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Organizing for moral excellence in the military
A theoretical exploration and demonstration through casuistry

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Abstract
This paper develops a virtue ethical perspective on moral military behavior in relation to the infrastructural design of the military organization. To this end, Aristotelian virtue ethics is integrated with insights from social cognitive theory on moral behaviour and moral development and insights from sociotechnical systems theory on the design of organizations. This results in a normative theory on the design of the military organization to facilitate moral development and moral behaviour. This theory can yield new insights on the role of the organizational design in moral military behavior, as is demonstrated by applying it to casuistry taken from military operations in which the Netherlands participated: SFIR, UNPROFOR and ISAF.
Keywords
Moral functioning, virtue ethics, socialcognitive theory, sociotechnical systems theory, military organization, critical incident technique

Introduction
During deployments, junior military leaders encounter situations that ask for moral deliberation and action (Groen junior leadership). In this paper I argue that, in order for them to deal with moral situations responsibly, these leaders should operate in an organizational context that facilitates the development and application of moral virtue, practical wisdom and technical skills, and that this is a design issue. More specifically my claim is that task design influences the possibilities for moral action and that military crisis response organizations can be designed in such a way as to support the moral behavior and moral development of military personnel. So far, little research has been done on how tasks should be designed to facilitate in moral functioning (Weaver 2006; exceptions are: Schminke 2001; James 2000; Achterbergh & Vriens 2010) although researchers claim that morality should be integrated into everyday organizational activities (Weaver et al. 1999; Tenbrunsel et al. 2003; Nyberg 2007) and have called for more research on the role of the division of labour in moral functioning in organizations (Ford & Richardson 1994; Treviño et al. 2006; Craft 2013). This paper aims to increase our understanding of how the division of tasks affect moral (military) behavior by theorizing the relation between moral functioning and task design and applying this theory to casuistry drawn from military practice.

To this end, the paper starts by developing a theoretical framework on facilitating moral behaviour and development in organizations based on Aristotle’s ethics (Aristoteles 2005) and social cognitive theory. This results in an interactionist account of moral functioning, i.e., a perspective on moral functioning that considers moral behavior and moral development the result of an interaction of personal, situational and behavioral factors. Based on this interactionist account, requirements are formulated that organizations have to met in order to be conducive to the development of moral competence. Finally, Dutch socio-technical systems theory is used to derive a set of design parameters for organizational structures (i.e., divisions of labour) that meet these requirements. I argue that organizational structures that are designed according to these parameters support moral functioning and by
extension, human flourishing (De Sitter 1994; Kuipers et al. 2010; Achterbergh & Vriens 2010). These design principles apply to a variety of organizations, including the military.

In order to demonstrate the usefulness of this theory, the second part of the paper presents two cases drawn from military operations (UNPROFOR and SFIR). Developed using a critical incident technique, these cases are analysed in light of the theoretical framework developed to demonstrate how moral development and responsible behavior is enabled or hindered in the context of crisis management operations. The first case (UNPROFOR) suggests a process of moral numbing as a result of small-scale, routine tasks and a lack of oversight on the aims and processes of the operation. The second case (SFIR) demonstrates how moral virtue and practical wisdom can be developed in tasks characterized by high regulatory potential, thus contributing to human flourishing. It results in ‘anticipatory’ moral behavior, i.e., behavior aiming to prevent moral issues from occurring.

By way of conclusion I reflect on the implications of this study for the military organization and organizational design for and in the context of crisis management operations. Currently, military organizations mix and match the various skills and equipments necessary to achieve operational goals. This creates opportunities to design organizational infrastructures that are supportive of moral behavior and moral development during military operations. Furthermore, processes of organizational redesign during deployments, which the casuistry demonstrates, may further improve or frustrate the possibilities for moral military behavior.

1. Theoretical framework

1.1. Human flourishing: Aristotelian virtue ethics
Aristotle considers moral development and moral behaviour from within a teleological framework. His ethics is based on the question ‘what is the highest good for man?’. The highest good is that which we do for no other reason but for its own sake; it is an end in itself. Aristotle defines the highest good for human beings in terms of their internal organization and the characteristically human capacities resulting from this. The highest good for human beings is eudaimonia: ‘living a fulfilled life’ or ‘human flourishing’. The capacities that are characteristically human and that human beings should develop in order to live a fulfilled life
are reason (the capacity which disposes humans to know truth) and desire (the capacity which disposes humans to reach out for something perceived as good).

Living a fulfilled life means that the capacities for reason and desire are developed and exercised in the best possible way. This happens in a process of habituation, for human beings are naturally disposed for reason and desire, but these capacities have to be developed into excellences. Habituation occurs when we develop our natural capacities into habits. If we develop our reason in the right direction, we will recognize as true that which is actually true and if we develop desire in the right direction, we will desire as good those things that actually are good. However, we can also habituate ourselves to consider as true things that are not true, and to desire things that are not good. For human beings then, living a fulfilled life consists of both developing our capacity for reason and desire into virtues and acting in accordance with those virtues.

Being morally virtuous means that one desires the right things in specific situations. Aristotle emphasizes the situational nature of emotional responses. He argues that in specific situations we can have an emotional response that it too strong or too weak, and we should habituate ourselves to have an emotional response that is appropriate for the situation in which we find ourselves and that is neither an overreaction or underreaction. Thus, courage may be a virtuous response in one situation while being an overreaction in another. If we desire our capacity for desire in the right direction, we will be able to determine which emotional response is appropriate. This is also known as Aristotle’s theory of the mean.

Living a fulfilled life occurs in human practice, and being morally virtuous and practically wise enables us to act well. Acting well is defined by the quality of the act as well as the quality of one’s character:

‘...but if the acts that are in accordance with the excellences have themselves a certain character it does not follow that they are done justly or temperately. The agent also must be in a certain condition when he does them; in the first place he must have knowledge, secondly he must choose the acts, and choose them for their own sakes, and thirdly his action must proceed from a firm and unchangeable character’ (Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea, 1105a28-1105b).
Aristotle here lists three requirements that have to be met in order for an act to be virtuous. A person has to desire the right thing and choose to do this. One has to be both morally virtuous and practically wise in order to act morally responsible. Being morally virtuous means that one desires the right thing for its own sake and because it is the right thing to do. What is the right thing to do is relative to the particular situation, and being practically wise enables one to know which act best fulfils the desire (Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea*, 1105a28-1105b).

Therefore, if an organization aims to encourage moral behavior and moral development, it should encourage the development of moral character, moral virtue and practical wisdom in relation to the application of job-related skills. To this end, it should enable the habituation of reason and desire into excellences and to apply them in practice, i.e., while doing one’s job.

![Diagram of Aristotelian virtue ethics on moral behavior](image)

*Figure 1: Aristotellean virtue ethics on moral behavior*

The development of moral virtue and practical wisdom occurs through repeated actions and feedback from others. Others are important examples for our behavior, especially the
Aristotle discusses what is the right thing to do.

Figure 2: Process of moral development according to Aristotle (Achterbergh & Vriens 2010, p.343)

1.2. Moral functioning: social cognitive theory

Aristotle’s ethics builds on a moral psychology that emphasizes a process of moral development through experience, emulation, and feedback. For this reason, it has often been characterized as an ethics which centers on ‘becoming by doing’. Present day studies in the field of social cognitive theory deepen our understanding of the psychological processes involved in the development of moral virtue and practical wisdom, in particular, theory on moral identity (Narvaez & Lapsley 2009; Blasi 2005; Aquino & Reed 2002), moral motivation (Hardy & Carlo 2005) and ethical expertise (Dreyfus & Dreyfus 2004; Narvaez & Lapsley 2005; Hulsey & Hampson 2014; Dane & Sonenshein 2014). In terms of social cognitive theory, human flourishing consists of the development of moral identity, moral motivation and ethical expertise and is threatened by moral disengagement.

Two assumptions of social cognitive theory are especially relevant for my account. First, according to social cognitive theory, cognitive development is an interactionist process, in which training, practical experience and emulation play an important role. When applied to moral functioning, social cognitive theory sees the development of moral capacities as the
result of interactional processes between the person, his environment and behavior. Through processes of acting, observing and reflection, and through training and education, people develop moral schemes that affect and shape their functioning in the moral domain. Put different, social cognitive theory, like Aristotle, characterizes moral development as ‘becoming by doing’. Second, according to social cognitive theory, people are naturally inclined towards self-consistency and the avoidance of negative affect (Bandura 1977). As a result, people are motivated to act in accordance with their self-image in order to avoid self-sanctions.

Ethical expertise

People develop moral capacities through their own actions and trainings, as well as observing and emulating moral behavior from others. In this process, people may develop ‘ethical expertise’, which is extensive knowledge of moral values and ethical theories and the ability to justify moral claims convincingly (‘epistemic expertise’) as well as the ability to apply moral knowledge in practice and to perform moral tasks well (‘performative’ expertise) (see Steinkamp et al. 2008). In the remainder of this paper, the focus is on performative ethical expertise, which is also referred to as moral competence. Moral competence may pertain to live in general or to specific professional practices (Dane & Sonenshein 2014).

The development of ethical expertise consists of the development of ‘moral schemes’ (Lapsley & Hill 2008). Schemes are general knowledge structures that structure information, expectations and experiences (Narvaez & Lapsley 2005; Lapsley & Narvaez 2004). They enable the interpretation of situations and facilitate the processing of situational clues to determine an appropriate course of action. Which schemes someone develops depends in part on his identity, experiences, goals and self-image, while the development of schemes contributes to and reinforces the actor’s identity, self-image, goals and experiences; it is a self-reinforcing process. Schemes may become ‘chronic’, meaning that they are readily accessible and prominent in someone’s knowledge structure (Narvaez et al. 2006).

Moral schemes are focused on the moral domain, and consist of moral convictions orientations, categories as well as moral goals, values, personality characteristics and principles and guidelines for behavior (Narvaez & Lapsley 2005). A moral scheme influences moral awareness, judgment, motivation and action. If a moral scheme is used often, it is
developed further and becomes more complex. In addition, it is easily accessible and as a result, situations are seen and interpreted in light of this scheme. People with elaborate moral schemes that are chronically accessible, are considered ‘moral chronics’. They are likely to perceive themselves primarily in terms of this moral schemes, in other words; they have a strong moral identity.

In the development of ethical expertise, experiences of the self and of others play an important role. Others serve as rolemodels, trainers, teachers and commentators. The behaviors of others and their consequences, especially in terms of sanctions and rewards, provides valuable information on which behavior is morally permissible and results in desired outcomes. Through emulation, people develop their own insight in the outcomes of behaviors. In addition, others provide feedback on our behavior and if these are reflected upon, this may also result in moral development. A requirement for moral development is the interaction with others and the ability to see the consequences of one’s actions.

Moral identity
Moral identity has been discussed from a characterological and a socialcognitive perspective (Shao et al. 2008). The discussion in the previous section on moral expertise is a socialcognitive account of the development of a moral identity; someone whose moral scheme is chronically accessible is thought to have developed a moral identity that is central to his self-image.

A characterological perspective on moral identity emphasizes the way this identity motivates everyday moral behavior (Blasi 2005; Blasi 2004). Willpower, integrity and moral desire are the core virtues of a moral identity. Willpower consists of self-control and perseverance and enables someone to resist temptation and to remain focused on moral goals. Integrity concerns the need for unity and consistency in the self-image and motivates people to act in accordance with their moral identity. Finally, moral desire is the element of the moral character that concerns morality. It is the intensity with which someone is focused on realising moral goals.

Moral desire gives direction to willpower and integrity. A high level of moral desire contributes to consistent moral behavior based on an intrinsic motivation. This conception of moral identity is closely related to the Aristotelean account of moral character and clarifies
how mental processes and individual characteristics such as integrity and willpower enable consistent moral behavior.

**Moral motivation**

Moral motivation has to be distinguished from moral desire, which refers to the intensity with which someone is focused on realising the good. Moral desire is an aspect of moral identity, whereas moral motivation is the result of an internalised moral desire (Blasi 2005). Moral motivation has been perceived as a step in the moral decision making process (Rest 1986). As such it refers to the decision of an individual to act in accordance with his moral judgment, thereby linking moral judgment to moral action. Moral motivation requires prioritizing moral goals over other, non-moral goals.

From a personality perspective, moral motivation (also: moral will) is a characteristic of the individual and concerns the extent to which someone is generally motivated to act on his moral judgment. As such, it is related to moral identity and moral expertise. It is assumed in social cognitive accounts of moral functioning that moral expertise and the prominence of someone moral identity in his self-image contribute to moral motivation, thereby increasing the likelihood that someone will behave in accordance with his moral convictions and judgments. As a characteristic of the individual, moral motivation is the motivation to act in a moral responsible manner (Tanner & Christen 2014). It is an aspect of moral identity; people may differ in their moral motivation. Moral motivation is positively related to moral awareness, moral judgment and moral action; a high level of moral motivation is more likely to result in moral responsible behavior. Furthermore, moral motivation affects the willingness of the individual to reflect on a situation in moral terms, to formulate a moral judgment and to act in accordance with this judgment in spite of difficulties or resistance (Tanner & Christen 2014).

**Implications**

The three concepts discussed above paint a picture of moral functioning that is closely related to a virtue ethical perspective on moral functioning. It prioritizes the role of moral competence and personality in moral behavior. Moral development is perceived as a self-
reinforcing process; moral identity, moral expertise and moral motivation are closely linked and are mutually reinforcing.

1.3. **Synthesis: requirements for organizations**

Based on the above discussion of virtue ethics and sociocognitive theory, a set of general requirements for organizations can be developed that have to be met in order to facilitate moral behavior and moral development.

An organizational environment is conducive to moral behavior and development if it enables people

1. To encounter a variety of moral situations;
2. To witness the moral behavior of others and their consequences in terms of outcomes, rewards and punishments;
3. To deal with moral situations themselves and to see the outcomes of their own actions;
4. To reflect on their own moral behavior and that of others;
5. To act in accordance with their moral desire.

In the next section, I elaborate what organizational structure may realize these requirements by drawing on the Dutch Modern Sociotechnical Approach.

2. **Sociotechnical systems theory**

The Dutch Modern Sociotechnical Approach (MST) as developed by De Sitter (De Sitter 1994; Achterbergh & Vriens 2010) assumes that organizational functioning is defined by the level of coherence between the design of the structure and systems of an organization and social variables (attributes of human beings and their relations) (Van Amelsvoort 1999, p.10).

MST perceived of human beings as socially referential beings, that is to say the needs of human beings are defined or activated in human interactions. Since the organizational structure defines the working relations between different tasks which are occupied by specific people, they also influence the possibilities for behaviour (Van Amelsvoort 1999: 45). This is in line with the interactionist perspective on moral functioning advocated by Aristotelian virtue ethics and sociocognitive theory. MST adds to this an organizational perspective. More
specifically, it focuses on the way the organizational structure influences interaction between human beings and their abilities for specific behavior.

MST was developed by De Sitter (De Sitter 1973; De Sitter 1994; De Sitter et al. 1997). He developed a set of design parameters for the structure of the organization. In this paragraph I will first discuss the philosophy underlying MST, i.e., its cybernetic origins, its view of human beings, its concept of complexity and of alienation. These provide the background against which we are to understand De Sitter’s design parameters and his claim that the value of these parameters should be ‘as low as possible’.

Two core concepts in MST are complexity and controllability. The organization is perceived as a dynamic network of mutually dependent, interacting humans and machines. The complexity of an organization is a factor of the number of elements, the number of relations, the stability and specificity of those relations (Van Amelsvoort 1999). An organization with many elements and many relations between those elements is more complex than an organization with few elements and few relations between those elements. Complexity is positively related to the sensitivity for interferences, which in turn is negatively related to the controllability of the organization (Amelsvoort 1999: 43). Controllability refers to the ability of an organization to deal with disturbances effectively and to realize its aims. This requires attenuation (a reduction of the sensitivity for disturbances) and amplification (the increase of regulatory potential in order to deal with disturbances).

According to De Sitter, an organizational structure can be source for disturbances and regulatory potential. It should be designed so as to attenuate and amplify, thereby enabling the organization to realize its aims. Generally, attempts to reduce the sensitivity for interferences add rules and procedures to the organization, thus increasing its complexity. In MST this is referred to as the ‘vicious circle of the division of labour’. MST attempts to end this cycle by emphasizing the importance of complex jobs in simple organizations. Rather than adding complexity to the organization, the complexity of the organization should be reduced and regulatory potential of individuals within the organization should be increased.

2.1. Design Parameters for the division of labour
De Sitter develops design parameters capturing characteristics of organizational structures relevant for attenuation and amplification (Achterbergh & Vriens 2009: 242). He is concerned with the controllability of organizations. He distinguishes 7 design parameters that define the organizational structure. These parameters can be clustered together into parameters that (1) describe the production structure, (2) regard the separation between the production and control structure, and (3) regard the control structure of the organization. They can be summarized as follows:

Parameters for the production structure:

1. **Level of functional concentration relative to orders.** Functional concentration: the extent to which operational tasks are concentrated into specialized departments, where they are performed with respect to (potentially) all orders. If the value of functional concentration is low, this means that the operational tasks required for realizing an order are grouped together in production flow.

2. **Level of differentiation of operational transformations in tasks:** De Sitter distinguished making, preparing and supporting as operational sub-transformations. Operational sub-transformations can be grouped into separate tasks, or they can integrated into operational tasks.

3. **Level of specialization of operational transformations in tasks:** this parameter refers to how much tasks are split up into small sub-tasks. One task can be separated into several subtasks. If the level of specialization is high, this means that a task is split up into many small sub-tasks. If, in contrast, the level of specialization is low, sub-transformation of a transformation are integrated into one task.

Regarding the separation between the production and control structure, this parameters is developed:

4. **Level of separation of operational and regulatory transformations in tasks:** the level of separation is high if the regulatory tasks are separated from the operational tasks; operational tasks are grouped together and stripped from their regulatory potential, and operational tasks are grouped together and stripped from their operational aspects. Separation is minimal if a tasks consists of both operational sub-transformations and the related regulatory transformations.
Regarding the control structure of the organization, De Sitter formulates these design parameters:

5. **Level of differentiation into aspects of regulatory transformations in tasks**: De Sitter distinguishes three types of regulation: regulation by design, strategic regulation and operational regulation. The differentiation of regulatory transformation is maximal if these three types of regulation are grouped into different tasks, i.e., if strategic, operations and regulation by design are separate tasks.

6. **Level of differentiation into parts of regulatory transformations in tasks**: De Sitter assumes that all regulatory transformations consist of monitoring, assessing and acting. If regulation is differentiated into three parts and if these sub-transformation are coupled with separate regulatory tasks, differentiation is maximal.

7. **Level of specialization of regulatory transformation in tasks**: this is about the extent to which regulatory transformation are split up into separate tasks (Achterbergh & Vriens 2009: 242-248).

De Sitter states that the value of all the parameters should be as low as possible. If this is the case, controllability is high. As a result, the organization will realize a high quality of work, high quality of organization and high quality of working relations. Such an organizational structure can be characterized as ‘complex jobs in simple organizations’, as opposed to ‘simple jobs in complex organizations’. His logic is explained below and then applied to moral functioning in organizations.

### 2.2. A structure with ‘low’ parameter values (this section needs elaboration)

An organizational structure characterized by ‘high’ parameters values, is a structure with high levels of specialization, differentiation, separation and functional concentration. It consists of a complex network of small tasks. The tasks are characterized by their limited regulatory potential, few possibilities for learning and few opportunities for interaction. In contrast, an organizational structure that is designed according to ‘low’ parameters values, can be described as a simple structure with complex tasks. Such a structure offers opportunities for growth and learning, meaningful work, active participation in organizational developments, and social interaction. Below I explain why this is the case.
In an organizational structure characterized by low parameter values, the primary process is organized into homogeneous, parallel streams focused on the production of one type of order. Within these streams, tasks are performed in relation to specific order types, i.e., for specific input-output combinations. Parallel streams can be partitioned into segments that are assigned to taskgroups (Achterbergh & Vriens 2010; De Sitter 1994) and taskgroups are responsible to realize specific products. When differentiation is low, tasks include preparing, making and supporting functions, and low specialisation results in large, complex tasks as opposed to small and short-cycled tasks. Such tasks create room to deal with problems that occur whilst working; since the tasks are large and more complex, they allow for flexibility and are thereby able to absorb disturbances. They also allow for learning, since people are responsible for solving problems and can see the effects of their actions. This feedback contributes to their learning process. In addition, employees have insight and oversight over the production process to which they are contributing, and as a result they are able to see the effect of their own and others’ actions.

When the controlstructure has been designed according to low parameter values, controltasks have a low level of separation, differentiation and specialization. In combination with low values on the fourth parameter, the separation of control and production, then tasks consist of both control and production aspects. There is no separate, hiërarchical controlstructure. Employees have the regulatory potential to deal with problems when they occur, rather than having to ‘pass on’ the problem to other tasks or having to rely on an extensive, complex control structure to resolve the problem. When problems can be dealt with at the level at which they occur, they can be dealt with more effectively and more efficiently.

When the differentiation of regulatory tasks is low, strategic, design and operational regulation is integrated into one task. When separation is low, tasks encompass the ability to monitor, assess and act. As a result, the domain of regulatory tasks increases, since they are concerned with several aspects and levels of regulation. This is reinforced with the low level of specialisation.

Other outcomes of low parameter values:

- People are able to deal with disturbances effectively, either within their own task or in collaboration with their network of tasks;
Disturbances are dealt with quicker, because this can happen at the level at which the disturbance occurs.

Employees can contribute to product and process innovation

Complex, rich tasks are challenging and contribute to commitment;

Stress is reduced because employees are able to deal with problems they encounter.

Increased insight in the process and the contribution of a task to the larger process contributes to feelings of motivation and commitment.

(This section is still under construction.)

2.3. Relating the design parameters to moral behavior

In this paragraph, the design parameters as developed by De Sitter are related to the requirements for organizations that facilitate moral functioning listed above. I argue that if an organization is designed according to low parameter values, it will facilitate moral responsible behavior and moral development. It enables people:

1. To encounter a variety of moral situations. The complexity of the task is increased, and as a result, employees may encounter a variety of task related problem. These will include moral issues and situations calling for moral action.

2. To witness the moral behavior of others and their consequences in terms of outcomes, rewards and punishments. In an organizational structure characterized by low parameter values, people are most likely working in groups and are collectively responsible to realize the final product or service. The work requires and allows for close collaboration and interaction. In this process, people will witness the behavior of others and its effects. This contributes to the development of moral schemes.

3. To deal with moral situations themselves and to see the outcomes of their own actions. Since employees have broad, complex tasks that contain regulatory potential, they are able to deal with problems themselves or to resolve them in their network of tasks. The regulatory circle is complete, which means that people are able to monitor, assess and intervene in situation. This means that all steps of the moral decision making process, moral awareness, moral judgment and moral action, can be taken. In addition, given the complexity of tasks, people can act on a complex understanding of the situation; they are aware of multiple aspects of a situation and how their
actions may contribute to it. This will contribute to the quality of moral decision making, since it is based on a complex understanding of the moral issue. Repeated experiences with moral decision making contribute to moral development.

4. To reflect on their own moral behavior and that of others. In order to reflect on others’ behavior, one has to be able to see that behavior and to see its outcomes. In simple structures with complex tasks, employees can see the effects of their moral actions, as well as the effects of others’ actions. In addition, given the scope and complexity of their task, people are able to respond to situation in a variety of ways. Both aspects contribute to the further development of moral schemas and moral competence. The behavioral repertoire can expand and insights in the effects of behavior on other can be extended.

5. To act in accordance with their moral desire; this is closely related to point 3. If tasks contain a full regulatory circle, this means that people are enabled to act in accordance with their assessment of what is best in the given situation. They are motivated to do their work and committed rather than alienated (De Sitter 1994). This commitment and motivation will also affect their moral behaviors; given the fact that people are responsible for more aspects of their work and that they can see the effects of their work on others, they are also more likely to be motivated to do the best they can.

To summarize, organizations aiming to facilitate moral development and moral behavior are best organized in such a way that people have complex tasks (or: ‘rich jobs’ as Achterbergh and Vriens (2010) refer to them). Such tasks allow for a variety of experiences, the development and improvement of moral skills and insights. They also encourage moral actions because people are made responsible for the entire cycle of decision making.

This finding is in line with claims in the literature. For example, Treviño (1986) argues that complex tasks allow for role-taking, thereby encouraging moral behavior. Based on Jones’ Issue-Contingent Model (Jones 1991), it can be argued that complex tasks are likely to contribute to a high perceived moral intensity of situations (Gulpers, forthcoming).

3. Cases
In order to demonstrate the usefulness of the theory developed, it is now applied to three cases drawn from encounters that Dutch military personnel had with moral situations during their deployment in international crisis management operations. In this paper, three cases will be presented and analysed using the theoretical framework developed above. The cases demonstrate how moral development and responsible behavior are enabled or hindered in the context of crisis management operations by the organizational design.

The first case (UNPROFOR) suggests a process of moral numbing as a result of small-scale, routine tasks and a lack of oversight on the aims and processes of the operation. The second case (ISAF) shows that moral behavior can be expressed as acts of protest and defiance when the organizational structure does not facilitate actions in accordance with one’s sense of moral responsibility, professional skills and expertise. This may result in an informal redesign of the organization. The final case (SFIR) demonstrates how moral virtue and practical wisdom can be developed in tasks characterized by high regulatory potential, contributing to human flourishing. One of the effects is ‘anticipatory’ moral behavior, i.e., behavior aiming to prevent moral issues from occurring.

3.1. Method
To develop these cases, secondary empirical data was analysed using a critical incident technique. For two of the cases (SFIR and UNPROFOR), a large database of interviews with Dutch veterans was accessed and the search tool was used to find interviews in which an ethical issue or confronting situation was recounted (Scagliola 2010; van den Berg et al. 2010). The search focused on military operations since the end of the Cold War. Interviews matching the criteria were carefully examined to develop insights on the moral issue encountered, the way the soldier involved dealt with it, and the organizational context in which he operated. Additional interviews with veterans who were part of the same deployment were examined to deepen insights in the mission, the organizational context and moral behaviour and development during that deployment. Next, general information on the military operations was collected, using previous empirical studies, commemorative books, scientific publications and websites. By combining these insights, the cases were developed. The analysis of the cases focuses on moral functioning and the organizational context.
3.2. Discussion of the cases
For each of the cases, a description will be given of the mission’s aims, the ‘protagonist’, the moral issue(s) encountered, the way it was dealt with and the organizational context in which this occurred.

3.2.1. Case 1: Moral disengagement and numbing in UNPROFOR (DutchBat II)
This case recounts the experiences of DutchBat II, who were deployed to Srebrenica, Bosnie Herzegovina from July 1994 – January 1995.¹ DutchBat’s task was to minimalise hostilities between the parties to the conflict by manning observation posts and performing patrols on foot and by car. In addition, DutchBat was to contribute to the improvement of the infrastructure and living conditions in the enclave in collaboration with MSF, UNHCR and ICR (Jansen et al. 1999). In this case I focus on the experiences at one of the observation posts and the experiences of an engineer.

Tango-Two was a permanent observation post, located at the border of the enclave. The building was located in a house on the side of a road that separated Serbs and Muslims. On one hand, the building overlooked the road, and on the other hand, it overlooked a valley. From this post, Dutch soldiers performed patrols. They also worked at the further development and maintenance of the observation post. And they were responsible for monitoring the valley and the entrance to the enclave. When on watch duty, soldiers overlooking the road had to count the number of cars entering the enclave. The lists had to be handed in, but the soldier who recounts his experiences is unaware of what the lists were used for or who they were given to. While overlooking the valley, this group commander experienced a harrowing situation; he witnessed the execution of locals in the valley. He reported this incident to his superior, but the response was that he must have seen this wrong, that it did not happen. This commander reports feeling that his observations were not used by others, that the reports of his patrol were not acted on. Over time, and after encountering multiple difficult situations, the soldiers at this post lost their faith in the mission. They experienced time and again that they could not do anything and that their superiors did not

¹ For the development of this case, several sources were used, including books and reports on DutchBat II (Vogelaar et al. 1997; Kramer 2007; Vogelaar et al. 2005; Jansen et al. 1999). In addition, interviews from the interviewproject Nederlandse Veteranen were used (Scagliola 2010).
act either. They experience a sense of impotence and meaninglessness. This resulted in irresponsible behavior, such as harassing of local population and physical abuse.

The second case that sheds light on the role of the division of labour in DutchBat II are the experiences of an engineer. He was responsible for the maintenance of observation posts, for the repair of roads, supplying the observation posts and the processing of waste. This engineer was extremely motivated to work, although the working and living conditions were harsh. During his daily work, he has many encounters with the local population and witnesses their hardship. At the same time, he is unable to help them; his only responsibility is to fix the road. When he is processing waste (which entails transporting waste of the observation posts and dumping it in a ravine), he is confronted with starving locals, who climb on his truck to sift through the waste for food and valuables. Over time, his situation is becoming more problematic. As a soldier, he considers it his responsibility to protect these people, but he finds that he cannot. He can hardly survive himself. Over time, he starts to see the locals as sub-humans, who are sifting through waste in order to survive. The only way he can cope with this situation is by morally disengaging (Bandura et al. 1996).

In both cases, a process of moral decline can be observed. The lack of options to deal with the moral situations encountered, which are due to a lack of regulatory potential, but also to the extreme situations these soldiers encounter and the harsh living conditions, results in moral numbing and moral disengagement. They are not able to act in accordance with their moral motivation and desire.

3.2.2. Case 2: Moral growth in SFIR

The final case focuses on the experiences of a compound commander deployed in SFIR. His task is characterized by a high level of regulatory potential; he is responsible for a variety of tasks, oversees the entire process of the compound. As a result, he feels responsible for the well-being of the soldiers stationed there. He develops several initiatives to improve life at the compound, including the creation of a fire-squad and measures to ensure that no strangers can come into the compound. Thereby he attempts to prevent that a child wired with a bomb will enter the compound, knowing that his men will experience a moral dilemma when confronted with a child soldier. He has the regulatory potential to deal with this problem, even before it occurs. He can monitor developments in the mission (more attacks against the
allied forces and the use of children in bomb attacks), assess likely problematic events (a child soldier entering the compound with a bomb, and hesitance of his soldiers to react) and acts to prevent this from happening (expanding the security parameters around the camp). This can be referred to as ‘anticipatory morality’.

This commander reports a process of personal, professional and moral growth during his mission. His moral identity is strengthened, he is able to further develop his moral thinking and to act on it. This can in part be explained by the fact that his job is a ‘rich job’; it is a complex job with a high level of regulatory potential. He is able to set his own goals, to redesign the organization (in this case: the functioning of the compound), to deal with problems he encounters. His motivation is high throughout the operation and he takes on several opportunities to initiate new

4. Conclusion
In this paper, I developed a theoretical framework that relates moral functioning to organizational design. A moral and psychological perspective on moral functioning were integrated to define general requirements that have to be met by organizations to facilitate moral development and moral behavior. Next, De Sitter’s design principles were used to logically derive which organizational structures are likely to meet these requirements. The resulting design theory was applied to casuistry drawn from military practice. The cases demonstrate that organizational structures that consists of small tasks are likely to affect the motivation of personnel, their ability to recognize moral issues and their willingness to respond in a moral responsible manner. It may contribute to processes of moral disengagement and moral numbing, which ultimately may result in immoral behavior and even moral degradation. Tasks that are characterized by high levels of complexity and responsibility in contrast, provide opportunities for moral growth and anticipatory morality.

This study has several limitations. The casuistry was developed using secondary empirical data, which means that information on the design of the organization was mainly derived from additional, general information on the mission. It is well known in literature that the formal organizational design is often not the reality of the organization. An organizational structure develops over time through negotiation, job crafting and formal redesign amongst
others. Such processes of organizational development may have occurred in the cases studied.

Furthermore, the organizational structure is merely a starting point for developing organizational infrastructures that facilitate moral behavior and moral development. A complete infrastructure includes the organizational structure, human resources and the systems for their management and technology and tools (Achterbergh & Vriens 2010). Therefore, additional research has to be done in which other aspects of the organization are included as well.
Bibliography


