

7 Contagious conflict

Spill-over effects of labor conflict between and within organizations

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Introduction

The current field of industrial relations is characterized by scholars' attempts to explain the prevalence of industrial conflict both in sectors and in countries. A prominent question in the field is: "why do some countries exhibit more strikes than other countries?" The actual effects of strikes—although widely recognized in the literature—have received much less systematic scholarly attention and theoretical-empirical study. Yet, if a strike occurs, this event may have profound effects beyond the instance of actual industrial conflict, and beyond the immediate stakes of the participants in the bargaining process, which is restricted in time and place. The aim of this chapter is to move the study of industrial conflict forwards by looking at the *effects* of strikes in two distinct areas: (1) collective bargaining that takes place *outside* the immediate scope of the focal bargaining organizations; and (2) work relations among employees *within* organizations affected by a strike.

Most explanations of industrial conflict consider strikes to be independent and rather isolated events (for an overview, see Franzosi, 1995). The bargaining process between negotiation partners is assumed to be unaffected by conflict elsewhere, and conflict in the bargaining process is not assumed to affect other bargaining events. Micro-economic models developed in bargaining theory explain the occurrence of a strike from its information-providing function: a strike provides negotiators with information about their relative strength, which is necessary information to obtain an equilibrium outcome (Hicks, 1932; Mauro, 1982; McConnell, 1989; Reder & Neumann, 1980). By exclusively focusing on the strike during the focal negotiations as an information device, micro-economic models ignore the possibility that negotiators may reduce their uncertainty also, or perhaps primarily, by looking *sidewards*; informing themselves about what other negotiators do (or have done) in comparable circumstances (Heckathorn, 1996).

The assumption of independence and isolation of strike events is not very plausible for two reasons. First, from this assumption it would follow that strike-waves and sudden rises of industrial conflict can only be understood as coincidental phenomena that may arise from a conjunction macro (socio)-economic and political factors. However, these factors are insufficient to fully explain macro level strike activity (Franzosi, 1995). Second, the assumption that bargaining parties are uninformed about what happens in the rest of the world is not very plausible. Modern collective bargaining practices make use of well-trained and highly

professionalized negotiators, often responsible for multiple collective bargaining negotiations. Moreover, these negotiators partake in an extensive network of peers and other professional contacts. It would be rather naive to assume that negotiators ignore information from other bargaining events, such as claims made by parties, or employers' resistance and workers' willingness to strike in those events. Such information is shared among negotiators and used in other bargaining events. In this chapter we study how the use of strategic information from other bargaining events affects the negotiations and the probability of conflict between employers and unions.

Industrial conflicts, in particular strikes, do not only have an effect outside the realms of the organization involved in the strike. The aftermath of a strike is often a long-lasting process and involves personal and relational costs that may have profound effects on production in the long run. During strikes, several fault-lines may arise, not only between management and employees but also between groups of employees. It is well-documented that during strikes emotional confrontations occur between employees "on strike" and employees who "break" the strike and remain at work (Francis, 1985; Getman, 1998). The case studies' findings suggest that social relations between management and employees—as well as among those employees who joined the strike and those who did not—can become severely damaged by the process of the strike. However, systematic empirical research into the effects of strikes for social relations among employees within organizations lacks to date. To fill this

gap, we present the results of our studies that aim to reveal the conditions under which social relations on the shop floor are affected by strikes.

Information spill-over between organizations and conflict

A remarkable feature of industrial conflict, such as strikes, is that it sometimes “spreads all over the country like a forest fire” while at other times it is confined to a single sector or a single firm. Standard *bargaining models* in economics and industrial relations studies offer little explanation for these strikingly different patterns (Hicks, 1932; Mauro, 1982; Reder & Neumann, 1980). Bargaining models attribute the occurrence of a strike to the information problem of bargaining partners, who must assess each other’s bargaining power, as well as the employer’s willingness and ability to pay. Under the condition of full information all bargaining partners can perfectly calculate their capacity to endure conflict, and therefore will always reach an outcome peacefully. Under conditions of imperfect or asymmetric information, however, miscalculations will lead to mistakes and mismatches in the strategic behavior of bargaining partners, which result in conflict. In other words, traditional bargaining models view strikes as dysfunctional incidents. In a world of static bargaining power, industrial conflict would never recur. However, in reality we observe that industrial conflict continues to occur, even in well-established bargaining relations.

Both bargaining theory and theories on protest mobilization have a fairly restricted view on actors’ retrieval and use of strategic information (Andrews &

Biggs, 2006; Biggs 2002, 2005; Meyers, 2000; Soule, 2004). “Example strikes” show that workers learn from strategic information about the *outcomes* of industrial conflict: learning about successes in one firm or industry may drive workers in another firm or industry to engage in a strike. Connell and Cohn (1995) found that even lost strikes inspired other workers to engage in a subsequent strike. However, when focusing on professional negotiators it would be quite unrealistic to assume that they base their bargaining strategy exclusively on the *outcomes* of other conflicts. Negotiators need much broader strategic information, for example about the resistance of unions/employers to engage in a conflict: the judicial, social or political acceptability of specific means of protest; the potential for a mobilization of workers; or the specific costs and benefits associated with conflict. The first question of this chapter is how strategic information spreads between bargaining events in negotiations between employers and unions. *How and under which conditions does information about other bargaining events influence the probability of negotiators experiencing conflicts in collective bargaining?*

Theoretically, there are two mechanisms that relate strikes—or other events of industrial conflict—to each other: *rational learning* and *social comparison*. For both mechanisms it is assumed that negotiations take place under uncertainty. The union and its members are uncertain about the economic situation of the employer, while the employer is not fully informed about his employees’ willingness to strike. During a strike both parties learn about each other’s resistance, and a strike

can thus be seen as a source of information (see, for instance, Hicks, 1932; McConnell, 1989). Several economic bargaining models studied the effect of past negotiations on later negotiations and found indications that negotiators learn from bargaining in the past, thus referring to *backward looking* learning (Heckathorn, 1996). As proposed by Mauro (1982) and Gramm and colleagues (1987), negotiators use previous conflicts as a source of information and adapt their strategies to avoid costly strikes. In Lehr, Akkerman and Torenvlied (2013) we argue that what holds for backward looking learning, also holds for information spill-over across negotiations for different organizations, thus proposing *sideward looking* learning (Heckathorn, 1996).

Bargaining outcomes of, and conflict in other organizations, reveal information that serves to limit uncertainty (Kuhn & Gu, 1999), thus creating a conflict-decreasing effect of information spill-over across organizations. While these economic bargaining models assume pure rational behavior of negotiators—maximizing their utility and thus avoiding costly strikes when possible—more sociological approaches of bargaining point at social comparison as an alternative mechanism (Babcock, Wang, & Loewenstein, 1996; Babcock, Engberg, & Greenbaum, 2005; Fehr & Falk, 2002; McCarthy, O'Brien, & Dowd, 1975; also see De Dreu et al., this volume). Ideas of equity and fairness affect the point of reference negotiators (and employees) take in judging information as relevant. For instance, workers will use the wages in other organizations as a point of

reference for “fair wage increase” in their own organization (cf. Akerloft & Yellen, 1990; Frank, 1984; Rees, 1993). Therefore, information about other negotiations, in other organizations, especially those that are settled favorably for the employees, would increase conflict across negotiations in other organizations (Babcock, Wang, & Loewenstein, 1996; Connel & Cohn, 1995).

The first empirical study we present on the question of whether conflict leads to less or to more conflict, is a survey among employer and union negotiators. This survey study shows that information about nearby conflict has a clear conflict-increasing effect. The second empirical study is an experiment with which we investigated the effect of social comparison versus learning on conflict more systematically.

Rational learning versus social comparison: a negotiators’ survey¹

During Fall 2011 and Winter 2012, survey data was collected about the kind of information negotiators use for collective bargaining among a total of 128 professional negotiators from both the employer and the union side, the response rate being 28 percent of the 451 negotiators we invited to fill in the questionnaire. Each respondent was invited to complete the questionnaire for a specific collective bargaining process, predetermined by the researcher. The semi-structured web-based survey gathered data on:

- *the occurrence of conflict* during the bargaining;

- the *information source* the respondent uses (being: prior bargaining with/for the same organization; bargaining events in other organizations in the same sector; and bargaining events in other sectors); and
- *the content of the information* used in preparation of or during the negotiation (being: the outcomes of the bargaining; employees readiness for action; and success of industrial action).

Forty-four respondents reported that no conflict happened during the specified negotiations, 72 respondents reported an impasse, while 12 reported industrial conflict (for instance, a strike or a work stoppage).

Information about prior bargaining in the same organizations and information about “nearby” bargaining, that is bargaining events in different organizations in the same sector, appears to be most influential. Information about bargaining in other sectors is not considered to be relevant for the negotiators’ own bargaining event. This holds for all three information contents we distinguished.

In general, the negotiators reported that information about outcomes was more important to them than information about employees’ readiness for industrial action and the success of industrial action. Indeed, information about the outcomes of prior bargaining and nearby bargaining events is not statistically related to the probability of conflict in their own bargaining. The statistical analysis, however, showed that information about conflict (“employees’ readiness for action” and

“the success of industrial action”) *is* related to a higher probability of industrial conflict.

It is difficult to determine the causal direction of this relation. It could mean that negotiators who are exposed to information about prior and nearby conflict, are more likely to engage in conflict. Or, it could signify that negotiators in a situation of a looming conflict make more use of information about employees’ readiness for action, and the success of industrial action in prior or nearby collective bargaining events.

Rational learning versus social comparison: experimental evidence²

The negotiator survey indicates that especially “nearby” negotiations, that is in the same sector, are used as sources of information by negotiators. Moreover, the more information spill-over from other bargaining events is used by negotiators, the more likely it is that they will experience conflict in their own collective bargaining. Whether this means that the exposure to nearby conflict increases the probability of conflict or whether a looming conflict in one’s own bargaining makes negotiators more aware of, or urges them to actively scan the environment for information about conflict, is not clear yet. To investigate the use of information that spills over from other bargaining events more systematically, we studied the rational learning and social comparison explanations in an experimental study.

We designed an experimental study in which one firm and one union negotiator negotiate about the distribution of the firm’s profit (for a discussion of such

representative negotiations, also see De Dreu et al., this volume). In this experiment the union negotiator makes the first move (“a demand” or “opening proposal”) after which the firm negotiator responds by either accepting this proposal or by making a counter offer, after which the union negotiator can make another counter offer etc. After 60 seconds the negotiation stops. When one of the bargaining parties accepts an offer of the other party within these 60 seconds, an agreement is reached. When neither of the parties accepts an offer of the other party within these 60 seconds no agreement is reached, and the final offer is automatically rejected, a situation which reflects a conflict.

The treatments in this game concern the information the negotiators were given about other negotiations. The first treatment consists of information about the bargaining outcome in another organization for which the profits equal those of the organization with whom the union negotiates (correlated information). The other treatment consisted of information about the bargaining outcome in another organization with an unknown profit (uncorrelated information). The subjects were presented two types of information: (1) whether the information given is correlated or uncorrelated; and (2) whether the outcome of the negotiation for this correlated or uncorrelated organization was high, low or a rejection, from the trade *union negotiator's perspective*. In the first treatment both mechanisms, rational learning as well as social comparison may operate, while in the uncorrelated information treatment, there is nothing to learn rationally. In this treatment any influence of spill-over must be attributed to social comparison.

The computerized experiments were held in October 2012, in the Nijmegen Decision Lab at the Radboud University of Nijmegen. In total 70 students participated in the experiments. They were randomly assigned to one of the two treatments and to the role of union or employer. The reward for participating in the experiments included a fixed show-up fee and a variable part depending on what they earned in the negotiations. In total, we obtained data from 490 valid negotiations.

The experiments allowed us to investigate the effect of information spill-overs on:

- the opening proposal of the union;
- the accepted proposal; and
- conflict (the rejection).

A first important finding is that information about conflict in other negotiations did *not* affect either of the three dependent variables. Information about the outcome of other negotiations did affect the opening proposals (the demands) of the union, both in the correlated and the uncorrelated treatment. As the effect in the correlated treatment was linear—meaning that lower outcomes elsewhere lead to lower opening proposals and higher outcomes to higher opening proposals—in the uncorrelated treatment another effect was found. In the uncorrelated treatments only the higher outcomes were used as a point of reference, while the lower outcomes were ignored. This shows that negotiators exhibit self-serving biases in choosing their reference point. Especially union negotiators, who are at

an informational disadvantage, not only ignore unfavorable information but even counter it with escalating demands. At the same time both sides anchor on information that is favorable to them. This leads to divergence between the negotiators and increases conflict. The process of bargaining itself reduces this conflict greatly, a finding that serves as an important caveat to previous experimental findings based on one-shot games. Whether or not self-serving biases lead to conflict is dependent on context. If there is clear information and common knowledge that reference points actually reveal private information, the conflict-increasing effects of social comparisons are prevented.

Taken together, the results of the experiments offer support for the learning mechanism as well as for the social comparison mechanism, albeit only with regard to the demands and outcomes of negotiation and not with regard to the probability of conflict. This seems to contradict the results of our first survey study, and brings us back to the causality question we posed for the positive relation found in the survey study between negotiators' use of nearby conflict information and the probability of conflict in their own negotiations. Does exposure to conflict information ignite conflict or does looming conflict lead to seeking information about nearby conflict? The results of the experiments indicate that the first direction, information leads to conflict, is less plausible. Bearing in mind that the "conflict" in the experiment was in fact "only" reflecting an impasse and not a manifest conflict such as a strike, the second proposed causal direction (looming conflict leads to

observe nearby conflicts), seems plausible: information about conflict elsewhere becomes important only in conflict situations.

Contagious conflict within organizations

The second main question of this chapter is how social relations on the shop floor are affected by strikes. We are particularly interested in the question why and when strikes cause segregation in working teams and when this affects production.

Theoretically we depart from the working hypothesis that fault-lines, which develop during a strike, can have long-lasting effects for work relations, and may play out even long after a strike has been settled. The deteriorated work relations affect long-run productivity through associated problems of cooperation, a lack of motivation combined with socially detrimental behavior—such as harassment and even bullying. There is evidence supporting this hypothesis from economic, psychological and sociological literature. A small branch of economic literature in the past already tried to analyze the economic consequences of strikes (Addison & Teixeira, 2009; Krueger & Mas, 2003; Mas, 2006; Gruber & Kleiner, 2010). All these case studies confirm that productivity is hampered not only during, but also for some time after, the strike.

Although these studies consider the possibility that obstruction and cooperation problems are causing sub-optimal production after strikes, economic research fails to specify the causal mechanisms that link strikes to economic performance. Psychological research reports

prolonged effects of strikes on workers' psychological health and job satisfaction (Barling & Milligan, 1987; De Dreu & Weingart, 2003; Fowler, Gudmundsson, & Whicker, 2009; Kelloway, Barling, & Shah, 1993). Although these studies verify that strikes have strong effects on occupational health, they cannot explain why employees experience stress still long after the dispute—the stressor—was settled. Fowler and colleagues (2009) suggest that social factors are responsible for a continuation of stress. Indeed, sociological case studies indicate that social factors are responsible for a prolonged experience of stress and frustration. Case studies of severe strikes reveal strong and destructive cleavage groups within the organization (MacDowell, 1993). These studies show that overt hostilities persist after dispute settlement between the former strikers and strike-breakers and even report instances of physical and verbal harassment (Brunsden & Hill, 2009; Francis, 1985; Waddington, Dicks, & Critcher, 1994). Strike-breakers are often labeled “scabs” in union terminology and the cleavage between strikers and non-strikers effectively splits teams, organizations, and sometimes whole communities (Francis, 1985; Getman, 1999; Waddington et al., 1994). The “lack of solidarity,” demonstrated by strikebreakers, induces sentiments of “betrayal” in those workers who strike—creating sharp fault-lines between employees.

Theoretically, we argue that the harsh relations between groups of employees after a strike can be explained by the existence of a *solidarity norm*. The solidarity norm explains strikers' contempt for strike-breakers and their strong out-group sentiments towards them. Case study

research (Brunsden & Hill, 2009; Waddington et al., 1994) provides indications that strike-breakers indeed break a solidarity norm and, for this reason alone, pose an immediate threat to strikers. The threat is that the success of a strike depends on the degree to which the production process is disrupted, and hence on the number of employees on strike. In addition, because strikers bear considerable costs (e.g. a loss of income), and because they risk future repercussions by the employer, employees who continue to work are considered free-riders. Social disapproval and punishment of free-riders serve to reinforce solidarity norms (Casari & Luini, 2009; Gächter & Fehr, 1999). The punishment of free-riders increases with the extent to which the free-rider deviates from the average investment of the other members (Fehr & Gächter, 2002). In reaction, strike-breakers also may develop strong out-group sentiments towards strikers, fuelling the polarized conflict.

Empirically, we first studied when social relations between workers change due to punishment of non-cooperative behavior by way of a social network case study. This network study shows that the private interactions at work change differently than work-related interaction between colleagues: while one can easily break private ties with colleagues who behave differently, it is less easy (and formally difficult) to escape interaction with colleagues on work-related matters. Thus, breaking social ties to colleagues is not always an option to avoid punishment of deviant behavior. The second empirical study, we report on here,

is an experiment and studies the effects of this punishment on the productivity of a team.

Punishment and social relations: a network study

Although previous case studies report the existence of strong cleavages among strikers and “strike-breakers” after a strike, actual changes in social relations before and after a strike have never been studied in-depth. In this section we report on the social network analysis we performed on work relations among employees of a Dutch cleaning firm which suffered a 105-day strike in 2012.³

In explaining how deviant behavior and punishment can result in cleavages between team members, we build on the findings of recent social network simulations. Kitts, Macy, and Flache (1999) and Takacs, Janky, and Flache (2008) argue that, in addition to complying to group norms or suffering punishment for deviant behavior, individuals have a third strategy: changing the composition of one’s social network strategically in order to avoid punishment and get social approval from other groups—where similar behavior during strikes is the definition of a group. Strategic network adaption can explain why strikes sometimes cause cleavages between workers. However, in work relations, it is not always possible to change the interaction with colleagues at will. Although establishing new network relations with colleagues may not cause trouble, disengaging from interaction with colleagues is less easily done, at least not without potential reprimands from supervisors. Formal and organization restrictions may impede workers’ possibilities to apply this particular strategy.

Thus, the segregation effect of network adaption is not expected to be complete due to the necessity of work-related interaction, still leaving room for the punishment of deviant colleagues.

To test this explanation we reconstructed the work-related communication network among employees at the beginning of the strike and three months after the strike. We compared this with the changes in the private communication

network of the employees after the strike. Both type of relations were reconstructed by way of structured questionnaires which were filled in during a personal interview with 59 of the 66 employees. Seven employees refused to cooperate in the study. Forty-five of the respondents did not participate in the strike, 13 participated throughout the whole duration of the strike, and one went back to work before the strike was settled. The questionnaire contained a list of all the employees' names and respondents were asked to indicate with whom they communicated with on: (a) work-related matters (reflecting a work communication relation); and (b) private-related matters (reflecting a private communication relation). The respondents indicated the intensity of communication on a scale from 0 (no communication) to 7 (daily communication). The respondents completed the questionnaires just after the strike started and again two months after the official settlement of the strike. In addition to the network questionnaires, qualitative questions were asked and field notes were taken.

The formal analysis of the changes in network relations reveals a deep structural cleavage between the former strikers and those who continued working. The behavior during the strike (joining the strike or not) significantly predicts the network ties established and intensified, controlling for other, more natural network changes (such as a tendency towards demographic homophily, transitivity and reciprocity). The deletion of network ties is explained significantly by the behavior during the strike in the private network, but not in the work-related communication network. This “all-or-nothing” strategy in the private network can less easily be adopted in the work-related communication network—largely because of the necessity of (at least minimal) cooperation among workers for their performance appraisal. Another noteworthy finding of this network study is that not only the strikers considered those who did not strike to be free-riders, who may be punished. Strikers themselves were also considered to be free-riders by the non-striking employees. Going on strike, and leaving the rest of the team of workers to perform the tasks necessary to perform well as a company was regarded as a behavior which violated yet another norm: the “team cooperation norm.”

Punishment and productivity: an experimental study of reward systems⁴

The social network study showed why and which network relations change due to strike and that norm deviation (whether the norm be to contribute to the strike or to cooperate in the team work) leads to segregation of the employees in a group of strikers and non-strikers. We

saw that the avoidance of punishment, and the seeking of approval, changes workers' networks significantly. We also found that the mechanism underlying this process—strategic network adoption—not necessarily leads to complete group segregation. Formal organizational restrictions probably impede the total avoidance of interaction with punishing colleagues. To further study the relation between punishment and productivity we applied a game theoretic experimental design to determine the effect of free-rider punishment—due to strikes—on group productivity.

In this experiment we examined the effect of free-rider punishment on group productivity. We designed an experiment representing two incentive structures: a “weak link game” and a “public good game.” The weak link game is characterized by an incentive structure in which the individual reward of each group member is dependent on the effort of the “weakest link,” that is: the team member who invests the least effort in the group task (Thommes, Vyrastekova, & Akkerman, 2013). The “public good game” is characterized by an incentive structure in which the individual reward of each group member is dependent on the total output of the group minus their own effort.

The experiments started with five consecutive rounds of cooperation in a team of three team members. In each of the five rounds, each team member chose a level of effort between one and seven. After two minutes, during which efforts could be changed, the efforts chosen were final. After every round all the team members' efforts were made known to the other team members. These

rounds were followed by a strike, in which the subjects could decide to participate or not, followed by another five consecutive rounds of cooperation. Those who decided to participate in the strike paid three euro (the show-up fee for the experiments), while all participants would benefit an extra six euro when the strike was successful. The strike was successful when at least four employees participated in it. Before the second set of five rounds of cooperation began, team members were informed about the strike participation of their team members. The pre- and post-strike rounds of cooperation were performed in teams of three members, while the strike concerned all participants in the experiment (that is, the “whole organization”). The “whole organization” consisted of four teams, whose composition remained the same during the experiment. We expected that after the strike the productivity in groups consisting of strikers and non-strikers, would be affected by punishment within teams, while the homogenous teams would continue their level of production of the pre-strike rounds.

The computerized experiments were held in the Nijmegen Decision Lab in November and December 2011. The subjects (N=72), all students of the Radboud University, were randomly assigned to teams. Their payment after the experiments included a show-up fee and a variable part depending on the rewards earned in the games. Those who participated in the strike did not receive the show-up fee. Both the public good and the weak link game, each played with four teams at the time, were played three times, resulting in 12 team level observations for both games.

The experiments showed that during the first five rounds before the strike, team members establish higher level of productivity by each contributing more effort in each consecutive round. After the strike, for some groups their productivity decreased dramatically. Mixed teams—consisting of both strikers and free-riders—lowered their production after the strike, as expected. While productivity recovered somewhat after two or three rounds, total production in the second set of rounds never reached the level of the previous rounds. This negative effect of mixed team composition on productivity is stronger for teams in which strikers are in the majority, compared to teams in which only one member participated in the strike. Remarkably, homogeneous teams—either containing exclusively strikers or exclusively non-strikers—increased their productivity after the strike.

Both empirical studies show that strikes can have a serious negative effect on the social relations on the shop floor. Different choices regarding the participation in strikes may lead to segregation of groups of employees. Especially when strong social norms about participation in strikes are present, punishment of deviant behavior causes segregation between groups that bothers communication and collaboration. When formal and organizational restrictions impede employees to strategically adapt their social network at work, punishment of deviant behavior cannot always be avoided. As shown in the experimental study, punishment of team members can have severe consequences for team productivity. On the other hand,

we also found that strikes can positively affect cooperation between team members. For homogenous teams, in which nobody deviates from the group norm—whatever that norm may be—we found that cooperation is higher after the strike.

Conclusion

In this chapter we challenged current explanations of industrial conflict, which consider strikes as being independent and isolated events: the bargaining between negotiation partners is not affected by conflict elsewhere, and the conflict has no influence on other bargaining events. By contrast, we argued that strikes are not isolated in space from other bargaining events, and are not isolated in time from their consequences for relations on the shop floor.

As for contagious conflict between organizations we found evidence that the *outcomes* of labor negotiations in nearby bargaining events do affect both the initial demands as well as the eventual outcomes of collective bargaining. Conflict in nearby bargaining does not affect the outcomes of bargaining. However, when negotiators reach an impasse, they do use information from nearby organizations. Information about employees' readiness for industrial action and the success of industrial conflict then becomes significant. The positive relation between the use of this information and conflict in the bargaining thus suggests that conflict becomes contagious in situations of latent conflict.

As for the contagious effect of strikes within organizations, we also conclude that conflict between

management and the union can ignite conflict between other groups in the organization. We showed that strikes, being a collective good, are especially harmful for social relations between employees, when strong, but different, group norms exist about participation in strikes. The punishment of those colleagues who deviate from the dominant group norm sets in group segregation leading to strong social cleavages within organizations that seriously affects cooperation in teams.

Notes

1 This section is based on Lehr, Akkerman and Torenvlied (2012).

2 This section is based on Lehr, Vyrastekova, Akkerman and Torenvlied (2013).

3 This section is based on Thommes and Akkerman (2013).

4 This section is based on Thommes, Vyrastekova and Akkerman (2013).

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