Two centuries ago, Sheridan invented the delightful character of Mrs. Malaprop, who had an unfailing ability to use the wrong word to the greatest effect. Since Sheridan, the malapropism has been a standard tool of comic writers, especially useful for indicating inferior intellectual ability of a speaker (as when Archie Bunker says “We need a few laughs to break up the monogamy”). But not all errors involving substitution of one word for another result from ignorance of the correct usage; on the contrary, inadvertent use of the wrong word is a common variety of speech error. In this article we will examine such word substitution errors (which we will call malapropisms, although they do not arise, as Mrs. Malaprop’s did, from ignorance); we will show that they reveal some interesting aspects of the structure of the mental dictionary used in producing and understanding speech.

Consider a typical example of a malapropism:

(1) T: If these two vectors are equivalent, then . . .
E: If these two vectors are equivocal, then . . .

Here the speaker has intended to say *equivalent*, but has inadvertently substituted for it *equivocal*. This error illustrates well the three major characteristics of malapropisms. First, the erroneous intrusion is a real word—not the intended word, of course, but not a meaningless string of phonemes either. Second, the target and error seem to be unrelated in meaning. Finally, there is a close relation between the pronunciation of the target and the pronunciation of the error.

Before we analyze in more detail the properties of this kind of error, it would be
well to mention some other classes of speech errors that look like malapropisms but in fact are not. The first class comprises errors in which the speech sounds in an utterance are misplaced: spoonerisms, anticipations, perseverations, and omissions. Examples (2)–(5) represent typical cases of such errors.

(2) a. T: . . . bone and joint clinic.
   E: . . . boin and jont clinic.
   b. T: . . . carrot and cabbage.
   E: . . . cabbot and carriage.

(3) a. T: . . . splicing from one tape.
   E: . . . splacing from one tape.
   b. E: If you tend me—if you send me the time of your birth . . .

(4) a. T: . . . pale sky.
   E: . . . pale skay.
   b. T: People bounce back and forth . . .
   E: People pounce back and forth . . .

(5) a. E: When panets—planets pass each other . . .
   b. E: A most important vote and repeat—replete with historical overtones . . .

The (a) examples represent cases in which an error of this type has produced a nonword in English, while the (b) cases show that such errors may also result in real English words. In example (2), two phonemes\(^3\) have switched places in the utterance. In (3), a phoneme has been anticipated, and in (4) the speaker has perseverated by repeating a phoneme that occurred earlier in the sentence. In (5), a single phoneme has been omitted from the intended utterance.

A second type of error involving the sound segments of a word arises when two synonyms are blended together. Usually this results in a nonword, but again, a real word of English will occasionally occur; examples are given in (6):

(6) a. T: gripping/grasping
   E: grisping
   b. T: heritage/legacy
   E: heresy

Obviously, when we look for malapropisms, we must be careful to exclude cases of word substitution that might equally well be spoonerisms, anticipations, perseverations, omissions, or blends. (A further lesson to be drawn is that in collecting speech errors it is important to note the full linguistic context as well as the speaker’s intuition about the intended utterance, in order to be able to perform this categorization correctly.)

\(^3\) See Fromkin (1971) for evidence that it is indeed phonemes, rather than phones, that are involved in these errors.
A third class of errors that must be distinguished from malapropisms is that of semantic errors. Often these errors consist in saying the antonym of the intended word; (7)–(9) are typical examples:

(7)  T:  good  
     E:  bad  
(8)  T:  nearly  
     E:  barely  
(9)  T:  specific  
     E:  general  

Other kinds of semantic errors involve substitution of body parts or articles of clothing, as in (10) or (11), or changes in a semantic feature (e.g. time and space), as in (12) and (13):

(10)  T:  Don’t burn your fingers.  
     E:  Don’t burn your toes.  
(11)  T:  He got hot under the collar.  
     E:  He got hot under the belt.  
(12)  E:  The two contemporary—sorry, adjacent buildings  
(13)  E:  Not Thackeray, but someone that wrote below Thackeray—before Thackeray.  

This is by no means an exhaustive classification of semantic errors. Unfortunately, separating semantic errors from true malapropisms is not a task that can be performed mechanically. In compiling the data used in this study we have relied on our intuitions as to what words were semantically related; where we have considered that a semantic relation existed, the error was eliminated from our list. As far as we can see, the malapropisms discussed in this article involve no similarity of meaning between target and error.

From a collection of over 2000 errors in speech compiled by the first author, we initially selected all errors that involved word substitution (397). From this initial list we eliminated all errors that could have arisen from the sources discussed above. The remaining corpus comprised 183 errors. These errors, the malapropisms, have some interesting properties. First, the target and the error are of the same grammatical category in 99% of the cases. Second, the target and the error frequently have the same

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4 Examples (10) and (11) come from Fromkin (1973, Appendix); example (12) is from Nooteboom (1969).

5 As a conservative strategy, all errors involving addition, deletion, or substitution of a single phoneme were omitted, since these may be phonological errors. Further, malapropisms involving prepositions, adverbs, and compound nouns were also eliminated. These kinds of malapropisms are rare and seem to have slightly different properties from the more frequent errors involving nouns, verbs, and adjectives; the major difference is that they have a much higher incidence of disagreement on number of syllables. We hope to discuss these examples in a future paper. The pairs that comprised the data for this article are listed in an Appendix at the end.
number of syllables (87% agreement in our list). Third, they almost always have the same stress pattern (98% agreement). Table 1 summarizes these results:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Agreement on:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Grammatical Category</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malapropisms</td>
<td>99%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semantic Errors</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For comparison, the semantic errors mentioned above can be tested for the same properties. To do this we supplemented the 43 semantic errors eliminated from our original data with 36 found in Fromkin (1973), for a total of 79 errors. The target and error in this case agreed on number of syllables in 75% of the pairs. Of the polysyllabic semantic errors agreeing on number of syllables (27 pairs), 82% agreed on stress pattern. Of course, all of the pairs agreed in grammatical category, because of the nature of the semantic relations involved (antonyms; members of the same semantic field, e.g. body parts; and so on). These results are included in Table 1.

Clearly, then, this coincidence of properties between target and error exhibited by malapropisms is not accidental. We will show that it has strong implications for a theory of the mental lexicon. Before considering these implications further, however, we should devote some attention to the mechanisms by which malapropisms might occur; that is, we should sketch the relevant parts of a theory of speech production.

At a certain point in the production of a sentence a grammatical structure must be framed to carry the meaning that the speaker intends to convey. This structure can be thought of as incorporating both the syntactic properties of the impending utterance (in the form, say, of a phrase structure), and the meanings of the words to be used. What is not in the structure initially is any specification of the phonological characteristics of the chosen words. For these the speech production device must look into its mental

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6 There were four pairs that disagreed on number of syllables due to pluralization or tensing: persons/purposes, expected/expressed, ferreted/ferried, compromises/coincides. These were counted as agreements, since the level at which the errors arise (i.e. the lexicon, as will be argued below) surely does not include marking for tense or number.

7 By "same stress pattern", we mean that the main lexical stress falls on equivalent syllables in target and error. Of course this comparison cannot be meaningfully performed with monosyllables or with malapropisms in which the target and error have differing numbers of syllables. After eliminating such pairs we compared the remaining 116 pairs.

8 The level of agreement on number of syllables for malapropisms is not as high as for the other properties (although the difference in agreement between malapropisms and semantic errors is statistically significant). Perhaps this concordance is due entirely to the similarity in length between target and error. If so, syllable structure would not be an organizing principle for the lexicon as suggested below.
dictionary to find a particular entry whose meaning and syntactic category match the specifications embodied in the grammatical structure. If synonyms exist, the device will have to make a choice among the alternatives. Note that the device might err slightly in reading the meaning specification of the word from the grammatical structure, e.g. by switching the value of a particular semantic feature. It is possible that semantic errors such as those in (7)–(13) above might arise in this way. What is important for our purposes, however, is that the device knows two things about a word before it searches for it in the dictionary: on the one hand, its syntactic category (noun, verb, adjective, etc.), and on the other, its meaning.

No commitment is implied in this brief sketch to any particular model of syntactic aspects of speech production. The production model must, however, differ in at least one respect from transformational grammars, as currently conceived. This difference concerns the way in which lexical items are inserted into syntactic structures. Because of its formal representation, the grammar need not represent the “flow of information” in the derivation of a sentence. For example, there is no temporal sense in which lexical items are inserted “before” or “after” the meaning of the sentence is determined by the semantic component. A production model, however, does not have this freedom. The only reasonable assumption to make in such a model is that the meaning of an utterance is determined before the syntactic structure that will carry the meaning. In addition, syntactic structures must be constructed on the basis of the meaning. We know little about what the process of construction is like, but it seems obvious that some part of the operation must involve the specification of the meanings of the lexical items to be used. In our sketch of this process we choose to think of the specified lexical meanings as a set of syntactic and semantic features attached as leaves to the phrase structure tree (there are, of course, other ways of representing such information). Given this set of features, the speech production device can then look into the mental dictionary to find the appropriate entry matching the features appended to the tree.

What is this mental dictionary, or lexicon, like?9 We can conceive of it as similar to a printed dictionary, that is, as consisting of pairings of meanings with sound representations. A printed dictionary has listed at each entry a pronunciation of the word and its definition in terms of other words. In a similar fashion, the mental lexicon must represent at least some aspects of the meaning of the word, although surely not in the same way as does a printed dictionary; likewise, it must include information about the pronunciation of the word although, again, probably not in the same form as an ordinary dictionary. What is important to notice about dictionaries is that they must be lists, since the relation between sound and meaning is essentially arbitrary—with the exception of the small subset of words formed by onomatopoeia and those words formed by productive morphological processes (see Aronoff (1976)). Given the meaning

9 We will use the terms dictionary and lexicon interchangeably to refer to the listing of words in the head.
of a word, there is no set of rules that one could invoke to construct the pronunciation of the word, and vice versa.

Such a pairing of sound and meaning must be used in both production and comprehension of speech. In production, as outlined above, the device that searches for a word takes as input a meaning and a grammatical category, and gives as output a sound representation. In comprehension, some representation of the sound of the word is input, and the meaning and syntactic category must be retrieved from the dictionary.

Consideration of the double use to which these meaning-sound pairs are put raises the question of whether there are separate dictionaries for production and comprehension, or simply a single listing that is used in both operations. It might be argued that there should be two listings, since the optimal arrangement of the entries for the purpose of comprehension is surely not the optimal arrangement for production. In the latter process, the search for a word must be on the basis of meaning, whereas in comprehension it must proceed on the basis of sound. The relation between meaning and sound being arbitrary, it would seem to be difficult to group together words on the basis of both sound and meaning. Hence if optimal access arrangements are to be made available, separate listings would appear to be necessary.

On the other hand, since the essential property of a dictionary is simply the pairing of sound and meaning, separate listings would entail that each sound-meaning pair be simply duplicated. Any reasonable principle of economy of storage requires that duplication of this sort be avoided, hence that each pairing be listed only once—i.e. in a single dictionary. The evidence from malapropisms argues strongly that there is indeed just one mental dictionary.

We have noted a coincidence of syntactic category between target and error on the one hand, and a coincidence in phonological properties on the other. While the former might be expected to show up in errors made in the process of accessing a dictionary arranged by the requirements of production, one would not predict in this case any relation between the sound of the error and the sound of the target. That is, if there exist two dictionaries, separately accessed by the production and comprehension devices respectively, there is no way to explain why errors made in the process of word selection should show such a systematic relation in pronunciation to the words sought.

Supposing there to be just one mental lexicon, however, a very simple explanation of this relationship is possible. First, let us consider the principles by which such a single listing might be arranged. It is reasonable to assume that the arrangement should be such as to optimize accessibility; however, as has already been pointed out, the optimal arrangements for production and comprehension purposes respectively are different and apparently incompatible. We have also seen already that the phonological similarity between target word and malapropism cannot be explained if we assume the production device accesses a lexicon arranged along semantic lines; of course, this holds whether we posit two listings, or one in which the arrangement happens to be the one optimal for a production device. What, though, if there were a single lexicon,
arranged on the principle of maximum usefulness for the comprehension device? Then we might expect that near neighbors in the dictionary might be very similar in sound; we might expect that if the production device, homing in on a particular word in the lexicon, were to err just a little and pick, instead of its target word, that word's "next-door neighbor", or a near neighbor, then the word it chose by mistake might sound very similar to the target word, but would be unlikely to bear any relation to it in meaning. We might expect, in other words, to find errors having exactly the characteristics of malapropisms.

We have also noted, however, that malapropisms belong to the same syntactic category as their targets. Does this imply that the mental dictionary is arranged by syntactic category, and only within syntactic category by sound? Possibly this is true; certainly it would make things easier for the production device, which after all "knows" what category it is looking for. On the other hand, it is unlikely that the comprehension device knows the syntactic category of a word it is looking up, so that such an arrangement would be hard to justify from the point of view of comprehension requirements. We know of no strong arguments either way on this point (but see Fay (1975) for further discussion).

Let us assume, then, that there is simply one mental dictionary, and that it is arranged according to the sounds of the words it lists. The correspondence of syllable structure and stress pattern between target and error in our collection of malapropisms suggests that these two properties may also be principles of arrangement for the dictionary, i.e. that the dictionary may list its entries according to syllable structure and/or stress pattern, and only within these categories according to sound. This would presumably be useful in comprehension; since the comprehension device has segmented the sentence or part of a sentence into words before it begins to look up these words in the lexicon, it is most likely the case that the syllable structure and stress pattern are included among the things it "knows" about each word it is seeking.

One might ask what method of access the production device has to this "comprehension-biased" lexicon. It would certainly be extremely inefficient if the production device were forced to conduct an exhaustive search of the list every time it needed to find a lexical item. Yet the order in which the items are listed is apparently not the order—semantic order—which the production device needs. Is there an alternative to listing, which would allow semantic information alone to be used to locate the exact address of a given lexical item?

Suppose the method of access of the production device to be a system of paths, having a common origin. Each fork in the path would represent a choice between two (or more) values of a particular feature. The more general semantic features would obviously have their forks closer to the origin, the more specific features would occur

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10 It may well be true that the device entertains simultaneously a number of hypotheses about where word boundaries fall. The hypothesis that is finally chosen might then be the one in which all the putative words have entries in the lexicon.
further down the path system. The production device, given a set of semantic features, would be able to proceed down the path, making a choice at every fork, until there were no more choices to be made, that is, until the path terminated in a particular word. (Since we have assumed the words to be listed by their sound properties, we must assume this system of paths to resemble more a mess of spaghetti than a neatly-arranged "tree". Presumably this would not affect its viability as a thoroughfare, however.)

The above account may appear less than satisfactory, particularly in that the arrangement we have proposed for the production mechanism is not motivated by any empirical considerations. There are, however, certain differences between the tasks of the comprehension and production devices that render this account less arbitrary. Consider the problem of noise. Any system implanted in biological material must overcome the problem of doing its computations in the presence of noise internal to the organism. On this count production and comprehension devices are on a par. However, there is an additional source of noise that the comprehension device must contend with—external noise. It is rare that the comprehension device will be faced with interpreting a signal that is not embedded within a matrix of extraneous noise. The same is not true of the production device; this we take to be a basic difference between the two. Where the comprehension device must retrieve the important information in the speech signal from the irrelevant environmental noise, the production mechanism has only to overcome the internal noise.

In the case of lexical search this difference has an important implication. The comprehension device, but not the production device, must be designed to consider alternative choices in comparing the incoming signal with the lexical entries. That is, the comprehension device will often be faced with deciding which of the lexical entries best matches the (incomplete, distorted, and mashed) speech signal. If this is true, then it makes sense to list entries that have similar phonological properties "near" each other, thus facilitating comparison and choice of the best match. The production device, on the other hand, is presumably never faced with the situation of finding the best match to an incompletely specified input; the device can be as precise as it desires in determining the properties of the entry it is seeking.

It is this fundamental difference between comprehension and production, and the empirical evidence presented here that the lexicon is arranged by sound properties, that have prompted our two proposals; first, that the basic arrangement of the lexicon is by phonological segments for the purpose of aiding comprehension, and second, that the accessing arrangement for production is by means of a network. This latter proposal is, of course, quite unspecific, and the intent is only to provide an example of how the accessing might be accomplished to contrast it with access in comprehension. We will have no more to say about how the lexicon is accessed in production and look forward to the time when a more specific hypothesis can be proposed.

Let us now return to the mental dictionary and the nature of its arrangement. We
have said nothing so far about the details of the ordering by sound properties. On this point the correspondences noted between target words and errors are able to shed some light. Consider the process of comprehension; we assume that the speech perception device converts a sound wave representing an utterance into a string of phonemes marked for syllable boundaries, stress pattern, and word boundaries. We know little about how this might take place, but it is commonly assumed that some such conversion must be made. (In fact, this is just the problem of speech perception.) Assume further that the words, so segmented, are looked up in the dictionary on the basis of this phonological "spelling", using a left-to-right convention.\footnote{Simple left-to-right ordering is not the only possibility, of course. For example, one might imagine the primary principle of classification to be the form of the stressed syllable; or that the head of the entry is the stem of the word—minus its affixes. See fn. 15 for further discussion of this issue.} So, for example, to locate \textit{cat} (/kaet/), the device goes first to the section reserved for one-syllable words beginning with /kl/, then to the subsection of words beginning /kael/, and then finally to words beginning /kaet/. It is here that the device will find an entry for \textit{cat} with the attached information about syntactic category and meaning. Now what can we say about the sound properties of the words that are "near" the entry \textit{cat}? One hypothesis that we might entertain is that the entries are arranged on the basis of distinctive features of the kind proposed by Jakobson and Halle (1956). Thus the nearest entry (of the same length) would be \textit{cad}, since the last phoneme, /dl/, differs from /l/ only on the feature of voicing. Further away would be such entries as \textit{can, cab, cam}, and so on, which differ from \textit{cat} on more than one feature.

The distinctive feature hypothesis, in conjunction with the left-to-right convention, predicts that at the point at which target and error depart from being identical (counting from the left), the two words would be very close in feature marking. To test this hypothesis on the malapropism data, we have eliminated those target–error pairs that differ in syntactic category, syllable structure, or stress pattern. Our justification for this is that the correspondences noted above for these properties are so high that it would be suspect not to treat them as categorical properties of malapropisms. We might expect that although we eliminated from consideration other known kinds of word substitution errors, we may well have included some as yet unrecognized types of errors. Elimination of these errors may provide us with a more truly representative sample. Note that this move in no way increases the chances that our hypothesis will be supported by the data, since the examples we eliminated were excluded independently of whether the data show the sound properties predicted by our hypothesis.

Having excluded possible contaminations, we can perform a feature counting analysis\footnote{For a distinctive feature analysis of the phonemes of English we have used that given in Lehmann (1972, 98). This particular analysis is a modified version of the Chomsky and Halle (1968) feature chart; it eliminates from consideration phonemes that never appear in phonetic representations.} on the remaining 156 malapropisms. To take an example of how this is done, consider the pair \textit{map—make}. We first transcribe the target and error into phonological segments: /mæp/-/mek/. Then, counting from the left, we note that it is the second
segment at which the transcriptions first differ. Next, we compare the marking of these two segments on distinctive features. They are marked identically on all features but ⟨low⟩. On this feature, /æ/ is marked ‘‘+’’ and /e/ is marked ‘‘—’’. Thus we assign one feature difference to this pair. The results of all 156 comparisons are presented in Fig. 1, opposite.

It can be seen that, in general, the greater the number of feature differences, the fewer cases we find. By way of comparison, we have performed a distinctive feature analysis on 59 semantic errors (those of the 79 semantic errors mentioned previously that agree on stress and syllable structure). The results of this analysis are also shown in Fig. 1, and it can be seen that the maximum value of the curve falls, not at one feature difference, but at four.

We should note that 22 of the 156 malapropisms involve vowel–consonant comparisons. These cases produce all of the spread beyond 7 differently-marked features. We might also account for some of the spread beyond one feature by noting that there are many lacunae in the dictionary. For example, if we compare equivocal and equivalent we find that there is no other three-syllable word that is more like equivalent than equivocal. Yet if we compare them at the point at which they depart from identity, /l/ versus /k/, we find that they differ on seven features. Thus even if two words are listed next to each other in the dictionary we cannot guarantee that they will differ on only one or even a few features. It is remarkable, in fact, that our analysis shows such close correspondence on feature marking.

It appears, then, that the listing of words in the mental lexicon may be done on the basis of a distinctive feature system. Those words that begin with the same phoneme are listed together, those that have the same second phoneme form a subcategory of that class, and so on. Adjacent categories on the same level are minimally different in terms of their feature markings.

Let us summarize here the main properties of the mental dictionary as suggested by malapropisms.

(a) There is a single dictionary used for production and comprehension.
(b) In this dictionary, words are arranged by phonemic structure, in a left-to-right manner, and based on a distinctive feature system.

These comparisons result in large differences because not all features apply to both consonants and vowels. We have treated all comparisons in which one segment is marked on a feature, while the other is not, as being differences in feature marking. That is, the difference is treated as if one segment were marked ‘‘+’’ and the other ‘‘—’’ on that feature.

This is true only if the listing is partitioned by grammatical category. If it is not, then the verb equivocate is presumably listed closer to equivocal than is equivalent. However, as mentioned earlier, there is no reason to believe that equivocate would appear as a malapropism for equivocal because of this difference in syntactic category.

As noted above, there are other possibilities for arrangement of the phonological specification of a word. However, none of the other obvious candidates seems to fit the data as well as the one assumed here. Briefly, one can test the hypothesis that the stressed syllable, rather than the first syllable, heads a lexical entry by determining whether first syllables or stressed syllables are more alike between target and error. A simple comparison of how often the vowels of the respective syllables are identical shows that first vowels...
FIGURE 1 MALAPROPISMS AND SEMANTIC ERRORS: COMPARISON OF FEATURE MARKING AT POINT OF DIVERGENCE FROM TARGET
(c) The major partitioning of the dictionary, however, seems to be by number of syllables, with stress pattern as a second categorization within syllable categories.

(d) Words may also be arranged by syntactic category.

Our model provides, we think, a reasonable outline for a mental dictionary. There is, however, one area of this study in which we feel that a major revision, of some importance, may be necessary. In our distinctive feature analysis we used a level of description closely corresponding to that of autonomous phonemics. Although this level is sufficient for our purposes, we might ask whether it is the appropriate level of description for the mental dictionary. Chomsky and Halle have argued persuasively in *The Sound Pattern of English* (1968) that a deeper level of analysis, that of systematic phonemes, is necessary to explain the underlying regularities of the sound structure of English. Their analysis raises the question of whether the mental lexicon may not likewise be based on systematic phonemes. In fact, there is some evidence from speech errors that such an analysis is appropriate. Fromkin (1974, 21) gives examples of segmental misordering such as that in (14):

(14) T: swing and sway  
E: swin and swaig

These examples can be explained quite simply if one adopts an analysis in which the sequence, /ng/, underlies the surface segment / /g/. Since there are two segments in the underlying form, the /g/ is free to move independently of the /n/, giving rise to such utterances as (14).

If this argument is correct, we should expect that a reanalysis of our data on this deeper level would provide a simpler description of the sound relations between targets and malapropism errors. Although we have not yet found convincing arguments that this is true, there are certain hints that a deeper analysis would be desirable. We noticed that a number of target–error pairs involved the comparison of /y/ with a vowel at the point of departure. We list these examples in (15):

(15)  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error</th>
<th>Target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. musician</td>
<td>magician</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. museums</td>
<td>machines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. emanate</td>
<td>emulate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. review</td>
<td>revise</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

are identical in 83% of the cases, while stressed vowels are the same in only 65% of the cases (a significant difference), eliminating those comparisons in which first vowel and stressed vowel coincide.

Alternatively, one might think that phonological entries are listed right-to-left. Again, however, the data indicate otherwise. An analysis of the feature differences at the point of departure, counting from the right, shows no difference between malapropisms and semantic errors. It seems then that the left-to-right hypothesis is the correct one.

16 In the speech of the person who made this error, *museums* has two syllables ([myuzimz]). Thus, despite initial appearances, this is not an example of disagreement on syllable structure.
It is interesting in this regard that Chomsky and Halle propose a rule (1968, 192ff.) that inserts a /y/ before certain vowels. If this rule applies in the examples above, we should compare the target and error words at a level before the /y/-insertion rule had applied. This would mean that the comparison at the departure point would be between two vowels rather than between a vowel and a glide. This is surely an intuitively appealing step, and it results in a decrease in the marking differences in the above examples. Whether a reanalysis at the level of systematic phonemes would result in an overall simplification in the description of our data is a complex issue beyond the scope of this article.

Although in this respect our model is open to further elaboration, we feel that the evidence from malapropisms has supplied some insight into aspects of linguistic performance. In particular, it has provided evidence for the existence of but one mental lexicon, and for the organization of the entries in the lexicon according to phonological properties. We hope that this account may prove of value for the construction of more detailed and explicit descriptions of the processes involved in language use.

Appendix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error</th>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Error</th>
<th>Target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>lawn</td>
<td>line</td>
<td>week</td>
<td>work</td>
</tr>
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<td>gaudy</td>
<td>gory</td>
<td>map</td>
<td>make</td>
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<td>machines</td>
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<td>early</td>
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MALAPROPISMS AND THE STRUCTURE OF THE MENTAL LEXICON

result  resort  count  call
gouge  gorge  confirm  concern
camera  calendar  met  read
rest  wash  left  lost
linking  lurking  crawled  cried
recipe  remedy  advertising  agitating
experience  experiments  inclination  intimation
prescriptive  predictive  apartment  appointment
bleed  breathe  good  glad
closed  cleaned  shield  shed
downstairs  downtown  powerful  popular
blankly  blindly  inclusion  intrusion
fire  follow  hospital  holiday
save  hold  writing  waiting
improve  intrude  result  regard
miraculously  mysteriously  advertising  advocating
definitions  derivations  ferreting  ferried

Pairs differing in stress, number of syllables, or grammatical category:

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References


Fay
Department of Psychology
University of Illinois at Chicago Circle
Box 4348
Chicago, Illinois 60680

Cutler
Department of Psychology
E10-034
MIT
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139