1 Introduction

The last few years have shown a worldwide rise in the attention for, and actual use of, open source software (OSS), most notably of the operating system Linux and various applications running on top of it. Various major companies and governments are adopting OSS. As a result, there are many publications concerning its advantages and disadvantages. The ongoing discussions cover a wide range of topics, such as Windows versus Linux, cost issues, intellectual property rights, development methods, etc. Here we wish to focus on security issues surrounding OSS. It has become a reasonably well-established conviction within the computer security community that publishing designs and protocols contributes to the security of systems built on them. But should one go all the way and publish source code as well? That is the fundamental question that we wish to address in this paper.

The following analogies may help to introduce the issues and controversies surrounding the open source debate.

- Would you, while travelling far from home, take medicines of an unknown brand given to you by a self-proclaimed “doctor”, without documentation, and hence without (independent) assurance about the nature and proper working of the ingredients?

- Who would you trust most? A locksmith who keeps the working of his locks secret, so that thieves cannot exploit this knowledge? Or a locksmith who publishes the workings of his locks, so that everyone (including thieves) can judge how good/bad they are (so you exclusively rely on the complexity of the keys for protection)?

*Id: oss-acm.tex,v 1.16 2005/04/26 17:44:29 jhh Exp
In the remainder of this paper we will discuss the impact of open source on both the security and transparency of a software system. We focus on the more technical aspects of this issue (and refer to Glass [4] for a discussion of the economical perspective of open source), combining and extending arguments developed over the years [12]. We stress that our discussion of the problem only applies to software for general purpose computing systems. For embedded systems, where the software usually cannot easily be patched or upgraded, different considerations may apply.

1.1 Security through obscurity: design vs. implementation

Through the centuries, secrecy was the predominant methodology surrounding the design of any secure system. Security of military communication systems, for example, was mostly based on the fact that only few people knew how it worked, and not on any inherently secure method of communication. Ciphers in those days were very insecure.

In 1883, Auguste Kerckhoffs [5] extensively argued that any secure military system "... must not require secrecy and can be stolen by the enemy without causing trouble". In the academic security community Kerckhoffs’ Principle is widely supported: in the design of a system, security through obscurity is considered bad practice, for many reasons similar to the ones we will discuss later on. This point is starting to get across to industry as well, witnessed by the fact that, for instance, the security of the third generation of cellular telephone networks (UMTS) is based on open and published standards.

In Kerckhoffs’ days there was hardly any difference between the design of a system and its actual implementation. These days, however, the difference is huge: system designs are already very complex, and their implementation is hard to get completely right. The question then arises whether Kerckhoffs’ Principle applies only to the design of a system, or also to its implementation. In other words, should secure systems also be open source, or not?

There is no agreement on the answer to this question even in the academic community [1]. According to us, the answer is: "absolutely!". In the remainder of this paper we will argue why.

1.2 Security, risk and exposure

When discussing whether open source makes systems more secure, we have to be precise about what we mean by that. In fact, for the purpose of this discussion we need to distinguish between the security of a system, the exposure of that system, and the risk associated with using that system. We define these terms next.

The ultimate decisive factor that determines whether a system is “secure enough” is the risk associated with using that system. This risk is defined as
a combination of the likelihood of a successful attack on a system together
with the damage to the assets resulting from it.

The exposure of a system completely ignores the damage that is incurred
by a successful attack, and is defined as just the likelihood of a successful
attack. This depends on several factors, like the number and severity of vul-
nerabilities in the system, but also whether these vulnerabilities are known
to attackers, how hard it is to exploit such a vulnerability, and whether the
system is a high-profile target or not.

Finally, we consider the security of a system to be an objective measure
of the number of its vulnerabilities and their severity (i.e., the privileges
obtained by exploiting the vulnerability).

To summarise, exposure combines security with the likelihood of attack,
and risk combines exposure with the damage sustained by the attack. We
note that in other papers on this and similar topics, security has been used
to mean either security proper, exposure or risk as defined above. With
these definitions in place, we see that opening the source clearly does not
change the security of a system (simply because it doesn’t introduce new
bugs), while the exposure is likely to increase in the short term (because it
makes the existing bugs more visible). The question is what happens to the
security and the exposure of an open source system in the long run.

1.3 Open vs. closed source

The increased attention paid to open source in the media and by society at
large has made open source an almost catch-all phrase. Here, we use it in
its original, rather specific, meaning. Open source software is software for
which the corresponding source (and all relevant documentation) is available
for inspection, use, modification and redistribution by the user\(^1\). We do
not distinguish between any kind of development methodology (e.g., the
Cathedral or the Bazaar\(^10\)). Neither do we care about the pricing model
(freeware, shareware, etc.). We do assume however that users (in principle)
are allowed and able to rebuild the system from the (modified) sources, and
that they have access to the proper tools to do so.

In some cases, allowing the user to redistribute the modified sources
(in full, or through patches) is also necessary (e.g., Free Software and the
GNU Public License\(^2\)). Most of our arguments also hold for source available
software, where the license does not allow redistribution of the (modified)
source.

\(^1\)See [http://www.opensource.org/](http://www.opensource.org/).
\(^2\)http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/gpl.html
2 Open source necessary for security

We believe that using open source software is a necessary requirement to build systems that are more secure. Our main argument is that opening the source allows independent assessment of the exposure of a system and the risk associated with using the system, makes patching bugs easier and more likely, and forces software developers to spend more effort on the quality of their code. The remainder of this paper is devoted to arguing our case in detail.

We will first review arguments in favour of keeping the source closed, and then discuss reasons why open source does (in the long run) increase security. As noted in the introduction, there is a distinction between making the design of a system public and also making its implementation public. We focus on the latter case, but note that most (but not all) of these arguments also apply to the question whether the design should be open or not.

2.1 Keep the source closed: arguments against open source

First of all, keeping the source closed prevents the attacker from having easy access to information that may be helpful to successfully launch an attack. Opening the source gives the attacker a wealth of information to search for vulnerabilities and/or bugs, like potential buffer overflows, and thus increases the exposure of the system.

Also, there is a huge difference between openness of the design and openness of the source. Openness of the design may reveal logical errors in the security in the worst case. With proper review, these errors can and usually are found. For source code, this is not, or at least not completely, the case. In the foreseeable future, source code will continue to contain bugs, no matter how hard we look, test or verify.

Moreover, opening the source gives unfair advantage to the attacker. The attacker needs to find but one vulnerability to successfully attack the system. The defender needs to patch all vulnerabilities to protect himself completely. This is considered an uneven battle.

Fourth, there is no direct guarantee that the binary object code running in the computer corresponds to the source code that has been evaluated. People unable or unwilling to compile from source must rely on a trusted third party to vouch for this.

Also, making the source public does not guarantee that any qualified person will actually look at the source and evaluate (let alone improve) it. There are many open source projects that, after a brief flurry of activity, are only marginally maintained and quickly sink into oblivion. The attackers, on the other hand, most surely will scrutinise the source.

\footnote{Or could use tools like \texttt{systrace} to confine untrusted object code, and to enforce a security policy nevertheless\cite{9}.}
In bazaar style open source projects, back-doors may be sneaked into the source by hackers posing as trustful contributors. That this is not an idle threat became clear in November 2003, when Linux kernel developers discovered a back-door in a harmlessly looking error-checking feature added to a system call\(^4\).

Finally, and more generally, the quality of a piece of software (and patches to it) depend on the skills of the programmers working on it \([8]\). For many open source projects there is no a priori selection of programmers based on their skill. Usually any help is appreciated, and there is only rudimentary quality control.

2.2 Closed is not so closed: arguments against closed source

Let us first review the arguments put forward against open source in the previous section. The last two arguments against open source are actually aimed at the development methodology instead. The systems developed in that manner would also be more insecure if they were closed source. We assume a minimal standard of proper coding practices, project management, change control and quality control. In fact, one of our main points is that by opening up the source, software projects cannot get away with poor project management and poor quality control so easily.

Now turning to the first argument against closed source, we note that keeping the source closed for a long time appears to be hard \([7]\). Last year, source code for certain types of voting machines manufactured by Diebold were distributed on the Internet, and subsequent research on that source code revealed horrible programming errors and security vulnerabilities \([6]\). Recently even parts of the source to Microsoft Windows NT became public. Within days the first exploit based on this source code was published. The Diebold case also revealed how bad coding standards of current closed source systems can be, and how they lead to awfully insecure systems.

Even if the source remains closed, vulnerabilities of such closed source systems will eventually be found and become known to a larger public after a while. Vulnerabilities in existing closed source software are announced on a daily basis. In fact, tools like debuggers and disassemblers allow attackers to find vulnerabilities in applications without access to the source relatively quickly. Moreover, not all vulnerabilities that are discovered will be published. Their discoverers may keep them secret to avoid patches for them, allowing use of the vulnerability to exploit systems for a prolonged period of time. We see that while the perceived exposure of a closed source system may appear to be low, the actual exposure eventually becomes much higher (approaching the exposure that would exist initially if the system were completely open source).

Even worse, only the producer of closed source software can release patches for any vulnerabilities that are found. Many of those patches are released weeks or months after the vulnerability is discovered, if at all. The latter case occurs for instance with legacy software for which the company producing it no longer exists (or refuses to give support for it after a while, e.g., Microsoft Windows NT Server 4.0 or Netscape Calendar). The consequence is that systems stay exposed longer, increasing the risk of using that system.

We see that keeping the source closed actually hurts the defender much more than the attacker: while a determined attacker can still discover weaknesses easily, the defender is prevented from patching them.

Finally, closed source software severely limits the user of such software to evaluate its security for or by himself. The situation improves if at least the design of the system is open. If the system is evaluated by an independent party according to some generally accepted methodology (like the Common Criteria), this gives the user another basis for trusting the security of the software. However such evaluations are rare (because they are expensive), and usually limited to certain restricted usage scenarios or parameter settings that may not correspond to the actual operating environment of a particular user. Moreover, such evaluations apply only to a specific version of the software: new versions need to be reevaluated.

2.3 The way forward: arguments supporting open source

We see that the arguments against "security through obscurity" generally apply to the implementation of a system as well. It is a widely held design principle that the security of a system should only depend on the secrecy of the (user-specific) keys, on the ground that all other information of the system is shared by many other people and therefore will become public as a matter of course.

Moreover, open source enables users to evaluate the security by themselves, or to hire a party of their choice to evaluate the security for them. Open source even enables several different and independent teams of people to evaluate the security of the system, removing the dependence on a single party to decide in favour or against a certain system. All this does not decrease the security or exposure of the system. However, it does help to assess the real exposure of the system, closing the gap between perceived and actual exposure.

Open source enables users to find bugs, and to patch these bugs themselves. There is also a potential network effect: if users submit their patches to a central repository, all other users can update their system to include this patch, increasing their security too. Given that different users are likely to find different bugs, many bugs are potentially removed. This leads to more and faster patches, and hence more secure code (this corresponds to
"Linus’s Law": “Given enough eyeballs, bugs are shallow” [10]). Evidence suggests that patches for open source software are released almost twice as fast as for closed source software, thus halving the vulnerability period [12].

If a user is unable to patch a bug himself, open source at least enables him to communicate about bugs with developers more efficiently (because both can use the same frame of reference — i.e., the source code — for communication [10]).

Also, open source software enables users to add extra security measures. Several tools exist to enhance the security of existing systems, provided the source is available [3]. These tools do not rely on static checking of the code. Instead, they add generic runtime checks to the code to detect e.g., buffer overflows or stack frame corruptions. Moreover, open source software allows the user to limit the complexity of the system (and thereby increasing its security) by removing unneeded parts.

Finally, and importantly, open source forces developer communities to be more careful, and to use the best possible tools to secure their systems. It also forces them to use clean coding styles (“sloppy” code is untrustworthy), and to put more effort into quality control. Otherwise, companies and individual programmers alike will loose respect and credibility. As a side effect, this will stimulate research and development in new, improved tools for software development, testing and evaluation and perhaps even verification.

3 Conclusions

We conclude that opening the source of existing systems will at first increase their exposure, due to the fact that more information about vulnerabilities becomes available to attackers. However, this exposure (and the associated risk of using the system) can now be determined publicly. With closed source systems the perceived exposure may appear to be low, while the actual exposure (due to increased knowledge of the attackers) may be much higher.

Moreover, because the source is open, all interested parties can assess the exposure of a system, hunt for bugs and issue patches for them, or otherwise increase the security of the system. Security fixes will quickly be available, so that the period of increased exposure is short.

In the long run, openness of the source will increase its security. Sloppy code is visible to everyone, and questions even the overall quality of it. Any available tools to validate the source will be used more often by the producers. If not, the users will do it themselves, afterwards. New, much more advanced, tools will be developed to improve the security of software even further. Open source allows users to make a much more informed choice about the security of a system, based on their own or on independent judgement.
It is our conviction that all these benefits outweigh the disadvantages of a short period of increased exposure.

References


