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Abstract

During the past decades, processes of (post)modernization have raised the importance of quality-of-life issues and related policies, resulting in a higher salience of intimate citizenship issues on the political agenda. The Catholic Church as an institution especially has been articulating strong positions on issues considered to be about personal and family morality, actively opposing liberalization of abortion or even contraception, assisted reproduction for non-married couples, and the extension of marriage rights to homosexual people. This paper will investigate to what extent the framing of a number of intimate citizenship issues (reproductive rights, abortion, same-sex marriage and divorce) by the Catholic Church resonates with the framing of these issues in Catholic countries that are members or candidate to the European Union, and whether the presence or absence of resonance is linked to the degree of religiosity of the population, the support for Catholic religious values or to the institutional strength of the Catholic Church. The analysis will show to what extent we find ‘Catholic’ frames in the various countries and how that is connected to the level of religiosity, the support for Catholic religious values or the institutional strength of the Catholic Church.

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During the past decades, processes of (post)modernization have raised the importance of quality-of-life issues and related policies, resulting in a higher salience of intimate citizenship issues on the political agenda. Growing support for and activities of feminist, gay and lesbian movements have resulted in new political demands and in changes in family laws and legal arrangements about sexuality and reproduction at national levels in Europe. Several of these quality-of-life issues, such as family relations, freedom of sexual behaviour or reproductive rights, historically have been of strong concern (at least in the West) to churches and religious ideologies (Minkenberg: 223, 224).

The Catholic Church as an institution especially has been articulating strong positions on issues considered to be about personal and family morality, actively opposing liberalization of abortion or even contraception, assisted reproduction for non-married couples, and the extension of marriage rights to homosexual people (Trujillo and Romer 2006). In the context of the European Union, the strengthening and harmonization of fundamental citizen...
rights (as in the Treaty of Amsterdam and the Charter of Fundamental Rights) has been mostly responsive to social changes and the pressure of feminist, LGBTQ, antiracism movements or pressure groups for the rights of disabled, young or old people.

Scholars vary in their understanding of the positioning of the Catholic Church as part of European societies and politics. Walby (2009) considers the Church to be part of the polity, because of its ongoing power as an organized religion, and its formal links with the state in still many European countries. The Vatican also exerts direct political power as a state, holding institutional representation at various UN and EU levels. In contrast, authors such as Warner (2000) and Steven (2009) consider the Catholic Church to resemble an interest group, especially in the last decades when it has lost some of its previous autonomy and power. Sjorup, obviously reasoning from a similar perspective considers the Catholic Church a powerful opponent to sexual and reproductive health and rights, being the only religion with a highly institutionalized lobbying structure (European Parliament 2006).

As a religion, Catholicism still has strong support in many European countries too. Some argue that its support could be been strengthened even more by the accession of strongly Catholic countries such as Poland to the European Union2 (Casanova 2003). While ongoing secularization has been a part of (post)modernization processes, it seems that Catholicism is more resistant to secularization compared to other Christian denominations (Höllinger et al. 2007), resulting in visible support for the positions taken by the Catholic Church as an institution. The European Women’s Lobby observes that a more conservative political climate over the past decade has led to a possible growth in the influence of religion in Europe (position paper EWL, 2006).

Given the clash between certain human rights and Catholic values, the dynamics of further developing fundamental rights issues at European level, the changes in the social and political positioning of the Catholic

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2 “A modern religious Poland could perhaps force secular Europeans to rethink their secularist assumptions and realize that it is not so much Poland which is out of sync with Europe, but rather secular Europe which is out of sync with the rest of the world and with global trends.” (Casanova Tr@nsit online, Nr. 25/2003)
Church and processes of secularization, a closer look at the relationship between Catholic religion and public policy on intimate citizenship issues seems highly relevant. As a first step, this paper will investigate to what extent the framing of a number of intimate citizenship issues (reproductive rights, abortion, same-sex marriage and divorce) by the Catholic Church resonates with the framing of these issues in Catholic countries that are members or candidate to the European Union, and whether the presence or absence of resonance is linked to the degree of religiosity of the population, the support for Catholic religious values or to the institutional strength of the Catholic Church.

We will first present a short overview of theoretical and empirical studies linking Catholic religion, church, (gender) equality policy and intimate citizenship. In the data section, we use existing data on religiosity, support for Catholic religious values and the institutional strength of the Catholic Church for the countries that we study, to show the variety in ‘Catholicness’ across the countries studied, followed by a short analysis of the Vatican positions on intimate citizenship issues, using texts of bishops from Hungary, Italy and Spain and a text from the Pontifical Council for the Family. The last part of the data section presents new data, gathered in the context of the QUING project, using Critical Frame Analysis to expose the content of gender equality policies (laws, policy plans and parliamentary debates) on a number of intimate citizenship issues. The analysis will show to what extent we find ‘Catholic’ frames in the various countries and how that is connected to the level of religiosity, the support for Catholic religious values or the institutional strength of the Catholic Church. We will end with a discussion section.

B. Catholic Religion, Church, (Gender) Equality Policy and Intimate Citizenship

When discussing the influence of religion and whether or not this influence is declining (secularization), there has been a variety of different ways by which contemporary social scientist have looked at this. Most often it is acknowledged that the influence of religion can

3 Poland, Malta, Ireland, Portugal, Italy, Croatia, Austria, Slovakia, Slovenia, Belgium, Luxembourg, Spain, Lithuania, Hungary, France, Czech Republic
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and must be researched on multiple levels. A distinction is often made between three levels. The macro level focuses on the institutional relationship between church and state (structure). The meso-level focuses on the occurrence of a public religion whereby the religion is more a movement or pressure group that vies with rivals in the public sphere. The micro level focuses on the individual religious practices and beliefs. The trend towards more multidimensional approaches has been rather productive theoretically, but less so empirically (Gorski and Altinordu, 2008). According to Veit Bader researchers should address the full reciprocal relationship between society, culture, politics, nation, state and (organized) religions in more historical and comparative perspectives (Veit Bader 2003).

1. Religion on Macro and Meso Level

There are several historical studies that clarify the (political) processes in which the Catholic Church has been active on issues of intimate citizenship. Reference is made to the salience of intimate citizenship issues for the Catholic Church (Burns 1994), the behavior of the Catholic Church as an interest group (Steven 2009), to the alliances of Catholic groups with the medical profession and the role of Christian parties (Engeli 2009), and to discursive strategical framing (Burns 2005).

Historically, scholars such as Burns (1994) see the preeminence of issues of personal and family morality for the Catholic Church as a reaction to its loss of political and economic power in the 19th Century. Its positions on birth control (forbidden because sexuality should lead to procreation) and sexuality (no permissive liberalism of any kind) have not changed since. Since 1981, the Catholic Church holds that homosexual orientation is not in itself sinful, but that all homosexual behavior is (Andryszewski 2007).

More recently, Steven shows that the harmonization of fundamental citizen rights in the European Union has lead to a situation in which churches are losing power, referring to a case where the Scottish Catholic Church - previously independent in decision making in its schools - was forced to adhere to the Equal Treatment Directive towards its school employees. According to Steven, as the political climate of European integration develops,
churches in the European Union are increasingly forced to be much more pro-active in order to develop their interests (Steven 2009: 189). This is confirmed by the European Parliament’s Working Group on Separation of Religion and Politics who states that: “With enlargement, more instances of interference by the Vatican were noted, such as the intervention so that a Lithuanian MP would not take part in a study tour on SRHR to Latin America, as well as the concordat the Vatican tried to establish with the Slovakian government, not to mention the strong Catholic stance of Malta” (European Parliament 2006). The European Women’s Lobby interprets this increasing influence of (Catholic) religion also as a result of a more conservative political climate over the past decade. They are concerned that “religion is impacting on European and national level policies in ways which undermine equality between women and men, and curtails women’s access to and enjoyment of their basic human rights” (position paper EWL, 2006: 2).

Burns analyzed the history of (attempts at) change in the legal possibilities for contraception and abortion in the US. In his analysis, the influence of the Catholic Church on policies is mainly reactive, and limited to delaying or preventing progressive changes. He argues that the success of the Catholic Church in blocking changes in the laws on contraception was based on its ability to frame these issues as part of a moral world view. In this way, he states, even if this Church was relatively weak and unpopular in the US, they could exercise a moral veto, especially as they were a powerfully committed and vocal group. Such groups can not push through their own proposals, but they can stop action by others. Burns suggests that in the early twentieth century, it was the appeal of the Catholic Church to wider fears about loosening sexual morality that explains its success, while arguing from distinctively Catholic principles would not have worked (Burns 2005).

These examples of research indicate that the Catholic Church seems to shift away from operating on the macro level towards operating on the meso level; an ‘institutional differentiation’, in particular the separation of church and state leading towards the emergence of public religions, where the Catholic Church can be seen as a pressure group within the public sphere.

This idea of the Catholic Church moving away from a ‘polity’ actor towards a more ‘civil society’ actor does not necessarily mean that the
influence of the Church declines. According to Gorski and Altimordu some secularization theorists, such as Hume and Comte, suggest that with the institutional differentiation of Church and State the influence of religion declines. (Gorski and Altimordu, p. 56) However the rational choice approach on religion (the so called economics of religion model) says that lack of state regulation of the church makes religious competition flourish and stimulates interest in churches because these are forced to adjust to changing market forces. In their analysis, separation of Church and State leads to more Church attendance and higher belief in God. In this way the church-state relationship (structural) is seen to determine religiosity (culture) to some extent.

There are several typologies of countries according to their state-church relationship. Höllinger et al (2007) present a typology of European countries where they distinguish between countries that have Catholic religion as the state church (France, Spain, Portugal, Austria, Slovenia, Slovakia, Hungary, Czech Republic), and countries where there is a nationalist popular Church (Poland, Ireland, Italy), defined as a Church that helped a people to preserve its cultural identity against foreign powers or against a rule imposed by foreign powers. Countries with a nationalist popular Church observe the highest degree of religiosity. They also observe a relationship between the development of welfare state systems and a reduction in religiosity that they argue is caused by the reduction of personal insecurity that comes with higher degrees of welfare arrangements. Riedel (2008) distinguishes three models of church-state relations. The state church model is characterized by the existence of one official religion as established national church. In this case religious and state institutions are closely connected. In the cooperationist (hybrid) model, the church and state engage in cooperation in the sense that the practice of faith is defined not as a private but as a public affair. Churches benefit from state subsidies and tax exemption whereby the relationship with the state is characterized by self-government and absence of any other kind of state influence in religious affairs. In the secular (separation) model faith is regarded as private matter so that church and state are totally separated.

Finally, Durham (1996) uses somewhat the same typology of state-church relations as Riedel does, although his typology is more extensive.

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4 Höllinger ‘s use of the concept of state church is wide, including countries where one particular church has had the position of a state church over long periods
Durham makes a distinction between established churches, endorsed churches, cooperationist regimes, accommodationist regimes, separationist regimes, inadvertent insensitive, hostility and overt persecution.

Another part of research on the institutional dimension of religion and state can be found in electoral and party research literature on religion’s political impact. Engeli’s (2009) analysis of 18 reproductive policies in nine Western European countries shows that, contrary to the neo-institutionalist explanation, institutional arrangements at the national level do not tend to exert any clear systematic and direct impact on artificial reproduction technologies (ART) and abortion regulation in terms of policy content, even if the presence of Christian Democratic parties tends to significantly delay some policy-making processes. Variations among Western European countries seem to be significantly better explained by the sectoral logic of regulation. The sectoral logic of regulation refers to the configuration of state, movements and professions relevant to the issues. States first tend to rely on the medical community to provide an adequate response to reproduction challenges.

The multidimensionality of reproductive challenges often launches intense public controversy that mobilizes numerous divergent interests. Among them, the women’s movements and pro-life actors represent strong competing interests. Women’s movements largely bring a gender perspective to the debate, arguing in favor of women’s rights, whereas pro-life movements (often religious) concentrate on the protection of the life of the embryo and on the defense of the privileges for the traditional heterosexual family structure. Facing such competition, physicians have largely been obliged to accept compromise by forging alliances either with women’s movements or with pro-life actors. As a result, the medical profession is the pivotal sector.

What becomes clear in the studies presented above is that the institutional links between Church and state are dynamic and that there is evidence of a transposition of the ‘polity’ role of the Catholic Church (when the Catholic Church has an autonomous realm of decision making (e.g. schools), to an ‘interest group’ role (when they have to lobby to have influence on decision making), even if it remains unclear to what extent and in which countries the Catholic Church still has its ‘old’ role, and where and how much they are already acting as an interest group.
2. **Religion, Values in Society and Policy Making**

In the previous section, emphasis is put on the role of the Church at a macro or meso-level and on the (possible) influence the Church has on Catholic religiosity at the micro level. This section focuses on the influence of individual religious values and religiosity on policy making. The idea is that the cultural values that exist in society will find reflection in politics and hence also in policy making. While this is a classic assumption that democracy will function as a democracy, that is, that politics will reflect the will of the people, it is also clear that the process of policy making contains elements that put barriers to a simple translation of the will of the people in politics. Yet, some reflection can be expected in several ways.

Firstly, the values from the population in a democracy are reflected by political parties. Especially in majority systems, the views of the majority can be expected to be found in major political parties, and from there result in policy. In general, the values held by large parts of the population can be expected to be found in the political programs of certain political parties, because – to the extent that these values are important for these parts of the population – political parties can win their support by advocating these values in their programs. Through parties, the values of the population can be expected to turn up in government policies, even if it is possible that this is not a linear relationship, but one that is distorted by political power policy in the case of coalition governments, where small parties can push through policy that is not the view of the majority. Secondly, values of the population can also be transferred to politics through pressure form civil society groups.

Lastly, another way of transferring societal values that are reflected in policy is that politicians are also part of society, part of the population so that it can be expected that the values that are dominant in society can also be most often found with politicians, which will be reflected in issues they are putting on the political agenda, in policies that they are proposing and in decisions that they are taking. In contrast to the first two modes of transfer, this last mode of transfer can be expected to work whether or not issues have already acquired status as ‘political’ issues.
3. Expectations on the Relationship Between Religion, Values and Policy Framing

There have been quite some predictions on the relationships between the macro and micro levels, and on the influence of separation of religion and state on values that exist in society (or other way around). They examine how institutional differentiation is related to a decline or persistence of religious values, but do not investigate whether any of them separately or together affect the policy outcomes on and/or framing of several intimate citizenship topics. Therefore, it is interesting to see to what degree the institutional linkage of church and state (including prominent positions of Christian/Catholic political parties) and/or culture (values and religiosity) is related to the framing of gender equality policy that concerns intimate citizenship issues.

Based on the studies presented above, we have a clear expectation about the relationship between religiosity or values and policy framing. We expect that the stronger the existence of Catholic cultural values, or the stronger the religiosity in a Catholic country, the greater the resemblance between the framing of topics of the Church and the framing of policy of government. It is more difficult to express an expectation based on the institutional character of the Catholic Church. On the one hand, the stronger the relationship between Church and state in a Catholic country, the more influence the Church has on policy, and therefore the greater the resemblance between the framing of topics of the Church and the framing of policy of government. Yet, the new developments of the Church towards being an interest group actually means that the weaker the relationship between Church and state in a Catholic country, the more attempts will be made by Church linked groups to influence policy, potentially also leading to resemblance between the framing of topics of the Church and the framing of policy of government. We will look at the relationship Church-State without giving predetermined expectation. We will also look at the lobbying that can have been done by parties in government that are explicitly Catholic. We then expect that: The more Christian/Catholic political parties are found in a Catholic country
and the more these parties are part of government, the greater the resemblance between the framing of topics of the Church and the framing of policy of government.

Our analysis can not be more than presenting some correlations that point towards confirmation of these expectations, leading to further questions for research.

C. The position of the Catholic Church on intimate citizenship issues

This section will clarify what is the official position of the Catholic Church on abortion and reproductive rights, on marriage and divorce and on same sex partnership, based on a crucial Vatican text (Pontifical Council for the Family 2007) and several national texts by bishops. In the context of Vatican frames, abortion, divorce, same sex marriage or reproductive technologies (especially when used outside marriage) are all ‘cultural deviations of our times’ (Pontifical Council for the Family 2006). These official positions are presented as the one and only ‘truth’ that needs to be advocated strongly by all Church members.

The official views of the Catholic Church on reproductive rights are derived from a perspective that sexuality and human procreation belongs only in the context of marriage, which excludes all interventions that disconnect sexuality and procreation such as contraception, or reproductive technologies. In this view, techniques of fertilization in vitro are seen as contrary to the human dignity proper to the embryo, because they can open the way to other forms of biological and genetic manipulation of human embryos, such as attempts or plans for fertilization between human and animal gametes and the gestation of human embryos in the uterus of animals, or the hypothesis or project of constructing artificial uteruses for the human embryo. Also the freezing of embryos is against the human dignity of the embryo. The view of the Catholic Church on abortion is that abortion is infanticide, and a violation of the fundamental rights to life that belongs to every human being from conception. It is the deliberate killing of an innocent human being.

The view of the Catholic Church on marriage is based on a view of sexual difference as natural and dichotomous (men and women), and on sexuality as ‘naturally’ heterosexual, and leading to procreation. They see marriage as a stable form of heterosexual relationship that is a superior form of
relationship, in itself and as a basis for a family that is the only suitable unit for raising children. Marriage should therefore be a bond forever, the more so as it is a union blessed by God, and divorce is impossible, as it would be an act against God. Marriage should not be opened to non-heterosexual relationships, as this goes against the natural sexual difference that is made by God as the basis for human procreation in families based on marriage, and homosexual behavior and same-sex partnership are not only aberrations, but also sins.

In order to measure the extent to which Catholic views in policy occur, Catholic frames are first identified, making use of the frames that were coded in the policy documents for the Quing project, and then their occurrence in policy texts is counted. Policy frames are ‘an organizing principle that transforms fragmentary or incidental information into a structured and meaningful problem, in which a solution is implicitly or explicitly included (Verloo, 2007). The frames are identified using codes given to texts.\(^5\)

There are five frames found in the Intimate citizenship issue that can be seen as Catholic frames\(^6\) because these frames match the explanation below and they were found in coded civil society texts of (arch) bishops from Hungary, Italy and Spain and a text of the Vatican on the family. The five frames are:

1) A frame claiming that the wellbeing of children should be at the centre of policy and this can be guaranteed only if children are brought up by both of their biological parents;

2) A frame claiming that there is a conflict between the right for equality and liberty and that of religious freedom, whereby this conflict should be resolved by prioritizing religious freedom;

3) A frame claiming that marriage was, is and needs to be an important and special institution, with marriage in a traditional definition as heterosexual, stable (preferably life long) and monogamous;

\(^5\) See Verloo 2007 for more information on the method of Critical Frame Analysis.

\(^6\) These frames can surely be found also in other fundamentalist religions, but dealing with this is beyond the scope of this paper.
4) A frame that expresses negative views on homosexuality as an unacceptable practice;
5) A frame claiming that life starts at the time of conception, thus abortion is the violation of the right to life of the embryo.

D. Data

In this article we have chosen a broad definition of ‘Catholic countries’, taking all European Union countries or European Union candidate countries into consideration in which Catholicism is clearly the largest denomination. The sixteen countries where Catholicism is the largest denomination are: Austria (78%), Belgium (81%), Croatia (89%), Czech Republic (40%), France (70%), Hungary (68%), Ireland (92%), Italy (85%), Lithuania (85%), Luxembourg (97%), Malta (91%), Poland (92%), Portugal (97%), Slovakia (67%), Slovenia (76%) and Spain (99%). For these countries we will investigate to what extent the Catholic views and beliefs can be found in laws, policy plans and parliamentary debates that were coded for the Quing project.

E. Analyses

1. Catholic values in society

Table 1 shows the relationship between religiosity and the presence of Catholic frames. There is a clear pattern that countries with high and medium high Catholic frames in their policy plans and laws have got high religiosity. The countries with medium low Catholic frames have medium high or medium low religiosity. The countries with low or no Catholic frames have medium high, medium low or low religiosity. Overall, there seems to be a rather good relationship between the religiosity in a country and the amount of Catholic frames that are found. There is only one clear deviant case, Portugal, in

7 Based on the Religion and state (RAS) dataset (2002). The Religion and State (RAS) project is a university-based project located at Bar Ilan University in Ramat Gan, Israel. Its goal is to create a set of measures that systematically gauge the intersection between government and religion. Specifically, it examines government religion policy. See: http://www.biu.ac.il/SOC/po/ras/index.html
comparison to the values of the other countries. In Portugal the religiosity is medium high, while no Catholic frames are found.

**Table 1: Catholic frames and religiosity**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Presence of Catholic frames</th>
<th>Religiosity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High Catholic frames (.6 - .8) (Malta)</td>
<td>1 high religiosity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium high Catholic frames (.4-.6) (Poland, Ireland)</td>
<td>2 high religiosity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium low Catholic frames (.2-.4) (Lithuania, Slovakia, Spain, Croatia, Italy)</td>
<td>3 medium high religiosity 2 medium low religiosity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Catholic frames (.01-.2) (Slovenia, France, Austria, Hungary)</td>
<td>2 Medium Low religiosity 2 low religiosity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Catholic frames (Belgium, Czech Republic, Luxembourg, Portugal)</td>
<td>1 medium high religiosity 1 medium low religiosity 2 Low religiosity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Deviant cases are in *italics*

Table 2 shows the relationship between the conservative values in society and the presence of Catholic frames in policy. Looking at this table, in the country with high Catholic frames, high conservative values are found and in the countries with medium high Catholic frames, medium high conservative values are found. These values show a clear relationship between presence of catholic frames and conservative values. In countries were medium low catholic frames are present in policy, the conservative values are medium high, medium low or low. The country with the low conservative values is Spain. This seems to be a deviant case. In the countries were a low amount or no Catholic frames are found, the conservative values are either medium high, medium low or low. The country with low Catholic frames and medium high conservative values is Hungary. This is also a deviant case.
Table 2: Catholic frames and conservative values

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Presence of Catholic frames</th>
<th>Conservative values</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High Catholic frames (.6 - .8) (Malta)</td>
<td>1 high value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium high Catholic frames (.4-.6) (Poland, Ireland)</td>
<td>2 Medium high values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium low Catholic frames (.2-.4) (Lithuania, Slovakia, Spain, Croatia, Italy)</td>
<td>1 Medium high value 3 medium low values 1 low value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Catholic frames (.01-.2) (Slovenia, France, Austria, Hungary)</td>
<td>1 medium high values 2 Medium low values 1 low value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Catholic frames (Belgium, Czech Republic, Luxembourg, Portugal)</td>
<td>1 medium low value 3 low values</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Deviant cases are in *italics*

2. *Institutional factors*

Table 3 shows the relationship between the official church-state connection and the presence of catholic frames. The country with high catholic frames also has a close state-church connection. In Malta the Catholic Church is the only recognized state church. The only country with the most official institutional differentiation between church and state is France, which has a low amount of Catholic frames in its policy. The church-state connection in which the state has a civic religion (medium high connection) is more often found in countries were also high catholic frames are found in policy and the church-state connection in which a state is cooperative towards a religion (medium low connection) is more often found in countries that have less Catholic views found in their policy. The only clear deviant case is
again Portugal, where the state has a civic religion, but no catholic views are found in policy. It seems that countries with a stronger connection of the church with the state also have more often catholic views in their policy. However, it has to be kept in mind that the overall differentiation between countries is low (most countries have the value medium low or medium high), and the difference between ‘civil religion’ and ‘cooperation’ as two consecutive steps in the relationship between church-state is not very large, making strong conclusions difficult.

Table 3: Official church-state connection and Catholic frames

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Presence of Catholic frames in policy</th>
<th>Official Church-State connection</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High Catholic frames (.6 -.8)</td>
<td>1 high connection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Malta)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium high Catholic frames (.4-.6)</td>
<td>2 Medium high connection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Poland, Ireland)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium low Catholic frames (.2-.4)</td>
<td>2 Medium high connection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Lithuania, Slovakia, Spain, Croatia, Italy)</td>
<td>3 Medium low connection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Catholic frames (.01-.2)</td>
<td>3 Medium low connection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Slovenia, France, Austria, Hungary)</td>
<td>1 low connection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Catholic frames</td>
<td>1 medium high connection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Belgium, Czech Republic, Luxembourg, Portugal)</td>
<td>3 Medium low connection</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Deviant cases are in italics

The second institutional factor, shown in table 4, is the presence of Catholic parties in government related to the presence of Catholic frames. The table shows many deviant cases, and there does not seem to be a clear relationship between the presence of Catholic parties in government and the presence of Catholic views in policy.
Table 4: Catholic parties in government and presence of Catholic frames in policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Presence of Catholic frames in policy</th>
<th>Catholic parties in government</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High Catholic frames (.6 - .8) (Malta)</td>
<td>1 high presence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Medium high Catholic frames (.4 - .6) (Poland, Ireland) | 1 Medium high presence  
1 low presence |
| Medium low Catholic frames (.2 - .4) (Lithuania, Slovakia, Spain, Croatia, Italy) | 1 high presence  
2 Medium high presence  
2 Medium low presence |
| Low Catholic frames (.01 - .2) (Slovenia, France, Austria, Hungary) | 2 high presence  
2 Medium low presence |
| No Catholic frames (Belgium, Czech Republic, Luxembourg, Portugal) | 1 high presence  
1 Medium high presence  
1 Medium low presence  
1 low presence |

Deviant cases are in *italics*

As the correlation between the presence of Catholic parties and the presence of Catholic views in policy plans and laws is not clear at all, we also took a closer look at whether the presence of Catholic parties correlates with the presence of Catholic views in parliamentary debates. Table 5 shows this relationship. Again there are several deviant cases. There does not seem to be a relationship between the presence of Catholic parties in government and the presence of Catholic views in parliamentary debates.

Table 5: Catholic parties in government and presence Catholic frames in parliamentary debates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Presence of Catholic frames in parliamentary debates</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Catholic parties in government</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High Catholic frames</td>
<td>Italy (.71)</td>
<td><em>Medium low</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>France (.57)</td>
<td><em>Medium low</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category</td>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium Catholic frames</td>
<td>Lithuania (.57)</td>
<td>Medium low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Poland (.54)</td>
<td>Medium high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Malta (.5)</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Portugal (.5)</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Slovenia (.5)</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Catholic frames</td>
<td>Croatia (.43)</td>
<td>Medium high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Austria (.33)</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Slovakia (.33)</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Belgium (.29)</td>
<td>Medium low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Czech Republic (.25)</td>
<td>Medium high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spain (.22)</td>
<td>Medium high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hungary (.18)</td>
<td>Medium low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ireland (0)</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Luxembourg (0)</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

0-.25 = low, .25-.5 = medium, .5-.75 = high

F. Conclusions

This paper has set out to ask whether the extent to which we find Catholic frames in the various countries is connected to the level of religiosity, the support for Catholic religious values or the institutional strength of the Catholic Church. Our findings are summarized in Table 6 (see below).

Our findings are partly in line with the expectations that we developed after consulting some of the literature on religion and politics. We expected to find that the stronger the existence of Catholic cultural values or religiosity in a country, the more we would see a resemblance of the policy positions with the positions taken by the Catholic Church. Our findings are in line with this expectation, and we find that cultural factors seem to explain the presence of Catholic frames in policy better than institutional factors. Of the two cultural factors, religiosity correlates strongest with the presence of Catholic views in policy. High cultural factors are found in countries where high/medium high Catholic views are found in policy. Most of the low cultural factors are also found in countries where low Catholic...
views are found. Only Spain is an exception, with rather high amount of Catholic views in policy, but low cultural value.

The medium low and medium high values are a bit more mixed, although medium high values seem to be more present in countries some Catholic views and medium low values seem to be more present in countries with low or no amount of Catholic views in policy.

The literature was more ambivalent about the relationship between the institutional relationship of the respective states and the Church. Our findings do not allow us to clarify this. Within institutional factors the official state-church relationship can better explain the presence of Catholic views in policy, even if this relationship is very weak. In countries where religions are acknowledged as state/civic religion, more often Catholic views are found in policy than in countries where the state is only cooperative towards a religion or where a state has a separationist attitude towards religion. Therefore there is an indication that the more church and state are connected, the more Catholic views are found in policy.

The mere presence of Catholic parties in government is not related to the occurrence of Catholic frames in policies, not to the presence of Catholic frames in parliamentary debates.

We think that this does not mean that the institutional factors are not relevant, but that there would be a need for another type of data to show the extent of the relationship. In line with Engeli (2009), we would like to see whether the presence of Catholic frames in intimate citizenship issues is linked to the presence of Catholic strongholds in the educational or medical and care institutions. Such strongholds could be seen in high percentages of Catholic schools, hospitals, care and charity institutions, and in high numbers of Catholic professional organisations.

All in all, this paper is intended to show that more research is needed to fully understand the relationship between Catholic religion and the quality of gender equality policies, as all the frames that are labeled Catholic in this paper run against gender equality.
Table 6: Catholic frames, Religiosity, Cultural values, Cultural values and Catholic parties in government

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Presence of Catholic frames</th>
<th>Religiosity</th>
<th>Cultural values</th>
<th>Official Church-State relationship</th>
<th>Catholic parties in government</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High Catholic frames (.6 - .8) (Malta)</td>
<td>1 high religiosity</td>
<td>1 high values</td>
<td>1 high connection</td>
<td>1 high presence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium high Catholic frames (.4-6) (Poland, Ireland)</td>
<td>2 high religiosity</td>
<td>2 Medium high values</td>
<td>2 Medium high connection</td>
<td>1 Medium high presence, 1 low presence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium low Catholic frames (.2-4) (Lithuania, Slovakia, Spain, Croatia, Italy)</td>
<td>3 medium high religiosity, 2 medium low religiosity</td>
<td>1 Medium high values, 3 medium low values, 1 low values</td>
<td>2 Medium high connection, 3 Medium low connection</td>
<td>1 high presence, 2 Medium high presence, 2 Medium low presence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Catholic frames (.01-2) (Slovenia, France, Austria, Hungary)</td>
<td>2 Medium Low religiosity, 2 low religiosity</td>
<td>1 medium high values, 2 Medium low values, 1 low values</td>
<td>3 Medium low connection, 1 low connection</td>
<td>2 high presence, 2 Medium low presence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Catholic frames (Belgium, Czech Republic, Luxembourg, Portugal)</td>
<td>1 medium high religiosity, 1 medium low religiosity, 2 Low religiosity</td>
<td>1 medium low values, 3 Low values</td>
<td>1 medium high connection, 3 Medium low connection</td>
<td>1 high presence, 1 Medium high presence, 1 Medium low presence, 1 low presence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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