grammar that is abstracted away from all other information relevant to the production and comprehension of sentences is an unlikely candidate for an accurate representation of our syntactic knowledge.

The book has some unsatisfactory aspects. More than half of it consists of previously published papers, mostly from readily available books and journals, and dating back to the early seventies. Since the papers were originally intended to be read separately there is much unnecessary repetition of arguments and examples. I also wonder who the book is aimed at: the specialist will have read much of the material already, and it is a pity that the non-specialist is provided with what is surely only half of the argument. A point of view that has been urged for several years, and which runs counter to the ideas of such figures as Chomsky, Lakoff and McCawley, is unlikely to have gone unanswered.

P. SMITH


This is the first volume in a series designed to remedy what the editors claim to be a major lack in psycholinguistic publishing by providing “constructive surveys of the state of particular aspects of psycholinguistics . . . and detailed and critical accounts of important growth areas”. They are correct in their identification of a need, and it is to be hoped that future volumes will meet it; this first volume unfortunately only goes part way. The major defect is that it seems to have taken four years to get the book into print, so that the “surveys” stop in 1973. Publication lag, the editors would no doubt agree, is one of the major bug-bears of psycholinguistic (and all academic) publishing, and one which particularly demands remedy.

Of the four essays in the book, only one is a true survey of an aspect of psycholinguistics. This is Eve Clark’s “First Language Acquisition”, also by far the longest article in the book. It is a clear and thorough review which deals chiefly with research carried out in the period 1968–73; it contains comparatively little criticism or interpretation. The author’s own theoretical orientation is reflected in the full treatment given to the child’s semantic development, to the accomplishment of speech acts and to the relationship between linguistic development and cognitive development, while the acquisition of syntax receives rather shorter shrift. This, however, is a fair reflection of the preoccupations of the field in 1973. Clark’s survey is sure to prove useful, especially to teachers and others looking for an overview of the area; but at the same time it is of the four contributions the one which has suffered most by the publication lag, since so much has appeared in the last four years (the sections on speech perception in infants, children’s linguistic intuitions, and the acquisition of phonology are just three examples of areas in which the treatment is obviously out of date).

The remaining three articles are all more polemical in nature than Clark’s. David Bloor’s essay “The Regulatory Function of Language” is a brief description of Luria’s theory of language as functioning to regulate behaviour, and American failures to replicate Luria’s experimental results. Bloor concludes—not, it seems, without some regret—that the American critics are in fact right; he attempts a synthesis of the two approaches, however, by suggesting an explanation for both sets of results in terms of limited processing capacity. He reports some of his own experimental evidence for his explanation; but his hypothesis is not spelt out in any detail, and the impression left is that only precursory generalisations have been made, the proof is yet to come.

Joanna Ryan’s essay “The Silence of Stupidity” contains a short historical review of attitudes to mental subnormality and an account of research on language in subnormals, with an argument that subnormal language development may reflect in greater part paucity of environmental input rather than impaired capacity. There is no doubt that subnormals do not in general receive as rich a linguistic input as normals; but the experimental evidence is not as yet sufficient to determine whether this alone could account for lack of linguistic development. Ryan is very conscious of the lack of good research in this field, and in fact
the overall tone of her article is dispiriting: “All that can really be said at present about the failure of language development in many subnormals is that the causes must be many and various” (p. 119).

The concluding chapter by John Marshall, “Disorders in the Expression of Language”, is the most stimulating of the four. It presents a persuasive case for the relevance of data from aphasia to the description of language processes: specifically to the reality of surface structure trees in the production process. The position taken by those, like Fodor, Bever and Garrett, who doubt the relevance of pathological evidence to psycholinguistic description, is, generally, that such evidence offers nothing new, nothing that experimental evidence cannot offer; Marshall’s argument provides at least the beginnings of a challenge to this view. The next step is to go beyond, e.g. the parallels drawn between errors made by aphasics and those made by normal speakers by using the aphasic data as a base from which to predict speech errors of normals or, as the case may be, performance of normals in experimental tasks.

Finally, there are some irritating slips in the book; a little editorial attention to future volumes should prevent further occurrences. The vowel laxing in the pairs sincere—sincerity and opaque—opacity, for instance, is not due to a stress shift but to the addition of the suffix (Clark, p. 39). The abscissae of Bloor’s figures do not represent continuous data—are histograms so hard to draw? The same author states (p. 96) that Luria’s theory has generated interesting predictions, which “makes it a good scientific theory”. Any good scientific theory will, certainly, lead to experimental predictions, but it is surely not the case that any theory which generates experiments is ipso facto a good one.

A. Cutler


A big barrier to anyone who tries to follow modern work in semantics is that so much of it assumes the terminology, symbolism, and conceptual framework of twentieth-century formal logic, an edifice that can seem truly forbidding to the linguist or psychologist unfamiliar with such topics as modal and tense logics, the theory of relations, possible world semantics, categorial grammar, and the lambda calculus. Though the study of word meanings has been carried on (from various directions) largely outside this edifice, the field of compositional semantics, which concerns itself with the way in which the meanings of multiword units in natural languages are related to the meanings of the parts of these units, has historically been located firmly inside it. Anyone who wants to find out what is known about compositional semantics must somehow gain entry.

The purpose of this book (a revised English version of an earlier volume published first in Swedish, then in German) is to take the reader into this territory, to supply a rough map of it, and to give some feel for the terrain. The book is a new entry in the Cambridge Textbooks in Linguistics series, and though it is written with the interests and assumptions of linguists in mind, it is by no means narrowly directed at them. As a text it begins at near zero, with the sort of elementary set theory and logic sometimes offered to nursery school children these days, and in ten chapters works rapidly through a series of interconnected topics to intensional logic, Montague grammar, and the analysis of presuppositions. The book could easily be used for self-study.

The authors take some care to introduce terms that figure prominently in the literature, they illustrate their points with numerous examples, and they provide a few exercises for each of the first eight chapters (with solutions at the end of the book). The last chapter is a compact essay on “the relations between logic and linguistics and the extent to which logic provides useful insights for the study of natural language” (p. 158). The authors are not afraid to simplify matters by letting terms be defined by context rather than being explicitly defined; by not mentioning, by glossing over, or by postponing discussion of troublesome or intricate details; and by almost entirely avoiding metatheoretical questions,