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Chapter 3
Warlords and the Coalition in Afghanistan

This chapter focuses on the relationships between coalition forces and the so-called warlords of post-2001 Afghanistan. While the term “warlord” is frequently used in political and normative ways to evoke “brutality, racketeering and the suffering of civil communities,” these actors are astute political entrepreneurs whose legitimacy rests on “the power to make war effectively” and who play critical roles in people’s access to the political arena and economic opportunities. They act at various times as the principal suppliers of governance to people in areas where they wield influence. As such, they cannot be, and have not been, ignored by ISAF. They have been instrumental to allied forces from the very beginning of the US-led intervention. In turn, they have exercised a surprising capacity to shape state-building and state formation processes to suit their interests by exploiting the cross-cutting agendas of external actors. While a multitude of warlords co-exist with the state in post-2001 Afghanistan, this chapter focuses on two typical cases: Abdul Rashid Dostum, the ethnic Uzbek leader of Northern Afghanistan and Ismail Khan, the self-proclaimed Amir of Herat.

It is often argued that the main objective of state-building is the uniformization of sovereignty, or conversely, the weakening and destruction of alternative forms of governance. Most international actors involved in Afghanistan (foreign governments, aid agencies, international organizations, etc.) therefore prefer that warlords recede into insignificance as the central state asserts its authority. While this state-building project promotes the construction of a state along the path most closely associated with the historical rise of western states, the political survival of Afghan warlords is an indication that the process is in reality being shaped by interactions between the state, the international community, and de facto power holders.
(warlords in particular). State-builders have to engage in a process of hybridization—arguably the real process of state formation—as they attempt to construct institutions that at least appear to conform to Weberian ideals of bureaucratic institutional and territorial control.

Warlords are “by definition illegitimate and unrecognized.” It is therefore striking (and for some truly shocking) to see that coalition forces that are supposed to back and support the official democratically-elected government of Afghanistan have been in business with warlords since the very beginning of the US military intervention. The growing role of regular and irregular indigenous forces in external interventions raises practical concerns about the military and political objectives of the Afghan war and the nature of state-building in Afghanistan and elsewhere. In this chapter, I show that warlords maximize their authority in permissive environments, that is in environments with limited external pressure. They take advantage of the heterogeneity of the international community, both within and outside NATO, to maximize their interests and survive. I chose two cases of warlordism that illustrate how warlords exert diplomacy and how it allows them to survive in changing environments.

**Working with the Devil: Afghan Model of Warfare and Warlord Strategy**

Coalition forces began to achieve a series of quick military victories soon after it began combat operations in October 2001. The success of the “Afghan model” of warfare—the combination of Special Operation Forces, precision-guided munitions and Northern Alliance militia forces—quickly expelled Taliban forces from key cities around the country. Unfortunately, the “Afghan model” did not support coalition state-building efforts. Afghan warlords took control of regional and national state institutions with the blessing of the Bush administration. Seeking short-term stability through deals with regional leaders to compensate the absence of a central state in turn
empowered these illegitimate armed actors and prevented the long-term emergence of the said central state. This “warlord strategy”⁶ required “living with ambiguity.”⁷ US Special Operations Forces worked hand in hand with warlords in their fiefdoms in spite of their increasing stigmatization by human rights organizations.⁸

Things started to change around 2003/2004. US policymakers began at that time to impose “new rules of the game”⁹ as most in the Bush administration believed the war in Afghanistan to be about to end. Wrote Michael Bhatia:

[The] dominant post-Bonn discourse, particularly among external observers, has been that of the warlord challenge to the central government, which is partly a process of demythologizing the mujahideen. Practically, this is linked to advocacy for the increased pace of DDR [Demobilization, Disarmament, Reintegration], broader security-sector reforms (SSR), governance reform and the proposed creation of a war crimes tribunal.¹⁰

As Jihadi credentials became “a liability,”¹¹ warlords were either co-opted or abandoned by the US and international organizations to favor the construction of the central state.¹² Zalmay Khalilzad, former Special Presidential Envoy and US Ambassador to Afghanistan, recalls:

We worked with President Karzai to persuade major regional leaders to give up their arms in exchange for an opportunity to become legitimate political actors, either through appointments to new positions or though entry into electoral politics.¹³
In this context of weak international demand for proxies and increasing role of the US State Department over strictly military considerations, Afghan warlords had no choice but to transform their bases of power. At times when the state becomes stronger, warlords transition into something else: they become businessmen, notables, ministers, governors, etc. They become dormant warlords. Because of the kind of authority that they have in their communities and their ability to conduct international relations, they can make the transition back to being warlords if the opportunity presents. They exercise a surprising ability to shape shift. They reinvent themselves and instrumentalize what westerners perceive as social disorder to ensure their survival in a changing political environment.

_Dostum: The “Unsavory Friend”_14

In the 1990s, Abdul Rashid Dostum was the most powerful warlord of Northern Afghanistan. His case illustrates both the early ties that were created between coalition forces and warlords and the long-lasting relationships that some warlords manage to initiate and maintain with regional neighbors (in this case with Turkey). It also shows how they take advantage of this.

In spite of his reputation as a violent and self-interested man, Dostum provided the US with a powerful ally on the ground. He immediately recognized that the US-led intervention would give him the opportunity to turn his situation around (both militarily and financially) and reaffirm his local authority. He thus embraced a pro-American stance and became “absolutely gaga on America.”15 He cooperated fully with CIA paramilitary officers and US Special Forces, with whom he and his men created what journalist Doug Stanton described as a “familial
Together, and with the help of other Northern Alliance’s commanders, they were quickly able to recapture Mazar-e Sharif.

Dostum’s political opponents have accused him of being sympathetic to American interests, calling him an American stooge. “Dostum is like clay, [the Americans] can shape him however they wish,” said a Northern Alliance source. But as subsequent events show, the Americans also were clay in Dostum’s hands. The Uzbek leader used his warrior ethos—which resonates particularly well with US Special Forces—as a tool to increase his power. He told foreign forces what they wanted to hear to benefit from this new relationship, calling American troops his “friends.” General Dostum organized a farewell ceremony for them, offered them presents, and even erected a memorial to honor a deceased CIA paramilitary officer.

Dostum’s collaboration with the US allowed him to rearm and remobilize, but it was also instrumental to his power in many other ways. Like other warlords, Dostum has used foreigners as a way of legitimizing and strengthening his local authority, as his arrival in Mazar-e Sharif perfectly illustrates: “Spencer understood that Dostum wanted to be seen riding alongside the Americans as they entered [Mazar]…[Dostum] suggested that they hoist an American flag on a pole attached to the buggy,” wrote Stanton. Like many others, Dostum also tried to instrumentalize American forces to get rid of his opponents by asking them to strike what he claimed were Taliban safe houses.

An elite unit of US Special Forces continued advising Dostum long after the fall of Mazar-e Sharif and the signature of the Bonn agreement. They travelled in his car, sat by his side during military briefings, and became so intimate with him and his men that they reportedly “took an inaugural dip in [Dostum’s] new indoor pool” almost a year after the beginning of the US-led intervention. The significance of this form of diplomacy in fact lies in the extent to
which Dostum was able to personalize his relations with Americans. Warlord diplomacy is a distinctive form of diplomacy that exploits personal networks as much as formal ties, and is conducted to enhance personal authority. One would imagine that the US exercise of power would occur along more formal bureaucratic lines and would be applied in support of a state-building project. Instead, Dostum’s close personal ties, right down to individual soldiers accompanying him, showed how he could manipulate this set of foreign relations to bolster his personalized form of authority.

In the past twenty years, Dostum has acquired the reputation of being “a thoroughly self-interested man,”24 who “goes where the wind blows.”25 Pakistani journalist and expert on South Asia Ahmed Rashid claims that Dostum has “been on every country’s payroll, receiving funds from Russia, Uzbekistan, Iran, Pakistan and lately Turkey.”26 Dostum owes his survival, above all else, to his ability to conduct his own diplomacy (both towards foreign and domestic actors) in a highly pragmatic fashion that accommodates to immediate conditions. This is nowhere better exemplified than in his relationship with Turkey, which has offered him great support over the years and has clearly been instrumental to his political and physical survival.

Dostum’s relations with Turkey have been conducted along more formal channels than the ones with the US, though personal networks have also played a critical role, at least initially. Dostum managed to develop contacts with that country through Azad Beg, a Turkish nationalist who mobilized Uzbeks and Turkmens from northern Afghanistan in the fight against the Soviet Union. Through his family connections—his cousin, Mirza Aslam Beg, was Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff—Azad Beg became the chief contact between Dostum and the Pakistani intelligence.27 He then developed ties with Turkey, which started to finance Dostum’s party (the
Junbesh). Turkey has been supporting Dostum ever since, as illustrated by the Akbar Bai episode.28

Akbar Bai is an Afghan of Turkmen ethnicity, head of Afghanistan’s Association of Islamic Turks, and former Junbesh representative in Kabul, who was sacked in 2004 for not being in line with the party’s policy.29 In 2007, he began to vehemently accuse Dostum of killing Turkmen and Uzbeks, of possessing arm depots, and of entertaining close links with the ISI and the Taliban.30 A number of minor episodes followed these declarations, during which Dostum’s dog was allegedly kidnapped and Akbar Bai’s office was set on fire.31 In November 2007, the Turkmen leader was arrested by a local branch of the National Directorate of Security under Dostum’s control on charges of insurgency activities and masterminding an attempt on the general’s life.32

The tensions between Dostum and Akbar Bai reached another level in the night of February 2, 2008, as the general’s men reportedly beat up Akbar Bai and members of his family, kidnapped him, and brought him back to Dostum’s palace in Kabul.33 When police surrounded the tacky pink mansion, Dostum appeared on the roof, allegedly drunk. According to media reports, President Karzai refused permission to make an arrest; Dostum released Akbar Bai; and the standoff ended.34

While Akbar Bai demanded that Dostum be officially prosecuted,35 the attorney-general argued that bringing Dostum to court would be difficult for it could provoke factional fighting in northern Afghanistan. “[Even] in those places where the rule of law does exist, sometimes we cannot enforce the law over some people,” he said after Turkey allegedly interceded with Karzai and with the UN to protect the Uzbek leader.36 For former US envoy to the Afghan resistance Peter Tomsen, the Afghan president “[worried] that arresting Dostum could destabilize the
relatively stable northern provinces.”\textsuperscript{37} In fact, a spokesman for Dostum warned of unrest in seven or eight northern provinces if the police tried to arrest the general.\textsuperscript{38} After news of the siege emerged, hundreds of protestors demonstrated in Maymana, capital of Faryab province, to support Dostum, threatening to pick up weapons against the government if the police did not leave the Uzbek leader alone.\textsuperscript{39}

Dostum was placed under house-arrest and suspended from all official positions after he refused to comply with the attorney-general’s summon for interrogation.\textsuperscript{40} In December 2008, a special plane was chartered by the Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan who had reached an agreement with Karzai to put an end to the Akbar Bai case. All charges would be dropped under the condition that Dostum would stay in exile indefinitely.\textsuperscript{41} The spokesman for the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared that his country had sent a plane for him because he was “the honorary leader of [the] Turkish community in Afghanistan.”\textsuperscript{42} Less than a year later, right before the 2009 presidential election, Dostum made a triumphant and surprising return to his northern stronghold of Shibirghhan, where crowds of followers gathered as a choir sang “Our King is coming.”\textsuperscript{43} Karzai, in need of the Uzbek vote, had decided to bring him back—a move that provoked the ire of the international community.

While it is common for leaders of a part of a country (such as Canada’s Quebec, Belgium’s Wallonia and so forth) to conduct their own relations with officials in other countries, Dostum’s conduct is calculated to highlight to observers the extent to which he, rather than the government, is the central authority responsible for northern Afghanistan’s international affairs. This role enhances his image as a patron and as the apex of power in his region. To foreigners, working with Dostum has seemed necessary and pragmatic; to him, international connections are critical to asserting personal power against the state-building enterprise. Dostum’s post-2001
authority stems directly from his ability to concentrate multiple sources of power while preventing his competitors from doing the same. What mattered to Dostum has been to remain the only Turkic leader able to combine political and military power, as well as the ability to act in the international system to receive international protection.

**Ismail Khan: The Amir of Western Afghanistan**

Ismail Khan is a “creature of the borderland.” He is the perfect illustration of the way warlords have taken advantage of the heterogeneity of the international system in post-2001 Afghanistan to increase their local autonomy. “The Lion of Herat” portrayed himself as a bulwark against terrorism to benefit from American largesse, while at the same time receiving extensive support from Iran. In October 2001, he expressed his willingness to cooperate with whoever could advance his interests: “To win, we need more money, men and weapons. We’re willing to accept help from whoever has our best interest in mind.”

Ismail Khan’s position vis-à-vis the US has been ambiguous and ambivalent from the very beginning of the intervention. The Herati leader always publicly opposed the presence of foreign troops because he understood that they would limit his ability to rule Western Afghanistan as he pleased. Interviewed via satellite phone in early October 2001, he said: “We have no desire to see any foreign troops on our soil. The coalition’s mission is to provide assistance for the liberation of Afghanistan from terrorist occupation by the Pakistanis and the Arabs. The mission is not to impose a new type of foreign rule.” In other words, the US-led intervention should not aim at building a conventional Weberian state.

After he had regained control of Herat, Ismail Khan became more confrontational vis-à-vis the US: he called the deployment of American and British soldiers “a mistake,” and
declared that Afghanistan did not need outside help to form a representative government.48

“[We] do not need the American expert…We have gained enough experience from 23 years of war,”49 he said. After the signature of the Bonn agreement in December 2001, Ismail Khan stated that no international troops would be allowed to stay into his territory.50 Since 2001, he has consistently reiterated his disapproval of foreign interference through the conduct of high-level diplomacy of a sort commonly reserved for formally recognized sovereign states.51

Ismail Khan has managed to portray himself as a leader able to deal on an equal foot with powerful heads of states and diplomats, which has in turn strengthened his local legitimacy. His oft-reaffirmed anti-American stance also increased his ideological power; yet it was compatible with accepting considerable resources and behind the scenes support from foreign forces. The main point at this stage in Ismail Khan’s political evolution was that he was able to force foreigners and the government in the capital to take him seriously as an autonomous political force and realize that they needed to negotiate with him and take his interests into account in any wider political arrangement. Simply put, Ismail Khan was trying to take advantage of the international situation without paying the price—in this case formal allegiance to the state. By holding private meetings with foreign officials, Ismail Khan demonstrated to observers that he should be regarded as the leader of western Afghanistan.52

By February 2002, Ismail Khan seemed to have softened his tone towards the US, declaring that he would abide by the government’s decision regarding foreign forces: “Whenever the center of government is recognizing that their presence in Herat is needed, we never prohibit,”53 he said. By March 2002, Ismail Khan had agreed both for a UN office to be reopened and for a civil affairs unit to be stationed in Herat.54 About 10 US Special Forces soldiers also spent several months in one of his guesthouses. They developed a close relationship with him
and supported him financially. Fights were still going on…Giving…money [to the warlords] was the normal thing to do to keep them on your side,” justified a western diplomat.

At the same time that he developed his relationship with the US, Ismail Khan also got strong support from Iran. Although he never officially admitted receiving weapons and ammunition, he did not conceal his good relationship with his western neighbor. He always considered that not dealing with Iran would be “unnatural,” considering their geographic and personal historical ties. In early 2002, observers reported that Ismail Khan’s soldiers were trained by Iranian advisers, wore Iranian fatigues, and carried Iranian-made rifles. Iran even allegedly sent money to Ismail Khan to pay for his soldiers, as well as provided him with tanks captured from the Taliban.

As the strongest armed actor in western Afghanistan, Ismail Khan found himself at the center of a power struggle between Iran and the US, and took great advantage of this peculiar situation. Said Ahmed Rashid:

I think there is a kind of competition going on to gain the favor of the local warlord, Ismail Khan, who controls three of the western provinces that border Iran…He is a master at this game. He’s been playing it for the last 10, 15 years. And he frankly has been taking advantage of the Americans and the Iranians. He’s getting them both to start reconstruction in the region he controls, building roads and other things. As far as he’s concerned, and as far as the local Herati people are concerned, he’s, you know, been playing a very wise game, which has been helping him and helping the territory under his control.
In a typical Afghan ploy, the wily Ismail Khan made sure that the Iranians and the Americans spent most of the time watching each other rather than him, as he fed them with tidbits of misinformation and gossip that kept their daggers drawn.63

Both the US and Iran were desperately in need of a strong ally to limit each other’s influence in the border region.64 Ismail Khan’s balancing act clearly allowed him to accumulate various sources of power, in particular military and economic ones. His military might gave him the means to control Herat and its region, and most of all, to control the borders and the economic benefits associated with it.65 It also gave Ismail Khan the opportunity to portray himself as the city’s one and only liberator, even though other factions were involved as well. Ismail Khan was able to further increase his local legitimacy by providing goods and services that were in fact paid for by American and Iranian money, custom revenues, and international aid. According to a UN official:

[Ismail Khan] basically presented us with a shopping list of what he wants and stressed the urgency…But it also seems pretty clear that he wants it to be recognised that he is in charge in this region, not the UN, or western governments, or indeed, the government in Kabul.66

It is true that “[much] of the power Ismail Khan and his fellow warlords enjoy was a byproduct of U.S. anti-terrorism efforts in Afghanistan.”67 It is more accurate that Ismail Khan’s survival is largely due to his ability to navigate between different levels, and keep pressure on the various actors involved in western Afghanistan, by never fully cooperating with nor fully
defying and antagonizing the central government and its allies. His central position in multiple networks enabled him to acquire military and economic power, which he could in turn use to resist Kabul’s homogenizing pressure and run his own fiefdom, without much interference from the center.

Conclusion

In the immediate post-intervention period, warlords such as Dostum and Ismail Khan developed complex marketing plans to boost their image. They used different “faces” (warrior, businessman, notable, ally against terrorism, etc.) to instrumentalize international actors who denounced warlords while praising in the same men the state ministers or the ethnic representatives. Confronted to a changing environment, warlords had to shape shift and become “dormant,” as they were no longer able to exert undisputed control over their territories. They used the heterogeneity of the international community to maintain authority and survive, both physically and politically.

With the growing influence of the Taliban insurgency and the announced departure of US troops, political dynamics have radically changed in the past few years. The tensions between Hamid Karzai and the international community indirectly led the Afghan president, in need of local power-holders able to deliver votes, to bring the political brokers back into the loop prior to the 2009 presidential elections. Today, the uncertainty regarding the international community’s intentions in Afghanistan after 2014 creates a level of domestic uncertainty that drives the local demand for military leadership. Afghan warlords are reorganizing, remobilizing, reuniting, and evidence shows that they have the ability to circumvent both the Afghan state and the
international community to exert their own kind of diplomacy and negotiate directly with the Taliban.  

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1 This chapter draws on the author’s doctoral research, for which he undertook extensive fieldwork in Herat, Kabul, Mazar-e Sharif, and the Panjshir; conducted nearly 200 interviews; and spent over 9 months in Afghanistan over the course of 5 years. This author is grateful for research support from the Embassy of France in Afghanistan, the Institut des Hautes Etudes de Défense Nationale, the Fondation Pierre Leroux, Northwestern University, Sciences Po Paris, and Columbia University’s Harriman Institute.


3 See Ariel Ahram and Charles King’s discussion on *Kriegsherr* in “The Warlord as Arbitrageur,” *Theory and Society* 41.2 (March 2012): 171.


5 For more on US policy options and the “Afghan model” of warfare, see Chapter 4 of this volume.

6 Human Rights Watch, *Afghanistan’s Bonn Agreement One Year Later: A Catalog of Missed Opportunities* (December 5, 2002).


Interview with Afghan researcher, Kabul, March 13, 2011.


For a detailed account, see Stanton, *Horse Soldiers*.


Ibid., 280.


24 Cienski, “Uncle Sam’s shifty new ally.”


27 Interview with Afghan researcher, Kabul, February 2, 2011.

28 Interview with Antonio Giustozzi, Kabul, October 11, 2008; interview with Afghan intellectual, February 21, 2011.


37 Quoted in Carter, “The art of warlord.”


40 “Afghan daily says police plan to arrest northern general Dostum,” Arman-e Melli, May 18, 2008; “Afghan chief of staff suspended as part of investigations into alleged assault,” Tolo TV, February 18, 2008.


42 “Foreign ministry confirms Afghan warlord Dostum is in Turkey,” Anatolia news agency, December 4, 2008.

43 Jeremy Page, “Brutal ally back to boost Karzai’s flagging campaign; 20,000 supporters cheer return of exiled warlord,” Times, August 18, 2009.


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69 Interview with former aide to Massoud, Kabul, February 28, 2011.