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Using you to get to me: Addressee perspective and speaker stance in Duna evidential marking

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Abstract: Languages have complex and varied means for representing points of view, including constructions that can express multiple perspectives on the same event. This paper presents data on two evidential constructions in the language Duna (Papua New Guinea) that imply features of both speaker and addressee knowledge simultaneously. I discuss how talking about an addressee's knowledge can occur in contexts of both coercion and co-operation, and, while apparently empathetic, can provide a covert way to both manipulate the addressee's attention and express speaker stance. I speculate that ultimately, however, these multiple perspective constructions may play a pro-social role in building or repairing the interlocutors' common ground.

Keywords: addressee perspective, Duna, evidentiality, interaction, multiple perspective, stance

1 Introduction

Perspective-taking is central to human interaction. For certain elements of language, identifying a subjective 'point of view' is also central to meaning. This is so, for example, for prototypically deictic categories such as pronouns and temporal shifters (see, e.g., Lyons 1982). It is also usually the case for items that have been studied under the broad rubric of 'modality', incorporating lexical and grammatical means for the expression of attitudes and evaluations towards a described situation (see, e.g., Jakobson 1957, Frawley 1992). In order to interpret words such as *you* or *certainly*, we need to understand that they are anchored by a particular perspective: your *you* is different to my *you*, and your *certainly* may be my *possibly*, or vice versa.

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Theories and descriptions of modality and related domains have generally focused on the speaker as an attitude holder who communicates his or her own evaluation of an event (e.g., as something desirable, likely, surprising). However, there has been a growing interest in linguistic markers that appear to orient to the perspective of the addressee. Such markers, for example, may indicate that the speaker believes their utterance to contain information that will be especially new and surprising to the addressee (e.g., Mexas 2013, Zariquiey Biondi 2011, Hengeveld & Olbertz 2012), or is something that the addressee should already know (e.g., Molochieva 2006, Schapper & San Roque 2011). A focus on attributes of the addressee is also seen in studies of ‘intersubjectification’ (as opposed to the exclusively speaker-oriented ‘subjectification’) in polysemy and language change (e.g., Davidse et al. 2010).

The expression of addressee perspective is furthermore often involved in ‘multiple perspective’ constructions (Evans 2005), that is, structures that represent two or more different viewpoints concerning the same semantic domain. For example, the ‘engagement’ particle *kē* in the language Andoke marks propositions that the speaker witnesses, but assumes the addressee is not aware of (Landaburu 2007), encoding two projected perspectives on the same event. This kind of ‘complex perspective’ is a testimony to our special human abilities for representing and comparing the mental states of ourselves and others.

This paper presents data on two kinds of constructions in the language Duna (Papua New Guinea) that are relevant to the expression of multiple perspective and examines some of their functions in discourse. Specifically, I focus on the evocation of addressee perspective through the use of evidential morphology. Such practices may be quite hostile, drawing attention to disparities of knowledge and even seemingly at odds with the addressee’s stated version of events, or more (apparently) affiliative, asserting the potential for equivalent knowledge and a shared evaluative attitude. Referring to an addressee’s point of view can be an attempt to manipulate his or her engagement with the speech setting and narrated world (cf. Verhagen 2008), and can furthermore provide a way to express speaker stance towards a proposition.

The rest of this introductory section provides some background on the language of study. Section 2 describes the Duna evidential system and discusses certain issues of perspective, and section 3 looks in detail at two conversational extracts that illustrate how evidential markers can be employed to convey an assessment of addressee stance. Sections 4 and 5 comprise a discussion and conclusion.

1.1 Background on Duna

Duna is spoken in Hela Province (formerly part of Southern Highlands Province) in Papua New Guinea. The language has approximately 20,000 speakers (Haley 2002). The research on which this paper is based was undertaken in the Lake Kopiago region of the Duna area. Most people in this region are subsistence farmers with limited access to services. Duna is the main language of communication in daily life, although many people also speak Tok Pisin, one of the major national *lingua francas*, and some also speak some English and/or Huli (a dominant neighboring language).

Duna has a fairly standard Trans New Guinea (TNG) phoneme inventory, including five vowels, bilabial, alveolar, and velar stops, bilabial and alveolar nasal stops, and a palatal and a bilabial glide. Somewhat more unusual is the presence of a contrastive alveolar tap and a lateral flap, and the (irregular) use of an aspiration/fricativization contrast in the stop series. Suprasegmental tone and nasalization are also contrastive (but tone is not represented in the standard orthography). Syllables are open and consonant clusters do not occur.

Clauses in Duna are verb (or predicate) final. Subject NPs usually precede object NPs (giving SOV as the unmarked order), although core arguments are commonly elided from the clause. NPs carry enclitics that indicate grammatical relations, semantic role, and/or discourse-pragmatic features such as topicality and contrast. Like many TNG languages, Duna makes extensive use of clause chains that consist of one or more ‘medial’ clauses followed by a ‘final’ clause. Final clauses are headed by a fully inflected and independent verb form, whereas medial clauses are marked for features of time and continuity in relation to the following clause, and are dependent upon the final verb in the chain.

Final verbs carry a range of suffixes or enclitics that mark tense, aspect, modality, evidentiality, and/or other knowledge-related categories. There is also one verbal circumfix, the negator *na-ya*. Overall, final verb morphology is quite heterogeneous, and comprises several different paradigms of forms, as well as markers that are ‘odd men out’ and do not really fit in any one group. In this paper we focus on the group of evidential markers, that is, those that appear to have information source as a primary meaning (Anderson 1986, Aikhenvald 2004), exemplified and discussed in the following section.

The Duna language has been described in pedagogical works (Giles nd, Rule 1966), a statement of ‘essentials for translation’ (Cochrane & Cochrane 1966), and a descriptive grammar that covers simple sentences (San Roque 2008). Data discussed in this paper come from the author’s fieldwork and consist of material from audio and/or video-recorded narratives and multi-party interactions, as

well as elicited and constructed examples (see ‘Abbreviations’ for a key to data codes).

2 Duna evidential markers

The Duna evidential system comprises two related sets of (usually mutually exclusive) bound morphemes that can occur on verbal and non-verbal predicates. In this paper we look at the evidential markers as used on final predicates only, although some of these forms can also mark non-predicating noun phrases and subordinate clauses. The first set are the ‘individual’ viewpoint markers (section 2.1), which generally present information source as experienced by a particular identifiable person. The second set are ‘impersonal’ evidentials (section 2.2), which present information source as potentially perceivable, without necessarily indicating the perceptual experience of an individual. Both individual and impersonal evidentials participate in constructions that at least imply more than one viewpoint, that is, can be interpreted as expressing multiple perspective. However, in neither case is it clear that this is an entailed meaning of the construction.

2.1 Individual viewpoint evidential markers

Duna evidential markers that imply an individual or ‘personal’ viewpoint are shown in Table 1, along with a brief outline of their meaning. Five (or arguably, four) information source categories are distinguished, cross-cut with other features of aspect and relative time reference, for example whether the evidence is perceived at the same time as (‘current’) or prior to (‘previous’) the time of speaking. Further details on information source and temporal semantics can be found in San Roque (2008) and San Roque & Loughnane (2012b); see also Fleck (2007). Diachronically, several of the evidential markers shown in Table 1

Table 1: Duna individual viewpoint evidential markers, regular forms.

Evidential category	Current	Previous
Visual: the event or situation was seen	–	<i>-rua, -tia</i>
Sensory: the event was heard, smelt, tasted, felt, thought	<i>-yarua</i>	<i>-yatia, -yaritia</i>
Results: event inferred from resultative evidence	<i>-rei</i>	<i>-rarua</i>
Reasoning: event inferred (with surprise) from different sources	<i>-noi</i>	
Hearsay: a report from a thirdhand or unknown original source	–	<i>-narua</i>

clearly derive from complex constructions, and in some cases they are probably intermediate between constructions and unitary morphemes (see also San Roque & Loughnane 2012a). However, the markers form a recognizable paradigm on both formal and functional grounds, and I treat them as one synchronic ‘system’ for descriptive and analytic purposes.

The evidential markers shown in Table 1 contrast functionally with a perfective suffix (-o ~ -u) that is not specified for evidentiality (1). Two examples of contrastive evidential verb endings are shown in (2) and (3), indicating visual and non-visual sensory evidence, respectively. An approximate rendering of the meaning of the evidential in this context is shown in curly brackets in the translation line.

- (1) *Ita-ka no mbou ali-u.*
 pig-ERG 1SG garden dig-PFV
 ‘Pigs dug up my garden.’ [CD]
- (2) *Ita-ka no mbou ali-tia*
 pig-ERG 1SG garden dig-PFV.VIS.P
 ‘Pigs dug up my garden {I saw}.’ [CD]
- (3) *Ita-ka no mbou ali-yaritia*
 pig-ERG 1SG garden dig-SNS
 ‘Pigs dug up my garden {I heard}.’ (i.e., heard the sound of it happening) [CD]

In addition to the categories mentioned above, Duna also has an ‘evidential strategy’ (see Aikhenvald 2004) for reported information source that uses the (irregular) verb *ruwa-*, ‘speak, say’ in a particular kind of reported speech construction. Example (4) shows a typical reported speech construction, where the speaker is referenced as a noun phrase (*na*, ‘I’) and the reported clause is both introduced and followed by a form of *ruwa-* (shown in bold type). Example (5) shows the evidential strategy, where the speaker is not overt and the only indication of the reported nature of the utterance is the use of *ruwa* sentence-finally.¹ This structure is similar to the use of a phrase such as *they say...* or *it’s said that...* in English.

¹ The double use of *ruwa-* to ‘bracket’ reported speech with an identifiable speaker is not strictly obligatory, and furthermore in some instances it may be ambiguous as to whether a putative speaker is truly unspecified or is intended to be recovered from the context. Thus, it is not possible to draw a sharp distinction between ‘ordinary’ reported speech and the reported evidential strategy.

- (4) *na ri-ya*
 1SG.ERG say-DEP
no kenowa puka kone koya-na ru.
 1SG sadness big INTENS be/stand.IPFV-SPEC say.PFV
 ‘I said, I am extremely sorry.’ [T/KP250903]
- (5) *imanoa yapa mana nguni*
 people two manner bad
wa-ye ko ri-tia
 do-DEP be/stand.PFV say-PFV.VIS.P
 ‘Those two people have behaved badly, it’s said.’ [ED/VIII:127]

In statements, individual viewpoint evidentials and the reported evidential strategy are typically understood as being relevant to speaker evidence. For example, in (2), it is the speaker who is understood to have seen the pigs in the garden. In this way, evidentials are stance markers that position the speaker with respect to the described event, for example as something that they have personally witnessed (cf. Hanks 2005, Du Bois 2007). However, in questions, evidentials are typically understood to refer to addressee viewpoint, as framed by the speaker (see also San Roque et al. 2015, Bergqvist 2015). Thus, in (7) and (8) we understand that it is the addressee who has evidence concerning whether or not the event occurred.

- (6) *Ita-ka no mbou ali-u=pe.*
 pig-ERG 1SG garden dig-PFV=Q
 ‘Pigs dug up my garden?’
- (7) *Ita-ka no mbou ali-tia=pe*
 pig-ERG 1SG garden dig-PFV.VIS.P=Q
 ‘Pigs dug up my garden {you saw}?’
- (8) *Ita-ka no mbou ali-yaritia=pe*
 pig-ERG 1SG garden dig-PFV.SNS.P=Q
 ‘Pigs dug up my garden {you heard}?’ [CD]

Interrogatives that are marked with evidentials can thus make quite specific, albeit covert, assertions of addressee knowledge, ‘smuggled in’ as presuppositions of the question. In response, the questioned person could reasonably deny either the main proposition, or the presupposition that he or she witnessed the event.

Examples such as (7) and (8) are relevant to the expression of multiple perspective as regards epistemicity or knowledge. While the addressee's perspective is specified by an evidential marker, the speaker's perspective (i.e., one of ignorance) seems to be at least implied through the use of an interrogative construction.² However, it is not clear that *=pe* in Duna 'encodes' a knowledge value that is directly comparable to that of the evidential markers. This contrasts, for example, to languages where evidentials occur in the same paradigm as an interrogative morpheme (e.g., Jaqaru, Hardman 1986), giving some evidence that 'ignorance' is a value on the same dimension as specific types of knowledge. In the Duna case, there is insufficient evidence to claim that two viewpoints concerning a single dimension are clearly specified (as per Evans 2005 definition of multiple perspective constructions). Nevertheless, an evidential marker in an interrogative sets up the contrastive epistemic stances of speaker and addressee in an unusually specific way, as the knowledge of the addressee is portrayed as stemming from a very particular kind of exposure to the event that the speaker (presumably) does not share.

2.2 Impersonal viewpoint evidential markers

A further group of evidential markers in Duna describe evidence that is generally perceivable, as opposed to experienced by a particular person at a particular time. These forms are shown in Table 2. (The impersonal 'reasoning' form, *-nonua*, is very rare in the available data, and more examples are needed to better understand its meaning.) The impersonal evidentials are clearly related to the individual forms (Table 1), in that the sequence *nua* in the former corresponds to *nua* in the latter.³ The impersonal evidentials *-nua* and *-yanua* are commonly used in noun phrases as well as in full clauses, in which case they express how the referent is or can be known of. However, in this paper I focus on instances where they are applied at the clause level.

How do the perspectives of speaker and addressee figure in the use of impersonal evidentials? In most main clause uses, it seems that both the speaker

² One could additionally argue that interrogative marking expresses *both* speaker and addressee perspectives as ignorant and knowledgeable, respectively.

³ Duna consultant R. Alo suggested to me that the impersonal forms developed from the individual forms plus the 'specific' marker *-na*. This is a viable hypothesis, particularly given that the evidential + SPEC construction seems to be the preferred way of expressing addressee viewpoint in a declarative, see San Roque (2008).

Table 2: Duna impersonal evidential markers (regular forms).

Evidential category	
Visual: the situation is visible	- <i>nua</i>
Sensory: the event can be heard (about), smelt, tasted, felt, thought	- <i>yanua</i>
Results: there is observable resultative evidence	- <i>ranua</i>
Reasoning/?hearsay: the event is realized (with surprise)	- <i>nonua</i>

and addressee are understood as potential experiencers of the evidence in question. This is the case, for example, for *-yanua* in (9), where the speaker smells a bad smell and anticipates that the addressee may also do so.

- (9) *ndune ndu ringa-yanua kuma hatia karu-pa*
 thing one stink-SNS.IMPL nose opening block-IMP
 ‘Something stinks {it can be sensed}, block your nose.’ [ED/III:80]

A similar example is seen in (10), where the (reported) speaker in a narrative points out to her husband that a dog is barking. Husband and wife subsequently have an argument about who should go and investigate the barking, supporting an interpretation that the sound referred to is audible to both speaker and addressee.

- (10) *ima-na-ka ri-ya,*
 woman-SPEC-ERG say-DEP
yawi ndu-ka khã-ya ka-yanua
 dog one-ERG cry.out-DEP be/stand-SNS.IMPL
 ‘The woman said, a dog is barking {it can be heard}.’ [T/YS:270205]

Examples (9) and (10) suggest that Duna impersonal evidentials are markers of multiple perspective, encoding that both speaker and addressee (according to the speaker’s assessment) have access to the evidence in question. However, while this analysis is supported most of the time, the data also include a few cases where it does not seem correct, as the addressee is *not* identifiable as a potential perceiver. For example, in the constructed/elicited dialogue shown at (11), the speaker uses the visual marker *-nua* immediately after an explicit disavowal of the addressee’s perceptual experience. Furthermore, as this conversation is about the existence of a certain tree species in another country from where the interlocutors are located, it is not clear that the addressee will ever have access to the evidence in question.

- (11) A: *yawale kei*
 casuarina be/stand.STAT
 ‘Casuarina trees exist [in Australia].’
 B: *na-ka-ya*
 NEG-be/stand-NEG
 ‘No they don’t.’
 A: *ko ke neya-yanua, ka-nua*
 2SG see not-SNS.IMPL stand-VIS.IMPL
 ‘You haven’t seen them, they exist [there] {it can be seen}.’
 [CD/ED/VIII:105]

Examples such as (11) suggest that the addressee does not necessarily have perceptual access to the evidence referred to by impersonal evidentials, and some examples of impersonal evidentials in noun phrases further suggest that even the speaker’s information source may not always be relevant to their use. Thus, it would seem that the Duna markers do not specifically encode the perspectives of both speaker and addressee. This contrasts with certain other evidential systems of the region which are described as explicitly distinguishing speaker and/or addressee knowledge. For example, Sillitoe (2010) lists verbal morphemes in Wola (Angal) that indicate such values as ‘both speaker and hearer witness’ versus ‘hearer did not witness’ versus ‘neither speaker nor hearer witness’, among other distinctions (see also Madden nd.).

While the Wola forms appear to be a canonical case of encoded multiple perspective in the sense of Evans (2005), it is not clear how the Duna markers fit into this definition, as the fixed (or unfixed) identity of the ‘perceiver(s)’ has not been determined.⁴ Nevertheless, although features of speaker and addressee epistemic access do not seem to be entailed in the use of impersonal evidentials, speaker and addressee perspective are at least implied. This is probably because the speaker and addressee are usually highly salient and animate participants in the discourse situation, and thus likely candidates to attract ascriptions of perspective. Thus, although it may not be a strictly necessary condition of their use,

⁴ Further work is needed to establish the exact semantics of the impersonal evidentials, as more than one hypothesis fits the currently available data. Perhaps they are best understood as referring to impersonal evidence (someone can experience it), but two possible alternatives are that they are about ‘collective’ evidence (more than one person can/could have experience(d) this) or, in the case of main clause uses, ‘speaker and other’ evidence (the speaker has experienced it, and someone else has/can also experience(d) it). It is hoped that further data collection and analysis will reveal the best way of characterizing these typologically unusual evidential markers. For the time being, I adopt the least semantically specific hypothesis (i.e., that of ‘impersonality’).

impersonal evidentials move towards expressing an ‘intersubjective evaluation’ (Nuyts 2005), whereby a speaker “indicates that s/he shares [an evaluation] with a wider group of people, possibly including the hearer” (Nuyts 2005: 14).

3 Addressee perspective and evidentiality: examples from multi-party texts

3.1 Personal evidentials in questions

As discussed above in regard to examples (7) and (8), interrogatives with personal evidentials offer one construction in Duna that implies more than one perspective. The speaker implies an epistemic stance of ignorance for him/herself, while simultaneously making a claim about addressee knowledge. The claim concerning addressee knowledge can be understood as twofold: *that* the addressee knows is implied by the act of questioning, and *how* the addressee knows is specified by the choice of evidential. As discussed by Aikhenvald (2004), the fact that evidential questions can purport to express specific aspects of addressee knowledge can make them ‘dangerous’ and dispreferred in discourse, as they run the risk of assuming too much; see also San Roque et al. (2015) concerning the pragmatic awkwardness of evidentials in interrogatives, and Levinson (2012) on the social costs of questions more generally.

The examples of questions we look at here occur in a situation where one person (here identified as ‘Damien’, DK) seems to be trying to force another (William, WK) to accept epistemic responsibility for an event, while that person seems determined to avoid it. Evidentially marked interrogatives are used by both people in trying to advance their positions. The data are from a mock ‘court case’, recorded at a private home in Kopiago in April, 2009. Mock court cases have been described to me by Duna people as a way of passing the time, an opportunity to hone rhetoric skills, and a kind of teasing. In such an event, a group of (young) men re-fashion the apparently innocent actions of one or more members of the group into a potentially suspicious activity that needs to be ‘investigated’. Different participants take on different roles, for example acting like a prosecutor or adjudicator (although this is not formalized in any way that I am aware of). In this and the following subsection I examine multi-party, spontaneous language data partly through the techniques of interactional linguistics and conversation analysis (see, e.g., Fox et al. 2013), trying to attend to features such as sequential organization and gesture, as well as the grammatical structure of single clauses.

The focus in this particular mock court case is on two young men, John (JA) and William, who have been accused of going on an escapade to chase girls. John has claimed that William was the ringleader of this affair, and that he (John) didn't know what was happening. According to his version of the events, he had innocently accompanied William on what he had thought was a simple walk, only to realize belatedly that it was an attempted assignation with some young women. William, meanwhile, won't admit that the event happened at all, but asserts his stance of ignorance concerning the events and John's testimony, for example with the utterance shown at (12) (which was produced in overlap with utterance (13a–b), discussed below).

- (12) WK: *No mbara neya-ta kei*
 1SG know not-DEP be/stand.STAT
 'I don't know [about this event].'

[MP/SD2009_4/NANE104/07:18-20]

One of the other men present, KK, finds John's version of events disingenuous, and asks why John didn't try to find out where William was taking him (13a). John responds that he did ask, but that William avoided the question (13b).

- (13a) KK: *nane, kone keno pa-ra nga-nda=pe ri-ya,*
 boy INTENS 1DU where-CNCL go-INT=Q say-DEP
waki wa-nopo-ta=ni
 ask do-ABIL-?=CMPL

“Hey, really, where are we going?”, you could have asked him that!’

- (13b) JA: *[??] wana-yaroko riya,*
 (??) ask-SW.SIM say-DEP
keno ho anda-ta nga-nda ngoae ri-tia
 1DU here house-LOC go-INT go.CAUS say-PFV.VIS.P
 ‘I was asking him and he said, let's go to the house here!, he said.

[MP/SD2009_4/NANE104/07:22-27]

Following this exchange, Damien (DK) takes up this issue, and seems determined that William either confirms or deny John's claim. In this longer passage we see the use of interrogatives that are marked with evidentials in (14a), (c) and (f), shown in bold.

- (14a) DK: *Ayu ka pi edodo ruwa-nda-na,*
 now 2SG.ERG LNK straight say-INT-SPEC
ene wana-tia=pe?
 true ask-PFV.VIS.P=Q

‘Now you too will talk straight, he [John] truly asked {you saw}?’

- (14b) WK: *Kho ri-ya ita roae-pa ri-na.*
 3SG say-DEP finish be/put.CAUS-IMP say-SPEC
 ‘I say let him [John] finish talking.’
- (14c) DK: *Neya, epa-na-ka ko-ta wana-tia=pe*
 not epa-SPEC-ERG 2SG-LOC ask-PFV.VIS.P=Q
na-wana-ya?
 NEG-ask-NEG
 ‘No, did the one over there ask you {you saw} or not ask?’
- (14d) WK: *pania-ka eto-na-ka*
 which-ERG eto-SPEC-ERG
 ‘Which, the one there?’
- (14e) DK: *ipa na-na ayu kole khi-yanua ri-ya*
 water drink-HAB now separate leave-SNS.IMPL say-DEP
 ‘Talking about when you went past the drinking spot’
- (14f) WK: *ah, ha-na, no-ne ngo ri-yarua=pe*
 EXCLAM there-SPEC 1SG-PR go.PFV say-SNS=Q
 ‘Ah, that one, (he) went with me, it’s said {you hear}?’
 (Do you hear it said, he went with me?)
ko (??) ri-ya ita ra ri-na
 2SG ?? say-DEP finish be/put.IMP say-SPEC
 I say, keep talking and finish (the story)’
- (14g) KK: *ko-ne ngo=nia,*
 2SG-PR go.PFV=ASSERT
hina-ka ko-ne ngo=nia ruwa-ta
 this-ERG 2SG-PR go.PFV=ASSERT say-SEQ
epa kei-na
 across be/stand.STAT-SPEC
 ‘He went with you, this one [i.e., John] says he went with you,
 he’s standing right across there.’ [MP/SD2009_4/NANE104/07:33-49]

In (14a), Damien begins his turn by stating what he expects to follow from this questioning: William will ‘talk straight’, that is, provide a true and clear account, without prevarication. He then asks William whether John ‘truly asked’ him where they were going, marking the question with the visual evidential *-tia*.

What epistemic stance or stances does Damien convey with his turn? Firstly, by asking a question he implies that he does not know whether or not John asked William, despite the fact that John has asserted this moments previously (13b, ‘I was asking him and he said...’). Thus, Damien indicates that he is not necessarily prepared to accept John’s version of events, hinting at the possibility that John is lying, and orienting to the fact that William and John are in conflict

and likely to propose different versions of the events in question. Furthermore, Damien's references to 'straight' (*etoto*) speech and to truthfulness (*ene*) may suggest that the truth has *not* been revealed so far. Damien's statement appears to be constructed to highlight the investigative nature of this interaction, which may in turn justify the asking of pointed questions.

Secondly, Damien suggests that William *does* know what happened. His question incorporates the presupposition that William and John were out walking together, indicating that he believes at least this much of the story to be true. In particular, he uses a visual evidential to represent addressee perspective and indicate that William was in a position to visually witness the contested event. The evidential ascribes a specific kind of epistemic responsibility to William, and implicates him in the supposed 'crime': Unlike Damien and the other 'investigators', who must rely on spoken testimony, William was a participant in the escapade, and must have seen what happened.

William does not seem prepared to accept Damien's version of events. Rather than co-operating and providing an answer, he rejects the terms of Damien's question by directing the listeners to John as a source of information (14b). However, Damien repeats his question using the visual evidential (14c, 'did the one over there ask you or not?'), reiterating his assessment of William's knowledge of the affair. At this point William goes further in countering Damien's assumptions, indicating that he does not even know who Damien is talking about (14d). Disingenuous as this may be, William's turn appears successful in that it goads Damien into making a statement of clarification (14e) and briefly turns the tables: now William is the one asking questions and Damien is the one in a position to provide information.

In line (14f) we see another example of an evidentially marked interrogative, this time from William. This sentence is complex in that it features the reported evidential strategy with the verb *ruwa* 'say' (see 5) in construction with the non-visual sensory evidential *-yarua*. William has formed the utterance with three potential 'mediations' of the central proposition, *none ngo* 'he went with me', casting doubt on the fact that his journey with John happened at all.

Firstly, William flags the addressee's evidence for the event as reported by presenting it within a reported speech construction. Reported evidence is less direct than several other kinds of evidence (e.g., participation, visual witnessing), and William's use of this evidential strategy likely draws attention to the fact that Damien's knowledge of this affair is based entirely on hearsay, not direct experience.

Secondly, William marks the verb *ruwa* 'say' that heads the reported construction with the evidential *-yarua*, specifying this 'saying' to be a non-visually witnessed event. Normally, present speech is referred to by a verb that is unmarked for

evidentiality, and the use of the form *riyarua* here is pragmatically marked.⁵ William's selection of the sensory category presents John's testimony as somehow insubstantial, an aural artifact that is experienced differently to normal speech.

Finally, through using an interrogative structure William casts the addressee, Damien, as the knowledgeable person in the exchange. However, as William is simultaneously a (supposed) participant in the contested proposition (i.e., one of the people who went), this does not add up. The need to ask genuine questions that relate to our own actions arises in relatively unusual situations, for example where we have acted unknowingly or unintentionally, or have forgotten something. William's utterance seems to imply 'if *I* don't know about it, how could it have happened?'; a partial counterpart to Damien's covert assertion that 'if it happened *you* would know it'.

Thus, with this evidentially marked interrogative, William suggests the proposition 'John went with me' is doubtful in that: i) the addressee only has hearsay evidence for the event taking place; (ii) even that hearsay evidence is based on an utterance that warrants special evidential mediation; and iii) others appear to know more about this event than a supposed participant.

Damien's and William's turns relate to multiple perspective in that through the questions they ask (and the responses they do or do not give), each man attempts to assert asymmetrical access to the information in question, positioning himself as less knowledgeable and his addressee as more knowledgeable (see also Heritage 2012 concerning 'K+' and 'K-' positions in conversation). The way that they attempt to manipulate each other and reassign epistemic responsibility simultaneously implies a stance towards the factual status of William and John's supposed adventure. Damien implies that it did happen, while William implies it did not.

3.2 Impersonal evidentials in assertions

The example we look at in this section shows a different side to the use of evidential markers in conversation. Rather than the combative use of evidential questions seen in (14), the impersonal evidentials in this extract seem to be used as part of a more collaborative endeavor. However, the orientation to addressee

⁵ For referring to past speech of second or third persons, a visual evidential is typical, as in (5). Using a non-visual evidential for present speech does, however, seem to be common when doing simultaneous interpreting into Duna; in this case, the non-visual evidential arguably refers to the experience of inferring meaning from another's speech using one's mental capacities, rather than (solely) to the auditory nature of speech. This can also be understood as a distancing device for the interpreter to make it clear that the speaker is reporting someone else's words and does not necessarily endorse them as his or her own knowledge.

perspective can nevertheless be seen as part of a (gently) manipulative practice on the part of the speakers.

Extract (15) was recorded in an interview with two senior men, Daniel (DK) and Alan (AH) and the author (LSR) in April 2009. The men are sitting together facing LSR, and have been describing their early lives and their history of involvement in the development of Kopiago as an administrative and service centre for the wider region, including the construction of the road and airstrip (etc.) in the 1960s and 1970s. Towards the end of the interview they start to compare the way things used to be (well built and well maintained) to the current state of affairs, where much of the infrastructure that they helped to create is in disrepair and no longer functions properly.

Most of the verbs in the discussion preceding extract (15) have been inflected with the simple perfective form, typical for describing past activities that one was closely involved in, as exemplified in (15a). Following this, we move to present time, and to the repeated use of the impersonal visual evidential *-nua*, which indicates that visual evidence of the proposition is currently available (see lines 15f, h, j–n).

- (15a) DK: *Ha-me wa-ta oro.*
 there-MNR do-SEQ be/put.PFV
Ayu-na, e, senesi-ta iri-na.
 now-SPEC HES change-SEQ be/put.STAT-SPEC
 ‘That’s how it used to be [i.e., people used to live well]. Now, ah, things are changed.’
- (15b) AH: *ayu ita raye ndu kone.*
 now finish be/put-DEP one INTENS
 ‘Now to finish up there is just one thing.’
- (15c) DK: *mm.*
 affirm
 ‘Mmm’
- (15d) AH: *mbaluta roma-ta wa-ta iwa-na,*
 plane above-LOC come drop-?HAB
 ‘Planes come and land up there.’ ((points))
- (15e) DK: *mm.*
 affirm
 ‘Mmm’
- (15f) AH: *ayu mbaluta hama roma era-nua*
 now plane clearing above be/put-VIS.IMPL
 ‘Now the air strip is there {it can be seen}.’
 ((points with extended arm, moves gaze to LSR))

- (15g) LSR: *mm.*
affirm
'Mmm'
- (15h) AH: *Kapoko mbaluta hama roma era-nua ?hunia=pe*
Kopiago plane clearing above be/put-VIS.IMPL this=Q
'Kopiago air strip is there [it can be seen], isn't it?'
((maintains point and gaze))
- (15i) LSR: *mmm.*
affirm
'Mmm'
- (15j) AH: *ayu Papua.Nu.Kini-ka aru ko-ra-ngi*
now PNG-ERG look.after be/stand-SHRD-TIME
mbaluta hama ha era-nua.
plane clearing there be/put-VIS.IMPL
'Now in the time since PNG took over things the air strip is there [it can be seen].'
((makes 'placement' gesture, points))
- (15k) DK: *E, itiki hoa-ta roma era-nua.*
yes weeds come-SEQ above be/put-VIS.IMPL
'Yes, weeds and grasses have come there [it can be seen].'
- (15l) AH: *kharo hatia ha era-nua.*
vehicle road there be/put-VIS.IMPL
'A car road there [it can be seen].' ((points, nosepoints))
- (15m) DK: *kharo hatia-na pi le-ta ha era-nua*
car road-SPEC LNK close.up-SEQ there be/put-VIS.IMPL
'The car road too is closed there [it can be seen].' ((points))
- (15n) AH: *le-ta era-nua*
close.up-SEQ be/put-VIS.IMPL
'Closed.' ((points)) [IV/DV05_2/20:08–30]

Alan and Daniel go on to detail other differences between past and present, stating that in former times things were *pele* 'good' but have since become *nguni*, 'bad'. As discussed in section 2, while addressee perspective may not be encoded in the visual evidential *-nua*, it is typically strongly implied in its use. In this example, Daniel and Alan appear to use *-nua* as one way to encourage LSR to examine her own visual experience and reflect on her own knowledge. This analysis is supported by other utterances made by Alan and Daniel in the course of the interaction, and especially by the pointing gestures that Alan uses.

Alan initially points to the airstrip's location just as he is finishing speaking (15d, 'planes come and land up there'), and just before his first use of the visual evidential in this passage. The place he speaks of is in fact just visible out of the open door of the house in which the recording is being made, behind where the addressee is sitting. Alan's conversational turn is met with a minimal response, *mm*, from Daniel. For his next turn (15f), which is marked with *-nua*, Alan moves his gaze to LSR, congruent with the interpretation that he is inviting a response and/or working to engage her attention. He also makes a more exaggerated pointing gesture with an extended arm. (LSR offers a minimal response but unfortunately, as she is only intermittently visible in this video recording, it is not possible to tell if she follows Alan's point at this stage.)

In his next turn (15h) Alan again points to the relevant location. He also offers a slight reformulation of the airstrip (now including the proper name *Kapako*, Kopiago), which suggests he has identified a need for clarification or repair (see Hayashi et al. 2013). Alan closes his utterance with a question (similar to a tag question such as *isn't it?* in English), implying that LSR is in a position of knowledge concerning this proposition and should be able to assert it for herself. All of these elements – the point, the added proper name, the visual evidential, and the question – seem designed to pursue the addressee's acknowledgment that she recognizes and can visually attest to the situation being talked about.

LSR offers another minimal response (it is also possible to hear a rustle of movement from off-screen – perhaps, this time, she shifts to follow Alan's point). Alan makes a final assertion concerning the airstrip's existence (15j, 'Now... the airstrip is there'), and then he and Daniel move on to detail the problems that now beset Kopiago. This is accomplished via co-construction as Alan names the feature, pointing as he does so (j, l) and Daniel elaborates on its state of disrepair (k, m).⁶ Both men mark their utterances with *-nua*, achieving a kind of cross-turn parallelism and suggesting an alignment between them. This alignment is inferable both with respect to the propositions expressed (they agree that the propositions are the case), and to the evidential status of these situations for both speaker and addressee (they agree that the situations are potentially visible to themselves and others, including the addressee). Furthermore, Daniel and Alan align in evaluating past times as positive,

⁶ Alan also makes exaggerated blinks during these turns. Blinking is sometimes used as a gesture of affirmation in Duna conversation (e.g., in answer to a question), and it is possible that Alan blinks as a marker of emphatic assertion here. However, further study of this gesture is needed to confirm this interpretation.

characterized by order, and present times as negative, characterized by neglect and decay.

In this extract, orientation to the addressee's perspective appears to be part of an attempt to manipulate her perceptual and attentional engagement with her surroundings, and to encourage her to share in co-appraisal of the things being talked about. Stating that something is visually accessible to the addressee is involved with directing her to look at it (e.g., through pointing), presumably to thereby establish a basis of shared knowledge with the speakers and potentially a shared evaluative stance.

4 Discussion

The term 'stance' has been used in a variety of ways in linguistics and discourse studies (see Kockelman 2004 for overviews and discussion) but is generally understood to relate to the (observable) subjective assessment of a 'stance object', for example a person, activity, utterance, or state of affairs. In an attempt to emphasize stance-taking as a dynamic and intersubjective practice, Du Bois (2007) defines stance as follows:

a public act by a social actor, achieved dialogically through overt communicative means, of simultaneously evaluating objects, positioning subjects (self and others) and aligning with other subjects, with respect to any salient dimension of the sociocultural field.

In this paper, the public, communicative acts under scrutiny are linguistic and gestural interactions between social actors who are members of the Duna-speaking community (and the author). Under Du Bois' framework these acts should achieve three things, which I now discuss in turn: evaluation, positioning, and alignment.

To take the first item, the kinds of evaluations that we have been most concerned with are broadly epistemic (for example, concerning how something is known or can be known), as reflected in the use of evidential markers and interrogative structures. What are the 'stance objects' that are being evaluated? It was mentioned in section 2 that individual viewpoint evidentials can be understood to assert a particular epistemic stance towards a state of affairs. For example, where the meaning expressed is that the speaker has firsthand knowledge of pigs digging up the garden, the stance object is the proposition about the pigs. In regard to the questions and statements looked at in extracts (14) and (15), I argued that the speaker can also use evidentials to assert an assessment of (potential) addressee knowledge; for example, by representing the

addressee's evidential perspective in an interrogative structure, or by implying through the use of an impersonal evidential that a situation is perceptually accessible to the addressee. In such cases, the epistemic stance of the addressee (for example, his knowledge or ignorance of an event) is itself projected as a stance object for the speaker. This is an example of a 'meta-stance' (or 'second order stance'), defined by Kockelman (2004: 143) as "the stances we take towards our own and other's stances".

As well as taking the role of evaluated object, the addressee is a subject to be 'positioned'. In the analyses presented in section 3, I suggested that these particular displays of attitudes towards addressee knowledge attempt to manipulate his or her engagement with the speech situation and the narrated world. In the mock court case, Damien tries to push William into 'speaking out' on what he (supposedly) knows, while William manages to force Damien and the other 'investigators' into a position of answering rather than asking questions. For Daniel and Alan, evidentials are used in combination with gesture to direct the addressee's attention to potentially visible situations in the environment; she must exercise herself to examine the perceptual information that is available to her.

The way a speaker encourages (or pushes) the addressee to epistemically engage with a certain situation can also speak volumes concerning the speaker's own stance towards that situation. In other words, the speaker can use their assessment of addressee knowledge to convey contrasting evaluations and position themselves as subject. In terms of the factual status of John and William's supposed reprehensible activities, Damien's portrayal of William as a visual witness to John's actions indicates that, at the very least, the speaker believes the two men were together on the day of the alleged incident, while his questions also highlight a sense of distrust towards William and John's testimony: they were up to *something*, but what? William, on the other hand, acts as if his questioners are in a position to know more about the event than he himself does. At the same time, he undermines that knowledge by specifying it as hearsay. These assessments imply that, according to William, the events under dispute did not happen at all, and he was not in any case involved.

Going in the opposite direction, Daniel and Alan evoke addressee viewpoint as a way to assert their conviction in a state of affairs; they are not just relaying their own perceptual experience, but also stating independently observable and therefore incontrovertible facts. Thus, in both of these cases speakers demonstrate apparent insight into other perspectives partly to put across their own point of view. This concurs with Traugott's (2010: 59) observation that items that overtly reference addressees and may thus appear to be markers of intersubjectivity (e.g., *y'know* in English) are in fact often used "for subjective purposes, to negotiate speaker meaning".

Overall, however, even these expressions of speaker stance can be viewed as steps on the road to alignment, Du Bois' third component. Such practices seem to be an example of "true" intersubjectivity, wherein the mind of another is recognized as an alternative or parallel subject, rather than as an inert object for conscious calculation (Danziger & Rumsey 2013, Duranti 2010). There may indeed be something face-threatening about making covert assertions concerning the private perceptual experience of another person (cf. Aikhenvald 2004) whether couched as a hostile accusation or a amicable suggestion. However, one reason to take such a risk could be the attainment of consensus, either in a situation where "reality" has schismed into separate versions of events, as in the mock court case, or as a prerequisite to a shared evaluation, as in Daniel and Alan's lament for their neglected homeland. It seems possible that multiple perspective constructions may thus be useful for both the repair and establishment of common ground between interlocutors.

5 Conclusion

In this paper I have tried to establish that certain structures in Duna can express multiple perspectives, and to look at what such constructions might be used for in interaction. Both evidential interrogatives and impersonal evidentials in Duna can be interpreted as simultaneously implying (but not entailing) reference to speaker and addressee perspective. In the former case, those perspectives are broadly opposed ('ignorant' versus 'knowing'), whereas in the latter they are broadly congruent (e.g., something is visible to both parties). In both instances, making an oblique reference to the addressee's perceptual experience appears to be involved in directing the addressee into taking a certain course of action; either to own up to knowing about that situation, or to direct their attention toward it and thereby come to know about it.

In addition, a speaker can use purported addressee perspective as a tool to express their own point of view on the events that are under discussion, for example presenting them as certain or doubtful. For evidentially marked interrogatives, the speaker may present their own knowledge as being at odds with that of the addressee, challenging their version of events. Impersonal evidentials, with their implication of symmetrical access, may encourage the addressee to share in co-appraisal of a thing or proposition with the speaker and thus reach a similar evaluative stance. While potentially disharmonious, one motivation for constructions that evoke addressee perspective may be to help interlocutors reach or restore a shared view of events, a foundation for cooperative

engagement (Clark 1996). Further study of the goals and methods of speaker-addressee alignment in culture-specific settings is necessary to explore this possibility further.

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Abbreviations

ABIL	abilitative
ASSERT	assertion
C	current
CAUS	causative
CD	constructed data
CMPL	completive
CNCL	concealed location
DEP	dependent
DU	dual
ED	elicited data
ERG	ergative
EXCLAM	exclamation
HAB	habitual
HES	hesitation
IMP	imperative
IMPF	imperfective
IMPL	impersonal
INT	intensive
INTENS	intensifier
IV	interview
LNK	linker
LOC	locative
MNR	manner
MP	multi-party text
P	previous
PFV	perfective

PLN	place name
PR	pair
PSN	personal name
Q	question marker
REAS	reasoning
REP	reportative
SG	singular
SNS	non-visual sensory
SEQ	sequential
SHRD	shared
SIM	simultaneous
SPEC	specific
STAT	stative
SW	switch
T	monologic text
UNC	uncertainty
VIS	visual

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