

A Companion to the Latin Medieval Commentaries on Aristotle's Metaphysics

Edited by

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CONTENTS

Introduction	1
<i>Fabrizio Amerini and Gabriele Galluzzo</i>	
Latin Medieval Translations of Aristotle's <i>Metaphysics</i>	19
<i>Marta Borgo</i>	
The Commentator: Averroes's Reading of the <i>Metaphysics</i>	59
<i>Matteo di Giovanni</i>	
Avicenna's and Averroes's Interpretations and Their Influence in Albertus Magnus	95
<i>Amos Bertolacci</i>	
English Commentaries before Scotus. A Case Study: The Discussion on the Unity of Being	137
<i>Silvia Donati</i>	
Aquinas's Commentary on the <i>Metaphysics</i>	209
<i>Gabriele Galluzzo</i>	
Giles of Rome's Questions on the <i>Metaphysics</i>	255
<i>Alessandro D. Conti</i>	
Five Parisian Sets of Questions on the <i>Metaphysics</i> from the 1270s to the 1290s	277
<i>Sten Ebbesen</i>	
Alexander of Alessandria's Commentary on the <i>Metaphysics</i>	315
<i>Fabrizio Amerini</i>	
The Questions on the <i>Metaphysics</i> by John Duns Scotus: A Vindication of Pure Intellect	359
<i>Giorgio Pini</i>	
Jandun's Question-Commentary on Aristotle's <i>Metaphysics</i>	385
<i>Roberto Lambertini</i>	

Three Franciscan Metaphysicians after Scotus: Antonius Andreae, Francis of Marchia, and Nicholas Bonet	413
<i>William O. Duba</i>	
John Buridan's Commentary on the <i>Metaphysics</i>	495
<i>Femke J. Kok</i>	
Paul of Venice's Commentary on the <i>Metaphysics</i>	551
<i>Alessandro D. Conti</i>	
Fifteenth-Century Parisian Commentaries on Aristotle's <i>Metaphysics</i>	575
<i>Paul J.J.M. Bakker</i>	
Bibliography	631
List of Manuscripts	665
Index of Names	667

FIFTEENTH-CENTURY PARISIAN COMMENTARIES
ON ARISTOTLE'S *METAPHYSICS**

Paul J.J.M. Bakker

1. INTRODUCTION

Fifteenth-century commentaries on Aristotle's *Metaphysics* have received remarkably little scholarly attention. Yet, judging from the number of extant works, the tradition of commentaries on the *Metaphysics* would seem to have flourished in the 15th century, especially in comparison to the second half of the 14th century, when only a handful of commentaries was produced. No fewer than 42 commentaries written between 1400 and 1500 are known to have survived, either as complete texts or as fragments, either in manuscripts or in printed editions.¹ Of these 42 commentaries, five were written by Dominican masters, three by Franciscans,² three by Conventual Franciscans,³ one by an Augustinian, and 30 by secular authors.⁴ The commentaries can be assigned to three main geographical regions: Italy (eight commentaries), France (ten commentaries), and Central Europe (22 commentaries). The absence of English commentaries is striking. The Italian works mainly came from Padua, Florence, and Bologna. All but one of the French commentaries are from Paris. Within the Central European group, commentaries from Krakow (six or seven) and Erfurt (five) constitute the most important subgroups. Hence, judging

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¹ The complete list of extant commentaries is given in Appendix 1.

² None of the three works composed by Franciscan authors seems to be wholly autonomous. The first is an *abbreviatio* of Scotus's commentary (Johannes de Colonia), the second a *tabula* of Antonius Andreae's commentary (Kilianus Stetzing), and the third a *declaratio* of Antonius Andreae's commentary (Nicolaus Murrifex).

³ One of the three commentaries composed by Conventual Franciscans is referred to as *annotationes* (or *castigationes*) of Scotus's commentary (Mauritius de Portu). The other two seem to be autonomous works (Antonius Trombeta and Nicolaus de Orbellis).

⁴ If we take into account the authors whose commentaries seem to be no longer extant, as listed in Appendix 1, we can add six Dominicans, one Franciscan, one Augustinian, one Servite, one Carmelite, one Carthusian, and one secular.

from the origins of the extant works, it seems that in the 15th century, Padua, Florence, Bologna, Paris, Krakow, and Erfurt were the most important centers for the production of commentaries on the *Metaphysics*.

The focus of the present chapter will be on the Parisian group of commentaries. In particular, for reasons of availability, attention will be given to the works by the following six authors: Georgius Bruxellensis, Johannes Hennon, Johannes le Damoisiau, Johannes Versoris, Nicolaus de Orbellis, and Petrus Tartareti.⁵ The *Metaphysics* commentaries produced by these six authors date to the second half of the 15th century. Judging from the oldest surviving manuscripts or earliest printed editions, the works can be arranged chronologically into three main groups:

1. Johannes Versoris's commentary seems to belong to the 1450s. One of the manuscripts containing this work (Prague, Národní knihovna České republiky, XXIII. C. 106) was written in 1459.
2. The commentaries by Nicolaus de Orbellis, Johannes Hennon, and Johannes le Damoisiau can be dated to the decade 1470–80. One of the manuscripts containing Orbellis's commentary (Rome, Biblioteca Angelica, 127) was written in 1473. The single manuscript containing Hennon's work (Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale de France, lat. 6529) was written in the same year. The single manuscript containing Damoisiau's commentary (Wrocław, Biblioteka Uniwersytecka, IV. F. 8) was written in 1479–80.
3. The commentaries by Georgius Bruxellensis and Petrus Tartareti seem to have been produced between 1485 and 1495. The earliest printed edition of Georgius Bruxellensis's commentary was published in 1486. The earliest dated printed edition of Petrus Tartareti's commentary was published in 1493. No manuscript witnesses of these works are known to survive.

2. FORMAL CHARACTERISTICS

Before examining the contents of these three groups of commentaries, let me briefly discuss three of their formal characteristics, namely, (a) the

⁵ No attention will be given here to the commentary of Johannes de Nova Domo, which I have not been able to examine. The commentaries of Johannes de Caulaincourt and Johannes Hervaeus will also be left aside, given that the surviving manuscripts of their works are defective and difficult to read in several places. All references will be to the following manuscripts and editions: (1) Georgius Bruxellensis, *Quaestiones super Metaphysicam* (Paris, 1502) (henceforth *Qu. Met.*); (2) Johannes Hennon, *Quaestiones super Metaphysicam*, Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale de France, lat. 6529 (henceforth *Qu. Met.*); (3) Johannes le Damoisiau, *Quaestiones super Metaphysicam*, Wrocław, Biblioteka Uniwersytecka, IV. F. 8 (henceforth *Qu. Met.*); (4) Johannes Versoris, *Quaestiones super Metaphysicam* (Cologne, 1494; repr. Frankfurt a. Main, 1967) (henceforth *Qu. Met.*); (5) Nicolaus de Orbellis, *Cursus librorum philosophiae naturalis secundum viam doctoris Subtilis Scotti*, pars III: *Metaphysica* (Basel, 1494) (henceforth *Cursus Met.*); and (6) Petrus Tartareti, *Commentarii in libros Metaphysice Aristotelis* (Basel, 1514) (henceforth *Comm. Met.*).

relationship between the commentaries and the text of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, (b) the literary formats of the commentaries, and (c) the scope of the works.

(a) The six commentaries each refer to Aristotle's text in different ways. Johannes Versoris's commentary is the only work that incorporates the complete text of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* (Books I–XIV) in William of Moerbeke's Latin translation. In contrast, in Nicolaus de Orbellis's commentary, Aristotle's text is only referred to in short lemmata.⁶ In both commentaries by Johannes Hennon and Johannes le Damoisiau, only a few lines of Aristotle's text are cited at the beginning of each book. But these citations seem to function more as a pictorial decoration of the manuscript than as part of the text.⁷ The commentary by Georgius Bruxellensis contains the abbreviated text of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* composed by (or attributed to) Thomas Bricot. A salient feature of Bricot's abbreviation is that it summarizes entire chapters of Aristotle's text in a concise series of *conclusiones*.⁸ Finally, Petrus Tartareti usually cites a short passage of

⁶ A complete list of these lemmata is given below, in Appendix 2.

⁷ This way of referring to Aristotle's text by way of decoration at the beginning of each book seems to have been quite popular in late 15th-century Paris. It is also found in the commentaries of Johannes de Caulaincourt and Johannes Hervaeus.

⁸ For example, the first three chapters of Book I of the *Metaphysics* are summarized in the following three series of *conclusiones*. Thomas Bricot, *Textus abbreviatus Metaphysicae*, in: Georgius Bruxellensis, *Quaestiones super Metaphysicam* (Paris, 1502), fol. 2va: "Pro istis igitur sit hec prima *conclusio*: ex multis memoriis in hominibus fit experimentum. [...] Secunda *conclusio*: ars et scientia per experientiam fiunt in hominibus. [...] Tertia *conclusio*: ars et experientia non differunt quoad agere. [...] Quarta *conclusio*: experti certius operantur artificibus inexpertis. [...]"; fol. 2vb: "Quinta *conclusio*: artifices non experti sunt sapientiores quantum ad cognitionem non expertis. [...]"; fol. 7va: "Pro quo sit prima *conclusio*: sex sunt conditiones sapientis. Prima est scire omnia ut contingit, idest, eodem modo quo possibile est. Secunda est difficilia cognoscere, quia non dicimus illum sapientem qui facilia cognoscit et levia. [...] Tertia est ipsum habere scientiam certiore alii. Quarta est posse reddere causas quesitorum. Quinta est habere scientiam que suiipsius gratia est vel causa sciendi. Sexta est habere scientiam principaliorum. [...] Secunda *conclusio*: necesse est habenti scientiam inesse istas sex conditiones. [...]"; fol. 7vb: "Tertia *conclusio*: sapientia simpliciter dicta seu metaphisica habet considerare primas causas et prima principia. [...] Ad videndum qualis scientia sit metaphisica sit prima *conclusio*: metaphisica est scientia speculativa. [...]"; and fol. 8ra: "Secunda *conclusio*: metaphisica est scientia libera. [...] Tertia *conclusio*: metaphisica est scientia honorabilissima. [...] Quarta *conclusio*: metaphisica procedit ex notitia causarum admirabilium." The *conclusiones* are generally followed by short proofs. For bibliographical information concerning Bricot's abbreviations of Aristotle's works, see *Gesamtkatalog der Wiegendrucke* (Leipzig, 1932), vol. 5, pp. 528–46, esp. nn. 5540–45. Bricot's authorship of the *Abbreuiatio* of the *Metaphysics* is not entirely certain.

Aristotle's *Metaphysics* (in Moerbeke's translation) at the beginning of each book and from time to time a few more lines as part of his *expositio* of Aristotle's text.⁹

(b) All six commentaries implement the literary formats of *expositio* and *quaestio* in one way or another.¹⁰ The commentary by Nicolaus de Orbellis is the only one that adopts the *expositio* format as its overall structure, but within this basic *expositio* format, Orbellis discusses Aristotle's text in short *notabilia* (which are sometimes composed of articles and structured by means of *conclusiones*) and *dubitationes* (some of which exhibit the standard *quaestio* structure). The remaining five commentaries adopt the *quaestio* format as their basic structure. Johannes Versoris's commentary is composed of *quaestiones*, but within these *quaestiones* (usually in the first *notabile*), some elementary *expositio* is given to explain the logical order of Aristotle's text.¹¹ Johannes Hennon's commentary has a

⁹ For example, the following passages are cited at the beginning of Books I and II of Tartareti's commentary: fol. 112rb: "Omnes homines natura scire desiderant. Signum autem est sensuum dilectio; preter enim et utilitatem propter se ipsos diliguntur, et maxime aliorum qui est per oculos. Non enim solum ut agamus sed et nihil agere debentes ipsum videre pre omnibus ut dicam aliis eligimus. Causa autem est quia hic maxime sensuum cognoscere nos facit et multas rerum differentias demonstrat. [=Met., A 1, 980a21]"; fol. 113va: "De veritate theorica sic quidem difficilis est, sic vero facilis. Signum autem est neque digne quemquam adipisci ipsam posse nec omnes exortes esse, sed unumquemque aliquid de natura dicere [=Met., α 1, 993a30]." In the *expositio* of Book I, the following lines are cited: fol. 112rb: "Quoniam autem scientiam hanc querimus, circa quales causas et circa qualia principia scientia sapientia sit [=Met., A 2, 982a5] [...] Quia vero non activa, palam ex primum philosophantibus. Nam propter admirari homines [=Met., A 2, 982b1]." The following lines are cited in the *expositio* of Book II: fol. 113va: "At vero quod sit principium quoddam et non infinite cause existentium nec in directum [=Met., α 2, 994a1] [...] Contingunt autem auditores secundum consuetudines hominibus; nam ut consuevimus ita etc. [=Met., α 3, 995a1]."

¹⁰ For general information concerning these formats, see Olga Weijers, "La structure des commentaires philosophiques à la Faculté des arts: quelques observations," in: Gianfranco Fioravanti, Claudio Leonardi, & Stefano Perfetti, eds., *Il commento filosofico nell'Occidente latino (secc. XIII–XV). The Philosophical Commentary in the Latin West (13–15th centuries)*. Atti del colloquio Firenze-Pisa, 19–22 ottobre 2000 (Rencontres de Philosophie Médiévale) 10 (Turnhout, 2002), pp. 17–41.

¹¹ Versoris's *quaestiones* usually contain the following elements: (1) title of the question; (2) arguments *quod sic* (or *quod non*) and *in oppositum*; (3) a series of *notabilia* (sometimes only one, sometimes six or seven); (4) answer to the question (generally in the form of *conclusiones* with extensive proof); (5) *dubitationes* (sometimes one or two, sometimes six or seven). Some typical examples of *expositiones textus* in Versoris's commentary are the following: I, q. 3, fol. 3ra: "Sciendum primo quod postquam Philosophus posuit principium primum generationis scientie in nobis, quod est naturale desiderium ad scire, hic consequenter ostendit principium cognitionis per omnes gradus eius, ut tandem veniat ad accipiendum dignissimum gradum cognitionis, ut ostendat debere versari circa altissima principia et altissimas causas, ut etiam ostendat illum esse speculativum et non practicum"; III, q. 1, fol. 17ra: "Sciendum primo quod postquam Philosophus secundo *huius* dedit

similar make-up: within an overall *quaestio* structure, Hennon frequently offers classical *divisiones* and *expositiones* of Aristotle's text.¹² Johannes le Damoisiau and Petrus Tartareti also adopt the *quaestio* structure, but they place separate *expositiones* of Aristotle's text in front of the *quaestiones* (instead of including them in their *notabilia*).¹³ The *expositio* format is the least developed in the commentary by Georgius Bruxellensis, where only some of the *quaestiones* contain elementary *divisiones* of Aristotle's abbreviated text.¹⁴

(c) With regard to scope, commentaries can be grouped into those that cover Books I–XII of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* and those that only deal with Books I–VI. The commentaries by Johannes Versoris and Nicolaus de Orbellis belong to the first group.¹⁵ Although Orbellis's commentary (the only one that adopts the *expositio* format as its basic structure) covers

modum considerande veritatis in omni materia, consequenter in hoc tercio incipit procedere ad veritatis inquisitionem entium, circa que versatur huius scientie consideratio"; V, q. 13, fol. 50va: "Sciendum primo quod postquam Philosophus distinxit nomina aliqua que pertinent (!) ad perfectionem entis, consequenter, quia totum et perfectum aut sunt penitus idem aut sibi invicem proxima, distinguit quedam nomina que pertinent ad rationem totius et ad rationem partis."

¹² Hennon's *quaestiones* normally contain the following elements: (1) title of the question; (2) arguments *quod sic* (or *quod non*) and *in oppositum*; (3) a series of three *notabilia*; (4) a *conclusio responsalis*; (5) three *dubia*. The *divisiones* and *expositiones* of Aristotle's text are usually found in the *notabilia*. Most of the *dubia* are not subsidiary problems related to the principal question but, rather, are independent questions, in which the standard *quaestio*-structure is reiterated.

¹³ The commentaries by Damoisiau and Tartareti contain exactly the same elements (in precisely the same order): (1) *expositio textus*; (2) title of the question; (3) arguments *quod non* (or *quod sic*) and *in oppositum*; (4) a series of four *notabilia*; (5) three *dubia*; (6) a *conclusio responsalis*. In both works, the *notabilia* and *dubia* include but few elements of textual explanation.

¹⁴ Georgius's *quaestiones* normally contain the following elements: (1) title of the question; (2) arguments *quod sic* (or *quod non*) and *in oppositum*; (3) a series of two *notabilia*; (4) two *conclusiones responsales*; (5) three *dubia*. The *divisiones* are usually given in the first *notabile* of the first question of each book. Some typical examples of *divisio textus* in Georgius's commentary are the following: II, q. 1, fol. 10rb: "Sciendum est primo quod in hoc secundo libro Aristoteles determinat de facilitate et difficultate que est in cognitione veritatis. Et habet tria capitula. In primo determinat de facilitate et difficultate cognitionis entium. In secundo removet opinionem ponentium processum in infinitum in causis. In tertio declarat contingentia in cognitione veritatis"; IV, q. 1, fol. 19ra: "Sciendum est primo in hoc quarto libro quod Aristoteles incipit determinare questiones motas in tertio. Et dividitur iste liber in duos tractatus. Primus est de consideratione huius scientie circa incomplexa. Secundus est de consideratione huius scientie circa complexa. Primus continet tria capitula. In primo ostendit quod hec scientia habet considerare de ente et de partibus eius. In secundo ostendit quod habet considerare de uno. In tertio quod habet considerare de passionibus entis et unius."

¹⁵ Versoris's commentary contains the text of Book I–XIV of the *Metaphysics*, but his *quaestiones* only cover Books I–XII. Versoris offers the following explanation of why the text of Books XIII and XIV is nevertheless included: fol. 116rb: "Finiunt decimustercius et

TABLE 1. *Number of Quaestiones Contained in the Five Quaestio Commentaries*

	Versoris	Hennon	Damoisiau	Bruxellensis	Tartareti
I	7	2	1	5	1
II	5	1	1	2	1
III	7	—	1	2	1
IV	6	2	1	3	1
V	15	1	1	3	1
VI	3	1	1	2	1
VII	12	—	—	—	—
VIII	4	—	—	—	—
IX	5	—	—	—	—
X	10	—	—	—	—
XI	5	—	—	—	—
XII	17	—	—	—	—

Books I–XII, the work is, nevertheless, highly selective. The list of lemmata clearly indicates that large sections of Aristotle’s texts are given no attention.¹⁶ The second group of commentaries by Johannes le Damoisiau, Johannes Hennon, Petrus Tartareti, and Georgius Bruxellensis are more limited in scope. Given that these four commentaries all limit themselves to the first six books of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*, it seems quite likely that this practice somehow reflects the educational program at the Arts faculty of the University of Paris.¹⁷ The commentary by Johannes Hennon occupies a position of its own in that it covers only Books I–II and IV–VI (omitting Book III).¹⁸

To conclude this outline of the formal characteristics of the Parisian commentaries, and before examining their contents, let me indicate in table 1

decimusquartus libri *Metaphysice* Arestotilis, qui sunt additi ad duodecim precedentes libros propter quibusdam (!) studiosos illorum noticiam speculari aspirantes.”

¹⁶ See the list of the lemmata given in Appendix 2, below.

¹⁷ The commentary by Johannes de Caulaincourt also covers Books I–VI. Johannes Her-vaeus limits himself to Books I–V. For both works, see Appendix 1.

¹⁸ Hennon only offers a very short *divisio* of Book III (fol. 316va) and then immediately jumps to Book IV. In the commentary by Georgius Bruxellensis, the (abbreviated) text of Book III of the *Metaphysics* is also lacking. At the end of Book II, Georgius explains this omission as follows: fol. 13vb: “Finis secundi *Metaphysice*. Tertius liber, quia nihil in eo resolutorie dictum est, Parisii (!) non legitur.” The commentary nevertheless contains two questions related to Book III (see Appendix 2, below). The link between these questions and Book III of the *Metaphysics* is established by a lemma (preceding the first question): fol. 13vb: “*Necesse est ad quesitam* etc. [=Met., B 1, 995a25].” Georgius’s commentary also states that only the first two and a half chapters of Book I (from 980a21 to approximately 983b6) were read at Paris: fol. 8rb: “Et hec de primo *Metaphysice*. Residuum, quia tantum de opinionibus antiquorum est, Parisii (!) non legitur” (the same statement is repeated a few columns further, fol. 9va).

the number of *quaestiones* the five *quaestio* commentaries devote to each individual book of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*.¹⁹ Nicolaus de Orbellis's *expositio* commentary is, of course, excluded.

3. CONTENTS

The fact that most of the 15th-century Parisian commentaries under discussion devote only a few questions to Books I–VI of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* means that only a limited number of topics are given attention. In the present chapter, the following issues will be briefly discussed: (3.1) the *concept of metaphysics*, (3.2) the *subject-matter of metaphysics*, more specifically the question of whether “being *qua* being” constitutes the subject-matter of metaphysics and the question of whether the quiddities of particular beings as such fall under the consideration of metaphysics, (3.3) *knowledge of separate substances*, and finally (3.4) the relationship between *being and unity* and *being and essence*.

3.1. *The Concept of Metaphysics*

Most 15th-century Parisian commentators agree on the basic questions concerning the concept of metaphysics. They argue that metaphysics is a science (*scientia*), that it can rightly be called “wisdom” (*sapientia*), and that it is a speculative rather than a practical science. They sometimes offer slightly different, more-or-less elaborated explanations of their views. For example, in answering the question of whether metaphysics is a speculative or a practical science, all six commentators claim (unsurprisingly) that metaphysics is a speculative science. Johannes le Damoisiau argues for this position by merely stating that the characteristic features of a practical science, as opposed to that of a speculative science, do not apply to metaphysics.²⁰ Johannes Versoris, Johannes Hennon and Georgius Bruxellensis argue more extensively that metaphysics (or “first

¹⁹ A complete list of the titles of the *quaestiones* (and *dubitaciones*) for each of these works can be found in Appendix 2, below.

²⁰ Cf. *Qu. Met.*, I, q. 1, fol. 26grb: “Dubitatur tertio utrum metaphisica sit scientia speculativa, et an scientia speculativa sit melior et nobilior practica. Pro responsione supponitur primo ex dictis circa prologum logice quid sit praxis, quid speculatio, quid scientia practica et quid speculativa. Unde ad scientiam practicam requiritur quod ipsa sit directiva alicuius vere praxis secundum respectum conformitatis, aptitudinalis et prioritatis; que omnia repugnant scientie metaphisice; quare ipsa non est scientia practica. Secundo supponitur quod scientia speculativa est illa que queritur propter scire, sed practica est que queritur propter operari.”

philosophy” according to Georgius Bruxellensis) aims at nothing but the acquisition of knowledge through the elimination of ignorance and that, historically speaking, metaphysics only developed after the practical sciences had been established. The texts of these three authors show some striking literary similarities:

JOHANNES VERSORIS	JOHANNES HENNON	GEORGIUS BRUXELLENSIS
<p>Conclusio responsiva: metaphisica est scientia speculativa et non practica. Probat <i>ratione</i> et <i>signo</i>.</p>	<p>Prima conclusio est hec: methaphisica est scientia speculativa. Probat Philosophus <i>ratione</i> et <i>signo</i>.</p>	<p>Prima (sc. conclusio <i>PB</i>) est: metaphisica est scientia speculativa. Probat (sc. Aristoteles <i>PB</i>) <i>ratione</i> et <i>signo</i>.</p>
<p><i>Ratione</i> sic: metaphisica queritur propter ignorantiam effugandam, et non propter aliud queritur; et sic queritur propter scire; ergo etc. Assumptum probat Aristoteles nam: propter ammirari nunc et primum inceperunt homines philosophari, differenter tamen, quia in principio erant ammirantes pauciora dubitabilium, deinde paulatim procedentes nunc de maioribus et offuscationibus ammirantur; sed omnis qui dubitat et ammiratur ignorat; ergo assumptum fuit verum.</p>	<p><i>Ratione</i> sic: illa scientia que solum queritur propter scire est speculativa; sed methaphisica est huiusmodi; igitur. Maior patet, quia finis scientie speculative est scire, practice vero est operari. Et minor probatur: philosophantes istam scientiam primo inquisiverunt ad fugiendam ignorantiam; sed non fugatur ignorantia nisi propter scire; igitur. Maior huius prosillogismi patet, quia propter admirari homines nunc et prius inceperunt philosophari. Unde a principio de paucioribus mirabantur, sed paulatim procedentes de maioribus dubitaverunt. Sed qui dubitat et ammiratur, ignorare videtur. Ergo ista scientia primo quesita est ad fugiendam ignorantiam [...]</p>	<p><i>Ratione</i> sic: illa scientia est speculativa que est solum propter scire quesita; sed sic est de prima philosophia; igitur. Minorem probat quia: propter admirari inceperunt homines philosophari, et primo mirabantur de minoribus, secundo de maioribus, ut de ente et passionibus entis et de his que fiunt circa solem et astra; sed qui dubitat et ammiratur ignorare videtur; quare hec scientia quesita est propter ignorantiam fugiendam et per consequens propter scire.</p>

Signo sic arguit Arestoteles quia: iam cunctis existentibus artibus ordinatis ad utilitatem vite aut voluptatem aut introductionem in alias scientias, hec scientia cepit inquiri. Quod est signum quod solum queritur propter ipsum scire et non propter aliam utilitatem.²¹

Signo sic probat dictam conclusionem quia: hec scientia tunc inquiri cepit quando fere omnes artes ordinate ad sublevendam necessitatem humanam et voluptatem et ad instantionem omnis honeste conversationis et morum invente fuerant; ergo ista scientia non queritur propter aliam scientiam, sed solum propter se ipsam.²²

Signo probat sic quia: prima philosophia cepit inquiri omnibus fere inventis que necessaria erant ad vitam et ad voluptatem; igitur ipsa non queritur propter aliquam vite necessitatem; et per consequens queritur solum propter scire.²³

In addition, Johannes Versoris also offers an account of the notion of *praxis*. Taking his cue from John Duns Scotus, he defines *praxis* as an operation of a potency different from the mind, that is, naturally subsequent to the mind's cognitive operation and is capable of being chosen according to the judgment of right reason (*recta ratio*). From this definition he infers that *praxis* belongs to the will. For acts of the will are subsequent to acts of the mind and are capable of being chosen on the basis of right reason. Acts of the mind can only be called "practical" insofar as they control the acts of the will. Versoris argues that it is for this reason that logic too must be seen as a speculative science. For logic is in command of acts of the mind, not of acts of the will.²⁴ Nicolaus de Orbellis offers a similar, but more detailed account of the notion of *praxis*, which is clearly derived

²¹ Cf. *Qu. Met.*, I, q. 1, q. 7, fol. 11rb.

²² Cf. *Qu. Met.*, I, q. 2, fol. 31rb.

²³ Cf. *Qu. Met.*, I, q. 5, fol. 8vb.

²⁴ Cf. *Qu. Met.*, I, q. 7, fol. 11rb: "Ideo describitur praxis a Doctore subtili sic: praxis est operatio alterius potentie quam intellectus naturaliter posterior ipsa intellectione nata conformiter elici rationi recte ut recta sit. Ex quo patet quod huiusmodi actus alterius potentie, scilicet voluntatis, que primo praxis dicitur, non est in ipso intellectu nisi dumtaxat ut in dirigente, quia tunc non oporteret ipsum intellectum extendi, sed est in voluntate ut in eliciente illum actum et operante, et sic de aliis potentibus executivis pro quanto earum actus imperantur a voluntate. Neque actus ipsius intellectus practicus dicitur nisi pro quanto directivus est actus illius cui primo convenit ratio praxis. Ex quo patet quod male dixerunt ponentes logicam esse practicam. Nam secundum diffinitionem praxis prius datam nullus habitus intellectus est practicus nisi quia est directivus alterius potentie operationis quam intellectus. Logica autem non est directiva nisi operationum intellectus, et ideo speculativa est et non practica." This explanation differs from the one given by Scotus in his *Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum*, I, q. 7. See Ioannis Duns Scoti *Opera Philosophica*, vol. 3, ed. Robert Andrews et al. (St. Bonaventure, New York, 1997), p. 154.4–10.

from the explanation given by the 14th-century Franciscan commentator Antonius Andreae.²⁵

ANTONIUS ANDREAE

Stat ergo prima conditio quod praxis sit actus alterius potentie quam intellectus vel, quod idem est, alterius generis a speculatione. Et per consequens nec logica nec rhetorica est scientia practica. [...] Secunda conditio est quod est naturaliter posterior intellectione. [...] Tertia conditio est quod praxis est actus aptus natus conformiter elici intellectui recto. [...] Quarta conditio est talis: quod praxis est actus qui potest recte et non recte elici. [...]²⁶

NICOLAUS DE ORBELLIS

Tertio ex dictis dicam ad questionem. Quantum ad primum praxis a qua scientia dicitur practica est actus alicuius potentie alterius quam intellectus naturaliter posterior intellectione natus conformiter elici intellectioni recte ad hoc quod sit rectus. In ista descriptione quattuor ponuntur. Prima conditio est quod sit actus alicuius potentie alterius quam intellectus. [...] Secunda conditio est quod praxis naturaliter posterior est intellectione. [...] Tertia conditio est quod praxis sit actus natus conformiter elici intellectioni recte. [...] Quarta conditio est quod praxis est actus rectus qui potest recte et non recte elici. [...]²⁷

Like Versoris (and in much the same words as Antonius Andreae), Orbellis argues that metaphysics is a speculative science.²⁸

A different line of reasoning is found in Petrus Tartareti. He elaborates in some detail on the notion of “practical knowledge” (*notitia practica*), which can be understood in two ways: formally and virtually. Formally speaking (*formaliter*), practical knowledge is complex, i.e., propositional, knowledge that brings about some *praxis* either indirectly (when the *praxis* is mentioned in the premises of a syllogism of which the conclusion is not explicitly formulated, for example: “all supreme good is to be

²⁵ For more information on Antonius Andreae’s extremely influential commentary on the *Metaphysics* (and its relation to the works of John Duns Scotus), see William O. Duba’s chapter in the present volume. I use the following edition: Antonius Andreae, *Quaestiones super duodecim libros Metaphysice* (Venice, 1481) (henceforth *Qu. Met.*).

²⁶ Cf. *Qu. Met.*, I, q. 11, fol. c1rb–va. Notice that Andreae’s “*prima conditio*” is very close to the first two lines of Johannes Versoris’s text cited below, note 66.

²⁷ Cf. *Cursus Met.*, I, fol. 16ra–vb.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, fol. 16vb: “Quantum ad tertium articulum dico quod metaphysica est scientia speculativa et non practica. Quod patet tum ex auctoritate Aristotelis tum quia cognitio entis in quantum ens non dirigit aliquam vere praxim.” Cf. the following passage in Antonius Andreae (*Qu. Met.*, I, q. 11, fol. c1va): “Quantum ad tertium dico quod metaphysica est scientia speculativa, non practica. Probatur tum ex auctoritate Aristotelis hic in littera et sexto *Methaphysice*. Probatur etiam per rationem: omnis scientia practica est directiva alicuius vere praxis secundum duplicem respectum predictum; sed metaphysica non est huiusmodi; ergo etc.”

chosen; God is a supreme good; hence etc.”) or directly (in case the *praxis* is referred to in an explicitly articulated conclusion, for example: “hence God is to be chosen”). Virtually speaking (*virtualiter*), practical knowledge is non-complex knowledge of a term which virtually contains the knowledge that brings about some *praxis* (for example the term “God”). Therefore, in Tartareti’s view, a proposition such as “God is a supreme good” represents a piece of (virtual) practical knowledge, because it brings about the *praxis* of choosing God.²⁹ Now, given that metaphysical propositions such as “being is good” do not bring about some *praxis*, but only lead to speculation, it follows that metaphysics is a speculative science.³⁰

3.2. *The Subject-Matter of Metaphysics*

Our commentators also agree on the question of what metaphysics is about. All six argue, in one way or another, that being *qua* being (*ens inquantum ens*) constitutes the subject-matter of metaphysics.

Johannes Versoris mentions three different opinions concerning this question. Averroes considers metaphysics to be about God, the followers of John Buridan (*Buridanistae*) hold metaphysics to be the science of causes *qua* causes, and a third, unidentified group of thinkers view metaphysics as the science of the quiddities (or essences) of material things.³¹ In contrast, Versoris argues that the subject-matter of metaphysics is being *qua* being.³² Yet in explaining his view, Versoris arrives at a much more

²⁹ Cf. *Qu. Met.*, I, q. 1, fol. 113rb: “Adverte ulterius quod aliqua noticia dicitur practica dupliciter: uno modo formaliter, alio modo virtualiter. Formaliter adhuc dupliciter, scilicet mediate et immediate. Immediate sicut est noticia conclusionis, quia immediate inclinatur ad praxim eligendam vel fugiendam; et cognoscitur hoc modo quando talis conclusio includit rem significantem praxim. Mediate sicut est noticia premissarum que inclinatur ad praxim mediante conclusionis noticia, ut noticia harum premissarum: ‘omne summe bonum est eligendum; Deus est summe bonum; igitur.’ Virtualiter est noticia incompleta alicuius subiecti virtualiter continentis noticiam premissarum et ipsius conclusionis practice, cuiusmodi est noticia ipsius Dei. Ideo noticia istius propositionis ‘Deus est summe bonus’ est noticia practica.”

³⁰ *Ibid.*: “Istis suppositis, respondetur ad dubium quod metaphysica est scientia speculativa, quia immediate inclinatur ad speculationem eliciendam, cuiusmodi est noticia huius quod est ‘ens est bonum.’”

³¹ Cf. *Qu. Met.*, I, q. 1, fol. 1va: “Dubitatur primo utrum ens sit subiectum huius scientie. [...] Pro solutione dubii sciendum quod Averrois propter rationem ultimam tenet quod Deus est subiectum huius scientie. Alii dicunt quod causa secundum intentionem cause accepta est subiectum, sicut Buridaniste. Et alii dicunt quod est quidditas rei materialis.”

³² *Ibid.*: “Sed contra ista ponuntur conclusiones. Conclusio prima: Deus non est subiectum huius scientie, sicut probat Avicenna quia: de subiecto debet presupponi quia est et debent inquiri passiones eius; sed in ista scientia Deum esse est quesitum; ergo. [...]”;

complex (and perhaps not entirely consistent) position. Plainly accepting the analogy of being, he states that metaphysics is first and foremost about substance as the primary kind of being to which all other kinds of being are somehow related.³³ He also claims that metaphysics has being in general (*ens commune*) as its subject-matter, God and the immaterial intelligences as its ultimate goal, and categorial and transcendental being as its properties.³⁴ Finally he argues that real created being (*ens creatum reale*), i.e., being that is divided into the ten categories, must count as the subject-matter of metaphysics (so as to exclude both beings of reason and uncreated being, i.e., God).³⁵ It remains unclear to what extent these different statements agree with one another.

Nicolaus de Orbellis argues more straightforwardly that being *qua* being is the primary subject-matter of metaphysics. In his view, an entity counts as the primary subject-matter of a science when its characteristic and essential properties are primarily investigated by that science. In the case of metaphysics, this can only be true of being as such, because metaphysics deals with unity, truth, goodness, act, and potency, which are the essential properties of being as such. Orbellis's reasoning at this point again closely corresponds to the explanation given by Antonius Andreae:

fol. 1vb: "Conclusio secunda: causa secundum intentionem cause accepta non est subiectum huius scientie. [...] Conclusio tertia: quidditas rei materialis non est subiectum huius scientie. [...] Conclusio quarta: ens in quantum ens est subiectum huius scientie. Patet, quia sibi conveniunt conditiones subiecti respectu huius scientie; ergo etc."

³³ *Ibid.*, fol. 1vb: "Dicitur ultra quod, licet hec scientia sit de ente in quantum ens ut de subiecto adequato, est tamen principaliter de primo membro analogie, quod est substantia, ad quam omnia alia habent attributionem." On Versoris's views about the analogy of being, see his reply to the following argument: "Tercio arguitur sic: subiectum scientie debet esse univocum; sed ens non est univocum; ergo etc." (fol. 1vb). To which Versoris replies: "Ad terciam dicitur quod sufficit unitas analogie, que necessaria est subiecto scientie communis" (fol. 1vb).

³⁴ *Ibid.*: "Unde [...] hec scientia est de ente communi ut de subiecto, de Deo et intelligentiis ut de fine, et de decem categoriis et de partibus eius et de ceteris transcendentibus ut de passionibus eius." In explaining this passage, the primacy of substance is reaffirmed: "Ens enim secundum quod ens est subiectum attributionis et adequatum huic scientie, cuius inquiruntur proprietates et principia, et inter partes principalior est substantia, sed Deus est finis ultimus" (fol. 1vb).

³⁵ *Ibid.*, fol. 1va: "Dubitatur secundo utrum ens quod est hic subiectum sit commune Deo et creaturis, enti reali et enti rationis. Dicitur quod non, quia, ut habetur quarto *huius*, inquirende sunt cause entis quod est hic subiectum; sed ens commune Deo et creaturis non habet causas; ergo etc. Similiter hec scientia est realis; et ens commune enti reali et enti rationis non est totaliter reale; ergo etc. Et sic restat quod ens creatum reale, quod dividitur in decem predicamenta, est subiectum huius scientie."

ANTONIUS ANDREAE

Ad conclusionem istam arguitur etiam per rationes. Primo sic: illud est subiectum cuiuslibet scientie cuius per se primo sunt passionnes que considerantur per se in illa scientia; sed nihil aliud ab ente est huiusmodi, quod scilicet passionnes methaphisice sunt per se primo illius; ergo ens et nihil aliud est subiectum primum scientie methaphisice. [...] Sed minor patet quantum ad utranque partem, quia passionnes methaphisice, puta unum, bonum, verum, unum et multa, actus et potentia etc., non sunt alicuius inferioris entis per se primo, sed cuiuslibet inquantum ens, nam alias non convenirent omni enti; ergo sunt per se primo passionnes entis inquantum ens.³⁶

NICOLAUS DE ORBELLIS

Tertia conclusio est ista: ens inquantum ens est primum subiectum in methaphisica. [...] Item etiam probatur ratione: illud est subiectum primum cuiuslibet scientie cuius sunt per se primo passionnes que per se considerantur in illa scientia; sed nihil aliud ab ente est huiusmodi, cui passionnes considerate immediata insint per se primo; ergo ens est primum subiectum metaphisice. [...] Sed minor patet, quia passionnes metaphisice, puta unum, verum, bonum, actus et potentia, necessitas, contingentia et sic de aliis, non sunt alicuius entis inferioris primo et per se, sed cuiuslibet inquantum ens, nam alias non convenirent omni enti; ergo sunt passionnes entis inquantum ens primo et per se.³⁷

However, Orbellis (like Andreae) does not completely exclude God and the immaterial substances from the domain of metaphysics. They do not count as primary subject-matter but are nevertheless considered to belong to metaphysics insofar as they fall under the more general concept of being *qua* being. More precisely, metaphysics deals with God and the immaterial substances as the causal principles of being, or as the noblest of all beings. For that reason, metaphysics is sometimes called “theology” or “divine science.”³⁸

³⁶ Cf. *Qu. Met.*, I, q. 1, fol. a4rb.

³⁷ Cf. *Cursus Met.*, I, fol. k7rb.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, fols. k7vb–K8rb: “Ad cuius evidentiam notandum primo quod scientia non videtur esse tantum circa aliquid tanquam circa subiectum principaliter consideratum, sed etiam circa causas subiecti. [...] Consimiliter est in proposito de metaphisica. Nam eius consideratio est circa causas altissimas non tanquam subiectum principale, sed tanquam principia subiecti. Unde in principio sexti *huius* dicitur quod principia et cause que-runtur enti. Considerat ergo metaphisica causas altissimas ut principia sui subiecti. Vel etiam aliter considerat eas ut partes principales subiecti primi, quia sunt nobilissima entia. Secundo notandum quod substantie immateriales et immobiles non pertinent ad considerationem scientie alicuius particularis note nobis ex puris naturalibus. Licet enim de ipsis sint multe proprietates cognoscibiles quantum est ex parte earum, non tamen nobis via sensus. Ideo aliqua scientia possibilis est haberi de eis, sed non nobis. Proprietates autem scibiles a nobis via sensus sunt passionnes entis. Unde verum est quod iste substantie sunt subiectum alicuius scientie speculative potenti<s> eas cognoscere, sed non nobis. Et ideo quantum ad ea que sunt scibilia de eis cadunt sub consideratione metaphisice, non ut primum subiectum, sed tanquam aliquid contentum sub primo subiecto, quod est ens. [...] Et ideo scientia hec est circa separabilia et immobilia tanquam circa principia et principales partes subiecti, et hoc modo denominatur theologia vel divina, non a subiecto, sed a causa.” This passage in fact summarizes a longer passage by Antonius Andreae (*Qu. Met.*, I, q. 1, fol. a6ra–b).

Johannes Hennon first phrases the question of the subject-matter of metaphysics in terms that are almost identical to Antonius Andreae's wording:

ANTONIUS ANDREAE

Est ergo sensus questionis: utrum ens communissime sumptum ut sub se continet omne ens finitum et infinitum et sub propria et formali ratione entitatis, id est ens inquantum ens, sit subiectum primum scientie metaphisice sic adequatum quod nihil subterfugiat considerationem huius scientie ut participat rationem entis.³⁹

JOHANNES HENNON

Ex hiis infertur sensus questionis, videlicet: utrum ens communissime sumptum ut sub se continet omne finitum et infinitum sub propria et formali ratione entitatis sit primum subiectum methaphisice primate adequationis, ita quod nichil subterfugiat considerationem huius scientie quod non subterfugiat rationem entis, nec aliquid pertineat ad considerationem huius scientie nisi quod participet rationem entis.⁴⁰

Having thus formulated the question, Hennon (again following Andreae) rejects the Averroist position according to which God and the immaterial intelligences (taken together as the "class of separate beings" [*genus entium separatorum*]) constitute the subject-matter of metaphysics.⁴¹ His main criticism against the Averroist view is that God and the immaterial intelligences could only constitute the subject-matter of metaphysics by virtue of some common feature from which the science of metaphysics would ultimately derive its unity. But then this common feature would have to count as the primary subject-matter of metaphysics rather than God and the immaterial intelligences themselves.⁴² Having thus rejected the Averroist position, Hennon develops a view that comes close to that

³⁹ Cf. *Qu. Met.*, I, q. 1, fol. a2va.

⁴⁰ Cf. *Qu. Met.*, I, q. 1, fol. 306va. For the phrase "primum subiectum methaphisice primate adequationis," see below, note 45ff.

⁴¹ The Averroist position is introduced as follows: "Consequenter ponuntur tria dicta secundum opinionem Commentatoris, qui dicit quod Deus et intelligencie, sive (quod idem est) genus encium separatorum, est primum subiectum huius scientie. [...] Primum dictum est quod nulla scientia probat suum subiectum esse. Secundum dictum est quod prima philosophia non potest probare Deum esse, sed tamen scientia naturalis hoc potest. Tertium dictum quod genus entium separatorum est primum subiectum prime philosophie" (fol. 306va–b). The Averroist position is described in precisely the same words by Antonius Andreae (*Qu. Met.*, I, q. 1, fols. a2vb–a3ra).

⁴² Cf. *Qu. Met.*, I, q. 1, fols. 306vb–307ra: "Contra tertium dictum, quod est principale, arguitur sic quia: unius scientie unum est subiectum, ut patet primo *Posteriorum*; ergo si Deus <et> intelligencie sint huius scientie subiectum, oportet quod habeant aliquod commune in quo communicant et a quo hec scientia habeat unitatem. Et per consequens illud erit magis subiectum quam Deus et intelligencie." A similar, but more elaborate criticism is given by Antonius Andreae (*Qu. Met.*, I, q. 1, fol. a3rb).

of Orbellis, although formulated with somewhat less terminological accuracy. First he claims God to be the primary subject-matter of metaphysics (where “primary” means “most perfect”), since God is the first and most perfect of all things considered in metaphysics.⁴³ Second he claims that being *qua* being, which is common to God and creatures, constitutes the primary subject-matter of metaphysics.⁴⁴ To explain his second claim, Hennon uses exactly the same argument as Andreae and Orbellis: metaphysics deals with unity, truth, goodness, act, and potency, which are the essential properties of being as such. Hence, being as such must count as the primary subject-matter of metaphysics (where “primary” obviously means something else than “most perfect”). In contrast to Versoris (who defends the analogy of being) and Orbellis (who, in this context, is silent on this issue), Hennon explicitly claims to presuppose the univocity of being.⁴⁵

⁴³ *Ibid.*, fol. 307ra: “Dimissa igitur opinione Commentatoris, ponuntur duo alia dicta. Primum est quod Deus est subiectum methaphisice primum primate perfectionis. Probatum sic quia: principalis consideratum in aliqua scientia est subiectum primum eius primate perfectionis; sed [in] inter omnia considerata in methaphisica Deus est ens principalis et perfectus; igitur.”

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*: “Secundum dictum: ens in quantum ens, quod est commune Deo et creature, est subiectum primum scientie methaphisice.” Hennon’s phrasing again closely resembles that of Antonius Andreae (*Qu. Met.*, I, q. 1, fol. a3va): “Quantum ad tertium articulum dicendum quod ens in quantum ens, quod est commune Deo et creature, est subiectum primum methaphisice.”

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*: “Pro isto dicto supponenda est univocatio entis, que tamen quarto *huius* probabitur. Istud dictum probatur per duas auctoritates positas post oppositum. Et per rationem sic probatur: illud est subiectum primum huius scientie cuius passiones primo considerantur in ista scientia; sed entis sunt per se primo passiones considerate in methaphisica; ergo ens in quantum ens est methaphisice subiectum primum. Minor patet, quia unum, verum, bonum, actus et potentia et sic de aliis non sunt alicuius entis inferioris per se primo, sed cuiuslibet sunt; ergo entis in communi sunt” (for the corresponding passages from Andreae and Orbellis, see above, p. 587). In contrast to the formula “subiectum methaphisice primum *primate perfectionis*” (see above, note 43), and in line with the formulation used by Hennon in the title of the question (see above, p. 588), one might suppose him to mean that being *qua* being is the “primum subiectum methaphisice *primate adequationis*.” In another context (*Cursus Met.*, IV, fols. m4vb–5ra), Nicolaus de Orbellis also sustains the univocity of being: “De secundo articulo sit ista prima conclusio: ens communiter sumptum non est univocum omnibus entibus univocatione physica. [...] Secunda conclusio est ista: ens communiter sumptum est univocum omnibus entibus univocatione logica. [...] Tertia conclusio est ista: ens communiter sumptum est vere univocum omnibus entibus univocatione metaphisica, sic intelligendo quod ens dicit aliquem unum conceptum realem abstrahibilem ab omnibus participantibus ens quidditative secundum quem conceptum ens est predicabile de omni ente univoce et realiter et in quid.”

Johannes le Damoisiau holds basically the same opinion as Hennon, but puts it in a more elaborate and more precise way. In comparison to Hennon, Damoisiau offers more sophisticated explanations of the notions of “being” (*ens*), “subject-matter” (*subiectum*), “primary subject-matter” (*primum subiectum*), and of the meaning of the term “*qua*” (*inquantum*) in the expression “being *qua* being.”

Secundo: quod ens potest capi dupliciter. Uno modo participialiter, quo modo connotat tempus presens, alio modo nominaliter.—Tertio: quod hec dictio “inquantum” potest sumi multipliciter, scilicet reduplicative et specificative. Hic autem accipitur specificative et denotat ens cui ipsa additur accipi secundum suam rationem formalem, ita quod sit sensus: ens inquantum ens, id est ens sub ratione entis, est subiectum methaphisice. Nec ad hoc sequitur quod omne ens sit subiectum metaphisice, sicut sequeretur si ly “inquantum” sumeretur reduplicative.—Quarto: triplex est subiectum alicuius scientie, scilicet commune, speciale et specialissimum.—Quinto: quod sicut duplex est primitas, ut ad propositum sufficit, scilicet perfectionis et adequationis, ita potest dupliciter intelligi aliquid esse primum subiectum alicuius scientie, scilicet primum primitate perfectionis et primum primitate adequationis. Hic autem est sermo de subiecto primo primitate adequationis, quod scilicet non excedit scientiam nec exceditur ab ea, ymo quidquid cadit sub consideratione scientie, cadit sub ratione formali talis subiecti, et e contra, quidquid participat rationem formalem illius subiecti, cadit sub consideratione illius scientie. Unde si ens inquantum ens ponatur subiectum primum methaphisice tali primitate, quidquid participat rationem entis ut sic cadit sub consideratione methaphisice, et quidquid considerat methaphisicus, sub ratione entis considerat.⁴⁶

However, apart from these technical clarifications (which play only a minor role in the rest of his elaboration), Damoisiau’s view is essentially the same as that of Hennon. Like Hennon, Damoisiau claims being *qua* being, which is common to God and creatures, to be the primary subject-matter of metaphysics.⁴⁷ He also states that his view presupposes the univocity of

⁴⁶ Cf. *Qu. Met.*, I, q. 1, fol. 267ra. Damoisiau’s explanation of the notion of “*primitas adequationis*” almost verbatim resembles the following passage by Antonius Andreae (*Qu. Met.*, I, q. 1, fol. az^{vb}): “Sed primitas sive prioritas adequationis notat <e>qualitatem precisam subiecti ad scientias, quando scilicet scientia non excedit subiectum nec e converso. Sed quicquid cadit aliquo modo sub consideratione scientie, cadit sub ratione formali subiecti, et e converso, quicquid participat rationem formalem subiecti, cadit sub consideratione illius scientie. Verbi gratia si ens inquantum ens ponit <ur> subiectum primum metaphisice tali primitate, quicquid participat rationem entis ut sic cadit sub consideratione methaphisice, et quicquid methaphisicus considerat, sub ratione entis considerat.”

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*: “His premissis, dicendum quod ens inquantum ens sive ens simpliciter sumptum, quod est commune Deo et creature, est primum subiectum methaphisice primitate

being: the notion of “being” applies univocally to created and uncreated being, to finite and infinite being, and to the ten categories.⁴⁸ Damoisiau criticizes the Averroist view of the subject-matter of metaphysics, while admitting (unlike Hennon) that both God and the immaterial substances (taken together as the “class of separate beings”) can be considered to be the primary, i.e., most perfect subject-matter of metaphysics.⁴⁹

Finally, Georgius Bruxellensis and Petrus Tartareti also maintain that being *qua* being constitutes the subject-matter of metaphysics, but they offer little explanation of their views.⁵⁰

Closely linked to the problem of the subject-matter of metaphysics is the question of whether the quiddities or essences of particular beings as such fall under the consideration of metaphysics. In other words, does the metaphysician examine the quiddities or essences of, for example, bodies

adequationis, quia nichil aliud ab ente et passionibus eius consideratur in methaphisica. Unde si hec scientia non esset de ente, oportebit esse aliquam aliam scientiam superiorem et priorem ista que consideret de ipso ente in communi.”

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*: “Sciendum primo quod pro responsione ad titulum questionis aliqua sunt supponenda ex dictis in logica et physica. Primo: quod ens est univocum ad ens creatum et increatum, finitum et infinitum, et ad decem predicamenta.”

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, fol. 267ra–b: “Ex quo sequitur opinionem Commentatoris esse falsam, qui dicit quod Deus et intelligentie, sive genus entium separatorum, [non] est primum subiectum huius scientie primitate adequationis, quamvis forte hoc bene sit verum de primitate perfectionis.” Hennon only admits God (not the entire “class of separate beings”) to be the primary (i.e., most perfect) subject-matter of metaphysics. See above, notes 42ff.

⁵⁰ Georgius Bruxellensis treats this question very shortly at the beginning of his commentary on Book IV of the *Metaphysics*. After a detailed refutation of the “opinio scotistarum” concerning the concept of a “primary subject-matter” (*primum subiectum*), Georgius arrives at the following conclusion (*Qu. Met.*, IV, q. 1, fol. 19va–b): “Conclusio secunda: ens in quantum ens est subiectum metaphisice. Probatur sic quia: idem est subiectum habitus et primorum principiorum habitus; sed subiectum primorum principiorum metaphisice est ens; igitur ens est subiectum metaphisice. Minor patet de isto principio: ‘impossibile est idem simul esse et non esse.’ Item: idem est subiectum habitus et prime passionis; sed subiectum prime passionis, scilicet unitatis, est ens; igitur. Hoc etiam patet auctoritate Aristotelis in principio huius quarti post oppositum allegata. Item: communissime scientie subiectum debet esse communissimum; sed metaphisica est scientia communissima; igitur. Item: dyalectica et metaphisica et sophistica, ut habetur sexto *huius*, conveniunt in subiecto, quod est ens simpliciter; igitur. Item: enti in quantum ens convenit ratio primi subiecti respectu huius scientie; igitur. Et est advertendum quod hec dictio ‘in quantum’ non tenetur reduplicative, quia omne ens esset subiectum, sed tenetur specificative, ita quod specificat rationem secundum quam ens est subiectum metaphisice.” Petrus Tartareti arrives at the following conclusion in *Comm. Met.*, I, q. 1, fol. 113rb: “Ens in quantum ens est subiectum totius metaphisice. Que conclusio relinquatur probata ex dictis in primo articulo.” However, the first article of his question mainly concerns the concept of “being” (*ens*) itself, as univocal to God and creatures, and the concept “*experientia*.”

qua bodies, animals *qua* animals, men *qua* men etc.? This issue is discussed by all the commentators except Nicolaus de Orbellis.⁵¹ Johannes Versoris's treatment of the question is slightly different from that of the others. He briefly refers to one anonymous opinion according to which both the quiddities and the essential properties of all particular beings (for example, the quiddity and essential properties of man *qua* man) fall under the consideration of metaphysics.⁵² But against this opinion, he argues that metaphysics is about being in general. Now, given that being in general in fact encompasses all particular beings, it follows that metaphysics investigates particular quiddities under the aspect of being in general and of their universal principles and causes. Hence metaphysics investigates the quiddities of particular beings in general (*in universali*), but not in particular (*in particulari*).⁵³ However, insofar as metaphysics constitutes the last science in the order of teaching (*ordo doctrinae*), it presupposes all knowledge previously acquired through the special sciences. Hence, from this perspective, Versoris claims that the ideal metaphysician should possess knowledge of all particular quiddities as acquired through the special sciences, even though, as metaphysician, he can only examine the quiddities of particular beings in general and under the aspect of being.⁵⁴

Similar views can be found in Johannes Hennon, Johannes le Damoisiau, Georgius Bruxellensis, and Petrus Tartareti, but, in contrast to Versoris, their respective explanations and arguments all reflect Antonius

⁵¹ Orbellis raises one *dubitatio* about singularity as the proper formal object of sense perception ("An singularitas sit ratio formalis obiectiva sensus," *Cursus Met.*, I, fols. 13va–15ra), but this *dubitatio* is totally unrelated to the question of the subject-matter of metaphysics.

⁵² Cf. *Qu. Met.*, I, q. 1, fol. 5ra–va: "Queritur sexto utrum ad sapientem pertineat consideratio quidditatum omnium rerum etiam in particulari. [...] Ulterius sciendum est, descendendo magis ad quesitum, quod aliqui voluerunt dicere [...] quod ad metaphysicum pertinet cognitio quidditatum omnium rerum etiam in speciali et passionum propriarum illarum rerum, scilicet quod metaphysicus in quantum huiusmodi habet cognoscere quidditatem hominis in quantum homo, et sic de aliis speciebus specialissimis."

⁵³ *Ibid.*, fol. 5va: "Sed considerato processu Aristotelis in isto libro, videtur magis dicendum esse ad quesitum pro conclusione responsiva videlicet quod ad metaphysicum pertinet consideratio quidditatum omnium rerum in universali, et non in particulari. [...] Prima pars conclusionis patet, quia subiectum metaphisice est ens, quod ambit et continet sub se omnia alia entia; modo quilibet scientia habet cognoscere suum subiectum, partes et proprietates eius; ergo metaphysicus habet considerare quidditates omnium rerum secundum quod reducuntur in ens, in principia et causas universales eius, partes et proprietates."

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*: "Nisi pro quanto secundum ordinem doctrine nostre metaphisica est postrema scientia. Et sic acquisitio eius supponit omnes alias scientias fuisse acquisitas. Quare metaphysicus perfectus habet cognoscere quidditates omnium rerum etiam in particulari, non quod in hoc libro *Metaphisice* ab Aristotele tradantur."

Andreae's treatment of the question to some extent. Andreae mentions two anonymous opinions on this issue. According to the first opinion, metaphysics studies all particular quiddities, both *qua* quiddity (*quidditas*) and *qua* particular quiddity (*haec quidditas*). Only accidental properties are excluded from the domain of metaphysics and assigned to the special sciences.⁵⁵ The second opinion goes one step further by claiming that metaphysics not only examines the quiddities of particular beings but also includes their essential accidents (*accidentia per se*). Only non-essential accidents (*accidentia per accidens*) are assigned to the special sciences. For example, in the case of man, this view claims that metaphysics studies man's quiddity (both *qua* quiddity and *qua* quiddity of man) along with man's essential accidents.⁵⁶ In contrast to these two opinions, Andreae himself denies that metaphysics studies particular quiddities as such. According to him, metaphysics only examines particular quiddities in general (*in universali*) under the general aspect of being (*sub ratione entis*). Otherwise, the various special sciences would become superfluous.⁵⁷ More specifically, Andreae argues against the second anonymous opinion saying that, if metaphysics studies the quiddities of particular beings together with their essential accidents, whereas the special sciences only

⁵⁵ Cf. *Qu. Met.*, I, q. 9, fol. b5ra: "Sed sunt duo modi dicendi. Unus modus est quod ad metaphysicum pertinet cognoscere quamlibet quidditatem secundum quod quidditas est et secundum quod hec quidditas, non tamen secundum omnem rationem cuiuscumque accidentis huic quidditati, sed hoc pertinet ad alias scientias." Andreae offers four arguments in favor of this opinion.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, fol. b5rb: "Alius modus dicendi tenens eandem conclusionem est quod quidditas hec et particularis est prior accidentibus, et accidentia per se respectu illius quidditatis sunt priora accidentibus per accidens. Licet ergo quidditas secundum quod hec <et> particularis et etiam quantum ad per se accidentia pertineant ad metaphysicum, tamen in quantum mobile vel huiusmodi, que sunt accidentia per accidens, id est ut formaliter intellecta sub aliquo accidente per accidens, pertinet ad aliam scientiam, quia sic est posterior seipsa intellecta sine illis accidentibus que sunt accidentia per accidens." Andreae goes on by explaining the precise similarity and dissimilarity between the two opinions: "Ambo isti modi conveniunt in hoc quod alie scientie non considerant quidditatem nec hanc quidditatem in se, sed tantum accidentia sibi. Sed differunt quia primus modus dicit quod metaphysica considerat quidditatem et hanc quidditatem tantum ut quidditas est; secundus modus dicit quod metaphysica considerat quidditatem et hanc quidditatem non tantum ut quidditas est, sed etiam quantum ad per se accidentia."

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, fol. b5va: "Aliter ergo dicendum quod ad metaphysicam in quantum talis non pertinet considerare omnes quidditates in particulari, sed in universali tantum et sub ratione entis. Et hoc probat ratio facta quia: aliter alie omnes superfluerent. Unde et Aristoteles multum temperate dicit sicut decet et ut convenit quia 'sapientis non est scire omnia quocumque modo, sed ut contingit,' id est in communi et in universali."

examine the non-essential accidents, the special sciences become subalternated to the science of metaphysics.⁵⁸

In the commentaries by Johannes Hennon, Johannes le Damoisiau, Georgius Bruxellensis, and Petrus Tartareti, we find several elements of Andreae's explanation. Hennon refers to the same two opinions as Andreae.⁵⁹ Moreover, he argues against the second that the special sciences either become superfluous or become subalternate sciences of metaphysics.⁶⁰ Finally, he accepts the same view as Andreae.⁶¹ Damoisiau also describes two opinions regarding this question. One coincides with the first opinion mentioned by Andreae: all particular quiddities, both *qua* quiddity and *qua* particular quiddity, fall under the consideration of metaphysics while the various accidental properties are treated in the special sciences.⁶² One of the arguments used by Damoisiau in support of this view is the argument from the subalternation of the special sciences, which

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, fol. b5rb–va: “Contra illud in quo secundus modus distinguitur a primo arguitur sic quia: si sic, ergo omnes alie scientie erunt scientie methaphisice subalterne. Consequens est falsum, ut etiam ipsi dicunt. Ergo et antecedens. Probatio consequentie quia: tunc nulla passio remanet consideranda in aliis scientiis, quia sola methaphisica considerat proprias et primas passiones, alia autem accidentia per accidens, et per consequens nulla alia demonstrat primam passionem inesse, sed presupponit demonstrari in alia; sed conclusio ubi demonstratur prima passio est principium in inferiori scientia ubi demonstratur posterior passio vel aliquid aliud; sed hec est conditio scientie subalternantis et subalterne; ergo omnes alie scientie sunt subalterne scientie methaphisice.”

⁵⁹ *Qu. Met.*, I, q. 2, fol. 310rb: “Sciendum est primo quod de questione mota sunt due opinioniones. Prima est quod alie scientie a methaphisica non considerant quidditates nec hanc quidditatem in se, sed tantum secundum accidens eius. Et hec dividitur in duo. Nam quedam est opinio dicens quod methaphisicus considerat quidditatem in communi et hanc quidditatem in particulari consideratam ut quidditas est, et non secundum aliqua accidentia rei per se nec per accidens. Et sic dicit hec opinio quod methaphisicus habet considerare hominem ut ens, ut substantia et ut homo. Alia opinio dicit quod methaphisicus considerat quidditatem, non tantummodo consideratam ut quidditas est, sed etiam quantum ad per se accidentia eius. Et hec ultra primam additur quod methaphisicus habet considerare accidentia per se convenientia quidditatibus particularibus.”

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, fol. 310rb–va: “Contra secundam opinionem arguitur quia: sequeretur quod alie scientie superfluerent vel quod methaphisice subalternarentur. Consequens est falsum. Sed consequentia patet quantum <ad> primam partem, quia quidditates particulares cognoscuntur in aliis scientiis aut sub ratione eius (et tunc, cum in methaphisica sub eadem ratione consideratur, sequitur quod alie scientie superfluent), aut sub ratione alicuius accidentis (et tunc ille subalternatur methaphisice). Nam quando subiectum unius est inferius ad subiectum alterius et addit super ipsum differentiam accidentalem, sicut sonus additur numero et visuale additur linee, ibi est subalternatio, dummodo una habeat considerare principia alterius.”

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, fol. 310ra: “Conclusio responsalis: ad methaphisicum non spectat cognoscere omnes quidditates rerum in particulari.”

⁶² Cf. *Qu. Met.*, I, q. 1, fol. 268vb: “Pro solutione supponitur quod de dubio proposito sunt due principales opinioniones. Una est dicentium quod ad metaphisicum pertinet considerare quamlibet quidditatem secundum quod quidditas et etiam secundum quod hec

was used by Andreae to criticize the opinion according to which metaphysics examines both the quiddities of particular beings and their essential accidents.⁶³ The other opinion mentioned (and implicitly endorsed) by Damoisiau in fact corresponds with Andreae's own view: metaphysics studies the quiddities of particular beings in general and under the aspect of being.⁶⁴ Georgius Bruxellensis argues more briefly, but along similar lines, that the quiddities of particular beings do not fall under metaphysics but are investigated by the special sciences.⁶⁵ Finally, Petrus Tartareti refers to the same opinions as mentioned by Johannes le Damoisiau (albeit in the reverse order), but without choosing one of them.⁶⁶

The likeness between Antonius Andreae's commentary, on the one hand, and those of Johannes Hennon, Johannes le Damoisiau, and Petrus

quiditas, sed non secundum rationem cuiuscumque accidentis illi quiditati, ymo secundum hoc consideratur ab aliis scientiis."

⁶³ *Ibid.*, fol. 269ra: "Secundo arguitur: si methaphisicus non cognosceret quidditates in particulari, ymo sic considerarentur ab aliis scientiis, sequeretur quod alie scientie essent subalternate methaphisice aut non ab ea distincte, quia ad eandem scientiam pertinet superius et inferius. Hec tamen quiditas secundum quod mobilis vel quanta vel intellecta sub aliquo accidente per accidens pertinet ad aliam scientiam, tamen quiditas quantum ad per se accidentia eius que concomitantur quidditatem sive naturam rei, consideratur a methaphisica." Andreae uses this argument against his second opinion (see above, note 60).

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*: "Ideo est alia opinio quod ad methaphisicum inquantum huiusmodi non pertinet considerare omnes quidditates in particulari, sed tantum in universali et sub ratione entis (alias superfluerent omnes alie scientie, ut dictum est). Ideo dicit Philosophus in textu quod sapiens omnia scit ut contingit. Neque oportet, ut dicit, sapientem habere scientiam superiorem de omnibus."

⁶⁵ Cf. *Qu. Met.*, VI, q. 1, fol. 37ra–b: "Sciendum secundo quod opinio aliquorum est quod ad metaphysicam spectat considerare quidditates rerum sic quod nulla scientia particularis quidditatem in ratione quidditatis habet considerare, sed circa eam considerat accidentia propria. [...] Conclusio prima: metaphisica non considerat quidditates omnium rerum in particulari. Patet, quia sic sequeretur quod scientie particulares superfluerent. [...] Conclusio secunda: scientie speciales habent considerare quidditatem suorum subiectorum in particulare. Patet, quia si supponerent eam, sequeretur quod omnes scientie essent metaphisice subalternate, quod est falsum. Et patet consequentia, quia omnis scientia acciperet sua principia propria a metaphisica; igitur. Antecedens patet, quia propositio in qua predicatur diffinito de diffinito est principium demonstrandi passiones de subiecto, et illa acciperetur a metaphisica; ergo quelibet scientia acciperet sua principia propria a metaphisica."

⁶⁶ Cf. *Qu. Met.*, I, q. 1, fol. 113rb: "Respondetur breviter quod de hoc sunt duo modi dicendi. Dicunt enim aliqui quod ad metaphysicum secundum quod huiusmodi non pertinet considerare omnes quidditates in particulari, sed tantum in universali et sub ratione entis. Alias omnes alie scientie superfluerent, quod est falsum. Ideo dicit Philosophus in textu quod sapiens omnia scit ut contingit, quod sic glossant: 'id est, in universali.' [...] Aliter tamen dicunt aliqui quod metaphisicus inquantum metaphisicus habet considerare quidditates omnium rerum et quod nullus artifex habet ea investigare quam metaphisicus."

Tartareti, on the other, is confirmed by the following passages, which explain the relationship between metaphysics and the special sciences.

ANTONIUS ANDREAE	JOHANNES HENNON	JOHANNES LE DAMOISIAU	PETRUS TARTARETI
<p>Ad tertium dicendum quod ad eandem scientiam pertinet considerare superius et inferius, genus et speciem, secundum rationem superioris, sicut patet in exemplo quod adducitur, quia arismeticus considerat de numero et binario secundum rationem numeri. Et sic methaphisicus secundum rationem entis in communi considerat de omni ente, tamen de superiori et inferiori potest esse alia et alia scientia secundum aliam et aliam rationem propriam. Unde si binarius haberet aliquas passiones proprias demonstrabiles de ipso non per rationem numeri, eius consideratio pertinet ad aliam scientiam ab arismetica.⁶⁷</p>	<p>Ad tertiam dicitur quod ad eandem scientiam pertinet considerare superius et inferius, genus et speciem, secundum rationem superioris, ut patet in exemplo adducto. Nam arismeticus considerat de numero et binario secundum rationem numeri. Similiter geometria considerat de triangulo et ysochele secundum rationem trianguli. Similiter methaphisicus considerat de omni ente secundum rationem entis. Sed tamen de superiori et inferiori potest esse alia et alia scientia, secundum aliam et aliam rationem propriam, ut patet si binarius haberet aliquas passiones de ipso demonstrabiles non per rationem numeri, sed per rationem propriam.⁶⁸</p>	<p>Pro ulteriori tamen declaratione huius opinionis est primo advertendum quod, licet ad eandem scientiam pertineat considerare superius et inferius, genus et speciem, quantum ad rationem superioris et passionem eius, tamen de inferiori quantum ad suas proprias rationes potest esse illa scientia de superiori, non tamen disparata, sed ordinata, sed non subalternata; cuius subiectum debet addere supra subiectum subalternantis differentiam accidentalem, sicut sonus additur numero et visuale lineae.⁶⁹</p>	<p>Et si dicatur quod ad eandem scientiam pertinet considerare superius et inferius, ergo si metaphysica considerat ens, ergo etiam considerabit omnia inferiora eius—respondetur quod, licet ad eandem scientiam pertineat considerare superius et inferius quantum ad rationem superioris et passionem eius, tamen de inferiori quantum ad suas proprias rationes et proprias passiones potest esse alia scientia a scientia superioris.⁷⁰</p>

⁶⁷ Cf. *Qu. Met.*, I, q. 9, fol. b5va–b.

⁶⁸ Cf. *Qu. Met.*, I, q. 2, fol. 311ra.

⁶⁹ Cf. *Qu. Met.*, I, q. 1, fol. 269ra.

⁷⁰ *Qu. Met.*, I, q. 1, fol. 113rb.

3.3. *Knowledge of Separate Substances*

All commentators, with the exception of Johannes Hennon, raise the question of whether and how human beings in their present life can acquire knowledge of separate substances. They generally combine this issue with the question of whether and how God (sometimes referred to as the first cause) can be known.⁷¹ Their views of these two related issues diverge more strongly than their opinions about the concept and the subject-matter of metaphysics. On the one hand, Johannes Versoris argues that quidditative knowledge of God and separate substances is wholly unattainable for human beings in their present condition. According to him, only God's existence (*quia est*) can be known, not his quiddity (*quid est*). On the other hand, Johannes le Damoisiau, Nicolaus de Orbellis, Georgius Bruxellensis, and Petrus Tartareti all argue that some form of quidditative knowledge of God and the separate substances is possible in this life. They offer (more-or-less) different explanations of precisely what form of quidditative knowledge can be acquired.

Johannes Versoris explicitly takes his cue from Thomas Aquinas. He argues that quidditative knowledge of God and the separate substances cannot be obtained because, in our present condition, our knowledge necessarily depends on sense perception. God and the separate substances are not only inaccessible to our senses but they also fail to produce effects that can bring about quidditative knowledge of their causes. However, according to Versoris, human beings are able to obtain knowledge of the existence of God and the separate substances through a (well known and not further described) threefold procedure: the "way of causality" (*via causalitatis*), the "way of eminence" (*via eminentiae*) and the "way of negation" (*via remotionis*).⁷² Versoris defends Aquinas's view about the impossibility

⁷¹ Some of our commentators also raise questions (or *dubia*) about the possibility and difficulty of human knowledge of the truth. This is the case in Johannes Versoris, Nicolaus de Orbellis, Georgius Bruxellensis, and Petrus Tartareti.

⁷² Cf. *Qu. Met.*, II, q. 2, fol. 13ra–b: "Dubitatur utrum intellectus noster corpori coniunctus possit cognoscere Deum et substantias separatas. Pro dubio cum sancto Thoma ponitur hec conclusio: intellectus noster corpori coniunctus non potest cognoscere Deum et substantias separatas quantum ad quid sunt, sed solum quantum ad quia sunt et non quid sunt. [...] Ratione autem patet sic: intellectus noster corpori coniunctus propter causam in primo articulo dictam nihil potest cognoscere nisi per ministerium sensus. Ideo dicitur tercio *De anima* quod oportet quemlibet intelligentem fantasmata speculari. Sed substantie separate non sunt per se sensibiles neque habemus aliquo modo effectus ipsis adequatos quorum cognitio conferat ad cognoscendum quidditates earum. Ergo etc. [...] Secunda pars patet, quia, ut dicit sanctus Thomas, tripliciter possumus devenire ad cognoscendum quia Deus est, scilicet per viam causalitatis, eminentie et remotionis, et etiam quia sunt

of quidditative knowledge against the opinion of some anonymous authors claiming to follow Albert the Great on this point. These anonymous authors argue that the human possible intellect becomes united to the (separate) agent intellect as a result of a previously acquired complete knowledge of all intelligible forms, both natural and mathematical. This unity with the agent intellect enables the human (possible) intellect, of itself and without needing phantasms any longer, to acquire immediate quidditative knowledge of separate substances. The human intellect in that condition is called the “acquired intellect” (*intellectus adeptus*). According to Versoris, this opinion is untenable for a variety of reasons.⁷³

Nicolaus de Orbellis and, to a lesser extent, Johannes le Damoisiau are obviously familiar with Antonius Andreae’s treatment of the question.⁷⁴ Orbellis repeats parts of Andreae’s detailed criticism of two views, which

alique substantie separate, et quid non sunt, et etiam attribuere ipsis eminenter ea que perfectionem simpliciter dicunt.” This threefold procedure of obtaining knowledge of God goes back to Ps. Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, VII, c. 3. Its standard formulation is found in Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum*, I, d. 3, divisio primae partis textus, ed. Pierre Mandonnet, 2 vols. (Paris, 1929), vol. 1, pp. 88–89 (“per viam causalitatis [...] per viam remotiois [...] per viam eminentiae”), and d. 35, q. 1, a. 1, p. 809 (“per remotioem, per causalitatem, per eminentiam”).

⁷³ *Ibid.*, fol. 13rb: “Huic etiam conclusioni adversantur quidam dicentes se in hoc sequi Albertum, qui ymaginabatur (ut dicunt) quod postquam intellectus noster possibilis consecutus est perfecte omnes formas intelligibiles naturales et mathematicas, que cadunt sub actualitate luminis intellectus agentis, tunc unitur sibi intellectus agens non solum per modum efficientis, sed etiam unitur sibi per modum forme intelligibilis, et intelligit ipsum intellectum agentem et substantiam anime perfecte et seipsum, nec plus ad intelligendum eget conversione ad fantasmata, sed habet lumen suum totaliter conversum superius concipiendo substantias separatas, et ideo ab ipsis immediate recipere potest illuminationes et quidditates earum cognoscere. Qui intellectum sic formatum et completum vocant ‘intellectum adeptum.’ In qua adeptioe ponunt felicitatem hominis pro isto statu consistere. Sed ymaginatio videtur impossibilis [...]”

⁷⁴ Johannes le Damoisiau answers the question to the affirmative: “Dubitatur tertio utrum de ultimo fine vel prima causa et aliis substantiis separatis cognoscamus quid sunt. Respondetur quod sic” (*Qu. Met.*, I, q. 1, fol. 273rb). Having given five arguments in favor of this answer (some of which correspond verbatim to arguments found in Antonius Andreae: see below, note 77), Damoisiau concludes that separate substances can be known through “common quidditative concepts” and through “accidental or connotative concepts”: “Et sic patet quod etiam pro isto statu possibile est intellectum nostrum cognoscere tam materialia quam immaterialia et substantias separatas quantum ad conceptus quidditativos communes et quantum ad conceptus accidentales vel connotativos etiam positivos et proprios” (fol. 273va). This conclusion is mainly based on the following argument (which I have not been able to locate in Antonius Andreae): “Si cognoscamus de substantiis separatis quia sunt, ut concedunt adversarii, oportet quod habeamus aliquem conceptum priorem cui attribuimus existere. Et universaliter dato quocumque conceptu attributali substantiarum separatarum quem de ipsis enunciamus, habemus priorem conceptum quidditativum cui ipsum accidentalem attribuimus, et non solum habemus conceptum negativum vel privativum sensibilem, qualem habemus de chymera, cui non attribuimus illos conceptus

resemble Johannes Versoris's position, almost verbatim. The first of these views claims that only the existence (*quia est*) of a separate substance can be known, not its quiddity, the second that the quiddity of a separate substance can only be known negatively (*quid non est*).

ANTONIUS ANDREAE

Respondetur ad omnes istas quinque rationes quod non concludunt nisi quod cognoscimus de substantiis separatis quia sunt, vel inquantum sunt cause omnium istorum inferiorum, non autem propter quid, cum effectus deficiens non sufficiat ad causandum noticiam de quid est cause. Aliter respondetur quod cognoscimus de illis substanciis quid non sunt, quia scilicet non sunt aliquid istorum inferiorum. Per hoc enim cognoscimus ipsas esse causas excedentes respectu horum. Non autem cognoscimus quid sunt. Et hoc concludunt dicte (decem *ed.*) rationes et non plus.

Sed contra, primo contra utramque solutionem simul [...]

Secundo contra primam responsonem specialiter arguitur sic: [...]

Preterea, impossibile est cognoscere compositionem aliquorum nisi cognitis terminis vel extremis, quia secundum Philosophum primo *Periarmanias*, capitulo de verbo, esse significat quandam compositionem quam sine compositis non est intelligere. Sed esse immediate inest quidditati illarum substantiarum. Ergo si cognoscimus substantias esse, et per consequens esse quidditati earum inesse, sequitur de necessitate quod cognoscimus quidditates earum.

NICOLAUS DE ORBELLIS

Responsio quod de substantiis separatis cognoscimus quia sunt vel inquantum sunt causa omnium illorum inferiorum, non autem cognoscimus quid sunt. Aliter dicitur quod de ipsis cognoscimus quid non sunt, quia scilicet non sunt aliqua istarum (!) inferiorum.

Contra primam rationem arguitur sic: impossibile est cognoscere compositionem aliquorum nisi cognitis terminis et extremis, quia, ut habetur primo *Periarmanias*, esse significat compositionem quam sine extremis non est intelligere. Si igitur cognoscimus eas esse, et per consequens esse quidditati (!) eorum inesse, sequitur de necessitate quod cognoscimus quidditates earum.

accidentales positivos quos attribuimus substanciis separatis. Ergo de ipsis cognoscimus quid sunt" (fol. 273rb).

Tercio contra resposionem secundam arguitur specialiter sic quia: in omni propositione (propositione *ed.*) negativa (necessaria *ed.*) est aliqua propositio affirmativa prior. Ergo si cognoscatur de substantia separata quid non est, oportet cognoscere quid est. Antecedens patet ex secundo *Periarmentias*, capitulo ultimo, ubi dicit Philosophus quod illa propositio "bonum non est malum" est vera, quia hec affirmativa prior est vera "bonum est bonum." Et quarto *huius* dicit Philosophus "notior itaque est dictio quam opposita negatio."⁷⁵

Contra secundum arguitur sic: quod omni propositioni negative est aliqua affirmativa prior. Ergo si cognoscatur de substantia separata quid non est, oportet de ipsa cognoscere quid est. Antecedens patet ex secundo *Periarmentias*, capitulo ultimo, ubi dicit Philosophus quod ista propositio "bonum non est malum" non est vera nisi quia hec affirmativa prior est vera "bonum est bonum." Et quarto *huius* dicit Philosophus "notior utique est dictio quam opposita negatio."⁷⁶

Orbellis's own solution to the question is somewhat less elaborate than that of Andreae. The latter introduces six degrees (*gradus*) of intellectual knowledge (corresponding to six degrees of sensory knowledge) claiming that God and the separate substances can be quidditatively known through the fifth degree (i.e., by means of composite concepts) and also, although less properly, through the sixth (i.e., by means of knowledge of their effects).⁷⁷ However, Orbellis mentions only two kinds of knowl-

⁷⁵ Cf. *Qu. Met.*, II, q. 3, fols. c3vb–c4ra. Andreae's last argument is also found in Johannes le Damoisiau (*Qu. Met.*, II, q. 1, fol. 273rb–va): "Tercio arguitur: omni negative est aliqua affirmativa prior et notior, puta in qua predicatur idem de seipso, que omni negative est prius vera. Sed nos cognoscimus de substantiis separatis propositiones negativas. Ergo cognoscimus aliquas affirmativas de ipsis."

⁷⁶ Cf. *Cursus Met.*, II, fol. 18rb–va.

⁷⁷ Cf. *Qu. Met.*, II, q. 3, fol. c4ra–b: "Ad videndum autem quomodo iste substantie a nobis cognoscantur notandum est quod sex sunt gradus cognitionis sensitive quibus correspondent alii sex gradus cognitionis intellectualive. [...] Similiter etiam correspondent dicuntur sex gradus cognitionis intellectualive. Prima cognitio est intuitiva, que dicitur notitia visionis, que est de obiecto presenti ut presens est in sua existentia. Secunda cognitio est abstractiva, que est obiecti presentis in sua specie genita ab obiecto quod potest esse absens in sua existentia. Tertia est cognitio obiecti oppositi obiecto primi modi. Quarta est [in] cognitio obiecti oppositi obiecto secundi modi. Quinta est cognitio alicuius ex conceptibus aggregatis. Sexta est per accidens cum aliquid cognoscitur per speciem illius quod sibi accidit. Exemplum primi: cognitio beatorum in patria. [...] Exemplum secundi: cum intelligo rosam absentem. Exemplum tertii: cum intelligo aliquod oppositum contrarie vel forte privative obiecto intuitive viso, ut cum intelligo non visum obiectum intuitive. Exemplum quarti: cum intelligitur oppositum contrarie vel privative obiecto abstractive cognito, puta cum intelligo non rosam abstractive. Exemplum quinti: cum intelligo aliquid esse ens infinitum necessarium sempiternum. Exemplum sexti: substantia intelligitur per speciem accidentis secundum unam opinionem.—Ad propositum dico quod quiditas substantiarum separatarum non intelligitur nec primo, nec secundo, nec tertio, nec quarto, sed quinto modo, scilicet in conceptu aggregato, et aequaliter sexto modo, scilicet per effectus suos. Substantie enim separate cognoscuntur per hoc quod multa apprehensa simul concipiuntur que omnia nunquam alibi inveniuntur et nulli alii conveniunt. Et iste

edge, sensory and intellectual, both of which can be either intuitive or abstractive.⁷⁸ He argues that God and the separate substances cannot be known intuitively in this life (neither through sensory nor through intellectual intuitive cognition), but only through abstractive intellectual cognition. More accurately, God and the separate substances can be known abstractively (*abstractive*), not by means of (intelligible) species produced by God and the separate substances themselves but only by means of (intelligible) species derived from created beings that are accessible to sense perception. Orbellis explicitly refers his readers to John Duns Scotus's *Ordinatio* (I, d. 3) for a more detailed explanation of his view.⁷⁹

Georgius Bruxellensis treats the question of our knowledge of separate substances in three consecutive *dubia*. The first asks whether separate substances can be known by us, the second whether separate substances can be known quidditatively, and the third whether separate substances can be known by means of absolute and proper concepts that signify naturally (rather than by convention).⁸⁰ The first *dubium* is mainly designed to disprove the two views also criticized by Nicolaus de Orbellis (and Antonius Andreae).⁸¹ Georgius's second *dubium* corresponds nearly verbatim

est conceptus aggregatus, puta de Deo quod est ens infinitum necessarium et primum etc., que omnia nulli conveniunt simul accepta nisi Deo. Et sic de aliis intelligentiis."

⁷⁸ Cf. *Cursus Met.*, II, fol. 18va: "Dicendum est ergo quod huiusmodi substantie possunt intelligi secundum suas quidditates ab intellectu viatorum secundum modum qui dicitur. Pro quo sciendum quod duplex est noticia, scilicet sensitiva et intellectiva, et utraque est duplex, scilicet intuitiva et abstractiva. Cognitiono intuitiva est que respicit obiectum ut presens est <in sua existentia>. Exemplum de sensitiva: ut oculus videt colorem. Exemplum de intellectiva: ut cognitio beatorum in patria. [...] Cognitiono autem abstractiva est que est obiecti presentis in sua specie generata ab obiecto, quod potest esse absens in sua existentia. Exemplum de sensitiva: ut fantasia imaginatur colorem visum. Exemplum de intellectiva: ut cum intelligo rem absentem."

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*: "Ad propositum ergo dico quod substantie separate non cognoscuntur a nobis pro statu isto cognitione intuitiva, ut patet ab ipsis, nec etiam abstractiva que fit per species genitas in ratione obiecti, cum species ipsarum non cadunt sub sensu. Bene tamen cognoscuntur cognitione abstractiva per species creaturarum. Quod sic declarat Scotus, distinctione 3 primi *Sententiarum* [...]." The explanation that follows corresponds to John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, d. 3, p. 1, q. 1–2, n. 66, in: Iohannis Duns Scoti *Opera Omnia*, vol. 3, ed. Carlos Balić et al. (Civitas Vaticana, 1954), p. 42.10–20.

⁸⁰ Cf. *Qu. Met.*, II, q. 1, fols. 10vb–11va: "Dubitatur primo utrum substantie separate cognoscantur a nobis. [...] Dubitatur secundo utrum substantie separate sint a nobis quidditative cognoscibiles. [...] Dubitatur tertio utrum possumus substantias separatas cognoscere per conceptus absolutos proprios et naturaliter representativos."

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, fols. 10vb–11ra: "Ad dubium respondetur quod de substantiis abstractis non solum cognoscimus quia sunt vel quid (quia *ed.*) non sunt. Patet, quia de eis habemus multos conceptus tam simplices quam complexos, ut de primo ente cognoscimus quod est immaterialis, quod est virtus infinita, quod est productivum rerum. Et confirmatur quia:

to Petrus Tartareti's *dubium* on the knowledge of separate substances. Both authors distinguish between three forms of quidditative knowledge and between different kinds of concepts: simple and composite (or complex), absolute and connotative. With respect to our knowledge of God or the first cause, they argue that it is possible for us in this life to have composite proper concepts (for example the concept of a necessary and infinite being) and simple, connotative proper concepts (for example the concept of something that creates).

GEORGIUS BRUXELLENSIS

Ideo ad videndum qualem noticiam simplicem de Deo habere possumus est advertendum quod tripliciter aliquid potest cognosci quidditative. Uno modo per hoc quod immediate intuetur in se. Secundo modo est habere propriam speciem sive proprium conceptum representativum eius naturaliter. Tertio modo, quia habemus de Deo conceptus proprios et simplices, vel proprios non absolutos, sed connotativos.

Primus modus non est nobis possibilis in presenti statu, quia possemus esse beati in hac vita. De secundo videbitur in tertio dubio. Sed pro tertio sit conclusio prima: prima causa est cognoscibilis in aliquo conceptu composito sibi proprio. Patet, quia possumus aliquem conceptum de Deo proprium componere ex conceptibus simplicibus abstractis ex aliis rebus et illum attribuere enti particulariter accepto, dicendo "ens necesse esse," "ens summe bonum est infinite potentie simpliciter loquendo." Conclusio secunda: prima causa est cognoscibilis in aliquo conceptu simplici connotativo sibi proprio. Patet, quia aliquis conceptus connotativus, scilicet cui correspondet ista vox "creativum," est proprius Deo et predicari potest de ente particulariter sumpto. Talis autem conceptus

PETRUS TARTARETI

Ideo ad videndum qualem noticiam de Deo habere possumus est advertendum quod aliquid potest cognosci quidditative tripliciter. Uno modo, quia intuemur illud in seipso. Secundo modo, quia habemus propriam speciem vel proprium conceptum representativum eius naturaliter. Tertio modo, quia habemus de eo conceptus complexos vel simplices, vel compositos non absolutos, sed connotativos.

Primus modus non est nobis possibilis, neque secundus, pro statu isto, quia tunc in hac vita possemus esse beati. De tertio sit prima conclusio: prima causa est cognoscibilis in aliquo conceptu composito proprio. Patet, quia possumus aliquem conceptum de Deo proprium componere ex conceptibus simplicibus abstractis ab aliis rebus et illum attribuere enti particulariter accepto, ut ens necessarium esse, ens summe bonum, ens infinitum et sic de aliis. Secunda conclusio: prima causa est cognoscibilis in aliquo conceptu simplici connotativo sibi proprio. Patet, quia aliquis est conceptus connotativus cui correspondet ista vox "creativum," et est propria (!) Deo. Unde advertet quod de isto conceptu connotativo dicunt aliqui quod non est naturaliter significans, sed ad placitum,

de his habemus noticiam complexam; igitur et incomplexam." For Nicolaus de Orbellis and Antonius Andreae, see above, pp. 599–600.

est simplex, quamvis plura significet, sicut iste terminus “album” est terminus simplex, quamvis unum significet et aliud connotet. De tali autem conceptu connotativo dicunt aliqui quod non est naturaliter significans, sed ad placitum, sicut et quodlibet signum vocale, quia conceptus naturaliter significans precise eam rem significat pro qua supponere potest, quia huiusmodi conceptus est talis in esse ficto qualis est res in esse reali.

Ex his patet quod prima causa est cognoscibilis quidditative per conceptus quidditativos ab aliis rebus <abstractos>. Quod autem determinatum est de prima causa debet intelligi de aliis substantiis separatis et abstractis.⁸²

sicut et quodlibet signum vocale, quia conceptus naturaliter significans precise istam rem significat pro qua potest supponere.

Ex his patet quod prima causa est cognoscibilis quidditative per conceptus quidditativos ab aliis rebus abstractos. Et quicquid dictum est de prima causa etiam dicatur de aliis substantiis separatis.⁸³

Finally, in his third *dubium*, Georgius introduces yet another distinction between proper and common concepts, or, more accurately, between “simple, absolute and proper concepts” and “simple, absolute and common concepts.” Using this distinction, he claims that it is impossible for humans, in our present life, to have a simple, absolute and proper concept that signifies the first cause naturally. For, in order to be a natural sign of the first cause, such a concept would have to be formed in our minds directly by the first cause itself (which is considered an absurd requirement). Likewise, material substances cannot be known through simple, absolute, and proper concepts signifying naturally. For material substances are not known by us immediately, only by way of their various (proper) accidents.⁸⁴ At the same time, Georgius claims that we can have a simple, absolute, and common concept of the first cause. This claim is substantiated as follows. Given that it is possible for us to have connotative concepts of the first cause (as was shown in the second *dubium*), there must be some absolute concept underlying them. The same condition applies to all connotative concepts. For example, the connotative concept of “the

⁸² Cf. *Qu. Met.*, II, q. 1, fol. 11ra–b.

⁸³ Cf. *Qu. Met.*, II, q. 1, fol. 114rb.

⁸⁴ Cf. *Qu. Met.*, II, q. 1, fol. 11rb–va: “Pro dubio sit prima conclusio: prima causa non est cognoscibilis in aliquo conceptu simplici absoluto sibi proprio qui sit naturaliter representativus eius. Probatur quia: talis conceptus est effectus ipsius rei cuius est; ergo nihil est cognoscibile per talem conceptum nisi quod immediate et in ipso facit precognitum; igitur. Ex quo sequitur quod substantia non est in aliquo tali conceptu simplici proprio et absoluto cognoscibilis.”

white" (*album*) presupposes an underlying absolute concept of something capable of being white, for example the concept of paper or shirt. According to Georgius, in the case of the first cause, the simple absolute concept underlying the various connotative concepts is the common concept of either being (*ens*) or substance (*substantia*). He points out that some argue, on account of this reasoning, that there must be some common quidditative concept predicable (univocally) of God and creatures, but it remains unclear whether or not he himself endorses this view.⁸⁵

3.4. *Being and Unity, Being and Essence*

Our six commentators agree to a large extent about the question of whether the terms "being" and "unity" signify one and the same nature, and whether they can be used interchangeably. Some of them (Nicolaus de Orbellis and Johannes Hennon, again following Antonius Andreae) pay attention to Avicenna's view according to which "being" and "unity" do not signify the same nature and that unity, given that it belongs to one particular Aristotelian category (viz., quantity), is not convertible with being as such, that includes all categories.⁸⁶

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, fol. 11va: "Secunda conclusio: prima causa potest cognosci in aliquo conceptu simplici absoluto, non proprio, sed communi. Patet, quia omnis conceptus connotativus aliquem conceptum absolutum presupponit cui mediate vel immediate attribuitur, sicut album attribuitur absoluto. Aliquid enim est quod dicitur album, ut lignum vel lapis. Et hoc potest probari ex ratione vel diffinitione explicante quid significet talis conceptus, ut ratio huius nominis 'album': album enim est informatum albedine. Patet autem quod quelibet talis ratio alicui conceptui absoluto attribuitur. Cum ergo prima causa sit cognoscibilis in aliquo conceptu quidditativo, sequitur quod est cognoscibilis in aliquo conceptu absoluto, et est conceptus entis vel substantie. Ex hac autem ratione concludunt aliqui quod necesse est esse aliquem conceptum Deo et creature communem predicabilem in quid de Deo et creaturis. Ideo aliter Deus non posset ex creaturis cognosci."

⁸⁶ Johannes Versoris also refers to Avicenna in this context, but he presents his view in a slightly different manner, mentioning the real distinction between being and essence: "Sciendum secundo quod Avicenna posuit unum et ens non significare substantiam rei, sed aliquid additum substantie rei. Et ad hoc dicendum de ente movebatur ex hoc, quia in qualibet re que ab alio habet esse aliud est esse rei ab essentia. Et quia hoc nomen 'ens' imponitur ab esse, concludit quod hoc nomen 'ens' significat aliquid superadditum essentie sive substantie rei. Sed hoc de uno dicebat, quia existimavit quod unum quod convertitur cum ente sit idem cum uno quod est principium numeri. Unum autem quod est principium numeri necesse est significare quandam naturam superadditam substantie rei. [...] Dicebat tamen quod hoc non obstante, unum convertitur cum ente, non quia significet ipsam rei substantiam, sed significat accidens quod inheret enti, sicut risibile quod convertitur cum homine significat accidens homini inherens" (*Qu. Met.*, IV, q. 2, fol. 27rb).

ANTONIUS ANDREAE

Utrum unum et ens significant eandem naturam. [...] In ista questione sic procedam: primo quedam opinio premitetur, secundo eius improbatio apponetur, tertio ad questionem aliter dicitur. Quantum ad primum sciendum est quod una est opinio Avicenne, cuius conclusio est quod ens et unum significant aliam naturam. In sua autem positione dicit tria dicta. Primum dictum est quod ens et unum predicantur de omnibus entibus. Secundum quod non sunt idem secundum naturam, licet sint idem subiecto, sicut passio et subiectum que sunt idem subiecto. Tertium dictum est quod unum est determinati generis, scilicet de genere quantitatis, et per consequens non convertitur cum ente.⁸⁷

NICOLAUS DE ORBELLIS

Circa predicta tamen posset dubitari an ens et unum significant eandem naturam. [...] In ista questione sic procedam: primo quedam opinio premitetur, secundo improbatio apponetur, tertio ad questionem aliter dicitur. Quantum ad primum sciendum quod est una opinio Avicenne, que stat in tribus dictis. Primum est quod ens et unum predicantur de omnibus. Secundum est quod non sunt idem secundum naturam. Tertium est quod unum est determinati generis, scilicet de genere quantitatis, et per consequens non convertitur cum ente.⁸⁸

JOHANNES HENNON

Sciendum est primo quod de ista materia videtur Avicenna dicere tres propositiones. Prima est: ens et unum predicantur de omnibus. Secunda est: quod non sunt idem secundum naturam, licet sint idem subiecto sicut passio et subiectum. Tertia est: quod unum est determinati generis, scilicet quantitatis.⁸⁹

Unlike Avicenna, most of our commentators distinguish between unity as a numerical principle and unity as a transcendental concept. In the first sense, unity belongs to the category of quantity; in the second, it does not. Hence they argue that transcendental unity is convertible with being as such.⁹⁰ As regards the signification of the terms “being” and “unity,”

⁸⁷ Cf. *Qu. Met.*, IV, q. 3, fol. d3rb–va.

⁸⁸ Cf. *Cursus Met.*, IV, fols. m6vb–7ra.

⁸⁹ Cf. *Qu. Met.*, IV, q. 2, fol. 318va.

⁹⁰ Cf. Johannes Versoris, *Qu. Met.*, IV, q. 2, fol. 27rb: “Necesse est ergo confiteri quod unum quod est principium numeri aliud est ab uno quod cum ente convertitur.” Nicolaus de Orbellis, *Cursus Met.*, IV, fol. m7rb–va: “De primo sit ista prima distinctio quod unum dicitur dupliciter: quoddam enim unum est quod est principium numeri, quoddam quod convertitur cum ente. Primum unum est de genere quantitatis, secundum unum est transcendens et passio entis.” Johannes le Damoisiau, *Qu. Met.*, IV, q. 1, fol. 284vb: “Sciendum secundo quod pro solutione aliarum rationum ante oppositum supponitur primo quod ‘unum’ accipitur multipliciter, ut patuit circa primum *Phisicorum*. Uno modo pro uno quod est principium numeri de genere quantitatis. Secundo modo pro uno transcendente, quod scilicet est principium numeri transcendentis causati ex divisione essentialium proportionaliter sicut numerus de predicamento quantitatis causatur ex divisione continui. Tertio

Johannes Versoris argues that they signify one and the same nature *secundum rem*, but not *secundum rationem*. For the term “unity” signifies something that is not implied by the term “being,” namely, the fact that being is intrinsically undivided. This “intrinsic undividedness of being” (*indivisio entis in se*), signified by the term “unity,” is itself not a real being, but only a being of reason. For, as the mere negation of dividedness (*negatio divisionis*), it does not imply any positive characteristic of being. Versoris emphasizes, however, that although the undividedness implied by the term “unity” is a being of reason, it nevertheless has some foundation in reality itself (*fundamentum in re*).⁹¹ Georgius Bruxellensis develops a similar view in somewhat less technical terms.⁹² The other authors (again following Antonius Andreae) all claim that the terms “being” and “unity” signify one and the same nature *realiter*, but not *formaliter*. In other words, they consider the distinction between being and unity to be neither a real distinction (as Avicenna seems to claim) nor a distinction of reason (as Versoris argues), but a formal distinction.⁹³ Some of the commentators

modo capitur ‘unum’ pro simplici. Unum autem primo modo dictum est determinati generis, et non unum secundo modo, ymo tale unum convertitur cum ente et pro eadem convertibiliter supponit cum ente. Sed unum tertio modo dictum est membrum divisionis entis, quia dividitur ens in unum et multa, id est in simplex et compositum.” Johannes Hennon, *Qu. Met.*, IV, q. 2, fol. 318va–b: “Et secundum hoc duplex est unum: quoddam est principium numeri de genere quantitatis, aliud est unum quod est principium numeri transcendentis.” Petrus Tartareti, *Comm. Met.*, IV, q. 1, fol. 116va: “Ad dubium responderetur quod ens et unum convertuntur capiendo ‘unum’ transcendentem ut est passio entis, et de quocumque predicatur ‘ens,’ ita et ‘unum.’ Et sic dico quod unum non dividit ens. Sed unum quod dividit ens magis est unum quod est principium numeri.” Georgius Bruxellensis claims without further distinction that unity is convertible with being: “Ad dubium dicitur quod ens et unum convertuntur, quia de quocumque dicitur ens de eodem dicitur unum, et de quocumque dicitur unum de eodem dicitur ens” (*Qu. Met.*, IV, q. 1, fol. 20rb).

⁹¹ Cf. *Qu. Met.*, IV, q. 2, fol. 27vb: “Sit igitur conclusio responsiva: ens et unum eandem naturam secundum rem important. [...] Conclusio secunda: unum supra ens addit aliquid secundum rationem. [...] Et ratione sic arguitur: unum significat indivisionem entis in se, que quidem indivisio nomine ‘entis’ non significatur; igitur etc. Item cum unum non addat aliquid secundum rem supra ens et convertatur cum ente, tunc, si non adderet aliquid secundum rationem, essent penitus synonyma (!), et sic esset nugatio dicendo ‘ens unum.’ Verum est tamen quod illud additum supra ens, quod est negatio divisionis entis in se, que quidem negatio est ens secundum rationem tantum, fundamentum tamen habet in re, quia, ut dictum est, talis negatio divisionis fundatur in ipsa forma perficiente et terminante, et per consequens uniente potentiam in se.”

⁹² Cf. *Qu. Met.*, IV, q. 1, fol. 19vb: “Pro dubio est advertendum quod isti termini ‘ens’ et ‘unum’ eandem rem significant sub diversis tamen rationibus, quia ‘ens’ significat illam rem ut est quedam natura in se, sed ‘unum’ significat eam ut est in se indivisa.”

⁹³ Cf. Nicolaus de Orbellis, *Cursus Met.*, IV, fol. m7vb: “Tertia conclusio sit ista: ens et unum dicunt eandem naturam realiter, sed distinguuntur formaliter” (Orbellis seems to copy Antonius Andreae [*Qu. Met.*, IV, q. 3, fol. d4va]). Johannes le Damoisiau, *Qu. Met.*, IV, q. 1, fol. 284vb: “Secundo supponitur quod unum secundo modo dictum est passio entis.

(Nicolaus de Orbellis and Johannes le Damoisiau) specify that the term “unity” does not merely indicate a negation (the undividedness of being) but some positive characteristic of being as well.⁹⁴

The question of the relationship and distinction between being (*esse*), or actual existence (*existentia*), and essence (*essentia*) is raised by three of our commentators: Johannes le Damoisiau, Georgius Bruxellensis, and Petrus Tartareti. Damoisiau offers by far the most sophisticated treatment of the problem. He mentions four opinions on this issue. The first is Avicenna’s view that being constitutes “something added” (*aliquid additum*) to a thing’s essence.⁹⁵ The second is Thomas Aquinas’s position, according to which being is different from essence, but does not add anything to it; instead, being arises out of the internal constituting principles of an essence. In this context, Damoisiau introduces (somewhat surprisingly) the distinction between the term “being” taken as a noun (*nominaliter*) and the term “being” taken as a participle (*participialiter*). “Being” taken

Ideo de ipso dicendum est sicut solet dici de aliis subiectis et passionibus suis, scilicet quod sunt idem realiter, propter impossibilem separationem, sed distinguuntur formaliter. Et ideo ens et unum non dicunt eandem naturam quidditative et formaliter, sed bene realiter.” Johannes Hennon, *Qu. Met.*, IV, q. 2, fol. 318vb: “Secundum dictum: ens et unum non dicunt unam et eandem naturam formaliter, etiam capiendo ‘unum’ ut est principium numeri transcendentis. Patet, quia alia est ratio entis et unius; ergo ens et unum non dicunt unam naturam formaliter.” Petrus Tartareti thinks along the same lines, as can be conjectured from the following passage: “Tertio supponitur quod conceptus entis non includitur formaliter in passionibus vel differentiis ultimatis, sed realiter. Ideo de passionibus et differentiis ultimatis eius non predicetur nisi denominative, et non quidditative” (*Comm. Met.*, IV, q. 1, fol. 116rb). Concerning the signification of “being” and “unity” he simply concludes: “Conclusio responsalis ad quesitum: ens et unum dicunt unam et eandem naturam” (fol. 116vb). One might wonder to exactly what extent Johannes Versoris’s claim that the term “unity” signifies the undividedness of being, i.e., a being of reason, which nevertheless has some *fundamentum in re*, in fact coincides with the view according to which being and unity are formally distinct.

⁹⁴ Cf. Nicolaus de Orbellis, *Cursus Met.*, IV, fol. 177vb: “Quarta conclusio sit ista: unum quod est passio entis dicit formaliter aliquid positivum. Probatum quia: unum dicit perfectionem simpliciter; sed negatio non dicit perfectionem simpliciter de se et formaliter; ergo ipsum unum non dicit puram negationem” (Orbellis again copies Antonius Andreae [*Qu. Met.*, IV, q. 3, fol. 14va]). Johannes le Damoisiau, *Qu. Met.*, IV, q. 1, fol. 285ra: “Ex quibus sequitur quod unum supra ens aliquid addit, non quidem tanquam dispositionem accidentalem entis, sed aliquid positivum quod non est formaliter ens, sed bene realiter. Et illud est aliquid positivum et non pura negatio.”

⁹⁵ Cf. *Qu. Met.*, IV, q. 1, fol. 286ra: “Dubitatur primo utrum esse existentie sit aliquid additum realiter sive distinctum ab essentia, cum dicat Avicenna esse accidere omni rei create. [...] Nam Avicenna videtur respondere affirmative volens unum et ens significare aliquid additum rei, et non substantiam eius. Maxime de ente hoc dicit, propter entia que habent esse ab alio et quorum substantia est in potentia ad esse. Idem autem non est in potentia ad seipsum. Tum etiam, quia differt dicere rem et rem entem. Unde potest sciri quid est res et ignorari an sit.”

as a noun is derived from essential being. This type of being does not add anything to an essence. “Being” taken as a participle is obtained from existential being. In the case of created beings, as opposed to uncreated being, i.e., God, this type of (actual) existential being differs from the (potential) being of an essence.⁹⁶

The third view discussed by Damoisiau is attributed to Albert the Great and some anonymous “others,” who claim that the terms “being” and “essence” signify one and the same entity (*realitas*). In this view, the only difference between the two terms resides in their way of signifying that entity: the term “being” signifies by way of an act (*per modum actus*), whereas the term “essence” signifies the same entity by way of a habit (*per modum habitus*). Other, more theologically oriented proponents of Albert’s view claim that one and the same thing is called “essence” insofar as it is an object of the divine intellect, and “being” insofar as it is the result of the divine creative act.⁹⁷ Finally, the fourth view discussed by Damoisiau is that of John Duns Scotus, who distinguishes between four kinds of being: essential being (*esse essentiae*), existential being (*esse actualis existentiae*), subsistent being (*esse subsistentiae*), and propositional being, that signifies the composition of a subject term and a predicate term.⁹⁸

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*: “Doctor Sanctus vero dicit quod esse est aliud ab essentia rei, non tamen superadditum essentiae rei ad modum accidentis, sed quasi constituitur per principia essentiae. Ideo hoc nomen ‘ens,’ quod secundum ipsum imponitur ab ipso esse, significat idem cum homine, quod imponitur ab essentia. [...] Hic tamen advertatur quod ‘ens’ aliquando accipitur nominaliter, et tunc imponitur ab esse essentiae, ut communiter dicitur; nec illo modo ‘ens’ dicit aliquid additum super essentiam; et de ente sic accepto intelligitur illud dictum textus ‘idem est homo et ens homo.’ Alio modo accipitur ‘ens’ participialiter, quo modo imponitur ab esse existentie, quod in rebus creatis non est idem cum esse essentiae, ut dicit Doctor Sanctus, eo quod essentia rei create est possibilis esse. Nichil autem est possibile ad seipsum. Ex essentia etiam et esse primo componitur quelibet res creata et de ipsa essentia recipit esse in illa compositione.”

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, fol. 286ra–b: “Albertus autem et aliqui alii volunt quod idem sit essentia et existentia, ita quod illa realitas eadem que significatur nomine ‘essentiae’ per modum habitus significatur per modum actus per hoc verbum ‘esse.’ Dicit enim quod esse non est aliud quam diffusio essentiae in eo quod est. Aliter ab aliis ponitur differentia esse et essentiae, quia scilicet illa realitas que in quantum est obiectum intellectus divini dicitur essentia, et ut est terminus operationis divinae, scilicet creationis, dicitur esse. Nec secundum istos est ymaginandum quod essentia sit quedam res que sit in potentia ad esse, quasi ad quandam aliam rem, sed quod tam essentia quam esse est in potestate creantis. Quando enim aliquid creatur, tota realitas creatur.”

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, fol. 286rb: “Alia est opinio Doctoris Subtilis. Pro qua supponitur quod quadruplex reperitur esse, scilicet esse essentiae (et hoc tantum differt in modo concipiendi ab essentia); aliud est esse actualis existentie quo res ponitur in rerum natura extra suam causam; aliud est esse subsistentie, quod est esse actualis existentie in seipso non dependens in subsistendo ab alio vel ad aliud suppositum; et his tribus modis esse est aliquid reale

Against the background of these four opinions, especially that of Scotus, Damoisiau himself argues that, in the case of created beings, there is neither a real distinction between being and essence nor a mere distinction of reason.⁹⁹ He also insists that the distinction between being and essence must be found at a metaphysical level (*metaphysicaliter*) and cannot be located at the level of grammar (*grammaticaliter*) alone.¹⁰⁰ What remains then is that being and essence are distinct *ex natura rei*. For in created beings, essence neither precedes being in the order of time (*duratione*) nor in the order of origin (*ordine originis*), but only in the order of nature (*ordine naturae*).¹⁰¹ At the same time, being and essence are not distinct as two different quiddities, but rather as a quiddity (essence) with its intrinsic mode (being). Such an intrinsic mode does not modify the formal definition (*ratio formalis*) of a quiddity, given that it does not have a formal definition of itself—only quiddities have formal definitions; modes do not.¹⁰² Hence, Damoisiau emphasizes that being and essence are not formally distinct but are only *ex natura rei*. For, unlike a distinction *ex natura rei*, a formal distinction always implies a difference at the level of the formal definitions of the distinct entities. But in the case of the (potential) essence of a thing and its (actual) existence, there is no

extra animam. Quarto modo est esse quod significat compositionem intellectus unientis predicatum cum subiecto, quod est sinchategorema. De quo dicit Philosophus quinto *huius* quod esse significat verum et non esse falsum. Et de illo non est ad propositum, sed de esse actualis existentie.”

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*: “Hoc supposito, dicitur primo <quod> in nullo creato essentia et actualis existentia differunt realiter. [...] Dicitur secundo quod essentia et esse non sola ratione differunt.”

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*: “Dicitur tertio quod esse et essentia non differunt tantum grammaticaliter. Patet, quia tunc questio ista non esset methaphysicalis, sed tantum grammaticalis; sed constat quod est summe methaphysicalis.”

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, fol. 286va: “Restat nunc ulterius videre quomodo differunt existentia et essentia. Et quoad hoc dicitur primo quod essentia rei creabilis non precedit existentiam suam in duratione. [...] Dicitur secundo quod essentia rei creabilis non precedit suam existentiam ordine originis. [...] Dicitur tertio quod talis essentia precedit suam existentiam ordine nature. Patet, quia creatio posterior est ipsa quidditate, cum omnis relatio sit posterior suo fundamento; sed ipsa creatio passiva est quedam relatio; igitur.”

¹⁰² *Ibid.*: “Dicitur quarto quod essentia creabilis non distinguitur a sua existentia sicut quidditas a quidditate, sed sicut quidditas a suo modo intrinseco. Patet, quia modus intrinsecus est qui adveniens alicui non variat eius rationem formalem, eo quod de se nullam habet rationem formalem; sed existentia adveniens essentie non variat eius rationem formalem.”

difference of definition. Damoisiau thus differentiates clearly between a distinction *ex natura rei* and a formal distinction.¹⁰³

Finally, Georgius Bruxellensis and Petrus Tartareti offer less sophisticated discussions of the distinction between being and essence. Tartareti argues quite straightforwardly that, in created beings, being and essence are really identical but formally distinct. He claims that the only reason why existence is sometimes considered to be an added, accidental property of an essence is that (actual) existence is not included in the formal definition of a created thing. The case is different for God, whose quiddity of itself includes actual existence.¹⁰⁴ Georgius Bruxellensis devotes two separate *dubia* to the distinction of being and essence, but in the end, his exact position in the debate remains unclear (just as his position with respect to the univocity of being). On the one hand, he argues that being adds nothing real to an essence, neither an absolute thing (*res absoluta*) nor a real relation (*respectus realis*).¹⁰⁵ On the other hand, he puts forward two possible interpretations of the idea that being and essence are distinct according to reason alone (*solum ratione*), without explicitly endorsing one of them. What is clear, however, is that Georgius does not argue in favor of a formal distinction (or a distinction *ex natura rei*) between being and essence.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*: “Distinguitur ergo existentia ab essentia ex natura rei, sed non formaliter. Quod non formaliter patet, quia quandocumque sunt aliqua totaliter idem quantum ad diffinitionem, illa non possunt formaliter distingui; sed homo in potentia et homo in actu sunt penitus idem quantum ad diffinitionem; igitur.”

¹⁰⁴ Cf. *Qu. Met.*, IV, q. 1, fol. 116^{va}: “Dico ulterius quod esse existentie et esse essentie sunt idem realiter, licet distinguantur formaliter. [...] Dicitur tamen ipsa existentia accidere cuilibet rei create, quia est extra eius conceptum et non quod sit accidens, capiendo ‘accidens’ pro forma inherente rei. Et dicitur notanter ‘cuilibet rei create,’ quia existentia Dei est de conceptu quidditativo Dei. Ista enim est in primo modo dicendi per se ‘Deus est,’ et ista est per accidens et in materia contingenti ‘homo est.’”

¹⁰⁵ Cf. *Qu. Met.*, IV, q. 2, fol. 21^{ra}–b: “Dubitatur primo utrum in eadem re esse realiter distinguatur ab essentia. [...] Pro dubio est advertendum quod de distinctione esse ab essentia varie sunt opiniones. Quidam dicunt quod esse addit supra essentiam aliquam absolutam, alii quod esse addit ultra essentiam aliquem respectum realem ad agens. Alii dicunt quod ratione solum distinguuntur. Alii vero dicunt quod <distinguuntur> solum grammaticaliter, quia ‘essentia’ significat ipsam nominaliter et ‘esse’ significat verbaliter. Sed prima et secunda opinio sunt false. [...]” Georgius’s second *dubium* is devoted to the third opinion (see following note). The fourth opinion is completely left aside.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, fol. 21^{rb}–va: “Dubitatur utrum esse et essentia solum ratione different. [...] Pro dubio est advertendum quod essentia illa dicitur esse que est posita extra nihil. In hoc autem quod dicitur essentia posita extra nihil duo dicuntur, scilicet ipsa essentia et ipsa positio extra nihil. Quidam igitur voluerunt dicere quod esse est ipsa positio extra nihil, et ita ipsa positio extra nihil non est alia res a re ipsa posita, licet sit bene alius conceptus secundum quem concipitur ut res et secundum quem concipitur posita extra nihil.

4. CONCLUSION

At a first glance, it seems that we can conclude that the tradition of commentaries on Aristotle's *Metaphysics* flourished in the 15th century, insofar as many more commentaries were produced than in the previous century. The tradition was established in many important intellectual centers throughout Europe, with the notable exception of England, and spread across a wide variety of religious orders, even though most of the commentators were seculars. Therefore, it seems reasonable to consider the 15th century to be the golden age of Aristotelian metaphysics.

However, a closer examination of the Parisian group of commentaries challenges this idea of a flourishing tradition. First of all, most of the commentators covered only a limited selection of Aristotle's work (Books I–VI) and addressed only a relatively small number of questions (in many cases only one or two). Furthermore, there is little evidence of philosophical innovation or sophistication in the Parisian works. Leaving aside one isolated reference to John Buridan's followers (*Buridanistae*), all references named are the conventional authorities on the topic: Avicenna, Averroes, Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, and John Duns Scotus. The most influential commentator is Antonius Andreae, whose commentary was used as a model by Johannes le Damoisiau, Johannes Hennon, Nicolaus de Orbellis, and Petrus Tartareti (and, to a lesser extent, Georgius Bruxellensis), which gave these works a strong flavor of early 14th-century Scotism. Finally, several of the commentators not only reproduced entire sections from Antonius Andreae's commentary but also copied fragments of text from each other's works or that by other, as yet unidentified authors. As a result, the commentaries ended up being very similar to one another in many respects.

However, Johannes Versoris's commentary is an exception. It is much less selective, it is hardly (if at all) influenced by Antonius Andreae's commentary, and it seems to be largely unaffected by mutual copying. Versoris's commentary also differs from the other works with respect to contents. While our commentators seem to agree on several issues, particularly on the concept and the subject-matter of metaphysics, Versoris follows his own line of reasoning. For example, with respect to the subject-matter of

[...] Alii tamen dicunt quod ipsum existere est ipsa essentia existens, nec est res aliqua absoluta vel respectiva et inherens, sed esse aliquam essentiam existere. Hoc autem, puta aliquam essentiam existere, omnino nulla res est."

metaphysics, his approach differs from that of the other Parisian authors, even though his conclusions are similar to theirs. Moreover, Versoris not only follows different lines of reasoning but also defends his own particular views. For example, he argues that quidditative knowledge of God and the separate substances is wholly unattainable for us in this life, and that being and unity are only distinct according to reason (*secundum rationem*). In contrast, the other authors claim that some form of quidditative knowledge of God and the separate substances can be acquired in this life and that being and unity are formally distinct (*formaliter*). Versoris also stands alone in explicitly defending the analogy of being while the other authors either argue in favor of the univocity of being (Johannes le Damoisiau, Johannes Hennon, Nicolaus de Orbellis, and Petrus Tartareti) or leave the question undecided (Georgius Bruxellensis). As a rule, Versoris adopts Thomist solutions, whereas the other authors, with the notable exception of Georgius Bruxellensis, proceed along Scotist lines.

To conclude, if we leave aside Versoris's commentary and ignore all the slight differences in detail, we see that the Parisian commentaries are actually very similar in terms of both formal structure and contents. In fact, they look like standard accounts of Aristotelian metaphysics to be used as teaching manuals for the Arts faculty or *studia* of the religious orders. From the perspective of philosophical innovation or sophistication, the fifteenth-century tradition of commentaries on Aristotle's *Metaphysics* was, therefore, not as flourishing as the comparative numbers of extant commentaries would suggest.

APPENDIX I

FIFTEENTH-CENTURY *METAPHYSICS* COMMENTARIES¹⁰⁷

1. Antonius de Carlenis O.P. (d. 1460), *Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicae* (Unknown [Italy]) (Lohr 1, 365).¹⁰⁸
2. Antonius Trombeta O.F.M. CONV. (d. 1517), *Quaestiones quodlibetales metaphysicae* (Padua) (Lohr 1, 366–67).¹⁰⁹
3. Arnoldus Bodense, *Disputationes super librum XII Metaphysicae* (Unknown [Vienna?]) (Lohr 1, 369).
4. Bertholdus dictus Gepzen (?), *Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum* (Ezlingen) (Lohr 7, 130).
5. Dominicus de Flandria O.P. (d. 1479), *Quaestiones super Metaphysicam* (Florence [?]) (Lohr 1, 399).¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁷ This list of 42 extant commentaries is based on Charles H. Lohr's survey of "Medieval Latin Aristotle Commentaries," published between 1967 and 1974 in subsequent issues of *Traditio*: 23 (1967), 313–413 (= Lohr 1); 24 (1968), 149–245 (= Lohr 2); 26 (1970), 135–216 (= Lohr 3); 27 (1971), 251–351 (= Lohr 4); 28 (1972), 281–396 (= Lohr 5); 29 (1973), 93–197 (= Lohr 6); and 30 (1974), 119–44 (= Lohr 7). The abbreviated text of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* Books I–VI composed by (or attributed to) Thomas Bricot (d. 1516) (see Lohr 6, 177–78, and above, note 8) has not been included in this list. In addition to the 42 extant commentaries, Lohr lists 12 15th-century authors whose commentaries seem to be no longer extant: Ambrosius Spiera (Spera) Tarvisinus O.S.M. (Lohr 1, 357); Andreas de Biliis (Biglia) O.E.S.A. (Lohr 1, 358); Baptista de Fabriano O.P. (Lohr 1, 374); Erasmus Friesner de Wunsiedel O.P. (Lohr 1, 405); Franciscus Securus de Nardo O.P. (Lohr 1, 412); Gualterus Scotus de Parisiis (?) (Lohr 2, 188); Hieronymus de Janua O.P. (Lohr 2, 239); Jacobus de Jutirboc O. CARTH. (Lohr 3, 143); Johannes Capreolus O.P. (Lohr 3, 184); Johannes Nicolaus Blancus (Bianchi) O. CARM. (Lohr 4, 306); Vincentius Merlinus O.P. (Lohr 6, 196); and Franciscus de Fortis O.F.M. (Lohr 7, 134). Commentaries discovered since the publication of Lohr's survey have not been taken into account.

¹⁰⁸ For this author, see Thomas Kaeppli, *Scriptores Ordinis Praedicatorum Medii Aevi*, 4 vols. (Rome, 1970–93), vol. 1 (A–F), p. 109, esp. n. 283 (*Quaestiones in libros XII Metaphysicorum Aristotelis*); and Steven J. Livesey, *Antonius de Carlenis, O.P. Four Questions on the Subalternation of the Sciences* (Philadelphia, 1994).

¹⁰⁹ According to Lohr, a new edition of this work was printed in 1502 as *Opus in Metaphysicam*. See also Edward P. Mahoney, "Antonio Trombeta and Agostino Nifo on Averroes and Intelligible Species: A Philosophical Dispute at the University of Padua," in: Antonino Poppi, ed., *Storia e cultura al Santo di Padova fra il XII et il XX secolo* (Vicenza, 1976), pp. 289–301 (repr. in: Edward P. Mahoney, *Two Aristotelians of the Italian Renaissance* [Aldershot, 2000], n. IX); and Sven V. Knebel, "Volo magis stare cum Avicenna. Der Zufall zwischen Averoisten und Avicennisten," in: Andreas Speer & Lydia Wegener, eds., *Wissen über Grenzen. Arabisches Wissen und lateinisches Mittelalter* (Miscellanea Mediaevalia) 33 (Berlin-New York, 2006), pp. 662–76, esp. 672–76.

¹¹⁰ For this work, see Léon Mahieu, *Dominique de Flandre: sa métaphysique* (Bibliothèque Thomiste) 24 (Paris, 1942). See also Kaeppli, *Scriptores Ordinis Praedicatorum*, vol. 1, pp. 315–18, esp. 317, n. 861 (*Summa divinae philosophiae* [Quaest. In XII libros Metaphys.]); Franco Riva, "L'analogia dell'ente in Domenico di Fiandria," *Rivista di filosofia neoscolastica* 86 (1994), 287–322; and E. Jennifer Ashworth, "Suárez on the Analogy of Being: Some Historical Background," *Vivarium* 33 (1995), 50–75. Dominicus's commentary has been

6. Franciscus de Casleto (fl. 1437), *Metaphysica* (Toulon [Toloniae?]) (Lohr 1, 409).
7. Gabriel Zerbus, *Quaestiones metaphysicae* (Bologna or Padua [?]) (Lohr 2, 150).
8. Georgius Bruxellensis (d. 1510), *Cursus optimarum quaestionum [...] Metaphysica* I–VI (Paris) (Lohr 2, 156–57).¹¹¹
9. Henricus Ruyn (fl. 1428), *Disputata super Metaphysicam* (Erfurt) (Lohr 2, 228).¹¹²
10. Humbertus de Albiziis O.P. (d. 1434), *Glossae super libris Metaphysicae* (Firenze) (Lohr 2, 244).¹¹³
11. Jacobus de Gostynin (d. 1506), *In Metaphysicam* (Krakow) (Lohr 3, 142).¹¹⁴
12. Jodocus de Marbach (fl. 1446–47), *Expositio libri VII Metaphysicae* (Leipzig) (Lohr 3, 151).
13. Johannes de Caulaincourt (d. after 1483), *In libros Metaphysicorum* (Paris) (Lohr 3, 184).¹¹⁵
14. Johannes de Colonia O.F.M. (fl. 15/2 c.), *Quaestiones magistri Iohannis Scoti abbreviatae et ordinatae per alphabetum super IV libris Sententiarum Quodlibetisque Metaphysicae et De anima* (Unknown [Cologne ?]) (Lohr 3, 185).
15. Johannes de Glogovia (d. 1507), *Quaestiones super XII libros Metaphysicae* (Krakow) (Lohr 3, 200).¹¹⁶
16. Johannes de Glogovia (d. 1507), *Expositio in libros Metaphysicorum* (Krakow) (Lohr 3, 200).

edited as *Quaestiones in duodecim Metaphysicae libros Aristotelis secundum processum et expositionem doctoris angelici Thomae de Aquino ordinis praedicatorum* (Venice, 1499; repr. Frankfurt a. M., 1967).

¹¹¹ For this author, see Olga Weijers, *Le travail intellectuel à la Faculté des arts de Paris: textes et maîtres (ca. 1200–1500)*, vol. 3: *Répertoire des noms commençant par G* (Studia Artistarum) 6 (Turnhout, 1998), pp. 73–74.

¹¹² The *Disputata super Metaphysicam* by Henricus Ruyn (Runen or Ryen) have been edited by Andrea Tabarroni, “Henricus Ruyn, *Disputata Metaphysicae*. An Edition,” *Cahiers de l’Institut du Moyen-Age Grec et Latin* 61 (1991), 185–428.

¹¹³ For this work, see Thomas Kaeppli & Emilio Panella, *Scriptores Ordinis Praedicatorum Medii Aevi*, vol. 4 (*T–Z*) (Rome, 1993), pp. 412–13, n. 3915.

¹¹⁴ For this author, see Władysław Śeńko, “La Philosophie médiévale en Pologne: caractère, tendances et courants principaux,” *Mediaevalia Philosophica Polonorum* 14 (1970), 5–21, esp. 17–18.

¹¹⁵ For this work, see Paul J.J.M. Bakker, “Natural Philosophy and Metaphysics in Late Fifteenth-Century Paris. III: The Commentaries on Aristotle by Johannes de Caulaincourt (*alias* Johannes de Magistris),” *Bulletin de philosophie médiévale* 49 (2007), 195–237, esp. 231–33.

¹¹⁶ For this author, see Stefan Swieżawski, “Matériaux servant aux recherches sur Jean de Glogow († 1507),” in: *Mélanges offerts à Etienne Gilson* (Toronto-Paris, 1959), pp. 613–50; and Śeńko, “La Philosophie médiévale en Pologne,” pp. 16–17. Johannes’s commentary has been edited by Ryszard Tatarzyński, *Jan z Glogowa, Komentarz do Metafizyki* (Opera philosophorum medii aevi. Textus et studia) 7 (Warszawa, 1984).

17. Johannes Hennon (d. after 1484), *Liber philosophiae Aristotelis (Metaphysica I–V)* (Paris) (Lohr 3, 203).¹¹⁷
18. Johannes Hervaeus (fl. 1478–1505), *In libros I–V Metaphysicae* (Paris) (Lohr 3, 204).¹¹⁸
19. Johannes le Damoisiau (d. after 1488), *In libros I–VI Metaphysicae* (Paris) (Lohr 4, 255).¹¹⁹
20. Johannes Meyger de Lübeck (?) (fl. 1458–62), *Quaestiones metaphysicae* (1462) (Rostock) (Lohr 4, 262).
21. Johannes de Nova Domo (fl. 1400–15), *Positiones notabiles circa libros Metaphysicae* (Paris) (Lohr 4, 264).¹²⁰
22. Johannes Orient (fl. 1405–42), *Lectura cum textu et quaestionibus omnium XII librorum Metaphysicae collecta ex scripto Alexandri [de Alexandria]* (Krakow or Prague [?]) (Lohr 4, 265).
23. Johannes Ottonis de Münsterberg (d. 1416), *Quaestiones in XII libros Metaphysicae* (Prague) (Lohr 4, 266).
24. Johannes de Racziborsko (fl. 1444–45), *In Metaphysicam* (Krakow) (Lohr 4, 273).¹²¹
25. Johannes Rucherat de Weselia (d. 1481), *Exercitium Metaphysicae* (Erfurt) (Lohr 4, 277).¹²²

¹¹⁷ For this work, see Paul J.J.M. Bakker, “Natural Philosophy and Metaphysics in Late Fifteenth-Century Paris. I: The Commentaries on Aristotle by Johannes Hennon,” *Bulletin de philosophie médiévale* 47 (2005), 125–55, esp. 154–55.

¹¹⁸ For this author, see Richard Sharpe, *A Handlist of the Latin Writers of Great Britain and Ireland Before 1540* (Turnhout, 1997), p. 262 (John Harvey); and Olga Weijers, *Le travail intellectuel à la Faculté des arts de Paris: textes et maîtres (ca. 1200–1500)*, vol. 5: *Répertoire des noms commençant par J (suite: à partir de Johannes D.)* (Studia Artistarum) 11 (Turnhout, 2003), p. 84.

¹¹⁹ For this work, see Paul J.J.M. Bakker, “Natural Philosophy and Metaphysics in Late Fifteenth-Century Paris. II: The Commentaries on Aristotle by Johannes le Damoisiau,” *Bulletin de philosophie médiévale* 48 (2006), 209–28, esp. 226–28.

¹²⁰ For this work, see Anton G. Weiler, “Un traité de Jean de Nova Domo sur les universaux,” *Vivarium* 6 (1968), 108–54, esp. 120–23 and 153–54 (edition of fragments); also Weijers, *Le travail intellectuel*, vol. 5, pp. 132–34, esp. 133.

¹²¹ For this author, see Jerzy Zathej, “*Colligite fragmenta ne pereant*. Contribution aux recherches sur l’histoire de l’enseignement à l’université de Cracovie au XV^e siècle,” *Mediævalia Philosophica Polonorum* 10 (1961), 96–102; and Sophie Włodek, “Quelques informations sur les commentaires médiévaux de la *Métaphysique* d’Aristote conservés dans les manuscrits de la Bibliothèque Jagellone à Cracovie,” in: Paul Wilpert, ed., *Die Metaphysik im Mittelalter. Ihr Ursprung und ihre Bedeutung* (Miscellanea mediævalia) 2 (Berlin, 1963), pp. 767–74, esp. 769–70.

¹²² For this author, see Gustav A. Benrath, “Rucherat, Johann, von Wesel,” in: Wolfgang Stämmler & Karl Langosch, eds., *Die deutsche Literatur des Mittelalters. Verfasserlexikon*, 14 vols. (Berlin-New York, 1978–2008), vol. 8 (Berlin-New York, 1992), pp. 298–304, esp. 301.

26. Johannes de Slupcza (?) (d. 1488), *Puncta super libros Metaphysicae* (Krakow) (Lohr 4, 282).¹²³
27. Johannes Streler de Francfordia O.P. (d. 1459), *Quaestiones libri Metaphysicae* (Vienna) (Lohr 4, 284).¹²⁴
28. Johannes Tinctoris de Tornaco (d. 1469), *Textualia vel copulata Metaphysicae* (Cologne) (Lohr 4, 287).¹²⁵
29. Johannes Versoris (d. after 1482), *Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicae* (Paris) (Lohr 4, 293–94).¹²⁶
30. Kilianus Stetzing O.F.M. (fl. 15 c.), *Tabula super Metaphysicam Antonii Andreae* (Colchester & Erfurt [“tabula super *Metaphysicam* rev. doctoris Fr. Antonii Andreae o.m. Scotelli magno labore collecta [...] in Anglia Colcestriae, Erfordiae vero completa”]) (Lohr 4, 307).
31. Mauritius de Portu O.F.M. CONV. (d. 1513), *Annotationes (Castigationes) in Scoti Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicae* (Milan or Padua [?]) (Lohr 4, 344).¹²⁷
32. Nicolaus Murrifex O.F.M. (fl. 1454–60), *Declaratio super Antonii Andreae Metaphysicam* (Magdeburg) (Lohr 5, 288).
33. Nicolaus de Orbellis O.F.M. CONV. (d. 1475), *Compendium mathematicae, physicae et metaphysicae* (Paris [?]) (Lohr 5, 289).¹²⁸
34. Nicolaus Theodorici de Amsterdam (d. ca. 1460), *Quaestiones Metaphysicae* (Rostock & Leipzig) (Lohr 5, 303).¹²⁹

¹²³ For this work, see Ryszard Tatarzyński, “Le Commentaire à la *Métaphysique* d’Aristote attribué à Jean de Slupcza: le choix des questions relatives à la causalité,” *Medievalia Philosophica Polonorum* 24 (1979), 133–68.

¹²⁴ For this author, see Thomas Kaeppli, *Scriptores Ordinis Praedicatorum Medii Aevi*, vol. 3 (I–S) (Rome, 1980), pp. 17–8, esp. 17, n. 2676.

¹²⁵ For this author, see Martin Grabmann, *Mittelalterliches Geistesleben. Abhandlungen zur Geschichte der Scholastik und Mystik*, 3 vols. (Munich, 1956), vol. 3, pp. 411–32; Emile van Balberghe, “Les œuvres du théologien Jean Tinctor,” in: Emile van Balberghe, *Les Manuscrits médiévaux de l’abbaye du Parc* (Brussels, 1992), pp. 123–53; Götz-Rüdiger Tewes, “Frühhumanismus in Köln. Neue Beobachtungen zu dem thomistischen Theologen Johannes Tinctoris von Tournai,” in: Johannes Helmuth, Helmut Wolff, & Heribert Mueller, eds., *Studien zum 15. Jahrhundert. Festschrift für Erich Meuthen* (Munich, 1994), pp. 667–95; and Raymond Macken, *Medieval Philosophers of the Former Low Countries. Bibliography and Catalogue*, 2 vols. (Leuven, 1997), vol. 2, pp. 376–80.

¹²⁶ For this author, see Weijers, *Le travail intellectuel*, vol. 5, pp. 170–77, esp. 173; Pepijn Rutten, “*Secundum processum et mentem Versoris*: John Versor and His Relation to the Schools of Thought Reconsidered,” *Vivarium* 43 (2005), 292–336; and Serge-Thomas Bonino, “Le thomisme parisien au XV^e siècle,” *Revue thomiste* 107 (2007), 625–52.

¹²⁷ For this author, see Sharpe, *A Handlist*, pp. 375–76 (Maurice O’Fihely).

¹²⁸ For this author, see Olga Weijers, *Le travail intellectuel à la Faculté des arts de Paris: textes et maîtres (ca. 1200–1500)*, vol. 6: *Répertoire des noms commençant par L-M-N-O* (*Studia Artistarum*) 13 (Turnhout, 2005), pp. 166–68, esp. 167.

¹²⁹ For this author, see Macken, *Medieval Philosophers*, pp. 423–28; and Jan Pinborg, “Die Aristoteles-Quaestionen des Magister Nicolaus von Amsterdam,” *Classica et Mediaevalia* 25 (1964), pp. 244–62. Two questions from Nicolaus’s commentary on the *Metaphysics* (IV, q. 5: *Utrum “ens” univoce significat substantiam et accidens*, and VII, q. 1: *Utrum substantia sit prior accidente definitione, notitia et tempore*) are edited by Paul J.J.M. Bakker, “Nicholas of Amsterdam on Accidental Being. A Study and Edition of Two Questions from

35. Paulus Nicolettus Venetus O.E.S.A. (d. 1429), *Lectura super librum Metaphysicorum* (Padua [?]) (Lohr 5, 318).¹³⁰
36. Paulus Soncinas O.P. (d. 1494), *Quaestiones metaphysicales (In libros Metaphysicae quaestiones)* (Milan, Ferrara, or Bologna [?]) (Lohr 5, 321).¹³¹
37. Petrus Martinez de Osma (d. ca. 1480), *Compendium super libros VII–XII Metaphysicae* (Salamanca) (Lohr 5, 363).¹³²
38. Petrus de Rivo (d. 1499), *Textualia Metaphysicae* (Louvain) (Lohr 5, 367).¹³³
39. Petrus de Sienna (d. before 1460), *Quaestiones super librum Metaphysicorum* (Krakow) (Lohr 5, 371).¹³⁴
40. Petrus Tartareti (d. ca. 1522), *Quaestiones super tota philosophia naturali et metaphysica (Metaphysica I–VI)* (Paris) (Lohr 5, 374–75).¹³⁵

his Commentary on the *Metaphysics*,” *Bochumer philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter* 15 (2012), 131–80.

¹³⁰ For this work, see Amos Bertolacci, *Il commento di Paolo Veneto ai libri IV e VI della Metafisica di Aristotele e la tradizione esegetica medievale* (Laurea [M.A. equivalent] dissertation, University of Pisa, 1990–91); Leonardo Riccadonna, *Il commento di Paolo Veneto al libro VII della Metafisica di Aristotele e la tradizione esegetica medievale* (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pisa, 1994–95); Alessandro D. Conti, *Esistenza e verità. Forme e struttura del reale in Paolo Veneto e nel pensiero filosofico del tardo Medioevo* (Rome, 1996); Alessandro D. Conti, “Paul of Venice on Individuation,” *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales* 65.1 (1998), 107–32; Alessandro D. Conti, “Paul of Venice’s Theory of Divine Ideas and its Sources,” *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 14 (2003), 409–48; and Fabrizio Amerini, “Thomas Aquinas, Alexander of Alexandria and Paul of Venice on the Nature of Essence,” *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 15 (2004), 541–89.

¹³¹ For this author, see Kaeppli, *Scriptores Ordinis Praedicatorum*, vol. 3, p. 203, n. 3177. Paulus Soncinas’s commentary (which covers Books IV–XII) has been edited as *Quaestiones metaphysicales acutissimae* (Venice, 1588; repr. Frankfurt a. M., 1967).

¹³² For this author, see Horacio Santiago-Otero & Klaus Reinhardt, *Pedro Martínez de Osma y el método teológico. Edición de algunos escritos inéditos* (Madrid, 1987); José Labajos Alonso, “Pensamiento metafísico de Pedro de Osma,” *La Ciudad de Dios* 207 (1994), 49–75; and José L. Fuertes Herrerros, “Contra el nominalismo. Humanismo y renovación de la filosofía y teología en Pedro Martínez de Osma (1428–1480),” *Revista española de filosofía medieval* 11 (2004), 243–55.

¹³³ For this author, see Luc Burie, “Proeve tot inventarisatie van de in handschrift of in druk bewaarde werken van de Leuvense theologie professoren uit de XV^e eeuw,” in: Edmond J.M. van Eijl, ed., *Facultas S. Theologiae Lovaniensis, 1432–1797. Bijdragen tot haar geschiedenis* (Bibliotheca Ephemerium theologicarum Lovaniensium) 45 (Leuven, 1977), pp. 214–72, and Chris Schabel, *Theology at Paris, 1316–1345: Peter Auriol and the Problem of Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents* (Aldershot, 2000).

¹³⁴ For this author, see Włodek, “Quelques informations,” pp. 769–70; and Feliks Krause, “Przedmiot metafizyki i jego specyficzne właściwości według Piotra z Sienna (L’objet de la métaphysique et ses propriétés spécifiques selon Pierre de Sienna),” *Acta Mediaevalia* 12 (1999), 215–34.

¹³⁵ For this author, see Gerhard Krieger, “Die Begründung der Metaphysik in der Existenz. Zu einer Parallele zwischen sprachanalytischer Ontologie und spätmittelalterlichem Scotismus,” *Franziskanische Studien* 72 (1990), 70–86; and Olga Weijers & Monica B. Calma, *Le travail intellectuel à la Faculté des arts de Paris: textes et maîtres (ca. 1200–1500)*, vol. 7: *Répertoire des noms commençant par P* (Studia Artistarum) 15 (Turnhout, 2007), pp. 233–38, esp. 236–37.

41. Simon Baechcz de Homburg (d. 1464), *Exercitium metaphysicae* (Erfurt) (Lohr 6, 140).
42. Thuo Nicolai de Vribergia (d. 1472), *Disputata in libros Metaphysicorum* (Erfurt) (Lohr 6, 191–92).¹³⁶

¹³⁶ Thuo's commentary has been edited: Thuo de Vribergia, *Disputata metaphysicae*, ed. Andrea Tabarroni (Corpus Philosophorum Danicorum Medii Aevi) 13 (København, 1998), pp. 1–277. See also Egbert P. Bos, "Thuo of Vriborg and Marsilius of Inghen," in: Sten Ebbesen & Russell L. Friedman, eds., *Medieval Analyses in Language and Cognition*. Acts of the Symposium *The Copenhagen School of Medieval Philosophy*, January 10–13, 1996 (Copenhagen, 1999), pp. 523–39 (with an edition of Marsilius of Inghen, *Qu. Met.*, VII, q. 15, *Utrum sit aliquis conceptus singularis essentialis*).

APPENDIX 2
LISTS OF *QUAESTIONES*, *DUBITATIONES*, AND *LEMMATA*

I. *JOHANNES VERSORIS*, *QUAESTIONES SUPER METAPHYSICAM* (COLOGNE, 1494;
REPR. FRANKFURT A. M., 1967)

Liber primus

1. Utrum ista scientia que metaphisica dicitur sit scientia distincta ab aliis partibus philosophie.
2. Utrum omnes homines natura scire desiderant.
3. Utrum ex sensu fiat memoria, et ex memoria fiat experimentum, et ex experimento fiat ars.
4. Utrum expertus artifex certius operetur artifice non experto.
5. Utrum scientia speculativa sit melior activa sive practica et magis nomine sapientie digna.
6. Utrum ad sapientem pertineat consideratio quidditatum omnium rerum etiam in particulari.
7. Utrum metaphisica sit scientia speculativa vel activa.

Liber secundus

1. Utrum cognitio veritatis sit homini possibilis.
2. Utrum difficultas in cognitione veritatis veniat ex parte rerum vel intellectus nostri.
3. Utrum ista scientia que philosophia prima dicitur sit maxime veritatis scientia.
4. Utrum in causis efficientibus sit processus in infinitum.
5. Utrum in finibus et formis sit processus in infinitum.

Liber tertius

1. Utrum inquirenti veritatis scientiam necesse sit primum dubitare.
2. Utrum unius scientie aut diversarum sit omnia genera causarum speculari.
3. Utrum unius scientie aut diversarum sit considerare simpliciter prima principia demonstrationum, et si unius, utrum eiusdem sit vel alterius considerare substantiam, que est primum et principale ens.
4. Utrum preter substantias sensibiles et singulares sint ponende alie substantie separate ab eis secundum esse universales et predicabiles de ipsis singularibus substantiis, ut posuerunt platonici.
5. Utrum genera sint principia aut elementa rerum aut eadem ex quibus inexistentibus et primis componitur unumquodque.
6. Utrum omnium rerum sint eadem principia secundum numerum.
7. Utrum unum et ens sint principia substantialia rerum.

Liber quartus

1. Utrum ens dicatur univoce de creaturis.
2. Utrum ens et unum dicant eandem naturam.
3. Utrum primum principium sit ista propositio: "impossibile est idem simul inesse et non inesse eidem."
4. Utrum noster intellectus possit simul multa intelligere.
5. Utrum omne nomen significet unum tantum.
6. Utrum omne quod apparet sit verum.

Liber quintus

1. Utrum ad metaphisicum pertineat nominum multiplicium distinctio.
2. Utrum diffinitio elementi sit bene assignata in qua dicitur "elementum est ex quo componitur aliquid primo inexistente indivisibili specie in aliam speciem."
3. Utrum consideratio huius nominis "natura" ad metaphisicum pertineat.
4. Utrum illa que dicuntur unum quinto modo, scilicet quorum intelligentia est indivisibilis loco, tempore et ratione, sunt maxime unum.
5. Utrum divisiones entis et substantie posite in textu sint sufficientes.
6. Utrum divisiones eiusdem et diversi, similis et dissimilis, oppositi et contrarii, specie diversorum et eorundem specie sint sufficienter assignate.
7. Utrum modi prioris et posterioris sint sufficienter in textu positi.
8. Utrum divisiones potestatis seu potentie et quanti sint sufficienter posite.
9. Utrum modi qualis seu qualitatis sint sufficienter assignati.
10. Utrum modi ad aliquid sint sufficienter ab Aristotele positi.
11. Utrum modi perfecti sufficienter ponantur in textu.
12. Utrum inter privative opposita sit dare medium.
13. Utrum totum universale et integrale differant.
14. Utrum conditiones colobon sint sufficienter assignate.
15. Utrum falsum est in rebus.

Liber sextus

1. Utrum divisio philosophie in factivam, que mechanica dicitur, et activam, que moralis, et theoreticam, que speculativa dicitur, sit sufficiens.
2. Utrum de ente per accidens sive secundum accidens sit scientia.
3. Utrum ens quod dicitur verum sit de consideratione metaphisice.

Liber septimus

1. Utrum substantia sit prior accidente tempore, diffinitione et cognitione seu noticia.
2. Utrum materia sit substantia.
3. Utrum ex cognitione istorum sensibilibum deveniamus in cognitionem substantiarum immaterialium.
4. Utrum accidentia diffiniantur per additamentum.
5. Utrum quod quid est sit idem cum eo cuius est quod quid est.
6. Utrum sint ydee ponende separate ut sint cause horum inferiorum.

7. Utrum forma generetur vel compositum in his que componuntur ex materia et forma.
8. Utrum diffinitiones rerum sensibilium concipiunt materiam.
9. Utrum partes diffinitionis significant unum et utrum ex ipsis fiat unum.
10. Utrum universale sit substantia.
11. Utrum, si ydee ponerentur ut posuit Plato, possent diffiniri.
12. Utrum ipsum quod <quid> est sit principium et causa rei cuius est.

Liber octavus

1. Utrum materia et forma sint principia omnium substantiarum sensibilium.
2. Utrum species vel forme rerum habeant se sicut numeri.
3. Utrum accidentium sit materia.
4. Utrum ex materia et forma per se fiat aliquid unum.

Liber nonus

1. Utrum differentia posita ab Arestotele inter potentias rationales et irrationales sit sufficiens, que est quod potentie rationales sunt eedem oppositorum et potentie irrationales non sunt eedem oppositorum.
2. Utrum nihil sit possibile nisi quando actu est, ut dixerunt mechanici.
3. Utrum omne illud ex quo aliquid fit sit in potentia ad quod fit.
4. Utrum actus prior sit potentia diffinitione substantia sive perfectione et tempore.
5. Utrum actus sit melior potentia et intelligentia prior.

Liber decimus

1. Utrum omnia mensurantur uno.
2. Utrum unum sit substantia aliqua per se subsistens.
3. Utrum unum et multa opponantur contrarie.
4. Utrum diffinitio contrariorum sit bene posita, in qua dicitur: contraria sunt que plurimum differunt eorum que sunt in eodem genere et in eodem subiecto et sub eadem potestate.
5. Utrum privatio et habitus sint principium contrarietatis.
6. Utrum equale opponitur magno et parvo.
7. Utrum unum et multa opponantur.
8. Utrum media contrariorum componantur ex extremis.
9. Utrum contrarietas sit differentia secundum speciem.
10. Utrum corruptibile et incorruptibile differant genere.

Liber undecimus

1. Utrum unius scientie sit considerare principia rerum.
2. Utrum si ens pure equivoce diceretur de omnibus entibus, de omnibus entibus esset scientia una.
3. Utrum ad metaphysicam pertineat considerare prima principia demonstrationum.

4. Utrum preter scientias particulares sit ponenda scientia universalis ab aliis distincta.
5. Utrum aliqua scientia consideret de ente per accidens.

Liber duodecimus

1. Utrum materia et forma sint principia substantiarum sensibilium.
2. Utrum eadem principia sint omnium entium, scilicet substantiarum et accidentium.
3. Utrum sit necesse esse aliquam primam substantiam sempiternam et immobilem.
4. Utrum primus motor moveat celum tanquam bonum appetibile.
5. Utrum celum secundum sui substantiam et secundum suum motum a primo principio dependeat.
6. Utrum celum sit animatum.
7. Utrum prima causa, que est Deus, sit omnino simplex.
8. Utrum Deus sit suum intelligere et sua vita.
9. Utrum sit tantum unum primum principium.
10. Utrum sint ponende plures substantie intellectuales separate.
11. Utrum in substantiis separatis sit multitudo individuorum sub una specie.
12. Utrum substantie intellectuales separate create sint composite.
13. Utrum cognitio prime substantie intellectualis sit discursiva, scilicet aut per modum compositionis et divisionis, aut per modum simplicis intelligentie.
14. Utrum substantia intellectualis creata sit suum intelligere et sua potentia intellectiva.
15. Utrum substantie separate create intelligant per species a rebus sensibilibus acceptas.
16. Utrum substantia intellectualis creata quandoque intelligat in actu et quandoque potentia.
17. Utrum substantie separate cognoscant se ipsas.
18. Utrum bonum et finis universi sit ordo universi vel aliud bonum separatum.

II. NICOLAUS DE ORBELLIS, CURSUS LIBRORUM PHILOSOPHIE NATURALIS
SECUNDUM VIAM DOCTORIS SUBTILIS SCOTI, PARS III: METAPHYSICA (BASEL, 1494)

- I: Omnes homines naturaliter scire desiderant (fol. 1ra) [=Met., A 1, 980a21];
Animalia quidem igitur natura sensuum (fol. 1vb) [=Met., A 1, 980a27];
Fit autem ex memoria hominibus experimentum (fol. lii rb) [=Met., A 1, 981a1];
Ad agere quidem igitur (fol. liii ra) [=Met., A 1, 981a15]; Experti quidem quem sciunt licet propter quid (fol. liii rb) [=Met., A 1, 981a30];
Primum quidem igitur (fol. lv ra) [=Met., A 1, 981b15]; Quoniam autem hanc scientiam (fol. lv rb) [=Met., A 2, 982a5]; Quare vero non active (fol. lv vb) [=Met., A 2, 982b11].
- II: De veritate theorica sic quidem (fol. lvii ra) [=Met., α 1, 993a30]; Forsan autem ex difficultate secundum (fol. lvii va) [=Met., α 1, 993b7]; Non solum autem his dicere gratiam (fol. m ra) [=Met., α 1, 993b12]; Vocari vero philosophiam veritatis scientiam (fol. m rb) [=Met., α 1, 993b20].

- III: Necesse est ad quesitam scientiam nos aggredi (fol. mii rb) [=Met., B 1, 995a25].
- IV: Est scientia que speculatur ens inquantum ens et que (fol. miii vb) [=Met., Γ 1, 1003a21]; Ens autem quidem multis dicitur modis (fol. miv rb) [=Met., Γ 2, 1003a33]; Ubique autem non proprie primum est (fol. mvi va) [=Met., Γ 2, 1003b16]; Quoniam autem unius est opposita speculari (fol. mviii rb) [=Met., Γ 2, 1004a10]; Volunt autem hoc demonstrare (fol. n ra) [=Met., Γ 4, 1006a6]; Est autem alia opinio Pithago (fol. n ra); Verum inter contradictionem nihil esse contingit sed necessarium est aut dicere aut negare (fol. n va) [=Met., Γ 7, 101b24].
- V: Principium dicitur aliud quidem unde utique aliquid (fol. nii va) [=Met., Δ 1, 1012b35]; Elementum vero dicitur ex quo componitur primo inexistente (fol. nii va) [=Met., Δ 3, 1014a26]; Natura dicitur uno modo nascentium generatio (fol. nii vb) [=Met., Δ 4, 1014b16]; Necessarium dicitur sine quo (fol. nii vb) [=Met., Δ 5, 1015a20]; Unum dicitur aliquod secundum accidens aliquod secundum se (fol. niii va) [=Met., Δ 6, 1015b17]; Uni vero esse principium alicui est numero (fol. niii vb) [=Met., Δ 6, 1016b17]; Amplius autem alia secundum numerum sunt unum (fol. niii vb) [=Met., Δ 6, 1016b32]; Ens dicitur aliud quidem secundum se id autem secundum accidens (fol. nvi va) [=Met., Δ 7, 1017a8]; Eadem vero dicuntur (fol. nvi va) [=Met., Δ 9, 1017b28]; Diversa vero (fol. nvi vb) [=Met., Δ 9, 1018a10]; Priora et posteriora dicuntur (fol. nvii rb) [=Met., Δ 11, 1018b9]; Potestas dicitur principium et mutationis in altero aut inquantum alterum (fol. nvii vb) [=Met., Δ 12, 1019a15]; Ad aliquid vero dicuntur (fol. o ra) [=Met., Δ 15, 1020b26]; Perfectum vero dicitur unum (fol. oii vb) [=Met., Δ 16, 1021b12]; Terminus dicitur quod est cuiuslibet ultimum (fol. oii vb) [=Met., Δ 18, 1022a4]; Dispositio dicitur habitus (fol. oiii ra) [=Met., Δ 19, 1022b1]; Privatio dicitur uno modo (fol. oiii ra) [=Met., Δ 22, 1022b22]; Ex aliquo esse dicitur uno quidem modo (fol. oiii rb) [=Met., Δ 24, 1023a26].
- VI: Principia et cause queruntur entium palam (fol. oiii va) [=Met., E 1, 1025b3]; Sed quoniam ens simpliciter (fol. ov va) [=Met., E 2, 1026a33]; Quod autem ut verum ens (fol. ovi rb) [=Met., E 4, 1027b17].
- VII: Ens dicitur multipliciter (fol. ovii rb) [=Met., Z 1, 1028a10]; Dicitur autem substantia (fol. oviii va) [=Met., Z 1, 1028b34]; Et primo dicemus de eo quedam logice (fol. oviii vb) [=Met., Z 4, 1029b13]; Eorum autem que fiunt hec natura (fol. p va) [=Met., Z 7, 1032a12]; Quoniam vero diffinitio (fol. piii vb) [=Met., Z 10, 1034b20]; Quoniam vero de substantia (fol. pv vb) [=Met., Z 13, 1038b1].
- VIII: Ex dictis namque silogizare oportet et colligentes (fol. pvii ra) [=Met., H 1, 1042a4].
- IX: Ergo de primo ente et ad quod omnes alie cathegorie (fol. pviii va) [=Met., Θ 1, 1045b28].
- X: Unum vero dicitur multis modis (fol. q vb) [=Met., I 1, 1052a15]; Opponuntur autem unum et multa (fol. qii vb) [=Met., I 3, 1054a20].
- XI: Quod quidem sapientia (fol. qiv ra) [=Met., K 1, 1059a19];
- XII: De substantia quidem theorica (fol. qiv ra) [=Met., Λ 1, 1069a18].

III. JOHANNES HENNON, QVAESTIONES SUPER METAPHYSICAM, PARIS,
BIBLIOTHÈQUE NATIONALE DE FRANCE, LAT. 6529

Liber primus

1. Utrum ens simpliciter sumptum, quod est commune Deo et creature, sit methaphisice subiectum primum primitate adequacionis, hoc est querere utrum ens in quantum ens sit subiectum adequatum mathaphisice (!).
 1. Utrum prudentia sit in brutis.
 2. Utrum expertus non habens artem cercius operetur artifice non experto.
 3. Utrum omnes actiones et generaciones sint circa singularia.
2. Utrum ad methaphisicum spectet considerare omnes quiditates rerum.
 1. Utrum magis universalia sint difficiliora ad cognoscendum.
 2. Utrum methaphisica sit sciencia libera.
 3. Utrum methaphisica sit sciencia honorabilissima.

Liber secundus

1. Utrum difficultas cognoscendi sit ex parte intellectus nostri aut ex parte rerum cognoscibilem.
 1. Utrum in causis essentialiter subordinatis sit processus in infinitum.
 2. Quot sunt impedimenta impediencia nos a cognicione veritatis.
 3. Utrum necesse sit ponere statum in omni genere causarum.

Liber quartus

1. Utrum "ens" predicetur univoce de Deo et creaturis, de substanciis et accidentibus.
 1. Utrum quecumque conveniunt in aliquo uno conceptu reali simul etiam conveniant in aliqua realitate.
 2. Utrum indifferentia conceptus ad plura cum eius unitate sit ratio sufficiens univocacionis illius conceptus.
 3. Utrum differentie non ultime et etiam passiones entis includant ens quiditative.
2. Utrum ens et unum convertantur et eandem naturam significant.
 1. Utrum "unum" significet aliquid principaliter positive.
 2. Utrum impossibile sit demonstrare primum principium.
 3. Utrum istud principium "impossibile est idem simul esse et non esse" sit simpliciter primum.

Liber quintus

1. Utrum possibile sit duo accidentia solo numero differentia esse in eodem subiecto simul.
 1. Utrum relaciones de tercio modo relativorum dicantur mutue.
 2. Quot modis dicitur perfectum.
 3. Utrum universaliter quodlibet quantum dicatur "colobum."

Liber sextus

1. Utrum sciencia speculativa bene dividatur in phisicam, mathematicam et methaphisicam.
 1. Utrum de ente per accidens sit sciencia.
 2. Utrum entis per accidens sit causa per se et determinata.
 3. Utrum intellectus possit plura intelligere.

IV. *JOHANNES LE DAMOISIAU, QUAESTIONES SUPER METAPHYSICAM, WROCLAW, BIBLIOTEKA UNIWERSYTECKA, IV. F. 8*

Liber primus

1. Utrum ens inquantum ens sit subiectum methaphisice.
 1. Utrum omnes actus et generationes sint circa singulare.
 2. Utrum ad methaphisicum inquantum huiusmodi pertineat cognoscere quiditates omnium rerum in singulari.
 3. Utrum methaphisica sit sciencia speculativa, et an sciencia speculativa sit melior et nobilior practica.

Liber secundus

1. Utrum difficultas cognoscendi res sit ex parte cognoscentis, scilicet intellectus nostri, vel ex parte rerum cognoscibilium.
 1. Utrum methaphisica sit sciencia maxime veritatis.
 2. Utrum in causis essentialiter ordinatis sit procedere in infinitum.
 3. Utrum de ultimo fine vel prima causa et aliis substantiis separatis cognoscamus quid sunt.

Liber tertius

1. Utrum universale sit res extra animam existens in rebus singularibus distincta a re singulari.
 1. Utrum universalia habeant esse in rerum natura preter operationem intellectus.
 2. Utrum universalia sint conceptus mentales.
 3. Utrum universale sit aliqua entitas ex natura rei distincta a rebus singularibus et posteriorica (?).

Liber quartus

1. Utrum "ens" et "unum" significant eandem naturam et inter se convertantur.
 1. Utrum esse existentie sit aliquid additum realiter sive distinctum ab essentia, cum dicat Avicenna esse accidere omni rei create.
 2. Utrum negatio habeat distinctam formalitatem ab affirmatione cui opponitur.
 3. Utrum hoc principium "impossibile est idem simul esse et non esse" sit firmissimum, notissimum et simpliciter primum.

Liber quintus

1. Utrum necessaria habeant causam sui esse.
 1. Utrum possibile sit duo accidentia solo numero differentia esse simul in eodem subiecto.
 2. Utrum tres modi relativorum sint a Philosopho convenienter assignati.
 3. Utrum sit possibile plures substantias immateriales esse in eadem specie.

Liber sextus

1. Utrum divisio qua Philosophus dividit scientiam speculativam in phisicam, mathematicam et methaphisicam sive divinam sit sufficiens.
 1. Utrum hec famosa divisio scientie speculative realis in phisicam, mathematicam et methaphisicam sit sufficiens.
 2. Utrum de ente per accidens sit scientia.
 3. Utrum ens verum debeat excludi a consideratione methaphisica.

V. GEORGIUS BRUXELLENSIS, QUAESTIONES SUPER LIBROS METAPHYSICAE
(LYON, 1502)

Liber primus

1. Utrum talibus habitibus qui metaphisica dicitur sit unus numero.
 1. Utrum principiorum metaphisicalium habitus sit idem numero cum habitus conclusionum.
 2. Utrum principiorum metaphisicalium sit unus habitus numero.
 3. Utrum principiorum et conclusionum sit idem habitus.
2. Utrum omnes homines natura scire desiderent.
 1. Utrum appetitus quo omnes homines naturaliter scire desiderant sit ipsius voluntatis aut intellectus.
 2. Utrum inter omnes sensus maxime diligamus sensum visus.
 3. Utrum verum sit quod illud est magis eligendum cuius privatio est magis fugienda.
3. Utrum prudentia insit brutis.
 1. Utrum ex experimentis generetur ars.
 2. Dubitatur secundo de modo quo ex experimento fit ars.
 3. Utrum noticia experimentalis sit noticia propositionis universalis accepte ex multis singularibus vel sit multe memorie multorum singularium.
4. Utrum expertus non artifex certius operetur artifice non experto.
 1. Utrum possit aliquis esse artifex sine experimento.
 2. Utrum omnes actus et operationes sint circa singularia.
 3. Utrum sensus sit circa singulare.
5. Utrum metaphisica sit sapientia.
 1. Utrum metaphisica sit scientia practica vel speculativa.
 2. Utrum omnis noticia directiva praxis sit practica.
 3. Utrum metaphisica sit honorabilissima.

Liber secundus

1. Utrum difficultas in cognitione veritatis rerum parum de actu habentium proveniat ex parte rerum vel ex parte nostri intellectus.
 1. Utrum substantie separate cognoscantur a nobis.
 2. Utrum substantie separate sint a nobis quidditative cognoscibiles.
 3. Utrum possumus substantias separatas cognoscere per conceptus absolutos proprios et naturaliter representativos.
2. Utrum in causis efficientibus sit processus in infinitum.
 1. Utrum in aliis generibus causarum possit esse processus in infinitum.
 2. Utrum infinitum sit cognoscibile a nobis.
 3. Quot sunt impedimenta in veritatis inquisitione contingentia.

Liber tertius

1. Utrum inquirenti scientiam veritatis necesse sit primum dubitare.
 1. Utrum eiusdem scientie sit considerare omnia genera causarum.
 2. Utrum eiusdem scientie sit omnes substantiales (!) considerare.
 3. Utrum preter substantias sensibiles sint ponende alique alie substantie.
2. Utrum genera et species sint principia rerum vel partes ex quibus unumquodque componitur.
 1. Utrum corruptibile et incorruptibile sint eadem principia.
 2. Utrum ens et unum sint substantie rerum.
 3. Utrum numeri, superficies, linee et puncta sint substantie vel non.
 4. Utrum genera et species sint universalia in rerum natura in ipsis singularibus existentia vel extra singularia subsistentia.
 5. An quelibet res mundi sit seipsa singularis et individua vel an sit talis per aliquam differentiam individua tanquam per principium individuationis.
 6. An sit ponenda differentia individualis tanquam principium formale et essentia distinctivum unius individui ab alio eiusdem speciei.

Liber quartus

1. Utrum subiectum metaphisice sit ens inquantum ens.
 1. Utrum ad scientiam spectat de uno determinare.
 2. Utrum unum dicat aliquam entitatem superadditam enti.
 3. Utrum ens et unum convertantur.
2. Utrum possibile sit aliqua esse eadem realiter et differre ratione.
 1. Utrum in eadem re esse realiter distinguatur ab essentia.
 2. Utrum esse et essentia solum ratione differant.
 3. Quot sunt conditiones primi principii.
3. Utrum hoc principium "impossibile est idem simul esse et non esse" sit firmissimum.
 1. Utrum omnia que apparent sint vera.
 2. Utrum omnia contradictoria sint simul vera.
 3. Utrum contradictoria sint simul falsa.

Liber quintus

1. Utrum necessaria habeant causam.
 1. Quot sunt modi unius.
 2. Quot sunt modi entis.
 3. Quot modis dicuntur opposita.
2. Utrum relatio sit vera res extra animam preter operationem anime existens.
 1. Utrum ens ad non ens et non ens ad ens possit realiter referri.
 2. Utrum cuiuslibet cause realis ad suum causatum sit relatio realis.
 3. Utrum idem realiter referatur ad seipsum.
3. Utrum relatio sit entitas ab omni entitate realiter distincta.
 1. Quot sunt modi totius et partis.
 2. Quot sunt conditiones colobon.
 3. Quot modis dicitur falsum.

Liber sextus

1. Utrum ad solam metaphysicam pertineat considerare quidditates omnium rerum in particulari.
 1. Utrum de ratione habitus practici sit esse activum et causativum eius de quo est.
 2. Utrum de ente per accidens possit esse scientia.
 3. Utrum entis per accidens causa sit ens ut in pluribus.
2. Utrum ad veritatem cathgorice de inesse mere de presenti requiratur quod subiectum pro aliquo supponat.
 1. Utrum veritas propositionis sit entitas a propositione vera distincta.
 2. Utrum significatum totale totius propositionis sit una res extra animam.
 3. Utrum propositioni correspondeat aliquod significatum totale a significatis suorum terminorum distinctum.

VI. *PETRUS TARTARETI, COMMENTARII IN LIBROS METAPHYSICE ARISTOTELIS*
(BASEL, 1514)

Liber primus

1. Utrum ens in quantum ens sit subiectum metaphysice.
 1. Utrum omnis actus sit circa ipsum singulare.
 2. Utrum ad metaphysicum pertineat considerare omnium rerum quidditates in singulari et sub propriis rationibus earum.
 3. Utrum metaphysica sit scientia speculativa vel practica.

Liber secundus

1. Utrum difficultas cognoscendi res sit ex parte cognoscentis vel ex parte rerum cognoscibilium.
 1. Utrum veritatis apprehensio rerum sit possibilis, quod non est aliud querere nisi utrum apprehensio propositionis vere sit possibilis.
 2. Utrum substantie separate sint a nobis quidditative cognoscibiles.
 3. Utrum in causis essentialiter subordinatis sit procedere in infinitum.

Liber tertius

1. Utrum inquirenti cognitionem veritatis necesse sit primum dubitare.
 1. Utrum singularium principia sint eadem numero.
 2. Utrum ens et unum sint substantie rerum.
 3. Utrum lineae, numeri, superficies et puncta sint substantie.

Liber quartus

1. Utrum ens et unum significant eandem naturam et inter se convertantur.
 1. Utrum ens et unum convertantur.
 2. Utrum in eadem re esse realiter distinguatur ab essentia et existentia.
 3. Utrum hoc primum principium "impossibile est idem simul esse et non esse" sit firmissimum, notissimum et simpliciter primum.

Liber quintus

1. Utrum necessaria habeant causam sui esse.
 1. Quot sunt modi totius et partis.
 2. Quot sunt conditiones colobon.
 3. Quot modis dicitur falsum.

Liber sextus

1. Utrum divisio qua Philosophus dividit scientiam speculativam in physicam, mathematicam et metaphysicam sit sufficiens.
 1. Utrum divisio scientie speculative realis in physicam, metaphysicam et mathematicam sit sufficiens.
 2. Utrum de ente per accidens sit scientia.
 3. Utrum verum debeat excludi a consideratione metaphysice.