ANTI-AMERICANISM AND TRADE POLICY IN BRAZIL AND FRANCE

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I. INTRODUCCIÓN

After the 2001 attack on the Twin Towers and the subsequent foreign policy actions of the George W. Bush administration, a renewed interest emerged in the phenomenon of anti-Americanism. While relatively recent foreign policy actions of the United States have stirred up anti-American sentiments in different parts of the globe, the phenomenon itself has a history with roots dating back to at least to the 19th century. The greater part of the literature on anti-Americanism focuses on conceptualizing and defining the phenomenon and measuring its presence in different countries. It is argued now that in recent years anti-Americanism has become so common and widely shared that it “has begun to mutate from the world of having been almost exclusively a ‘dependent’ variable to becoming an ‘independent’ one as well” (Markovits 2007:8). However, if the consequences of anti-Americanism are currently addressed in scientific research, this mainly concerns consequences for the US national interest (Datta 2009; Katzenstein and Keophane 2007). Systematic research into the effects of anti-Americanism on politics and policies in the states where anti-Americanism is present is relatively scarce, with the exception of Meunier (2005 and 2007).

This article aims to contribute to the debate by conducting a comparative case study into the effects of anti-Americanism. The cases selected are Brazilian decision-making on the negotiation of the FTAA (2001-2005) and French decision-making during the Uruguay Round of the GATT (1982-1993). Important commonalities are that Brazil and France are medium sized powers that see themselves as great powers. Both strive for influence within their respective regions and are anxious about US interference in this respect. Existing publications agree that anti-Americanism is present both in Brazil and in France. Our cases have positive scores on the independent variable (presence of anti-Americanism), and in both this score is partially related to concerns for US dominance in their respective regions. Empirical analysis is expected to
show differences and similarities in the effects of anti-Americanism in Brazil and in France, likely to result in theoretical implications more widely applicable than would be possible on the basis of empirical research within a single region.

The policies studied are economic in nature. Trade policies in particular are usually analysed from theoretical perspectives emphasising economic and to some extent political interests. Analysing the effects of anti-Americanism, which can be considered an ideational variable rather than a material one, is therefore likely to provide new insights. Furthermore, because economic policy may be considered a relatively hard (or less likely) case for the influence of ideational or non-material variables, potential findings confirming the influence of anti-Americanism in the cases selected would indicate a greater degree of likeliness that similar effects of anti-Americanism may be found in other issue areas as well.

In order to answer the question to what extent and how anti-Americanism influenced Brazilian and French decision-making and policies, we will first shed light on the concept of anti-Americanism as it is applied in this article and compare and contrast it in the two states. In the subsequent case analysis we investigate whether and how anti-Americanism affected Brazilian and French policy-making processes and foreign trade policies. The final section will summarily discuss the outcomes and pose questions for further research.

II. CONCEPTUALISING ANTI-AMERICANISM

The conceptualisation and definition of anti-Americanism is an issue of debate. Meunier (2010) places the positions in this debate on a continuum between anti-Americanism as “a fundamental prejudice against the essence of the United States [...] a pervasive distrust of what the United States is” on the one side and, “a critique of specific US policy actions [...] a negative opinion against what the United States does” on the other side. In the former, the attitude of distrust is based on the difference in values held by the US and those held by the actor with the anti-American attitude. In the latter, the anti-American attitude is based on criticism of US policies.

The view adopted in this article is that although anti-Americanism may increase due to specific US foreign policies, criticism of US policies should in itself not be regarded as anti-Americanism. Only when these policies are criticised as being typically ‘American’ (United States) in that they are for example oppressive or ultra-capitalist – ultimately pointing at criticism of what the US is perceived to be – should these forms of criticism be regarded as anti-American. We consider anti-Americanism as
an unfavourable predisposition towards the US that translates in negative beliefs about and attitudes towards the US and may even result in negative stereotyping or ascription of inferiority to the US (Markovits 2007; O’Connor 2009).

A substantial amount of research has been conducted on the causes and presence of anti-Americanism in different states at various points in time (Chiozza 2009; Markovits 2007). Only recently scholars have begun to investigate the political consequences of anti-Americanism. Katzenstein and Keohane (2007) as well as Datta (2009) studied whether worldwide anti-Americanism affected US national interest and power. While the former found no significant relation between anti-Americanism and a decline in US soft power, the latter argues that anti-Americanism does precipitate a decline in US soft power and economic interests. Based on a quantitative analysis of French, German and British preferences on security policy, Ray and Johnston (2007) consider that the degree of anti-Americanism present in these states significantly affects their support for security policy through NATO (the ‘American’ solution) as against support for a more European or national security policy.

The idea that anti-Americanism may lead to decreased alignment with the US and to resist following the ‘American’ course is widely shared in the literature. Quinn and Cox (2008) as well as D’Appollonia (2008) provide empirical examples of this claim, but what is still lacking in the literature is in depth qualitative assessments of the effects of anti-Americanism on such policies and theoretical reflection on how and when anti-Americanism is likely to have effects. The case studies presented here are appropriate for uncovering the causal processes at play and reflecting on theoretical implications for future research.

III. ANTI-AMERICANISM IN BRAZIL

The roots of Brazilian anti-Americanism date back to the 18th and 19th centuries. The elites of the South American independent nations hated the US citizens’ tendency to “place Latin Americans below them in any racial hierarchy” (Cochrane 1993). Apart from the feelings of superiority attributed to US citizens, the anti-Catholic and protestant colonial roots of the US created mistrust of its government and society in Latin America. As a consequence, Latin American anti-Americanism was “fraught with misunderstanding and distrust” due to cultural misperceptions by the US (Cochrane 1993). Catholic Church mistrust of American Protestantism and Latin American elitist intellectuals’ bent on showing the US as culturally inferior (Castro 2000). These actors put forward the perception of US as uncultured, materialist, utilitarian, lacking any artistic qualities, and its
policies were portrayed as ‘the output of a flawed civilization’ (McPherson 2007:82-84).

The asymmetry in power in the advantage of the United States inevitably created strains and conflicts of interests, which sometimes ended with military defeat and military occupation of Latin American nations (Cochrane 1993). As early as the 19th century, fear of US imperialism started to take root, due to the US ideology of ‘manifest destiny’ (McPherson 2007:90). This anti-imperialist strand of anti-Americanism remained a constant factor in Latin America and would play a role in Brazilian anti-Americanism after the end of the Cold War.

Whereas Brazil had aimed to play an important international role after World War II (during which it had supported the Allies), the US was less interested in Latin America after the war and not keen on contributing the Brazil’s international status (Bowman 2006:151). During the Cold War, anti-Communism and Brazilian dependence on the US, on the one hand, tempered the potential for anti-Americanism in Brazil (Bowman 2006:149), but the upsurge of socialist parties, on the other hand, increased Brazilian criticism of US-led capitalism and US imperialism (McPherson 2007:85). Anti-Americanism was taken up by leftist politicians, academics and trade unions that not only protested against the US intervention in Vietnam but also denounced US support of military rule (1964-1984) in Brazil (Bowman 2006:153). In this sense, anti-Americanism in Latin America seems to follow the same path Markovitz found in Europe: it moved from being a phenomenon of the right until the 1920s, to become one of the left since the 1960s (Markovitz 2007).

After the end of the Cold War, anti-Americanism re-emerged in Brazil aided by two factors. The first was Brazil’s quest for regional influence in South America and its demand to be respected as a large and important country (Bowman 2006:142). The Brazilian perception of itself as a regional power emphasises self-assertion in the South American region and the wish of recognition (Tollefson 2002), together with emulation of the US. Indicative of the latter is the Brazilian demand of equal treatment from the American government. The second factor that increased anti-Americanism in Brazil was US foreign policies (e.g. the interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan) which were described as ‘the arrogant, unilateral and militaristic policies of Washington’ (McPherson 2007:100). The US was perceived as a dangerous imperialist power, posing a threat to Brazilian regional power, and Brazilian governments looked for ways to minimize Washington’s regional influence (McPherson 2007:51).

While anti-Americanism is clearly present in Brazil, anti-American sentiments are not shared among all the citizens and the political actors in
Brazil (Bowman 2006:158). It also appears prone to wax and wane with political changes in Brazil itself and to some extent with US foreign policies as well (McPherson 2007:54). When there is harmony between the US and Brazilian governments’ interests, pro-US sentiments increase, and when there is disharmony, anti-Americanism increases (Bowman 2006). US policies and demands therefore increase anti-Americanism only to the extent that these policies are detrimental to the Brazilian self-perception as a regional power.

IV. ANTI-AMERICANISM IN FRANCE

The earliest foundations of French anti-Americanism date back to the 19th century “when a set of stereotypes emerged that have been recycled and developed upon ever since” (O’Connor 2009:1). French anti-Americanism was characterised by aesthetic, political and cultural strands. After the discovery of the American continent, French anti-Americanism first took the form of commiseration, then turned into disdain, to make place for astonishment, worry and anger between 1880 and 1900 (Roger 2007:274).

Commiseration can be found in the ‘naturalist’ critique of the New World, describing the dismal nature of its flora and fauna and hypothesising the contamination of people, animals and plants once they had reached the New World. The disdain in the early 19th century – sometimes labeled aesthetic anti-Americanism and considered an important precursor to its cultural strand – was related to the perceived poor aesthetic output in literature and philosophy and to the uncultivated American social mores (Roger 2007:36). The traits ascribed to America and to Americans were often contrasted with the French self-image: France’s superior intellectual and spiritual values with American non-civilisation and the American ‘way of life’ with France’s mores. By the end of the 19th century the French were astonished by the growth of US economic and political power, and the image of the ‘ridiculous yankee’ was replaced by the ‘terrifying yankee’ (Roger 2007:142). The US was still considered inferior and its capitalist trust-system, industrialisation and consumerism were vehemently denounced (Nettelbeck 2007; Wall 2007) but a perception started to take shape that the US was aiming at world dominance (Roger 2007).

This perception of a US imperialist drive for world dominance obtained a particularly firm footing in France after the two World Wars, when steep French decline could no longer be ignored. French anti-Americanism now took a more defensive turn, aimed at defending France against US political, economic and cultural hegemony (Nettelbeck 2007).
The US was not considered a benign hegemon, but instead a force aiming at subjecting other states not only politically, but also economically and culturally (Judt 1992). Americanisation was considered cultural imperialism and a threat ‘destroy[ing] the individuality of the world’s many cultures and to impose a homogenised and spiritually vacuous Americanism over them all’ (O’Connor 2009:9).

French governments considered that France should reinstate its grandeur and great power status as ‘la Grande nation’ (Cogan 2003:12-14). President Charles de Gaulle argued that US hegemony should be resisted in Europe, and France should lead Europe in serving as a counterweight against the US (Wall 2007). Important in this self-image of France is that it does not only consider itself a leader in Europe, but that its role is to lead against US dominance. Thus, in redefining its identity after its decline in power, France “used America as an instrument of self-definition” and defined itself against America (Nettelbeck 2007:153). Anti-American prejudices depicting the US as a domineering ally and a non-benign hegemon that should be resisted became embedded in French state identity and have remained important in France ever since (Wall 2007), so anti-American sentiments are shared widely among both citizens and political actors (Meunier 2007).

While anti-Americanism is clearly present both in Brazil and in France, it is a more constant and widespread factor in France, where it is less prone to wax and wane with domestic political changes. What France and Brazil have in common is that both are particularly anxious about US influence in their respective regions. For Brazil its self-perception of being a regional power does not in itself include anti-American elements and US policies and demands increase anti-Americanism only to the extent that these policies are detrimental to the Brazilian self-perception. For France, combating US hegemony is a goal in itself as France explicitly defines itself as a counterweight against the US.

V. THE BRAZILIAN POSITION ON THE FTAA

In December 1994, the US proposed a FTAA among the nations of the Western Hemisphere but negotiations did not begin until 2001, after the American Executive obtained fast track authority (Gistelinck 2005:16-17). From the beginning, Brazil made clear that it wanted to include discussions on trade in agriculture and that the negotiations would be conducted in concert with the rest of Mercosur (Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay). Regarding the influence of anti-Americanism on Brazilian participation in FTAA negotiation, two stages can be identified: one before and one after
2003, when the leftist PT (Workers Party) and its leader Lula (Luiz Inacio da Silva) won the presidential election.

2001-2003: Economic considerations during the Cardoso government

Under the government of the social democrat Fernando H. Cardoso, foreign policy was linked to the perception of the stagnation and decrease of Brazilian trade possibilities with developed nations, unless concessions in agriculture were made in the WTO (World Trade Organization) or the FTAA (Lima 2005:20). During an FTAA Summit in Quebec (2001), Cardoso said the agreement would be welcome if it established shared rules on antidumping and ended non tariff barriers to trade (Bandeira 2005:5). Without those measures, it would be irrelevant for Brazil.

The Brazilian government identified the FTAA threats in a Ministry of Development document – 1) an increase in imports from NAFTA/North American Free Trade Agreement (United States, Canada, Mexico) nations; 2) a decrease in Brazilian exports to the rest of Latin America; 3) the possibility that members of the FTAA would extend preferences to third parties; and 4) that multinational companies operating in Brazil would reshape their regional strategies. Brazil sharpened this position after 2000, when Chile, instead of joining Mercosur signed a bilateral trade treaty with the US, and the Argentine government appeared ready to do the same. Thus, the threat extended to Mercosur because the FTAA could mean the end of this sub-regional integration scheme. Parallel negotiations of a trade agreement between the European Union (EU) and Mercosur were not considered a threat, since the EU supported the institutionalisation of Mercosur and did not compete with Brazil for influence in South America (Gistelinck 2005:20).

The difficulties in the negotiations sprang from the size of the Brazilian economy, which the government considered its comparative advantage since its share of trade with the US was relatively minor in comparison to other Latin American economies (Abreu, 2006: 3). Additionally, relevant products from the viewpoint of protectionist interests in Brazil were relevant for American export interests (computers, electronics and telecoms equipment, transport equipment), and export interests of Brazil (oranges, sugar, footwear, heavy trucks, steel, tobacco, etc.) were sensitive imports from the American viewpoint (Abreu 2006:41, 45). Results of a gravitational model applied by Sangmeister and Taalouch (2002) support the skeptical position of Brazil vis-a-vis the FTAA. They quote from a study of the Brazilian Planning Ministry that established that an agreement with the EU would have a similar negative impact and that
the growth of Brazilian exports to the EU would be less than in the FTAA. Nevertheless, this did not prove to be an obstacle for economic cooperation with the EU.

At first, Brazilian economic interests were not united. For example, among industrialists, sector interests generated divisions – shoes, textiles and orange juice producers favored a faster negotiation of tariff barriers in the FTAA; chemical, electronics and capital goods producers looked for special concessions in the FTAA; while steel, furniture, and paper sectors opposed it (Botelho 2003:186-187). Those in opposition employed arguments as their inability to compete with American goods or the fact that imports to the US were not harmed by tariffs but by antidumping measures and subsidies (Epsteyn 2009:19, 27), and all of them appeared interested in institutionalising their participation in the FTAA consultation process (Santana 2000:174).

During this stage of the negotiation, neither the government nor the private sector employed anti-American discourse, but anti-Americanism appeared in the discourse of the main opposition party (Lula’s PT), trade unions and NGOs. Examples of anti-American trade unions views can be found in Correio Sindical Mercosur and Correio Sindical Latinoamerica, organs of the Coordenadora de Centrais Sindicais do Cone Sul, together with anti-FTAA articles and points of view of the Hemispheric Social Alliance and the Continental Mobilization against the FTAA, which also included NGOs. The PT was a member of the anti-American Social World Forum of Porto Alegre, a group of social movements, NGOs, and trade unions, supported by European political parties that rejected the FTAA as a project of economic and political annexation of Brazil to the US (Marulanda 2008:24).

Before 2003 the government saw the FTAA as an economic threat to Brazil, and the only ideational element present in the justification of an anti-FTAA position was the notion that Brazil is predestined to play an important role in the world, and in order to reach this, it must develop an autonomous industrial base. Opting for Mercosur as the organisation through which the FTAA should be negotiated strengthened Brazil’s position on the FTAA and it was clearly linked to its self-perception as the potential leader of South America. At the same time, its failure to add Chile to Mercosur contributed to the feeling that the US was threatening its regional leadership.

Even after the Summit Meeting in Quebec (2001), when Brazil changed from a “defensive position” to one of “conflicting participation” in the FTAA negotiation (Botelho 2003:172) anti-Americanism was not part of the official discourse. But the FTAA had become a highly politicised
issue in Brazil. That year, the Brazilian government issued an open invitation to organizations interested in the FTAA to send recommendations and suggestions, finding response from business organisations, trade union federations, and academic and consumer groups (Botelho 2003:176, 178, 181). At the same time, the government, industrialists, and agri-business agreed on an almost unanimous anti-FTAA position during the discussion of the Farm Act and the Trade Promotion Authority (Santana 2007:31-32), approved in 2002 by the US Congress. This act extended large subsidies to American producers of corn and soy, and imposed many conditions for negotiating tariff cuts in orange juice, tobacco, dairy products, and other goods of interest to Brazilian exporters (Markwald 2005:109).

The Brazilian anti-FTAA position under Cardoso was predominantly instigated by economic considerations. While Brazil also feared adverse effects on its regional aspirations in Latin America, these fears did not give rise to anti-American discourse on the part of the government. It did not heed the advice of PT, trade unions and NGO’s that branded the FTAA as an American ploy to gain power in the region. Judging from the policy process described and the governmental discourse legitimatising its position, we may conclude that anti-Americanism did not affect the position taken by the Brazilian government on the FTAA before 2003 nor did it affect the policy-making process substantially.

Lula takes office: The empowerment of anti-american groups

While Lula had previously supported his anti-FTAA stance with anti-American rhetoric, he toned down his discourse during the presidential election campaign in 2002. He still supported the idea that Brazil should withdraw from the negotiation and submit to plebiscite whether Brazilians wanted the hemispheric treaty (Almeida 2003; Marulanda 2008), but during the election campaign and after his election, he had to make concessions to his moderate nationalist allies, leading to a watering down of his anti-American speech (Carvalho and Ferrari Filho 2004). The PT’s election victory is considered the result of ‘widespread displeasure with neoliberal economic policies’ rather than an effect of Brazilian anti-Americanism (McPherson 2007:51). While in 2001, the PT got the Chamber of Deputies to approve a motion calling for Brazil to withdraw from the FTAA negotiation, less than a year later the party ignored a similar trade union’s call for a plebiscite to decide if Brazil should continue negotiating (Almeida 2003:90-92, 94).
When the PT entered office, the new administration made important changes in the bureaucracy in charge of Brazilian foreign economic negotiations. As a result, the Ministries of Agriculture, Finance, Development, and Industry and Commerce lost their central role in favor of the Ministry of External Relations. Thus, political departments closer to the Executive displaced technically oriented departments. Additionally, Samuel Pinheiro Guimaraes, a diplomat fired by Cardoso due to his anti-FTAA comments, was appointed General Secretary of the Foreign Affairs Ministry. He claimed that the restrictions the FTAA imposed on trade, investments, government procurement, and intellectual property affected Brazilian sovereignty by reducing the state’s internal and external ability for collective action. According to him, it was imperative to resist the will to insert Brazil into the world by means of economic schemes subordinated to external objectives, because this would reduce Brazil to a position similar to Puerto Rico (Guimaraes 2001:25-29).

If the private sector had been the privileged interlocutor of the Brazilian government under the Cardoso administration, after 2003 trade unions and NGOs gained the upper hand (Botelho 2003:173). In general, these domestic actors supported the anti-FTAA policy of the government before and after 2003, albeit for different reasons (Epsteyn 2009:2-3).

The PT government demanded NGOs and trade unions participation, as observers and by explicit invitation, in an effort to slow down the FTAA negotiations and gain time to align the rest of Mercosur behind its position (Botelho 2003:176). In this vein, NGOs and trade unions opposition to the FTAA was used to obtain internal legitimacy and external negotiating power (Botelho 2003:172). This instrumental use of NGOs and trade unions by the PT had the political advantage that the government could employ their arguments to legitimate FTAA resistance, making it look as something different from the previous radical opposition of the PT, in order not to antagonize its coalition partners. The latter did not object when Guimaraes and Lula’s diplomatic advisor, Marco Aurelio García, echoed the ideationally charged, implicit anti-American, anti-FTAA arguments of trade unions and NGOs (Almeida 2008:116), because they also opposed the FTAA due to economic reasons.

Anti-American positions were also exposed by academics influenced by the dependency school, which, during the 1960s and 1970s, had developed the thesis that Brazil should help reshape world power. For example, Costa (2005) stated that, with the FTAA, the US pretended that Latin American governments support American international interests, that these countries accept its culture, that its universities produce professional elites in favor of the US presence in the region, that the economic system
allow for the free circulation of goods and capital, but not workers, enlarge the production capacity of American business, guarantee American access to the region’s raw materials, and inhibit the installation of alternative poles of technological development. In this case, the Brazilian government also chose to listen to academics whose arguments matched its opposition to the FTAA, and to disregard the arguments of those supporting the hemispheric agreement (Almeida 2006).

Nationalist military entered the debate against the FTAA because they considered that the US was trying to curb the development of advanced military technologies in Latin America, and limit its armed forces to maintaining internal order, while drug trafficking and environmental threats required direct American intervention (Ferolla 1994:16). Nationalist Brazilian officers believed that the Cold War had been supplanted by a North-South conflict, so the real enemy of Brazil was the US (Carvalho 2004). When Brazil became more active in regional and world politics, clashes with the US in security issues augmented, for example, on how to deal with the Colombian conflict. This conflict threatened the Amazonia, a strategic concern for the military, in which ‘in the future the country’s natural resources may need to be protected from external ambitions’ (National Defense Policy 2005, cited in Lima & Hirst 2006:36). Brazilian military also played a relevant role in the state led industrial program, and they felt the FTAA threatened to end the protection of military technological development in Brazil (Revanales 2002).

According to a member of the Supreme Military Court and president of the Administrative Council of state company Embraer (Ferolla, cited in Salvador 2003), the FTAA showed “intolerable levels of American hegemonic intentions in the Americas”. He questioned the US policy of signing agreements that asked for asymmetric capability reductions in strategic areas, employed expressions such as “coercive implementation of a pretended free trade area” and “imperial expansion”, and he was quoted comparing President Bush to “an American Caligula of the nuclear era”.

These anti-American discourses contrasted with the diplomatic language of President Lula and Foreign Minister Celso Amorim, who emphasised the need to reconcile trade promotion with the preservation of socio-environmental, technical, and industrial Brazilian policies as the main reason for their opposition to the FTAA (Amorim 2003; “El canciller Amorim critica el ALCA”, 2003). Lula himself claimed that he was not opposing the FTAA for ideological reasons but because it was a pragmatic decision to promote Brazilian interests in the region (Marulanda 2008). Thus, “securitisation” of the FTAA was carried out by other members of the administration and the PT, as well as by sympathetic academics, who
presented it as ‘existentially threatening’ to Brazil’s sovereignty, economy and culture. In this process, they employed anti-American discourse and adopted the arguments of trade unions, NGOs and transnational anti-FTAA networks. In spite of the visibility of trade unions and NGOs in the Brazilian debate, they continued to depend on the willingness of the government to heed their opinions, so Epsteyn (2009:29) and Botelho (2003:182) consider that they were used by the government to reach its own goals.

Veiga claims that the Brazilian position on the FTAA was based on material considerations (economics interest groups), a critique of the US from a core-periphery perspective (academics) and a realist nationalist vision (military) (Veiga 2002:72). All these justified Brazilian regional leadership and the quest for an autonomous global position, with the result that they favoured alternative strategies to the FTAA. But, after 2003, NGOs and trade unions offered the PT government the alternative of using anti-Americanism disguised as specific social demands and not radical ideological party positions. Though only a part of the many domestic actors opposing the FTAA can be said to be clearly anti-American, the government chose to listen to them in order to fulfill its trade negotiating goals – delay or reject the FTAA.

Our analysis shows that the importance of anti-Americanism in the domestic policy-making process did increase after the electoral victory of the PT in 2003. Its ‘natural’ domestic allies (trade unions and other NGO’s), that had applied anti-American arguments against the FTAA from the start, were empowered in the domestic-decision making process. They provided the government with the means to slow down and reject the FTAA, with the support of other domestic actors who opposed the negotiation based on more material considerations.

VI. THE FRENCH POSITION IN THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND

The first step towards a new round of GATT negotiations was the proposal made by 18 GATT contracting parties – among which the United States – to convene a ministerial meeting in 1982 (Paemen & Bensch 1995:31). The US was struggling with an increasing trade deficit, which it blamed in part on the European Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), and was eager to bring agricultural trade measures, particularly export subsidies, under effective GATT discipline (Davis 2003:272). The EC (European Community) member states were not yet keen on starting another round of GATT negotiations (Paemen and Bensch 1995:32). Within the EC, France took the most reserved position from the start. It
repeatedly stalled the negotiations, giving primacy to its agricultural interest over its wider economic interests.

**Launching a new GATT round**

A new round of GATT negotiations could be considered in France’s economic interest, because it would counter protectionist tendencies of the EC’s trading partners (particularly the US) in a period of economic slowdown (Paemen and Bensch 1995:32), and because France had competitive interests in services that were also to be included in the new GATT round. Including agriculture in the negotiations, however, would harm French agricultural interests because this sector was unable to compete in the world agricultural market without the CAP export restitutions that would be up for negotiations in GATT (Delorme 1994:41). Concerns over the agricultural sector and unwillingness to be forced by the US into a new GATT round of American design dominated French discourse, supporting the rejection of the negotiation.

The French government was concerned about France’s agricultural export potential if export restitutions should be curtailed. Apart from opposing new negotiations because they were simply not in the French agricultural interest, France also repeatedly suspected US initiatives and tried to convince its European partners that if negotiations were to be held, Europe should take the lead and not simply accept an American agenda, that emphasised export subsidies and was bound to be in favour of the US. France instead proposed a number of negotiating issues to obtain a better balance between the various areas of discussion (Report of the article 113 meeting of 29 June 1982). In line with these arguments, during the 1982 ministerial conference, French representatives indicated that the American Congress was not the center of the universe (New York Times, 29.11.1982). After the failure of the conference, socialist President François Mitterrand rejoiced in the European solidarity that had created a “front of trade resistance against the domination of those more powerful than us” (Conférence de presse de M. François Mitterrand, 29 Nov. 1982).

As time went on, France came under increasing pressure, both from the US and its EC partners, to make concessions, but the French farm lobby sought to support the government’s resolve by mirroring the earlier governmental discourse presenting the US as the antagonist. The FNSEA (Fédération Nationale des Syndicats d’Exploitants Agricoles) warned that the US – by its emphasis on restricting export subsidies – was launching an offensive against the CAP, while it refused to put its own system of agricultural support up for discussion (L’Information Agricole, December 1985). Government officials, such as Henri Nallet, Minister of
Agriculture, also repeated the argument that the GATT proposal was unacceptable because it would imply having the US impose a negotiating agenda on the EC and France (Discours de monsieur Henri Nallet. 20 June 1985). This argument was particularly applied in domestic discourse, while at the European level, France referred to its interests in economic terms, denouncing the restriction of export subsidies as long as other instruments of agricultural policy (e.g. US deficiency payments) would be left unaffected.

Material arguments would have been sufficient to justify the French government’s rejection of GATT negotiations, but the anti-American discourse was useful to legitimate its position domestically. Claims by Quinn and Cox (2008) as well as D’Appollonia (2008) that anti-Americanism results in opposition to proposals that are considered ‘American’ solutions seem to hold here, but it is difficult to prove the independent effect of anti-American considerations as French agricultural economic interests would have resulted in a similar French position. The conclusion is that anti-Americanism strengthened the arguments of French economic interests and offered additional legitimisation for the French position.

1990: Farm lobby anti-americanism to no avail

In 1986, the GATT partners launched the GATT Uruguay Round in Punta del Este. Even France was finally willing to accept the inclusion of agriculture in the negotiations after it had been agreed that all measures affecting agricultural trade – not only export subsidies – would be discussed (Agra Europe, 26.9.1986). During the first half of the Uruguay Round agricultural negotiations mainly focused on the form and modalities of an agreement and it was not until 1990 that actual reduction percentages of customs duties, internal support and export assistance (subsidies) were negotiated. Proposals on these issues were due by October 1990 and would be the basis for the Heysel conference in December 1990, during which the Uruguay Round was originally scheduled to be completed.

In the run up to this conference, the EC put a proposal before the Council of Ministers to reduce agricultural support by 30 per cent. French farm organisations fiercely denounced it, both because it would negatively affect the French trade balance, and because it would represent a form of capitulation to the US. They argued that acceptance would equal ‘kneeling before the power of the United States’, and insisted that European agricultural policy should not be defined by states other than the EC member states themselves (Le Monde, 25.10.1990; Année politique, économique et sociale 1990:389; FNSEA, Communiqué de Presse, 9 Oct.
1990). It was even argued that the Commission proposal would turn over the internal market to US hegemony (MODEF, Communiqué. Coup de grâce! 4 Oct. 1990). When the French government finally accepted a watered-down version of the proposal in November 1990, the farm lobby considered that the government had sacrificed its agricultural sector on the altar of American interests and the EC was regarded as behaving like the 51st state of the US (Agence France Presse, 6.11.1990; GATT: réactions du MODEF, du RPR et de l’Union pour la France, 7 Nov. 1990).

The French government felt obliged to react to such allegations lest it be pictured as a weak government that did not safeguard France’s interests in the world. Prime Minister Michel Rocard criticised those who qualified the European accord as a ‘capitulation’. He argued that the accord safeguarded CAP principles, which had consistently been the French demand from the start of the negotiations. Louis Mermaz, who had succeeded Nallet as Minister of Agriculture, insisted that French market shares were safe. He added that no unilateral concessions had been made to the US but that the European accord, instead, implied ‘a comparable engagement on the part of the United States’ (Agence France Presse, 7.11.1990).

While farm organisations resorted to anti-American discourse in order to delegitimise the option of accepting the Commission proposal, they did not influence the preference France eventually defended. France was still resisting the Commission proposal, but economic considerations seemed to be more important than anti-American considerations for the government. The importance of community preference – which ensured privileged access of member states to the EC market compared to third states – was repeatedly emphasized by government officials (Communiqué de Premier Ministre, 9 Oct. 1990; Secretariat du Gouvernement, 10 Oct. 1990). Governmental documents show that France was particularly occupied with preserving unity with Germany against the Commission proposal (Relevé de décisions de la réunion de ministres tenue le 19 octobre sous la présidence du Premier Ministre, 24 Oct. 1990). Once Germany had gained sufficient concessions from the Commission and was inclined to approve the proposal, France decided to make the best of it by seeking a few additional concessions to its economic interest and then accepting what was left of the original proposal. While anti-American discourse influenced the domestic decision-making process (farm lobby allegations and governmental reactions), it did not affect the position the French government defended in the EC.

The Heysel conference in December 1990, which was intended to conclude the Uruguay Round negotiations, ended in a stalemate. The EC was blamed due to its unwillingness to make additional concessions to the 30 per cent support reductions in agriculture. The negotiations were in the doldrums until Arthur Dunkel, Secretary General of the GATT, tabled a compromise proposal in December 1991. This document proposed liberalising the agricultural market and increasing access of third states to the EC market, so it was not economically attractive to France (Paemen and Bensch 1995). Furthermore, while the Draft Final Act included substantial reductions in the EC’s export restitutions, it left the US system of deficiency payments untouched. It was in the French economic interest to reject the Act.

The government flatly rejected the Act, but its reaction was markedly wrought with arguments similar to those the farmers had applied in 1990. According to the Financial Times (6.1.1992), Mitterrand had commented during a cabinet meeting that “France is not ready to bow to American demands or to submit itself to the interest of any other country, and it will not give in”. Mermaz noted that accepting the Dunkel Draft would imply that the EC made concessions, whereas the US was unwilling to do the same (Le Monde. 20.12.1991).

If one were to take the statements of the government officials at face value, it would seem that anti-American considerations affected the French position against Dunkel’s text. It should be kept in mind though, that the government may also have applied this discourse to satisfy domestic actors. Although farm organizations hardly mobilized against Dunkel’s text, they were angry about negotiations on CAP reform that had commenced in 1991. The FNSEA equated CAP reform with giving in to US demands and pretensions to dominate the world trade agenda (L’Information Agricole, December 1991). Applying anti-American rhetoric with respect to the Draft Final Act was at least a means for the government to appease the belligerent farm lobby. While it is again difficult to establish whether anti-Americanism was also a decisive independent cause of the French position, the French concerns about greater relative gains for the US (greater relative gains for other negotiating partners did not enter the government’s considerations) seem to indicate that anti-Americanism informed the French perception of its economic interests and led France to oppose Dunkel’s proposal.

When the Draft Final Act was not accepted, agricultural negotiations continued on a bilateral level between the EC and the US, and resulted in the Blair House accord of November 1992. This included smaller support
reductions than the Draft Final Act. Moreover, the larger part, if not the whole, of the reductions would already be covered by the CAP reform the EC member states had agreed on in May 1992. The Blair House accord was unlikely to involve additional economic costs, while it could even be beneficial for the French economy if it enabled the conclusion of the Uruguay Round in its entirety, which had been blocked due to agriculture. Most French economic interest groups therefore did not reject the accord.

The farm lobby cautioned the government, in February 1992, that if the Commission accepted a compromise before the October elections in the US, it would be conniving with the ‘aggressor’ (Le Monde, 29.2.1992). Shortly before the Blair House agreement was reached, the farm lobby claimed that if the EC accepted a deal with the US, this would be its greatest diplomatic humiliation since its establishment (Le Monde, 20.11.1992). Once the US and the EC reached an agreement on 20 November 1992, farm organisations called for “absolute resistance against the American aggressors” and demanded a “’no’ to an agricultural Munich” (L’Information Agricole, November 1992; December 1992).

The French government rejected the accord, arguing that it had a more adverse impact on EC agricultural exports than on American exports (Commissariat Général du Plan, 30 Nov. 1990). The government considered the agreement to be economically costly, and the effects on EC exports were again compared to the effects on US exports in particular, even though there were other important competitors. Furthermore, Prime Minister Pierre Bérégovoy argued that no state should be allowed to impose its will on the rest of the world. Laurent Fabius framed the GATT issue as a question of US dominance versus EC independence: “In essence it is a question of whether the United States is in charge of the French and European economy or if Europe should assert itself” (Fabius à RTL, 27 Nov. 1992). France demanded renegotiation of the accord in order to strike a better deal. In these negotiations, Europe should be on an equal footing with the US and should not allow the US to dictate European policy (Interview accordée par Bérégovoy à France 2, 22 Nov. 1992; Interview accordée par Fabius à RTL, 27 Nov. 1992).

Both the farm lobby and the government used anti-American discourse, linked to the idea of a strong France leading Europe as a counterweight against the US, to delegitimize the option of accepting the Blair House accord. While a similar farm lobby discourse had not influenced the government in 1990, its influence increased in 1992 because the government had grown more sensitive to domestic pressure after the near-debacle of the September referendum on the Maastricht Treaty, and because parliamentary elections were to be held in March 1993. Anti-
Americanism therefore affected both French decision-making and its position in 1992, at least through the effective use of anti-American discourse by the farm lobby. Furthermore, anti-Americanism seemed to affect the French perception of its economic interest, assessing the Blair House agreement as costly because of potential relative gains for the US, while a wider view of its economic interests should have led France to accept the deal.

The March 1993 elections brought the Right back into power under the leadership of Édouard Balladur, in cohabitation with socialist President Mitterrand. Balladur, like his predecessor, demanded, and eventually achieved, the reopening of negotiations with the US in order to strike a better deal (Guyomarch, Machin and Ritchie 1998:145). The renegotiation resulted in a Final Agreement in December 1993. The reduction percentages agreed were similar to those of the Blair House Accord (20 per cent reduction of internal support, 36 per cent reduction in customs duties, and 21 per cent reduction in the volume of subsidized export), but with respect to import access the US now accepted the EEC calculation method and a reference period for the export assistance reductions that favored the EEC.

Despite reservations by the farm lobby, France, both considering its international political and economic interests, really had no other choice but to accept the agreement (Réponse du premier ministre M. Édouard Balladur à une question d’actualité à l’Assemblée Nationale, 8 Dec. 1993; Declaration de politique générale de M. Édouard Balladur devant l’Assemblée Nationale, 15 Dec. 1993). For the US and the GATT Secretary General had issued credible threats that December 15 would be the final deadline for the Uruguay Round. If this deadline was not met, the round would fail and gains in domains other than agriculture would be lost. The government nevertheless domestically tried to legitimize its acceptance of the final deal by presenting it as a victory over the US, emphasizing that the US had made concessions even though a few months ago it had claimed that it would not alter a syllable in the Blair House Accord (Conférence de presse conjointe du ministre des affaires étrangères, M. Alain Juppé et du ministre de l’agriculture, M. Jean Puech, 7 Dec. 1993). This way, though the anti-American lobby did not get all that they wanted, they could pretend to have done so, showing that anti-American rhetoric was useful for French domestic consumption.

VII. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Our case studies indicate that a distinction is warranted between effects on the decision-making process and effects on policies.
Conceptualising anti-Americanism as an ideational variable (Higgot and Malbasic 2008) – actors have a certain idea of what the US is (e.g. unilateralist, capitalist, dominating) and evaluate these traits negatively – implies that policies that seem to be inspired by or contribute to American unilateralism or world dominance are less attractive. In this sense, ideas may affect actors’ evaluation of different policy options in much the same way as considerations of political support or economic gains.

Anti-American discourse can be useful in the domestic policy-making process to legitimate one’s own position and to delegitimise the position of others in order to enhance one’s influence in the debate. This reflects what Meunier (2005) has labeled the “policy legitimation” role of anti-Americanism and resembles Schimmelfennig’s notion of rhetorical action defined as “the strategic use of norm-based arguments in pursuit of one’s self interest” (Schimmelfennig 2001:63). In this vein, governmental actors may apply anti-US rhetoric to obtain societal support for their position and create domestic unity. Societal actors can also engage in rhetorical action, employing anti-US discourse to strengthen their influence over outcomes and constrain the government in the domestic debate. In order to legitimise a policy, one could present it as enabling the state to devise its own policies in opposition to the US or as enhancing the state’s claim for regional power while curbing US regional influence. Alternatively, policies may be delegitimised by depicting them as disproportionately beneficial to the US and enhancing US influence in the region, to the detriment of one’s own power position.

Anti-Americanism had a greater effect on the domestic debate in France than in Brazil because these sentiments are more widely shared in France, as shown by governments of different ideological persuasion (Mitterand’s and Balladur’s) using anti-American arguments. One caveat is in place though: since the agricultural focus of the French case resulted in an emphasis on the agricultural lobby (the industrial lobby usually refraining from mobilization in this domain), while the Brazilian case was broader in scope, including the military and industrial groups, it could be that agricultural groups share deeper anti-American sentiments than industrial or military groups, but this falls outside the scope of this article and is an interesting avenue for further research. For states such as Brazil, where anti-Americanism is present but limited to specific political and social actors, the expectation is that anti-Americanism is more likely to affect the domestic debate and the power of different actors to the extent that the political party or parties in office share anti-American sentiments. Empirical proof of this effect can be found when anti-American discourse is consistently applied over time, and actors in the domestic process feel
obliged to react to allegations that the policies they propose are bad because they are typically ‘American’ solutions or contribute to increasing US power in the region at the expense of their country.

This article has shown that anti-Americanism influenced the domestic policy process and governmental position in Brazil and France to different degrees and in distinct ways. The degree to which anti-American sentiments are shared among the population and the political establishment as well as the degree to which anti-American aspects are embedded in or directly related to a state’s identity seem to be promising variables for explaining the effects of anti-Americanism on decision-making and policies. Further research could put these expectations to the test. In the end, it is not a question of showing that anti-American ideas trump material interest or vice versa, but rather of establishing the importance of ideational variables in decision-making processes and policies.

NOTES

1 Keck and Sikkink (1998) argue that non material variables such as international norms are more likely to be influential on softer issues involving, for example, bodily harm or legal equality of opportunity.

2 One may wonder how continuity in French anti-Americanism coincides with variations in its position toward NATO. For France, it has always been decisive whether NATO could serve French interests and ambitions. Its exit from the organisation’s military branch in 1966 can be explained by the French perception that NATO particularly furthered US interests and extended the American influence in Europe. The end of the cold war and insecurity about future US involvement in the region opened opportunities for France to serve its regional interests through NATO in the 1990s. Furthermore, considering the adaptations in the organization’s goals and tasks, it was also perceived as an instrument to serve French interests in the Mediterranean. This explains France’s rapprochement to NATO in the 1990s, which came to an end when France did not succeed in gaining command of the NATO fleet in the Mediterranean, due to the US unwillingness to give up that role. France returned to the integrated command structure of NATO in 2009 under President Sarkozy, who did not seem to share the anti-American sentiments of his predecessors, and under strict French conditions which, for example, safeguarded its nuclear power.

3 For the concept of securitisation see Oelsner, 2005.

4 While the EC used export subsidies (or ‘restitutions’ in their own terms) to stimulate the export of agricultural products, the US applied a system of deficiency payments which were paid to farmers directly. Both systems of support affected agricultural trade.
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