975 article referenced here.

6 In 1985, the National Advisory and Consultation Body (LAO) was established so as to represent ethnic minorities through their own organisations. The LAO was to advise the government on issues of immigrant integration and to be consulted on administrative issues vis-à-vis integration policy. In 1997, the LAO was replaced by the National Consultation Body for Minorities (LOM), an institution with a weaker mandate.

7 The policy documents of 1981 and 1983 do not employ the term ‘multiculturalism’. Particularly by adversaries, referring to EM Policy as consisting of ‘multiculturalist’ policies is something that was only later introduced.

8 Top measures included those such as the subsidised Melkert jobs for the long-term unemployed.

9 These courses are known in Dutch as *inburgeringscursussen*. The word ‘*inburgering*’ contains the word ‘*burger*’ (meaning ‘citizen’), but its denotation is not that of naturalisation (i.e. becoming a national citizen) as much as that of becoming a well-informed, active participant in society. For the sake of clarity, the authors of this chapter prefer the term ‘civic integration courses’ rather than ‘citizenship programmes’, for the courses do not necessarily prepare people for national citizenship.

10 The meaning depends on one’s translation of the Dutch word ‘*drama*’ in the title of the article ‘Het multiculturele drama’.


12 TK (Tweede Kamer), 6 April 2004, 63-4112.

13 Cabinet Balkenende I was a short-lived coalition of Christian Democrats, liberals and the extreme-right LPF; it was followed in 2003 by Cabinet Balkenende II, a coalition in which the LPF was substituted by the progressive liberals of D66.

14 Another element introduced – without much debate – since implementation of New Style integration policy concerns financial implications: all costs of admission and immigration for the state are to be borne by the immigrants themselves. This means that immigrants have to pay sums of money for visas and residence permits, as well the renewal of them – this was previously unheard of. The application for a temporary residence permit costs € 430 (its renewal € 285 per family member), and for a permanent residence permit, € 890 (VluchtelingenWerk Nederland 2004).

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