

4.5 What Books Are Made of

Scholarship and Intertextuality in the History of the Humanities

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Introduction: Paper castles

In 1866 Alfred Blot, a history teacher at the Collège Stanislas, published a re-edition of Louis de Beaufort's 1738 *Dissertation sur l'Incertitude des Cinq Premiers Siècles de l'Histoire Romaine* [Fig. 4]. Out of print for more than a century, the main virtue of Beaufort's work was to show systematically how little we know about the mythical past. The gist of Beaufort's argument is that most of the early Roman historical record and monuments perished in the sack of the city by the Gauls in 387 or 390 BCE, and that of the two main sources we have today, Dionysius of Halicarnassus is overly credulous and Livy knows that he is working with unreliable legend but has nothing else to fill the gaps. The book then proceeds to list inconsistencies in early Roman history, for 500 pages.

In support of his new edition, Blot cites two authorities in his introduction, Michelet and Hyppolite Taine. Both describe Beaufort, in strikingly similar terms, as 'the first true reformer', who 'deserves to be reprinted', the man who destroyed the idealized past in order to make space for proper historiography – in short, a French precursor to Niebuhr and Mommsen. Niebuhr, for that matter, in the foreword to his *Römische Geschichte*, makes a somewhat grudging acknowledgement toward Beaufort as the only predecessor in early Roman history whose work makes sense, but puts him down as 'mehr Gewährsmann als Vorgänger', someone whose sound judgment has proved reliable rather than someone who actually contributed substantial work. This is not entirely fair as Beaufort proceeded, thirty years later, to publish a two-volume *Plan Général* of the Roman Republic, for which the *Dissertation* self-avowedly prepared ground; but as far as the *Dissertation* is concerned one is tempted to agree with Niebuhr. Beaufort's contribution is indeed entirely negative in terms of facts, though it *does* propound new arguments.

Blot's edition and its argument about the origins of source criticism make a nice case of how *text is made of earlier text*. There are at least six layers of that:



Fig. 4: P. Yver, frontispiece to Louis de Beaufort, *Dissertation sur l'incertitude des cinq premiers siècles de l'histoire romaine* (Utrecht, 1738), engraving (© University Library, University of Amsterdam, Special Collections)

the ancient Roman records, now lost; the work of Roman and Greek historians, partly preserved; early modern comments on those histories; the *Dissertation*; its reception; and finally, the schoolmaster's foreword. (Moreover, Blot's edition includes Beaufort's response to 'l'écrit d'un certain Allemand' that had doubted the originality of his work and even accused him of plagiarism.)¹ What is relevant here is the ways in which these text are linked: already in the ten pages of the introduction, we see different kinds of quotation, allusion, comparison, reformulation and criticism at work. Highlighting Beaufort's originality and his contribution to classical scholarship requires in itself a whole network of such links.

This illustrates the duplicity inherent in all scholarship concerned with text, not just historiography but also philology and language study: of building and destroying paper castles at the same time, so that one arrives at the underlying fact. At the end of the paper trail is a very concrete event: the sack of Rome by the Gauls in 387/390 BCE, before which nothing can be known with certainty. Beaufort merits canonization, according to Blot, Taine and Michelet, precisely because of his destructive work so that others can build. Beaufort says it with a frontispiece: *Ignorance and Fable Cover the Truth of Roman History*.

Reproduction and innovation

My aim in this article is to argue for the study of *types of intertextuality* as a means for mapping developments in the humanities. The basic idea is simple. Scholarly work is, in many ways, a compound of earlier text. Very little, at least in the humanities, is the report of direct observation or firsthand experience. In August Boeckh's dictum, philology (in a very inclusive sense) is *die Erkenntnis des Erkannten*, the recognition of what has been recognized. The question, then, is: to what extent does research in the humanities add significant new information? And how do the means of information management change?

Intertextuality is not mere replication. Or rather, replication is just the simplest form of intertextuality; we have already seen more sophisticated types such as comparison, continuation, emendation, comment and critique. Rather than being the opposite of adding significant new insight, intertextuality is the precondition of it: only by building upon previous work, by accumulation as well as rejection, is progress in the humanities possible. Still, from Descartes and Bacon onwards, historians and philologists have been accused of building paper castles, of heaping together stacks of useless antiquarian facts and comments on footnotes – and every generation of scholars has since been occupied with defending its practice, putting it on new footing, presenting new ways of doing '*scienza nuova*', writing proper history, and time and again announcing a 'crisis in the humanities'.

The notion of *intertextuality*, stemming from literary studies, has until recently rarely been applied to the history of scholarship, or to the history of ideas at large.² According to the principle of ‘guilt by association’, this may well be *because* it stems from literary studies. There has, however, been substantial previous work in intellectual history on the notion of ‘influence’,³ the paper trail of ‘core concepts’,⁴ information management,⁵ the history of the footnote,⁶ and, more recently, digital humanities scholarship on textual borrowing.⁷ This article aligns with the latter rather than the former. My main interest in intertextuality is in how bits of source text are embedded into the argument of the target text, and what this reveals about changes in scholarly practice. Although there is an obvious similarity between my analysis of ‘types of intertextuality’ and the five ‘types of transtextuality’ identified by Genette,⁸ and the six ‘levels of intertextuality’ distinguished by Bazermann,⁹ their concern is ultimately with authorship, whereas mine is with information management.

In this article I will be offering a typology of different *types of intertextuality* with some examples from the history of scholarship. The aim behind this typology is to find a way of assessing changes in scholarly practice while short-stepping discussions of epistemology, ideology, or worldview, without recourse to such notions as ‘hermeneutics’, ‘narrative’, ‘discourse’, and ‘context’. This perspective, obviously, is *internalist*; it only takes into view what scholars were doing *in*, not what they were doing *by* writing a particular text. However, intertextuality includes the replication, reformulation and extension of *arguments*, the reuse and redefinition of *concepts* by which scholars define themselves, and *models and examples* they follow; as well as the *selection* and *arrangement* of this material. All this requires a more substantive analysis for which the mere study of intertextuality only supplies the raw data; which is why, in conclusion, I will propose an integrated approach in which types of intertextuality are one element.

Types of intertextuality

The typology offered here is essentially open and informal: it can be extended with further types, and there is a certain overlap between types. Some elements in the typology – those dealing with literal replication – can and have been the object of computational research: given the availability of a substantial digitized corpus, it is relatively easy to do queries over word or word-pair matches and distribution of terms. With other types, such as paraphrase, model-following, critique and borrowing or continuing arguments, that depends on whether sources are stated. But for each type, the issue is not just how often it is done but also how it is done.

The typology should at least include the following:

Quotation, paraphrase, reference, samples, excerpts, summaries, editing, translation, comparison, continuation, following models, borrowing concepts, borrowing arguments, critique, comment, emendation, plagiarism.

In table 1 below, these are listed according to how they use the source text, what role the source text plays in the target text, and what else is distinctive of this or that type.

Table 1: Types of Intertextuality

<i>Type</i>	<i>Use of the source text</i>	<i>Role in the target text</i>	<i>Specific function or features</i>
Quotation	literal reproduction of the source text	embedded in the argument of the target text	often a status marker that attributes authority to what is cited
Paraphrase	a reformulation of (the crucial information from) the source text	integrated into the target text, often interspersed with quotes	more interpretive than quoting; requires further support by references, unless the content is assumed to be 'common knowledge'
Reference	pointing to a source text for some information, quote, or paraphrase	supplies additional information that does not fit into the main text	represented by a symbol or abbreviation
Samples	reproduce source text, but it's not the content that matters	functions as an illustration of something asserted in the target text	crucial for dictionaries and linguistic proofs
Excerpts	a type of 'longer quotation' which presents the source text in its own right	independent bit of text, referred to in the main text or part of a larger compilation of excerpts	often used in compendia, chrestomathies, etc.
Summaries	a 'longer paraphrase' which abbreviates the source text into a (supposed) semantic equivalent of the relevant information	either integrated or referred to in the main text; if integrated into a novel argument, the summary also contains comment and/or critique	a way of applying Ockham's razor through selection

<i>Type</i>	<i>Use of the source text</i>	<i>Role in the target text</i>	<i>Specific function or features</i>
Editing	reproduces the source text in full, after a critical examination and comparison of different (printed/manuscript) versions	target text becomes a fuller, more correct version of the source text	extends the source text with comments/emendations/corrections/multiple versions
Translation	replaces the source text by a (supposed) semantic equivalent in a different language	translation = the target text	translation involves a reformulation or introduction of novel/alien concepts
Comparison	presents source texts (versions/translations) side-by-side as a tool for analysis	comparison supports a generalization/selection/preferred reading	leads to specific kinds of layout: double columns, tables, glosses, etc.
Continuation	'updates' the source text with emendations and extensions	source text is literally copied as a model for presenting information	target text generally makes no claim of original authorship, unless the divergence is substantial
Models	target text does not reproduce source text or content as such but follows its example	source text functions as an guide for how to structure and present one's material	operates on a second or 'meta-intertextual' level
Concepts	borrowes a specific (abstract) term drawing upon its previous associations, implications and definitions	employs a previously defined concept in a novel argument; alternatively, it introduces a new though related term or description	equivalence of concepts cannot be established unambiguously, even if the same term is used
Arguments	rarely ever reproduced from the source text in exact terms, but rather paraphrased and commented upon	structures the target text through extended argument	arguments (unlike proofs) are essentially open and contestible; equivalence cannot be established unambiguously
Critique	either extends or reformulates the source text, drawing out false implications or noting contradictions with other source material	statements or arguments from the source text are corrected or ruled out as false (often in support of the argument of the target text)	functions both as a selection mechanism for novel insight, a step to new ideas through the rejection of old ones, and an expression of scholarly morals and standards

<i>Type</i>	<i>Use of the source text</i>	<i>Role in the target text</i>	<i>Specific function or features</i>
Comment	extends the source text with elucidation or significant additional information	embeds a quote or paraphrase	when comment raises questions, it overlaps with critique
Emendation	fills lacunae in the source text with additional information	target text becomes a fuller, more correct version of the source text	
Plagiarism	reproducing the source text or its significant new information without mentioning the source	presenting the source text or its content as a new text	makes a false claim of original authorship, or disregards considerations of authorship

Several things can be concluded from this list. First, that the different types not merely *overlap* but also *combine*: a comment upon the source text contains a quote or paraphrase, concepts are borrowed as words but also through the continuation of arguments, quotes and paraphrases are marked with a reference. Second, that although the list is not strictly hierarchical, there are different levels on which intertextuality operates: there is the basic level of reproducing text; the more interpretive level of reproducing content; the meta-level of concepts, arguments, and the structure of a text; and the supra-level of models and critique. This is only an analytical distinction: these levels do not exist as different layers in the text. Third, that some types are alike in what they do to the source text, and others in how they function in the target text. Accordingly, there are two possible subdivisions within this typology.

One can distinguish three categories in 'what is done to the source text':

Replication: quotes, references, samples, excerpts, plagiarism

Reformulation: summaries, arguments, concepts, critique, comparison, translation

Extension: editing, continuation, model-following, comment, emendation

Equally, one can distinguish three ways in which the source text functions in the target text. There are ways in which the source text is *embedded* in a line of argument, ways in which the source text or its content is presented in its own right, and there are ways in which the source text plays a structuring role, in which the target text is built around it:

Embedding: quotes, references, arguments, paraphrase, concepts, plagiarism, translation

Presenting: summaries, samples, excerpts, comparison, editing, emendation

Structuring: continuation, models, critique, arguments, concepts

The division between *embedded* source text and being *structured* around the source text is one of degree: comments and critique can be an element of a larger text as well as an entire new text, and concepts and arguments affect the content and structure of the text they are embedded in. These higher-level types of intertextuality are on the whole more difficult to pin down; if there is no lower-level marker (say, a quote, a reference, an allusion, or word matches) then there is only a subjective judgment on similarity and possible influences.¹⁰

Table 2: Subdivisions

Use of the source text	Function in the target text		
	Embedding	Presenting	Structuring
Replication	quotes, references, plagiarism	samples, excerpts	
Reformulation	paraphrase, arguments, concepts, critique	summaries, translation	critique, concepts, arguments
Extension	emendation, comment	editing	continuation, model-following

One could include more elements in this typology. For instance, there is *arrangement* or *collation*, and also *parody* (which is not a very common scholarly device, but it happens). Even *forging* is to a large extent an intertextual construct. Equally, I'm not sure whether *coagulation* – that is, combining things – should be a separate category. But the resultant picture of what we as scholars do most of the time is clear enough: we read, pen in hand, and then we write. Like the typology, this may sound like stating the obvious. But the most obvious conclusion of all is that you don't structure a text by simply replicating it.

Shifting patterns

Within the scope of this article, it is impossible to give detailed examples for each type;¹¹ but the Beaufort/Blot example serves to show that, at least in the percep-

tion of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century scholars, there was indeed a shift in the uses of source text. As Glenn Most argues elsewhere in this volume, we are so used now to smoothed narratives in scholarly publications that we are surprised to see how openly early modern works display their building blocks. This is particularly true for the genre of *compendia*, which is now restricted to well-defined types of lexicon but had a much wider scope in the early modern period. Some examples are below.

Equally, there is a shift in citation strategies from *representative* to *epistemic* uses; that is, in the early modern period, authorities are often quoted because they are authorities, even when the actual information is drawn from elsewhere. As recent articles by Edelstein and by Horton, Olson, Roe et al. have shown,¹² the *Encyclopédie* predominantly quotes classical and seventeenth-century authors, while shamelessly plundering passages from Montesquieu (681), Voltaire (528), Moréri's *Grand Dictionnaire Historique* (2606), and the *Dictionnaire de Trévoux* (11,430). These figures also serve to illustrate different attitudes toward plagiarism.

The great shift in model-following is toward *disciplinary models*: Ranke and Niebuhr in history, and Bopp and Grimm in linguistics are key examples. Their influence in this regard is not so much in the content of what they write as in the example they give of how to write, and how to be a scholar. In this, they are unlike earlier models like Montesquieu and Gibbon, Condillac and Port-Royal: they are not examples of a *genre*, such as *Histoire Philosophique* and *Grammaire Générale*, but of a *profession*.¹³

As stated in the previous section, intertextuality takes place on different levels: reproducing text; reproducing content; the meta-level of concepts and structure; and the supra-level of models and critique. The next section will provide examples of intertextuality on all these levels: the uses of samples, excerpts and summaries in *compendia*; the methodological problems in tracking *arguments and concepts*; and the uses of *criticism* as a means of fact-checking. Accordingly, these are examples of how content is organized, presented, and scrutinized, and the role that intertextuality plays in this. How these different aspects can be combined in an integrated approach will be addressed in the final section.

Examples

Compendia

Toward the end of his life, German lexicographer Johann Christoph Adelung published the first volume of *Mithridates, oder allgemeine Sprachenkunde mit dem Vaterunser als Sprachprobe*. The title says it all: in four volumes, *Mithridates* presents all (c. 500) known languages with the Lord's Prayer as standard sample.

Why the Paternoster? Because that was the first text that Jesuit missionaries would translate; which is where approx. half the samples come from. Obviously, in these samples, it's not their content that matters, but their uniformity.

One of Adelung's avowed aims, in this overview, is to avoid all kind of partiality and speculation:

Ich habe keine Lieblingsmeinung, keine Hypothese zum Grunde zu legen, sondern ging unmittelbar von dem aus, was ist, ohne mich um das zu kümmern, was seyn kann, oder was seyn sollte. Ich leite nicht alle Sprachen von einer her; Noah's Arche ist mir eine verschlossene Burg, und Babylons Schutt bleibt von mir völlig in seiner Ruhe.¹⁴

Compare that with the following. In his two-volume *Histoire des Navigations aux Terres Australes* (1755), Charles de Brosses explicitly disavows the ambition to wield 'la plume de l'historien'¹⁵ in flowery storytelling. Rather, for the sake of objectivity, De Brosses offers a lengthy digest of all the known voyages to the southern seas. He reproduces and translates journals and travel literature from the past two centuries, sometimes commenting on the reliability of the sources and judiciously selecting, but never quite interfering with the original accounts.

This, indeed, is 'applying Ockham's razor': De Brosses' own comments are sparse, but he sifts the information so that the reader is in a position to compare and draw out the relevant information without going through fifty-three books. (Together, this makes a 'compound argument' for further exploration in the South Seas; the English translation indeed motivated Captain Cook's expeditions.) With summaries, the information can be condensed even further than with excerpts: instead of reproducing the most relevant passages, one can reformulate the relevant information in the shortest possible way. However, such reformulation also means a substantial loss in transparency.

Johann Gottfried Eichhorn's *Geschichte der Litteratur von ihrem Anfang bis auf die neuesten Zeiten* (1805-1812) is a late example of a compendium of the whole of fiction and nonfiction from the West as well as the Rest. One could see it as an early 'history of the humanities', though it's actually rather a 'handbook in encyclopaedia', intended primarily for students but also aimed at the general educated public. In the first three volumes, Eichhorn presents an overview of the arts and sciences of each period, divided by genre and subgenre, ordered by country or region. In the next three volumes, he treats the history of *Schöne Redekunsten*, *Sprachwissenschaft*, and theology. The text is divided into paragraphs dealing with each specific field (as in 'Political Sciences in Sweden, 1650-1810,' vol. 3, 861-863). At the end of each paragraph, he provides references for further reading.

These compendia are entirely built upon previous text: nothing in them could count as 'original research'. Partly textbooks, partly reference works, they belong to a previous age in information management. Eichhorn devotes the first 130 pages of the first volume to speculation about the arts and sciences until 1483 BCE (that is, before Moses), true to the conventions of *historia litteraria* that require him to start at zero. Still, by sheer virtue of completeness, these works are excellent indicators of the state of knowledge at the time of writing: Eichhorn points in a footnote to the forthcoming work of Adelung, Adelung's posthumous editor and continuator Vater makes abundant use of Alexander von Humboldt's reports from Southern America, and De Brosses may have a mistaken belief in a 'great southern continent' as a counterweight to the Eurasian land mass, but he very acutely points out a knowledge gap. Most striking is an observation in Adelung's foreword: 'Nur aus der Vergleichung der Wurzelsylben lässt sich die Verwandtschaft und Verschiedenheit der Sprachen beurtheylen'¹⁶ – a quite more precise statement than William Jones' famous remark on the Sanskrit language.

Concepts and arguments

Hans Aarsleff, in his collection of essays *From Locke to Saussure*, argues against the 'standard account' of the history of linguistics by pointing out that intellectual debts cannot be inferred from references, nor even from the lending of certain concepts, but only by identifying similarities in *arguments* in which these concepts are employed. The problem is that this kind of similarity between arguments is much more subjective than references or word matches: it requires interpretation, or even rational reconstruction.

Dietrich Busse levies a similar kind of methodological critique in *Historische Semantik: Analyse eines Programms*. Busse describes the lexicon *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe* and related works by Reinhart Koselleck and Jürgen Kocka as a 'mountain ridge tour' (*Gratwanderung*) along canonical figures.¹⁷ The approach of *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe*, according to Busse, is insufficient as an account of the development of 'core concepts'; to get a full grasp of how a term was used in discourse and what an author was doing in using it, one would need to know how common a certain term was in a certain period and who else were using it to what ends.

In 1987, this was an impossible demand in terms of scale – *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe* already fills eight big volumes. In the digital age, this has become easier. Although the degree to which books and journals have been digitized varies, one could now more easily do a corpus search for the earliest occurrences and the frequency of specific words in a certain period. However, this does not yet solve the problem noted by Aarsleff; the results of such queries still need to be assessed (not merely filtered) by human readers.

Both through rational reconstruction and through tracking references, the search for where a certain concept or argument derives from tends to be quite canon-confirming. Concepts are generally associated with a small set of authors who (re)defined it, and they are wound up with arguments in strands of reasoning which require lengthy formulation. The lengthiest reconstruction of intellectual debts to date, Pocock's multivolume work on Gibbon's *Decline and Fall*, reads like a 'Who's who?' of Enlightenment philosophy and historiography in spite of its contextualist approach. This does not mean that the history of concepts can only be a Big Man history; rather, one can also view the standard authors as shorthand for a certain thought complex, as nodes in the organization of knowledge.

Critique

The greatest shift that takes place in criticism is probably the professionalization of it: that is, the degree to which a work of scholarship is judged as a contribution to expert knowledge. Thus, during the nineteenth century, criticism increasingly becomes a way of distinguishing experts from amateurs – a distinction that was more diffuse during the early modern period. However, that is not in itself a change in the intertextual format of it – though the more professional criticism also tends to be more argumentative rather than simply listing mistakes and inconsistencies.

What sets critique apart from other types of intertextuality is its power to pierce through paper: more than any other kind of reformulation or extension it connects the source text to the outside world. This is apparent in the Beaufort example. An even more telling example is the nineteenth-century historiography of the French Revolution. The Revolution did not only bring about a drastic shift in historiographic perspective (one for which classical antiquity no longer provided a model, and in which social, economic and ideological factors became impossible to ignore), but histories of the Revolution were also particularly vulnerable as they were liable to incite public debate and drew on recent and sometimes living sources. Particularly noteworthy is a case previously discussed in Ann Rigney's *The Rhetoric of Historical Representation*: Nettelement's critique of Lamartine's *Histoire des Girondins*.

Alphonse de Lamartine's *Histoire des Girondins* became an instant bestseller upon its appearance in 1847. In the *avertissement*, he stated his procedure: 'We don't request faith on word. Indeed we haven't supplied footnotes, citations and *pièces justificatives*, but there is not one assertion which is not authorized by authentic memories, be they unpublished memoirs, correspondence or oral communication.'¹⁸ As Lamartine's work presents a romanticized picture of the Revolution in which the heroes and villains are united by the larger historical drama, and as he fills the gaps with what one would charitably call 'narrative imagination', it is

unsurprising that his conservative adversaries did not take this for granted. One of them, the Catholic journalist and historian Alfred Nettement, published an announcement inviting critical responses.

This provided the basis for Nettement's *Études Critiques sur les Girondins* (1848). A large part of the book consists of letters and excerpts from letters, mainly from nobles, notables, and clerics: pages 64-160 are entirely filled with them, other letters are quoted and alluded to throughout. Some correspondents complain against Lamartine soiling their families' good name; one argues, more convincingly, that his grandfather was not guillotined at all; still others produce written counterevidence or give a point-by-point reading of events of which they were an eyewitness. A rather uneven lot, these 'rectifications historiques' still serve their purpose in throwing doubt on Lamartine's reliability as a historian.

Not that Nettement fared any better: in his own *Histoire de la Conquête d'Alger* (1856) he did not take the trouble of asking any Algerians how they felt about the matter. On the whole, his *Études Critiques* are entirely dependent in content and outline on the book they wish to discredit. The argument developed throughout 500 pages of pedantry is that freethinking leads to terror and that any attempt at 'rehabilitation' of the Revolution should therefore be dispelled. It is interesting to note what Nettement did next: in the same year (1848) he published a new edition of Bossuet's *Discours sur l'Histoire Universelle* as an example for modern historians of how history should be written – that is, in a theological frame. As this was the book that Voltaire's *Essai sur les Moeurs* famously set out to outdo, Nettement's statement will have been read by at least some of his readers as 'taking back Voltaire'.¹⁹

Conclusion: An integrated approach

What the above examples show is that intertextuality goes further than providing 'building blocks'. Rather, the typology contributes to a history of the humanities in terms of information management and the organization of knowledge. More specifically, intertextuality is part of *how information is turned into knowledge*. That process is in no way reducible to intertextuality, but it requires a constant reassembly of facts and concepts precisely in virtue of being creative and self-corrective.²⁰ The typology and the above examples show different ways in which content is *collected* and *selected*; but they also show that it must be *organized*, *presented*, and *scrutinized*.

An integrated approach, accordingly, should take into account: (1) What counts as a 'fact', how is an argument built from the source material? (2) How are these findings presented (rhetorically, visually) and ordered? (3) How is fact-

checking done, what counts as valid/relevant/good scholarship? and (4) Where does the content come from and what is added to it? As a grid for answering question 4, the typology developed here is one step toward developing such an integrated approach.

These questions correspond to four broad categories of analysis: (1) *styles of reasoning*, (2) *forms of presentation*, (3) *ways of criticism*, and (4) *types of intertextuality*.²¹ These are, to some extent, overlapping categories. Criticism is itself a type of intertextuality, different styles of reasoning are manifest in different forms of presentation, and the form of presentation generally depends upon a model – that is, something borrowed. The overlap is excusable as it is precisely the interrelation between these categories that connects scholarly ideals and scholarly practice. The terms by which scholars define themselves and their practice, the criticism they give, the models they follow are not a ‘top layer’ of ideology, they are part of the intertextual fabric.

Notes

- 1 Louis de Beaufort, *Dissertation sur l'Incertitude des Cinq Premiers Siècles de l'Histoire Romaine*, ed. A. Blot (Paris: Maillet, 1866), 301-326. The accusation of plagiarism is addressed on page 320ff. The German was Christoph Saxe (1714-1806).
- 2 A key example is Ann Rigney, *The Rhetoric of Historical Representation: Three Narrative Histories of the French Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), chapter 1. More explicitly geared toward methodology is Robert Darnton, ‘Discourse and Diffusion’, *Contributions to the History of Concepts* 1.1 (2005), 21-28.
- 3 Quentin Skinner, ‘The Limits of Historical Explanations’, *Philosophy* 41.157 (1966); ‘Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas’, in J. Tully (ed.), *Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and His Critics* (London: Polity, 1988).
- 4 Reinhart Koselleck, Otto Brunner, and Werner Conze (eds.), *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe: Historisches Lexicon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1972-1997); Rolf Reichardt et al. (eds.), *Handbuch politisch-sozialer Grundbegriffe in Frankreich, 1680-1820* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1985ff.).
- 5 Ann Blair, *Too Much to Know: Managing Scholarly Information before the Information Age* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010).
- 6 Anthony Grafton, *The Footnote: A Curious History* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997).
- 7 Dan Edelstein, ‘Humanism, *L'Esprit Philosophique*, and the *Encyclopédie*’, *Republics of Letters: A Journal for the Study of Knowledge, Politics, and the Arts* 1.1 (2009), URL: <http://rofl.stanford.edu/node/27> (accessed 4 March 2013); Russell Horton, Mark Olsen, and Glenn Roe, ‘Something Borrowed: Sequence Alignment and the Identification of Similar Passages in Large Text Collections’, *Digital Studies/Le champ numérique* 2.1, URL: http://www.digitalstudies.org/ojs/index.php/digital_studies/article/view/190/235 (accessed 4 March 2013); *ibid.* et al., ‘Plundering Philosophers: Identifying Sources of the *Encyclopédie*’, *Journal of the Association for History and Computing* 13.1 (2010), URL: <http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.3310410.0013.107> (accessed 4 March 2013).

- 8 Gérard Génette, *Palimpsestes: La littérature au second degré* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil 1982), 7-17.
- 9 Charles Bazerman, 'Intertextuality: How Texts Rely on Other Texts', in C. Bazerman and P. Prior (eds.), *What Writing Does and How It Does It: An Introduction to Analyzing Texts and Textual Practices* (Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, 2004).
- 10 Such judgments are an essential building blocks of histories like Meinecke, *Die Entstehung des Historismus*, and Aarsleff, *From Locke to Saussure*. Their judgments on similarities and influences may well be correct, but they require a great deal of *reformulation* in order to (re)construct patterns in the history of historiography and linguistics.
- 11 An earlier version of this paper consisting mainly of such examples is on my blog, URL: <http://florisotto.blogspot.nl/2012/05/scholarly-intertextuality-in-18th.html> (accessed 4 March 2013).
- 12 Edelstein, 'Humanism, *L'Esprit Philosophique*, and the *Encyclopédie*'; Horton, Olsen, and Roe, 'Something Borrowed'.
- 13 For Montesquieu and Gibbon as paradigmatic examples of modern historiography, see Hugh Trevor-Roper, *History and the Enlightenment* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
- 14 Johann Christoph Adelung, *Mithridates oder allgemeine Sprachkunde mit dem Vater Unser als Sprachprobe* (Berlin: Voss, 1806), vol. 1, xi.
- 15 Charles de Brosses, *Histoire des Navigations aux Terres Australes*, 2 vols (Paris: Durand, 1766), vol. I, xi.
- 16 Adelung, *Mithridates*, xiii. Adelung's discussion of East Asian and Semitic languages, though, shows that he neither understands isolating languages nor bisyllabic roots, describing the former as an impediment on abstract thought and the latter as a 'random and untenable theory' (p. 301).
- 17 Dietrich Busse, *Historische Semantik: Analyse eines Programms* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1987), 66ff.
- 18 Alphonse de Lamartine, *Histoire des Girondins* (Paris: Furne/Coquebert, 1847), vol. 1, i-ii.
- 19 Apart from Blot's edition of Beaufort, and Nettelement's edition of Bossuet, there are other, more successful examples of such programmatic republications. Michelet's first work was in fact a translation of Vico's *Scienza Nuova*, while his friend Quinet was translating Herder's *Ideen*, both at the instigation of Victor Cousin, himself a cultural broker for German Idealist philosophy in France. Later, editing Schleiermacher's work and correspondence was crucial for Dilthey's program of defining the *Geisteswissenschaften*.
- 20 Wilfrid Sellars once described science as 'rational not because it has a *foundation* but because it is a *self-correcting* enterprise' ('Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind', in *Science, Perception and Reality* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963), ch. 8, §38). That is precisely what the typology highlights.
- 21 The term 'styles of reasoning' is borrowed from Ian Hacking, 'Language, Truth and Reason' (1980) and 'Style for Historians and Philosophers' (1991) in *Historical Ontology* (Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard University Press, 2002). The nearest example for 'forms of presentation' is Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison, *Objectivity* (New York: Zone Books, 2007).